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The impact of media blame assignation on the EOC response to disaster

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Material Information

Title:
The impact of media blame assignation on the EOC response to disaster a case study of the response to the April 26, 1991 Andover (Kansas) tornado
Series Title:
Quick response ;
Physical Description:
33 p. : ; 28 cm.
Language:
English
Creator:
Fischer, Henry W
Schaeffer, Susan
Trowbridge, Marna L
University of Colorado, Boulder -- Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center
Publisher:
Natural Hazards Research & Applications Information Center, University of Colorado
Place of Publication:
Boulder, Colo
Publication Date:

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Disasters -- Press coverage -- Case studies -- Kansas   ( lcsh )
Tornadoes -- Kansas -- Andover   ( lcsh )
Natural disaster warning systems -- Case studies -- Kansas   ( lcsh )
Mass media -- Psychological aspects -- Case studies -- Kansas   ( lcsh )
Genre:
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )

Notes

Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references (p. 31-33).
Additional Physical Form:
Also issued online as part of a joint project with the Louis de la Parte Florida Mental Health Institute (FMHI) Research Library’s disaster mental health initiative.
Statement of Responsibility:
Henry W. Fischer, III, Susan Schaeffer & Marna L. Trowbridge.
General Note:
Cover title.

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of South Florida Library
Holding Location:
University of South Florida
Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
aleph - 001985105
oclc - 29529462
usfldc doi - F57-00027
usfldc handle - f57.27
System ID:
SFS0001108:00001


This item is only available as the following downloads:


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The impact of media blame assignation on the EOC response to disaster :
a case study of the response to the April 26, 1991 Andover (Kansas) tornado /
Henry W. Fischer, III, Susan Schaeffer & Marna L. Trowbridge.
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Boulder, Colo. :
Natural Hazards Research & Applications Information Center, University of Colorado,
1992.
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33 p. ;
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HAZARD HOUSECOP I MPI>tC, 'oF MEbl1>tASSlGNATlPt'JoNit+oc3'KESPOIIJS. TO bISASTE.IC: : ITSiUbY<'fi'H-E'R'SPDA)SE. To T\TE;(.CPJ/C/91AI\JDOV&R...(KANSAs')NA-bo 11 vtlve.rsi-br(l)fG>/oV'aloJA.h......vntt+c-3CJ..X'6s;;'Resen...reka...Y\d.G.pp{lCO-{; i ov\s:rV1for'wta.,t[OVJ(r'1/\"!>titLLi:eBe.ha.v(ova,(-'--QUlC'<:#=

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THE IMPACT OF MEDIABLAMEASSIGNATIONON THEEOCRESPONSETODISASTER ACaseStudyoftheResponsetotheApril26,1991Andover(Kansas)Tornado HENRY W.FISCHER, IIISUSAN SCHAEFFER ,MARNA L.TROWBRIDGE SOCIAL RESEARCHGROUP DEPARTMENT OFSOCIOLOGY/ANTHROPOLOGY MILLERSVILLE UNIVERSITY MILLERSVILLE, PENNSYLVANIA 17551. KARCH 1992 QUICK RESPONSE48A QUICK RESPONSE GRANTFINAL REPORTPREPAREDFORTHENATURALHAZARDSRESEARCH APPLICATIONS INFORMATION CENTER THE UNIVERSITY OFCOLORADOBOULDER,COLORADO

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TABLEOFCONTENTSAbstract.. ....... ... 3TheEvent.................. 4ResearchGoalandMethodology.......6DidMediaReportingInfluenceEOCDecisions?.....10ContentofMedia'sReporting........19LiteratureBasedAnalysisandDiscussionoftheFindings21ConcludingObservations...........272

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ABSTRACTAthree-personfieldteamdevotedfourdaystogatheringdatainAndover,Kansas,afteratornadodevastatedtheGoldenSpurMobilHomeParkonApril26,1991.Theresearchfocuswastoassesstheextenttowhichthemedia'sreportingofthelocalemergencymanagementteam'sresponsetothedisasterinfluencedtheteam'ssubsequentdecisions.TheresearchersfunctionedasparticipantobserversintheEmergencyOperatingCenter(EOC),informallyinterviewedprincipalEOCmembersandmediapersonnel,andobtainedcopiesofmedianewsstories(televisionandnewspaper)whichreportedontheorganizationalresponsetothedisaster.Anassessmentoftheobservationandinterviewdataaswellasthecontentanalysisofthenewsstories,suggeststhattheEOCteamdevotedaconsiderableportionoftheirtimetorespondingtothenegativepresstheyreceivedcenteringaroundtwoissues:pre-impactwarningandpost-impactdebrisclearance.Someofthemedia'snewsstoriessoughttoengageinblameassignation.TheEOCmembersdevotedtimetodevelopingstrategiestocontrolthemediadamageandchangedsomedecisionstheyhadmadeinresponsetothemedia'scriticism.TherelevantdisasterresearchliteratureisutilizedtoexplaintheresponseoftheEOCpersonnelandthemedia.HAZARDHOUSE COP'Y 3

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THE IMPACT OF MEDIABLAME ASSIGNATIONONTHEEOCRESPONSETODISASTER ACasestudyoftheResponsetotheApril26,1991Andover(Kansas)TornadoWhatwouldDorothyhavefoundifshehadreturnedhometotheGoldenSpurMobilHomeParkonFriday,April26,1991?Theanswerdependsonthetimeofday.Ifshehadarrivedat6:00p.m.,shewouldhavefoundacalm,normaltimelifestylebeingfollowedbytheresidents.Ifshehadarrivedafter6:39p.m.,shewouldhavebeenconfrontedbythehorrorofwhatlookedlikeareenactmentofthebombingofHiroshima.TheEventOnFriday,April26,1991,theworkweekwasending,thecommunity'schildrenandtheirparentswerelookingforwardtotheweekend.FortheresidentsofAndover,however,thiswouldNOTbeanormalweekend.Thirteenliveswouldend,175otherswouldbeinjured,840individualswouldlosetheirhomes,and$7milliondamagewouldbesustainedbyaKansascommunityof4,047beforethedaywasover.TheGoldenSpurMobileHomeParkislocatedjusteastofoneofthemaintrafficarteriesleadingintothecentralbusinessdistrictofAndover,asuburbofWichita.Theparkhadcontained241mobilehomeshousingapproximately1,000people.Theresidentsrepresentedacross-sectionofthecitizensofAndover: 4 newly-

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weds,singles,,youngfamilies,middle-agedcouples,retirees, soforth.Thetown'spolicechiefnumberedamongtheresidentsofthemobilehomecommunity.Thecitygovernmentofficesarehousedinabuildingapproximatelyonemilenorthofthepark.ThecentralbusinessdistrictofthecommunityislocatedapproximatelytwomilesnorthoftheGoldenSpur.OntheeveningofFriday,April26,someresidentsoftheGoldenSpurwerenotyethomefromwork,othershadgoneoutfordinnerortorunerrands,manyotherswereathome.By6:00p.m.,thetornadowatchhadbecomeawarning.LocalradioandtelevisionstationsbroadcastthiswarningfortheWichita/Andoverarea.Unfortunately,numerousresidentsdidnothavetheirradioortelevisionturnedonwhenthesewarningswerebeingbroadcast.Manypeoplehadnoideaatornadowasapproachingtheircommunity.Tomakemattersworse,theneighborhood"civildefenseIIsirenwhichwassupposedtosoundthewarning,apparentlydidnotworkwhenitwasactivated.Furthermore,whenalocalpoliceofficertriedtogiveonelastwarningtotheparkresidentsbydrivingupanddownthestreetsoftheGoldenSpursoundinghispolicecarsirenjustminutesbeforeimpact,therebyriskinghisownlife,manyresidentsdidnotknow(ordidnotremember)thatsuchpoliceactionduringastormisawarningtotakeshelter.Atapproximately6:39p.m.onFriday,April26,1991,atornadodidimpacttheGoldenSpurtrailerparkdestroyingvirtuallyeverytrailerinthepark.Thirteenpeopledied,175wereinjured.Moredeathsandinjurieshadbeenavertedfortwo5

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reasons. manyresidentswerenotathome.Second, 200-300residentshadheardthetornadowarningandwenttotheundergroundshelterlocatedinthecenterofthetrailerpark.Theywatchedinhorrorasthetornadocrushedtheirmobilehomes.TheGoldenSpurMobileHomeparksustainedadirectimpactfromtheunusuallylargeandpowerfultornado.Thepolicechiefwasintheshelterwatchinghisown homebeingdestroyed.Hewasinconstantradiocontactwiththepolicestationwhilethetornadoworkeditsdestruction.Listeningtorecordingsofhismessagestopoliceheadquartersprovidesachillingindicationofwhatthevictimswereexperiencing.ThedestructionwassomassiveandtotalthatFederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA)certifiedtheAndoversiteasafederaldisasterarea.ResearchGoalandMethodologyTheNaturalHazardsResearchandApplicationsInformationCenter's"Quick-ResponseGrant"program(UniversityofColorado)supportsresearchwhichisfocusedonquestionsbestansweredthroughgatheringdataduringtheimmediatepost-impactperiodofadisasterevent.Athree-personfieldteamfromtheSocialResearchGroup(SRG),DepartmentofSociologyandAnthropology,MillersvilleUniversityofPennsylvania,wassupportedbysuchagrantwhenitproceededtotheAndoversitewithin48hoursofimpact.Theteamsoughttoassesstheextenttowhichmediareportingofthelocalemergencymanagementagency(LEMA)responsetotheeventinfluencedthesubsequentLEMAdecisions.Thereisa6

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disaster literaturethatnotesthecontributionmadebythemediainwarningthepUblicofanimpendingdisasterandindisseminatinghelpfulrecoveryinformation(see,forexample,Drabek&Stephensen,1971,foradiscussionoftheradioasawarningsource;andQuarantelli,1980),butlessisknownabouttheroleofthemediaininfluencingthebehind-the-scenesLEMAdecision-makingprocess.Theresearchdirector(facultymember)andtworesearchassistants(students)remainedinthefieldforfourdaysfunctioningprimarilyasparticipantobserversinthetemporaryemergencyoperatingcenter(EOC).TheteaminformallyinterviewedvirtuallyeverymemberoftheEOCteam,e.g.,themayorwhoservedastheemergencyresponsecoordinator,acountycommissioner,citycouncilmembers,variouscityworkers,policepersonnel,andsoforth.Thefieldteamalsoobservedandinterviewedseveralprintandbroadcastmediapersonnelwhowereworkingonnewsstoriesoftheevent.ThefieldteamsoughttogainanunderstandingofwhattheEOCwasattemptingtocoordinateandhowtheyprioritizedtheiractionspursuanttomeetingtheneedsanddesiresoftheirvariousconstituencies,e.g.,victims,volunteers,cityworkers,andthelargerpUblic.ThemembersoftheresearchteameasilygainedentreetotheEOC.TheresearchdirectorhadspokenwithoneoftheLEMApersonnelbytelephonepriortoleavingforthefield.ThisLEMAofficialwasreceptivetoourresearchparticipationandindicatedthathewouldserveasour"sponsor."When wearrivedinthefield7

PAGE 9

weaskedfor contactandpresentedourcredentials.The EqC personnelinvitedourcompleteparticipation.Infact,wehadtomakeitclearthatwewerenottheretoadvise,butmerelytoobserveandgatherinformationthatcouldbehelpfultoothersastheydeveloptheirfuturedisasterplans.Wefunctionedasparticipantobservers.WewerefreetoenterandleavetheEOCaswewished.WeobservedvirtuallyallEOCmeetingsduringthefourdaysofourfieldwork.Wecompletedinformal,one-on-oneinterviews,duringnon-busyperiods.TheprincipalEOCpersonnelwereverycandidabouttheirsituation,i.e.,theproblemstheywerefacingintryingtocoordinatearesponse,theirperceivedfailures,theirirritationatthemedia,andsoforth.TheywereveryfrankduringtheirEOCmeetingsindiscussingthedetailsofhowtheyshouldrespondtothemediaandvariouscommunityconstituencies.Thecompletenessofourentreebecamereadilyapparenttousduringoursecondandthirddaysinthefieldwhentheywereopenlydiscussinghowtheyshouldreacttothemedia'sblame-fixing--IocalofficialswerecomingunderincreasingcriticisminthebroadcastandprintmediaforallegedlynotadequatelywarningtheGoldenSpurresidents.Aninterviewguidewascommittedtomemorybythefieldteammemberspriortoenteringthefield.Thisinformalguidecontainedopen-endedquestionsdesignedtoobtaintherespondent'sperspectiveofwhatproblemstheywereencounteringinrespondingtothedisaster,howtheseproblemswerebeingaddressed,bywhom,andwhen.WeaskedtheEOCpersonnelwhattheythoughttheywould8

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dodifferently..(orsimilarly)shouldtheyfacesuchasituationagain.Weaskedwhatindividualsandwhatorganizationswereinvolvedintheresponse.And,weaskedthemtodescribetheirperspectiveonthemedia'sactivitiesinhelpingorhinderingtheresponseprocess.AfterenteringthefieldandobservingEOCactivities,theteamrealizedthelimitedutilityoftheinterviewguide.Wefounditfarmoreusefultojustobserveeveryconversation,meeting,anddiscussionthatwe COUld.Wetriedtoinconspicuouslytakenotestohelpusrememberwhathappenedandwhenithappened.Weusedourtaperecorderstodictatenotesandtosometimesrecordinterviews.Mostofourinterviewsbecameconversationswhichhelpeduspiecetogetherthedecisionsmadebythedifferentemergencyorganizations.Weweretryingtounderstandtheinteractivedecision-makingprocessofthisemergent(EOC)group.We"interviewed"everymemberoftheEOCteamwhichwascomprisedofpersonnelfromlocalgovernmentagenciesandvolunteerorganizations.Wealso"interviewed"leadersandworkersinvolunteerorganizationswhichhadnodirectaffiliationwiththeEOC,e.g.,theMennoniteDisasterServices,andwe"interviewed"personnelfromlocalprintandbroadcastmediaorganizations.Wecompletedatotalof32"interviews"whileinthefield.Thefieldteamobtainedcopiesofthelocalnewspaperspublishedduringthefirstmonthofthepost-impactandrecoveryperiodsinordertodeterminetypesofstoriesandtheslantofthestoriesbeingpublishedabouttheEOC'sdisasterresponse.While9

PAGE 11

inthefield, the teamalsovideo-tapednewsbroadcastsoftwoofthelocaltelevisionstationsforthesamepurpose.DidMediaReportingInfluenceEOCDecisions?WhatWeFoundUponOurArrival.ThefieldteampresenteditscredentialstothefirstlocalofficialwemetuponenteringtheEOC.Afterexplainingwho wewereandwhy wewerepresent,wewereacceptedandgivenaccesstoeveryactivitytakingplaceintheEOC.Weimmediatelyassumedtheroleofobserver.Weconductedinterviewswhenpossible.WehadtelephonedtheEOCpriortoleavingforthefieldinordertofacilitateentree.Wefoundourinitialcontactshortlyafterourarrival.TheEOCpersonnelappearedtobepleasedtobeofhelptotheresearcheffortthatcontributestohelpingothercommunitiesastheyplanforsuchevents.ThefieldteamfoundtheEOClocatedinanemptystorefrontinasmallstrip-malladjacenttothedestroyedmobilehornepark.Thecommunitydidnothaveawrittendisasterplan.Thereisnofullorpart-timelocalemergencypreparednesscoordinator.Themayoremergedduringtheimmediatepost-impactperiodtofunctionasthecoordinatorofthecity'sresponsetothetornado.Variousotherlocalelectedofficialsemergedtofunctionasacommitteetoassistthemayor.Community,church,andvolunteerorganizationsconvergedtoassisttheelectedofficialsincoordinatingthecleanup.AtemporaryEOCwassetupinanemptyroomofthevacant10

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store.The EOC containedaconferencetablewithenoughchairsaroundittoseatapproximately15people.Afelt-tipwritingboardwasmountedonawallonwhichinformationwaswrittenasitbecameavailable,e.g.,problemsneedingattention,namesandphonenumbersofkeypersonnel,themayor'snextscheduledpressconference.Atypewriter,telephones,andeventuallyatelevisionandaphoto-copyingmachinewereinstalled.AlmosteverythingintheEOC,includingthestoreitwashousedin,weredonatedbylocalbusinesses.EOCsecuritywasmaintainedbythelocalpolicedepartmentwhichnumberedfiveuniformedpoliceofficers.within36hoursofimpactasecuritybadgesystemwasinplace.NoonewasallowedintotheEOCareawithoutasecuritybadge.Acommunicationsbuswaspositioneddirectlyinfrontofthestore(EOClocation).ARedCrossCanteenwaslocatedintheparkinglotnearthecommunicationsbus.Variousadditionalvolunteerorganizations,e.g.,hamradiooperatorsclub,wereworkingoutofemptystoresorvehiclesinthemallparkinglot.ThedestroyedtrailerparkwasacrossthestreetfromthemallinwhichtheEOCwaslocated.AnyonefromtheEOCwishingtovisitthedisastersitecouldsimplywalktoitwithinafewminutes.Thefieldteammadenumeroussuchtrips.TheNationalGuardwasonsitetopreventanyonewhodidnothaveasecuritybadgefromenteringthetrailerpark.TheywerecalledtoAndoverto"preventlootingandtoassistintrafficcontrol."Therewasaproblemwithconvergingsightseerscloggingtheroads.Searchandrescue11

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activities slowedduetothisconvergence.Residentswho we:r;e nothomeduringimpactaswellastherelativesofvictimsorsurvivorsfounditdifficulttoreachthesite.And,volunteerswhoweretryingtoassistsortingthedebrisforvaluableswerealsohinderedbytheconvergence.Thetruckscarryingthebulldozeddebrishadadifficulttimegettingtoandfromthesite.EmergentIssuesReportedintheMediaDebrisClearance.When wefirstarrived,theEOCpersonnelwereintheprocessofdividingintotwoseparatecampsofdiverseopinioninresponsetoanemergingissue.Whenshouldclearanceofthetrailerparkbegin?Ithadbeenlessthan48hourssinceimpact,buttherewerethosewhowantedtogivethego-aheadtothecityengineer,hiscrew,andthecrewsdonatedbyareabusinesses,toinitiatetheclearanceofthedebris.Theprimaryreasongivenforstartingthecleanupassoonaspossiblewasthatthebusinesseswhichdonatedthebulldozercrewsandequipmentwouldnotbeabletodowithoutthemindefinitely.Theirwithdrawalwasanticipatedwithindays,especiallyiftheyweresittingidle.Asecondreason,providedbytheownerofthemobilehomepark,wasthatthevictimswouldnotbeabletoobtain,install,andmoveintonewmobilehomesintheparkuntiltheparkwasclearedofthedebrisfromthestorm.Hence,theparkownerandthosepersonnelchargedwithcompletingtheclearanceofthedebris,lobbiedtheEOCtokeepthesurvivorsoutoftheparksothatthedebrisclearancecouldbecompletedimmediately.Thoseopposingimmediateactionwereconcernedthatthe12

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survivors muchmoretimetolocatevaluablesthatwereamongtheruins,e.g.,familyphotosandmementos.Membersofthiscampmadefrequentvisitstothetrailerparktospeakwiththesurvivingresidentswhowerecombingthroughthedebris.TheseEOCofficialswouldreturntorelatethepleasandfrustrationsthesecitizensexpressedinaskingfor"acouplemoredays"tofindtheirirreplaceablekeepsakes.Mostlocalprintandbroadcastmediafocusedonreportingtheextentofdamage,thedeathandinjuries,thesourcesofhelpforvictims,thetypesofaidneeded,wheretosendit,andthelocationsforvolunteerstomeettohelpvictims.Onelocaltelevisionstation,however,andonelocalnewspaperfocusedonblame-fixing.[Blameassignationoccursmorecommonlyaftertechnologicaldisasters,buthasbeenknowntooccurafternaturaldisasterssuchastornadoes(Chandessers,1966).]Areporterfromeachoftheserepeatedlyinterviewedvictimswhowereveryvocalabouttheirfrustrationwiththecity'sinitialdecisiontonotallowthemtoreturntotheirdamagedordestroyedhometoobtainvaluablesandwiththecity'sinitialannouncementthatdebrisclearancewouldbeginshortly--beforevaluablesalvagingcouldbecompleted.TheslantofthenewsstoriesofthesereportersessentiallyportrayedtheEOCasbeinginconsiderateoftheneedsofthosetheyweresupposedtoserve.Wearenottakingsideshere,wearemerelyattemptingtodescribetherolesassumedbytheprincipalsaswehaveassessedthesituationinthefield.Theargumentcouldcertainlybemadethattheblame-fixingreportersweredoingthevictimsaservicebytakinguptheir13

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cause.The p()int beingmadehereisthatwearenot passirlg jUdgmentonwho maybemorerightormorewrong,wearenotingthataconflictexistedwhichpittheEOCagainstsomeinthemedia.ThisconflictconsumedalotoftimefromtheEOCpersonnelastheyplannedhowtorespondtothemountingcriticismwhereitappeared.WhiletheEOCwasattemptingtocoordinatethecommunity'sresponsetothedisaster,itdevotedmuchtimetodeterminingwhatitconsideredthebestresponsetothiscriticism.Thedebateoverwhentocompletethedebrisclearancecontinuedthroughoutourfourdaysinthefield.Deadlinesforvictimstofinishtheirsalvageeffortsweresetdaily,thenpushedbackasaresultofcomplaintsbythevictimsandthemedia'sportrayalofsuchcomplaints.Theclearancewasfinallysettobeginthedaythefieldteamwasleavingtown.TheMennoniteDisasterServices(MDS)alsocontributedtothecontinualEOC"mindchanging."EarlyeachmorningtheMDSwouldsendalargecrewtothetrailerparktosiftthroughthedebris\forvictimswhowerenotpresent.TheMDSoperatedseparatelyfromtheEOCandresistedvirtuallyalleffortstobringthemwithinthecoordinationsphereoftheEOC.TheMDSessentiallyignoredanydecisionbytheEOCwhenitwouldindicatethatsearchactivitieswouldbediscontinuedtobeginclearingthepark.Betweenthemedia'scriticismandtheMDS'signoringofEOCdecisions,itbecameimpossibletobeginclearingthepark.EOCpersonnelrealizedany"strongarmtactics"tostoptheMDSwouldonlyfurtherexacerbatetheEOC'semergingpUblicrelationsproblems.14

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Thefield ,team concludedthatitwasobviousthatthemedia'sinvolvementhadadefiniteimpactonthedecisionmakingoftheEOCpersonnel.ItinfluencedhowtheEOCutilizeditstime.ItalsoinfluencedtheEOC'sdecisionastowhentobeginthefinalphaseofthedebrisclearance.VirtuallyeveryEOCdecisionincreasinglybecamehostagetothedesiretolimit"mediadamage"astheneedtoconsiderhowthemediamightperceive(ormisperceive)theiractionswasofincreasinglygreaterconcerntothemwitheachnegativepressstory.Warnings.Wealsodiscovered,shortlyafterourarrival,thatbothEOCcampswerebristlingattheemergingmediablame-fixingreportswhichweresuggestingthatthecitydidnotdoanadequatejobwarningthetrailerparkresidentsaboutthetornado'simpendingimpact.EventhoughtherewasadifferenceofopinionbetweenthetwocampsintheEOCoverwhentoinitiatedebrisclearance,therewastotalunanimityofresentmenttowardthoseinthemediawhosoughttocriticizetheirpre-impactefforts.VirtuallyalloftheEOCpersonnelhadnosleepinthe48hourssinceimpact.Theyfeltthattheyhadbeentotallydevotedtodoingthebestjobtheycouldincoordinatingtheresponsetofacilitatethecommunity'srestorationtonormaltimeactivity.Inprivateconversationswiththeresearchteam,someEOCpersonnelsuggestedthatmaybeeverythingtheyhaddonebefore,aswellassince,impactmaynothavebeenperfect,but"weareonlyhuman...hadnopriorexperience,nowritten(disaster)plan,nopriortraining,andaredoingthebestwecanmakingthisupaswego15

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along."They j,ndicated thattheywereinfrequentcontactwith.aneighboringcommunitythathadrecentlyexperiencedanemergencyeventandhadtakenstepstobebetterpreparedshouldtheybeatargetofadisasteragain.TheAndoverEOCpersonnelwereusingtheirneighboringcommunity'semergencycoordinatorsasconsultantsindevelopingtheirownemergentresponse.Nevertheless,mediaattentioncontinuedtofocusonwhythecity,allegedly,didnottakeadequatestepstowarntheresidentspriortoimpact.Thefirstsuchissuecenteredoncriticismofthepolicedepartment'sattempttowarnthemobilehomeresidentsbysendingapatrolcarthroughtheparkneighborhoodssoundingitssiren.Thecitystatedthatthisprocedureisstandardoperatingprocedureduringatornadowarning,aprocedurethatthecommunityhadpreviouslybeeneducatedtorecognizethroughnewspaperandtelevisionreports.Inotherwords,thecitizensshouldhaveknownwhatthesirenmeant.Fromthecity'sperspective,theyriskedthelifeofanofficertogivethewarningjustminutesbeforeimpact.Fromthepointofviewofthosewhocriticizedthepoliceeffort,itwasameaninglesseffort.Intheviewofonesurvivor,"whynotatleastuseabullhorntowarnthosewhowerewalkingonthestreet?"TheEOCdecidedtoreleaseavideotapetheyhadofthepoliceofficer'seffort.InresponsetothealledgedbeatingofRodneyKingbyLosAngelespoliceofficers,Andoverhadmountedavideocameraoneachpolicecruiserjustweeksbeforethetornadostrucktheircommunity.Cityofficialsstatedthatthesecameraswereto16

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beusedto recprd arrestsinordertoprovideevidencefordrunkdrivingoffensesandtoprotectthepoliceofficerfromfalsechargesofpolicebrutality.Bychance,theofficerwhosoundedthealarminthemobilehomepark,hadthevideocameraon,inadvertentlyrecordinghisattempttowarntheparkresidents.TheEOCdecidedtocallapressconferenceinordertoplaythevideotapeforthepressasastrategyforreducingthecriticism.Manyinthemediasawitdifferently,however;theyrecoiledwhentheywatchedthepoliceofficerdrivepastaresidentwhowaswalkingherdog--apparentlyunawareorunconcernedabouttheimpendingdisaster.Theythoughttheofficershouldhavestoppedtoinformtheresidentofwhatthesirenmeantandtellhertoseekshelter.Itwasseenasquitepossiblethatshecouldhavehadtimetogettotheshelterifhehadstopped.Itisalsoquitepossiblethata)shewouldhavedecidedtonotgototheshelter,b)shemaynothavehadenoughtimeanyway,and/orc)thepoliceofficermayhaverunoutoftimetosavehimself...anddied.AsecondcriticismofthecityIsallegedlackofadequatepreimpactwarningemerged.Adebateragedaroundthequestionastowhetherornotthecommunity(civildefensestyle)sirenwasactuallyactivatedduringthepre-impactperiod.ThemediaandtheEOCpersonnelcontinuedthedebatethroughoutthepost-impactperiod.Manyresidentswerequotedinthepressasstatingthattheydidnothearasiren,somesaidthattheyhad.Anexaminationofthesirenfoundittobenon-functional.EOCpersonnelstatedthatithadbeeninspectedrecentlyandhadbeenfoundtohavebeen17

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ingoodworking.order.Thefirmthathadbeenemployedtomaintainthesirenwasquotedasindicatingthatthesirenhadbeenleftunrepaireduntilfundscouldbefoundtopurchasetheexpensivepartsitneeded.WhiletheEOCwasbusyrespondingtothepost-impactneedsofthetrailerpark,itwasalsospendingafairamountoftimetryingtobothrespondtothemedia'sinvestigationintothesiren'sstatusandtoattempttolimittheill-willbeinggeneratedinthecommunitybythemedia'sinvestigativereportingofthisthirdissue.Tocountertheincreasingnegativefeelingsbeinggeneratedinthecommunitybythesirenissue,theEOCdecidedtoholdapressconferenceatwhichtheywouldanswerquestionsandreleaseinformationwhich,theyfelt,wouldrefutetheperceptionthatthecityhadbeenirresponsible.Thefieldteamconcludedthatitwasobviousthatthemedia'sreportinghadanobviousimpactontheactionstakenbytheEOCinresponsetoeachofthethreeissueswhichemergedinthemediaduringthepost-impactimmediaterecoveryperiod.WewanttoclearlyrepeatthewearenotchastisingeitherthemediaortheEOCforactionstaken.OurtaskwastodetermineifthedecisionsmadebytheEOCpersonnelwereinfluencedbythereportinginthemediaduringtheimmediaterecoveryperiod.Asparticipantobserverswhoengagedininformalinterviewingwesoughttogatherqualitativedatawhichwouldenableustodiscernwhatwasoccurringpursuanttoourresearchgoal.Theshortanswertothequestion(Didthemedia'sreportinginfluencethedisasterresponse18

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decisionsmade.bytheemergencypersonnelintheaftermathoftheAndovertornado?)is:Yes!ContentofMedia'sReportingWhiletheEOCwasstungbythenegativemediareports,wefoundmostoftheprintandbroadcastmediareportingtohavebeeneithersupportiveoftheireffortsoratleastneutral.Mostofthereportingdealtwithdamageestimates,deathtolls,humanintereststoriesaboutsurvivors,andsoforth.Themediawasarealassetastheprimaryoronlysourceofdisasterinformationforthecommunity(asobserved,forexample,byWenger,1980-whileWenger'sfocuswasquitedifferent,thepointisapplicablehere).Itwasessentiallyonereporterfromoneofthetelevisionstationsandonereporterfromoneofthenewspapersthatfocusedonthecriticalissues.Yet,whilemostofthereportingwassupportiveoftheEOC, muchtimeandeffortweredevotedtorespondingtothoseminorityofinstanceswheretheyreceivednegativepress.SomeEOCpersonnelbecameincreasinglyantagonisttowardanyonefromtheoffendingtelevisionstationornewspapercompany.Theyalsobecameincreasinglydistrustfulofthemediagenerally.ForexampleTable1,below,providestheresultsofourcontentanalysisofprintandbroadcastnewsreportsonthedisaster.Pleasenotethatinthecaseofboththeprintandbroadcastmediatheratioofnegativereportingwaslessthanoneinten.Mosttelevisionnewsstories(91%)wereeitherpositiveor19

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neutralin ondisastereventsandmostnewspaper accounts (93%)werealsoeitherneutralorsupportiveoftheeffortsoftheEOC.TABLE1:TYPEOFREPORTINGMediaFormBroadcastPrintReportingsupportivecritical91%(120)9%(12)100%(132)93%(141)7%(10)100%(151)Thereadershouldnote,however,thatwhiletheWichitaareahasfivetelevisionstations,pluscablenewschannel,thefieldteamwasabletoobtainvideotapesoftelevisionnewsbroadcastsonlywhilewewereinthefield.Furthermore,thesetapedbroadcastscamefromonlytwoofthetelevisionstations.Itispossiblethatthebroadcastsoftheotherstationsweresubstantivelydifferentfromthosewerecorded.Ontheotherhand,itwaspossibletoobtaincopiesofthemajorlocalnewspaperandthelocalweeklynewspaperforthemonthfollowingthedateofimpact.Hence,thecontentanalysisoftheprintmedianewsstoriesoftheeventismorecompletethanthatforthebroadcastmedia.WewereabletoincludeinourcontentanalysisthosenewsreportsthattheEOCfoundoffensive--andtowhichtheirdecisionswereresponsive.Recovery.Duringtheweeksthatfollowedthedisasterevent,theclearingoftheparkwassubsequentlycompleted.Rebuilding20

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wasbegunand..attemptsweremadetoreturnthecommunityto .. aversionofnormaltimeactivity.Themediasoughtnewstoriesandthevictimscontinuedtostrugglewithwhatwouldbe,forthem,alongtermprocessofrebuildingtheirlives.Thoselocalleaderswhocomprisedthepost-tornadoemergentEOCstaffbeganasoulsearchingprocesstoassesswhatshouldbedonetobebetterpreparedforanyfuturedisasterthattheyhopedwouldnevervisittheircommunity.LiteratureBasedAnalysis DiscussionoftheFindingsResearchershavelongarguedthatdisasterwarningsmustbeconceptualizedasasocialprocess(Williams,1956;Mileti,1975;Mileti,Drabek,andHaas,1975;Janis&Mann1977;Quarantelli,1980;Perry,1985;Drabek,1986)."Theinitialresponsetoadisasterwarningisdisbelief"(Drabek,1986;seealso,Drabek,1969;Moore,etal.,1963;Fritz&Mathewson,1957).Ifthedisastereventwasunexpected,e.g.,thecaseofarapidonsetdisasteragentsuchasatornado,andifthelevelofemergencypreparednessislow,mostpeopletendtocontinueintheirnormalroutinewhenfirstwarnedofanimpendingdisaster,astheydisbelievethewarningwhetheritcomesfromanauthorityornot(Perry,Lindell,&Greene,1981;Quarantelli,1980).Ifthewarningmessageappearstothelistenerasvague,theirtendencytodisbelieveitisincreased(Drabek,1986&1968;Mileti,Drabek,&Haas,1975;Perry,etal.,1981;Fritz,1957).Severalvariablesappeartoincreasethelikelihoodofawarningbeingtakenseriouslyandappropriatelyactedupon.These21

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variablesincludetheclarityofthewarningmessage,i.e.,specificityofthenatureofthehazardandwhatthelistenerisdirectedtodoinresponsetoit(Perry,Lindell,&Greene,1982);theconsistencyofthewarningmessagewithotherwarningmessages,i.e.,media,weatherservices,localauthorities,familymembersseemtoallbegivingthesamewarningmessage(Demerath,1957;Fritz,1957;Mileti,Drabek,&Haas,1975;Drabek,1986);thefrequencyofthewarnings(Mileti,1975;Fritz,1961;Drabek&Boggs,1968;Drabek,1969&1986;Perry,Lindell,&Greene,1981);thetypeofauthoritywhoisgivingthemessage,e.g.,themediaisbelievedmorethanthepoliceorfirepersonnel,yetthepolice/firepersonnelarebelievedmorethanfriendsorfamily(Perry&Greene,1983;Drabek,1969&1986;Mileti,1975);theaccuracyofpastwarnings,i.e.,iftheyaccuratelyforecastthedisasteragentsdirectionandimpact(Mileti,Drabek,&Haas,1975;Haas,Cochrane,andEddy,1976;Foster,1980;Drabek,1986);andthefrequencyofthedisasteragent,e.g.,iftornadoesfrequentlystrikethearea(Drabek,1986;Anderson,1969).Duringthepre-impactperiod,anattemptwasmadetowarntheresidentsofAndoveroftheimpendingtornadoIsimpact.First,thecommunityofficialsattemptedtoactivatethecivil-defensesirensystem.Itapparentlyfailedtooperateinthenormalfashion.Evenifithad,itshouldbenotedthatHodler(1982)studiedtheresponseoftheresidentsofacommunitytoatornadowarningandfoundthatlessthanhalfoftheaffectedresidentswhoheardthecivildefensewarningsirenssoughtalocationofsafety,even22

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thoughtheywe,retestedbrieflyonthefirstSaturdayofeachmonth.Dependenceonasirensystemtomovethepopulationtoeffectivelyrespondtothewarningofanimpendingimpactistherebyrenderedsuspectasaneffectivemeansofwarningthepopulation.Thecommunityutilizedtwoadditionalmediumtowarntheresidents.First,radioandtelevisionstationsbroadcastthetornadowatch,thenthewarningfortheWichita-Andoverarea.Becauseatornadoisarapid-onsetdisasteragent,itisdifficulttoexpectthewarningtoprovidesufficienttimeforthetotalpopulationtocompletethesocialprocessofdigesting,confirming,andactinguponthewarningpriortoimpact.Asnotedabove,themediahasbeenfoundintheliteraturetobethemostbelievedsourceofdisasterwarninginformationandWenger,James,andFaupel(1980)foundthatmostcitizenstendtoobtaintheirinformationaboutdisastersfromthemedia.Furthermore,notallresidentsofanycommunityhavearadioortelevisionturnedonwhensuchwarningsarebeinggiven.ThisappearedtobethecaseformanyAndoverresidents.And,thereremaintheissuesofclarity,consistency,frequency,previousaccuracy,andfrequencyoftornadoesinthearea.Thebroadcastmessageswerecleartotheextentthattheyindicatedthenatureofthethreat,atornado,andtheresponsethelistenerwasbeingdirectedtofollow,seekappropriateshelter.Asisthenatureofthestateoftheartoftornadoforcasting,thepathofthetornadoandsUbsequentimpactareaisvagueenoughtoenablemanylistenerstoassumethatthey23

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willnotbe actualtarget.Previousexperience,evenin areapronetotornadoes,tendstoreinforcethisperceptionofthevalidityofthewarningtomanylisteners.And,theopportunitytobroadcastfrequentwarningsisreducedbytherapid-onsetofatornado,unliketheslow-onsetgeneratedopportunitiesahurrianceprovidesforgivingfrequentwarningsnotonlyinthebroadcast,butalsotheprintmedia.TheremainingattempttowarntheareawastheattemptbytheAndoverPoliceDepartmenttoalerttheresidentsoftheGoldenSpurMobileHomeParkbysendinganofficertoquicklydriveupanddownthestreetsofthemobilehomeparkwithhissirenactivatedasawarning.Whenitbecameapparenttothecitythatthisareawasinthedirectpathofthetornado,therewereminutestoact.Thepatrolcarwasdispatchedtothepark,theofficerhadlessthan10minutestodrivethroughtheparkandthenreturn,atspeedsexceeding80milesperhour,tothestationhouseshelterwhichwasapproximatelytwomilesfromthepark.Iftheofficerhadattemptedtogodoortodoortowarnresidentshewould,inalllikelihood,havebecomeavictimofthestormhimself.Post-stormcriticismwhichsuggestedthattheofficercouldhaveusedabullhorntoatleastwarnthosewhoweremillingoutsidetheirhomes,aswellasthecriticismwhichsuggeststhattheresidents"hadonlythemselvestoblamesincetheydidnotheedthewarnings,"assumetheclarityofvisionthatcomeswithhindsight.Theliterature,asnotedabove,hasobservedthetendencyforthosewhoevenhearthewarningtodisregardit,unlessthemessageisvery24

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clear,frequentlygiveninaconsistentmessageovertime,whichisnotunderminedbypreviousexperiencewherethewarningsappeared,tothelistener,tobeunnecessary.IntheAndoverexperience,thecommunityisonewhichisgenerallyexposedtothethreatoftornadoes,theappropriateauthortiesweresoundingthealarm(mediaandpolicepersonnel),andthemessagewasclear.Infact,wecanaccountfortheresponseofatleast388,perhaps488oftheGoldenSpurMobileHomeParkresidents.Between200and300ofthemheededthewarningandwenttotheshelterinthepark.Theyweresafe.Thirteenpeoplediedand175wereinjured.Presumablythese188individualseitherdidnothearthewarningsordidnotheedthem.Wedonotknowthewhereaboutsoftheremainingresidents,between512and612individuals.Most,ifnotallofthem,wereapparentlynothomeatthetime.Someofthemheededthewarningandleftforsaferlocationsoutofthearea,manyhadnotreturnedfromworkyet,othershadgoneoutfortheevening.Apparently,fewstayedintheirmobilehomesandwalkedawayunharmed.Hence,itappearsthatmorethanhalfoftheresidentsthatwecanaccountfor,didrespondtothewarning.ThisisbetterthanwhatHodler(1982,discussedpreviously)observedinresponsetothewarningofanimpendingtornado'simpactinacasestudyofanothercommunity.Itappears,therefore,thattheAndovercitizensbehaviorwasverytypicalofwhattendstooccurinresponsetodisasterwarnings.Italsoappearsthattheresponseoftherelevantcommunityorganizations,e.g.,themediaandlocalgovernment,wasverytypicalintheirattemptstowarn25

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theresidents.Usingcivil-defensesirens,mediawarnings,andpolicewarningsarenotunusualwaystoattempttoallertthecitizenryandmovethemtoactonbehalfoftheirownsafety.IftheAndoverexperienceisnotatypicaloftheresearchliterature,thenwhydidweobservetheblameassignationprocessamonglocalresidentsasreflectedinthemedia?Drabek(1968)notesthatsearchesfor"theguilty"dofollowsomedisasterevents.Chandessais(1966)discoveredthatcitizensdosometimesusethetownadministrationasthescapegoatduringtheaftermathofatornado.Singer(1982),similarly,observedatendencytodirectblametowardcivicofficials.WolenskyandMiller(1981,asreportedinDrabek,1986:293)noted"thegeneralizedbeliefthatformalauthoritiesinlocalgovernmentwere[seenas]unresponsivetotheneedsofspecificcitizens..thereexisteda'gap'betweenwhatwasexpectedandwhatwasdelivered.Inresponsetothis,certainconstituenciesfeltunprotectedand'forced'tomobilize."DrabekandQuarantelli(1967,asreportedinDrabek,1986:292)suggestthatsuchblameassignationmay"helpgivetheillusionthatcorrectiveactionofsomesortisbeingtaken."Whileblameassignationismorelikelytooccurinconjunctionwithatechnologicaldisasterthanwithonethatiscausednaturally(Drabek&Quarantelli,1967),thescapegoatingexperiencedbytheAndovergovernmentofficialsduringthepost-impactandearlyrecoveryperiodswasnot,therefore,totallyunprecedented.Theappropriatequestiontoaddresspresentlyseemstosuggestitselfautomatically:underwhatcircumstancesisacommunity26

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likelytobecomemoreeffectiveinrespondingtosuchdisasterevents?Beyondthosewhichhavealreadybeenimpliedabove,severalsuggestedbytheliteraturewillbeofferedbelow.concludingObservationsWhatwouldDorothyhavefoundifshehadreturnedhometoKansasonthatfatefulFridayinApril1991?Shewouldhavefoundatrailerparktotallydestroyedbyanextremelylargeandpowerfultornado.Shewouldhavebeenpleasedtofindsomanysurvivorsresultingfromthe200-300residentswiselyheedingthewarningandevacuatingtotheundergroundshelter.Shewouldhavefoundadivided,butearnest,EOCtryingitsbesttorespondtotheeventsthathavebefallenthem,withoutawrittendisasterplanortrainingtoguidethemintheirdecision-making.Shewouldhavefoundaverywellorganized,verycompetent,ifveryindependent,groupassistingthevictimsintheirdeterminationtofindirreplaceablepossessions.AndDorothywouldhavefoundbroadcastandprintmedianewsstorieswhichwereoftensupportiveofthecommunity'sattemptstorecoverfromthetornado,yetshealsowouldhavefoundstorieswhichwerecriticalofthetown'sresponse.TheselatterstorieswereofsufficientconcerntotheEOCastoinfluencetheirdecision-makingduringtheimmediatepost-impactandearlyrecoveryperiods.SinceDorothyknows"there'snoplacelikehome,"shewouldbeinterestedinsuggestinghowthingscouldpossiblybeimprovedincaseanothertornadocomestotown.Therefore,thefieldteam27

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offersseveral whicharenotmeanttobecritical, supportiveasAndoverandothercommunitiesseektocontinuetoimprovetheservicetheygivetotheirpUblicduringtimeofdisaster.DisasterPlan.Awrittendisasterplanwouldassistpresentandfutureindividualswhofindthemselveswiththeunenviabletaskofhavingtorespondtoadisasteragent'simpact(seeDrabek,1986;Quarantelli,1984;Dynes&Quarantelli,1975;Dynes,Quarantelli,&Kreps,1972foradiscussionofthemeritsofsuchplanning).Theprocessofconstructingthewrittenplanwouldbeofgreatbenefittotheorganizationswhomustrespondtosuchemergencies.othercommunities,thestateemergencymanagementoffice,andFEMAwouldallbesourcesforguidanceindevelopingsuchaplan.CommunityEducationEffort.Thelocalgovernmentcouldengageinanongoingefforttoeducatethecommunityabouttheneeds,problems,andproceduresassociatedwithdisasterevents.Forexample,schoolchildrencouldbetaughttheimportanceofevacuatingorseekingshelterwhenthecommunityand/orpolicesirenisactivated.Ofcourse,additionalwarningactivitiescouldbeconsideredtofacilitategainingtheawarenessofcommunitymembersthatanemergencyistakingplace.DisasterTraining & Drills.ThosewhoaremembersoftheEOCwouldgreatlybenefitbyattendingtrainingseminars.Suchtrainingwouldnotonlygivedirectiontotheindividualroleresponsibilities,butshouldalsogivesomedirectioninwriting28

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andupdatinga..community'sdisasterplans.Inadditiontobeingtaughtdisasterresponseskills,regulardisasterdrillswouldtestthereadinessoftheindividualsandtheirorganizations.Drillsshouldbenefitthecommunityinassessingtheadequacyoftheirwrittendisasterplanaswell.EOCDesign.WhileitmaynotbeeconomicallyfeasibleforeverycommunitytomaintainapermanentEOC,thedisasterplancoulddesignateanemergentEOCstructurewhichshouldalleviatesomeofthetrial-and-errordecisionmakingthataccompaniesorganizationalresponsetoadisaster.EvenanEOCthatdoesnotexistuntiladisasterstrikes,needssomewrittenguidelineswhichoutlinewhatrolesneedtobefulfilled,whattaskscommonlyneedtobeaddressedinwhatorder,andwhatproblemscanbeexpectedtoariseduringthelifecycleoftherecoveryperiod.Ofcourse,anywrittenplanisonlyusefulifitisactuallyimplemented.MutualAssistanceAgreements.PerhapsthecooperationoforganizationssuchastheMennoniteDisasterServicescouldbeattainedifthecommunitydevelopedandmaintained,aspartoftheirimplementedwrittendisasterplan,arelationshipwithitduringnormaltime.ThecommunityandorganizationslikeMDScouldmutuallyeducateeachotheroftheirneeds,procedures,andsoforth.Ifanemergencydevelopsinthecommunity,itwould,thereby,beinabetterpositiontorespondinconcertwiththevariousorganizations.Developing a RelationshipwiththeMedia.Investigativereportersmaybydefinitionviewtheirroleasadversarial.Itis29

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arguablygood tpat.this isthecaseattimes,sincetheGolden MobileHomeParkresidents'desiretohavemoretimetoreclaimtheirpropertywasessentiallyfulfilledthroughtherolethelocalmediaplayedontheirbehalf.Therebuildingprocesscanbehurt,however,iflocalpoliticsandpersonalityclashesinterferewithEOCattemptstorespondeffectively.Agooddisasterplan,whenimplementedproperly,couldassistthosewhowouldperformEOCfunctionsduringemergencytime,ifitprovidesformechanismsfordevelopinganeffectiverelationshipwithkeypersonnelinprintandbroadcastmediaduringnormaltime.Themediacouldbecomeinvolvedintheplanningprocessandgainanunderstandingofthevaluableroletheycanplayinassistingthelocalcommunityasaninformationdisseminatorduringtimeofdisaster.Themediacanbeaveryvaluableaidtoacommunitystruckbydisaster.Lifesavinginformationcanbedisseminatedwiththehelpofnewspaper,television,andradioreporters.IfthosewhowouldfulfillEOCrolesduringdisastertimeseektoeducatethoseinthemediaastohowtheycangivevaluableassistancetotherecoveryeffort,thenperhapstheemergencycoordinatorscandevotemoreoftheirtimetotheprimarytaskofrespondingtothedisasterratherthantothemedia'scriticism.Bydevelopingaworkingrelationshipwithmediaorganizations,EOCpersonnelmaygaininsightintothemosteffectiveapproachtoinvolvingmediapersonnelasteammemberswhoarejointlyattemptingtoservethecommunityratherthanbeadversaries.30

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Interpreti,ngandActingonDisasterwarnings."BehaviorandPersonality10(1):97-104. Quarantelli,E.L.1984."OrganizationalBehaviorinDisastersandImplicationsforDisasterPlanning."Emmitsburg,Maryland:NationalEmergencyTrainingCenter,FEMA.Quarantelli,E.L.1980."EvacuationBehaviorandProblems:FindingsandImplicationsfromtheResearchliterature."UniversityofDelaware:DisasterResearchCenter.Singer,TimothyJ.1982."AnIntroductiontoDisaster:SomeConsiderationsofaPsychologicalNature."Aviation,Space,andEnvironmentalMedicine53(March):245-250.Wenger,DennisE.1980."A FewEmpiricalObservationsConcerningtheRelationshipbetweentheMassMediaandDisasterKnowledge."Pp.241-253inDisastersandtheMassMedia:ProceedingsoftheCommitteeonisastersandtheMassMediaWorkshop,February,1979,CommitteeonDisastersandtheMassMedia.Washington,D.C.:NationalAcademyofSciences.Wenger,DennisE.,ThomasJames,andCharlesFaupel.1980.DisasterBeliefsandEmergencyplanning.Newark,DE:DisasterResearchCenter,UniversityofDelaware.Williams,HarryB.Dissertation.Carolina.1956."CommunicationsinCommunityDisasters."ChapelHill,N.C.:UniversityofNorthWolensky,Robert,andEdwardMiller.1981."TheEverydayversustheDisasterRoleofLocalOfficials--citizenandOfficialDefinitions."UrbanAffairsQuarterly14-4:483-504.33