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Learning from risk

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Title:
Learning from risk organizational interaction following the Armenian earthquakes
Series Title:
Quick response research report ;
Physical Description:
33, 3 p. : ill. ; 28 cm.
Language:
English
Creator:
Comfort, Louise K ( Louise Kloos ), 1935-
University of Colorado, Boulder -- Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center
University of Colorado, Boulder -- Institute of Behavioral Science
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Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center
Place of Publication:
Boulder, Colo
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Subjects / Keywords:
Disaster relief -- Armenia (Republic)   ( lcsh )
Earthquakes -- Armenia (Republic)   ( lcsh )
Emergency management -- Armenia (Republic)   ( lcsh )
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government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )

Notes

Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references (p. 34-36).
Additional Physical Form:
Also issued online as part of a joint project with the Louis de la Parte Florida Mental Health Institute (FMHI) Research Library’s disaster mental health initiative.
Statement of Responsibility:
Louise K. Comfort.
General Note:
Cover title.
General Note:
"Institute of Behavioral Science #6."

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aleph - 001985177
oclc - 39057415
usfldc doi - F57-00032
usfldc handle - f57.32
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SFS0001113:00001


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HAZARD HOUSECOpy,\. s\C..:t...",\100.\
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NaturalHazards ResearchandApplicationsInformationCenterCampusBox482UniversityofColoradoBoulder,Colorado80309-0482 HAZARDHOUSE COpyLEARNINGFROMRISK:ORGANIZATIONALINTERACTIONFOLLOWINGTHEARMENIANEARTHQUAKESLOUISEK.COMFORT1989QUICKRESPONSE RESEARCH REPORT#31This publication is partofthe Hazards Research&Applications InformatIon ongoing Quick Response Research Report Series. http:/twww.colorado.edu/hazardsInstituteofBehavioralScience#6 (303) 492-6818TELEFAX:(303) 492-6924

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LEARNINGFROMRISK:ORGANIZATIONALINTERACTIONFOLLOWINGTHEARMENIAN EARTHQUAKESbyLOUISE K.COMFORTGraduateSchoolofPublicandInternationalAffairsUniversityofPittsburghandotherMembersoftheDISASTERREANIMATOLOGYSTUDYGROUP(Page1A)**fromtheInternationalResuscitationResearchCenter,DepartmentofAnesthesiologyandCriticalCareMedicine,GraduateSchoolofPublicHealth,SchoolofEngineering,andGraduateSchoolofPublicandInternationalAffairs,UniversityofPittsburgh(address:P.Safar,MD,IRRC,3434FifthAve,Pittsburgh,PA15260USA;tel.412/624-6735or343-2954)andtheInstituteofReanimatologyoftheUSSRAcademyofMedicalSciencesMoscow,USSR(address:V.Semenov,MD,Reanimatology,25OctoberStreet,Moscow103012USSRtel.921-6068or398-5749)Preparedforpresentationatthe1989AnnualMeetingoftheAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation,Atlanta,GA,August31,1989-September3,1989.

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**DISASTERREANIMATOLOGYSTUDYGROUPIRRC ,UniversityofPittsburgh:PeterSafar,M.D.(PrincipalInvestigator,Director,IRRC).EdmundRicci,Ph.D.,(Co-PrincipalInvestigator,PublicHealth,Methodology).MiroslavKlain,M.D.,Ph.D.,(TeamLeaderofsiteVisit,Anesthesiology).ErnestoPretto,M.D.(SiteVisit,AnesthesiologyandCriticalCareMedicine).SamuelTisherman,M.D.(SiteVisit,TraumatologicSurgery).DavidCrippen,M.D.(SiteVisit,EmergencyandCriticalCareMedicine).GadBar-Joseph,M.D.(Consultant,criticalCareMedicine;12/88ArmeniaRelief).JoelAbrams,Ph.D.(SiteVisit,CivilEngineering).LouiseComfort,Ph.D.(SiteVisit,PublicandInternationalAffairs).Moscow-ArmeniaReanimatologyInstitute:VictorSemenov,M.D.(CoPrincipalInvestigator,Director,Reanimatology Institute,Moscow, TeamLeader).AlexanderMichailov,M.D.(Reanimatology,Moscow).ArmenBunatyan,M.D.(Anesthesiology,MoscowArmenia).AlezanderMichaelyan,M.D.(SurgicalInstitute,Armenia).JulijShaposhnikov,M.D.,NefjodKozhin,M.D.,NickolauMironov,M.D.,andvictorNuzhdin,M.D.(TraumatologyInstitute,Moscow).BorisGazetov,M.D.,VladislavTeriaev,M.D.andEduardSaakyan,M.D.(SklifosovskyInstitute,Moscow).VladimirFjodorov,M.D.anaAlexanderMachulin,M.D.(VishnevskyInstitute,Moscow) .FacilitatorsandConsultants:EmilGabrielyan,M.D.andOganesSarukhian,M.D.(ArmeniaMinistryofPublicHealth).LeoMelkomov(Chief,CivilDefense,ArmeniaSSR).GennadjiSimonov, andEduardKosenko,M.D.(MinistryofPublicHealth,USSR).YevgeniChazov,M.D.(Co-President,InternationalPhysiciansforthePreventionofNuclear MinisterofHealth,USSR).ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThisstudyhasbeensupportedbytheInternationalResuscitationResearchCenter,UniversityofPittsburgh;InstituteofReanimatologyandMinistryofHealth,Moscow,USSR; AsmundS.LaerdalFoundation,Stavanger,NorwayandNewYork,USA;PharmaciaCompany,Uppsala,Sweden;NaturalHazardsCenter,UniversityofColoradoandCenterforRussianandEastEuropeanStudies,UniversityCenterforinternationalStudies,UniversityofPittsburgh.TheInstituteofGovernmentalStudiesandtheGraduateSchoolofPublicPolicy,UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeleyprovidedscholarlyfacilitiesandcollegialsupporttothefirstauthorduringthedevelopmentofthestudy.TheGraduateSchoolofPublicandInternationalAffairsofferedadministrativeassistance.BishopArisShirvanianandothermembersofst.John'sArmenianChurch,SanFrancisco,CAofferedinstructionandmaterialsinArmenianlanguageand Theauthorsgratefullyacknowledgeallorganizationsfortheirfinancialandadministrativesupport.WealsothankMarcelDennertforhisgraphicdesignofFigures1-5andWilladeanBaileyforherassistanceintheproductionofthispaper.

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LearningfromRisk:OrganizationalInteractionfollowingtheArmenianEarthquakesbyLouiseK.ComfortandtheDisasterReanimatologystudyGroupDesigningPolicyforEnvironmentsofSeismicRiskCatastrophicearthquakesposeoneofthemostdifficulttestsofpolicydesignandimplementationforpublicorganiza-tions.Policymakersareconfrontedwithatleastfivecondi-tionsthatchallengetheircapacitytoassess riskaccuratelyandtodesignappropriatealternativesforresponse,shouldaneventoccur.First,thereisthesharpcontrastintheconceptoftimebetweenthebriefinstitutionalmemoryofmodernpUblicorganizationsandthelongspanofyearsbetweengeologicalevents.Majorearthquakes withinrangesof90-150yearsinzonesofknownseismicrisk.1Governmentalagencies,operat-ingonyear-to-yearbUdgets,oftendiscounttheriskofeventsthatoccurwithsuchinfrequency.Lessonslearnedfrompasteventsareeasilyforgotten,asdecadespasswithoutrecurrence.Thetraumageneratedwhenearthquakesdooccurreflects,inpart,thedecisionnottoactinpreferencetootherneeds,perceivedasmoreimmediate.Second,itisthe'interactionbetweenearthquakesandhumansettlementsthatgeneratedisaster(Turner,1978;Shrivastava,1987).Aspopulationsmoveincreasinglyintoseismiczones,withaccompanyinginfrastructureandunplannedpatternsofsettlement,1DavidBoutacoff,"RealWorldLesson'sinSeismicSafety"inEPRIJournal,June1989:23-29.1

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therisktohumanlifeandpropertyincreases.Paradoxically,populationsinseismicenvironments,unawareoftheriskandconsequencesofearthquakes,mayescalatethatriskwith inap propriateconstruction,uninformedactionsorinadequatecopingskills.Third,designingpolicyforpreparednessandresponsetoearthquakesisnecessarilyaninterdisciplinaryandinterorganizationaltask(Comfort,1985,1986,1989a,1989b).Nosinglediscipline,nogivenorganizationcommandsalloftheinformationorresourcesneededforappropriatepreparednessorresponse.Theeffectivedeliveryofmedicalservicestoassistinjuredvictims,forexample,dependsupontimelinessofextrication,availabilityofappropriatelife-savingfirstaid,'accesstoneededextricationandmedicalequipment,adequacyoftransportation,functioningcommunications,waterandpowerfacilities(Klainetal.,1989.)Itistherapidintegrationofmuitipleskills,servicesandorganizationsintoacoherentresponseprocessthatfacilitatestheprotectionoflifeandpropertyinadisaster.Yet,inroutineoperations,thepersonnelandorganizationsrequiredforsucharesponseareunlikelytoworktogether.Effectiveresponsetodisasterrequiresindividualsandorganizationstoshifttoahigherlevelofabstractioninunderstandingtheirrolesinrelationtotheoverallgoalofhumanitarianassistanceandincoordinatingtheiractionswithothersinanintegratedcommunityeffort.Suchshiftsaredifficulttoaccomplishwithoutpreparednessandpractice,which,2

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inturn,areunlikelywithoutawarenessoftherisk--Catch22.Fourth,disasterresponseisnecessarilyinterjurisdiction-al.Inacatastrophicearthquake,thecapacityofthelocaljurisdictiontorespondtotheneedsofitspopulationis,bydefinition,overwhelmed.2Appropriateresponse,therefore,involvesmultiplelevelsofgovernment,local,regional,nationalandinternational.Theproblemsofcommunicationandcoordina-tionwithinandbetweenjurisdictionsescalatewiththescopeofthedisasterandthelevelsofjurisdictionalparticipation.Fifth,managingtheinformationinvolvedinpreparednessandresponseforsuchcomplex,uncertain,dynamiceventsrapidlyoverloadshumanandorganizationalinformationprocessingcapacity(Simon,1969,1981).Thecoordinationofmultipleindividualsand ineffectivedisasterresponseactionsdependsupontimely,accurateaccessibleinformation.Indisasteroperations,responsepersonnelareworkingbothinrealtimeandagainsttime(Zancanato,1988)intheireffortstosavelivesandprotectproperty.Accurate,accessibleinformationisintegraltothecapacitytomobilizeactionundertheurgentconstraintsoftimeanddistanceinappropriatedisasterre-sponse.Informationservesasthe"nerves"ofgovernmentaloperation,torecallthatmemorableimageofKarlDeutsch.(1963,1966).Thisroleforinformationisunderscoredinthecomplex,2.U.S.FederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA).1980.AnAssessmentoftheConsequencesandPreparationsfor g CatastrophicCaliforniaEarthquake:FindingsandActionsTaken.Washington,D.C.3

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dynamicenvironmentofriskanddisastermanagement.Giventhesefiveconditions,thetaskofdesigningpolicyforenvironmentsofseismicriskcreatesanextraordinarychallengeforhumanreasoningcapacity.Thesetofconditionsexceedstheboundariesofmanipulativereasonorevenwisdom.Remainingisthecategoryof"perceptivereason"oropennesstonewideas,insightsandlearningfromexternalsources(Deutsch,1963,1966:xv).Howtocreatesuchalearningenvironmentis,inherently,aproblemofdesign.TheOperationalContextofDisasterTheArmenianearthquakesofDecember7,1988vividlyillustratethesechallengestopolicydesignandimplementation.Thefirstearthquakeoccurred,withoutwarning,at11:41a.m.on that sunnyWednesdaymorning.Measuring6.9ontheRichterscalewithanepicenter neaF" Spitak,theearthquakehaddevastatingeffectsonfourcitiesinnorthernArmenia--Spitak,Leninakan,Kirovakan,Stepanavanand58villagesinthearea.Fourminuteslater,anaftershockofmagnitude5.8ontheRichterscaledamagedfurtherbuildingsalreadyweakenedinthefirsttemblor.Inminutes,buildingshadcollapsed,water,'electricityandcommunicationsweredestroyed,tensofthousandsofpeoplewerekilledandinjured,andhundredsofthousandswererenderedhomeless.Nearlyone-thirdofArmenia'spopulationof3.5millionwereaffectedtosomedegreebytheearthquakes.Publicorganizations,unpreparedforsuchdevastation,struggledtodeviseappropriateresponsestotheimmensityofhumanneeds4

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generatedbytheseismicevents.wasanunderstatement.Catastrophe,inthiscontext,ThreeconditionsmaketheArmenianearthquakesdistinctiveintermsofdemandsforpublicpolicyresponse.First,theearthquakeswereextraordinaryinthescopeofdamageanddestructiongeneratedforthehumansettlementsinthearea.Table1citesdatareportedbythecivilDefense,ArmeniaSSRregardingtheconsequencesoftheearthquakesuponpopulationcenters,industrialfacilities,culturalbuildings,residences,agricul-turalfacilitiesandlivestockoftheaffectedarea.Table2showsthesteepdeclineinliveextricationsofvictimsfromtherubbleafterDay4,droppingstillfurtherbyDay 5tovirtuallynoneafterDay12.Thesedataprovidegrimevidenceofthestruggleagainsttimeinlife-savingefforts.Table3reportsthetypeanddayofreceiptofequipmentforrescuework,increasinginnumberwithtimeformobilizationbutdecreasinginutilityforlife-savingoperations.Table4showsthenumberandtypesofpersonnelandequipmentutilizedinrescueoperationsbylocation.civildefenseunits,withlegalresponsibilityforresponseindisasteroperations,wereavail-ableonlyforthetwomajorpopulationareasaffected--Lenina-kanandSpitak.Theotherareaswereleftwithonlycivilianpersonneltocarryoutrescueoperations.Table5showstheresponsetotheearthquakeconsequencesbyarea.Particularlytellingisthefindingthatintheruralareas,leftlargelywithouttrainedpersonnelforrescueoperations,98%ofthe5

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TABLE1EARTHQUAKECONSEQUENCES POPULATIONINDUSTRIAlCULTURALAGRICULTURALDOMESTIC RESIDENCES ANIMALSLOCATIONS BUILDINGSFACILITIES 0w0>t 0 '0 00 0 WWW..1r;..1)4..1>e)of)of CITIES AND.41(41( 0 41( 0 00 0 ....CI).....HHf:....Mr:tottott4t4 t4tot REGIONS H Q.....CI)....CI)....CI)M(,I)Henz z wzwzW2:W:z:w .' ....--... 0 H Q HQ....QM0LENINAKAN 175\ 40 40 669323 12450 11250--.XIROVAKAN125\. 346456 71622333---SPITAK1100\ 96 28 24433 433 ---STEPANAVAN 1 67\9 1 134 12 2134 1430----RURAL fIIt34\ 39 34581186 29533 20094 13651259 34300 76500 If" TOTAL17360\131 871868 545 51112 35540 1365-1259 34300 76500Source:CivilDefense,ArmeniaSSRThedatapresentedinTables1-5wereobtainedfromGeneralLeoMelkomov,Director,CivilDefense,ArmeniaSSR,inabriefingformembersoftheDisasterReanimatologyStudyGroupinYerevan,ArmeniaSSR,March21,1989.ThesedatawerefirstpresentedinapaperbyJoelAbramset.al.,"Detection-ExtricationintheResuscitationResponsetotheArmenianEarthquake,December7,1988"totheEarthquakeInjuryEpidemiologyWorkshop,JohnsHopkinsUniversity,July10-12,1989.Dr.Abramsdiscussesthedatafromtheperspectiveofsearchandrescue gperations. appearto davebeen1l!!..erchanged.

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..... TABLE2RESCUEANDEVACUATIONOFINJUREDPOPULATION CLASSIFICATION 7.128.12'.1210.1211.12 12 -10.12"-25.12 TOTAL'I'OTALEXTJlICATED 4328 '6348243 '437 441'818741839795EXTRICATEDALIVE 1382'660 4825 56821757 150 1 15254TOTALEVACUATED 2470 130"00 40815963836.""9318 EVACUATEDTOOTHERREPUBLICS ---1JOO 34980 79150Source: Civil Defense, ArmeniaSSR

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TABLE3EQUIPMENT RECEIVEDFORRESCUEWORK DAYS OFRECEIPT AND TYPE OF EQUIPMENTIIIwd'" ... .W..SOURCEor .. .. > 8oJ.. > I..JEQOl:PKEln'..JU)(lIlI...,DlMJ
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\D TABLE4RESOURCES UTILIZEDFORRESCUEAND TREATMENT.PERSONNEL (in thousand.:EQOIPKENT(unJ. ts).. CI)wCONSISTIMG OF 0 I CI)(I)Ht:i:cCITIESANDen 0 w...Nfo4 >. HH8.-(REGIONS:z; > roTALH-e 0> 0 f4H ,0 CRANES::>x 0 00 wxLENINAKAN 39.330.5I8.8 97
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.... oTABLE 5RESPONSETOEARTHQUAKECONSEQUENCES POPULATIONHUMANITARIANAID, IPRODUCTS(inton_) HABITATIONz 0.0 w0 0CI) CITIES AND......ww.:o..0.eCI) CI)foe...w... INCLUDING .eflCzOz%11(%11(aEGIORS....,10'" 0, ..:;)itHI&.2.eC12PREFAB111:<0....w,tiwTOTALBREADHEATttNTS HOUSES HEATERSAt Q.3173 ILENlNAXAH '6959 9974 58642 394861688.51404 213.0 2924 '1280 KIROVAJtAH 171.0 4317 420 34720 23180 1120.6 945 126.78280SO560! SPITAJC. .18.5139909'33'809' 5377 982.0835109.011086 4774 2303. STEPANAVAH 21.010863--,857.0 7.7 82.0 5976 250877 RURALAJU;P.$4421 4352 17865 '16994752.64316 322.0 26431 7363 8320 TOTAL1589.039795 24542 "931.797509400.9 8247 852.7 5469' 14161 15233Source:CivilDefense,ArmeniaSSR

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\D TABLE4RESOURCES UTILIZEDFORRESCUEANDTREATMENT .PERSONNEL (in thoasaD4.:EQOXPKEHT(wU. ts).. CI)(X)NSISTIMG OF w I (I)0CI)Hf:jI:Il::cCZTXESANDII) 0 r&JE-tNfoot >. HH8REGXONSz0:TOTALM..:a41( 0> .:J0f4M I0 CRANES::>)( 0 0U ta).xLENINAKAN 39.330.5I8.8 914 3011672389 XXROVAKAN 3.53.5.-178 12465474SPITAX 7.36.01.3 415 187103897. STEPANAVAN1.65 91 7729170-RURALAREAS9.69.6 -333 299 2751391TOTAL61.3551.2510.11991 988639 5321Source:avi IDefeme, ArmeniaSSR

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.... oTABLE 5RESPONSETOEARTHQUAKECONSEQUENCES --POPULATIONHUMANITARIANAID, PRODUCTS(1ntonal HABITATIONz 00 w .CITIES AND....fo40 0CI)ww.:o.:a"0":CI) CI)104....w.... INCLUDING -<-
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victimsextricatedfromtherubbleweredead.Thereportedcostofthedisastertotaled$16billion.Second,theearthquakesgeneratedanequallyextraordinaryresponseintermsofdisasterassistancetothevictims.withinArmenia,therewasanimmenselystrongempathyandidentificationwithvictimsandtheirfamilies.affectedinsomewaybythedisasterAlmosteveryArmenianwaseitherbyenduringthelossoffamily,friends,orcolleaguesorbybeinginvolvedinsomesignificantwaywithreliefactivities.WithintheUSSR,theArmenianearthquakesrepresentedanhistoricinstanceinwhichtheCentralGovernmentpubliclyacceptedresponsibilityforalocaldisaster.Newsofthedisasterwascarriedonnationaltelevision.Nationalpoliticalfiguresvisitedthedevastatedarea. StudentsJ physicians,rescueworkerscarnefromKarabakh, Kiev, Moscow,Leningradandotherpartsofthecountrytoassisttheirstrickencountrymen.3WithintheArmenianDiaspora,theresponsewasequallyswiftandgenerous.ArmeniancommunitiesintheUnitedStates,France,Germany,Italy,GreatBritainandAustriasentmoney,physicians,suppliesandequipment,strengtheningculturalandreligioustieswiththeirhomeland.Withintheinternationalcommunity,some50nationssentaidandsolidaritypayments.Atleast267physi-3.TheextraordinarilygenerousresponsetotheneedsoftheArmenianpopulationfromwithintheUSSRisamplydocumentedinboththeUSandSovietpress.See,forexample,theNewYorkTimesissuesforDecember831,1988.TheseaccountswereverifiedbyreportsfromourSovietcolleaguesduringformalandinformaldiscussions,March13-26,1989.11

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ciansfrom14nationsvolunteeredtheirtimeandservicesinmedicalcareforthevictims.4Table 5 alsociteshumanitarianaidreceivedinArmeniatomeetbasicneedsoffoodandshelterforthevictims.ByDecember31,1988,Armeniahadreceived$108,818,759indisasterassistancefromtheinternationalcommunity.5TheeventsinArmeniahadcreatednewnetworksofcommunication,assistanceandsupport,crossinglocal,regional,nationalandinternationalboundaries.Third,themostdistinctivecharacteristicoftheArmenianearthquakeswasthestartlingdeadlinessoftheireffects,despitetheextraordinaryeffortsmadeinresponse.Thisdeadli-nessisshownbytwomeasures.Theusualratioofinjuredtodead,calculatedfromrecordsofpreviousseismicevents,is3:1.6IntheArmenianearthquakes,thisratiowasreversed.Ap-proximatelythreepersonswerefounddeadforeverylivevictimextricated,asshownbythedatareportedinTable5.Addition-ally,thegravityofinjuriesreportedtohospitalsinthisdisasterwasexceptionallyhigh.Ofthe9,976patientshospital-izedimmediatelyaftertheearthquake,5,012or50.2%were4DataprovidedbytheMinistryofHealth,ArmeniaSSR,March24,1989.5DataprovidedbyCounselor,EmbassyoftheUSSR,March16,1989.theGermanRedFederalRepublicCross.Interview,ofGermany,Moscow,6.ThisratiohasbeenestimatedbythePanAmericanHealthOrganization,baseduponcumulativedataonthenumberofinjuries/numberofdeadreportedforrecentearthquakesintheAmericas.Thisratioiscitedinadocumentaryfilm,"InternationalDisasterAssistance,"preparedbyPARafordistributionin1987.12

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classifiedasbeinginverygraveorgravecondition.7 ManyofthesepatientshadmUltiple"injuriesthatcompoundedtheireffectstoreducethevictim'soverallphysicalstate.TheseverityofconsequencesfromtheArmenianearthquakescontrastswiththedamagereportedfromearthquakesinotherregionswithinacomparablerangeontheRichterscale.Forexample,the1971SanFernandoEarthquakeinCaliforniaregister-ed6.6ontheRichterscale,butlessthan100victimswerekilled.8TheMexicoCityEarthquakeof1985registered8.0ontheRichterscale,withapproximately10,000knowndead.9IntheChileanearthquakeofMarch,1985,magnitude7.0ontheRichterscale,thebulkofinjuriesreportedconsistedofsimplefractures,cutsandbruises.10TheextraordinarycostinlivesanddollarsreportedinthesefindingscompelustoaskwhytheArmenianearthquakesweresodeadlyandtore-examinetheperformanceofthesocial,organizationalandculturalsystemscriticaltodisasterpre-parednessandessentialtothemobilizationofdisasterresponse.Thecapacityofthesesystemstorecognizeandrespondappro-7.ThesedatawerereportedbyRobertA.CharchoghlianandR.V.Sekoyanina paperpresentedbyDr.CharchoghlianataconferenceonEarthquakeInjuryEpidemiologyheldatJohnsHopkinsUniversityinBaltimore,MDonJUly10-12,1989.8.USGeologicalSurveyReports,SanFernandoEarthquake,1971.9U.S.OfficeofForeignDisaster DisasterReport:TheMexicoCityEarthquake,January,1986.Assistance,Washington,FinalD.C.:10PanAmericanHealthOrganization,MedicalReport,TheChileanEarthquake,March,1985.13

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priatelytotheknownthreatofseismicrisk,antecedenttotheconstructionofthephysicalbuildingsthatfailedinArmenia,iscentraltoourunderstandingoftheproblemofdesigningpolicyforenvironmentsatrisk.UnresolvedProblemsinEnvironmentsofSeismicRisk:LessonsfromArmeniaReviewingthesetofeventsandtheensuingconsequencesofdisasteroperationsfromtheArmenianearthquakes,threeproblemsstandoutasintegrallyrelatedtothefailureofhumanandphysicalsystemsinthisenvironmentofseismicrisk.Theseproblemsarerecognizableinsimilarenvironmentselsewhereintheworld,and,withoutappropriatedesignforpublicpolicy,arelikelytorecurwiththenextmajorearthquake,wheneverandwhereverthatmaybe.Theseproblems,recognizedbySovietandUSobserversalike,include:1)theinterdependenceofeventsthatleadtodisaster,createdbytheinteractionbetweenseismiceventsandthephysicalandsocialsystemsestablishedbyhumancommunitiesinseismiczones;2)theorganizationofcoordinatedresponseamongmUltipleorganizationsandjurisdictionswithemergencyresponsibilities;and3)theefficiencyofresponseoperations,thatis,allocatingscarceresourcesformaximumbenefittominimizelossesfortheaffectedpopulation.Eachproblemwillbediscussedbrieflyinturn.,TheProblemofInterdependenceTheArmenianearthquakesillustratedagainthefactthatearthquakestriggernotonlythecollapseofbuildingsandthe14

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consequentinjuryanddeathofvictims,butalsothecollapseoftheinfrastructureofcommunicationandcoordination that enablelocalcommunitiestorespondtothedemandsgeneratedbydis-aster.Thisinfrastructureincludesthesystemsofcommunica-tions,transportation,andorganizationalcapacitytomobilizeresourcesandpersonnel.Forexample,inSpitak,thecentraltelephoneofficewastotallydestroyedintheearthquake,leavingthetownwithnociviliantelephonecommunications.IntheothercitiesofArmenia,thesituationwasthesame.Themilitarytelephonesystemwasoperating,butitwasnotavailabletocivilianpersonnelandcouldnotbeusedtocallcivilianorganizationsorpersonnel.11ThisconditionwasfurthercomplicatedinthemulticulturalcontextofArmenia,wherethelanguageofcoordinationusedbygovernmentagencies,Russian,differsfromthelanguageofthepeoplewhoneedservices,Armenian.12Thiscomplexityincreasedwiththeentryofinternationalsearchandrescueteams,andadditionallanguages,intodisasteroperations.Culturaldifferencesposedaformidablebarriertocognitiveprocessesinhumaninteraction,alreadyunderstressbythetraumaoftheevent.13Coordinationrequiresaninfrastructureofcommunica-1311Briefing,civilDefenseHeadquarters,ArmeniaSSR,Yerevan,Armenia,March21,1989.12Briefing,CivilDefenseHeadquart'ers,ArmeniaSSR,Yerevan,Armenia,March21,1989.SeethediscussionoftheselectiveidentificationofriskinMaryDouglasandAaronWildavsky,RiskandCulture,(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1982.)Seealsothe15

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tionandcommonunderstandingthatfacilitatescollaborativeproblemsolvingandaction(Simon,1969,1981).Inthecomplex,uncertainenvironmentofdisaster,failureinonesystemtriggersfailureinother,relatedsystems.Likedominoesfallinginsequence,theearthquakesinArmeniaini-tiatedaseriesofeventsthatcausedsystemicfailureintheaffectedcommunities.Forexample,theschoolscollapsed,seriouslyinjuringchildrenandteacherstrappedinside.Simultaneously,thecommunicationsfacilitiesneededtocallforassistanceweredestroyed,aswerethehospitalfacilitiesneededtoprovidepromptmedicalcaretotheinjuredvictims,hadtransportbeenavailabletogetthemthere.Tragically,victimswhosurvivedtheearthquakediedfromthedamagedcommunity'sinabilitytorespondtotheirneedsintime.14TheproblemsinArmeniandisasteroperationswereinherentlyinterdisciplinary,requiringthecombinedknowledgeandskillsfrommultipledisciplinestomobilizeappropriateresponseundertheurgenttimeconstraintsofdisaster.Thecomplexityofdisasterissuchthatnosingledisciplinecanunraveltheproblem.Each,inturn,contributessUbstantivelytosolvingtheproblem.Yet,itrequirescontinualadjustmenttomaintainthefocusofattentiononthesharedproblemofsavinglivesinorderargumentpresentedbyJudithBradbury,liThePolicyImplicationsofDifferingConceptsofCulture"inScience,TechnologyandHumanValues,Vol.14,no.4;1989,inpress.14Interviews,Laywitnesses,Spitak,Leninakan,ArmeniaSSR,March22,1989.16

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tobringrelevantinformationfromthedisciplinesofgeophysics,engineering,medicine,organizationandmanagementtobearonthesuccessionofdynamicallyevolvingeventsindisasteroperations.Withoutfocus,effortstotakeactionmaylapseintostalemateorwanderofftrackinineffectiveusesofresourcesandtime.TheProblemofOrganizationTheproblemoforganizationfollowsdirectlyfromtheinterdependenceofhumansystemsincommunalenvironments.Withoutcommunication,therecanbenocoordination.withoutcoordination,therecanbenoorganization.BothSovietandinternationalobserversnotedaninitiallackoforganizationinthesearchandrescueoperations.15Coordinationofactionmeansknowingwhattodo,howtodoit,whentodoit,whowilldoitandwhattodoitwith.Thisknowledgedependsuponasharedunderstandingoftherequirementsofactionamongtheparti-cipants(Simon,1969,1981)involvedindisasteroperations.Withoutorganization,largenumbersofindividuals,thoughwell-intended,mayactuallyslowdownthesearchandrescueprocess,orhamperitinotherways.Forexample,whenstudentsatYerevanstateUniversitylearnedoftheearthquakesinnorthernArmeniaabout5:00p.m.onDecember7,1988,theyarrangedbusesfortransportationandleftforLeninakan.However,theyhadnopreviousexperienceindisasteroperationsand inLeninakan,eagertoworkbutunpreparedforthe15.Briefing,ChiefofMedicine,USSRcivilDefense,Moscow,March18,1989.Seealsonewspaperaccountsofresponsetothedisaster,NewYorkTimes,December8-31,1989.17

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extentofdevastationtheyfound.Theyhadnotools,nolights,notents,nofirstaidtraining,noglovesforworkingoutdoorsinsUbfreezingtemperatures.Fortoomany,theexperiencewasfruitlessandtheirenergieswereexpendedunproductively.Disappointed,theyreturnedtoYerevanandtriedtoregroup.16Toachieveorganizationindisasterenvironmentsrequirescleardefinitionoftheclassicfunctionsofdisasteroperations,sothatmultipleparticipantsmaybeintegratedintoanoverallresponseefforttomeetthevastarrayofdemandsgeneratedbythedisaster.Thisdefinitionoftasksisaproductofconsciouspolicydesign,bestdonepriortotheevent.Timetakenfororganizationaftertheeventsubtractspreciousminutes,hoursordaysfromthecriticalperiodduringwhichlife-savingoperationsaremost-productive.17TheProblemofEfficiencyDifficultiesgeneratedbytheinterdependenceofeventsand,sequentially,intheorganizationofresponseleadtotheproblemofefficiencyindisasteroperations.IntheArmeniandisaster,thisproblemwasunderscoredbythehighexpenditureofeffortandmoneyindisasterresponseincomparisontothelowrateofreturninterms of livessavedandtheheavylossesreportedindamages.ThesoberinglossesintheArmenianearthquakes--16.Interview,studentparticipantsindisasteroperations,YerevanstateUniversity,Yerevan,Armenia,March20,1989.17.SeeTable2above;seealsoP.Safar,E.PrettoandN.Bircher,"DisasterResuscitologyIncludingManagementofSevereTrauma"inP.BaskettandR.Weller(eds.),MedicineforDis-asters(London:Wright-ButterworthPubl.,1988):36-86.18

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25,000reporteddeadand$16billionindamages--compelustore-examineourunderstandingoftheprocessesofdisastermanagementandtoreconsiderourpresentproceduresforresponse.Efficiencyindisasteroperationsrequiresadifferentmeasure,whenthegoalistosavelivesplacedatrisk.Thedatashowthatifvictimsareextricatedwithinthefirst72 -96hours,theirchancesofsurvivalarehigher.TherateofliverecoveriesdropssharplyafterDay 4andprecipitouslyafterDay5.Themeasureofefficiencyindisasteroperationsisneces-sarilytime,notmoney,whichrunscountertothemeasureusedinroutineoperationsbymostgovernmentagencies.TheefficiencyoftheinternationalsearchandrescueteamsintheArmeniandisasteroperationsillustratesthisproblem.TheFrenchrescueteam,firstoftheinternationalteams,arrived79hoursaftertheevent.Theteamhelped1,000peoplewhowereinjured,buttheyrescuedonly15livevictimsfromtherubble.18otherteamsarrivedstilllaterandrescuedstillfewerlivevictims.19Disastermanagementnecessarilyinvolvestheperiodbeforetheeventaswellasafterinordertoaddresstheproblemofefficiency.Canlossesincurredindisasterbereduced?Wecannotstop18Interview,AttacheandCoordinator,FrenchContributiontoArmenianDisasterAssistance,EmbassyofFrance,Moscow,USSR,March17,1989.19Interviewswithofficialsresponsibleforcoordinatingtheirrespectivenation'scontributiontoArmeniandisasterassistanceintheEmbassiesoftheUnitedStates,GreatBritain,WestGermanyandItaly,Moscow, USSR,March15-18,1989.19

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theearthquakes,butarethereactionsthatcanbetakenpriortosucheventstoreducetherisktohumanpopulationsandtolessenthedamagetobuiltenvironmentsinzonesofknownseismicity?Intermsofefficiency,expendituresprojectedoveralOa-yearperiodtostrengthenconstructioncodesortopreparepopulationstorespondtoknownthreatsmaybecalculatedagainsttheknowncostsofdisasterwheretheseactionshavenotbeentaken.Toinitiatesuchapolicy,however,requiresthattheresponsibleorganizationstakethe"longtermview"(Naisbitt,1983),ashiftinperspectivethatdoesnotcorneeasilyinhumanorganizationsvyingforimmediatesupportincomplexpolicyenvironments(Deutsch,1963,1965).Suchapolicyshiftisnotlikelytobeachievedwithoutdesign.Disastermanagersareworkingagainsttimeinseekingtoincreasetheefficiencyofresponseoperations(Zancanato,1988;Safar,1976,1986.)Actionstakenornottakeninonephaseoftheclassiccycleofdisastermanagementmayfacilitateorhamperoperationsinthenext(Comfort,1985.)Clarifyingfunctionswithindisciplinesandwithintimephasesallowsmanagerstoseemoredirectlytherelationshipsbetweenimmediateproblemsandtheresourcesavailableforsolution,therebyincreasingefficiencyindisasteroperations.Cumulatively,thesethreeproblemsinterdependency,organizationandefficiencyinteracttodiminishhumanproblem-solvingcapacityindisasterenvironments.Repeatedly,weobservethathumanjudgmentfaltersincomplexenvironments,20

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andperformancedrops(Simon,1969,1981;Comfort,1985,1986,1987,1988).Thisdropinperformanceisrelateddirectlytothe"load"(Deutsch,1963,1966;Cohen,MarchandOlsen,1972),orburdenofdemands,placeduponhumancognitivecapacity.Itresultsnotfromperverseintentortimidity,butfromourlimitedabilitytoprocessinformationinshort-termmemory(NewellandSimon,1972.)"AccordingtocognitivetheoristsNewellandSimon,humandecision-makerssolveimmediateproblemsusingshort-termmemorycapacity,butsincethiscapacityislimitedtorememberingonlysevenitemsatatime,plusorminustwo,itiseasilyoverwhelmedincomplexenvironments(NewellandSimon,1972;Simon,1969,1981).Indisasterenvironments,withthetremendousfluxofinformation,thecognitiveprocessesofhumandecision-makersquicklybecomeoverloaded.Unabletoprocesstheinformationquicklyoraccurately,human"decision-makersignoremuchofit...anderrinjudgment,orworse,areunabletoact.Repeatedlyobservedindisasterenvironments20(Comfort,1985,1986,1988,1989),thissituationwasack-nowledgedbySovietofficialsinArmenia,andpromptedasoberingre-examinationofthedisastermanagementprocesswithintheUSSRandamongothernationalagenciesinvolvedindisasterassistanceandresponse.20Interview,Chief,CivilDefense,ArmeniaSSR,Yerevan,Armenia,March21,1989.Otherorganizations,nationalandinternational,alsore-examinedtheirroles1ntheArmeniandisasteroperationsinanefforttopreparemoreeffectivelyforparticipationinfuturedisasters.Forexample,aninternationalconferenceofleadersofsearchandrescueteamswassponsoredbytheUSOfficeofForeignDisasterAssistanceinWashington,D.C.,21

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Theinteractionoftheconditionsofdisasterenvironmentsandcharacteristicsofhumanproblemsolvingcapacitycreatesaconditioninwhichthemostpromisingalternativeforameliora-tionliesinincreasingindividualandorganizationalcapacityforperformance(Deutsch,1963,1966;Argyris,1984,1985).Thistask,difficultbyanymeasure,isconceivablewiththeap-propriatelinkageofcurrentinformationtechnologytoindividualandorganizationaldecision-makingprocessesindisastermanage-ment(Comfort,1988,1989.)problemofdesign.Itis,however,quintessentiallyaIncreasingcapacityforProblem-SolvinginUncertainEnvironmentsThecapacityofindividuals,organizationsandjurisdictionstorespondappropriatelytothecomplexrangeofdemandsgener-atedbyacatastrophicearthquakedependsdirectlyuponaccesstotimely,accurateinformationandmodesofprocessinginformationrelevanttoaction.Inthecomplex,uncertain,dynamicenviron-mentsofdisaster,decision-makersarelimitednotonlybythetechnicalfailuresofcommunicationsfacilities,butalsobytheirowncognitivecapacity,asstatedabove(NewellandSimon,.1972;Simon,1969,1981).BarryTurner,Britishsociologist,viewstheoccurrenceofdisasterasamanifestationofgapsininformationinsocietaldecision-makingprocesses,andourconse-quentabilitytorespondrationallytounanticipatedproblemsfromtheenvironment.Turner(1978:134)writes:May8-9,1989toexploremeansofimprovingperformanceinsearchandrescueoperationsinfuturedisasters.22

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...Thelimitsonrationalityareessentiallythelimitsofinformation-gatheringinaworldwhereinformation-gatheringhas costs; thelimitsofthenumberofpossiblealternativesolutionswhichcanreasonablybeconsideredandevaluated...andthelimitsofalackofknOWledgeoffutureeventswhererationalbehaviordependsupontheformulationandsuccessfulexecutionofplans which promiseattainmentsinthefuture.Consequently,theoccurrenceofdisastersignalstheneedforre-examinationoftheinformationprocessesuponwhichdecisionswithinandbetweenorganizations,withinandbetweenjurisdictionsarebasedinenvironments.withinthecomplex,dynamicnetoforganizationalinteractioncharacterizingagivencommunity,particularlyonevulnerabletoseismicrisk,gapsininformation,reasoningorcommunicationmayhavetriggeredunintendedconsequences,initiatingasequenceofeventsthatleadtodisaster.Thedecisionsleadingtotheconstruction(since1979)ofhigh-riseapartment inLeninakanthatfailedseriouslyintheDecember,1988earthquakestragicallyillustratesuchgapsininformationinthesocialdecision-makingprocess.21ReturningtoDeutsch's(1963,1966)conceptofperceptivereason,themostpromisingalternativeforincreasinghumanrationalityinthecomplexenvironmentofdisasteristoopenexistingdecisionprocessestoinsights,modes.ofinformationprocessingandassistanceexternaltopresentactorsandproce-dures.Currentinformationtechnologyallowsustoextendour21.Briefing,USReconnaissanceTeam,EarthquakeEngineeringResearchInstitute/NationalResearchCouncilontheArmenianEarthquakes,SanFrancisco,CA,February9,1989:4:00-7:00p.m23

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humanproblem-solvingcapacitywiththeaidofcarefullydesignedcomputerizedknowledgebases,heuristicreasoningprocessesandspatialrepresentationofcomplexinformation,accessibleoverlongdistancesthroughtelecommunicationsandsatellitelinkages(Nii,1987;Hayes-Roth,WatermanandLenat,1983;Dodhiawala,Jagannathan,BaumandSkillman,1989;McCann,TaylorandTuori,1988;Comfort,1986,1989).Yet,thesesystemsneedtobedesignedtosupporthumandecisionprocessesinthecomplex,dynamicenvironmentsofdisaster(Comfort,1988,1989).IntegratingInformationProcessestoSupportProblemSolvinginEnvironmentsatRiskThethreeinitialproblemsidentified"intheArmeniandisasteroperationsinterdependence,organizationandefficiencysuggestthreebasicdimensionsthatcharacterizedecisionprocessesindisastermanagementateachjurisdictionallevel.Thesedimensionsaretime,functionanddiscipline,andcanberepresentedinalayeredknowledgebase,asshowninFigure1.Withineachjurisdiction,thesedimensionsmaybefurtherspecifiedintosub-typesthatorderinformationneededbydisastermanagerswithdifferingresponsibilities.Thedimensionofdiscipline,forexample,addressestheproblemofinterdependence.Ifinformationcriticaltodecisionsinvolvingthedifferingperspectivesofdisastermanagementtechnical,organizational,medical,politicalandcultural--areorganizedbydisciplineandareaccessibletoallmanagersoperatingateachjurisdictionallevel,theresultwillbeasharedknowledge24

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FIGURE 1A Model of Multi-jurisdictional Response in Disaster Management J>Vlt-AAflf.. INTERNATIONAL NATIONAL eo REGIONAL LOCAL tI.N21>

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baseforinterdisciplinaryproblemsolvingthatwouldotherwisenotbeavailabletoanysinglemanager.ThisspecificationofdimensionsisshownforalocaljurisdictioninFigure2.Thedimensionoftimeiscritical,notonlyasameasureofefficiencyindisastermanagement,butintheclearspecificationoftasksthatshowthesequenceofevolvingphasesindisastermanagement.Tasksnotperformedinonephasearelikelytocarryoverandincreasetheloadoforganizationaldemandsrequiringresponseinsucceedingphases.Theclassicsequenceoftimephasesindisastermanagement(McLoughlin,1985),showninFigure2,allowsthespecificationofprimarytasksduringeachphasefordisastermanagersattherespectivejurisdictionallevels.Thedimensionoffunctioniscentraltotheintegrationofinformationfromthedifferingorganizationalactorswithineachjurisdictionandwithinthesetoffourjurisdictions.Also-showninFigure2arefivebasicfunctionsperformedbymanagersateachjurisdictionallevel:notificationoftheevent,assessmentofneeds,mobilizationofresources,performanceoftasks,evaluationofperformanceandredesignofnewactions.Infurtherspecificationoftasks,theinformationessentialforeachdisciplinemaybespecifiedbytimeandfunctionindisastermanagement.Figure3illustratesthisspecificationforthemedicaldisciplinebythesUbdisciplinesofbasiclifesupport,advancedlifesupportandprolongedlifesupport(Safar,1976,1986;Klainetal.,1989)Insummary,itispossibletodesignaknowledgebasethat26

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ordersinformationbythedimensionsoftime,functionanddisciplinethatareessentialtodecision-makinginenvironmentsatrisk.Suchaknowledgebasewouldbothincreaseaccesstosharedinformationforparticipatingdisastermanagersandreducethecomplexityofinformationprocessingrequiredofmanagersindisasteroperations,therebysUbstantivelyextendingtheirproblem-solvingcapacity.Combinedwiththeinteractivecapacityofsatelliteandtelecommunicationsfacilitiesandintelligentreasoningroutinesintheutilizationoftheknowledgebase,itispossibletocreateaninteractivenetworkofinformationsearch,processinganddisseminationfordisastermanagementthatmayincreaseperformanceinthedifficult,complex,dynamicenvironmentsofdisaster(McCann,TaylorandTuori,1988.)Ademonstrationmodelforaninteractive,intelligent,spatialinformationsystem(IISIS)forlocalpublic,privateandnonprofitorganizationsiscurrentlyunderdevelopmentforthePittsburghMetropolitanRegion(Comfort,Woods&Nesbitt,1989.)CriticaltoimprovingperformanceindisasterenvironmentsistheaccurateinterpretationandappropriateutilizationoftheinformationavailabletomUltipledecision-makersoperatingatmultiplelevelsindisastermanagement.Computerscanalsohelphumandecisionmakersshiftlevelsofanalysismoreeasilyininterpretingthevastfluxofinformationthatcharacterizesdisasterenvironments.Theproblem-solvingprocessindisastermanagementshiftsthroughatleastsixlevelsofaggregationandinference(Argyris,1980:147)inthetranslationofinforma-29

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tionintoaction,asshowninFigure4.Theseshiftsinlevelsofaggregationandinferencearenoteasyformanagerswithemergencyresponsibilities,aseachshiftrequiresthatwerethinktheproblemsinthecontextofexpandeddataandbroadercategoriesofpossibleinteraction(Argyris,1984.)Undertheurgentstressandpressureoftimeinactualdisasteroperations,thiscognitivetaskisparticularlydifficult,ifnotimpossibleforhumandecision-makers.Mostmanagersshifteasilyfromtheindividualtothesubdisciplinarytothedisciplinarylevels,butfinditincreasinglydifficulttomovetomUltidisciplinary,interdisciplinaryandsocietallevelsofaggregationofinformationandinferencetoaction.Yet,itispreciselythecapacitytodesignactionsatthesehigherlevelsofaggregationandinferencethatarecentraltoincreasingtheeffectivenessofperformanceofourorganizationalandsocialinfrastructureincatastrophicdisaster.Torespondeffectivelytodisaster,ortocopewiththeriskspresentedbyenvironmentsvulnerabletodisaster,weneedtocreateflexibleorganizations(MeltsnerandBellavita,1984)thatwillexpandrapidlytomeetthesuddendemandsofdisasterandcontracteasilywhenthethreathaspassedandoperationsreturntoroutineconditions.Currentinformationtechnologyallowsustodevelopthiscapacitybydesign,andrecentdevelopmentsindisastermanagementaremovingsteadilyinthisdirection.Figure5showsasetofexistinginformationsystemsthatmayservethisneed,ifextendedandlinkedinanetworkof30

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FIGURE 4 Levels of Aggregation and InferenceinDisaster ResearchLevel of Inference Unit of Aggregation Research Task6Societal Definition of Goal: To Protect Life and Reduce Loss 5Interdisciplinary Definition of Problem 4Multidisciplinary Data Collection and Measurement -3Disciplinary Data Analysis and Interpretation of Findings 2Sub-disciplinary Design of Alternative Strategies for Action 1Individual Direct Observation, Reflection and Redesign Unit of Observation: Individual Unit of Analysis: Organization Measure of Performance: EfficiencyinTIme Outcome Variable: Lives Saved I Lives Lost31

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FIGURE 5 Interactive International Disaster Information Network United Nations Emergency Information Network UNIENET tNational Emergency Information Systems e.g. IEMIS, US Federal Emergency Management Agency tRegional E,l1ergency Information Systems at Sub-national levels, State / Province / Regency, e.g. EIS, Pennsylvania tLocal Emergency Management Systems at Municipal, County, Cantonal Levels, e.g. IISISS, Pittsburgh Metropolitan Region C"i I f-.;.:......__:.,-:.... I, "< .. -".. .International Organization for Disaster Management32

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internationalinformationsystemstosupportdecisionprocessesfordisasterresponseandriskreduction.Developedandusedeffectively,suchasetofinformationnetworksmaybeusedtosupport"policyorganizations,"thatis,fulltimeorganizationsofpersonnelwithpart-timeresponsibilities(MeltsnerandBellavita,1984)fordisastermanagement.MostmanagerswithemergencyresponsibilitiesinpUblicand/orprivateorganizationshaveotherresponsibilitiesandotherjobs.Theycornetogetheronlyinthecontextofdisastertocarryouta commonpolicyofcoordinatedresponse.Thesepolicyorganizationscouldoperateatjurisdictionallevelstomeetparticulardemandsor,linkedtogether,respondpromptlyandappropriatelytomeetthedemandsofacatastrophicdisaster.Communicationandcoordinationprocessesarecrucial,however,fortheeffectiveutilizationofskillsandknowledgeoftherespectiveparticipants.Totheextentthattheseorganizationsaredesignedandusedeffectively,theyareIikelytoreducethedimensionsofcatastropheinenvironmentsatrisk.Suchutilizationmaybefacilitatedthroughaninteractive,intelligent,spatialinformationsystem.33

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REFERENCESArgyris,Chris.1980.InnerContradictionsofRigorousResearch.(NewYork:AcademicPress).Argyris,Chris.1984.Reasoning,LearningandAction.(SanFrancisco:JosseyBass).Argyris,Chris.Boston:Pitman.1985.Strategy,ChangeandDefensiveRoutines.Boutacoff,David.1989."RealWorldLessonsinSeismicSafety."EPRIJournal,June:23-29.Bradbury,Judith.1989."ThePolicyImplicationsofDifferingConceptsofCulture."Science,TechnologyandValues,Vol.14,no.4,inpress.Cohen,MichaelD.,JamesG.MarchandJohannGarbageCanModelofOrganizationalChoice."ScienceQuarterly17,no.1(March):1-25.Olsen.1972."AAdministrativeComfort,LouiseK.1989b."OrganizationalInteractioninResponseandRecovery"inRobertL.Schuster,ed.,TheMarch 2, 1987EcuadorianEarthquakes,(Washington,D.C.:NationalResearchcouncil,committeeonInternationalDisasters,post-DisasterResearchReport,inpress.)InEnglishandSpanish.Comfort,LouiseK.1989a."TheSanSalvadorEarthquake"inUrielRosenthal,MichaelT.Charles,andPault'Hart,eds.,CopingwithCrisis:TheManagementofDisasters,RiotsandTerrorism(Springfield,IL.,CharlesC.Thomas):323-339.Comfort,LouiseK.PolicyPerspectives.1988.ManagingDisaster:Strategies(Durham,NC:DukeUniversityPress).Comfort,LouiseK.1986."InternationalDisasterAssistanceintheMexicoCityEarthquake,"NewWorld,Vol.1,No.2,Fall:1243.Comfort,LouiseK.1985."IntegratingorganizationalActioninEmergencyManagement:StrategiesforChange,"PublicAdministrationReviewVol.45,SpecialIssue:"EmergencyManagement:AChallengeforPublicAdministration,"January:155-164.Deutsch,Karl.1963,1966.TheNervesofGovernment.(Glencoe,IL:TheFreePress).Dodhiawala,Jagannathan,BaumandSkillman.1989."TheFirstWorkshoponBlackboardsystems."TheAIMagazine10,no.1:7780.

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Douglas,MaryandAaronWildavsky.1982.RiskandCulture.(Berkeley:universityofCaliforniaPress).Hayes-Roth,Frederick,DonaldWatermanandDouglasLenat.BuildingExpertSystems.Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley.1983.Klain,Miroslav,EdmundRicci,PeterSafar,VictorSemenov,ErnestoPretto,SamuelTisherrnan,JoelAbrams,LouiseComfortandotherMembersoftheDisasterReanimatologyStudyGroup.1989."DisasterReanimatologyPotentials:AStructuredInterviewStudyinArmenia.I.MethodologyandPreliminaryResults"inPrehospitalandDisasterMedicine3:forthcoming.McCann,C.A.,M.M.TaylorandM.I.Tuori.1988."ISIS:TheInteractiveSpatialInformationSystem."InternationalJournalofMan-MachineStudies28(1988):101-138.McLoughlin,David.1985."AFrameworkforIntegratedEmergencyManagement."PublicAdministrationReview45,SpecialIssue(January):165-172.Meltsner,ArnoldandChristopherBellavita.1984.ThePolicyOrganization.BeverlyHills:SagePublications.Naisbitt,John.1983.Megatrends:TenNewDirectionsTransformingourLives.(NewYork:Bantam).Nii,H.Penny..1986."BlackboardSystems:TheBlackboardModelofProblemSolvingandtheEvolutionofBlackboardArchitectures.PartOne."TheAIMagazine,August:82-106.Nii,H.Penny.1986."BlackboardSystems:BlackboardApplicationSystem,BlackboardSystemsfromaKnowledgeEngineeringPerspective."TheAIMagazine,Summer:38-52.Newell,AllenandHerbertA.Simon.1972.HumanProblemSolving.EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.:PrenticeHall.Safar,P.,E.PrettoandN.Bircher.1988."DisasterResuscitologyIncludingManagementofSevereTrauma"inP.BaskettandR.Weller(eds.)MedicineforDisasters(London:Wright-ButterworthPublishers):36-86.Shrivastava,Paul.1987.Bhopal:Anatomyof .9. Crisis.Cambridge,MA:MITPress.simon,HerbertA.1969,1981.TheSciencesoftheArtificial.Cambridge,MA:TheMITPress.Turner,Barry.1978.Man-madeDisasters.London:Wykeman.u.s.FederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA).1980.AnAssessmentoftheConsequencesandPreparationsfor .9. CatastrophicCaliforniaEarthquake:FindingsandActionsTaken.

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Washington,D.C.u.s.OfficeofForeignDisasterAssistance.1986.FinalDisasterReport:TheMexicoCityEarthquake.Washington,D.C.:January.Zancanato,Robert.1988."BLOBS--AnObject-OrientedBlackboardSystemFrameworkforReasoninginTime."R.EngelmoreandT.Morgan,BlackboardSystems.Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley:335-346.


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