The 1986 California floods

Citation
The 1986 California floods

Material Information

Title:
The 1986 California floods
Series Title:
Quick response research report ;
Alternate Title:
Nineteen eighty-six California floods
Creator:
Bolin, Robert C
University of Colorado, Boulder -- Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center
University of Colorado, Boulder -- Institute of Behavioral Science
Place of Publication:
Boulder, Colo
Publisher:
Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, University of Colorado
Publication Date:
Language:
English
Physical Description:
29, [3] p. : ; 28 cm.

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Floods -- Social aspects -- California ( lcsh )
Disaster relief -- California ( lcsh )
Disaster victims -- Mental health -- California ( lcsh )
Genre:
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent) ( marcgt )
bibliography ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

Notes

Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references (p. [30]-[32]).
Additional Physical Form:
Also issued online as part of a joint project with the Louis de la Parte Florida Mental Health Institute (FMHI) Research Library's disaster mental health initiative.
General Note:
Cover title.
General Note:
"Institute of Behavioral Science #6."
Statement of Responsibility:
Robert Bolin.

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of South Florida Library
Holding Location:
University of South Florida
Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
001985097 ( ALEPH )
39116048 ( OCLC )
F57-00055 ( USFLDC DOI )
f57.55 ( USFLDC Handle )

USFLDC Membership

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Added automatically
Natural Hazards Center Collection

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HAZARD HOUSECOpy

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NaturalHazardsResearchandApplicationsInformationCenterCampusBox482UniversityofColoradoBoulder,Colorado 80309-0482t'(.u'flAlARD"OUS'"c COPyTHE1986CALIFORNIAFLOODSRobert Bolin1986QuickResponseResearch Report#02This publication is partofthe Natural Hazards Research&Applications Information Center's ongoing Quick Response Research Report Series. http://www.colorado.edu/hazardsInstituteofBehavioralScience#6 (303) 492-6818

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InFebruary,1986,largesectionsofnorthernCaliforniaexperiencedaperiodofintenseandprotractedrainandsnowstormsfromaseriesofbacktobackwetPacificstorms.As aconsequence,majorfloodingoccuredinanumberofareasalongseveralriverdrainagesystems.Thefloodingandassociateddamagesresultedinlargescalepropertydamagetoresidences,businessesandagriculturalenterprises,includingkeyviticulturalareasofSonomaandNapacounties.Inthecourseoftheflooding,thousandsoffamilieswereevacuated,homesdestroyedanddailylifedisrupted.AnumberofCaliforniacountiesreceivedfederaldisasterdeclarations,makingthemeligibleforfederalreliefprogramsmadeavailablethroughDisasterAssistanceCenters(DACIs)establishedthroughoutthestrickenareasbyFEMA.WhilenationalmediaattentiontotheunprecedentedfloodinginnorthernCaliforniawasquicklyredirectedtothedestructionofoneofNASA'sspaceshuttles,theproblemsofrespondingtothefloodanditsthousandsofvictimsneverthelesspersisted.ThepaucityofnationalmediacoverageoftheeventsinCaliforniabeliesthescopeandimpactofthedisasterintermsofbothfinancialandhumancosts.Whilethedeathtollwasverylow,thepropertydamageandresultantdislocationoffamilieswasextensiveifnotadequatelydramatictodrawmediaattentionawayfromthespaceshuttledebacle.Thedestructionofhomesandthedisplacementoffamiliesmadethestrickencommunitiesasuitableplacetoinvestigatetheroleofsocialsupportinmitigatingthestressfuleffectsof1

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residentialdislocationondisastervictims.PriortotheCaliforniadisasters,approvaltostudysocialsupportandthementalhealthimpactsofdisastershadbeenreceivedfromtheNaturalHazardsResearchandApplicationsInformationCenter,undertheaegisofit's"QuickResponse"researchprogram.ThisreportpresentsfindingsfromresearchconductedwithNHRAICsupport.TopresentanoverviewoftheresearchthatIconducted,thisreportwillbedividedintothreemajorsections.FirstageneraldescriptionofthefloodinganditssocialimpactsinnorthernCaliforniawillbepresented.Becausethenatureofthefloodingdifferedconsiderablybylocale,thesedifferenceswillbehighlighted.Thisparticularstudywillfocusononeimpactedcommunity,andthenatureofthedisasterinthatcommunitywillbedescribedafteranoverviewofthestatewidedamageispresented.Thesecondsegmentofthisreportwilldescribethestudyquestionsthatguidedtheresearchandbrieflydiscusssomeoftheextantliteratureonthetopic.Inthissectionthefieldproceduresthatwerefollowedaswellasadescriptionofthequalitativemethodologieswillbegiven.Becauseofseveraluniquecharacteristicsoftheresearchsetting,datagatheringtechniquesrequiredacertainamountofflexibility,hencetheuseofqualitativetechniques.Thethirdsegmentofthisreportwillexaminethedata,lookingspecificallyatsocialsupportandmentalhealthimpactsofthedisaster,relocationstressors,housingproblems,pre-disastersocialtrendsandpost-disastereffects.Includedhere2

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willbeadiscussionsofsomeoftheuniqueproblemsthatseemedtoaffectthevictims(anddisasterworkers)inthefloodedcommunity.TheWinterFloods,California1986NorthernCaliforniawasbatteredbyseriesofintensePacificstormsstartingFebruary12,1986andpersistingformorethanaweek.Whilesome29countiesinCaliforniaweredeclaredemergencyareasbythestate,thelocalesreceivingthegreatestdamageincludedSonoma,Napa,Lake,andYubaCounties,alongwithlargeareasofthedeltaregionwheretheSacramentoandSanJoaquinriversemptyintoSanFranciscoBay.ThechiefsourceoffloodinginSonomaCountywastheRussianRiverwhichheavilydamagedthetownofGuerneville,thesUbjectofthisstudy.TotheeastinNapaCounty,theNapaRiverfloodedcausingtheevacuationof4200residentsofthetownofNapa.PropertydamagesestimatesinNapawereplacedatfortymilliondollarswithanadditionalsixteenmilliondollarsindamagetothevineyards.Some12,000of30,000acresofwinegrapeswereinundatedalthoughgrowersdidnotexpectanylongtermeffectsonproduction.AnothermajorsourceofpropertydamagewastheYubariverwhichbrokethroughan84foothighleveeandfloodedthetownofLindanearSacramento.Ironically,theYubawasover5feetbelowfloodstagewhenthebreakoccured.Some26,000residentswereforced to evacuateandthefloodingresultedin6,700homesbeinginundatedatanestimatedpropertylossof$50million.Elsewhere,1300hadtoevacuateafteralevee break alongthe3

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MokelumneRiver.Becausemuchofthedeltaregionisupto20feetbelowsealevel,thelevee.systemcontainingtheriversflowingintotheareaiscritical,withbreaksresultinginlargescaleflooding.LeveebreaksalongtheSacramentoandSanJoaquinRiversresultedinover10,000acresofprimefarmlandbeingflooded.Becauseofthevolumeofrainreceived(sometownsreporting22inchesinoneweek),riverssuchastheSacramentocarriedrecordflows,oftenmorethanthe1100milesofleveesintheareacouldcontain.ForexamplethenormalwinterflowoftheSacramentoisapproximately40,000cubicfeetpersecond(cfs)butduringtheFebruaryfloodsitreachedover630,000cfs.Elsewhere,floodingalongtheEelRiverresultedinthedestructionoftwohundredredwoodsupto1000yearsold,alossofanessentiallyirreplaceablescenicresource.Inadditiontoriverinefloodingandleveebreaks,lakefloodingalsocausedevacuationofresidents.ClearLakerose4feetoveritsbanksnecessitatingtheevacuationof450familieslivingalongitsshores.Duetoconstrictedoutflowfromthelake,oncetherainsceasedthelakecouldbeloweredlessthantwoinchesperday.LakeSonoma,arecentlyconstructedfloodcontrolandrecreationallakewentfrom120thousandacrefeetto240thousandacrefeetasitimpoundedsomeoftherecordrunoff.Thelakeiscredited preventingtheRussianRiverfromcrestinganyhigherthanitdid.AconsiderableareaoftheRussian'swatershedliesbelowthedam,hencetheextensivefloodingthatdidoccur.SomeoftheworstfloodingalongtheRussianRiveroccured4

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wheretherivercutsasteepcanyonthroughtheruggedCoastRangetothepointwhereitemptiesintothePacificatthetownofJenner.PerhapshardesthitwasthetownofGuerneville,locatedalongtheRussianatthejunctionoftwoconvergingsidecanyons.Morethan1600hadtobeevacuatedfromtheRussianRiverarea(includingbutnotlimitedtoGuerneville)withsome1000homesreceivingflooddamage.InGuerneville,about150housingunitsweredeclareduninhabitableasaresultofflooddamage.Atthestartofthestorms(Feb12,1986)theRussian wasrunningat8.5feet.Itcrestedatmorethan49feet,17feetabovefloodstage.ThefloodingwassuchthatGuerneville,atonepointwasisolatedandvictimshadtobeevacuatedtoSantaRosabyhelicopter.utilityserviceinGuernevillewasdisruptedformorethantwoweeks,denyingvictimsthewaternecessarytocleanuptheirpreviouslyinundatedhomes.Overall,damagesinSonomaCountywereestimatedat25milliondollarsandthecountyreceivedafederaldisasterdeclaration.OveralllossesinCaliforniahavebeenplacedat$319million.Thestatedrafteda$115millionstateemergencyaidplanforvictimsincludingaprogramof$5000cashgrantsforvictimswithoutinsurance.ThosemonieswereinadditiontoFEMA'saidprograms,meaningvictimscouldreceiveasmuchas$10thousandincashgrants.TheRedCrossprovidedimportantemergencyaidaswellastemporaryhousingsupportforvictimsoftheGuernevilleflood,aswellasinotherstrickenareas.BecauseofthenatureofthedamageinGuernevilleandthe5

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evacuationexperiencesofvictims,itwasselectedastheresearchsite.GuernevilleandseveraladjoiningsmallcommunitiesincludingMonteRio,arefocused'onsummertourist/vacationtrade.However,theareaalsoishometoanumberofpoorerresidents.TheRussianRiveranditstributarieshavefloodedthetowninthepast,buttonowhereneartheextentofthe1986deluge.BecauseofGuerneville'sgeographic(and some wouldsaysocialandeconomic)isolationfromtherestofSonomaCounty,themanagementofthefloodingandevacuationwassomewhatproblematic.Thecounty'semergencyservicesdisastercenterinSantaRosawasmobilizedonFeb.13(Thursday)andtheRedCrosssoonafter.ThemobilizationwasinresponsetocountywideheavyrainswhichhadpushedtheRussianRiverupto32feet,fiveshortoffloodstage.A 37footcrestwaspredictedforSaturdaythe15th.TheRedCrossestablishedanemergencyshelterintheGuernevilleVeteransMemorialBuildingwhichhoused160evacueesthatSaturdaywhentherivercrestedat38.4feet.OnSundaytheNationalWeatherServiceissuedastatementsayingthattheriveratHoplandhadpeakedandwasreceding,indicatingthatitwouldsoonbedroppingindownstreamGuerneville.Howeverbecauseofheavyrainsinthecentralwatershed,downstreamoftheHoplandgaugingstation,theriverdidnotactaccordingtoofficialexpectations.TheRussianbeganfurtherrisingonthatSundayandonMonday(Feb.17)alocalstateofemergencywasdeclared.Theriverhit46feetlatemondayandsurgedtowarditseventualnear49footcrestonTuesday.Whilemanyresidentshadalreadyevacuatedtheirhomes6

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fortheapparentsafetyoftheemergencyshelterintheVeteran'sBuilding,theirevacuationexperienceswere,infact,justbeginning.LateMonday,astherivercontinuedtorise,officialsdecidedtoevacuatetheemergencyshelterandtaketherefugeestoSantaRosa25milestotheeastofthestrickencommunity.HoweverbythetimethatdecisionwasmadebothroadstoSantaRosawereclosedfromflooding,leavingnooverlandescaperoute.Instead,thevictimswerefirstmovedtoachurchonhighgroundinGuernevilletoawaitahelicopterevacuationtoshelterfacilitiesinSantaRosa.Throughapparentproblemsincoordinationbetweenvariousorganizationsmanagingtheemergency,thereweredelaysintheairlift.Notallofthe1200refugeeswereabletobeevacuatedthatTuesdayandthushadtoremaininGuernevillewhilethefloodingcontinued.Theremainingvictimswereevacuatedbynoonthefollowingday.Ittookatotalof152helicopter"sorties"toevacuateallthevictimstoemergencyshelterinSantaRosa.Becauseofthescaleoftheflooding,thenumbersaffected,andthefailureoftheriverto"behave"consistentlywithexpectations,agencieswerecaughtsomewhatunprepared.Becausefarmoreweredisplacedthanexpected,foodandmanpowerwereinshortsupplyintheemergencyshelterasthefloodingstarted.WhiletheRedCrosshadexpectedtouseaGuernevillegrocerystoreasafoodsupplierfortheshelter,thestorewassoonfloodeddeprivingthemofalocalsupplier.TheRedCrosswasalreadyrespondingtocountywidefloodingaswell,resultingin7

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personnelandmaterielshortagestomanagetheGuernevilledisaster.BecauseofGuerneville'srelativeisolationandthenumberofagenciesinvolvedintheemergency,communication.problemsreportedlymadecoordinationofresponseactivitiesdifficult.Inthecourseofdatagathering,victimswerenotshortofcriticismforhowtheevacuationwasmanagedandwhenitwasbegun.InterviewswithRedCrossworkersdisclosedthatthroughouttheevacuationprocess,aswellasintheemergencyshelters,theyweretargetsof"..surprisingamountsofhostilitybyvictims." evacuatedtoSantaRosawereabletofindemergencyshelteratfacilitiessetupbytheRedCross.Atotalofmorethan700evacueesoccupiedtheSantaRosashelteronFeb.18.TheshelterwaskeptopenfortwoweekstoallowrefugeestofindnewhousingortoreturntotheiroldhomesinGuerneville.Atthetimeofclosingoftheshelter(March4)approximatelysixtyvictimswerestillhousedthere.RemainingvictimswereplacedinmotelsbytheRedCrosswhiletheylookedforhousing.HoweveraccordingtoRedCrossofficials,approximately30%ofthoseintheshelteratitsclosingmayverywellhavebeenhomelessbutnotasaresultoftheflood.Oneoftheproblemsthatwasrepeatedlymentionedbyofficialsinthecourseofmyresearchwastheincidenceoffraudulentdisastervictims:personsseekingaidandhousingfromdisasteragencieswho,infactwerenotdisastervictims.AsvictimsreturnedtoGuerneville,theythenbeganthetaskofcleaningup(forthosewhosehousesremained)andapplyingforaidfromRedcross,FEMAandassociatedagenciesand8

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organizations.Oneofthechiefproblemsfacingthehomelesswasfindingaffordablehousinginacountywithveryexpensivehousing.GuernevillerepresentedoneofthefewlocationswherelowcosthousingwasavailableinSonomaCounty,buttheRussianRivermanagedtoerasemuchofthathousingstock.Thatleftlowincomevictimswithasignificantproblemintryingtolocateaff'ordablehousingintheGuernevillearea.Problemsvictimsfacedinemergencyshelter,inobtainingaid,andinfindinghousingwillbediscussedinmoredetailinsubsequentsections.StudyMethodsBasedonthenatureofeventsatGuerneville,Iselectedthattowntostudytheshort-termmentalhealthimpactsofthedisasterandwhatrolesocialsupportmayhaveplayedinaffectingthoseimpacts.Becauseoftheproblemsalreadyalludedtointermsofrepeatedevacuations,emergencyshelterexperiencesandhousingshortages,manyvictimsexperienceda ofstressfulevents.ThecentralquestionthatIstudiedwas:Whatistherelationshipbetweenthe use ofsocialsupportnetworksandthepsychosocialormentalhealthstatusofvictimswhohadtoliveinemergencyortemporaryshelterasaresultofthedisasterinGuerneville?Basicallythisbriefstudyinvolvesaqualitativeexaminationofseveralissues:thementalhealthimpactofdisaster(short-term);relocationstressorsandrelatedresponsegenerateddemands;theuseofinformalhelpingnetworksbyvictimstocopewithdisasterrelatedstresses.Attheoutsetthereaderisadvisedthatthisstudyisbasedonasmallscale"survey"of15victimswhowereinterviewed9

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informallywithasimpleinterviewprotocol.Itdoesnotpurporttobeeitheraclinicalassessmentofthementalstatusofdisastervictims,nordoesitclaimtobeasystematic,quantifiedsampleofallvictimsusingpredeterminedinterviewschedulestoprovidequantifiedmeasuresofselectedscales.Inthatsense,thisstudyisexploratory,basedonseveralsourcesofdata.Thestudyofthementalhealthimpactsofdisasterisaburgeoningareawithintheoverallfieldofdisasterstudies.withoutdelvingintoanoverallreviewofthatliterature(seeSowder,1985forarecentreview),someoftheliteraturethatpertainstothisstudywillbenoted.Thereisdisagreementintheliteratureastotheoccurence,pervasivenessandpersistenceofmentalhealthdisturbancesasaresultofdisaster(e.g.PerryandLindell,1978;Quarantelli,1979and1985).Howeverthereisampleevidencethatundercertainconditions,psychosocialproblemsdooccur(e.g.Hocking,1970;Lifton,1967;Lindyetal.,1981;Glesereta1.,1981;Sowder,1985).Quarantelli(1979)hasarguedthatsomeofthestressesthatdisastervictimsfacearenottheresultofthedisasterpersebutrathertheresultofthesocietalresponsestotheevent.These"responsegenerateddemands"canincludeforcedevacuation,staysinemergencyandtemporaryshelter,permanentrelocation,condemnationofproperties,anddisasteragencybureaucratic"hassles."Inthecaseoflivinginemergencyortemporaryshelter,aswellaslong-termrelocation,victimsoftenexperiencea10

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numberofstressesassociatedwiththelossofhomeandneighborhoodandthedisruptionofsupportnetworks(SowderandSteing1ass,1985;Garrison,1985).Additionally,thefailuretofindsuitableorstablehousingarrangementscaninhibitvariousaspectsofvictimrecovery(BolinandBolton,Forthcoming).Frequentresidentialchangeswhileintemporaryshelterhasbeenfoundtohavenegativepsychosocialimpacts(e.g.Gleser,eta1.,1981;LindyandGrace,1985).AsSolomon(1985)hasnoted,disastersdisruptongoingkinandfriendshipbasedsocialnetworksaswellascreatetheneedforsupportfromthosenetworks.Kinandfriendscanoffervictimsemotionalsupport,instrumentalhelpincleanup/rebuilding,temporaryshelter,transportation,andthelike(Cobb,1976;KahnandAntonucci,1980).Whilecopingwithcriseswithinthefamilyisthenormativestrategyinthisculture,failuretodealeffectivelywithacrisisinternallymayresultinfamiliesturningtosupportnetworksforassistance.Suchsupportnetworksmaybeeitherkinbasedornon-kinsupportgroups(Solomon,1985).Theclose,intimateandpersonalizedassistanceavailablefromprimarygroupmembersmaybeeffectiveinmitigatingtheeffectsofstressonpersonsincrisissituationssuchasnaturaldisasters.Paradoxically,disastersandthesocialresponsestothemmaydisruptsupportnetworkswhile,asnotedpreviously,creatinga"need"forsuchsupport.Whenevervictimsareresidentiallydisplaced,fromevacuationtoemergencyortemporaryshelter,orthroughpermanentrelocation,theiraccess11

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tosupportnetworksmaybehampered.Incasesofevacuation,ofcourse,evacueesexhibitapreferenceforgoingtothehomesoffriendsorkinoverthatofofficialshelters(DrabekandKey,1984).Evacuationtothehomesoffriendsandkinplacesvictimsinasociallysupportivecontext(e.g.Loizos,1977),particularlyinsocietiesinwhichresponsibilitytokinoutweighsproblemssuchasovercrowdingandmonetarydemands(Bolton,1979).Insituationsinwhichvictimstemporarilyorpermanentlyrelocate,theiraccesstothestressbUfferingeffectsofsupportnetworksmaybedisrupted,hinderingtheirpsychosocialrecoveryfromthedisaster(Bolin,1983;Parker,1977).Relocationcandenyvictimsaccesstothetherapeuticeffectsofsocialsupportinthepost-disastercommunity(Milne,1977;Wettenha11,1979).Thedisruptionsofvisitationpatterns,familiarsurroundings,andasecurehomethataccompanyrelocationincreasethestresslevelsthatvictimsexperience(AhearnandCastellon,1979;Dudasik,1980).Thelikelihoodofmentalhealthproblemsamongvictimshasbeenfoundtoincrease qS aresultofsuch"relocationstressorsll(Parker,1977:589).FieldProcedures:Inordertostudytherelationshipbetweentheuseofsocialsupportandtheemotionalstatusofvictims,Iutilizedtwosourcesofinformation-victiminterviewsandinterviewswithofficialsfromanumberofagenciesandorganizationsthathadknowledgeofthementalhealthimpactsofthedisasteronvictimsintheGuernevillearea.AfterpreliminaryphonecontactswithFEMAinCaliforniaandtheCaliforniaOfficeofEmergencyServicestogathergeneral12

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backgroundinformation,IbeganfieldworkinMarch1986,approximatelyonemonthafterthefloodingendedinGuerneville.InordertodeterminethemosteffectivewaytoidentifyandcontactasmallnumberofvictimsinGuernevilleforinterviewing,Ifirstinterviewedrepresentativesfromseveralorganizations.TheseincludedRedCrossDistrictoperationsinSantaRosa,PeopleforEconomicOpportunityinSantaRosa(involvedinhelpingthepoorandhomelessinSonomaCounty),RedCrossServiceCentercaseworkersinGuerneville,andmentalhealthworkersfromtheGuernevilleoutreachprogram.Informationobtainedintheseinterviewshelpedinfinalizingthegeneralinterviewprotocoltobefollowedintheinterviewingofvictims.ItalsoalertedmetoparticularidiosyncraciesofthesettingaswellasproblemsImightanticipateintheinterviewing.IncludedinthelatterwasawarningthatIcouldencounterhighlevelsofxenophobiainsomemembersofthecommunityandthesuggestionthatInotattemptinterviewswithoutlyingvictimswithoutbeingaccompaniedbyacommunitymember.ApparentlyinthemoreremotemountainousregionsaroundGuerneville,someresidentsareengagedinthefarmingofanillegalcashcropthatisofnosmallinteresttotheDEAandotherlawenformcementagencies,hencethewarning.Thecounterculturalelementcoupledwithaconsiderableamountofanger and frustrationwithdisasteragencyrepresentativesalsomadeastrangeraskingquestionssuspectintheeyesofsomevictims.InthecourseofmyinterviewswithagencyandprogrampersonnelIwasfortunateenoughtomakecontactwithalong-time13

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residentofGuernevillewhoofferedhisassistanceinidentifyingandinterviewingvictimsinthearea.Inaddition,becausehewaspresentduringallphasesofthefloodingfromonsetthroughtheserialevacuationsoftownspeopletotheirpiecemealreturnhefunctionedassomethingofalocalinformant(intheanthropologicalsenseoftheword).BecauseIalonewouldbedoingtheinterviewing,andwouldbelimitedinthenumberofvictimsIcouldinterview,hehelpedmeidentify15actualfloodvictim,basedonhispersonalknowledgeofthevictims.BecausehefunctionedasaRedCrossvolunteerintheemergencycenters,hehadfirst-handknowledgeofmanyofthevictims.OneoftheproblemsintheGuernevillearea,asdetailedtomebyseveralRedCrosspersonnelwasthatsomeofthevictimsmakingclaimsforfloodaidwerenot,infact,floodvictims. :Before interviewingvictims,their"authenticity"asfloodvictimswasverifiedthroughzone.pre-floodaddressesthatwereintheimpactDataGathering:Becauseofthesmallscalenatureofthisstudyandsomeofthespecialcharacteristicsofthestudysitealreadyalludedto,allinterviewswereconductedusingageneralprotocoloftopicstobediscussed.InterviewswithagencypersonnelwerefocusedontheactivitiesoftheorganizationsintheemergencyandspecialproblemstheyencounteredinmanagingtheGuernevilleoperation.CaseworkersforSonomaCountyoutreachandforthelocalRedCrossinGuernevillewereaskeddetailedquestionsaboutthevictimsintermsoftheirhousingoptions,theirpsycho-socialstatus,andtheirlong-termoptionsforbeingabletoresettleinGuerneville.14Informationfrom

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theseinterviewswasrecordedandcompiledforpresentationinthisreport.Forinterviewswithvictimsatwopageprotocolofgeneralquestionswaspreparedtoguideinterviews.Victimswerefirstqueriedabouttheirpre-floodhousingandoccupation.Questionswerethenaskedabouttheirfloodexperience,includingevacuation,timespentinemergencyandtemporaryshelter,aswellastheiruseofinformalsupportnetworksduringtheemergencyperiodforshelter,transportationandrelatedaid.victimswereaskedtoassesstheirpostfloodexperiencesandprospectsintermsofreestablishinghousingaswellasparticularproblemstheymightbehavingingettingaidandhousing.Lastlyvictimswereaskedageneralsetofquestionsregardingtheiremotionalstatusasaresultofthedisasterandtheroleofsupportfromkinandfriendsinaffectingtheiremotionalstatus.Becauseofthesmallsample,theuseofquantifiableformalmentalhealthinventorieswasrejectedasinappropriate.Ratherincludedintheprotocolweregeneralquestionsbasedonsymptomsandfeelingstheymayhaveexperienced(depression,feelingsofhelplessness,hostility,compulsivebehavior,anxieties,fearsetc.(e.g.Dohrenwendetal.,1980;Derogatis,1975).Itmustbeemphasizedthatalthoughthequestionswerebr9adlybasedonpsychologicalscales,theinformalnatureoftheinterviewingdidnotprovidequantifiablemeasures.Insteadtheinterviewsprovidedindicationsofgeneralpsychologicaldistresses,notclearlydefinedDSMIIIdiagnostic15

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categoriesofmentaldisorders.Allresponsestoquestionswererecordedandlatercompiledandsortedintogeneralthemesandcategoriesof Thissortingandsummarizationofanswersconstitutesthedataanalysisforthispaper.Qualitatitivetechniquessuchasthesearewellsuitedtoexploratoryresearch.Suchtechniquesalsoallowflexibilityindealingwithdisaster victims who,foronereasonoranother,mightbesensitivetoamoreformalinterviewstyle.InthecaseofGuernevillevictimstheinformalityoftheinterviewsallowedcompletionofinterviewswithsomevictimswhoquiteclearlywouldhaverejectedaformalinterview.Interviewsrangedinlengthfrom30minutestoonehourdependingonthenatureofthevictim'spost-disasterexperiencesandthetypesofproblemstheymighthaveexperienced.InterviewswerecompletedoverafourdayperiodintheGuernevillearea,exceptforoneinterviewdoneinSantaRosawithavictimwhohadn'tyetbeenabletofindhousinginGuerneville.Analysisvictimsthatwereinterviewedcanbedividedintotwobroadsocio-economiccategories.Onegroupconsistedoflower-middletoupper-middleconventionallyemployedpersons.conventionalherereferstosmallpropertyowners(resorts,restaurantsetc.)orwageworkersatvariousenterprisesororganizations(mechanic,firefighteretc.)inGuerneville.Incomesamongthisgrouprangedfrom$18,000tomorethan$40,000yearly.Achiefcharacteristicofthiscategoryofvictims(n=9)wasrelativeresidentialstablilityinthearea,andtheexistenceoffriendandkinnetworksintheSantaRosaarea(aswellasGuerneville).16

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Thesecondcategoryofvictimsthatwereinterviewedcanbecharacterizedaspoor,residentiallymobileandlackinginelaboratefriendshiporkinnetworksoutsidetheimpactedcommunity.ThreeofthevictimsinterviewedwerefemaleheadsofhouseholdsonAFDCwithincomesbelowthepovertyline.Threeotherswereself-employedartisanswithmarginalincomes.Allvictimsinthissecondcategorylivedinrentalunitsortrailers,incontrasttothefirstgroupwhichtendedtoowntheirhomes.Itisinthislattergroupwherethehighestlevelsofdepression,anxietyandfeelingsofhelplessnessaboutthefuture,werementionedduringmyinterviews.Frominterviewswiththevictims,itbecamepossibletoidentifyseveraldistinctsourcesofstressthattheyexperienced.Theintialfloodingofhomesandpropertybeganthesequenceofstressorsforallvictims.Evacuationtoemergencyshelterandtheserialevacuationoftwoevacuationcenters,cUlminatingintheaerialevacuationofrefugeestoSantaRosawasasecondsourceofstress.Forvictimswithoutalternativehousing,thestayintheemergencyshelterinSantaRosaalsoconstitutedaprotractedstressor.ThereturntoGuerneville,theclean-upofdamagedhomes,thesearchfornewhousing,andtheseekingofrecoveryaidwerealltasksfacingvictimsatthetimethatinterviewingtookplace.Ofcourse,notallthesestressorsimpactedvictimstothesameextent.Amongthe"conventional"victims,forexample,nonestayedintheemergencyshelterinSantaRosa,butratherfoundshelterinthehomesofkinorinmotels.Poorervictimsdid17

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notappeartohavenetworkstodrawoninSantaRosaforemergencyortemporaryshelter,andthusstayedintheemergencyshelter,anexperiencenotwithoutitsownchallengesanddemands.Forthevictimslivinginrentalhousing, a combinationoffactorsconspiredtoproduceheightenedstresslevelsresultinginmoreself-reportsofdepression,sleeplessness,andanxietyofthefuture.Asalreadynoted,thiscategoryofvictimsdidnothaveasupportnetworktodrawonoutsidethedamagedcommunity.Similarly,thefriends(nonehadkin)theyreportedinGuernevilletendedtohavefewresourceswithwhichtohelpout.Indeed,manyoftheirfriendshadalsobeen"wipedout"bytheflood.Thisisincontrastwiththeothercategoryofrespondents,who,forthemostpartreceivedtemporaryshelterfromkinorfriends,andwhowerealsoabletorecruitfriendsfromnon-impactedareastohelpoutinthedrudgeryofcleanupfromtheflood.Notsurprisingly,thereportedlevelsofdepressionandanxietyinthisgroupappearedconsistentlylowerthaninthelowerSESgroup.Onecaveatisinorderhoweverindrawingconclusionsaboutthementalhealthimpactsofthedisasteranditsaftermathonthevictimsinthisstudy.Thatis,thereisnowaytodeterminetowhatextentanyofthe of depression oranxietywerepresentpriortothedisaster.MostreviewsofthementalhealthliteratureindicateahigherincidenceofmentalhealthproblemsamongthoseinthelowerreachesoftheclasshierarchyintheU.S.Howeveritisalsoclearthatthelackofsupportnetworks18

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forthepoorervictimswhowereinterviewedmeantthattheyexperiencedstressesthatothervictimsdidnot,whileatthesametimehavingfewermonetaryorsocialresourcestodrawontohelpthemcope.Post-disasterhousingisemblematicofsomeofthedifficultiesthisgroupofvictimsfaced.Guerneville,accordingtointerviewswithagencypersonnel,isliterallytheonlysiteof"lowincome"housinginSonomaCounty,andtherewaslittleofthatavailableevenbeforetheflood.ThisfactaccountsforthepresenceofaconsiderablenumberofAFDCfamilies,lowincomeartisansandthelikeinGuerneville,asitwastheonlysourceoflowincomehousinginthecounty.Howeverthedisasterdestroyedmanyoftherentalhousingunitsthatthepoorlivedin,exacerbatingashortageoflowrenthousing.ThusformanyofthepoorinGuerneville,'theirprospectsforfindingpost-floodhousingwereverylimited.Thisisinadditiontothefactthatfederalprogramstohelpdisastervictimsrecoveraremuchmoregenerousforhomeownersthanforrenters.Inessencerenterswerelefttofendforthemselvesaftertheir60days(doublethenormaltime)ofrentalassistanceranout.Becauseofthedifficultyinfindingreplacementhousingforthepoorervictims,manyreturnedtoliveinflooddamagedhousingratherthanhavetheirlandlordsrepairthebuilding.Inaddition,assomerentalpropertieswererepaired,rentswereraised,tothepointwhereseveralvictimsaccusedtheirlandlordsofpricegouging.Inoneinstance,alandlordwasinsistingthathistenantsbUynewrefrigeratorsfortheir19

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apartments,toreplacethosedestroyedintheflood.Sincemostcouldbarelyaffordtherent,hisinsistenceonthepurchaseofrefrigeratorsmeantthatmanycouldnolongerlivethere.Theproblemsthatpoorervictimsfacedwithhousingresultedinapparentgrief-likereactionsoveralosthomeandfearsofnotbeingabletofindsuitable(andaffordable)housing.Oneofthevictimsinterviewedalludedtoa"realfeelingofdesperationaboutthis[herdestroyedtrailer].IguesslImjuststuck..sometimesIjustsithereandstartcrying.IIThisattitudewasnotuncommon amongthepoorervictimsinterviewed.Mostindicatedthatthefeelingofbeinghomelessandnothavinganygoodprospectsforreestablishingone,wasstressfulandinescapable.victimswhohadownedtheirownhomespriortothefloodappeared to haveaccesstomoreresourcesaswellastosupportnetworkstoaidinclean-upandrebuilding.Althoughmanyinthisgroupreportedfrustrationsandfatiguewiththeprocessofclean-up,aidapplicationsandsoforth,mostalsoindicatedsomeoptimismaboutgettingresettled.Becausethisgroupasawholeutilizedkinandfriendsassourcesofemergencyshelteraswellasinhelpingtheminmovingbackintotheirformerhomes,noneexpressedanyofthesenseofhelplessnessanddepressionthatsomeofthepoorervictimsdid.Theywerelikelytomention,inthecourseoftheinterviews,howgratefultheywereforthehelptheirfriendsandkinprovidedintheaftermath.WhilethissocialsupportcannotbeconsideredtheonlymitigatingfactorintheapparentlowerlevelsofpsychosocialdistressamongthehigherSESgroup,virtuallyallmentioneditduringinterviews.20

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Becauseofsomeoftheexpressionsofdepression,griefandanxietythatwerebeingmentionedbysomeofthepoorervictims,IinterviewedthecaseworkersbothattheRedCrossservicecenterandattheoutreachprogramatGuernevilletogetabroaderperspectiveonsomeofthetypesofpsychosocialproblemstheyhadencounteredduringtheemergencyandinthetimeperiodsince.Inadditiontoanincreasedoverallcaseloadsincetheflood,IwastoldattheoutreachCenterthattheyweretreatinganincreaseindepressioncases.Caseworkerstherereportedthatforaperiodofafewdaysafterthefloodtherewasaperiodof"elation"butafteraweekpeople"startedwearingdownandbreakingdown."Forthosewithhomes,thereturntoGuernevillemeantabreakdowninsocialsupportandanincreaseinpsychologicalstress,accordingtoonesocialworker.Alsoitwasreportedthatthereweresomepoorervictimswhose"basiclivingneedsweren'tbeingmet."Thereferenceherewastohomelessvictimswhohadneithertheresourcesnortheaccesstoresourcesfromsupportnetworkstogetresettledintopermanenthousing.Whilesocialworkersattheoutreachprogramagreedthatitwaspoorvictims,those"atthemarginsofsociety,"thatwerehavingthegreatestdifficultyincoping,acommonsourceofgriefandbereavementamongseveralvictimsincounselingtherewasthelossofpets.Inmyinterviews,4victimsalsoexpressedguiltoverthelossofpetsandindicatedthatitwasthatlossthatwasthehardesttoaccept.21

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Tosummarizethemainpointsthusfar,victimsinterviewedwhoindicatedthehighestlevelofpsychosocialdistress(paticularlydepressivestates)tendedtobepoorer,havefewerfriendswhomtodrawonforsupport,hadproblemsinfindingaffordablehousingtoreturnto,andasaconsequencehadthelongeststaysintheemergencyshelterinSantaRosa.WhilehigherSESvictimsweremorelikelytohavefriendsandkininSantaRosa(4ofthe9 workedthere),theoppositeheldforthepoorervictims.Amongthelatter,virtuallynonereportedfriendsoutsidetheimmediateGuernevillearea.ThusformostofthehigherSESvictims,theevacuationfromGuernevillemeantcontinuedaccesstosocialsupportnetworks,ifdesired.Forthepoorerrespondents,theevacuationmeantbeingremovedfromavailablesupportexceptforwhateverfriendsalsostayingintheemergencyshelter.BasedoninformationprovidedbyRedCrossworkers,outreachworkers,aswellasinterviewswithvictims,stayinginshelterswasasourceofconsiderablestrainformanyincludingthose.responsibleformanagingtheshelters.Basedonthesesources,itwouldbesafetocharacterizethesheltersashavingunprecedentedlevelsofviolence,interpersonalaggressionandhostilitycomparedtomostreportsofshelterbehaviorintheliterature.Onerespondenttoldmeduringaninterview,"Iwasstuckinthreedifferentshelters.Iwashungry,Igotwetandcoldandspentalotoftimenotknowingwhatwasgoingon.SomepeoplearoundmeweredrunkorstonedandfranklyIwasprettydamnedscaredofthem.AttimesIthoughtthefloodwastheleastofmy22

PAGE 25

problems."TheseproblemswereconfirmedindiscussionswithRedCrossworkers.Oneshelterworkerdescribedsomeofthevictimsas"...streetpeople,arealsadgroup.Theywereusingdrugs,alcohol,sellingdrugs.therewasanattemptedrapeandfamilydisputes."Totrytoalleviatesuchproblems,armedguardswerepostedat.facilitiestotrytocontrolsomeoftheaggressivebehavior.Guernevilleoutreachalsoplacedsocialworkersintheshelterstohelpvictimstalkouttheirhostilitiesandtokeepviolentbehaviorincheck.RedCrossworkersimpliedthatitwastheso-called"streetpeople"whowerethesourceofmuchoftheanti-socialbehaviorintheshelters.Onerespondentindicatedthatwhenshelterworkersgaveprioritytotheelderlyforfoodandwater,theyreceivedverbalabusefromothershelteroccupants.Whateverthesourceofthetroublesintheshelters,thosewhospentanytimeinthesheltersfoundtheexperiencestressful.Becauseshelterworkerswerethetargetsofmuchhostility,IpursuedthissUbjectininterviewswithRedCrossworkerswhomanagedthesheltersandthedisbursement of aid.Thecentralproblemsfromshelterworkerpointsofviewcenteredonthe"unconventional"natureofsomeofthevictimsandtheproblemoffraudulentclaimsfordisasteraid.Becausemanyofthevictimslivedincampers,busesandthelike,verificationofaddresseswasdifficultforshelterworkers.Similarly,anumberofthoseutilizingRedCrossaidandshelterapparentlyhadnoclear"familystructure"intheconventional23

PAGE 26

sense.Thismadeitdifficulttoidentifyheadsofhouseholdsorthenumberofpersonsinahouseholdwhoactuallyqualifiedforaid.This,inturn,createdproblemsinthedisbursementofaid.Thelackofverifiableaddressesalsomadedeterminingwhetheranaidapplicantwasactuallyafloodvictimproblematic.Thisresultedinverylengthyinterviewswithvictimsastheyappliedforaid.Thesedelaysresultedinheightenedlevelsofhostilitytowardagencypersonnelbyvictims.Asoneshelterworkersaidinaninterview,"Thesepeoplewouldcomeinherewithadifferentstoryeachtimetryingtogetaid.Alotofusweren'ttrainedtodealwiththis.It'srealhardtoapproachvictims.'whiledoubtingthereeligibility.AnditgotevenworsewhentheshelterwasmovedtoSantaRosa.Therewegotmorehomelesscomingintryingtobefloodvictims.Theyjustoverloadedthefacilities."Theupshotwasthatfraudulentclaimsandthedemandforimmediatereliefbysomevictimsplacedmanyshelterworkersinaverydemandingandstressfulsituation.Theproblemofworkerburnoutwasfrequentlymentionedbythoseagencypersonnelthatwereinterviewed.OneexperienceddisasterworkerindicatedthattheGuernevilleoperationpresented".farmoreproblemsthannormal."OnespecificallymentionedproblemwasthefactthatastheSantaRosashelteroperationwounddown,theRedCrosswasleftwithasmallgroupof"hardcorehomeless."Thisreferedtoasmallgroupofapparentvictimswhohadnohousingandwerenottryingtofindany.Oneofficialindicatedthatwhentheshelterwouldbeclosed,mostinthisgroupwould"...justdriftoff."Verifiablevictimswhorentedwereentitledtosixtydaysrent24

PAGE 27

whiletheylookedfornewhousing.TheRedCrosswascoveringrents(typicallyinmotels)untilvictim'sfederalaidchecksarrived.Suchdelays,aswellasprotractedstaysinmotelswereadditionalfactorsmentionedbyvictimsascontinuingproblemsthattheywerefacing.ThefloodinginGuernevilleseemedtoexacerbatepreexistingproblemsinthecommunity.Asalreadynoted,thelackoflowincomehousingbecameevengreateraftertheflood.Themarginaleconomicexistenceofasegmentofthecommunitybecamemoremarginal.VirtuallyallofthepoorervictimsthatIinterviewedindicatedthattheydidnotfeelthattheyhadmanygoodprospectsforfindingsuitablenewhousing.Asonetoldme,"ThefolksI knowaroundhereareinthesamefixI am. Someofthemhavebeenevictedand[theirlandlord]haskepttheirdamagedeposits.It'snotlikeIcanaskthemforhelp."Forthoserespondentswhowerehomeowners,theirpost-floodexperiencesandprospectsappearedmarkedlydifferentfromthepoorervictims.As agrouptheyexpressedfewerworriesaboutthefuture,andmadefewerstatementsaboutbeingdepressed,anxious,orangryabouttheaidsituation.similarly,theyexpressedfewersomaticcomplaintssuchasfatigueandsleeplessness.Becausethehomeownerstendednottoresideinemergencysheltersinthefewweeksafterthefloodandhadliveableoptionsintermsoftemporaryhousing,itisnotsurprisingthattheyhadfewerstressrelatedcomplaintsthandidthevictimswhowererenters.Forthelowincomevictims,ontheotherhand,thelackof25

PAGE 28

supportnetworksinconjunctionwithlongerstaysinthepublicshelterandfewopportunitiesforreestablishingpermanenthousinginGuernevilleappearassociatedwithseveralnegativementalhealthcomplaints.Thislattergroupofvictimsweremorelikelytoanswerpositivelytoquestionsaboutiftheywere:nervousorjumpy,anxious,worried,orhadtroublerelaxing.Theyalsofrequentlyreferredtothemselves(inresponsetoquestions)asbeingdepressed,inlowspirits,or"feltlikecrying."Intermsofpositiveaffectforothers,theyweremorelikelytorefertothemselvesasfeelinglonelyorallalone.Intermsofquantitativemeasuresofpsychologicaldistressthen,suchanswerswouldbecategorizedasexpressionsof(respec:tively)anxiety,depressionandweakemotionalties(e.g.VeitandWare,1983).Whilemysampleistoosmalltoquantifymeaningfully,itwasapparentinthecourseofinterviewing,thatthehigherSES,homeowningvictimswerenottroubledbysuchdistressedstatesnearlyasfrequentlyorasdeeplyasthepoorervictims.Asonevictimnotedinaninterview,"...well,youknowforaboutaweekafterwardIwasreallytiedupandnervous,butonceIgotbackhereandgotbusywithclean-upthingsdon'tseemtoobad.Ithinkthingswillworkoutprettywell..."Giventheexistential facingthepoorerGuernevillevictims,itshouldnotbesurprisingthattheyappearedto'havehigherlevelsofpsychologicaldistressthanothervictims.FromthesmallsampleofvictimsIinterviewed,itcan'tbedeterminedifthelackofsocialsupport played asignificantroleinthatdistress.Thelackofsocialsupportwasonefactorthat26

PAGE 29

conspiredwithseveralothers(e.g.longerstaysinemergencyshelters,housingproblems,fewpersonalresources)toaddtothestressfulnessoftheirpost-disastersituation.Fromtheothergroupofvictimsitcanbeconcludedthathavingfamilyorfriendsinsurroundingcommunitiesbecameanimportantwaytoavoidaprotractedstayintheemergencyshelter,withwhateverpsychologicalbenefitsthatmayhaveentailed.Too,havingsurplusincomeorotherfinancialresourcesallowedhigherSESvictimstoevacuatetomotels,withoutneedingtowaitforcashgrantsfromtheRedCrossorFEMA.ConclusionsThefloodinginGuernevilleimpactedwhat,inmanywaysisauniquepopulation,.andasaresult,anumberofproblemsemergedbothforvictimsandfortheagenciesresponding theflood,ashavebeendocumentedhere.Assuch,theGuernevillefloodconfrontedagenciesusedtorespondinginrelativelyroutinizedwaystovictimneeds,withmany"non-routinevictims"andextraordinaryproblems.Suchproblemsas:violenceanddrugsinemergencyshelters,non-familialcollectivelivingarrangementswithseveraladultsinthehouseholdclaimingaid,fraudulentclaimsforaidbynon-victims,difficultiesinverifyingaddressesbecausevictimslivedinbusesortents,hostilitybysomevictimstowardaidgivers,protractedevacuationexperiences,extensiveexposuretothefloodforsomevictims,intensificationoflowincomehousingshortagesduetoflooddamage,werepresentandaffectedagencypersonnel,victimsorboth. 27

PAGE 30

Identifiablepsychologicaldistresses,includingdepression,anxiety,post-floodsleepdisturbanceswerefoundtobemorecommon amonglowerincomevictims,victimswho,forthemostpartlackedextensivesocialsupportnetworksoutsidethestrickencommunity.Suchvictimstendedtolacksteadyemploymentorincome(severalwereonAFDC)andhaddifficultiesindealingwiththevariousaidbureaucraciesbecauseofunconventionallivingarrangementsandthelackofeasilyverifiableaddresses.OneRedCrossworkerreferredtosuchvictimsas"ghettoized,peoplestuckinadifferentkindofpoverty..drugsetc."Whilethis"category"ofvictimonlyconstitutedasmallportionoftheGuernevillevictims,intheeyesofvariousagencypersonnelrespondingtotheemergency,theycreatedmajordemandsfortheaidgivingagencies.FrominterviewswithbothmiddleandlowerSESvictims,itwasthelowerSESvictimswhoweremostlikelytoexpressvariousindicatorsofpsychologicaldistress,asnotedabove.Middleclassvictimstendedtohavethematerial,socialsupport,andpsychologicalresourcestobettercopewiththemanystressesassociatedwithsomeoftheuniquecharacteristicsoftheGuernevilleflood.Becausemiddleincomevictimstendedtobehomeownerstheyhadaccesstomoreextensiveaidprogramsfromthefederalgovernment(e.g.SBAloans,longerperiodsofrentsubsidywhilehomeswerebeingrebuiltorcleanedupetc.),reducingsomeofthedemandsandstressesbeingplacedonthemasrecoveryproceeded.Oneimportantwaythatthemiddleincomevictimstendedtodifferfromthelowerincomevictimsinmy28

PAGE 31

samplewasthefactthattheformeraveragedlessthanthreedaysstayinemergencyshelters,whileatleastoneofthepoorervictimsIinterviewedwasstillhomelessandintheemergencysheltermorethanthreeweeksaftertheflood.victimswiththemostextensivestaysinemergencyshelter(10daysormore)appearedtoexpressmorefeelingsofdepressionthanothers.Inthisregardthen,beingabletodrawoninformalsocialsupportnetworkswasinstrumentalforanumberofvictimsinbeingabletofindemergencyshelterinamoreprivate,andtypically,moresupportivesetting,thusavoidingsomeoftheproblemsthatoccuredintheemergencyshelters.29

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Ahearn, F.andS.castellon1979"MentalHealth Problems FollowingaDisastersituation."ActaPsiquiatricayPsicologicadeAmericalatina.25:58-68.Bolin,R. 1982 long-Term Family Recove:ry fromDisaster.InstituteofBehavioralScience.Universityof 1985a"DisastersCharacteristicsandPsycosocial Impacts." pp.3-29in Sowder (ed.)DisastersandMentalHealth:SelectedContemporaryPerspectives.NIMH.Washington,D.C. 1985b"DisastersandSocialSupport."pp.150-158in Sowder (ed.)DisastersandMentalHealth:Selected ContemporaJ:Y Perspectives.NIMH.washington,D.C.Bolton,P.1979 "longTerm RecoveryfromDisaster:ThecaseofManagua."UnpublishedDissertation.UniversityofColorado.Davis,I.1977 "EmergencyShelter."Disasters.1(No.1):23-40. [):)hrenwend, B.,P. Shrout, G. Eg1:y andS.Mendelsohn.1980"Non-specificPsychologicalDistressandotherPsychopathology.:ArchivesofGeneralPsychiat:ry.37:1229-1236.Drabek,T.andW.Key 1984ConqueringDisaster:Family Recove:ry and long-Tenn Irvington.Garrison,J.1985"MentalHealth IIrplications ofDisasterRelocationintheUnitedStates:A ReviewoftheLiterature."InternationalJournalofMassEmergenciesandDisasters.Vol.3,No.2:49-65.GIeser,G.,B.GreenandC.Winget1981ProlongedPsychosocialEffectsofDisaster: b StudyofBuffaloCreek.NY:AcademicPress.

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Hocking,F.1970"PsychiatricAspectsofExtremeEnvironmentalStress."DiseaseoftheNervousSystem,31,pp.542-545.Kahn,R.andT.Antonucci1980 "Convoys OVertheLifeCourse:Attachment,RolesandSocialSupport."InBaltesandBrim(eels.)Life D DevelopmentandBehavior.NewYork: AcademicPress.Lifton,R.J.1967survivorsofHiroshima:DeathinLife.NewYork: RandomHouse.Lifton,R.J.andE.Olson1976 "TheHumanMeaningofTotal Disaster."Psychiatty:. 39:1-18.Lindy,J.D.,M.C.GroceandB.L.Green1981"survivors:outreachtoaReluctantPopulation."AmericanJournalofOrthopsychiatry.5(July):468-478.Loizos,P.1977"AStruggleforMeaning:cypriotRefugees."Disasters.Milne,G.ReactionstoDisasterAmongst1(3):231-239.1977"CycloneTracy:ISomeConsequencesontheEvacuationforAdult Victims." AustralianPsychologist.12:39-54.Parker,G.1975"PsychologicalDisturbancein Danlin EvacueesFollowingCycloneTracy."MedicalJournalofAustralia.1(May24):650-652.1977"CycloneTracyand Danlin Evacuees:ontheRestorationoftheSpecies."Brit.Journalof Psychiatty:. 130(June):548-555. Ferry, R.W.andM.K.Lindell1978 "ThePsychological COI1.?equences ofNaturalDisaster:A ReviewofResearchonAmerican conununities." MassEmergencies.3:105-115.--

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Quarantelli,E.L.1979 TheConsequencesofDisastersforMentalHealth:conflictingViews.Monograph#62. Coltmlbus: Ohiostateuniversity,DisasterRes.Center.1982ShelteringandHousingAfterMajorCommunityDisasters:caseStudiesandGeneralConclusions.Columbus,Ohio:Disaster Research Center,ohiostateUniversity. Sowder, B.andP.Steinglass1985 "TheImpactof loss ofHomeandUndesiredMoveonMentalHealth."pp.170-224in Sowder andDickey-Darbey(008.)SomePotentialMentalHealthConsequencesofsixTypesoflosses Cormnon inMajorDisasters.Mandex:Virginia.Tierney,K.J.andB.Baisden1979CrisesIntel:VentionProgramsforDisastervictims: A SourcebookandManualforsmallerCommunities. Rockville,Ma1:yland: NIMH.Wettenhall,R. 1979"Organisationanddisaster:the1967BushfiresinSouthernTasmania.InHeathcote,R.andThorn B (008.)NaturalHazardsinAustralia. canberra, Australia:AcademyofScience.pp431-435.


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