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State and community during the aftermath of Mexico City's November 19, 1984 gas explosion

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Title:
State and community during the aftermath of Mexico City's November 19, 1984 gas explosion
Series Title:
Special publication ;
Physical Description:
iv, 44 p. : ill. ; 28 cm.
Language:
English
Creator:
Johnson, Kirsten
University of Colorado, Boulder -- Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center
Publisher:
Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, University of Colorado
Place of Publication:
Boulder, Colo
Publication Date:

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Petroleum industry and trade -- Accidents -- Mexico -- Ixhuatepec   ( lcsh )
Explosions -- Mexico -- Ixhuatepec   ( lcsh )
Genre:
non-fiction   ( marcgt )

Notes

Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references.
Additional Physical Form:
Also issued online as part of a joint project with the Louis de la Parte Florida Mental Health Institute (FMHI) Research Library's disaster mental health initiative.
Statement of Responsibility:
Kirsten Johnson.
General Note:
"June 1985."

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University of South Florida Library
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All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
aleph - 001985071
oclc - 13587661
usfldc doi - F57-00057
usfldc handle - f57.57
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State and community during the aftermath of Mexico City's November 19, 1984 gas explosion /
Kirsten Johnson.
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Boulder, Colo. :
Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, University of Colorado,
1985.
300
iv, 44 p. :
ill. ;
28 cm.
490
Special publication ;
v 13
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"June 1985."
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Includes bibliographical references.
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Also issued online as part of a joint project with the Louis de la Parte Florida Mental Health Institute (FMHI) Research Library's disaster mental health initiative.
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Petrleos Mexicanos
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Petroleum industry and trade
Accidents
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Ixhuatepec.
Explosions
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Ixhuatepec.
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University of Colorado, Boulder.
Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center.
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StateandCommunityDuringthe AftermathofMexicoCity'sNovember19,1984GasExplosion KirstenJohnsonCenter for Technology,EnvironmentandDevelopmentClark University Special Publication13June1985This pUblication is partofthe Hazards Research&Applications Information Center's ongoing Special Publication Report Series. http://wwW.colorado.edu/hazards

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iiiTABLEOFCONTENTSiviv......................................................................................................... ......................................................IntroductionListofFiguresListofMaps.......................................................TheSettingAChronologyofEventsonNovember19,1984.......................59TheAftermath.....................................................11....................................................EmergencyRestoration..................................................1618ReconstructionI............................................20ReconstructionII....'.24Discussion........................................................28................................................................................................................PublicResponsetotheDisasterStatevs.CommunityDecisionMakingLimitedOptionsforaHighRiskSettingReferences......................29323538Notes.............................................................39SomeRecentPEMEXAccidents.......................................44

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ivFigureLISTOFFIGURESTheSanJuanIxhuatepecGasExplosion:AChronologyofEvents102MapSanJuanIxhuatepec:RecoverystagesfromtheNovember19,1984PEMEXGasDisasterLISTOFMAPS15NorthernMexicoCityandtheSanJuanIxhuatepecDisasterSite......................32SanJuanIxhuatepecDisasterSite...........................8

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INTRODUCTION*OnNovember19,1984,Mexicoexperiencedtheworstindustrialdisasterofitshistorywhen aliquidpetroleumgas(LPG)plantwastotallydestroyedinaseriesofexplosionsresultinginover500deaths,approximately2,500injur-ies,aswellasthevirtualdestructionofasevenblockareaofaworking-classneighborhoodadjacenttothefacility.Withinhoursitbecamecleartomostpeoplethattheexplosionshadorig-inatedinthestorageplantitself,afacilityownedandoperatedbyPEMEX,thenationaloilcorporation.AlthoughofficialconfirmationofPEMEX'sre-sponsibilitydidnotcomefora numberofweeks, the corporationcameunderconsiderablepressurewhenpointedqueriesweremadeconcerningitssafetyrecordanditsjudgmentinlocatingtheplantinapopulatedurbanarea.GrowingpubliccriticismandalarmputthegovernmentandPEMEX,itsmostpowerfulparastatal,onthedefensive.Assoonastheurgentlogisticalprob-lemsofrescueandemergencyassistancehadbeenresolved,thegovernment'sattentionturnedtolimitingthepoliticaldamageresultingfromtheevent.Itbecameimperativeforthegovernmenttorespondinatimelyandeffec-tivemannertothedisaster.Inthedaysandweeksfollowingtheexplosion,itsmultipleagencies,organizations,anddepartmentsassumedmostofthemajor,andseveraloftheminor,rolesintherecoveryeffort.Inallre-spectstheStatesettheagendaforrecoveryandmonopolizedthedecisions*Thispaperisbasedon asixweekfieldvisittoMexicoCityduringDecember 1984andJanuary1985.ThestudywassponsoredbytheNaturalHazardsResearchandApplicationsInformationCenterandfundedby aNationalScienceFoundationQuickResponseTravelGrant.IowethankstoR.W.Kates,W.Riebsame,andS.Tubbesing.IamalsogratefulforthegenerousassistancegiventomeinMexico byofficialsoftheFederalDistrict'sDisasterProtectionUnit(S.I.P.R.O.R.),andbyDr.OvseiGelmanoftheNationalUniversity.

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-2-shapingthepaceandformofreconstruction.Despitetheoverwhelminggovernmentpresence,thesurvivorswerebyno meanspassiveactors.intherecoveryprocess.Community-basedgroupsarticulatedtheirneedsandorganizedassembliesanddemonstrationsinanattempttoinfluencethetermsoftherecoveryagenda.ThispaperprovidesanaccountandpreliminaryassessmentoftheearlystagesofrecoveryfromtheSanJuanIxhuatepecgasexplosiondisaster.Specialattentionispaidtotheactivitiesanddecisionstakenduringthetwomonthsfollowingtheexplosion.Thisperiodencompassestheprincipaldecisionsandevents,includingmajorchangesinlanduse,affectingthelongtermreconstructionprocess.Inaddition,itprovidesinsightsintothestrengthsandweaknessesofaparticularstyleofdisastermanagementwhichcanbestbetermedauthoritarian-paternalistic.Thefirstsectionofthepaperoffersashortdescriptionofthegeographicsettingandhistoricalevolutionofthedisastersite.SanJuanIxhuatepecislocatedintheStateofMexicoinanareaduenorthoftheFederalDistrict.SanJuanIxhautepecispartofthenorthernzoneofmetropolitanMexicoCitywhichhasexperienceddramaticindustrialexpansionandpopulationgrowthoverthepasttwodecades(seeMap1).However,unlike .Bhopal wheresquattersettlementsgrewupinthe vicinityoftheUnionCarbideplantafterthelatterwasestablished,thevillageofSanJuanIxhuatepecpredatesPEMEXandtheindustrialexpansion of MexicoCitybyseveralcenturies.Itscomplexhistoryofoccupanceandtheresultingconflictingclaimsoverlanduse,access,andownershipareanimportantelementinthedifferentialvulnerabilitytoriskexperiencedbysectorsofitspopulation,aswellasafactorinfluencingtheultimatepatternofpost-disaster

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-3-Map 1NorthernMexicoCityandtheSanJuan Di$aster SiteNORTHERN MEXICO CITY+MAJOR HOSPITALS (J.6 RELOCATION SITEo15003000meters, I 11 AZCAPOTZALCOunREFINERYFEDERAL+DISTRICTSANJUANIXHUATEPECDISASTERSITEVALLEDE efJ ANAHUAC 0-== INTERNA TIONAL AIRPORT

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-4-reconstruction.Followingabriefaccountofeventsonthedayofthe thesecondsectionofthepaperdescribestheactivities,decisions,andconflictsduringtheaftermathofthedisaster.SpecialemphasisisgiventotheroleoftheStateastheprincipaldecisionmakerduringthisperiod.However,otheraspects,inparticularthegeneralpublic'soverwhelmingresponsetotheevent,andtheevent'ssignificanceinpopularandpoliticalculturearealsonoted.ThefinalsectionofthepaperdiscussestheissuesraisedbyMexico'sexperiencewithdisasterrecovery.Someoftheseissuesconcernquestions,suchastherelationbetweenstatepowerandurbanworking-classneighborhoodorganizations,thatarefairlyspecifictoMexico'scurrentsocialandpoliticalcircumstances.Otherissues,suchastheactuallevel,timing,andefficacyofdisasterand.recoveryplanning,lendthemselvestoacomparisonoftheMexicancasewithotherinstancesofdisasterrecovery.Thebasesforasystematiccomparisonareprovidedbythe1977 Haasetal.study 1ofreconstructionaftertheManaguaearthquake,andarediscussedinapreliminarymannerinthispaper.Finally,perhapsthemostsignificantissuesraisedbyMexico'sgasdisasterconcerntheurbanecologyofriskgeneratedbyextraordinaryratesofurbangrowth,rapidindustrialdevelopment,andweakzoningandregulatorycontrols.TheseareconditionsMexicoCityshareswithBhopalanddozensofotherurbancentersindevelopingcountries.Modelsofhazardousfacilitysitingandtechnologicalriskassessmentsdesignedfortheindustrializedworldmaybelargelyirrelevanttosituations such asthosenowprevailinginmetropolitan Mexico City.

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-5-THESETTINGSanJuanIxhautepec,betterknownasSanJuanico,isanancientsettlementlocatedonthenorthernedgeofwhatisnowmetropolitanMexicoCity.ItshistorydatesbackatleasttoAztectimeswhenIxhuatepecwas knownastheplaceofgreenmaizeleaves.2 Thehamletoccupiedflatlandsadjacenttothebanksofariverinanarrowvalleysurroundedonthreesidesbysteephills.BeyondthesehillstothesouthwerethelakesandtheislandcityofTenochtitlan.DuringcolonialtimesIxhuatepecacquiredthesecondpartofitsname whenJuanDiego,thehumbleIndianpeasantwhoexperiencedavisionofthenation'spatronsaint,theVirginofGuadalupe,cametoliveinthecommunityforaperiodoftime.AchurchhousinganantiquepaintingcommemoratingthefirstbaptismofIndiansinSanJuanicobySpanishmissionarieswasbuiltduringtheeighteenthcentury.3Astimepassed,communitylandswereannexedtoanhaciendainthenorthernhalfofthevalley.Followingthis,araillineconnectingMexicoCitytothecoasttraversedthevalleymarkingaboundarybetweenSanJuanIxhuatepec'speasantsandthehaciendaestate.TheyearsfollowingtheMexicanrevolutionbroughtprosperitytothevillagewhichrapidlygrewtobecome athrivingagriculturalcommunitylinkedtoMexicoCity'sproducemarkets.Intime,however,thecity'slabordemandstransformedthisagriculturalsettlementintoalaborreserveperi-urbancommunity.ThiswasanimportantstepinSanJuanico'sfinalabsorptionintometropolitanMexicoCity.Newsettlementsgrewuparoundtheoriginalvillagesite.Asmigrantsarrivedfromthecountryside,shantytownswithnameslikeSanJuanLomasandLaPresacreptupthesteephillslopes,andastringof"irregular"dwellings

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-6-wereestablishedalongtheraillinewithinmetersofthetracks.Mostrecentlyamiddle-classresidentialdevelopmentandgolfcoursewerebuiltonlandformerlyowned bythehacienda.Overthepast30yearsthepopulationoftheoriginalSanJuanIxhautepecgrewfroma fewthousandtoover30,000inhabitants,whilethatoftheoverallvalleyandhillslopesskyrocketedtoroughly300,000.ThisgrowthreflectsthatofMexicoCityasawholewhereindozensofagriculturalvillageslocatedontheurbanfringebeingtransformedintourbanresidentialandindustrialzoneswithinamatterofadecadeorless.4 .InthecaseofSanJuanIxhuatepec,animportantelementinthisprocesswasPEMEX's1961decisiontolocateanLPGstorageanddistributionfacilityonfederallandsacrosstherailroadtracksfromSanJuanico.Whencompleted,thefacilitycovered30acresandincludedtwolargesphericaltanks,fourmediumsizeuprightcylindrical;and48smallerhorizontalcylindricalcon-.tainers12meterslongand2.5metersindiameterwithatotalcapacityof80,000barrelsofLPG. ThefacilitybecameanimportantnodeinthenetworklinkingproductionsitesontheGulfCoastwithurbanusers,ultimatelyproviding40%ofthemetropolitanarea'sgassupplies.ThePEMEXfacilityledtoaveryrapidindustrialandresidentialdevelopmentofSanJuanIxhuatepecintheyearsfollowing1961.Sevenprivategasdistributorsestablishedthemselvesintheimmediatevicinityofthestoragesiteonlandacquiredfromtheformerhacienda.By1984,over40industries(includingpetrochemicalfirms,apaintfactory,apapermill,afoundry,aglassfactory,and a sawmill)werelocatedinthevalleyfloor.TothesePEMEXrecentlyaddedanoilstoragefacilityinthenorthwestsectionofthevalley.

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-7-Asthevalleybecamepopulatedbyanincreasingnumberofindustriesandasthousandsofnewcomerssquattedonhillslopesettlementslackingrunningwaterandsanitation,environmentalconditionsinSanJuanicodeterioratedrapidly.TheoncecleanRemediosRiverisnowanopencanalcarryingrawsewageandindustrialwastes,anditssteepbanksarestrewnwithrefuseandfeces.Factoriespourtonsofpollutantsintotheatmosphere.HeavytrafficfromthenearbyhighwaygeneratesemissionsdangerouslycontaminatingSanJuanico'sairwithcarbonmonoxide,ozone,sulfurdioxide,lead,nitrousoxide,anddust.The communitynowlivesunderanalmostperpetualblanketof smog. 5 Theseairbornehazardsarecompounded byrisksunderground.SanJuanico'ssubsoiliscrisscrossedby anetworkofgaspipelines,manyofwhicharedecadesoldandinpoorrepair.6 Theresultofrapidexpansionhasbeenacomplexlandusepatternfeaturinga mixofresidualagrictilturallandandformerhaciendastructuresheldbyprivateestateowners;alongwithamiddle-classlow-density areapartiallybufferedbytopographyfromthehighdensityworking-classneighborhoodssituatedincloseproximitytoaconcentrationofindustrialfirmshandlingavarietyofhazardousmaterials(seeMap2).Whiletheindustriesarelocatedontheprimelandsofthevalleyfloor,theworking-classneighborhoodsoccupy variedtypesoflands: long-termconsolidatedsettlementofSanJuanIxhuatepecbounded onthenorthbytherailroadtrackandonthesouthbytheRemediosRiver;boundaryareasoccupiedbysquattersalongtherailroadtrackimmediatelyadjacenttoPEMEXandsomeoftheprivategasdistributors;newersettlementsoccupyingthehillslopes.ThequalityofhousinginSanJuanicoreflectsthevariedincomes,securityoftenure,andlevelsofconsolidationachievedbysuccessivewavesofimmigrants.The

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-8-Map 2SanJuanIxhuatepeCDisaster PachucaHighwayIIIMexicoVeracruzRailroad----RiodelosRemediosIndiosVerdesMetroStation 1CaracolesCemetery e PemexTankFarm ResidentialNeighborhood Industrial Area 4 Blastand Fire Zone

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-9-centerofthecommunityischaracterizedby oneandtwostorymasonrystructures,interiorpatios,andmetalgrillworkon doors and Hillslopehousesaremostlyoneortwo roomdwellingsofadobeofcementblockwithcorrugatedmetalroofs.Dwellingslocatedalongtherailroadtracksaremademostlyofimpermanent,flimsymaterials.ACHRONOLOGYOFEVENTSONNOVEMBER19,1984 At5:40onthemorningofMonday, November19,1984 SanJuanIxhuatepecanditssurroundingswereawakened bythesoundofamassiveexplosion.Insecondsagiantfireballengulfedlargeportionsofthecommunitysendingitsresidentsfleeingfromtheirhomestoseekrefugeonthenearbyhighwayandhills.Thefirstexplosionwasfollowedby asuccessionoflesserandgreaterblaststhatburnedhundredsofpeopleexposedonthestreetsastheyattemptedtoescapefromtheircollapsingdwellings.Theexplosionsalsopropelledlargemetalshardsintothesurroundingneighborhood,landingonhousesupto1.5kilometersaway.?Inall,54steeltanksholdingmillionsoflitersofliquidbutaneandpropanegasexplodedandwent upinflamesinaconflagrationthattookfiremen14hourstobringundercontrol.8Halfanhourafterthefirstexplosion,Mexico'sDefenseMinisterorderedanemergencyplan,theDN-III-Etobeputintoeffect(seeFigure1).BythattimesoldiersandfederalroadpatrolshadalreadyarrivedinSanJuanIxhuatepec.Ambulances,firemen,andreporterswereontheirwaytothescenefrom qll partsoftheFederalDistrictaswellasfromthestatesofMexicoandHidalgo.Thepoliceclosedthemajorhighwaytraversingtheareawhilesoldiersassistedintheevacuationofthepanic-strickenpopulation.

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-10-Figure The SanJuanIxhuatepecGasExplosion:AChronologyofEvents95:405:42 5:455:506:00 6:106:14 6:17 6:47 6:597:007:00-11:00AM7:308:009:009:309:5010:0011:50 14:00 15:3020:00FirstexplosionSanJuanIxhuatepecengulfedbyfireballsResidentsfleetoroadandhillstoSouthand West FirstalarmreceivedataFederalDistrictfirestationSecondexplosionFederalpolicecloseMexico-PachucahighwayFirstdetachmentofsoldiersarrives Defense SecretarydeclaresemergencyDN-III-EplanineffectAnotherexplosion,neighborhoodengulfedbyflamesagainReportersandphotographersarriveonscenePolice,firemen,andambulancesarriveHundreds wounded andothersstartarrivingonfoot and bycarattheIndiosVerdesMetrostation,LesserexplosionsArmystartstoevaculateareaPEMEXshutsoff4gaspipelinestofacilityLargeexplosionkeepsfiremenatadistanceDisasterannouncedontelevision,comparisonswithHiroshimaandNagasakileadtogeneralpanic,innorthernareasofthecitySeriesoflesserexplosionsCrowdsblockmajoraccessroadstodisastersiteChurchbellschimecontinuouslyFiremencontainflameswithina2 km.radiusSoldierscordonofflargeareaFirstinjuredtreatedathospitalsStateGovernorarrivesatsiteNorthernzoneofcitycutoff600factoriescloseElectricity,water,andtelephonesshutoffTensofthousandsofrefugeesbegintoarriveatnational. I !shrineoftheVirginofGuadalupeFirechiefdeclaressituationundercontrolPEMEXofficialswarnofpossiblefurtherexplosions200,000to250,000peoplehavefledorhavebeenevacuatedFiremencontainfiretostoragefacilitywheregascontinuestoburnFireextinguished

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-11-Attheoutset,thefire,explosions,andnumberofcasualtiesoverwhelmedtherescueefforts.Asexplosionscontinued,firemenwere togetnearenoughtobringtheflamesundercontrol.Astensofthousandsofpeoplefledtothehighway,ambulanceswereunabletogetthroughtopickupthewounded ;who wereemergingfromthedisasterarea.Duringthefirsthourresidentshadtorescueoneanother.By6:15hundredsofpeople,amongwhomweremanyof the wounded,hadmadetheirwaytoanearbyMetrostationand,withthehelp\ofcommuters ontheirwaytowork,arrivedatnearbymedicalcentersbypublictransportation.OthersmadetheirwaytothenationalshrineofGuadalupewhereby10:00inthemorningthousandsofrefugeesbegantocongregate.By8:00a.m.firemenmanagedtocontaintheconflagrationwithina twokilometerradius,andthearmy,aftercordonningoffalargezone,begantoevacuate thosewho hadnotalreadyfled.Bynoonthe zoneofthecitywascutoff,itsfactoriesclosed,anditsapprehensiveinhabitantswereleftwithoutelectricityandotherservices.Bymidafterno6nthefirewaslimitedtothestoragefacility,andapproximately250,000peoplehadbeenevacuated.Cityhospitalshadadmittedover4,000injuredpeople,andrescueteamscontinuedtocollectthebodiesofwhat,byofficialaccounts,weretobe500casualtiesfromtherubbleofSanJuan Inall,over housesweredamagedand150werecompletelydestroyedbytheexplosions,fire,andmetalshardsfromthetanks.Bynightfallthefirstphaseoftheemergencywasover.THEAFTERMATHInthetwo monthsfollowingNovember19,thepeopleofSanJuanicotriedtorecoverfromtheirpersonalandmateriallossesandrebuildtheir l'ives.

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-12-DuringthisperiodPEMEXwasforcedtoacknowledgeitsresponsibilityforthedisaster,andgovernmentofficialsfromavarietyofagenciesandministriesaddressedthemultipledemandsandtasksofcommunityreliefandreconstruction.Inaddition,themediaandthepublicatlargeraisedpointedquestionsaboutPEMEX'sculpabilityand,on abroaderlevel,issuesregardingthevulnerabilityofMexicoCity'spopulationtothenewrisksimplicitinitsrapidindustrialgrowth.Itwasduringthesecritical,self-questioningtimesthatauthoritiesmademajordecisionsregardingvictims'rightstocompensationaswellaschoicesresultinginsignificantlandusechangesinSanJuanIxhuatepec.Althoughmost,ifnotall,ofthesedecisionsweremadeina'paternalistic,top-downfashion,governmentofficialswerebyno means immunetopublicpressure.TheimageofresponsivenessbecameasimportanttotheStateasitsactualabilitytorespondtothecrisiseffectively.Inashorttime,thepoliticalmanagementofthedisasteranditsconsequencesovershadowedthetechnicalandlogisticaltasks.TheunfoldingofthesedecisionsandactivitiesduringtheearlyrecoveryperiodrevealsagreatdealaboutthemannerinwhichtheMexicanStatemanagestheaftermathofalarge-scale,politicallysensitivedisaster.Moreover,inthecaseofSanJuanIxhuatepec,thedisasteraftermathprovidesanexampleoftheeffectsofauthoritariandisastermanagementuponanurbanworkingclasscommunityattemptingtorecoverfromacalamity.Thefollowingpagesdetailtheeventsandactivitiesoccurringduringthiscriticalperiod.UsingasanorganizingframeworkamodeldevelopedbyHaasandotherstodescribeandcomparesequentialstagesofrecoveryfromdisaster,I will arguethattheMexicancase,whilebearingimportantsimiJar-

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-13-itiestothegeneralpatterncommontootherdisasterrecoveries,alsoexhibitsimportantdifferences.Inlargemeasure,thesedifferencesstemfromthehighlychargedpoliticalovertonesofadisasterlaidatthedoorstepofthecountry'smostimportantparastatal.ThemodeldevelopedbyHaasandothersintheirstudyofrecoveryinManaguaandothercitiespositsfourstagesofdisasterrecoveryactivity:(1)theemergencyperiod,duringwhichallofthecommunity'snormalsocialandeconomicactivitiescease;(2)therestorationperiod,inwhichthephysicalandservicefunctionsarerestoredatarudimentarylevel;(3)thefirstreconstructionperiod,inwhichmajorinfrastructureandurbanfunctionsarefullyrecovered;and(4)thesecondreconstructionperiod,characterizedbymajorimprovements,developments,andcommemorativestructures(Haasetal.,1977,pp.xxvi-xxviii).Theauthorsarguethatalthoughtheseactivitiesoverlaptoadegree,theyarelargelysequential,eachphaselastingapproximatelytentimesaslongastheprecedingone.Theirempiricalstudiesdemonstratethattherateofpost-disasterrecoveryisinfluencedbyfactorssuchasthemagnitudeofthedamage,theresourcesavailableforrecovery,predisastertrends,andtheplanningandorganizationalcapacitiesofthoseresponsibleforreconstruction(Haas,etal.,1977,pp.12).Usingthismodelitispossible,asitsauthorshavedone,tocomparedifferentinstancesofdisasterrecoveryofdifferentmagnitudesindiversesettings.AreviewoftheeventsunfoldingduringtheweeksfollowingtheNovember 19gasexplosionrevealsasequenceofactivitiesandindicatorssimilartothosesetforthinthegeneralmodel.However,importantdifferencesinthetimingandpatternoftherecoverystagesmaketheMexicanexperiencedivergefromboththegeneralmodelandotherhistoricalcases.Thesedifferences

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-14-concern,mostimportantly,theacceleratedrateofrecovery,which,lastingalittleovertenweeks,was muchshorterthanmighthave.beenpredictedbythealgorithmofthemodel.Moreover,inwhatisperhapsauniqueaspectofthiscase,thelastphaseofrecovery,ReconstructionII,involvingactivitiesassociatedwithcivicimprovement,commemorativedevelopments,andthelike,overlappedwithotherphasesofrecovery,havingadecisiveimpactuponthem.AnimportantfactorinthepaceandpatternoftherecoveryeffortwasthepromptimplementationofofficialmeasuresdecreedbytheGovernoroftheStateofMexico whenhearrivedatthesceneofthedisasterfourhoursaftertheexplosion.Thesemeasuresconcernedfivemajorspheresofactivity(reliefassistance,materialandeconomicsupport,establishmentofacommunicationsandinformationsystem,preventionoffuturecatastrophes,anddeterminationofresponsibilities)tobeexecutedwithinaspecifiedtimeframe:(1)immediateaction(thefirst15days);(2)shorttermaction(16to90daysafterthedisaster);and(3)mediumtermaction(90daystooneyearafterthedisaster).11Themannerinwhichthesemeasureswereimplemented,aswellastheresponsetheyevokedamongthosewhomtheyaffected,aredescribedinthepagestofollow.Foranalyticpurposestheaccountisorganizedaccordingtothegeneralstagemodelofdisasterrecoverydiscussedabove.However,itshouldbenotedthatinmanyrespectsthefirstthreestagesofthemodelarequitesimilartothoseoftheactualassistanceandrecoveryplanimplementedbythestateofMexico.Figure2providesausefuldiagramofthefourstagesalongwitha numberofrelevantindicatorsdiscussedinthetext.

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300Plrlllll.lt_. 180 210240150 12090 """""I"'"""-" ""-"""-", RECONSTRUCTION I JW61.IllJlclol,IIitf:ld......1lW_..-"1'1IQlIM'unItyPlok'l.....r.",...,UJ..L.. 1 I. I OrdetsPEMEX 10 II"'''.WIIP1rya-.O-lNolt6'11111Gk1 I .....OoonToIE.a.nalCl: tiuallhQlnlIllT'lMtso-,OO Bum VlClomsPel'DIy I tJOCornpctnulIlWlCllma-""""..e--"CompunulIOf\a-PINkv.::,_uL..fUIld-"N_ Ul ..0IsIr1bula..lo......"fldHtl.IllhCllnllllO(lllt_ Dubr.a.-lWll*8O':L"",,-, 121 T/5,uc_f'(MEXAelocebonIPwto RESTORATION RECONSTRUCTION II >:::::---------..../X.........----"-.........'"--_.........................----.---/"" "'"'"//......./"'""" 2III31II6 E1XPLOStiONOIlIC'IbAmounce......""""""'"lJenefl1fufWlEllabIrshodHnodIInlaHeIum 10 All I OoualcIrSlIllD6QiO ,fn ",,-Dulr.oef.........."1DemulIlIOflUev!'OCoo'Il Pr'll;'. .......,' :xlo(lO/SRl!upun""",.....;K!OOOOHt/IUfOklFWlmlIlnfAfu.uUI.... RuslolCKl tI .clof_Reopen In Oubr..--"--",8,-MauBu'.... DAYSEMERGENCY l4IuCordonnedOl'l 9,T,OOOIlQnflttoQlil'eOUlC6OJF.KlOfoesClowUI"olIr.oCulOffCIJa:.""1'OSe.. If"II!llVOI3< o CF".b""""lIhed PERIODSOF RESPONSEMAXIMAL CD>z!= -> 11.-0" 00 0( MINIMALFigure2SanJuanrxhuatepec:RecoveryStagesfromtheNovember19,1984PEMEXGasDisaster

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-16-Emergency(November 19 November21)TheemergencyperiodlastedapproximatelythreedaysandwasexperiencedinvaryingdegreesoflengthandseveritybydifferentsectorsofthepopulationinthelargerSanJuanIxhuatepecvalleyarea.Onthemorningofthedayfollowingtheexplosion,azoneofabout8squarekilometersremainedcordonnedoffby-troops,androughly250,000ofitsinhabitantswerehousedintemporaryshelters.Almost2,500peoplewerebeingtreatedforwoundsin pitals,whilerelativesofthosewhohaddied were attemptingtoidentifyremainsandpreparefortheirburialina massgrave.Thedeathtollcontinuedtomountasthemostseverelyinjureddiedinhospitalsandasrescueworkersrecoveredmorebodiesfromtherubble.Over14hectaresofSanJuanicowhichbeforetheexplosionhadhousedapproximately3,000peopleweredestroyed,andanadditional15hectaresofdwellingswereseriouslydamaged.InadditiontoitsimpactonSanJuanico,theeffectsofthedisaster were feltovera latge areaofnorthernmetropolitanMexicoCitywhere hadbeencutoffandover600factorieshadshutdown,idlingthousandsofworkers.Significantly,thisdaycoincidedwithamajor natioDal holidaymarkingtheanniversaryofMexico'srevolution.,November20ischaracteristicallytheoccasionwhenPRI,thecountry'srulingparty,celebratestheaccomplishmentsoftherevolutionduringitslongtenureinoffice.Ashourspassed,itbecameincreasinglyclearthattheresponsibilityforthedisasterprobablyresidedwithPEMEX.Thisfactcasta shadow onthecelebration,astheregime,eversensitivetotheideologicalimplicationsofevents,wasputonthedefensive.ThePresident,afterasomberspeechattheceremony,flewoverSanJuanicoinahelicopterandorderedanassessmentofthedamage.

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-17-Bythistime,HumbertoLiraMora,theAttorneyGeneraloftheStateofMexico,whomtheGovernorhadputinchargeofcoordinatingassistancetothedisastervictims,hadsetupheadquartersinthenearbycityhallofEcatepec.Fromthere,teamsofdoctors,coroners,andlawyerscarriedouttheprioritytaskofcountingandidentifyingcasualties,andissuingdeathcertificatespriortoburial.Inaddition,engineersandpublicworkspersonnelbeganapreliminaryassessmentofdamagetocommunitystructuresandutilitiesandtherebydemarcatedthreeimpactzones:mostaffected(asevenblockcorezone),partiallyaffected(alargeportionofoldSanJuanIxhuatepec),andleastaffected(thelargelyundamagedperimeter).Thisclassificationwouldserveasthebasisfororganizingtheevacuees'phasedreturntothearea,andsubsequentlyasaguideforpost-disasterlanduseplanning(StateofMexico,1985,pp.7-9).Bythethirddayaftertheexplosion,authoritieshadallowedallpeoplelivingintheleastaffectedareastoreturntotheirhomes.Workmenwerebusyrestoringutilitiesandmanyfactorieshadresumedoperations.Thepopulationinthesheltersdecreaseddramatically.Officialagencieswhichhadbeenoverwhelmedbyprivatedonationsoffoodandclothingissuedapleatothegeneralpublictostopsendingassistanceinkindand,instead,tomakecontributionstoavictims'benefitfund.Asthingswerebeginningtoreturntonormalintheperimeterarea,themainpartofSanJuanicoremainedcordonnedoffanditspopulationscatteredinshelters,hospitals,oramongrelativesandfriends. theemergencyhadendedformostofthosewhohadbeenevacuated,itcontinuedforabout30,000ofthemost affected population.Itwasnotuntilthefifthdaythatresidentsofallbutthesevenblockdevastatedzonewereallowedtoreturntotheirhomes.

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-18-Restoration(November 22 December9,1984)Withintwodaysofthedisasterhighgovernmentofficialsdecidednottorebuildthesevenblock'mostaffected'areadestroyedbytheexplosionandfire.Itwasdecidedthatinitsplacetherewould be apark.Thisdecision,havingamajorimpactonthearea'slanduseaswellasuponthelivesofthosewholivedthere,wastoshapethecourseoftheentirerecoverypro-cess.Attheoutset,thecommunitybelievedthattheparkwouldbebuiltonPEMEXpropertyatthesiteoftheexplosionitself.However,whenbulldozersbegantodemolishtheremainingstructuresinthecorezone,SanJuanico'sresidentsawoketothe fact thatwhathadbeentermeda'commemorativepark'wouldbecarvedoutoftheirowncommunity.Bythetime,tendayslater,thatanofficiallyconstitutedInterministerialCommission madetheformalannouncementthatthePEMEXfacilitywouldberelocatedandaparkwouldbebuilt,majorstepshadalreadybeentakentoputthislandusechangeintoeffect,andtheadversarialcourseofState-communityrelationshadbeenset.TherestorationperioditselfcommencedfivedaysaftertheexplosionwhenlargequantitiesofbuildingmaterialsprovidedbythestateofMexicoweredeliveredtoSanJuanico.lEvenastherescueteamsdiscoverednewbodiesintheruins,municipalworkersbegantocleardebrisfromthestreetsandreconnectutilitiesinthedamagedareas. Inthedaysthatfollowed,teamsofsanitationworkersfumigatedhouses,andnotariespublicofficiallycertifiedthereturnofhomestosurvivingfamilies.Whilethecorezoneremainedcordonnedoffandguardedbytroops,otherpartsofthecommunityreturnedtolife.Food,clothing,andbuildingmaterialsweredistributedtoresidents,somestoresresumedbusiness,andninedaysaftertheexplosion,thecentral

PAGE 23

-19-marketandschoolsreopened.\Theconstructionofaparkdisplacedover180families-whohadsurvivedtheexplosioninthecorezone.Onthefifthdayfollowingtheexplosion,officialsannouncedthatallthesefamilieswouldbeprovidedwithhousinginValledeAnahuac,anewlyconstructedworking-classdevelopmentlocatedtenkilometerstotheeastofSanJuanico(seeMap1).)Thefirstfamilieswere j settledonthefollowingday."Thelocationandminisculesizeofthehouses(approximately270squarefeet)gaverisetoprotestsfromfamilieswhooftenhadtocrowd uptotenmembersintothesetwo roomdwellingsfarfromtheirfriendsandfamiliarcommunity.Therestorationperiodlastedapproximatelytwoandahalfweeks. lEy December9,threeweeksaftertheexplosion,90%ofthehomelesshadbeen\housed.\IntheaffectedareasofSanJuanicodebrisclearancewascomplete,mostbuildingmaterialshadbeendistributed,utilitiesandserviceshadbeenrestored,andanextensiveapparatusforadministeringreliefassistancewasinplace.,Itisimportanttonotethatthegovernmenthadadheredtoitsown '-----gencyreliefplan Within15daysoftheexplosion,"mostofthepopulationhadreturnedhomeorbeengivennewhouses,andbasicservicesandcivilactivitieswerenormalized"(StateofMexico,1985,pp.11).Atthesametime,thedeathtollkeptmountingasburnvictimscontinuedtodieinhospitals.Byofficialaccountsover300people,about one-thirn ofwhomwereincriticalcondition,werestillhospitalizedatthistime. hastilyestablishedhealthcenterinSanJuanicowasattendingover200out-patientsaday.Itsdirectorreportedthatwhilesupplieswereplentiful,manypatientsneededspecializedtreatmentforbothphysicalandemotional

PAGE 24

-20-traumas.12 Thelatterweremagnifiedduringthisperiodby aseriesofgasleaksfromundergroundpipeswhichcontinuedforatleasttwo weeksaftertheexplosion.ReconstructionI (November24,1984 -January30,1985)ThereconstructionphaseoftheSanJuanIxhuatepecgasexplosionstandsoutamongotherinstancesofdisasterrecoverybecauseofthespeedwith which itwasaccomplishedandtheexpeditiousmannerin which theprocedureandmechanismsforcompensatingitsvictimsweredevisedandexecuted.Giventhelengthofthepriorrestorationphase(18days),ReconstructionIcouldhavebeenexpectedtotakeapproximately180daystocomplete.Infact,thisphaseactuallytook only 63days,alittleoverone-thirdthattime.ThereconstructionofSanJuanIxhuatepecinvolveddecisionsandactivitiesinthreeareas:(1)physicalreestablishmentofprivatehousingdamaged by fire ormetalshardsinSanJuanicoitself,andprovisionofpermanenthousingforthehomelessattherelocationsiteofValledeAnahuac;(2)reestablishmentofa minimumsenseofcommunitysecurity;and(3)assuringthewell-beingofhousholdswithmemberswhohadbeenkilledorinjured.Repairsby homeownersbeganshortlyafterauthoritiessetup asystemfordeliveringbuildingmaterialsprovidedbythegovernmentoftheStateofMexico.ThreeweeksaftertheexplosionthesedistributionspeakedandbyChristmasthemajorpartofthedamagetoresidentialstructuresinthecommunityhadbeenrepaired.Bythistimeallbuta fewofthehomeless180familieshadbeensettledatValledeAnahuac.Asdayswentbyandtherealityoftheparkbecamecertaininmostminds,itbecameclearthatthesedwellingsweretobe aperma-

PAGE 25

-21-nentrelocationsolutionforthosedisplacedbygovernmentorders.Whilethissolutionwasadequateforthosewhose SanJuanicodwellings-hadbeensmall,makeshift,andlackinginutilities,andforotherswhodidnotcareevertoreturntothesceneofthedisaster,itwasstronglyopposedbythosewho possessedbetter,andinparticular,largerhousesinSanJuanico.Manyofthelatterwereold-timeejidatarioswhosefamilieshadlivedinthecommunityforgenerationsandwhoserelativelylargepropertiesallowedthemtokeepfarmanimalssuchaschickens,pigs,andevencows.Formanyoftheoldtimersthelossoftheirhomes was compounded bythelossoftheircommunity.13ThesecondelementofReconstructionI wasthereestablishmentof 2 senseofcommunitysecurity.VirtuallyallofSanJuanico'sresidentswanted andtheprivategascompaniestoleave.Thus muchanxietywasfocussedon the possibilitythatPEMEXmightrebuilditsfacility. When, onDecember2, the InterministerialCommissionissueditspreliminaryfindingsand recommenda tionsstipulatingthatthefacilitynotberebuilt and thatthe privategas distributorsrelocate,thepeopleofSanJuanicofeltastrong senseofrelief andmoralvindication.However, muchuneasepersistedbecause nothinghad beendonetoremovethewreckageofthe PEMEX facility, whichpresenteda macabrebackdroptothenewlyconstructedpark.Inaddition, owingtothe city'surgentdemandforgas,allbuttwoofthearea's privategas torshadresumedtheiroperationswithgasbrought inbytrucksfroEout of-statePEMEXfaci1ities.14Manyinthe community felt thatsoonitbe businessasusualforthesehazardousfirms.Thethirdandveryimportantcomponentof ReconstructionIthe cesswherebyvictimsreceivedcompensation.Although notits

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-22-critics,thespeedandefficiencywithwhichmostofthesurvivingvictimswereawardedmonetarycompensationwas oneofthetrulyremarkablefeaturesoftheMexicancase.Theprocessinvolvedaseries complexlegalandadministrativesteps,including,first,assigninglegalresponsibilityfortheexplosion;second,devisingamechanismtoevaluateandsetcompensationlevelsfordeath,forarangeoftypesofinjuries,andforpropertydamage;andfinally,settinginmotionaprocedurefordisbursingpaymentstothousands-ofindividuals.Thefirststeprequiredassigninglegalresponsibilityfortheexplosion.Thiswasaccomplishedonthe"basisoftheAttorneyGeneral'sinvestigation.Thepreliminaryreportsummarizingtheinvestigation'sfindingswas madepublicon December22.InthereporttheAttorneyGeneralconcludedthat"theexplosionstartedinthePEMEXfacility"andthat"PEMEXmustacceptitsobjectivesocialresponsibility"and"deliverthenecessaryfundstocovercompensationforallmaterialandpersonaldamages."PEMEX'shead,MarioBetetathenpublicallyacceptedtheAttorneyGeneral'sfindings,"PEMEXassumesmoralandcivilresponsibilityforthedisaster,"andstatedthatPEMEXwouldannouncetheoutlinesofitscompensationprocedurethefollowingweek.ISAttheoutset,PEMEXwouldnegotiatewithitsinsuror(aconsortiumof30domesticandforeigncompanies)fortheappropriatefunds.Intheabsenceoflegislationtoguidecompensationto andcommunitiesharmedbyindustrialaccidents,theAttorneyGeneral'sreportrecommendedthatcompensationlevelsbedeterminedonthebasisofprovisionssetoutinthefederallaborlaw.Thisdecisionrevealsaremarkabledegreeofflexibilityonthegovernment'spartinduced,perhaps,by asenseofurgencyandabeliefheldat

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-23-thehighestlevelsoftheadministrationthattheSanJuanicosituation had toberesolvedinaneffectiveandtimelymanner.Thegovernment's wasto issueallcompensations(includingpaymentsforlossoflife,injury, and propertydamage)duringthemonthofJanuary.Accordingtoofficialcriteria,compensationsforlossof lifewould equal730daysofminimumwage,plusone-thirdagainas muchformoralinjury, andone-thirdforfuneralcosts;thetotaltoequalalittle overIT.S.5!r')),!i](i1(1)j (atJanuary,1985ratesofexchange).Thesepayments wouldbemadeforchfldrenaswellasforadults(StateofMexico,1985,p.12). Begi!l!l!d.ngJaliItilliary-2,1985,compensationpaymentsforlossoflife,along viththosefor topersonalproperty,wereissuedbyofficialsatthe rateof5{)iaday. Inaddition,theinjuredwereexaminedonan individualbasisbya ofphysiciansandexpertsinlabormedicine. Compensationwasdeterminedim each case accordingtoacomplexformulainwhichthe extentofirrjroryW25 establishedonthebasisoffunctional,aesthetic, andpsychologicalcriteria.16Exceptforthosestillinhospitals, injuredezamrned andprocessedatarateof25 adayintwonearby healthcentersfuegimrningin earlyJanuary.Theofficialreportofthedisaster issuedbyStateof Springof1985statesthatasof tha: timea totalof1836claim$for materialdamages,780forinjury,and419for to dollars(atJanuary,1985ratesofexchange) badbeempai&to claimantsinSanJuanico(StateofMexico,1985, p.13).

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-24-ReconstructionII(November21,1984 November19,1985)Thegeneralrecoverymodelpositsasecondphaseofreconstructionencompassingdevelopmentsshapingthelong-termgrowthoftheaffectedcommunity.Activitiescharacterizingthisphaseinvolveimprovementsinthecommunity'sphysicalstructures,services,orfacilities.ThisphasewouldhypotheticallylastapproximatelytentimesaslongasReconstructionI.InthecaseoftheSanJuanIxhuatepecdisaster,ReconstructionIIcouldthusbeexpectedtolastroughlytwoyears(68daystimes10).FromtheoutsetReconstructionIIassumedgreatsignificanceinSanJuanIxhuatepec,withitsassociatedactivitiesandartifactsbeinginvestedwithconsiderableideologicalimport.Perhapsforthisreason,ReconstructionIIactivitiesoverlappedandevenprecededthoseofotherperiods.Ifthe-constructionofthepromisedhealthcenter,technicalschool,andkindergartenrunaccordingtoscheduleandarecompletedby November,1985,thenReconstructionIIwillhavetakenonlyhalfthetimeprojectedbythegeneralmodelandtypicalofotherhistoricalcasesofdisasterrecovery.Thepresentsectionprovidesa summaryoftheactivitiesassociatedwithReconstructionII,includingashortdescriptionofgrowingcommunityoppositiontotheauthorities'decisionsandagenda.ThepoliticalandideologicalimplicationsofReconstructionII,includingtheState-communityconflictoverthetermsofdisasterrecoverywillbeanalyzedinasectiontofollow.ThemajortangibleelementsofReconstructionIIinitsinitialphasewerethelarge14hectare'commemorative'park,alongwithpavedstreetsandsidewalksthroughouttheaffectedarea.Inaddition,therewereotherintangible,butveryreal,moralandideologicalaspectstoReconstructionIIimplicitinthegovernment'scampaignofnationalsolidaritywiththevictims

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-25-ofthedisaster.OnNovember 21, whenthedusthadhardlysettledandbodieswerestillbeingrecoveredfromtheruins,anunnamedofficialwasreportedtohaveannouncedthatgrassandtreeswouldbeplantedatthesceneofthedisastertoprovide"avisualbuffer."17Shortlythereafter,thenewlyconstitutedInterministerialCommissiondeclaredthatthePEMEXfacilitywouldbereplacedby apark.Thesedeclarationsweremetwithuniversalapprovalamongthepublicatlargewhofeltthatrestitutionwas owedtothesurvivorsofthedevastatedcommunity.Thisspurredactivityandplanningforthepark.EvenbeforeresidentswereallowedtoreturntotheirhomesintheaffectedareasofSanJuanico,thefirst Eteps weretakentoimplementthesedecisions.Therealizationthattheparkwould belocatedintheirowncommunityratherthanon PEMEX'slandignitedthefirstofaseriesof anti-governmentdemonstrations.OnNovember25,lessthanone weekaftertheexplosion,anestimated20,000SanJuanicoresidentsassembledinthecordonned-offzonedemandingthatPEMEXand,thegasdistributorsleavetheareaandthatthedemolitionofhousesbehalted.18 Thegenerallyadversarialtoneofthedemonstrationwastemperedbyexpressionofthankstothefiremenandtroopsfortheireffortsduringtheemergency.Thisdidnotstopthebulldozers.ByNovember 29, tendaysaftertheexplosion,thedemolitionofthecorezonewascomplete.Newspaperaccountsrecordednumerousexpressionsofcommunitydissatisfactionandanxietyduring'thedaysthat fol19wed. Manycomplaintsfocussedonperceivedincompetenceandcorruptioninthedeliveryoffoodandreliefassistance.OthercriticismswerelevelledatwhatwasseenastheforciblerelocationofpeoplefromthecorezoneandattheinadequatesizeofthehousingprovidedatVallede

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-26-Anahuac.Communitysentimentsfoundexpressioninsloganspaintedduringthenightonwallsandsidewalks:"Nopark. We wanthouses,"".Wheredidalltheaidgo?""PEMEXandgascompaniesgetout.,,19OnDecember11,theseverelybeatenbodyofa communityleaderwasfoundon anearbyhillside.Thisevent,alongwiththeabrupttransferofaparishpriestwhohadbeencriticalofPEMEXandthegovernment,helpedescalateten-sions.OnDecember16,survivorsvoicedtheirdissatisfactioninalargecommu-nitymeetingwhichissuedaformalwrittenpetitiondemandingthat:(1)"ourtragedynotbeusedforpoliticalends,"(2)acompleteaccountbemadeofallassistancedonations;(3)fatalitiesbecompensatedatarateofnolessthanu.s.$17,000;(4)forciblerelocationsbehaltedandthat"housingberecon-structedinSanJuanicoitself;and(5)thegovernmenttake theofficialbanners'andpoliticalsignsithadplacedthroughoutthecommunity.Whenthemeetingwasbrokenup bythepolice,peoplereassembledanddemonstratedatasitenearby.20IOnDecember23,thedayfollowingtheAttorneyGeneral'sreport,membersof-thecommunityheldanothermarch,demonstration,andassembly.Theactionwassponsoredby anewlyconstitutedNeighborhoodCommittee.SanJuanicowasgenerallyunimpressedbytheAttorneyGeneral'sfindings since ithadbeenob-vioustothemforovera monththattheexplosionstartedat PEMEX andnotelsewhere.21Theywerelikewiseunmoved bythepromiseofasoontobe com-pletedparkequippedwithbasketballcourts,grass,trees,lighting,andafountain,arguingthatitshouldhavebeenbuiltatthePEMEXsite.Notingtheincidenceofanguishandemotionalupsetresultingfromthedisaster,andarguingthatthedailysightoftheburnttanksandexplodedcylinderswasanaffronttothesurvivors,theNeighborhoodCommitteedemandedthatPEMEXat

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-27-leastremovethewreckagefromitsfacilities.Whiletheassemblywastenseforfearofreprisalsandarrests,itsmessagewasclear: want ajustcompensation,notcharity."22 The nextstepintheconfrontationbetweentheauthoritiesandthecom-munitywasoverthetermsofthecompensationprocess.FollowingtheAttorney / General'sreport,PEMEXannouncedthatit"accepteditsmoralandcivic responsibility,butnoblame,sincethedisasterwascausedbyanaccidentin-herentinthehazardousnatureofthistypeoffacility."23PEMEX,moreover,assuredthepublicthatalldamages would becoveredina promptandorderlywayinashortperiodoftime.TheseassurancesdidnotmolifytheNeighbor-hood Committee whose membersarguedthattheofficialfiguresdrasticallyunderestimatedthenumberofvictims.OnJanuary1,1985,theNeighborhoodCommitteeissueditsownestimateofthetoll:2,000dead,3,000wounded,and1,500missing.24 Overthefollowingweeks,asclaimsformaterialdamages,loss of life,andinjurywerebeingprocessed,communityanxietyreachedahighpoint.25OnJanuary11,thePSUM,acoalitionofleft-wingoppositionparties,chargedthattheSanJuanicovictimswerebeingcheated.PSUMcitedArticles1913and1915oftheLaborCodestipulatinga paymentequivalentto2,800daysofmini-mumwageperdeath,,insteadofthelowerfigureof730daysusedtocalculatetheofficialcompensationlevels.Ina fewdays, chargewasfollowedby alargepublicassemblycalledbytheNeighborhoodCommmittee.Duringthemeetingresidentsairedawiderangeofcomplaintsrevealingthedepthsoftheirfrustrationanddissatisfac-tionwiththegovernment'shandlingoftherecovery.Thestrongestprotestsfocussedonthe"arbitrary,capricious,andunjust"compensationprocedure,

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-28-includingwhatwereperceivedtobeunjustifiablylowcompensationsformaterialdamages,anunderestimationofthenumberof andthesettingoflowercompensationsforwomen.Atatimewhen work ontheparkwasnearingcompletion,manyofthesurvivorsstillvieweditas"anaffront.,,26Residentsalsodeploredthegovernment'srefusalto offersofforeignmedicalassistanceforsevereburncases.Underlying.allthedemandsandcomplaintswas awidelyshared_feelingthattheauthoritieswereactinginadisrespectful,highhanded,andintimidatingmannertowardthecommunity,usingitstroublesfortheirownpoliticalends.DISCUSSIONJudgedonthebasisofconventionalindicatorsandmeasures,thereisnodoubtthatSanJuanIxhuatepec'srecoveryfromdisasterwasbothrapidandeffective.Toalargedegree,thiswasbecausetheStateimmediatelyassumeddecision-makingpowerovervirtuallyallaspectsoftherecoveryprocess.WhilecriticismhasbeenlevelledatthequalityofState-providedrecoveryassistance(e.g.,incompetenthospitalcare,apoorlocationandinadequatesizeofsubstitutehousing,relativelylowsumspaidincompensationtothevictims),astrongcasecanbe madethatswiftandcomprehensiveassistanceaccompaniedbyimmediatephysicalreconstructionismorejustandlessdamaginginthelong-termthanmoreambitiousprogramsandhighercompensationsthatmightbeobtainedafterlongdelaysandyearsoflitigation.However,theauthoritarian-paternalisticmodelofdisasterrecoveryisnotwithoutitscostsandhiddeninjuries.Byitsnaturecalamitydisruptspeople'slivesanddeprivesthemofcontrolovertheirday-to-dayroutines.

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-29-Therefore,oneimportanttaskofdisasterrecoveryistoprogressivelyrestoreaneffectivedecision-makingspheretoapopulationtemporarilytraumatizedandrendereddependent.Thecostofanauthoritarianapproachisthatitimpedesthisprocess,creatingnewdependenciesand,attimes,intenseresent-ment amongthesutvivors.AsdemonstratedinthecaseofSanJuanico,partsoftherecoveryprogramwerechallengedby membersofthecommunitywhorapid-lyorganizedthemselvesintoapressuregrouptoopposetheState'sagendaandprotectthemselvesagainstitsmorerepressivemeasures.ThreeaspectsofSanJuanico'srecoveryfromdisastermeritdiscussion.First,theroleofpublicpressureinspurringthegovernment'sswift,full-scaleinvolvementindisastermanagementrevealsagreatdealabouttheideo-logicalandsymbolicimportoftheevent.Second,SanJuanico'sexperiencefollowingthedisasterraisesquestionsaboutthepossibilitiesforcommunityinvolvementindecisionsaffectingboththeirimmediatewell-beingandthoseleadingtolong-termchangesinthecommunity'slanduseandvulnerabilitytofuturehazards.TheboundarybetweenStateauthorityandcommunity poweralsounderliestothefinalissueaddressedinthispaper:'theevolutionofhighriskurbanecologicalsettingsinrapidlyindustrializingcountries.ThelessonsprovidedbyrecentdisasterssuchasthoseofSanJuanIxhuatepec,CUbatao,Bhopal,andCiudadJuarezhaveyettobefullyunderstoodandassim-ilatedbyurbanplannersandriskexperts. -+ IPublicResponsetotheDisasterWithinhoursoftheexplosion,MexicoCity'spopulationwasrivetedbyaccountstransmittedbyradioandtelevisioncrewswhohadrushedtothesceneofthedisaster.Fordaysthereafterdeepfeelingsofempathyexpressedin

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-30-theoften-voicedterm createdanexpandedsenseofcommunity amongthemetropolis'heterogeneousgroupsandclasses.\'Solidaridad'alsoresultedinsuchalargeflowofmaterialsupportfromconcernedindividuals(primarilyintheformoffood,clothing,andblood)thattheofficialdistri-butionchannelswereoverwhelmed.Theday-to-dayoperationsofsomeoftheFederalDistrict's16municipalcenterscametoahaltasthestaffattemptedtohandlethelargevolumeofdonations.27Inmanycasesthelogisticsandavailablemanpowerwerenotequaltothetaskofassembling,organizing,transporting,anddeliveringthemassofindividualdonationstothevariousshelters.Aftertwodays,authoritiesrequestedahalttoallassistanceinkindandaskedthat,inthefuture,donationsbelimitedtocashcontributionstoadisasterrelieffund.Asaresult,muchpubliceffortthenwenttoorganizingbenefits(concerts,plays,auctions,andboxingmatches)toraisemoneyforthevictims.Fromthebeginning,radioandtelevisionplayedapivotalroleinshapingthepublic'sresponsetotheevent.Becausethedayfollowingthedisasterwas anationalholiday,nomajornewspaperaccountsoftheeventwereavail-ableuntilNovember21.Radioandtelevisionfilledthisvacuumwithcompel-lingon-the-sceneaccountsoftherescueefforts.Inthehoursfollowingtheemergency,televisionandradiostationsdisseminatedimportantinformationonthelocationofevacuationsheltersandthehospitalstreatingthevictims.Inaddition,televisionandradioplayedaroleincoordinatingindividualdonationswithparticularneedsandrelieforganizations.Televisionre-porterswereevenabletohelptargetassistancetospecificshelterswhentheynotifiedtheirstationsofspecificneedsatdifferentreliefcenters.Thisinformationwassubsequentlybroadcastovertheairtothepublicgener-

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-31-atingpromptandappropriatecontributions. exampleofpublicresponsetothedisasterwastheuseofthe ( BasilicaofGuadalupeduringthedaysfollowingthe Asthousandsofrefugees,manyofwhomwereinjured,frightened,anddisoriented,begantoarriveat.the decidedtoopentheoriginaledificetoshelterthevictims.iThisbuilding,datingbacktocolonialtimes,hasbeenclosedforoveradecadebecauseitisstructurallyunsound.Yet,forthepublicatlarge,itismoreveneratedthanitsmodernsuccessor.AsSanJuanico'svictimsflockedintotheancientshrine,hundredsofpeoplefromtheworking-classneighborhoodsinthevicinitybroughtthemblankets,hotfood,andclothing.(Thesceneofvictimsofaterribleindustrialdisasterspontaneously "----. seekingsanctuaryattheBasilicawheretheywerehelpedandfedbyothersofhumble meanscreatedapowerfulemblematicimageintheeyesofmillionsofMexicantelevisionviewers.However,inthefollowingweekstheflowofpub-licsolidaritydiminishedsomewhat.Bymid Decemberanepidemicof'SanJuanico'jokesragedthroughthecity.Althoughtelevisionandradiorefusedtoairmostofthesejokes,generallyregardedas"tasteless"and"cruel,"manynightclubcomediansdelightedtheirwell-heeledpatronswithacascadeofmacabrepunsandone-liners.Theseweresubsquentlyrepeatedduringpre-Christmaspartiessothateachmorningthecityawoketoanewcropofgrislyjokes.The phenomenondidnotpassunnoticedbyworking-classcomediansandotherswhocondemnedtheclass-biasednatureofthehumor. 28InadditiontothesourelementsintroducedbytheSanJuanicojokesanother,perhapspredictable,responseemergedduringtheaftermathofthedisaster.Thiswasthealmostinevitablefeelingthatthere was corruption

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-32-amonggovernmentofficialscarryingoutthereliefoperations.Astrongconsensus,nurturedbythemetropolitanpopulation'sendemiccynicism,heldthatauthoritieshadpocketedmostofthedonationsandthatthevictimshadonlyreceivedapittance.Despitethecracksinpublicsolidarityemergingintheweeksfollowingthedisaster, \the peopleofSanJuanIxhuatepecwereabletobuildnewlinkstocertainmiddle-classgroups.Inadditiontotheinvolvementofprivatevoluntaryandreligiouscharitableorganizations,asignificantnewlinkwasestablishedwithMexico'smostinfluentialenvironmentalistgroup,EIMovimientoEcologistaMexicano.Theimplicationsofthisdevelopmentwillbediscussedinthesectiontofollow.Despitethecountercurrentscitedabove,theoverwhelmingpublicsolidaritywiththevictimsalongwiththewidespreadbeliefthatSanJuanicohadbeenill-usedbyPEMEX,hadonecriticaleffect:itputconsiderablepressureonthegovernmenttoassistthevictims,investigatethecauseoftheaccident,andassignresponsibilityforthedisaster.Italsoledpeopletoraisethepossibilitythatotheraccidentsandhazardswereendemictometropolitanexistence.Statevs.CommunityDecisionMakingInthewakeoftheintensepublicpressurebuiltupduringtheemergency,itbecamecriticallyimportantfortheStatetodemonstratethatitwasactivelyhelpingthevictimsand,moreover,thatsolutionswereinitshands.Officialsassimilatedtherhetoricofsolidarity,congratulatingthepublicforitsoutpouringofassistance,reassuringthematthesametimethattheproperauthoritieshadthesituationwellundercontrol.Asvariousgovern-

PAGE 37

+-33-mentagenciesdid,infact,assumecontroloverdecisionmaking,manyinthecommunity awoketothefactthattheStatemightbeencroachingtoofar.Discussionsinneighborhoodassembliesledtotheformalpetitionsdescribedinthepriorsectionthatarticulatedthecommunity'smostpressingconcerns.Someoftheseconcernsinvolvedthemannerinwhichthegovernmentcapturedthephenomenonofsolidarityandmadeitserveitsownpurposes.ThemostobviousexampleswerethenumerousofficialbannersandsloganspaintedonwallsadvertisingtheState's"solidaritywiththepeopleofSanJuanIxhuatepec."Manyinthecommunityfoundthesetobeunnecessary,selfserving,andoffensive,andwantedthemremoved.29Anotherissuewasthedistributionofreliefsupplieswhichmanyresidentsviewedasfraughtwithproblemsand"irregularities."Whateverthemeritofthesesuspicions,manyinthecommunityfeltthatproblemsarosebecause"outsidersweredistributingfoodtooutsiders."30ManyinSanJuanicobelievedthatalocalcommitteeheadedbytheparishpriestshouldhaveorganizedthesedistributionssothatassistancecouldreachtherightpeople.31 -'i" AnotherStatedecisionwhichwasbitterlyresentedbythesurvivorswasthegovernment'srefusalofoutside(mostlyNorthAmerican)offersofspecializedmedicalassistancefortheburnvictims.Officialshad,indeed,announcedthatMexicocouldtakecareofitsownpeople.However,therelativesofthosewhowerehospitalized with severeburnsfeltthatmattersofnationalpridehadlittletodowiththemandthatgovernmentofficialsshouldnothavetakenuponthemselvestherighttorejectthistypeofhelp.Thedecisionsinvolvedinthematterofthepoliticalbanners,reliefsupplydistribution,andmedicalcareforburnvictimsaffectedrelatively

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-34-short-term,orinthecaseoftheburnvictims,individual,aspectsoftheoverallrecoveryeffort.Othercontestedareasinvolveddecisionswithmorelong-term,community-wideeffects.Theprincipalfocusofconflictwas(andremains)thedesignationofthe14hectaredevastatedzoneasaparkandtheconsequentdisplacementofalmost200familiesfromtheirhomesandthecommunity.\ Fromthecommunity'spointofviewtheallocationofsuchalarge ofprimeresidentiallandforaparkwasaninordinateluxury.Thefactthatthedecisionwas madewithvir-tuallyno communityinputatatimewhentheaffectedfamilieswerescatteredinshelters,hospitals,andadistanthousingprojectwasviewedashighhandedandarbitrary.Thefactthatthegovernmenthas,sofar,refusedtoconsiderusingaportionofthislandtobuildhousesforthosewhomightwishtore-turnreinforcescommunitysuspicionsthattheparkisreallyintendedasabufferbetweenwhatremainsoftheoldSanJuanicoandafacilityPEMEXmightchoosetoconstructinthefuture.32 TheNeighborhoodCommitteehasestablishedlinkswiththeMovimientoEcologistaMexicano,agrowingenvironmentallobbyinggroupcomprisedprimari-lyofmiddle-classprofessionalsandplanners.InthemonthsandyearstocomethelimitstoStateauthoritymaywellbechallengedoverquestionsofcontestedlanduse,includingthesizeofthepark,thepermissiblefutureusesofthePEMEXsite,andtherelocationoftheprivategasfirmsstilloperatinginthearea.(Analliancebetweenarepresentativegrass-rootspres-suregroupinSanJuanicoandthecountry'slargestenvironmentalorganizationmaybeabletoeffectalong-termimprovementinthevalley'shazardousecol-ogy.

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-35-LimitedOptionsfora HighRiskSettingSanJuanIxhuatepecwill,nodoubt,be rememberedboth-inMexicoandabroadasanexampleofasuccessfulrecoveryfromdisaster.Manywillcom-pareitfavorablytothelegalmorassresultingfromBhopal.However,swiftcompensationandahastilyconstructedparkdoverylittletochangetheintrinsichazardousnessofaplacelikeSanJuanico.Measuresleadingtoagenuinereductionofoverallriskforthesurvivorsofthegasdisasterareconsiderablymorecostlyanddifficulttoimplement.The communityitselfidentifiedanimportantstep:therelocationofPEMEXanditsassociatedprivategasdistributors.Thisdemand wastakenupenthusiasticallybythepress,someoppositionparties,andthepublicatlarge.Intheweeksfollowingthedisasterpublicconsciousnesswasalertedtootherpotentialtimebombs wovenintothefabricofthecity:themassiveAzcapotzalcorefinery,theInternationalAirport,andamunitionsfactorynearthecenteroftown.WhilerelocationoftheAzcapotzalcorefinerywouldappeartobeprohibitivelyexpensive,thereisconsiderablediscussionaboutdecentralizingthecity'sgasprovisioningsystem.However,astheheadoftheprivategasdistributor'sassociationaptlypointedout,thecostofgastoconsumerswouldundoubtedlyriseastruckswouldhavetotravelanextra50kilometersormoretoreload.Hemighthaveaddedthattruckinglargeamountsofgaswouldalsoinevitablyresultinroadaccidentssuchasthe1978collisionofanLPGtruckontheMexico-Queretarohighwaythatresultedin up to100casualties.33(WhiledecentralizationwouldreducehazardsforneighborhoodssuchasSanJuanico,transportinglargequantitiesofgasoverMexico'scongestedhighwaysmayposeevenhigheroveralllevelsofriskthanexistinthepresentsystem.

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-36-AsecondmeasuretoreducethehazardousnessofSanJuanIxhuatepecwouldinvolvetightercontrolsandsafetyregulationsgoverningthenumerousremainingindustrieshandlingdangerousmaterials.Thisoption,whileworthwhile,runsintothefamiliardifficultiesimplicitinrestrainingindustryduringdifficulteconomictimes.ItisunrealistictoexpectenvironmentalsafetyregulationstobeimposedselectivelyuponindustriesinSanJuanIxhuatepec.However,certainmeasuresspecifictoSanJuanico'senvironmentalhealthmightbe morefeasible.OneexamplewouldbetocovertheRemediosRiver,atpresentasteepbankedopensewagecanal.ItappearsthatthismeasuremightbecarriedoutinthenearfutureastheresultofaprojectedextensionoftheAnilloPeriferico,theurbanfreewaysystem.TheAnillowouldfollowtheriver,therebycoveringit,butwouldalsodividethecommunityintotwopartsseparatedby asixlanehighway.AfinalmeasurethatwoulddecreaseSanJuanico'sexposuretoindustrialriskwouldbetheimplementationofacarefullandusezoningplanaimedatseparatingdenselypopulatedresidentialareasfromfacilitieshandlinghazardousmaterialsaswellasfromthosefacilities'arteriesoftransit.Unfortunately,owingtothespeculativeforcesatworkintheurbanlandmarket,effectivezoningisperhapsthemostelusivegoalofall.SanJuanIxhuatepec'spresentlanduseistheoutcomeofacomplexmosaicoftenurerightsandappropriationsencompassingfederallyownedlandsuchasthatoccupiedbyPEMEXandtherailline,municipalpropertysuchastheRemediosRiver,privateholdingswhicharepartoftheopenlandmarketsuchasthoseoftheformerhaciendaandindustrialfirms,formerpeasantholdingswhichenterasemi-openmarket,andnonmarketholdingscharacteristicofthehillsidesquattersettlements.

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-37-Aneffectivezoningplanmust cometotermswiththesediverseformsofoccupance.PopulationpressuresandvigorousspeculativeforcesoperatinguponrealestatehavesofardefiedmosteffortsatimplementingexistingzoningandenvironmentalregulationsinMexicoCity.ClearlySanJuanIxhuatepec'splightisonlyasmallpartofamuchlargerchronicproblem.

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-38-REFERENCESHaas,E.,R.W.Kates,M.Bowden,eds.1977ReconstructionFollowingDisaster.Boston:MITPress.StateofMexico1985"TheSanJuanIxhuatepecAccident."MexicoCity:OccupationalSafetyInstituteoftheStateofMexico.(Manuscript)

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-39-NOTESlSeeE.Haas,R.W.Kates,M.Bowden,eds.,ReconstructionFollowingDisaster,MITPress,1977.2AccordingtoA.Penafiel'sNombresGeograficosdeMexico,Mexico,1885,theprefex'izhuatl'signifies'leafofgreenmaize.'3ThepaintingdepictingFrayPedrodeValenciabaptizingamaninIndiangarbdatesfrom1796.Thechurchfacadeunderwentrenovation,includingtheadditionofaclock,in1929. -44MexicoCity,withacurrentpopulationofroughly18millionisexpandingattherateof1.5millionpeopleayearmakingitthelargestandthemostrapidlygrowingurbanagglomerationintheThirdWorld.Conservativeestimatesprojectthecity'spopulationtobe26millionintheyear2000;morepessimisticprojectionsciteapopulationdoublingtocloseto36millionpeople.SeeF.Pearce,"Mexico,-thecityunlimited,"inNewScientist,October18,1984.5Although,untilrecently,nosystematicdatawereavailable,mostexpertsagreethatthecombinationofMexicoCity'saltitude,itsbasintopography,andemissionsfromitslargelyunregulatedindustriesandtwotothreemillionvehicles,makeitsairpollutionproblemamongtheworstintheworld.AccordingtoonerecentestimateMexicoCity 4,600tonsofairpollutantsaday,mostoftheseinthenorthernsectionsofthecitywheremostofthefactoriesarelocated.SeeR.Monje,"Alarmaenelextranjero,no aqu{, lavelozdegradacionecologicadelValledeMexico,"inProceso,January28,1985.

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-40-6Ina November26,1984articleinProcesomagazine,HebertoCastillodescribesthehazardsofMexicoCity'ssystemofundergroundgaspipelines,manyofwhichwereinstalledover20yearsago.Castillowarnsthatmanyofthesepipelinesaredamaged,obsolete,andpronetoleaks.Mostalarming,Castilloasserts,isthefactthatinmanycasestheplanslocatingsomeoftheolderpipelines(includingthoseinSanJuanIxhuatepec)havebeenlost,makingitextremelydifficulttorepairorreplacethem.7personalcommunicationbyanofficialintheFederalDistrict'sdisasterplanningunit,SIPROR,aswellasbypersonalobservation.8PEMEXhasconsistentlyrefusedtoreleaseinformationwhichmightshedlightonthecauseorcausesoftheexplosion.Extraofficialversionsabound.Themostplausibleexplanationisthataleakfromanoverfilledtankignitedandcausedanexplosionwhichsubsequentlyresultedinachainreactionofexplosionsintheremainingtanks.Thisexplanationissupportedinpartby numerousstatementsmadetothepressby SanJuanicoresidentswhoobservedthattheflarethatburnsoffexcessgaswasoutduringtheweekendprecedingtheMondaydisaster.Therealsoappearstobe aconsensusamongresidentsthatastrongorderofgasbuiltupinthevicinityoftheplantonSunday.ThehighcasualtyrateandalargeproportionofthesevereburncasescanbeattributedtothegascloudthatseepedintodwellingsandsettledoverthestreetsofthecommunityduringthecourseofSundaynight.9ThistablewascompiledonthebasisofunverifiedandsometimesinconsistentnewspaperaccountsinExcelsior,Uno Mas Uno,andEIUniversal.

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houses.-41-10Considerab1ediscrepanciesexistbetweenextraofficialandofficialestimates,andevenamongdifferentofficialestimates,ofthenumberofcasu-alties.Communityestimatesinvariablytendtobehigherthangovernmentfigures.Yeteventhelatterareoftenwidelyinconsistent.Forexample,theInterministerialCommissionissuedareporton December2,1984statingthatthenumberofwounded was4248.However,anotherreportcompiledbytheDirectoroftheStateofMexico'sOccupationalSafetyInstituteputsthefigureat"over2000"(StateofMexico,1985,pp.3).AsubsequentreportpublishedintheApril,1985issueofThePanAmericanHealthOrganization's(PARO)"DisasterPreparednessintheAmericas"recordsa mere 886hospitaladmissionsresultingfromthedisaster.11ThisplanofactionisoutlinedinareportauthoredbyIng.FedericoLopez deAlba,DirectoroftheStateofMexico'sOccupationalSafetyInsti-tute,translatedintoEnglishwiththetitle"The SanJuanIxhuatepecAcci-dent,"StateofMexico,1985.12Fieldinterview with Dr.RodriguezPerez.13FieldinterviewswithrelocatedsurvivorsinValledeAnahuac.14IntheweeksfollowingthedisasterMexicoCityanditssurroundingsexperiencedcriticalshortagesofdomesticgasasPEMEXandthegasdlstribu-,torshadtoorganizeanalternativedeliverysystemtomake upforthe40% (( \supplyshortfallresultingfromtheSanJuanIxhuatepecfacility'sdestruc-\tion.Manypeoplerespondedtotheshortageby hoarding tanksofgasin thei;) /This,inturn,resultedinseveralincidentsinwhichindividuals/diedfromgaspoisoningandexplosions.15Excelsior,December23,1984.

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-42-16FieldinterviewwithDr.VasquezCaleb,intheSanJuanIxhuatepecHealthCenterandvisitstotwocompensationclaimscenters.17UnoMasUno, November22,1984.18Excelsior,November26,1984.19Personalobservation.20UnoMasUno, December17,1984.21PeopleinSanJuanicoaswellasthepublicatlargewereoutragedbywhat waswidelyregardedasarrogantstonewallingbyPEMEX'sdirector,MarioRamonBeteta.Inparticular,duringonetelevisioninterviewwhenhewasaskedwhetherPEMEXwouldcompensatethedisastervictims,Betetaexclaimedthat,astheprime.victim,PEMEXshouldbethefirstinlinewhencompensationswerehandedout.22Excelsior,December24,1984.23Excelsior,December27,1984.24UnoMasUno,January2,1985.25FieldinterviewsinSanJuanicoandValledeAnahuac.24,1984.

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-43-30FieldinterviewinSanJuanico.31 FieldinterviewsinSan 32 FieldinterviewsinSanJuanicoandValledeAnahuac.33pEMEXhasbeenplaguedwithaccidentsand,accordingtocriticssuchasHebertoCastillo,wascriminallynegligentinthecaseofmaintenanceandsafetyatitsSanJuanIxhuatepecfacility,"LaComisiondeSeguridad de Petroleos aviso delosgravesriesgosenSanJuanico,"inProceso,December10,1984.ThetableonthefollowingpageassemblesapartiallistofPEMEXgas-relatedaccidentsinrecentyears.

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-44-SOMERECENTPEMEXACCIDENTS*DATE1963 1971 1977 1978 1978 1981 1982 1983MARCH1984APRIL1984JUNE1984JULY1984JANUARY1985LOCATIONAzcapotzalcoRefineryMazatlanPortAzcapotzalcoRefineryMexico-QueretarohighwaySantaCruzVeracruzMexicoCityVicinityAzcapotzalcoRefinerySanJuanIxhuatepecAcachapan,TabascoColmenas,TabascoLosPajaritos,VeracruzCui dadJuarezSCALE4tanksofjetfuelexplodeGasolinepipelinespillresultsinlargefireFire,10injuredLPGtruckcollides,fireandexplosionkill100andinjure100 Methanegasexplosion,52victimsLPGpipelineleak'explosionandfiredestroysettlementPipelineexplosionkills10andinjures30FireFireandexplosionnearstoragetanks,residentsevacuatedat9pmGaspipelineexplosion,11deadand44injuredGaspipelineexplosion,settlementdestroyedAmmoniagaspipelineleakkills4andinjures46Gaspipelineexplodeskilling1andinjuring29*Thisisanincompletelistcompiledfrom avarietyofunverifiedextraofficialsources. Hith theexceptionoftheSanJuanIxhuatepecandtheAzacapotzalcorefineries,onlytransportandstorageaccidentsarerecorded.