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Educational policy analysis archives.
n Vol. 7, no. 19 (June 04, 1999).
Tempe, Ariz. :
b Arizona State University ;
Tampa, Fla. :
University of South Florida.
c June 04, 1999
Statist political economy and high demand for education in South Korea / Ki Su Kim.
Arizona State University.
University of South Florida.
t Education Policy Analysis Archives (EPAA)
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1 of 25 Education Policy Analysis Archives Volume 7 Number 19June 4, 1999ISSN 1068-2341 A peer-reviewed scholarly electronic journal Editor: Gene V Glass, College of Education Arizona State University Copyright 1999, the EDUCATION POLICY ANALYSIS ARCHIVES. Permission is hereby granted to copy any article if EPAA is credited and copies are not sold. Articles appearing in EPAA are abstracted in the Current Index to Journals in Education by the ERIC Clearinghouse on Assessment and Evaluation and are permanently archived in Resources in Education A Statist Political Economy and High Demand for Education in South Korea Ki Su Kim Memorial University of Newfoundland CanadaAbstract In the 1998 academic year, 84 percent of South Kore a's high school "leavers" entered a university or college while almost all children wen t up to high schools. This is to say, South Korea is now moving into a new age of univers al higher education. Even so, competition for university entrance remains intense What is here interesting is South Koreans' unusually high demand for education. In th is article, I criticize the existing cultural and socio-economic interpretations of the phenomenon. Instead, I explore a new interpretation by critically referring to the recen t political economy debate on South Korea's state-society/market relationship. In my in terpretation, the unusually high demand for education is largely due to the powerful South Korean state's losing flexibility in the management of its "developmental policies. For this, I blame the traditional "personalist ethic" which still prevail s as the modus operandi of the agents in the education market as well as state bureaucrats.The Situation in Question Remarkable in South Korea's contemporary education is the accelerating speed of its growth. Primary education (Grades 1-6) saw full participation in the late 1950s, about 70 years after its inception in 1886 (Yun et al. 19 96, p. 67; MCE 1988, pp. 151-3). From
2 of 251960 on, lower secondary education in "middle schoo ls" (Grades 7-9) expanded and reached full participation within 30 years. Then, f rom 1970 on, upper secondary education in "high schools" (Grades 10-12) followed suit, taking only 20 years to reach a similar state of full participation. (Note 1) From 1990, finally, higher education picked up speed in growth and by 1998 had come to admit 84 percent of the year's high school leavers (see Table 1).(Note 2) Now, thus, South Kor ea is entering into a new age in which almost all children go through the schooling process as far as universities and colleges.Table 1 Graduate Advance to Next-Level Schools (%) (MOE 199 8, p. 3)Advance Type1970198019901998Primary to Middle66.195.899.899.9Middle to High70.184.595.799.4High to University31.944.046.083.7 What is more remarkable is that the growt h of education has been attained largely at the direct financial expense of the students' pa rents. In 1997, for instance, state grants for private universities and junior colleges covere d barely 3 percent of their operation costs although such institutions accommodated 83 pe rcent of all students in higher education. In the same year, state universities too collected over 40 percent of their expenses from tuition and other fees. Even schools for compulsory education (all primary schools and some rural middle schools) rais ed more than 10 percent of their expenses from their pupils although they did not co llect tuition fees as such.(Note 3) The South Korean state, according to Cho (1994, p. 101) "has not given due regard to the importance of education while concentrating its ene rgy on economic growth." The impressive growth of education, in his view, is "th e result of the natural course of events" in the education market, in which high dema nd constantly called for increased supply (Ibid., 101n). South Koreans' demand for edu cation is indeed high and firm is their determination to get education for their chil dren. Evidence is the intensity of entrance competition which drives students in all s tages of schooling (even preschool) to costly neighbourhood cramming classes.(Note 4) Acco rding to South Korean studies (Kong et al., 1994; Kim YC et al. 1997), parents' m iscellaneous educational expenses, of which cramming fees occupy the largest portion, far exceed the costs for operating the nation's entire education system. Such was the situ ation in 1998 that Kim Dae Jung, the incumbent president installed in February of that y ear, vowed, as his predecessors did, to solve the entrance competition question as his top priority policy task. Why is there in South Korea such a high d emand for education?Existing Answers Possible answers may well be, and indeed the literature points out, that there is in South Korea a culture of valuing education, that th e recent economic development has greatly enhanced South Koreans' purchasing power, a nd that a successful life in their society requires a high level of schooling. While s ensible generally, these oft-given answers possess limited persuasiveness.
3 of 25 The point of departure of the cultural ac count is the phenomenon of "excess demand" in education commonly found in East Asian n ations. Evidence is high application rates for entry, low success rates and a large number of repeaters, as a study of the Japanese case aptly puts (James and Benjamin 1988, 56). Since such phenomena are uncommon in non-East Asian societies, it would be fair to associate them to what is unique to East Asia, the cultureÂ—the "Confucian con tinuum" of social lifeÂ—which respects educated persons (e.g., Tu 1997; McAdams 1 993; Smith 1991; Song 1990; Whitehill 1987). Since education earns respect in t his culture, anyone desirous of a respectful life would surely seek it. Non-East Asia n writers here often jump on to relating East Asia's recent economic rise to that c ulture, which has transformed the masses to an educated workforce. East Asian writers seldom agree to this favourable observation. While admitting the benefits of the cu lture, they are generally cynical as to its effect, obviously because they are so familiar with the problems entailed by the culture's thrust for education.They call this thrus t kyoyungnyol (or kyoikunetsu if they are Japanese), which means a blind enthusiasm cum fever for more and higher education. In their view, this cultural thrust gene rates more evil than good (e.g., Kim YH, et al. 1994; Park NK 1994, and Kim IH 1991). Let the Confucian culture be more prone t o valuing education than other cultures, and let it be more so in South Korea than elsewhere in East Asia. Neither of the cultural accounts actually takes us beyond re-identifying wh at has already been identified, that is, that there is a high demand for education in a soci ety where Confucian culture remains entrenched.(Note 5) The socioeconomic accounts, m eanwhile, sound better because they relate the phenomenon to what has enabled the consumers to demand more and higher education, and for what practical purposes. Yet a few points need be sorted out. The enhanced purchasing power account,(Note 6) to b egin with, is acceptable in the sense that demand for education would not rise unle ss money was available for purchasing it, given that education in South Korea was not free. True, South Korea's economic development has greatly improved household finance. Yet economic development may not explain the phenomenon of 1998 unless its fruits had been distributed as equally as to enable almost all Sout h Koreans to pay for education.(Note 7) This is not the case, however. Unequal distribut ion of the fruits has already caused several social turmoils during the last few decades Given this, it may be rather reasonable to suspect that the price of higher educ ation, tuition fees in particular, has been kept low enough for most parents to believe th at they could somehow afford it if they made self-sacrificial commitment, or that some how they have been compelled to pursue more and higher education for their children or both. In a country where demand in education is high and educational institutions s eldom have revenue sources other than tuition fees, it is unlikely that those institution s have voluntarily kept their fees low. They might do so, however, if coerced by a certain extra-market element, the state in particular. The account concerning the purposes of se eking education addresses the society which South Korean scholars characterize by the wor d hangnyogchuyi (just as the Japanese typify theirs by gakurekishugi the same word pronounced differently). This refers to a method of assessing individuals' merit by considering the last school they have attended, preferring university graduates to h igh school graduates and graduates from a prestigious university to those from other u niversities. This method is so widely employed that not only the employer who interviews job applicants but also the mother who looks for a bridegroom for her daughter, rely o n it. Since hangnyogchuyi is widespread and a university degree is "a ticket to the social elite" (Pak 1997), the argument goes, young people cannot but pursue highe r education preferably at a
4 of 25prestigious university so long as they desire entra nce to a high and respectable echelon of society (Sorenson 1997; Lee and Brinton 1996, 17 7-92; Ryoo 1995). Even if it is granted that the practice of hangnyogchuyi is more salient in South Korea than elsewhere, none the less, that does not explain the high demand for education, because the practice can as well be an effect of the high d emand for education and its competitive pursuit, as it can be the latter's caus e. When the great majority of a society's membership competitively seek higher education at a prestigious university, then hangnyogchuyi must actually be a dependable way to selecting emp loyees or sons-in-law. Although the cultural and socio-economic accounts are useful, their weaknesses may not be overlooked. A prominent weakness is thei r focus on the demand side of the education market and leaving the supply side out, a s if the demand side is self-sustaining. Yet in the education market, as in any market, demand is usually interdependent with supply. Its rise becomes sooner or later balanced out by the rise in supply, and its fall results in the fall in supply. So long as this rule stays, demand in education may not persist to rise if supply is left to fluctuate freely. Whereas, if supply is deliberately kept low, demand can surge unusually d epending on the nature of the commodity at stake. The situation of South Korea's education market in 1998 was that university entrance competition was intense (meanin g that demand was very high) even though universities and colleges had prepared suffi cient student places to admit some 84 percent of the year's high school leavers. As a mat ter of fact, supply in that year was raised well in excess of demand because post-second ary institutions as a whole ended up filling only 94 percent of their capacity (MOE 1998 3). Even so, entrance competition was as intense as before. If South Korea's educatio n market was not an exception to the general market rule, it would be sensible to assume that, here again, a certain extra-market element was deliberately creating "pov erty in abundance" on the supply side. It could, for instance, be making entrance to certain universities more difficult than others, and it could be keeping the price of higher education relatively low to motivate massive applications. Here, the unusual rise of demand in South Korea's education market seems to warrant an assumption that it is not a "result of t he natural course of events" in the education market but rather a market phenomenon due to intervention by certain external forces, especially the stateÂ—a state which is in fact well noted for heavy market intervention. In the rest of this article, I shall explore a new interpretation of the phenomenon by pursuing this assumption. In doing so I shall critically borrow from some of the theses that have emerged from the recen t political economy debate on the relationship between South Korea's state and societ y/market.The Political Economy of the Developmental State(1) The "Personalist Ethic" and the Statist Account The political economy debate on South Kor ea's state-society/market relationship has been triggered by the fact that the country's s ociety was not as "civil," nor its state as "political,"(Note 8) as in Western nations, while i ts economy achieved incredible development under the state's market intervention. Conspicuous in the not-so-civil society is the prevailing pre-capitalist modus operandi in which business transactions are made not by free and open competition as in mor e "capitalist" societies, but by such personal connections as clanship, alumni fraternity regional ties and bribery (which is a method of creating new ties and consolidating exist ing ones). Free and open market
5 of 25competition is also severely restricted by the stat e which controls transactions and allocates important resources. What further complic ates the matter is that the intervening state has been under the control of the military el ites who, having usurped power by coups d'tat, did not abide by public demand and of ten acted against it. Their governments were less likely than elected governmen ts to function "politically" in the interest of the public. Even so, surprisingly, Sout h Korea's economy has grown to be the eleventh largest in the world. How could this happe n? Some writers seek answers in what appears to be an obstacle to economic development, that is, the traditional modus operandi and the state's market intervention. The reason for considering the traditional modus operandi to be obstructive is that it leads supply to meet demand by collusion. This type of transaction may well be suitable for in-group distribution of available resources, b ut not for promoting the wide production of resources and their consumption, whil e the latter are essential for economic development. Unlike free and open market c ompetition, collusion precludes incentives for such activities. Dore (1980 and 1982 ) and Chang (1991) side step this commonplace observation by viewing the traditional modus operandiÂ—"the personalist ethic" as they call itÂ—in terms of the small groups which the colluding persons form, such as the bodies of clan, alumni, and so on, rath er than in terms of individual collusions as such. Thus viewed, the semi-capitalis t South Korean market appears to be operated by various personally-tied groups, each of which seeking its own group interest collectively internally and competitively externall y. Although these groups differ from the "individuals" in other markets, the argument go es; they are legitimate parties in the South Korean market and are as active as individual s elsewhere. Therefore, they conclude, the personalist ethic is as valid a "capi talist" modus operandi as the individualist ethic.(Note 9) And if the market whic h is pervaded by the personalist ethic has grown to be a world-class economy, they argue, this ethic appears to have worked as efficiently in South Korea as the individualist eth ic elsewhere. Market intervention by the stateÂ—a "stati st state" as it may be called because its interests override private interests or a "developm ental state" because it controls the market in order to make it "develop"Â—has drawn atte ntion from most writers on South Korea's political economy although they are divided over whether to recognize the state's contribution to economic development. Of focal conc ern here is the period between 1961 and 1979 during which General Park Chung Hi's military regime vigorously pursued economic development. For this purpose, the developmental state planned the economy's development, rigorously invested in the p ublic sector, and supplied private business with massive financial support to promote industries (Lee YH 1997, p. 1). In short, it managed the economy with the specific pur pose of promoting planned development. Writers of the "statist"viewpointÂ—stat ist, this time, because they emphasize the state's leading role in economic deve lopmentÂ—link this type of state intervention directly to the economic development t hat has actually taken place. They thus claim that, had it not been for the developmen tal state's effective distribution of resources for their maximal utilization, the econom y would not have developed as it did (e.g., Amsden 1994).(Note 10) The personalist and statist theses, thus, emerge as potential explanations for the educational development of South Korea, because sho uld they explain economic development there would be no reason for their not doing the same to the development of education, which also bears economic features. T he theses, however, may not squeak by without reservation. First, the state which inte rvened in the market with the political agenda of economic development was not free from th e personalist ethic which prevailed in the market. Government leaders and sta te bureaucrats very often operated
6 of 25according to personal ties, such as alumni connecti ons, regional loyalties, military collegiality and bribery. Even state policies somet imes noticeably favoured certain regions and groups while disfavouring others. Impor tant resources, such as loans from the state-controlled banks, foreign loan guarantees and licences for monopoly businesses, were very often allocated through such personal connections. The political state of South Korea, therefore, functioned very of ten as a mere economic agent, seeking private interest while intervening in the market in the name of public interest, thus obfuscating the state-society distinction.(Note 11) This leads to another reservation. If the state in its operation was affected by the personalist ethic while politically committed to pr omoting economic development, to that extent, one may say, its political commitment to economic development was impaired by the private, economic interests of the personalist market. In this situation, the state's political drive for economic developmen t can hold sway only to the degree that it is unaffected by the personalist ethic. Bey ond this degree, the developmental policy which the state pursued might in fact be a p ersonalist manipulation of the economy. Given that the personalist ethic was preva lent in society and even state officials and government leaders were affected ther eby, the degree could not be great. Put boldly, the state's political intervention can be rather more exceptional than normal. If so, saying that South Korea's economic developme nt was due to the developmental state's intervention, may be tantamount to saying t hat the economic development was due to the personalist ethic which held sway over b oth society/market and the state. The theses about the personalist ethic and the state's leading role in economic development are not separate, therefore. Can, then, the personalist ethic take cre dit for South Korea's economic development? The affirmative suggestion by Dore and Chang would be acceptable if the groups emerging from personal ties indeed competed with each other for important resources. Yet if they did so, the personalist ethi c would no longer be the groups' modus operandi because, in spite of their grounding in personal t ies, they were actually operating in the modus operandi of the individualist ethic, that is, competition as in Dahl's (1967) pluralist society. The groups tied by personal connections did not, however, function as groups in the pursuit of important resources, nor did the y compete for such resources. Although personal ties often de veloped to alumni associations, societies of regional origin, and the like, it was not the organizations themselves but some members of the organizations who actually reap ed benefits. They did so because the state's allocation of important resources was f requently made via personal collusion and seldom via competition among organizations. Thi s practice had to do with the lack of popular support for the military elite, not only for the initial Park regime which was born out of the 1961 coup but for the subsequent Ch un Du Hwan and Roh Tae Woo regimes which emerged out of another coup in 1979 a nd lasted until 1992. Through the years of their domination, the military elites soug ht to ground their support in personal ties rather than in the popular vote (which was sim ply not there) and allocated crucial resources to that end. This kind of practice was co mmon in the private sector as well, where chaebols, whose monopoly in the domestic mark et the state endorsed, often awarded contracts to minor enterprises in the same way. The personalist ethic may not claim credit until this mode of transaction is prov en to be more effective than free and open competition in the utilization of important re sources for economic development. (2) "Structural Problems" and the Institutionalist Account In fact, there are grounds for more persu asively arguing that the personalist ethic of South Korea's pre-capitalist market has impeded economic development as well as the
7 of 25state's own developmental effort. An exemplifying c ase for this is the economic crisis which began in November 1997. The crisis broke out when foreign capital pulled out of South Korea, which immediately placed the debt-ridden chaebols on the verge of bankruptcy and activated a disastrous chain reaction in the economy under thei r domination. While controlling major industries, the chaebols relied heavily for t heir operation on the state's favourable financial support and protection of monopoly rights in the domestic market. On the safe grounds provided by state support and protection, t he chaebols quickly grew, yet at the same time they lost the ability to survive market c ompetition. Their business organizations invariably grew to be big, bureaucrat ic and inefficient. In spite of protection, therefore, most of them repeatedly incu rred losses; and such losses were made up for by additional favourable loans from sta te-controlled banks. Justification of such additional loans required further expansion in business operations. The more chaebol businesses grew in size, thus, the more dep endent they became on such favourable loans. Then, the sudden depletion of fin ancial resources brought this practice to a halt because it took away from the "strong sta te" (Kim EM, 1997) the very resources for favourable allocation. The crisis glaringly dem onstrates that South Korea's economic development was not development in a solid market e conomy but growth in the volume of the economy due to the expansion of chaebol mono poly businesses under state protection and support. Yet while the economy grew, "structural problems" continued to be exacerbated, such as: the stifling of private in itiatives under state control and chaebol monopoly, the inefficiency of monopolistic chaebol businesses which constantly demanded increased state support, and, finally, the chaebol-bureaucrat collusion. Central to such structural problems is no t that the state controlled the market for economic development but, rather, that, for some re asons, it lost flexibility to move from control to liberalization when the volume of the ec onomy reached a certain level. Liberalization of the market would not only enhance the competitiveness of chaebol businesses but also allow smalland medium-sized e nterprises to grow. As a matter of fact, liberalization was considered by post-Park po licy makers. But such considerations either did not materialize in concrete policies or materialized only superficially. More seriously, even the policies of controlling and all ocating strategic resources for economic development often did not go through as intended. T hat is, the developmental state actually did not and could not unilaterally guide e conomic activity in the direction it desired politically. For this reason, non-statist w riters say that "there is little reason to call the rapid economic growth 'government-led'" (Y oo, 1997). Why did the strong state lose flexibility in policy making and implementation and could not even carry out its policies as it intende d them? The "institutionalists" point to the existence in society of "a concrete set of soci al ties which bind the state to society and provide institutionalized channels for the cont inual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies" (Evans, 1992). Due to such soci al ties (apparently pervaded by the personalist ethic) and the "institutionalized chann els" based thereonÂ—so goes their argumentÂ—the state allowed for societal input to it s policies and frustration of imposed policies, and this while "dominat[ing] over social constituent" (Lee YH, 1997, p. 8). The structural problems of the South Korean market, thu s viewed, were caused essentially by the personalist ethic which hampered both the healt hy development of a market economy and the statist state's flexible response t o market changes for the purpose of stimulating the voluntary activities of supply and demand. And the ongoing economic crisis means the breakdown of the problematic marke t structure at a time when the globalizing world market drastically reduced the st ate's ability to control the nation's economy.
8 of 25 It is here to be noted that, in the insti tutionalist view, the social channels do not originate solely from such social/personal ties, fo r imposed state policies, when institutionalized through negotiation and renegotia tion with societal forces, often turn against new, more efficient state policies. A write r of the same institutionalist persuasion lays down the process in three phases (Rhee 1994, p 15). First, there are certain institutional structuresÂ—state-imposed or indigenou s to societyÂ—determining "practices, norms, rules, organizational structures, and organi zations that guide both internal relationships within groups and interactions among groups." Once implemented, such structures immediately decide on "individual intere sts (or preferences) and abilities (or capabilities)." Eventually, their impact becomes fa r greater because they set limits on further state policies as well, because they "limit the range of policy-making and implementation options available to policy makers." Thus, second, institutional structures, which were initially a variable depende nt upon state intervention, turn to be independent variables. As a result, finally, they a ttain "institutional continuity (or persistence)" which readily overcomes challenges by more efficient policy alternatives. The intervening strong state can thus slip into its own trap, continually exacerbating the structural problems of the economy (and society) it controls.Implications for the Education MarketWhat kind of interpretation would these conclusions permit about the surging demand in South Korea's education market? Although supply and demand in education too are market phenomena and, as such, susceptible to the s tate-market/society relationship, differences between education and other markets sho uld not be overlooked. Before proceeding further to address the question, therefo re, it is in order to clarify the differences and, on this basis, characterize South Korea's education market in relation to the intervening state. This will facilitate identif ying the South Korean state's education policies on the political dimension, their frustrat ion and impairment at the state-society junction, and, finally, the establishment in the ed ucation market of certain institutional structures which disrupt the relationship between s upply and demand. (1) The State and the Education Market The most striking difference between educ ation and many other markets is that, while the latter are generally free and competition is the rule, the former is usually not so: it receives extensive state intervention in mos t countries. During the last hundred and fifty years or so, this market has been contracting as the state has been taking over an increasingly large part of it, creating a new publi c sector. While private education in the rest of the market is traded for fees, as it had be en so ever since Sumerian times (Krader 1963), public education is governed by the principle of universality, that the opportunity of receiving educational services should be made av ailable to all. In Canada, for example, public education is delivered free of char ge, and with compulsory measures, to all those in a certain age bracket up to a certain level of schooling. Beyond that level, it is provided to all those who are qualified for and desirous of advanced learning and willing to shoulder some necessary financial burden Private education too is often free or inexpensive, but it does not and cannot afford t o satisfy the universality principle. The underlying assumption of this principle is that, un like other goods and services, education cannot be left entirely to free and open market transactions (West, 1975 and 1970). State intervention commenced on this assumpt ion. Once commenced, however, it did not stop with the creation of the public sector ; it expanded over the private sector to regulate educational activities traded there in ord er to ensure certain standards and often offered financial support as well. In this sense, p rivate education also bears some public
9 of 25character. Not many other markets evidence such tho rough state intervention. But it is to be noted that the extensive state intervention does not relinquish the education market itself. The practice of selling ed ucational services for fees (and buying them by paying fees) remains in both public and pri vate sectors. Strictly speaking, this practice is absent only when educational services a re provided free of charge as in some cases of compulsory education. If compulsory educat ion charges fees, the market practice remains to the extent of the fees, no matt er how nominal they are. The consumers in this case are only compelled to buy th ese educational services at a reduced rate. The market practice is more pronounced in the type of non-compulsory public education where students are selected and fees char ged. In that case, the trading of educational services involves fairly active partici pation by both buyers and sellers. Meanwhile, the educational services offered by priv ate schools go through the market process even when they are subsidised by the state, for state subsidies here only restrict, and do not abolish, the practice of market transact ions. The market practice of trading educational services, which remains in many of toda y's private and public schools, helps us determine the degree and extent of state commitm ent to education and, thereby, distinguish between the realms of the political sta te and the market in education. The political economy theses on South Korea's state-soc iety relationship may be looked at in terms of this distinction.(2) A Statist Political Economy of Education The situation in the South Korean state's intervention in the education market is reflected in the interesting use of the terms "publ ic education" and "private education" in the country's education literature. In that literat ure, the former means education provided by any regular grade school or university, while th e latter stands for education supplied by small or large neighbourhood cramming classes. R egular private schoolsÂ—namely, private primary, middle and high schools and univer sitiesÂ—are all considered institutions of public education while public schoo ls and state universities, of course, remain so. And since the neighbourhood cramming cla sses are undesirable, South Korean writersÂ—both professional researchers and oc casional commentators on educational issuesÂ—argue for the "eradication of pr ivate education." In fact, the latter has been a major catchword in state education polic ies as well since the last years of military rule (surprisingly, in spite of the staunc h anti-socialist position).(Note 12) What this uniquely South Korean terminology suggests is the magnitude of state intervention which by virtue of control has transformed de jure private schools and universities to de facto public institutions. We are confident of this assertion and ba se it in part on an examination of South Korea's private schools. These schools indeed appea r to be public in the sense that they are subject to the state's extensive control as muc h as are public schools. They admit students within the quotas set by the state and as allocated by the state (either through direct allocation or through state-administered ent rance competition), collect tuition and other fees as set or approved by the state, and tea ch the same state-imposed curriculum using the same state-made or state-approved textboo ks as in public schools. A private school teacher is by law a "civil servant" just as his/her public school counterpart: both are agents carrying out the state's decisions. This legal view is firmly entrenched in state policies, as evidenced by the current policy to "in stitutionalize teacher rotation between private and public schools."(Note 13) Although univ ersities do not receive direct state intervention in their curriculum, the curricula whi ch they actually employ are fairly uniform because of other state policies (especially the system of state-administered entrance competition as we shall see shortly.)(Note 14) In such spheres as student quotas
10 of 25and tuition fees, they too are subject to rigid sta te control with no distinction between private and public. The delivery system of educational servic es, on the other hand, maintains the market mode of transaction in all schools and unive rsities, private or public. While they are all treated as "institutions of public educatio n," none of them actually provides free educational services. As mentioned earlier, primary schools conducting compulsory education raise more than 10 percent of their expen ses from their pupils. Tuition fees of public secondary schools and state universities are only slightly lower than those of their private counterparts. Educational services are inva riably traded for fees while the content, volume and price of the services are kept under the state's uniform control. The origin of these phenomena can be trac ed to the developmental state's policies. At the time of Park's 1961 coup, the country was st ill in the ruins of the Korean War, which had ended only eight years before. The state' s coffers were depleted. The First Five-Year Economic Development Plan, which Park's r egime launched in 1962, required a large portion of the resources under state contro l for supporting strategic industries. Meanwhile, full participation in primary education in the late 1950s increased pressure on the regime by increasing the demand for educatio n in middle schools and by creating severe classroom and teacher shortages in primary s chools. The regime's response was to minimize state expenditures on education and concen trate the secured education budget on primary schools. The regime could employ this st rategy in spite of its ambitious economic development plan because manpower requirem ents from the early stage of industrialization had been basically met by the uni versalization of primary education (Cho, 1994, p. 101n). In effect, the annual educati on budget during Park's 18-year rule ranged between 1.9 and 3.0 percent of the GNP and b etween 14.4 and 18.0 percent of the total state budget.(Note 15) From the education budget, between 70 and 82.8 percent went to primary education, the remainder being spli t among secondary and tertiary education, as well as the huge education bureaucrac y which the statist regime required as an instrument of government (KEDI, 1997b, p. 229). The secondary and tertiary education poli cy which Park's regime could work out under these circumstances was mainly to contain exp ansion in order thus to avoid possible demand for increased state funding (althou gh the regime officially put forward, as reasons, improvement of quality in education) (e .g., Lee IY, 1996). For this, on the one hand, the regime downscaled universities and co lleges, restricted licencing of new institutions, controlled student quotas for educati onal institutions and programs, and intervened in student selection by introducing a st ate entrance examination (in order to prevent frictions in selective admission of student s). On the other hand, it chose to use existing private schools and universities by subjec ting them to close supervision and extensive control for the purpose of (partially) me eting the rising demand, instead of the costly option of increasing public secondary school s and state universities. Tuition fee controlÂ—where fees are set by the state rather than by the educational institutions concernedÂ—was more closely related to developmental policies, because it was employed primarily as a measure to fight inflat ion, important as the latter was for not losing gains from economic development. It also acquired significance as an education policy as entrance competition intensifie d. Since this competition was basically due to the shortage of supply in student places in secondary and higher education, its intensification aroused public conce rns about insufficiency in state funding and heavy financial burdens on parents (e.g., Min, 1963; Chon et al., 1969). The Park regime, in response, more tightly controlled tuitio n fees and student selection as a way to allaying the discontent. Given that secondary and p ost-secondary education was not to be available to all but a few, low tuition fees and state-administered student selection
11 of 25would yield a system of meritocracy, in which those who had successfully survived state-administered competition would be somehow abl e to pay for the hard-earned opportunity for education. (Note 16) Such military-controlled developmental st ate's policy measures pushed demand in education higher than it would have been otherwise. So long as the state held down the supply of education, it was natural that entrance c ompetition intensified. In addition, the uniformity of learning ensured by the uniform teach ing materialsÂ—state-imposed curriculum and textbooksÂ—laid a common ground for t he nationwide entrance competition and turned classroom instruction into r ote-learning in state-imposed basics and drills, essential as these were for preparation for the entrance competition. The intensifying entrance competition quickly swept stu dents into the movement toward schools of higher level and caused demand in educat ion to rise further. During the 1960s alone, as a result, the quota-controlling Park regi me had to moderate its supply control and raise university student quotas by as much as 4 3 percent, because the number of applicants to universities had nearly doubled (Kim YB, 1980, p. 271). This moderation took place although university entrance competition at that time was much less serious than the competition for middle school entrance. Since then, the military regime's typical policy regarding entrance competition was to maintain supply control until the intensifying e ntrance competition and public discontent reached a critical point and, then, to a bruptly modify the control at the level of schooling where applicants were most congested. The measures typically employed for this were to increase student quotas and to loo sen conditions for licencing new institutions and programs. Such crises first hit mi ddle schools in the late 1960s, high schools in the late 1970s, and universities in the early 1980s. The increase of student quotas, however, invariably ended up further enhanc ing demand because the intensity of the entrance competition, which had already become critical, drove students toward higher levels of schooling with an uncontrollable f orce. The demand which was thus enhanced quickly exceeded the increased student quo tas.(Note 17) Thus, while the number of schools, universities and programs increa sed rapidly, demand for education grew even more rapidly. To a large extent, the incr edible speed of growth in South Korea's education can be accounted for by such earl y developmental policies. Overall, the Park regime's initial decisi on to control supply in the education market appears to have been inevitable on the polit ical dimension of policy making. When economic development was to be pursued from sc ratch and necessary manpower for industrialization was already secured by the un iversalized primary education, expenditures on not so urgent areas, such as educat ion, might well have to be suppressed. The resultant intensification of entran ce competition and even the rise in demand could be reasonably tolerated for a while. T he trouble, however, was, as in the case of economic policies, the state's inability to move from the temporary measures to policies which were more viable in the long run. As the growing economy gradually improved the condition of its coffers, the state co uld loosen its grip on the education market and liberalize private educational instituti ons in terms of their program development, student admission and decisions on tui tion fees. At the same time, it could increase investment in the public sector to expand and consolidate its system. Were freedom restored for private institutions to conduc t education according to their own decisions, supply and demand in education would soo ner or later be balanced, for the consumers in that case would consider which schools and what programs were useful for them, instead of blindly seeking higher and more ed ucation. On the other hand, concentration of financial resources on the public sector would not only enhance public education but also motivate private schools' compet itive efforts for survival and
12 of 25prosperity via marketable programs. But the state d id not choose such a free market alternative. Instead, it continued with supply cont rol and further tightened its grip on private education. And as part of this policy, it c ommitted much of the increased education funds to subsidising private schools (if not private universities).(Note 18) Thus, it continued to prop up the rising demand for more supply in education, contrary to its original policy pronounments. The failure of the state to make policy c hanges may not be explained by reference to the political dimension of policy making. It may be more plausibly explained by referring to the implementation process in which st ate policies met the economic world of the personalist society. Especially notable in t his connection are the behaviours of those parties who were involved in the transaction of educational services and of the officials functioning on behalf of the intervening state. (3) The Personalist Ethic and Protection under Stat e Control The statist policies of controlling stude nt quotas and tuition fees, and of prohibiting diversity in curriculum and textbooks, were obviously not what schools, especially private schools, would welcome. Quota co ntrol and tuition fee control meant constraint on their financial operations. The contr ol of curriculum and textbooks flagrantly violated their fundamental rights to con duct education according to their own philosophy and professional judgment. Nevertheless, when policy makers for the first civilian government of Kim Young Sam contemplated i n 1994 "liberalizing" educational institutions, the fiercest opposition came from pri vate institutions themselves. Not so conspicuous yet unambiguous resistance came also fr om within the state bureaucracy, in spite of the fact that it was the very instrument t o carry out state policies. As a result, most liberalizing elements in the government's educ ation reform schedule had vanished by the time it was made public. This irony can be a ccounted for in terms of the personalist ethic which affected the operation of t he parties involved in the supply and demand of educational services. As regards the private educational instit utions, although state control restricted their freedom and violated their rights, it practic ally permitted them advantages which far outweighed disadvantages on their personalist e thical scale. Most importantly, it guaranteed a secure way of balancing revenues and e xpenditures. State-set student quotas maintained supply in education constantly sh ort of demand. Meanwhile, the state-administered entrance examination repeatedly invigorated competition among students for entry to higher level schools. In effe ct, secondary and post-secondary institutions always received more applications than their quotas. Although the state placed limits on the number of students to admit an d the amount of tuition fees to collect, the limit was not so low as to bankrupt th e private institutions, for the state's policy was to rely on private institutions rather t han expand public institutions to cope with the rising demand. The student quotas and tuit ion fees which were actually granted to private schools and universities, therefore, wer e usually sufficient to raise necessary funds for running the latter's programs at minimal levels. If private institutions relinquished control over the content of their prog rams and kept costs of instruction (teacher salaries in particular) at low levels, the y could make ends meet and even generate some profit.(Note 19) This way of operatin g their institutions under state control and with "protection of vested interest" wa s much easier and safer than trying to draw students by offering attractive programs in an open market. Many private institutions, in fact, pursu ed their own interests more actively. Since they mostly relied on tuition fees for their revenu es, the key to gainful operation was the securing of as many students as possible. The state 's student quota control, however,
13 of 25practically blocked this avenue. Furthermore, the e xisting student quotas, albeit under control, had quickly surpassed the level of normal classroom operation as repeated crises in entrance competition compelled the state to rais e student quotas. Leeway was found in the increase of education programs (that is, more c lasses for high schools and more departments and faculties for universities) and aff iliated institutions (such as elementary and secondary schools for universities and universi ties for secondary schools). Many private schools and universities succeeded in this kind of effort, especially between 1980 and 1997. Since entrance competition at universitie s created a continual crisis during this period, the state repeatedly chose to institut e restricted yet large-scale increase in the total supply of student places. Taking advantage of the large sums of tuition fee revenues and the multiplied collateral values of their schoo l properties (due to economic development), private schools lobbied and obtained licences for new programs and affiliated institutions as well as necessary favour able bank loans. As a result, many of them grew to be large educational complexes compris ing numerous schools at different levels and accommodating tens of thousands of stude nts. At the same time, they incurred large debts which were payable only when cash kept flowing in not only from tuition fees but, more importantly, from additional bank lo ans. And, as in the case of chaebols, justification of such loans required continual expa nsion of the private educational institutions. The vicious cycle of expansion for th e sake of expansion could be sustained only when entrance competition provoked demand for more and higher education. Hence, ironically, private schools and universities demanded that the state continue to control their operation, keep supply short, and mai ntain other policy measures which exacerbated entrance competition. The grounds for collusion between state o fficials and educational institutions, then, are obvious. While a strong state controlled educational institutions in all aspects of their operation, concrete decisions in dealing w ith individual institutions were made by governmental leaders and state officials whose modus operandi was as personalist as most others in society. The tighter and broader the state exercised control, the greater became the arena for collusion. And through persona list collusion, new school and university licences were given often to those with no backgrounds in the educational profession, and permits for existing institutions' additional programs and affiliated schools were granted without proper assessment of f easibility. A substantial portion of the state's financial resources as well were wasted through collusion.(Note 20) Another ironic phenomenon in South Korea' s education market is the ambivalence of the consumers. Although they were the victims of the inflexible state policies and personalist collusion, they too were reluctant to s upport changes to the existing state policies. Generally, they understood that schools a nd universities were operating as businesses rather than as non-profit bodies as lega lly defined. They also agreed that state control of student quotas and student selection agg ravated entrance competition. Their conclusions, however, were that the state should mo re strictly control schools and universities in the areas of student quotas and tui tion fees, and that the state entrance examination should yield scores which more precisel y distinguished between individual aspirants for higher education, although doing so s hould further exacerbate entrance competition. Underpinning this attitude was undoubt edly the personalist ethic. What was of immediate concern was not the development of a v iable education system but their own personal interest in not becoming a loser in th e nationwide competition for higher and more education and, in case they won, in not pa ying high tuition fees even at tuition fee-dependent private institutions. All these parties turned against the refo rms intended to accord educational institutions autonomy and freedom necessary for div ersifying the education market and,
14 of 25thereby, reducing entrance competition and unnecess ary demand for education.(Note 21) (4) Institutionalization of Statist Policies The developmental state's educational pol icy measures, which were initially introduced for the purpose of temporarily containin g the expansion of secondary and tertiary education as a way to secure resources for strategic industries, have now become "institutionalized" in the education market althoug h the need for such measures has disappeared. The South Korean state's education bud get, which now consumes 5 percent of the world-class GNP, is comparable to those of m any advanced nations of similar population. Participation in primary and secondary education is full and in tertiary education it is nearly universal. Even so, the stat e continues the containment policy, allocates students to schools and universities dire ctly or via state-administered entrance competition, controls tuition fees, and maintains t he uniformity of curriculum and textbooks in grade schools. It does so on the stati st assumption that private schools as well as universities are institutions of public edu cation. And indeed the South Korean state does not seem to be able to abandon such poli cies unless it resolves to overhaul the entire education market and risk social and politic al dislocations. The main source of such difficulties is o bviously the prevailing personalist ethic. The hurdles erected by this ethic are interestingly reflected in the remarks made by the critics of liberalizing policy ideas. For instance, in 1998 a professor of mathematics education at a private university in Seoul criticiz ed the policy proposal to abolish entrance examinations and argued that, should this institution be abolished, the state would have to supply alternative ways of determinin g whom to accept and whom to reject. The leader of a major parental organization in the same year opposed liberalization of schoolsÂ—especially the abolition of the student quota system and tuition fee controlÂ—for the reason that the "greedy owners of private schools and universities would immediately raise tuition fees a nd admit students with no limit.(Note 22) Both leaders of public opinion could not see be yond the statist political economy because they did not consider that, where state con trol and protection is absent or not as extensive as in South Korea, whom to admit and whom to reject depends on what kind of education the university provides, and that, in the private sector, the tuition fee is one major regulator of the supply-demand relationship. On the other hand, state bureaucrats continually seek to influence policy makers in orde r to expand the extent of state intervention instead of shrinking it. None of the t wo civilian governments that have so far emerged since the end of military domination wa s prepared to confront such obstacles. It was not that they were unwilling to d ismantle old institutional structures, but simply that the electorate, divided along perso nal connections, would not confer on them the clear-cut mandate they needed. The statist policies, which became indisp ensable institutions in the state-controlled education market, have now acquire d "institutional continuity" and, as such, "readily overcome" challenges by more viable policy ideas. The strong South Korean state has, thus, fallen into its own trap, c ontinually expanding its intervention while seeking liberalization, and exacerbating the question of entrance competition while trying to solve it.(5) The Demand-Provoking Institutional Structures This being said, one last question remain s to be addressed. Why, as in 1998, does demand continue to rise and university entrance com petition remain intense even when the overall supply in student places has been incre ased far beyond the overall demand? The answer can be obtained by examining an institut ional structure that has emerged on
15 of 25the supply side over the years of state interventio n. This institutional structure is the hierarchy of universities which South Koreans unani mously accept.(Note 23) This hierarchy ranks universities not on the basis of their performance in teaching and research, nor on the basis of their educational facilities and equipment, but on the basis of a few external conditions. The conditions are (i) whether a university is located in Seoul or elsewhere, (ii) whether it is a state o r private university, and (iii) whether it is older or newer than others.(Note 24) Preference is based on the assumption that the university is better if it is located in Seoul not elsewhere, a state university not a private university, and older not newer than others. Superf icial though it may appear, this assumption is not groundless. Rather, it is fairly well grounded in a web of institutionalized state policies. Consumer indiffer ence to the actual performance of individual universities has to do with the state po licies of keeping supply short of demand and provoking entrance competition. The reas on is that a guaranteed supply of students under perpetual entrance competition depri ves the universities of incentives for trying to outperform others or to develop unique ed ucation programs. Since all universities, thus, tend to provide educational ser vices in money-saving ways, consumers look at conditions other than their progr ams, teaching and research, or equipment and facilities, when they consider which of them to choose. Preference for universities in Seoul is explained partially by the established state policy of not licencing any new university in Seoul in order to curb the co ncentration of population, which in turn was prompted by another state policy of seekin g industrialization at the expense of agriculture.(Note 25) The higher tuition fees of pr ivate universities for larger classes with less than satisfactory facilities and equipmen t may account for the low popularity of such universities. Licences issued to new universit ies at times of crisis are part of the reason for preferring older universities. Finally, the personalist ethic which requires useful personal connections to the state bureaucrac y and chaebol businesses endorses the status of the universities ranked high because thei r graduates are already in control of those institutions. Since these conditions are not what individual universities can alter, the hierarchy remains constant and individual unive rsities' ranks fixed, with the state university in Seoul at the top and the private univ ersities springing up in the country at bottom. The hierarchy's role in accommodating dem and in higher education is obvious in the fact that it is a hierarchy based on judgement about which university is preferable to which. The top-ranking university is the most prefe rred while the bottom one is the least. Most aspirants for higher education follow this rul e in seeking admission. This tendency is so strong that it persists even after entry to f irst-year programs well into advanced levels of undergraduate studies. Each semester univ ersities invite applications for the vacancies created by those who do not register beca use filling given quotas is vital for revenue generation. This is immediately followed by the breaking out of transfer competitions which are as intense as entrance compe tition.(Note 26) Since the upper ranks are always taken by a handful of prestigious universities while all aspirants for higher education seek to go to such universities, t he actual gap between supply and demand remains great even when the overall supply s urpasses the overall demand and lower-ranked universities fail to fill their quotas The significance of the hierarchy's role in provoking entrance competition can be considered in connection with the practices of stat e entrance examination and the uniform curriculum and textbooks in grade schools. The once-a-year state entrance examination gives all aspirants for higher educatio n scores specified down to decimal fractions to sort them into thousands of minute ran ks. Its questions are prepared in a multiple-choice format about the contents of the un iform curriculum and textbooks in
16 of 25selected subjects with minor variations. Since this examination is the only road to higher education while its questions are such that better prepared students perform better, it motivates most students in grade schools to competi tive preparation, including those with no serious interest in advanced learning. Whil e schools conduct instruction that focuses on entrance competition, their staying away from the competition means alienation from the mainstream school life. Meanwhi le, the hierarchical pyramid of universities lifts the nationwide drive toward high er education up to its apex, the state university in Seoul and a handful of prestigious pr ivate universities in the same city. In sum, the hierarchy of universities keeps the prefer red student places in short supply while the state entrance examination pushes student s toward top-ranking universities, and the uniform curriculum and teaching material ma kes the procedures of entrance competition a simple and technical matter.Summary and Conclusion If the foregoing discussion is not flawed it may permit a conclusion that the high demand for education in South Korea is a product of the statist political economy which, in spite of its initial "political" commitment to c oordinating educational development with state-initiated economic development, has beco me entangled in the private interests of a society in which a personalist ethic prevails. As part of the developmental strategy, the state initially sought to regulate the growth o f secondary and higher education in pace with the growth of resources available for edu cation. It also decided to rely on private education rather than expand public educati on for meeting the demand. That decision was clearly geared to develop a solid mark et in education as well as in the economy. The state, nevertheless, could not abandon such initial policy measures even when the changed circumstances no longer required t hem, and even after it practically dropped "development" from its policy agenda. The f our decades of education control have resulted in private educational institutions c omplacently seeking prosperity under the state's control and protection. Here, the perso nalist ethic of traditional Korea helped bond the policy measures of control and protection to the personalist ethic of the agents in the education market and the officials of the in tervening state. Thus, even at a time when the overall sup ply of student places far exceeds the overall demand, the institutionalized policy measur es continue to provoke entrance competition and, thereby, demand for education in h igher and more prestigious institutions. They do so by freezing student quotas at prestigious universities, by keeping tuition fees low enough to freeze the content of ed ucation at low standards, and by selecting students on the basis of scores from stat e examination in the basics covered in state-imposed curricula and textbooks. All this wor k together to sweep schools and their students into the nationwide entrance competition, thus producing the rising demand. Meanwhile, the hierarchy of universities maintains the intensity of entrance competition by keeping supply of student places at higher ranki ng institutions always short and by directing the drive toward higher education to the high-ranking universities. Undoubtedly, the near universalization of higher education in South Korea is a remarkable feat. But there are serious problems as well. The most serious one is that the selection of university students by competitive ent rance examination. Although this method has been a vital factor in the achievement o f near universal higher education, it prevents what UNESCO (1998) calls "diversification of higher education" and makes it impossible for higher educational institutions to b e "a lifelong source of professional training, updating and recycling." The former is du e to the guaranteed supply of students which weakens incentives for developing unique prog rams; the latter comes from the
17 of 25fact that competitive entrance examinations block t he existing workforce from returning to institutions of higher education. Moreover, the fact that almost all South Koreans are about to become university-trained professionals su ggests a serious weakness of the future workforce, for a healthy workforce includes not only professionals but also skilled and semi-skilled workers. Such weaknesses will plac e South Koreans in a very difficult situation given that the globalizing world market r equires well-trained, versatile workers who can nimbly adjust to the changing world of work The "structural problems" must be address ed soon. The institutionalized statist policies must be changed and ways explored to devel op the personalist ethic to a modus operandi which is more viable in the new world market. Will lessons learned from the South Korean case not cast light on other East Asia n nations where statism and the personalist ethic still prevail?NotesIn 1997, participation rates were 98.6 percent for primary schools, 101.0 percent for middle schools, and 94.6 percent for high schoo ls (KEDI 1997a, 32). Primary schools' participation rate was 96.4 percent in 195 9 and stayed above 100 percent for most years since then. Dropout rates in South K orean schools are negligible, e.g., 2.1 percent for high schools in 1995 (Ibid., 126) while that for American high schools was 5.3 percent in 1994 (Fetler 1997). 1. The rate rose very quickly in recent years. It was 60 percent in 1997 and 51 percent in 1995 (KEDI 1997a, 34). The non-mature st udents who were admitted in 1998 to day-time university and junior college prog rams alone accounted for 73 percent of all high school leavers. This is compara ble to Japan's 35-38 percent between 1988 and 1998 (Mombusho 1988-1988). 2. The proportion of fees other than tuition fees in t he operation costs was 17.9 percent in 1980 and 14.4 percent in 1995 respective ly (KEDI 1997a, 59). 3. Regarding the juku cramming classes in Japan, Simmons (1990, 90) writ es: "[The juku phenomenon] is a further measure of Japanese enthu siasm for education, or Japanese anxiety about educational achievement, and it is certainly a sign that the Japanese are willing to pay for educational assista nce and advantage." 4. There should be a limit in the Confucian culture's contribution to educational and economic development. Lie (1992, pp. 295-6) points out that the Confucian culture has been around in Korea for centuries yet Korea's rapid economic and other development is a recent phenomenon. Long befo re, Weber (1967) expressed his skepticism about Confucianism's possible contri bution to development. 5. This view is frequently found in South Korea's pres s. 6. This condition is not met in South Korea. In 1997, out of 2,792,410 students in higher education only 126,075 (4.5 percent) were re cipients of a scholarship, of which values were mostly far short of paying necess ary expenses (MOE 1997, 578, 592). Student loans are virtually unavailable. 7. For the concepts of "civil society" as a society of capitalist market economy and "the state" as a political entity overseeing civil society, I follow the long-established yet essentially controversial trad ition in social science. See Marx (1975). 8. Chang (1991) goes further to say that the developme nt of capitalism does not require the individualist ethic. Favourable interpr etations of the personalist ethic in Asian countries are also found in Smith (1991) a nd De Vos and Hsu (1985). 9. This is a South Korean application of Gerschenkron' s thesis that "a developing 10.
18 of 25country tends to establish its industrial structure differently from the advanced countries and . the higher the degree of backwa rdness, the stronger will be the role of the government." Cited from Cho (1995, 7). For Gerschenkron's own account, see: Gerschenkron (1961 and 1989).The Germany-based Transparency International's tran sparency index (TI) for South Korea is lower than Singapore, Taiwan, Hong K ong and Japan while higher than Indonesia, Thailand and China. TIs for East As ian nations are generally lower than those for Euro-North American nations. See Http://www.gwag.de/~uwvw/cpi1998.html 11. It was at that time that researchers have started t o compound public and private education. The earliest example is Yun and Park (19 77). 12. Kongsaribkan kyosasunhoanje (Teacher Rotation between Public and Private Schools), The Chosun Ilbo 7 Sept. 1998. 13. See below under the heading of "The Personalist Eth ic and Protection under State Control." While state-administered entrance competi tion enhances the drive towards higher education and, thus, guarantees univ ersities' filling student quotas, the universities which have no trouble in filling s tudent quotas do not need to recruit students by attractive education programs. Most universities, therefore, copy the programs of the top-ranking university (le ss bits of something as theirs do not have to be as good as the latter's). 14. For comparison, the size of the 1998 education budg et was 5 percent of the GNP and 24 percent of the total state budget. Given tha t the economy during the Park years was much smaller, it is obvious that state fu nding of education was much less than adequate for balanced development in scho ols of all levels. 15. Later on, the state allowed private schools and uni versities to "autonomously decide" on their tuition fees. Yet the "autonomousl y decided" tuition fees had to fall within the state's expectation in order for th e schools and universities not to be retaliated against. 16. Choi (1996) pointed out that as a result of the Chu n-Roh junta's policies, the number of university entrants increased by 30 perce nt and reduced young university graduates' wages down to the level of yo ung high school graduates. 17. See Note 20. 18. Up until the late 1980s teachers' salaries were ver y low while their teaching load was very heavy. In 1989, disgruntled teachers union ized against the law prohibiting such an activity. The military regime d ischarged those teachers who joined the illegal union and arrested their leaders At the same time, it decided to increase state funds for teacher salaries. This dec ision was applied not only to public schools but also to private schools. The pur pose of this was to mollify private school teachers' discontent while maintaini ng the existing arrangement for minimal-cost school operation under state control a nd protection. 19. An administrator whom I interviewed in May 1998 gav e me his estimation that at least a quarter of the state education budget was w asted in corruption. 20. The narrow perspective of the political state and c lass-dominated civil society is apt to lead to overemphasizing the "political" role of the state while overlooking the dynamics in which state policies protect class and other interests in civil society. An example of this is Chung and Armer (199 7), which emphasizes the developmental state's role "in shaping policies to expand and limit education to meet political and economic objectives rather than class interests." In this account, the inability of the strong state to carry out its political decisions is simply ignored. 21.
19 of 25The former was found in a newspaper article and the latter in proceedings of a public forum. I withhold documentation in order to avoid possible injury to the persons concerned. 22. The existence of hierarchy in East Asian universiti es is partially noted in Hayhoe (1995). 23. The general background description of this hierarch y can be seen in Kwon (1991). 24. As of 1997, for instance, only 39 out 169 universit ies were located in Seoul although a half of the whole population resided in that region (MOE 1997, pp. 580-9). 25. Each year, more than 7 percent of university studen ts migrate upward in the hierarchy. The number of registered university stud ents in 1997 was 1,368,461. At the beginning of the Second Semester of the 1998 ac ademic year, 42,468 of them moved to another university. Those to be transferre d at the beginning of the First Semester of the 1999 academic year are expected to be well over 50,000. "Sasang choedae-yi taehag pyoniphag" (The Largest Universit y Student Migration in History), The Chosun Ilbo 17 January 1999. The transfer application rate at major private universities in Seoul for the First Semeste r of the 1999 academic year ranged between 12 for 1 and 66 for 1. 26.ReferencesAmsden, A.H. (1994): "The Specter of Anglo-Saxoniza tion Is Haunting South Korea." In: Korea's Political Economy: An Institutional Perspec tive edited by Lee-Jay Cho and Yoon Hyung Kim (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 87-126.Chang, Yun-Shik (1991): "The Personalist Ethic and the Market of Korea," Comparative Studies in Society and Culture 33:1 (1991), 106-29. Cho, Soon (1994): The Dynamics of Korean Economic Development (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics).Choi, Kang-Shik (1996): "The Impact of Shifts in Su pply of College Graduates: Repercussion of Educational Reform in Korea," Economics of Education Review 15:1, 1-9.Chon, Nyongi, et al. (1969): "Nyongan tuipdoenun ky oyugbi chujong yongu." Research report, Central Institute for Research in Education Chung, Insook, and Armer, J.M. (1997): "State, Clas s, and Expansion of Education in South Korea: A General Model," Comparative Education Review 38:4, 531-45. Dahl, R.A. (1967): Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent (Chicago: R. McNally).De Vos, G., and Hsu, F. (eds.) (1985): Culture and Self: Asian and Western Perspectives (New York: Tavistock).Dore, R.P. (1982): "Groups and Individuals," in Society in Transition with Special Reference to Korea edited by Yun-Shik Chang, Taihwan Kwon, and P.J. Donaldson (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1982), 1329.
20 of 25Dore, R.P. (1980): "South Korean Development in Wid er Perspective," in Korea: A Decade of Development edited by Yun-Shik Chang (Seoul: Seoul National U niversity Press, 1980), 289-305.Evans, P.B. (1992): "The State as Problem and Solut ion: Predation, Embedded Autonomy and Structural Change," in The Politics of Economic Adjustment edited by Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman (Princeton: Prin ceton University Press, 1992), 139-81.Fetler. M. (1977): "Staffing Up and Dropping Out: U nintended Consequences of High Demand for Teachers," Education Policy Analysis Archives 5:16 ( http://epaa.asu.edu ). Gerschenkron, A. (1961): Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).Gerschenkron, A. (1989): Bread and Democracy in Germany (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).Hayhoe, R. (1995): "An Asian Multiversity? Comparat ive Reflections on the Transition to Mass Higher Education in East Asia," Comparative Education Review 39:2, 299-321. James, E., and Benjamin, G. (1988): Public Policy and Private Education in Japan (New York: St. Martin's).KEDI (1977a), Hangug-yi kyoyugchipyo, 1997 (Seoul: KEDI). KEDI (1997b): Tonggero bon hangug kyoyug-yi paljachui (Seoul: KEDI). Kim, Chong Chol, and Lee, Chong Jae (1994): Kyoyughaengjong-yi liron-gua shilje 2nd ed. (Seoul: Kyoyugkoahagsa, 1994).Kim, Eun Mi (1997): Big Business, Strong State (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press).Kim, Young Chol, et al., "Sagyoyugbi munje-oa taeun gbangan." Research report. Korean Economics and Finance of Education Society.Kim, Young Hoa, et al. (1994): Hangugin-yi kyoyungnyol yongu (Seoul: KEDI). Kim, Yung Bong (1980): "Education and Economic Grow th." In: Human Resources and Social Development in Korea: Essays on the Korean E conomy IV, edited by Chong Kee Park (Seoul: Korea Development Institute), 234-73.Kim, In Hoe (1991): "Hangugin-yi kyoyungnyol, ku ho -oa shil," Taehagkyoyug 50, 71-7.Kong, Un Bae, et al. (1994): "Hangug kyoyugtuja shi ltae-oa suingnyul punsog-e koanhan yongu." Research report. Korean Educational Development Institute. Krader, S.N. (1963): The Sumerians: Their History, Culture and Character (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
21 of 25Kwon, Kyun (1991): "Pinnagan kyoyug pungjo." In: Kyoyungnangug-yi haebu edited by Bum Mo Chung (Seoul: Nanam), 93-117.Lee, Il Yong (1996): "Taehagiphagjedo-yi kaehyoge k oanhan pyongayongu," Hanguk kyoyungmunje yonguso Ronmunjip 11 (1996), 133-47. Lee, Sunwha, and Brinton, M.C. (1996): "Elite Educa tion and Social Capital: The Case of South Korea." Sociology of Education 69:3 (1996), 177192. Lee, Yeon-ho (1997): The State, Society and Big Business in South Korea (London: Routledge).Lie, J. (1992): "The Political Economy of South Kor ean Development," International Sociology 7:3 (1992), 295-6. Marx, K. (1967): Early Writings (New York: Vantage Books). McAdams, R.P. (1993): Lessons from Abroad: How Other Countries Educate Th eir Children (Lancaster, PA: Technomic Publishing.) MCE (Ministry of Culture and Education) (1988): Mungyo sashimnyonsa (Seoul: MCE). Min, Yun Gi (1963): "Hagbumo pudam kyoyugbi chosayo ngu." Research report, Central Institute for Research in Education.MOE (Ministry of Education) (1997): Educational Yearbook of 1997 (Seoul: MOE). MOE (1988): "1998-nyondo chuyo-ommubogo (Briefings to the President on the Ministry's Major Policies for the Year 1998)." Type script. Mombusho (Ministry of Letters) (1988-1998): Wagakuni-no kyoikushisaku (Tokyo: Okurasho Printing Service).Pak, Min Sun (1997): "Two Wheels for Lifelong Learn ing in Korea: Credit Banking and Multimedia Technology." ERIC Clearinghouse Document No. JC97048. Pak, Nam-Ki (1994): "Hangugin-yi kyoyungnyol ihae-r ul uihan taeanjog koanjom," Kyoyughag yongu 32:5 (1994), 185-206. Rhee, Jong Chan (1994): The State and Industry in South Korea: The Limits o f the Authoritarian State (London: Routledge). Ryoo, Jai-Kyung, et al. (1995): "Changing Rates of Return to Education over Time: A Korean Case Study," Economics of Education Review 12:1, 7180. Simmons, C. (1990): Growing Up and Going to School in Japan: Traditions and Trends (Milton Keynes, PA: Open University Press).Smith, A.J. (1983): Japanese Society: Tradition, Se lf and the Social Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Smith, D.C. (ed.) (1991): The Confucian Continuum: Educational Modernization in
22 of 25Taiwan (New York: Praeger). Song, B.N. (1990): The Rise of the Korean Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Sorenson, C.W. (1997): "Success and Education in So uth Korea," Comparative Education Review 38:1, 10-35. Tu, Wei-ming (ed.) (1997): Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Fou r Mini-Dragons (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).Unesco (1998): "World Declaration on Higher Educati on for the Twentieth First Century: Vision and Action." Adopted at the World C onference on Higher Education, Paris, 9 Oct.Weber, M. (1967): The Religion of China translated by H.H. Gerth and D. Martindale (New York: Free Press).West, E.G. (1975): Education and the Industrial Revolution (New York: Barnes & Noble Books.)West, E.G. (1970): Education and the State: A Study in Political Econo my (London: The Institute of Economic Affairs).Whitehill, A.M. (Ed) (1988): Doing Business in Korea (London: Croom Helm). Yoo, Jungho (1997): "Neoclassical versus Revisionis t View of Korean Economic Growth." Harvard Institute of International Develop ment's Development Discussion Paper No. 588.Yun, Chong Il, et al. (1996): Hanguk kyoyugjongchaeg-yi tamgu (Seoul: Kyoyugchulpansa). Yun, Chong Il, and Park, Chongnyol (1977), "Kyoyugj aejong-yi hyonhoang-goa munje: kyoyugbi pigyoyongu." Research report. KEDI.About the AuthorKi Su KimFaculty of EducationMemorial University of NewfoundlandSt. John's, NF, CanadaA1B 3X8 E-mail: email@example.com Ki Su Kim is Associate Professor at Memorial Univer sity of Newfoundland. He has published about seventy scholarly papers, two books and several commissioned research reports, all on philosophical and policy issues in education. He has recently completed a policy-developing project addressing South Korea's question of university entrance competition. The project was commissioned by the Mi nistry of Education, the Republic
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