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The management of a maritime crisis

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Title:
The management of a maritime crisis the integration of planning, prevention, and response
Series Title:
Quick response research report ;
Physical Description:
24 p. : ill. ; 28 cm.
Language:
English
Creator:
Harrald, John R ( John Richard )
Marcus, Henry S
Wallace, William A., 1935-
University of Colorado, Boulder -- Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center
Publisher:
Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, University of Colorado
Place of Publication:
Boulder, Colo.
Publication Date:

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Alaska, 1989   ( lcsh )
Oil spills -- Alaska -- Prince William Sound Region   ( lcsh )
Emergency management   ( lcsh )
Marine accidents   ( lcsh )
Genre:
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )

Notes

Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references (p. 22-24).
Additional Physical Form:
Also issued online as part of a joint project with the Louis de la Parte Florida Mental Health Institute (FMHI) Research Library’s disaster mental health initiative.
Statement of Responsibility:
by John Harrald, Henry Marucs sic, and William A. Wallace.
General Note:
Cover title.
General Note:
Second author's name misspelled on cover.
General Note:
"... prepared for presentation at the fall ORSA/TIMS meeting in New York City, New York, October 16-18, 1989, and the Industrial Crisis Conferences, New York City, New York, November 2-4, 1989."
General Note:
"October 1989."

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Source Institution:
University of South Florida Library
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University of South Florida
Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
aleph - 001985172
oclc - 39104743
usfldc doi - F57-00038
usfldc handle - f57.38
System ID:
SFS0001119:00001


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The management of a maritime crisis :
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by John Harrald, Henry Marucs [sic], and William A. Wallace.
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Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, University of Colorado,
[1989]
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24 p. :
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Quick response research report ;
v #34
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Cover title.
Second author's name misspelled on cover.
"... prepared for presentation at the fall ORSA/TIMS meeting in New York City, New York, October 16-18, 1989, and the Industrial Crisis Conferences, New York City, New York, November 2-4, 1989."
504
Includes bibliographical references (p. 22-24).
"October 1989."
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Also issued online as part of a joint project with the Louis de la Parte Florida Mental Health Institute (FMHI) Research Librarys disaster mental health initiative.
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THEMANAGEMENTOFAMARITIMECRISIS:THEINTEGRATIONOFPLANNING, PREVENTION,ANDRESPONSEbyJohnHarrald,HenryMarucsandWilliamA.WallaceQuickResponseReport #34 October1989This publication is partofthe Natural Hazards Research&Applications Information Center's ongoing Quick Response Research Report Series. http://www.colorado.edu/hazardsThispaperwaspreparedforpresentationattheFallORSA/TIMSmeetinginNewYorkcity,NewYork,October16-18,1989,andtheIndustrialCrisisConferences,NewYorkCity,NewYork,November2-4,1989.TheResearchwassupportedbytheNationalScienceFoundationunderarapidassessmentgrantfromtheNaturalandManmadeHazardMitigationProgram,andbytheNaturalHazardsResearchandApplicationInformationCenterattheUniversityofColorado.

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" THEMANAGEMENTOFA MARITIMECRISIS:THEINTEGRATIONOFPLANNING, PREVENTION,ANDRESPONSEbyJohnR.HarraldDepartmentofEngineeringAdministrationSchoolofEngineeringandAppliedScienceTheGeorgeWashingtonUniversityWashington,D.C.20052(202)676-8609HenryS.MarcusOceanSystemsManagementProgramDepartmentofOceanEngineeringMassachusettsInstituteofTechnologyCambridge,Massachusetts02139andWilliamA.WallaceDecisionSciencesandEngineeringSystemsRensselaerPolytechnicInstituteTroy,NewYork12180-3590

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INTRODUCTIONcrisismanagementincludesassessmentofrisks,determinationofthewaytoachievethelowestpossible(oracceptable)levelofrisk,theestablishmentofsystemsandprocedurestomaintainthesystematanacceptablelevel,thepreparation(contingencyplanning)requiredtodealwitheventswhichcouldtakeplace,andthemanagementofresponseorganizationsandactionsresultingfromthispreparationwhenanincidentoccurs.Eachoftheseelementshasaneconomiccostandakeyelementincrisismanagementistherationalallocationofthesecosts.Theobjectiveofthispaperistoexaminetheintegrationofprevention,planningandresponseinthemanagementofmaritimecrises.ThepaperconcludeswithapreliminaryanalysisoftheEXXONVALDEZincidentbaseduponaNationalScienceFoundationfundedrapidassessmentstudyconductedbytheauthors.Maritimecrises,involvingthesavingoflivesandthesalvageofshipsandcargo,havebeenaresultofmaritimecommercesincemanfirststartedmovinggoodsbywater.Rescueandsalvageorganizationsevolvedthroughouttheworldandhavehistoricallydealtwithmaritimecasualtiesinaprofessional(andoftenheroic)manner.ThecostsofmaritimecasualtieshistoricallyhasbeenabsorbedbyacomplexsystemofunderwritersandPrudentialandIndemnityclubs.AturningpointinmaritimehistoryoccurredonMarch18,1967whenthe117,000dwtsupertankerTORREYCANYONstrandedontheSevenStonesrocksintheareaofseabetweenCornwallandtheIslesofscilly.Aminorhumanerrorcausedtheincident--theautomaticcontrolswitchwaslockedon,disengagingthehelm.(Ironically,asimilaractionisbelievedtohavecontributedtotheEXXONVALDEZincident.)Theinabilityofexistingmaritimeresponseorganizationstodealwiththe100,000tonsofescapedcrudeoilwassoonevident.Themaritimecrisiseventwas

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redefined:societyrealizedthatitmustsomehowlearntoprotectitselfandtheenvironmentfromthecargoreleasedduringamaritimecasualty.Progressindealingwiththisnewtypeofcrisishasbeenslow.ThegroundingofthetankvesselARGOMERCHANToffofCapeCodinDecemberof1976providedevidencethattheproblemsofoilspillpreventionandresponsehadnotbeensolved.Ina1979articlereviewingtheprogressofoilspillcleanupinthetenyearssincetheTorreyCanyonincident,White,NicholsandGarnettstatethat"littleprogresshasbeenmadeoverthepastdecadetoreducetheimpactofoilspillstotheextentthatavailabletechnologyshouldallow".Ina1979reporttheNationalResearchCounciloftheNationalAcademyofSciencesstatedthat,"littleattentionhasbeenpaidtohowgovernmentandindustrywouldrespondtoamajormaritimecasualtyinvolvinghazardouscargo...[and]..thetechnicalcommunity..isconcernedaboutthecapabilitytodoSO.IIIna1984ManaaementSciencearticle,theauthorsstatedthat,litheproblemofprovidinganimmediateresponse[toanoilspill]inareaswheremajorenvironmentaldamagemaybedoneinlessthan6-12hourshasnotbeensolvedorextensivelystudied.TheenvironmentaldamagecausedbyoilspillsintheseareascouldbemassiveandthepUblicinterestwouldbeintense.Intheseareas,thenationalstrategyfails.1IThedifficultyinpreparingforandrespondingtooilspillsstemsfromthefactthattheseareextremelyrareeventswithimpactsfargreaterthanthoseexperiencedduringmoreroutineemergencies.Societydoesnotdealeasilywithlowprobabilityhighconsequenceevents,particularlywhenthe risk isduetoatechnologicalhazard.Wenk(1986)notesthatthecatastrophiceventisqualitativelydifferentfromlesssevereaccidents;anobservationthatisparticularlytruewhenappliedtooil2

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spills.Karwan(1985)pointsout,forexample,that,"alargespillresponsestrategyinvolvespreparingforspillsover625,000timeslargerthanthemedianspillorover4,400timestheaveragespill."Psaraftis(1985),statesthat"strategicoilspillresponsedecisionstypicallyinvolveplanninghorizonsofconsiderableduration(e.g.515years).Thepublic'sattitudetowardlowprobability,highconsequenceeventstendstowardpolarextremes.Mostpeoplerarelythinkoftheeventandwhentheydotheyfocusonthelowprobabilityandassurethemselvesthatthehighconsequenceeventwillneverhappenandthatuntestedresponseplanswillbeadequateifitdoes.othersseeonlytheconsequenceofacatastrophiceventandinsisttheactivityshouldnotbeallowednomatterhowsmalltherisk.(e.g.thereactionofmanypeopletothenuclearpowerindustryaftertheThreeMileIslandincident).Thispositiongainsadherentsimmediatelyafteramajorincidentwhenpublicinterestintheriskandconsequencesofacatastrophiceventisintenselyshownforabriefperiod.If,however,theeventdoesnotreoccur,interestdiminishesrapidlyovertime.Thepublicresponsetotheriskofamajoroilspillfollowsthispattern,identifiedbyWenk(1986)as,"thepoliticsofrisk":neglectuntilsomeeventdramatizesanoldandhiddenbutsignificantdangerandthenover-reaction.Wedealroutinelywiththeaccidentsoflimitedconsequence,butcannotdealrationallywiththecatastrophicevent.Intheabsenceofanymajormaritimedisastersinu.s.watersduringthelastdecade,concernsaboutthepreventionandcontrolofhazardouscargoreleasesdidnotbecomemajorissues.TheMarch1989groundingoftheEXXONVALDEZandtheresulting240,000barrelcargoreleasehasshownthattheenvironmentalandsocietalrisksassociatedwiththe3

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maritimetransportoflargequantitiesofhazardouscargocannotbeignored.Unfortunately,thespillalsoillustratedthatprocesseswhichcanreducetheserisksareonlylooselycoupled,andthattherelationshipsbetweentheseactivitiesarepoorlyunderstood.Publicacceptanceofoiltransportandexplorationinenvironmentallysensitiveregionshasbeenshaken.Thegovernmentandtheindustryarebeingchallengedtodemonstrateanabilitytoprevent,toplanfor,andtomanageamajorresponseeffort.significantlegislativeand decisionswillbemadeonthebasisofthisdifficultdemonstration.Theauthorscontendthatanintegratedexaminationoftheareasofriskreduction,contingencyplanning,andincidentresponseshouldbeundertaken.ValuablelinkagesbetweentheactivitiescanbedevelopedandpOlicytradeoffscanbeidentified.Wedefinethesebroadareasasfollows:RiskReductionincludesawiderangeofactionswhichreducetheriskofareleaseofamaritimehazardouscargo.Activitieswhichreducetheriskofshipcasualtiesincludethesitingofportfacilities,theconfigurationandmarkingofharborchannels,thecontrolofvesseltrafficandtheestablishmentandenforcementofpersonnelstandards.Theriskofacargoreleaseresultingfromashipcasualtycanbereducedthroughcargoloading,handling,storageandshipdesignandconstructionstandards.contingencyPlanningincludes actionswhichinsurethatanadequateresponsecanbemountedtoamaritimecasualtyinvolvingahazardouscargo.contingencyplanningincludesthedevelopmentofaccidentscenarios,thegamingofthepossibleconsequencesofthesescenarios,andtheidentificationandcreationoftheorganizational,4

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financial,andphysicalresourcesrequiredtominimizetheimpactoftheseincidents.IncidentResponseincludesaseriesofrelatedactionsintendedtominimizetheimpactofanincidentonceitoccurs.Theyincludethecountermeasureactionstakentosalvagetheshipandcargo.(TheNationalAcademytermsmarinesalvageaslithemiddlegroundbetweenpreventingcasualtiesandcleaningupafterthem").Responseactivitiesmayincludetheevacuationofpopulations(ifthethreatoftoxicexposureorfireexists)andwillincludeallactionstakento"cleanup"afterthespill.AstheEXXONVALDEZincidentshows,theseactionsareconstrainedbytheresourcesandorganizationscreatedthroughthecontingencyplanningprocess.THEANALYSISOFCRISISDECISIONMAKINGOnceacatastrophiceventoccurs,responsibledisastermanagersmustcreateanorganizationappropriatetothedemandsofthecrisis.Inordertodothis,thedisasterandthedecisionsthatwillhavetobemadeinitswakemustbeanticipated.contingencyplanning,inotherwords,mustbescenariobasedanddecisionoriented.Thegenerationofrealisticscenariosiscriticalandnon-trivial.Alyeskabasedtheircontingencyplanontwoscenarios,aroutinespillandaworstcasespill.Theworstcasescenarioenvisioneda200,000bblreleasefromatankerina10hourperiOdunderidealweatherconditions.TheEXXONVALDEZlost240,000bblsinapproximately2-3hours.Scenariogenerationisacreative,challengingtaskrequiringadequatetimeandexpertparticipants.Warplannershaveinvestedextensiveresourcesgeneratingscenariosonwhichtobasenationalstrategyandtactics.TheNationalAcademyofSciences(1979)producedastudyofthenation'scapabilityofrespondingtoamaritimehazardousmaterials5

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incidentbaseduponasetofskillfullycreatedscenarios.Nunamaker,WeberandChen(1989)haveusedtheUniversityofArizonadecisionsupportroomtofacilitatethedevelopmentofcrisisscenariosbyseniorexecutivesofmajorindustries.Contingencyplannersmusthaveclearunderstandingofthetypeofeventswhichmayoccurandtherelativeprobabilityoftheseevents.Adescriptionofaneventisnot,initself,ascenario.Thescenarioincludesadescriptionofenvironmentalconditions,responseoptions,tacticalproblems,andcriticalconcerns.Onceasetofscenariosisgenerated,thedecisionprocesswhichwillcreateandimplementtheresponsecapabilitymustbeanalyzed.Thisdecisionprocessis,initssimplestterms,oneofpatternmatching.Thedisasterhasdimensionsoflocation,duration,intensity,andimpact.Theresponsewillhavethedimensionsofpeople,skills,equipment,money,andtime.Fraser(1979),forexample,discusses how realisticscenariosarecriticalfortheselectionandsizingofresponseequipment.Garry(1981)shows how scenarioscanbeusedtoestimateresourcerequirementsforastateresponseplan.Bellantonietale(1979)usedasetofscenariostodeterminerecommendeddeploymentrequirementsforu.s.CoastGuardpollutionresponseequipment.Matchingtheresourcestotheproblemwillrequireaseriesofdecisionswhichmustbeanticipatedandanalyzedduringthecontingencyplanningprocess.Whatdecisionsmustbemade?Whatinformationshouldbeavailabletothedecisionmakerwhenthesedecisionsaremade?Whataretherelationshipsbetweenvariablesandoutcomes?Howarethedecisionsconstrainedbyavailableresources?Theoutputofthisdecisionanalysisisanidentificationofinformationrequirements,identificationofresourcerequirementsandconstraints,andthe6

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developmentoftrainingscenariosfordecisionmakers.Thedecisionanalysiswillalsopredicttheresultsofoptimalresponseeffortsandhas,therefore,implicationsforpreventionstrategies.If,forexample,oilspillcontainmentandvesselsalvageoperationswouldbeimpossibleundercertainweatherconditions,morestringentvesselmovementcontrolmaybejustified.THEEXXONVALDEZ: ACASESTUDYTheauthorsweresponsoredbytheNationalScienceFoundationtovisitthesiteoftheEXXONVALDEZspillandtoidentifypotentialareasforfutureresearch.Theresearchteamfoundthatdecisionmakingintheearlyhoursoftheresponseeffortwasconstrainedbyinadequateplanninginseveralways.Themostobvioussymptomofinadequateplanningwasthelackofimmediatelyavailableresponseresources,afactwelldocumentedinsUbsequentgovernmentandpressreports.Moresubtle,butperhapsequallyserious,wasthefailuretoanticipatethedecisionsandactionswhichamajorincidentwouldrequireandtodevelopinformationanddecisionaidswhichwouldsupporttheseactions.suchcomputerbasedaidsaredescribedbyBelardoetale(1984),Everson(1986),HarraldandConway(1981),MickandWallace(1986),andWallaceandDeBalough(1985).Eventually,thefederalOSC,thestateOSC,andEXXONallevolvedcomputersystemstotrackresourceallocations,cleanupprogress,availabilityofkeypersonnel,andspillmovement.Thesesystemsarerelativelysophisticated,involvinglargedatabasesandgeographicalinformationsystems,andliterallyhundredsofpersonalcomputersareinuseatthespillsite.Unfortunately,noneofthistechnologywasinplaceatthetimeofthespill;theinformationonresourcerequirementsandavailability,7

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spillmovement,andvulnerabilityofareasinthepathofthespillwerenotreadilyavailabletodecisionmakers.Inordertoidentifyproblemareasinthedecisionmakingprocessduringthespillresponse, we constructedapreliminarynormativemodelofthisprocessduringtheEXXONVALDEZincident.Anormativemodelisadescriptionofwhatshouldhavehappened,assumingthatadecisionmakerhadaccesstoallrelevantinformationandpossessedtheabilitytosortandtocorrectlyprocessthisinformation.TheemergentstageoftheresponsetotheEXXONVALDEZoilspillwasmodeledwiththedecisionanalysistechniqueofinfluencediagramsusingthesoftwarepackageDAVID.Theresult,isshowninfigure 1. Aninfluencediagram'sBayesianlogicisequivalenttothatofadecisiontree,butitpresentsamuchclearervisualpictureofthedecisionprocess.AsdefinedbyShachter(1987),aninfluencediagramisanetworkrepresentationofprobabilisticanddeterministicvariables,decisionsandanobjective.Thestochasticvariablesarerepresentedbysingleovals,deterministicvariablesbydoubleovals,anddecisionsbyrectangles.Arrowsrepresentthedirectionofinfluence.Aninfluencediagramnotonlyshowsrelationshipsbetweenvariablesanddecisions,itimpliestheinformationrequirementsfordecisionmaking.HowardandMatheson(1984),Owen(1984),andShachter(1984)showhowtheinfluencediagramcanbeusedtomodelcomplexdecisionprocesses.Shachter(1987)showsthatifadiagram'sstructureisdeterminedandtheoutcomesanddistributionsofkeyvariablesarespecified,thenthediagrammaybesolvedinamannersimilartoadecisiontree.Theprocessofdrawing,manipulating,andanalyzinginfluencediagramshasbeen made easierbythesoftwarepackageDAVIDdesignedbyShachter(1988)fortheAPPLE8

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MacIntosh,SEandAPPLEIIcomputers.Thispackageenablesthecreationandrapidmodificationofinfluencediagramsthusprovidingausefulmeansofcommunicatingthecomplexityandinter-relationshipsofadecisionsequence.Forexample,thisinteractivecapabilitywasusedbyoneoftheauthorstoassistseniordisasterservicemanagersintheAmericanNationalRedCrosstoanalyzetheircrisisdecisionmakingprocessasafirststageinthedesignanddevelopmentofdecisionaids(Harrald,1988).AusefulinterpretationofthenormativeinfluencediagramoftheEXXONVALDEZresponsecanbemadeusingsimon'smodelofthedecisionmakingprocess.Inhisinformationprocessingviewofcognition,thedecisionmakingprocessstartswithanintelligencegatheringphasewhichleadstothedevelopmentofalternatives,ordesignphase.Oncealternativesaregenerated,thedecisionmakerisabletocomparealternativesandmakeachoice.Thefinalstageisimplementation.Infigure1,theupperleveloftheinfluencediagramrepresentsthestochasticanddeterministicvariableswhichmustbeknowninorderforthedecisionmakertomakeinformedstrategicchoices.Thiscorrespondstothediagnosis,orintelligencegathering,stageofdecisionmaking.IntheEXXONVALDEZincident,forexample,thealternatecaptainofthePortwassentouttophysicallyboardthevesseltoascertaintheextentofthedamage,thestabilityofthevessel,andtherateofcargoloss.Thenextlevelofthediagramrepresents.aseriesofstrategicchoices,thevalidityofwhichdependedheavilyonthequalityofinformationavailable.Thesedecisionsincludethedecisionstooffloadthevessel,toinitiatesalvagemeasures,toactivatetheRegionalResponseTeam,toinitiatethestagingofresponseresources,theactivation9

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ofthepre-designatedOnSceneCoordinatororganization,andtheacceptanceofresponsibilityforcleanupbyEXXON.Theoutputsofthesedecisionsweretheorganizationalstructuresandresources(equipmentandpeople)whichwereavailabletocombatthespillintheearlydays.Thesedeterministicvariablesactedasconstraintsfortheroundoftacticaldecisionswhichmadeupthenextroundofdecisionmaking:theuseofdispersants,theallocationofcontainmentandremovalequipment,andtheuseofbiologicalandburningagentstocombattheoil.Thevariablesdescribingtheresultsofthesedecisionsrepresenttheamountofoilremoved,dispersed,burnedorbiodegraded.Sincethiswasarelativelysmallamount,thefinalroundofdecisionmakingintheinitialstageofthespillresponsewastheallocationofboomstoprotectvulnerableresources,andthereplacementandaugmentationofon-sceneresources.Theoutputvariabledescribingthecompletionoftheemergentstageofthespillresponsearevariablesdescribingthemilesofbeachaffected,theimpactonfisheriesandbirdandmarinemammalpopUlations.Theinfluencediagramdoesnotshowtheevolutionofthespillresponseintoamassivebeachcleaningoperationandmediaevent.ThediagramalsodoesnotshowthegoalofthedecisionprocessduringtheEXXONVALDEZincident(Whichwouldbeindicatedbyaroundedrectangle).Itisnotclearfromtheinitialanalysisthatdecisionmakershadaconsistentandclearsetofgoals.Thediagrammaybeusedasabasisforanalyzingtheinformationgathering,processingandalternativegenerationwhichoccurredduringtheEXXONVALDEZincident.Moreimportantly,thetechniqueshownmayassistinthedevelopmentoffutureworstcasescenarios,decisionaids,andinformationresources.Similaranalysescouldbe10

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conductedforhazardouscargoscenarioswhereadecisionmakermustmakeaseriesofcountermeasure,evacuationandmitigationdecisionsbaseduponsparseinformation.ISSUESIDENTIFIEDINTHEEXXONVALDEZINCIDENTDuringtheassessmentoftheEXXONVALDEZoilspill,theauthors:interviewedfederal,state,local,andindustryofficials;visitedcommandpostsandcleanupsites;andwereprovidedaccesstorecords,messagetrafficandsituationreportsThefollowingisabriefsummaryofissuesinthepreventionandmanagementofmaritimecriseswhichwereidentifiedintheauthors'analysis.1.Externalities/Roleoftheu.s.Government/stateGovernmentOceancarriers,suchastankerowners,operateinabusinessenvironmentwheremanyexternalitiesexistthatareoutsideoftheircontrol.Nevertheless,theseexternalitiesmayhaveasignificantimpactontheiroperations.GovernmentalbodiessuchastheU.S.CoastGuard,andclassificationsocietiessetstandardsforshipdesignandperiodicinspection.TheCongresshaspassedlawsandtheu.s.CoastGuardhaspromulgatedregulationsrelatedtothemanningstandardsandworkrulesonu.s.flagvessels.TheUSCGalsolicensesseagoingpersonnelonu.s.Flagships.Liabilitylimitsonshipsandoilspillshavebeensetbyexternalbodies.VesselTrafficSystemsruntheUSCGaffectthemannerinwhichshipsenteralimitednumberofports,includingValdez.ThestateofAlaskahadasubstantialroleinminimizingtheriskofamajoroilspill.TheypermittedandinspectedtheAlyeskafacility,reviewedandapprovedcontingencyplans,andlicensedstate11

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pilots.(Jurisdictionoverpilotageoperationsisdistributedbetweenfederalandstateorganizations.)Itisfairtoaskwhetheralltheseexternalitiesareproperlycoordinatedintoacomprehensivepackagetoinsurevesselsafety.Foreigngovernmentsdonothandlealltheshipsafetyfunctionsinthesamewasastheu.s.Governmentdoes.Forexample,theDutchgovernmentintheRotterdamVTSsystemactivelycontrolsvesselmovementincontrasttothepassiveu.s.systems.Acomparisoncanalsobedrawnwiththeairlineindustry,whereairtrafficcontrolsystemsandmanningstandardsarehandledsomewhatdifferently.Thismaybeanappropriatetimetotakeafocused,integratedviewofthemaritimelegalandeconomicenvironment.2.VesselSafetyElementsofSafetyinclude:shipdesignandconstruction;crewtraining,licensingandmanningstandards;licensingofpilots;andtheuseofsafetydevicesbothontheshipandontheshore.Manysafetyaspectscanbecategorizedasactiveorpassiveandinternalorexternal.Theycanbefurtherclassified(seeBaisucketale1977)astointent:aretheydesignedtopreventthecasualtyfromoccurring,topreventacargoreleaseafteracasualtyoccurs,ortominimizetheimpactofthatcargorelease?Toincreaseshipsafety,onecanmakechangesinoneormoreareas.Shipdesignsofdoublebottomsordoublehullsmustbeconsidered.Bettertrainingofcrewsanddrugtestingarepossibilities.Passiveinternalequipmentincludesfathometers,radar,etc.Anactiveinternaldevicewouldbeanelectronicchartorcollisionavoidancesystemwithanalarmorameansoftakingcorrectiveaction.ExternalfactorsincludeVesselTrafficSystemswhich are relativelypassiveatpresentwhencomparedtothemore12

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activeairtrafficcontrolsystem.Acomprehensivesafetyanalysisthattiestogetherthesemanyfactorsinacoordinatedandefficientmannerisneeded.3.ContingencyPlanningThestateofAlaskaandthefederalgovernmentaccepteloildrilling,pipelineconstruction,andoiltransportationThestatehasreceivedeconomicbenefits.TheAlaskanfieldssignificantlyreduceourdependenceonforeignoilandsocietyhasconsciously,orunconsciously,acceptedtheenvironmentalandotherrisksinvolved.Apparently,nooneinauthorityinlookingattheregionalcontingencyplanorAlyeskaplan,seriouslyconsideredthata240,000bblspillcouldorwouldtakeplace.Theregionalcontingencyplan wa: inadequatefora200,000 to240,00bblspill,mainlybecauseofthelimitsoftechnologyused(whichwerenotfullyrevealedintheplansbecausetheresponsescenarioswerenotfullydeveloped).A1977EXXONUSAarticlestatedforexample,that"whileexercisingeveryprecautiontopreventanoilspill[inPrinceWilliamSound]Alyeskahasdetailedplanstocleanupaspillshouldoneoccur".ThestateacceptedAlyeska'splan.Basedonexistingtechnologyandexperienceinpastoilspills,itisunreasonabletoassumethatinamajoroilspill,morethan20-30%oftheoilwillbepickedupmechanically,treatedwithdispersants,orburned.Themajorityoftheoilwillhitthebeach,afactthatwasnotrecognizedincontingencyplans.Thelaborintensivenatureofthebeachcleaningoperationwasunanticipated.Thefederal,stateandcorporateorganizationswhichevolvedafterthespilldidnotconformtoanyorganizationalstructuresanticipatedinthecontingencyplanningprocess.Thishamperedthespillresponseandinter-organizationalcooperation.Noneoftheplans13

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anticipatedthattheaffectedoilcompany,notAlyeska,wouldactuallyrunthepollutionresponseduringamajorincident.Thefederalon-scenecoordinatorandthestateorganizationdidnotevolveintostable,smoothlyfunctioningorganizationsuntilaftertheopportunitytodealwiththefreeoilhadelapsed.MostoftheresourcesbroughttothescenebyEXXONandbythegovernmentarrivedafterthistime.Thethreatof'federalization'ofthespillresponseduetoimproperremovalactionsbytheresponsiblepartywasnota pelievable threat.Thefederalgovernmentdidnothavethefunds,contractingcapability,ororganizationalcapabilitytomoveresourcesasfastasEXXONcould.Thefactthattheincidentwasamajordisasterwhichwouldrequireanextraordinaryresponseeffortwasrecognizedrelativelyslowlybyallparties.Decisionmakingduringtheoperationwasreactiveratherthanproactive--e.gmobilizationofbeachcleaningforcesaftertheoilwasashore,establishingafederalandEXXONorganizationonKodiakaftertheoilhadreachedtheisland.Theorganizationandtechnologyforthemassivebeachcleaningoperationevolved--neitherwereconsideredinprespillplans.Thenationalcontingencyplanningprocesshasneverfullyresolvedstate--federalrelationshipsduringanoilspillofcatastrophicproportions.TheNCP,althoughallocatingoneseatontheRRTtothestate,doesnotensure(orrequire)thatstatessetupaunifiedcommandsystem.Thefragilityofthestate/federalandintra-staterelationshipswasacerbatedintheEXXONVALDEZspillbyanumberoffactorsandADEChaddifficultyestablishingitsroleastheleaderofthestateresponseandthestateresponseorganizationdidnotworksmoothlywiththefederal14

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OSCuntilwellintothespillresponse.Factorswhichaffectedthisrelationshipincludethefollowing:-TheAlaskaneconomyisheavilydependentuponoilrevenuesand,toalessorextent,revenuesfromitsfishingindustry.Theoilindustryiscontrolledfrom"outside",thefishingindustryispredominantlyAlaskanowned.Thespillwasperceivedascausedby'outsiders'andtheprimaryeconomicimpactwasontheprimelocalindustry.TheneedtocloseorrestrictfishingandtoprotectfishspawningareasensuredthatthestateFishandGamehadamajorrole.-Alaskanshadnotanticipatedthatamajorspillcouldoccurandweretrulyoutragedbythe'despoiling'ofPrinceWilliamSound,ensuringthatthestateresponsetothespillwouldbehighlypoliticized.ThevaluesprizedbyAlaskans--selfsUfficiency,independence,smalltown&villageliving,prideinthepristinewilderness--clashwiththeacceptanceoftheeconomicgiantoftheoilcompanies.-TheStateofAlaskaisamajorlandownerinthePrinceWilliamSoundarea,ensuringthattheDepartmentofNaturalResourceshadakeyroleintheresponseeffort.-NativeCorporationsaremajorlandownersinthePrinceWilliamSoundareaandnativevillagesrelyonfishingforsUbsistence.Thismadeboththepoliticalandsocialimpactsofthespillmorecomplex.-CoordinationbetweenStateEmergencyServicesandtheADECduringamajorenvironmentaldisasterhadnotbeenresolvedpriortotheincident.15

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Theareaofcontingencyplanningshouldbeexaminedcloselyinthe wake oftheEXXONVALDEZincident.Wemustbeabletocreate,equip,andmanageorganizationswhicharecapableofeffectivelyandefficientlydealing with majoroilspills.4.ResponseTacticsOncetheEXXONVALDEZincidentoccurred,a 'window ofresponse'lastedabout72hoursduringwhicheffectivemechanicalremovalofoilfromthesurfaceofthewater was possible.Dispersantsandburningtechniques were alsoeffectiveattheleadingedgeofthespill.This window endedSundaynight when theoil was emulsifiedbyastorm.AftertheinitialstormonSundaynight,there was 'a window oflessoropportunity'ofaboutaweek,duringwhichthere was stillasignificantamountoffreefloatingoilwhich,althoughhighlyemulsified,mayhavebeensusceptibletomechanicalpickup.Thisperiodalsoprovidedtheoptimaltimeforpreventiveboomingofsensitiveareas.Theamountofresourcesavailableonscene,accessibleintheregion,andinthelogisticspipeline(booms,skimmers,dispersants,burningagents) were notadequatetotakeadvantageofthefirst72hour 'window ofopportunity',regardlessof whowas inchargeor what organizationalarrangement was used.Amoreeffectiveorganizationalandcommandstructureandamoreresponsivemarshallingofresourcesmighthavemadeadifferenceduringthe week longperiodoflessoropportunity.Duringthisperiod,lessthan5 % oftheoil was contained,removed,dispersedorburned.Withan'optimal'responseanother10-20%oftheoilmayhavebeenpreventedfromreachingshore--buttheamountofshorelineaffectedwouldnothavebeensignificantlydifferent.Afterthefirst10days,littleelsecould have beendonetoreducetheamountofoilthathitthebeach,16

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althoughprotectiveboomingcouldstillhaveinfluencedwheretheoilhit.Thespillanditsresponseoccurredunderrelativelyfavorableweatherconditions.DuringperiodsofsevereweatherinPrinceWilliamSound,noamountofequipment,dispersants,etcwouldkeeptheoilfromthebeach.ThesalvageoftheEXXONVALDEZ,althoughnotpreplanned,wasexpertlyconductedinacoordinatedeffortbyEXXON,CGMarineSafetyOfficeVALDEZ,CGPacificStrikeTeam,andsalvorscontractedbyEXXON.ThissuccessfulsalvagepreventeduptoamillionadditionalbblsofoilfromenteringPrinceWilliamSound.Asstatedabove,responsetacticswereseverelyconstrainedbyresourceconstraintsandbythelackoffederal/state/industrycoordination.Theincidentdid,however,showthatthecapabilityofmechanicalcontainmentandremovaltechnologyisstillverylimitedandthatthepoliciesandproceduresgoverningtheuseofdispersantsandburningagentshavenotbeenadequatelyresolvednorhavetacticsfortheirusebeenfullydeveloped.5.BeachCleaningTechnologyandEnvironmentalImpactPossiblyoneofthemorefrustratingaspectsoftheEXXONVALDEZincidentwasthatmanyoftheactionstakentocleanthebeachesmayhaveactuallyhadanegativeimpactontheenvironment.Whilesomeamountofbeachcleaningisdesirable,thereisnoconsensusonhowmuchistherightamount.Similarly,thereisnoagreementonwhattechnologyorproceduresaremostappropriate.ManytechnologiesandproceduresusedintheAlaskanbeachcleaningoperationwereadoptedfromotherindustriesonshortnotice.Thereismixedreactiontotheprocessofusinghightemperature,highpressure,hot water, repeatedtenortwentytimes,to17

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cleanabeach.Acomprehensiveanalysis would considerthepollutioncausedbythearmyofmorethan10,000peopleandhundredsofboatsandplanesintheprocessofbeachcleaning.6.WastemanagementTheExxonValdezoilspillresultedintensofthousandsoftonsofoilsoakedmaterialthatneededtobedisposedof.Muchofthismaterial was biodegradable,suchasfloatinglogsorseaweedonbeaches.Typically,materialspickedup were biodegradableandplacedinplasticbags.Mostofthe wastewas placedinahazardous waste landfillinArlington,Oregon,oneofonly two hazardous waste landfillsintheu.s.PacificNorthwest.(Thegovernmentdid allow someincinerationonbargestowardstheendofsummer).Therearemanylessonstobelearnedin waste disposalmanagementfromtheEXXONVALDEZincident.TheEnvironmentalProtectionAgencycouldpromulgateregulationsforoceanincineration,aprocessthathasdraggedonformanyyears.Federalguidelinesforthedisposalofoilywastescouldprovidebetteralternativesthantheuseofascarcenationalresource(hazardous waste landfills).Thedevelopmentofbiodegradablebagsandthedeterminationoftheaffectofsalt water ontheoily waste couldaidthecleanupprocess.7.RiskreductionandresponsesystemdegradationAllelementsofthe'riskreduction'systemestablished when thepipeline was builthadneverbeenreachedor were degradedovertime.Alyeskahadcutitsfulltimepollutionresponsestaffandassignedtheirresponsibilitiesas18

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collateralduties;thestateacceptedthiscontingentuponrevisionstothecontingencyplanandincreasedresponsedrills.Alyeskahadneverestablishedaneffectivecapabilityforskimmingorstoringskimmedoil.statepilotswereallowedtodisembarkfromtankersnorthofBlighIsland.TheCoastGuardreduceditsVTSwatchfromtwopersonstoone.TheCoastGuarddidnotestablishareliablesystemcapableofmonitoringshipswhiletheywereintheshippinglanesinPrinceWilliamSound.ManyoftheCoastGuardsvesselinspectionfunctionshavebeendelegatedthroughcontractstotheprivateAmericanBureauofShipping.Theelementsofriskreductionwhichwereimplementedin1978/79aftertheArgoMerchantgroundingfailedtopreventortominimizetheEXXONVALDEZincident.Navigationsafetyregulationsprovidedpassiveaidstoshipmasterandwatchstanders(e.g.radar,loran,fathometer,charts).Therewerenorequirementsfor'active'systemswhichwouldalertsomeoneontheshiporintheVTStothefactthattheshipwasstandingintodangerandthatthepassivesystemswerebeingignoredorhadbeendisabled.Evenifsuchsystemsexisted,thereisnomaritimeorlegaltraditionorprecedentwhichwouldallowanyonetotakecontrolofthevesselawayfromthemaster.Thecreationofsuchsystemswould,therefore,requireadeparturefrommanymaritimetraditions.Thesegregatedballastprotectivelylocateddidnotpreventtheopeningof11cargotanksontheEXXONVALDEZ.Itisdoubtfulthatthepresenceofadouble.bottomoradoublehullwouldhave theescapeofanycargoduetotheimpactofthisextremelyhighmomentumgrounding,andmayhavecomplicatedthesalvageeffort.Noneoftherecommendationsforthefederallyfundeddevelopment,purchase,orallocationofpollutionresponseequipmentwhichresultedfromthe1978investigationofthe19

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ARGOMERCHANTincidentwereimplemented.Researchintomethodsofimprovingresponsetechnology(exceptfordispersantsandburningagents)wassharplycurtailedinthe1980s.CONCLUSIONSThedirecteconomiccostsoftheEXXONVALDEZoilspillwillbegreat.ThespillwillcostEXXONabout$5millioninlostoil,$20Minsalvageandrepaircosts,andabout$800Millionincleanupcosts.ThepotentialeconomiclossestopetroleumcompaniesoperatinginAlaskaaremuchgreater:lossofELF,BristolBayleasingmoratorium,potentiallossofAlaskanaturalwildliferefuge(ANWR)leases.ThemagnitudeoftheeconomiclossesbytheAlaskanpeopleandthestateofAlaskawillbedeterminedthroughextensivelegalproceduresbutareestimatedtobeinexcessof$1billion.Clearly,thereisampleeconomicmotivationtoinvestigatethelinkagesandtradeoffsbetweenriskreduction,contingencyplanningandpollutionresponseandtoinvestsignificantresourcesineachoftheseareas.Theauthorscontendthattheselinkagesshouldbeconsideredinpolicyformulation.Forexample,itisclearthatriskreductioneffortsmustfocusonscenariosforwhichcountermeasureandmitigationeffortsareextremelydifficultandcostly.Inthecaseofchemicalreleases,evacuationplansmustbeinplaceforareas/incidentswherenoeffectivecountermeasuresexist.TherisksassociatedwiththetransportofhazardouscargoaresogreatthatthepUblic'srighttoprotectionmayoutweightraditionalvaluessuchasthemasters'controlofhisorhervesselandlimitationsofowner'sliability.Increasedusageofactiveversuspassivetrafficcontrolandnavigationaidsmaybewarranted.20

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catastrophicspillshaveoccurredveryinfrequently,andhavehistoricallybeengeographicallydistributedthroughouttheworld.Effectiveriskreductionactionswillreducetheprobabilityoftheiroccurrenceevenfurther.Governmentandindustrymustbereadytodeliverhundredsofmillionsofdollarsworthofclean-upservicesanywhereintheworldwithinhoursofanincident.Thismeansmorethanfloodingtheaffectedareawithpeopleandequipment.Itmeanscreatingfunctionalorganizations,capableofmakingandimplementingdecisionsandoperatingaccordingtodoctrine.AswasdemonstratedthissummerinPrinceWilliamSound,muchworkremainstobedonebeforewereachthisideal.TheEXXONVALDEZreleasedacargoofrelativelynontoxiccrudeoilintoaverysparselypopulatedregion.Theenvironmentalimpactwassignificant,buttheimpactonhumanlifeandhealthwasminor.Theprobabilityofacollision,rammingorgroundingofashipcarryingchemicalsinaportsuchasNewYorkissmall,butiscertainlynotzero.Howeffectivelyhaveweminimizedthisriskandwhatisourcapabilityofrespondingtosuchanincident?21

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BibliographyBaisuck,A.andW.A.Wallace."AFrameworkforAnalyzingMarineAccidents:.MarineTechnolgvSocietvJournal,Vol.13,No.5.(1979).pp.8-14.Belardo,S.,J.R.Harrald,W.A.Wallace,andJ.E.Ward."APartialcoveringApproachtoSitingResponseResourcesforMajorMaritimeoilSpills".ManagementScience.Vol.30.,No.10.(Oct.1984).pp.1184-1196.Belardo,S.,K.R.Karwan,andW.A.Wallace."ManagingtheResponsetoDisastersUsingMicrocomputers".Interfaces.Vol.143,No.2.(March-April1984).pp.39-39.Bellantoni,J.,J.Garlitz.R.Kodis,A.O'Brien,andA.Passara.DeolovmentReauirementsforU.S.CoastGuardPollutionResponseEquipment:VolumeI:Analvsis.U.S.DepartmentofTransportation.TransportationSystemsCenter.Cambridge,MA.02142.(1979)Everson,P.R."EmergencyPlanningDecisionSupportsystems".TerminalDisasters.S.A.Marston,Ed.UniversityofColorado.Boulder,Co.(1986).pp.11-28.Everson,P.R."ASelectiveReviewofInformationTechnologyanditsApplicationEmergencyPlanningandResponse".EmergencyPreparednessCanadaReportNo.87.03.07.(May1986) EXXON."ProtectingPrinceWilliamSound:ImpressiveProtectiveMeasuresSafeguardandImpressiveBodyofWaterwhichTankersmustTraversewithCargoesofAlaskanoil".EXXONUSA16.No.3.(1977)pp.-.16-21.Fraser,J.P."oilSpillCountermeasures--ARationalSystemforSelectionandSizingofEquipment".Proceedincrs:1979oilSoillConference,AmericanPetroleumInstitute,Washington,D.C.(1979).pp253-255.Garry,B.J."TheMassachusetsoilspillcontingencyPlanningModel". .AmericanPetroleumInstitute.Washington,D.C.(1981).pp.87-92.Harrald,J.R.,D.Boukari,andF.R.Sapp."TheDesignofaDisasterManagementDecisionSupportSystemfortheAmericanRedCross".GeorgeWashingtonUniversityWorkingPaper.Washington,D.C.1989.Harrald,J.R.andS.M.Conway."TheUseofDecisionSupportAidsintheDevelopmentofanActionOrientedContingency22

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Plan".Proceedings:PetroleumInstitute.1981oilSpillConference.AmericanWashington,D.C.(1981).pp.509-512.Harrald,J.R.andW.A.Wallace."AnAnalyticApproachtoPlanningtheResponsetoTechnologicalDisasters".IndustrialCrisisQuarterlyVol2.,(1988).pp.257-270.Howard,R.A.andJ.E.Matheson,"InfluenceDiagrams",ThePrinciplesandApplicationsofDecisionAnalysis.Vol.II.R.A.HowardandJ.Matheson,Ed.,StrategicDecisionGroup.MenloPark,CA.(1984).pp.719-762.Karwan,K.R.andC.M.stone,"WhoCleansuptheOil?AMicroeconomicstudy"(1985)MarineBoard,AssemblyofEngineering,NationalResearchCouncil."RespondingtoCasualtiesofShipsBearingHazardousCargoes".NationalAcademyofSciences.Washington,D.C.(1979).Mick,S.andW.A.Wallace,"ExpertSystemsasDecisionAidstoDisasterManagement".TerminalDisasters:ComputerApplicationsinEmergencyManagement.S.A.Marston,Ed.,UniversityofColorado,Boulder,co(1986).pp.195-204.NationalResponseTeam.ReporttothePresident.TheEXXONVALDEZoilSpill:AWashington,D.C..May1989.Nunamaker,J.F.,Jr.,E.SueWeber,M.Chen."OrganizationalCrisisManagementSystems:PlanningforIntelligentAction"JournalofManagementInformationSystems.(forthcoming)Owen,D.T."TheUseofInfluenceDiagramsintheStructuringofComplexDecisionProblems",ThePrinciplesandApplicationsofDecisionAnalysis,R.A.HowardandJ.E.Matheson,Ed.,StrategicDecisionsGroup.MenloPark,CA.(1984).pp.763-772.Psaraftis,H.N.,G.G.Tharakan,ACeder.optimalResponsetooilSpills:TheStrategicDecisionCase.operationsResearch,Vol.34.No.2,(March-April1986).pp.203-217.Shachter,R.D."EvaluatingInfluenceDiagrams".WorkingPaper.DepartmentofEngineeringandEconomicSystems,StanfordUniversity.PaloAlto,CA.(1984).Shachter,R.D."ProbabilisticInferenceandInfluenceDiagrams".WorkingPaper,CenterforHealthPolicyResearchandEducation,DukeUniversity,Durham,N.C.(April1987).Shachter,R.D."DAVID:InfluenceDiagramProcessingsystemfortheMacIntosh"UncertaintyinArtificialIntelligence23

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J.F.LemmerandL.N.Kanal,Ed.ElsevierSciencePublishers.Holland.(1988).pp.191-196.Wallace,W.A.andF DeBalogh."DecisionSupportSystemsforDisasterManagement",PublicAdministrationReview.Vol45.(Jan1985).pp.134-146.Wenk,Edward,Jr.Tradeoffs:ImperativesofChoiceinaHigh-TechWorld,TheJohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.Baltimore,Md.1986.White,I.C.,J.A.Nichols,andM.J.Garnett."Ten-YearOverviewofoilSpillClean-UpatSean,Proceedings:1979oilspillConference.AmericanPetroleumInstitute,Washington,D.C.(1979). pp.247-251. 24

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LOGIHICS DECISIONS__ ----......,ISTRGING OF EQUIPMENT DECISION BY SPILLER10ACCEPTRESPONSIBI1I1V 14----\ RND MRNRGE CLERNUPCREATIDNDFDNSCENERESPONSEORGANIZRTIONBYPRE-DESIGNATEDOSCREPLACEMENTOfRUGMENTATIONOfOSC _CONTAINMENT RND REMOUALEQUIPMENT RURILRBLE I-::!::::::::::a:tDEPLOVMENT OF BOOMSl)MECHRNICRLSKIMMERS INflUENCE DIRGRRMOFTHERESPONSETOTHEEHHONURLDEZOILSPILL