Educational policy analysis archives

Educational policy analysis archives

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Educational policy analysis archives
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Educational policy analysis archives.
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Entrepreneurial ambitions in the public sector : a random effects model of the emergence of charter schools in North Carolina / Linda A. Renzulli.
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E DUCATION P OLICY A NALYSIS A RCHIVES A peer-reviewed scholarly journal Editor:Gene V GlassCollege of Education Arizona State University Copyright is retained by the first or sole author, who grants right of first publication to the Education Policy Analysis Archives EPAA is published by the College of Education at Arizona State University. Articles ar e indexed in the Directory of Open Access Journals ( 10 Number 19April 10, 2002 ISSN 1068-2341Entrepreneurial Ambitions in the Public Sector: A Random Effects Model of the Emergence of Charter Schools in North Carolina Linda A. Renzulli University of GeorgiaCitation: Renzulli, L. A. (2002, April 10).Entrepre neurial ambitions in the public sector: A random effects model of the emergence of charter sc hools in North Carolina. Education Policy Analysis Archives 10 (19). Retrieved [date] from 0n19/. AbstractIn this article, I study charter schools as social innovations within the population of established public educational institutions. I b egin by briefly outlining the history of public schools in the United States. I apply organizational theories to explain the perpetuation of the structure of public schools since World War II. Next, I delineate the characteristics of educationa l reform movements in the United States by focusing on the charter school mov ement. Then, I use an evolutionary approach to study the environmental ch aracteristics that drive the perceived need for innovation and the promotion of experimentation. Using data compiled from the North Carolina Department of Publ ic Instruction, the Census Bureau, and North Carolina State Data Center, I exa mine the characteristics of the local environment that promotes the submission of c harter school applications in North Carolina over a three-year period –1996-1998. I show that school districts in need of school choice do have a higher mean char ter school submission rate. I also show that some community characteristics and a vailable resources are important for the initial stage of charter school f ormation. IntroductionCharter schools represent a new organizational form in the public school system. They are founded by teams of entrepreneurs that may include students, parents, educators, and community


Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 10 No. 19 2 members. Instead of being part of the established bureaucratic structure, charter schools are independent of the rules and regulations of their a ssociated school districts. In return for per-pupil expenditures and a release from some of the require d bureaucratic structure, charter schools are held accountable by the state and local community for im proved student achievement. Since the first charter school was founded in Minne sota in 1992, the number of charter schools has grown at an increasing rate. In 1998, t hirty-four states have charter school laws and twenty-six states plus the District of Columbia hav e operating charter schools (Center for Educational Reform 1999). As of October 1998, 1,12 8 charter schools enrolled more than 250,000 children. These numbers are rising as new charters are accepted within states and as other states pass charter school legislation (Center for Educational Reform 1999). The development of charter schools is the result of recent entrepreneurial activity and an example of how a new organizational form can arise as a result of a social innovation. In this paper, I study charter schools as an innovation within the population of established public educational institutions. I expect the founding of charter scho ols to exhibit distinct stages of innovation, creation, and maintenance, in which people have int entions to start a school, actually create a school and finally, maintain a school. Specifically, I am interested in the environmental context in which these stages of social innovation unfold. Evolutionary theory argues that organizational chan ge in a population or community occurs as a result of three processes: variation, selectio n, retention and diffusion (Aldrich 1979). I treat the innovation of charter schools as an instance of a v ariation. First, variations in the environments ca n come from intentional or blind variation. Second, the variations must be developed and implemented or selected into the environment. And third, the innovation gains legitimacy and is retained through a struggle for resources. This pap er will examine the first of the three phases – intentional creations (or at least attempted creati ons) of a new organizational form. Thus, the socia l innovation of charter schools within established ed ucational institutions and structures is my primary concern. I begin by briefly outlining the history of public schools in the United States. I apply organizational theories such as institutional theor y to explain the perpetuation of the structure of public schools since World War II. Next, I delineate the characteristics of the educational reform movement in the United States by focusing on one of the many reform options –the charter school movement. Then, I use an evolutionary approach to study the environmental characteristics that insight community members and drive their perceived need for innovation and the promotion of experimentation. Using data complied from the North Carolina Departm ent of Public Instruction, the Census Bureau, and North Carolina State Data Center, I exa mine the characteristics of the local environment that cause charter school applications to be submitted in North Carolina over a threeyear period. The analysis begins in 1996 when the North Carolina Sate Legislature passed the SL1997-430, which gave parents, teachers, and communi ty members the legal option to publicly educate students through chartered schools. I use a Poisson random effects model to estimate the effects of community characteristics on the number of charter schools submitted for approval.Traditional Public SchoolsThe Constitution of the United States does not expl icitly say anything about public educational instruction; thus educational instituti ons fall under the jurisdiction of state and local governments. In the pre-industrial period (160718 12) public schools were set up by boards of


Renzulli: Entrepreneurial Ambitions in the Public S ector 3 education and funded by taxes to educate children, usually poor children.1 Finally, the Tenth Amendment officially left the responsibility for ed ucation to the states, which reaffirmed the tradition of local control. Before World War II, p ublic schools in the United Sates did not take on a clear institutionalized character, but after the wa r public schools became the norm (Hill, Pierce, and Guthrie 1997). Over time, public schools gained le gitimacy and acceptance alongside private education. In fact, by 1950 a majority of American children attended public schools. More recent numbers show that public schools still educate most children. For example, in 1995, 33.9 million kindergarten through eighth grade children attended public school whereas only 4.427 million attended private schools(Hill1995; Hill, Pierce and Guthrie 1997; United States Census Bureau 1998). Public elementary and secondary education has been and still is a politically charged topic. States and local governments want more control of e ducation, at the same time as the state and federal governments are ridiculed for not supportin g education enough. As late as 1979, in response to the growing push for federal intervention, the 9 6th Congress passed Public law 96-88 that established a Department of Education. The Departm ent of Education was instituted as a federal office to support more effective state and local ed ucational institutions while still allowing state a nd local governments to maintain control of education. In fact, PL 96-88 clearly stated that the responsibility of education should remain in the ha nds of state and local systems.2 State and local boards of education determine curriculum, testing, and teaching in traditional public elementary and secondary schools, while the federal government pro vides special programs and funds to enhance and aid state controlled education. Notwithstanding the freedom state boards of educati on have to create educational institutions and structures, public elementary and secondary schools have a remarkable resemblance to one other within and across state lines. School s in Iowa have curriculum, structure, and schedule, similar to the schools in Maine. In fact, children can easily be moved from one state to the next because public education is so similar. The simila rity between and within states can be explained if we consider schools an organizational form. Some o rganizational theories can explain the forces that produce similarities within a population, othe r organizational theories can explain why there are different organizational structures within the same population. Schools as Organizations There are a plethora of definitions for organizatio ns in the literature. However, in my analysis I will use the following definition: “Orga nizations are goal-directed, boundary-maintaining activity systems” (Aldrich 1979; Aldrich 1999). I have chosen this definition because it is broad enough to encompass public sector, non-business org anizations such as schools. In addition, the core of this definition focuses on the social proce sses, initiation, and endurance of organizations. Thus, Aldrich’s definition of organizations allows me to view schools, specifically charter schools, a s organizations and focus on the process of their for mation. I briefly explain the forces that produce similarity in organizational structures and then di scuss the evolution of change via the educational reform movement and school choice. 1 At the same time, religious schools continued to e ducate many of the children between the ages of 5 a nd 17. In addition, exclusive private schools were formed by the upper class to separate privileged children from the lower and middle class or, for that matter, the chi ldren of the Nouveau riche (Levine 1980).2 The Constitution only specifies that public educat ion must comply with the separation of church and s tate.


Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 10 No. 19 4 Forces that Explain School Similarity Institutional theory explains a great deal about th e similarity among public schools (Meyer, Scott, and Deal 1977). The system of public school s in the US maintains its legitimacy by conforming to an agreed upon set of rules and cultu ral expectations (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Meyer and Rowan 1978). Despite the variations in laws, schoo ls almost universally educate children in similar subjects and similar ways, partly because o f teachers’ and administrators’ sensitivity to publ ic opinion(Bidwell 1965). That is, the school as an o rganization faces formal pressures from state and local boards, informal pressures from parents and t he community, and cultural expectations. Thus schools are “highly penetrated organizations,” sens itive to the environment (Meyer, Scott and Deal 1977). In organizational terms, schools are isomorphic, or constrained to resemble one another, due to the similar set of environmental conditions they encounter (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Schools do not, however, face competitive isomorphi sm because they are not in a population of “free and open competition” (DiMaggio and Powell 19 83; Hannan and Freeman 1977). Traditional public schools face institutional isomorphism. In other words, schools fight to gain legitimacy for social acceptance. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) discu ssed three ways in which an organization undergoes isomorphism – coercive, normative, and mi metic. First, organizational leaders are coercively isomorphic because the organization need s to be political and social legitimized. Thus, an organization needs to follow both social and politi cal norms. Second, normative isomorphism is related to professionalization and professional nor ms. That is, norms related to the development of the occupations that fill the organization. Finally mimetic isomorphism is a result of uncertainty (s ee DiMaggio and Powell 1983). I believe that coercive and normative mechanisms constrain the schools from deviating from the norm.3Generally, coercive isomorphism results from formal and informal political and social pressures on schools to meet cultural expectations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued that organizations, which expand thei r presence in more than one social arena, increase their legitimacy by conforming to and crea ting institutionalized norms. State legislation, national test standards, and requirements for fundi ng have helped perpetuate school systems and school structure. Educational institutions and their te achings enter students’ and parents’ lives through political debate, family issues, and social ization. Public education has been socially constructed to reflect the mainstream values and ne eds of students, parents, citizens, and teachers (Berger and Luckman 1966). Normative isomorphism is also an important factor i n the perpetuation of the structure of public schools in the United States. Normative iso morphism stems from professional pressures on schools to conform to standards. Schools are creat ed and run by people who have been selected from a larger population, formally educated, profes sionally socialized, and in many cases made official members of unions American Federation of T eachers (AFT) and professional organizations such as the National Education Association (NEA). Teachers are semi-professionals4 who are subject to normative pressures. Teacher colleges a nd teacher certification programs formally educate teachers. In their education, teachers are taught how to teach, what to teach, and how to behave professionally. In fact, students in school s of education have an apprentice-like program – student teaching – that gives them experience and t ime in a classroom. It is in the classroom that teachers learn professional standards and are expec ted to conform to them. For example, teacher 3 Mimetic mechanisms are probably not the cause of i somorphism in the school population because uncertainty is rare.4 The professional status of teachers has been debat ed; nevertheless, teacher colleges and unions are a t the very least fighting for the professionalization of the occupation.


Renzulli: Entrepreneurial Ambitions in the Public S ector 5 colleges in New Jersey can prepare students to be teachers in any state. Therefore, professional standards created by teaching colleges and other as sociations perpetuate the structure of educational institutions and enhance similarity among schools a cross school systems. In sum, institutional norms and expectations have created traditional education in the US. Political structure, values, and professional norms play a part in creating public s chools as we know them. Furthermore, due to standardized norms and expectat ions, traditional schools are designed to serve the needs of the average child. Yet there are many children that do not fit the mold. Traditional schools often fail to meet the needs of students. However, every child must attend schools despite the goodness of fit between the stu dent and the school. The only other option for students is private school, and most parents cannot afford private or religious schools. And thus, until recently, those children who could not afford alternatives to public education were stuck in traditional schools regardless of the school’s abil ity to teach them. In the next section, I will use an evolutionary approach as applied to organizations t o explain the reform movement in education. A caveat to keep in mind is that most of the work don e on new organizational foundings and nascent entrepreneurship focuses on business organizations rather than public sector organizations. Nevertheless, I believe many of the same processes work for the evolution of the public sector. Evolution of SchoolsBecause I am interested in the genesis of a new org anizational form within the population of public schools, I must use a theoretical framework that is general enough to aid the understanding of social innovation. Institutional theory alone is not equipped to explain the recent changes in the educational system.5 Institutional arguments are static; therefore, the theories they provide are not sufficient to explain the change in the nation’s ed ucation system. Evolutionary theory, on the other hand, is a broad multi-dimensional theory that is m ost similar to ecology but uses principles form institutional theory, learning theory, cognitive th eory, transaction cost economics, and resource dependence to explain changes in a population (Aldr ich 1999). The theory directs our attention to the processes that produce patterned changes in a p opulation (Aldrich 1999). Organizational ecological models help answer “why t here are so many different kinds of organizations”(Hannan and Freeman 1977). Until rec ently, researchers studying the public school system in the United States need not grapple with t hat question because most schools structures looked similar to one another. However, today with the emergence of “new” public educational structures, population ecology, and even more broad ly evolutionary theory, is needed to help us understand why these new forms were created. Changes in the population of schools can occur for various reasons. Research on foundings shows that a need for a change may be the impetuous for an innovation but is not sufficient or even necessary. For example, a school district may be f alling behind national and state averages (their students are below the national or state average on standardized tests or are below grade level in math and reading), and yet an educational innovatio n never happens. On the other hand, school districts that produce above grade level students w ith above average and excellent test scores may produce many educational reforms. Although, the ne ed for change may be an important part of the social innovation process, it can not explain all o f it. Instead, social entrepreneurs are a key to the production of an innovation. Environments and comm unities may “breed” these entrepreneurs. Thus, the effects of community context are key to u nderstanding social innovation in the public school system. I will model some of these communit y characteristics to predict social innovation. 5 Institutional theories can explain why the diffusi on process is slow for educational reform in curric ulum and organizational development, but the diffusion process is b eyond the scope of this paper. For more information about the diffusion (Mort 1958; Owens 1981 : p. 237-249).


Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 10 No. 19 6 Educational Reform The educational reform movement focuses on school c hoice. Since the establishment of common schools in the mid-1800’s, local or state bo ards of education have assigned children to schools. Thus, children were bound to a school by their geographical location. In contrast, the movement for school choice advocates free, public o ptions for parents to send their children to schools other than those to which they are assigned Alternative schools provide a choice in the public school sector rarely available before the reform mov ement.6The current school reform project has changed the n ature and structure of public schools. Alternative schools are deliberate departures from the existing public educational form. Four major choice ideas have been experimented with in states around the country – magnet, voucher, contract, and charter schools. I briefly define the first th ree school choices and then spend the majority of time explaining charter schools. Magnet schools allow students to go to a different public school than the one to which they are assigned. They typically have entrance exams ( Nathan 1996). Vouchers are education “gift certificates” that allow children to use the money allocated to them for public schools, i.e. per-pupi l expenditure, to go toward their schooling at a priv ate institution. Vouchers have been rather controversial because public funds are often used f or non-secular schools (see Nathan 1996). Contract schools or school site management delegate s the administrative and financial responsibilities of a school to a firm rather than the local government. In other words, business organizations are contracted by the local education al agency to run a school. Again, this option is controversial because for-profit organizations run the school and may have conflicts of interest between their profits and the well-being of the sch ool. Charter SchoolsCharter schools represent an innovation in the popu lation of education systems in the public sector. Their organization differs from a traditio nal public school, and their place in the district structure of education is different. Charter schoo ls are public schools that break off from the schoo l district’s command, and yet they are still public s chools. Charter schools do not need to comply with all of the district rules, and thus the bureau cracy usually associated with public education is reduced. In return, charters schools’ missions and statements explicitly state that parents, teachers and students will increase their participation in s chool-related activities (Bomotti, Ginsberg, and Cobb 1999; Nathan 1996). In addition, charter scho ols must be accountable for student achievement or they can be closed. Charter schools give freedom to teachers to use innovative techniques and to administrators to structure the s chool day to best suit the students they serve. Like other public schools, the only federal regulat ion with which charter schools must comply is that they must be non-sectarian and may not charge tuiti on (Koppich 1997). Other regulations vary by state. For example, most states limit the number o f charter schools that can be created, the number of non-certified teachers that can be hired, and th e form of governance the schools can adopt. Nevertheless, the charter itself dictates the missi on, curriculum, and population of the school. Thus charter schools are public institutions, but they d iffer in many ways from traditional public schools. Charters are funded by state allotment for each stu dent, but lack the capital that public schools get from the state and local community. Wh en families place their child in a charter school, the state and local funds allotted to that child ar e moved from the traditional public school and given to the charter school. It is easiest to pict ure children sitting in a classroom with dollar sig ns over their heads. When they move from a traditiona l public school to a charter school the dollar 6 Private, and religious schools also provide variat ions in educational institutions but not in the pub lic realm. New York’s magnet schools are also an example of an educational choice but competitive based on entran ce exams.


Renzulli: Entrepreneurial Ambitions in the Public S ector 7 sign moves with them, but the desk and building the y were sitting in not. In other words, the only money each child gets is the dollar amount assigned to the individual, but not the capital used to build the traditional school. Funding is probably the most debated and controvers ial issue of charter schools. Per-pupil expenditure pays for teachers, books, and supplies. Opponents of charter schools argue that losing one child to a charter school means the loss of bet ween 3 to 5 thousand dollars, but fixed costs for the public school, such as the number of teachers o r their salary, remain the same. Thus, reallocating per-pupil expenditures to go to charte r schools rather than the fixed costs in the traditional public school will hurt public schools systems (Koppich 1997). In fact, opponents in Ohio, Illinois, and Oregon have used this argument to defeat charter school legislation (Marks 1998). However, researchers in North Carolina have shown t hat the negative financial consequences incurred by districts are overstated. First, very few students per district leave the traditional public schools (Hassel 1998). Thus, th e financial burden is minimal for most districts. Second, districts can contract services to charter schools for fees to recoup some of the money they lost to charter schools. In other words, some of t he per-pupil expenditures lost to charter schools can be gained back through contracting educational and tran sportation services (Coulson 1996). Finally, the financial loss felt by districts may b e an added incentive for traditional public schools to improve their accountability to families. In fact, charter school advocates intended for charter schools to create competition for students and decr ease the degree of monopoly traditional public school have over education (Hassel 1998). In the aggr egate, charter schools receive less than what traditional public schools receive from public fund s and do not put a great burden on their feeding school district7(Hassel 1998). Some even go as far as to say that c harter schools do not receive their “fair share” of public funds for a public schooling (Hassel 1998). Charter Schools and Small BusinessesBusiness organizations and charters schools exhibit an important similarity. The similarity is important for understanding charter schools via org anizational theories and using an evolutionary approach. Both charter schools and businesses must show gains. Like all organizations, a charter school must define and meet its goals to succeed an d survive. Achievement gains in a charter school are equivalent to profit gains in a business. Char ter schools must be accountable for student achievement. If they fail to do so, a charter scho ol will lose its charter just as if a business fail s to meet its profit goals it will fail. In addition, c harter schools, like businesses must stay out of de bt. For example, in Chapel Hill/Carborro North Carolina a charter school closed mid-year early in 1999 because of a $50,000 debt they could not repay Charter schools and businesses alike cannot run in the red and survive. But charter schools are not like small business in many significant ways. Charter schools must comply with state regulation and criteria. Fo r example, if a group of people want to start a charter school, they must first write an applicatio n and submit it to either the local educational agency or the state board of education for prelimin ary approval.8 Once the charter obtains preliminary approval, it is then sent to the State Board for final approval. If the charter is not approved, many states have an appeal process. In a ny case, the State Board reviews the charters to make sure they match the criteria laid out by the s tate legislation. 7 The data for financial burden come from an analysi s of funding in North Carolina. Depending on state law, some states may find more or less burden to their districts.8 This varies state by state. In North Carolina, ch arter applications may be sent to either the LEA or the state for preliminary approval.


Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 10 No. 19 8 A small business does not go through such an applic ation process. Under most circumstances, almost anyone can open a business wi thout approval from the state or local government. Furthermore, after a given period of t ime, the state board reviews the existing charter schools. Small businesses are not subject to offici al review. Finally there is a difference in the number of organizations legally allowed to form. S tate regulations limit the competition for charter schools, while other business organizations are in a more or less free and open market competition. Most states have a limit on the number of charter schools. For example, North Carolina has a cap of 100 schools but Mississippi has a cap of 6 chart ers. However, the Department of Commerce does not limit the number of donut shops or delis allowe d to open in a state. Thus the survival of a charter school depends less on the density of the p opulation of charter schools then does the survival of business organizations and so I expect different factors to affect schools than businesses such as community involvement (see Hannan and Freem an 1989 for a complete discussion of density dependence). Charter Schools as a Variation in the Population of Public Educational Institutions Variations occur as responses to need, resource availabili ty and mobilization when people actively attempt to generate alternatives to existi ng forms. Variations are important for creating competition, an implicit part of the evolution of o rganizations. They are also important because variations help generate differences within a popul ation. Charter schools are intentional variations that ari se from innovative and experimental groups of initiators often to solve the problem of complac ent and monopolistic schools (Coulson 1996). Public schools have had an almost complete exclusiv e jurisdiction of the education of American youth (besides religious and privateschools) and th us the population of schools has had very little variation and competition (Scott 1992).In fact, tra ditional public education meant that a school would be run by the local board where choice in edu cation meant that one would have to pay tuition to a private institution (Hill 1995; Hill, Pierce and Guthrie 1997). Because state and local government had a monopoly on education, public elem entary and secondary schools did not have to be accountable for growth and gains in student achi evement. However, state and local governments, those who hav e monopolistic control over education, are the only ones who can make school choice a lega l option. Thus, the system, rather than the environment, controls innovations in education at l arge. In fact, the initiation of the variation can only occur in states where the legislature has pass ed a charter school law. Someone must bring an initial bill to the state legislature. These polic y entrepreneurs (Mintron1997) help create a formal arena for educational entrepreneurs to experiment w ith a new educational form. Without the law, variations in public education are impossible. Charter Schools in North Carolina North Carolina passed legislation in 1996, five yea rs after Minnesota passed the first charter school law, that allows public funds to go to chart er schools. According to The Center for Educational Reform, North Carolina has a strong cha rter school law (see Appendix I for details of North Carolina Charter School regulations). “A str ong law (also known as a "live," "effective," "expansive" or "progressive" law) is one that fosters the development of numerous, genuinely independent charter schools” (Center for Educationa l Reform 1999). North Carolina had 63 operating charter schools as of November 1998. The schools are located in rural areas in the western counties, cit ies such as Raleigh and Charlotte, and affluent villages such as Chapel Hill/Carrboro. The schools serve a range of students including average students, at risk students, special needs children, and exceptional children among other populations. Controversy exists over the quality of education fo und in charter schools, the populations they serve, the number of students they teach, and the t eachers teaching them, ( for example Jackson 1998).


Renzulli: Entrepreneurial Ambitions in the Public S ector 9DataThe data for this analysis come from several source s. First, I collected the population of submitted charter school applications to the North Carolina State Board over a three-year period from the first legal year of charter schools in 199 6 to 1998. These data will be used to create the dependent variable in the analysis: number of subm issions of charter school applications to the State Board of Education. These data are from the Department of Public Instruction – Office of Charter Schools Recommendations for Preliminary and Final Approval summary reports. There were 184 charters submitted between 1996 and 1998, of which 66 were accepted.9 I was able to obtain the year the charter was submitted, acceptan ce status, grade level, county or local educational agency in which the school would be located, and ch arter type. For this analysis, I will only use the county and year for which the charter was submitted The second source of data is from the 1996 USA Coun ties DataBase (from Census Bureau) and North Carolina State Data Center (SDC). The US A Counties DataBase is a conglomeration of data compiled from the 1990 census and Current Popu lation Surveys (1992-1995). SDC is a consortium of state and local agencies that provide s data and information about North Carolina. I use the 1995 data. Because local educational agencies or LEAs10 and counties have an almost 1 to 1 correspondence in North Carolina11, I can use information about LEA and counties as conte xtuallevel variables. Finally, the third source of data comes from NC Dep artment of Public Instruction. In 1997, NC implemented the ABC’s, a program to monitor all public schools in North Carolina, in accordance with the School-Based Management and Acc ountability Act (1996).12 School growth and performance is measured by composite scores compute d for expected growth/gain, exemplary growth/gain, and a percentage of students at or abo ve grade level. Excellent, distinguished, progressing and low performing schools are identifi ed based on the composite scores. The data are in a stacked or LEA-year format. In o ther words, each of the 118 LEAs have 3 observations, one corresponding to 1996, one to 199 7, and one to 1998. Therefore, I have 354 observations of LEA years. I then use a year dummy variable to capture period effects. However, the other independent variables for the county char acteristics of the LEAs are time invariant. In other words, I continue to use the same values of t he independent variables over time. I use lagged county data (community characteristics prior to 19 96) to reflect the county atmosphere prior to submission of a charter school application.HypothesesI have three main hypotheses regarding the effect o f the environment on charter school application submissions. Sources of Dissatisfaction : Charters are educational options. If schools in a district are meeting the public expectations for educating its s tudent body, the need for school choice may be attenuated. Conversely, those districts that are n ot meeting the educational expectations of parents, teachers, and administrators may generate increased dissatisfaction with public schools. Therefore, I expect that quality of LEA schools will be inversel y related to the number of charter school submissions because people will respond to their di ssatisfaction. In addition, LEAs with few school -age children as a proportion of the total residenc e will be less likely to need charter schools. For 9 Three of the 66 accepted schools were closed somet ime after operation. 10 Local Educational Agency, school system, and schoo l district are all synonymous.11There are 100 counties and 118 Local Educational Ag encies in NC.12The results are publicly available and can be found in “A Report Card for the ABCs of Public Education Volume I.”


Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 10 No. 19 10 example, charter schools are often aimed at special needs children. The number of special needs children in LEAs with relatively few school-age chi ldren will be fewer than in LEAs with a greater proportion of school-aged children. H1: LEAs that have a higher percentage of low perfo rming schools will have a greater number of submitted cha rter school applications. H1a: LEAs with a smaller proportion of school age children will have fewer submitted charter school applications. Resources: School funding is an important part of the charter school application process. Those people who submit an application must show th at the charter is financially viable. According to the state law, charter schools receive state and local per-pupil expenditures for each student that attends the school but do not receive capital or st artup funds. Therefore, the more per-pupil funding, the easier it may be to start and maintain a school and thus the more likely one would be to submit an application. H2: The greater the state and local per-pupil expe nditure in an LEA, the greater the number of submitted charter school application s. Characteristics that promote experimentation : The community characteristics may have a positive or negative effect on charter sc hool submissions. For example, as stated above, strong institutional norms may inhibit exper imentation and social innovation. These norms may be produced by coercive, normative, or mi metic isomorphism. Therefore, the extent to which a community has institutional norms may inhibit or enable social innovation. Despite the possible institutional constraints on s ocial innovation, new organizations even in the nascent stages need founders. The need for a new form is not sufficient to understand the solutions(Aldrich 1999). Therefore, information about the types and groups of people in a community may be helpful to understa nd who starts a new form. Active and innovative groups are likely to see a need and act on it to create a new charter school. Therefore, I include information about the politica l environment as an indicator of the activity of people in the community. In addition t o the voter population, the political affiliations of voters may be important. Althoug h nation wide both Democrats and Republicans have supported charter schools, Democra ts seem more likely to support educational initiatives such as charter schools. T herefore, counties that are more Democratic will be more likely to start a charter s chool Furthermore, having a college degree is a personal characteristic that may increase the likelihood that a person would initiate a chart er school. College educated parents may be more active in their childrenÂ’s education, question educational practices, and have the skills to start a new educational form. H3a: The greater proportion of registered voters, the more likely there will be a greater number of submitted charter school applic ations. H3b: The greater proportion of voters who are Demo cratic, the more likely there will be a greater number of submitted charter school applications.


Renzulli: Entrepreneurial Ambitions in the Public S ector 11 H3c: The greater proportion of college educated pe ople in the county the more likely there will be a greater number of submi tted charter school applications.VariablesDependent Variable: Number of submitted charter sc hool applications.I use the number of applications rather than the nu mber of accepted charters to avoid testing the political structure of the approval process. I am interested in the effects of the environment on the decision to initiate a new educa tional form in a LEA. Figure 1 shows an approximate Poisson distribution of the percent of LEAÂ’s applications submitted to the state from 1996 to 1998. A LEA may have submitted an applicat ion in 1996 but not in 1998. Therefore, the percentage of LEAs is not mutually exclusive from o ne year to the next. There were 57 local educational agencies (49 percent of the 118 LEAs) that never submitted a charter school application between the years of 1996 and 1998. Figure 1: Percent of LEAs with Charter School Appli cation Submissions by Year0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 01234+ Number of SubmissionsPercent 96 97 98


Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 10 No. 19 12 Table 1 Independent Variables Year (for period effect)Dummy for 1996, 1997, 1998. (19 96 = reference category) LEA Public Schools: Based on the ABCÂ’s 1996-1997 High Performing schools: A ratio of the number of schools identified by the state as being a school of distinction or excellence over the number of pub lic schools in the LEA. Schools of distinction meet their expected gr owth or have at least 80 percent of their students performing at or above grade level. An excellence school has at least 90 percent of their stud ents performing at or above grade level. (range 0 to 100 percent of th e schools in the LEA) Low Performing Schools The number of schools that fail to meet their expec ted growth or have less than 50 percent of the students perform at or above grade level over the number of schools in the LEA. (range 0 to 100 p ercent of the schools in the LEA) School aged childrenProportion of school aged child ren in the county, 1995 (age 5-18) Characteristics to PromoteExperimentation:Voter registration The proportion of people (16+) registered to vote, 1995 Political affiliation The proportion of registered voters who are Democra ts, 1995 percent College Graduates The proportion of people in the county who are have received a college degree, 1990 FundingState Per-pupilexpenditure The dollar amount of money allotted to each child i n the LEA by the state divided by 100 in 1996 Controls:DemographicIndicatorsRacial composition of the county Proportion white in the county, 1995 Density per square mileProxy for rural or urban are a is the number of people per square mile in the county, 1995. Unemployment Rate:The unemployment rate in the coun ty in 1994. Per capita incomePer capita income in 1995 Control variablesI have included variables to control several other community characteristics. Many charter schools are found in cities rather than small afflu ent suburbs (though exceptions exist), therefore, I control for density, unemployment, per capita incom e, and racial composition as urban proxies. Method and ModelThe Poisson ModelCount data are discrete, non-negative integers that enumerate the number of events. Count dependent variables cannot be treated as continuous in a linear regression model or as binary in a


Renzulli: Entrepreneurial Ambitions in the Public S ector 13 logit model because the estimates will be inefficie nt, inconsistent, and biased (Long 1997). A linear OLS model will not produce reliable estimates becau se the count variable does not have a normal distribution. The log of a count variable cannot c orrect the problem because the log of a zero value is undefined. Therefore, we need a count model to estimate the effects of an environment on the number of events occurring. Count models can correct for the problems of the O LS by transforming the dependent variable. The Poisson regression model (PRM) determines the pro bability of the count of the event occurring by using the Poisson distribution. Poiss on is the simplest of the count models due to the properties of the probability density function [f( x)= lxe-l / x! ] but it is also restrictive. One of the assumptions of the PRM is that the dependent variab le’s mean and variance are equal. Thus, the distribution assumes that the event count is time i ndependent where the conditional mean of the error is 0 and the errors are heteroscedastic since var(e|x)=E(y|x). In my data, the mean is .5 and the variance is 1.7 thus the data are not distribut ed in an exact poison distribution. Random Intercept modelA simple Poisson model is not appropriate for corre lated data. In such instances, the maximum likelihood estimation of a Poisson model wi ll result in biased and inconsistent estimates. Because of the longitudinal data structure in this analysis and the use of time invariant covariates, the most appropriate model is the random effects model for a count dependent variable.The data for this analysis are clustered by school systems over three years. To correct for the clustering and account for the distribution of the dependent varia ble a Count Random Effects Model is most appropriate.13 The “extgee” command in Stata14 can estimate a Poisson Random Intercept model that corrects for over-dispersed dependent variables. ResultsThe exploratory analysis of the dependent variable is shown in Table 2. As shown, the mean number of submissions per LEA per year is .5 with a variance of 1.7. The correlations between the other independent variables are all below .6. The n umber of submissions is correlated with the independent variables (results not shown here). Th e significant correlations gave me enough confidence to proceed with the multivariate PREM. 13 A suitable model would be a negative binomial REM to account for the over-dispersion in the dependent variable. In other words, the variance is not equa l to the mean and thus the dependent variable actua lly has a negative binomial distribution. Using a negative b inomial model would relax the assumption of an equa l mean and variance of the Poisson distribution.14 Copyright 1999. Stata Corporation, College Statio n, Texas.


Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 10 No. 19 14 I ran a series of nested models, systematically inc luding each set of independent variables. By comparing the chi-squares and degrees of freedom I choose the most restrictive model as the final model. The results of the nested models are not shown here. Effects of environment on submission As I predicted in hypothesis 1, a greater proportio n of low performing schools does increase themean number of charter school applications. As shown in Table 2, a 1 percent increase in low performing schools in the LEA increases the mean nu mber of submissions by 134 percent. Hypothesis 2 was not supported. The direction of th e effect of state funding is negative but not significant. Surprisingly, a 100 dollar increase i n state funding decreases the mean number of submissions by 15 percent. One explanation for rev ersal in the predicted direction is that school districts that are getting more state money may be better off than those districts with less money and thus do not need school choice. This finding would be in direct contradiction to The Coleman study (1966)but may support educators such as Kozol who b elieve that the inequality in per-pupilVariablesCoef.Std. Err. Odds Ratio Intercept4.93002.60--YEAR1997 0.00000.181.000 1998 -0.22310.180.800 NEED (Hypothisis 1)% Low Performing LEA Schools7.2200+++2.261336.440% High Performing LEA Schools-0.01860.180.982% School Age -1.61246.170.199RESOURCES (Hypothesis 2)State funding 96-0.1600+++0.050.850EXPERIMENTERS (Hypothsis 3)% Registered to Vote -2.7795+1.500.062Democrat0.0012^0.001.001% College Grad5.9474+++1.78382.739CONTROLSUnemployment Rate0.11490.091.122Density per Sq. Mile0.00010.001.000Per capita Income0.00010.001.000% white -0.18230.690.833ICC or Rho 0.106 chi2(df=15) 280.37*** Number of observations 354 Number of Clusters 118 Number of obs per cluster3 +p< .05, ++p< .01, +++p<.001, one-tailed test ^p<.1, *p<.05, **p< .01, ***p<.001, two-tailed t est Table 2: Poisson Random Effects Model of Number of Submitted Charter School Applications


Renzulli: Entrepreneurial Ambitions in the Public S ector 15 expenditures does inhibit learning and performance for some students (Kozol 1991). Further research should explore the causes and consequences of per-pupil expenditures on school performance and alternative schooling. I show some support for the third set of hypotheses that environmental characteristics promote experimentation through active groups of pe ople. An increased proportion of registered voters actually decreased the mean number of submis sion in a county. The variable I use for voters may be too passive a measure to capture the activity of commun ity members. Voter registration does not necessarily mean that people are actually voting. I have used this measure but the reversed sign indicates to me that a better measure, such as voter turnout, would be more appropriate. Counties that have a greater proportion who are Dem ocratic voters have more submitted charter school applications over the three years in North C arolina. For ten percent increase in proportion of Democratic affiliated voters there is a 1.2 percent increase in the mean number of submitted applications net of all other variables. In additi on, a onepercent increase in the proportion of college grads in a county increases the mean number of submissions by 38 percent. The effect is so large due to the distribution of the variable. A transformation of the variable such as taking the natural log may help reduce the effect but transfor mations make interpretation more difficult to interpret intuitively. In sum, counties with more democrats and college ed ucated people and a greater percent of low performing schools will tend to have more submi tted charter school applications. Further research should examine the characteristics of the individuals who initiate charter schools in their communities. It is interesting that the control va riables I specified did not have a significant effe ct on the submission of charter school applications. Thus the racial composition, unemployment, and density of an area do not encourage or dissuade cha rter school development. This may be an area for further research.ConclusionThis paper analyzed the first part of the process o f creating a new organizational form. I was able to use the environmental context to explai n what types of communities are most likely to initiate a new educational form. I have shown that LEAs in need of school choice (defined by the percentage of low performing schools) in fact do ha ve a higher mean submission rate. I have also shown that some characteristics about the community and available resources are important for the initial stage of charter school formation. This analysis has shown that the environment is an important factor in predicting nascent school foundings. It is the first step in our unde rstanding of charter schools as a new educational organizational form. I would like to use more dire ct measures of community and professional activity to test the assumption that certain groups will be social entrepreneurs that initiate new organizational forms. Thus, information about the entrepreneurs and the resources they access will further illuminate our understanding of charter sch ools as a new organizational form. There is now evidence that school districts that fa il to meet high performance standards have a higher mean charter school submission rate t han districts that have high student outcomes. This suggests that charter schools are being develo ped in areas where there is a perceived need for them. The question remains if the students who att end charter schools are the underserved in those districts, which would include students at-risk and students of color. Recent studies in Arizona have shown that charter schools, in fact, do more to seg regate districts and schools than to integrate them (Cobb and Glass 1999). Do my findings here about the initiation of charter schools and the findings about charter school racial composition su ggest that charter schools are being used as a means of white flight without residential mobility?


Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 10 No. 19 16 I also found that some community characteristics a nd available resources are important for the initial stage of charter school formation. My research suggests that policy makers interested in encouraging charter school formation should provide financial resources to nascent founders for their endeavors but should also ensure that all stu dents get a chance at attending charter schools.


Renzulli: Entrepreneurial Ambitions in the Public S ector 17ReferencesAldrich, Howard. 1999. Organizations Evolving London: SAGE. Aldrich, Howard E. 1979. Organizations and Environments Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Berger and Luckman. 1966. The Social Construction of Reality Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Bidwell, Charles. 1965. “The School as a Formal Org anization.” Pp. 972-1022in Handbook of Organizations edited by J. G. March. Chicago, Il: Rand McNally. Bomotti, Sally, Rick Ginsberg, and Brian Cobb. 1999 “Teachers in Charter Schools and Traditional Schools: A Comparative Study.” Education Policy Analysis Archives 7. Center for Educational Reform. 1999. “Answers to Fr equently Asked Questions About Charter Schools.” vol. 2000: eform_faq/charter_schools.htm. Cobb, Casey D. and Gene V. Glass. 1999. “Ethnic Seg regation in Arizona Charter Schools.” Education Policy Analysis Archives 7. Coleman, James, E. Campbell, A. Mood, E. Weinfeld, D. Hobson, R/. York, and J. McPartland. 1966. “Equality of Educational Opportunity.” Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. Coulson, Andrew. 1996. “Markets Versus Monopolies in Education: The Historical Evi dence.” Education Policy Analysis Archives 4. DiMaggio, Paul J. and Walter W. Powell. 1983. “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields .” American Sociological Review 48:147-160. Hannan, Michael T. and John Freeman. 1989. Organizational Ecology Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hannan, Michael T. and John H. Freeman. 1977. “The Population Ecology of Organizations.” American Journal of Sociology 82:929-64. Hassel, Bryan. 1998. “Charter School Funding in Nor th Carolina.” North Carolina Charter School Resource Center, Durham. Hill, Paul T. 1995. “Reinventing Public Education.” RAND, Santa Monica, CA. Hill, Paul T., Lawrence C. Pierce, and James W. Gut hrie. 1997. Reinventing Public Education: How Contracting Can Transform America's Schools Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Jackson, Deidra. 1998. “Charter Schools Touted for Minorities.” in The News and Observer Charlotte. Koppich, Julia E. 1997. “Considering Nontraditional Alternatives: Charters, Private Contracts, and Vouchers.” The Future of Children 7:96-111.


Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 10 No. 19 18 Kozol, Jonathan. 1991. Savage Inequalities: Children in America's Schools New York, NY: Harper Perennial. Levine. 1980. “The Rise of American Boarding School s and the Development of a National Upper Class.” Social Problems 28:63-94. Long, J. Scott. 1997. Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Depen dent Variables Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Marks, Tiayana. 1998. “Arguments and Groups Affecti ng Current Attempts to Pass Charter School Legislation.” s.html. Meyer, John, W. Richard Scott, and Terrence Deal. 1 977. “Research on School and District Organization.” in The Structure of Educational Systems: Explorations in the Theory of Loosely Coupled Organizations edited by M. R. Davis, T. Deal, J. Meyer, B. Rowa n, W. R. Scott, and E. A. Stackhouse. Stanford: Stanford Center for Resear ch and Development in Teaching. Meyer, John W. and Brian Rowan. 1977. “Institutiona lized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony.” American Journal of Sociology 83:340-63. Meyer, John W. and Brian Rowan. 1978. “The Structur e of Educational Organizations.” Pp. 78-109 in Environments and Organizations edited by M. Meyer, J. Freeman, M. T. Hannan, J. Meyer, W. G. Ouchi, J. Pfeffer, and W. R. Scott. San Francisc o, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers. Mintron, Michael. 1997. “Policy Entrepreneurs and t he Diffusion of Innovation.” American Journal of Political Science 41:738-770. Mort, Paul. 1958. “Educational Adaptability.” Pp. 3 2-33 in Administration for Adaptability edited by D. H. Ross. New York: Metropolitan School Study Counci l. Nathan, Joe. 1996. Charter Schools: Creating Hope and Opportunity for American Education San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers. Owens, Robert G. 1981. Organizational Behavior in Education Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. Scott, W. Richard. 1992. Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems .Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. United States Census Bureau. 1998. “Statistical Abs tract of the United States: 1998.” Washington, DC.


Renzulli: Entrepreneurial Ambitions in the Public S ector 19 About the AuthorLinda A. RenzulliUniversity of GeorgiaDepartment of SociologyBaldwin HallAthens, GA 30606Email: renzulli@uga.eduLinda A. Renzulli is an Assistant Professor in soci ology. Her research interests include organizations and education. She is currently working on a severa l charter school projects including racial composition of teachers in charter schools and the initiation of charter school legislation and charte r schools across the United States.


Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 10 No. 19 20 Appendix I Charter School Legislation: Profile of North Caroli na's Charter School Law North Carolina Law passed 1996, amended 1997. Number of Schools Allowed 100 (maximum 5 per distri ct per year) Number of Charters Operating 59 Additional Schools Approved (Oct 1998) 5 Approval Process Eligible Chartering Authorities Local school boards, state board of education, Univ ersity of North Carolina institution, local board and UNC app roval subject to final approval by state board Eligible ApplicantsPerson, group of persons, or non -profit Corporation Types of Charter SchoolsConverted public and privat e, new starts (but not homebased schools) Appeals ProcessCharter denied by local school board or UNC institution may be appealed to state board of education Formal Evidence of Local Support Required For conversions, majority of teachers and uncertifi ed staff at school must support; evidence that a significant number of parents support conversion must also be provided ; districts must provide and sponsors must consider i mpact statement Recipient of Charter ApplicantTerm of Initial Charter Up to 5 years Automatic Waiver from Most State and DistrictEducation Laws Yes from state laws; yes from district regulations except for local-board-sponsored charters, which must negotiat e with sponsor district for waivers from district rules Legal AutonomyYesGovernanceSpecified in charterCharter School Governing Body Subject to Open Meeting Laws Yes Charter School May be Managed or Operated by a For-Profit Organization Charters may not be granted directly to for-profitorganizations, but charter schools may contract wit h forprofit organizations to run the school Transportation for StudentsCharter schools must pro vide same transportation assistance as district public schools Facilities AssistanceDistricts required to lease av ailable public space to charters so long as it is "economically viable;" charters may l ease space from sectarian organizations so long as secta rian symbols are removed Technical AssistanceDepartment of education must pr ovide technical assistance to charter school applicants upon request


Renzulli: Entrepreneurial Ambitions in the Public S ector 21 Reporting RequirementsCharter school must comply wi th reporting requirements established by state board of education in the Unif orm Education Reporting System; charter school must pre pare annual report for chartering authority and state bo ard; state board must prepare annual report on academic progress, best practices, and effect of charter schools on di stricts for legislature Funding Amount100 percent of state and district ope rations funding follows students, based on average district per-pupil revenue; special needs funding also follows the student PathState funds flow directly to charter school; lo cal funds pass through district to charter school Fiscal AutonomyYesStart-up FundsNo state funding; federal charter sch ool funding will be applied to start-up costs TeachersCollective Bargaining / District Work Rules For charter school sponsored by local school board teachers remain subject to district work rules unle ss they negotiate to work independently; for all other charter schools, teachers are not subject to district work rules (North Carolina is a right-to-work state) Certification25 percent of teachers in elementary c harter schools and 50 percent in secondary charter schools may be uncertified Leave of Absence from District Up to 6 years Retirement BenefitsTeachers qualify for state retir ement plan during leave of absence from district; state has defined charter em ployees as public employees and has asked the IRS for a for mal ruling on providing retirement benefits to teachers not on leave from a district StudentsEligible StudentsAll students in statePreference for EnrollmentChildren of charter's prof essional staff; in a charter's first year of operation the lesser of 10 percent or 20 sl ots may be reserved for children of founding board members; for public conversions, students in attendance area of former public school (for private conversions, students at tending the school prior to conversion may not receive pref erence) Enrollment RequirementsNot permittedSelection Method (in case of over-enrollment) Lottery At-Risk ProvisionsPreference in the approval proces s is given to charter schools designed to serve at-risk students


Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 10 No. 19 22 Racial Balance ProvisionsAfter one year, charter sc hool must reasonably reflect racial balance of district (or, if serving special populat ion, must resemble the balance of that population in the dist rict) Mandated AssessmentsStudent assessments required by state board of Education Other FeaturesSchool SizeCharter schools must have a minimum numb er of students (65) and teachers (3), though exceptions are allowe d; may increase by 10 percent without additional approval from sponsor Termination of CharterIf two thirds of teachers and support staff request, charter may be terminated Source: The Center for Education Reform –(Fall, 19 98


Renzulli: Entrepreneurial Ambitions in the Public S ector 23Education Policy Analysis Archiveshttp:// epaa.asu.eduEditor: Gene V Glass, Arizona State UniversityProduction Assistant: Chris Murrell, Arizona State University General questions about appropriateness of topics o r particular articles may be addressed to the Editor, Gene V Glass, or reach him at College of Education, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-2411. The Commentary Edi tor is Casey D. Cobb: Editorial Board Michael W. AppleUniversity of Wisconsin David C. Berliner Arizona State University Greg CamilliRutgers University Linda Darling-HammondStanford University Sherman DornUniversity of South Florida Mark E. FetlerCalifornia Commission on Teacher Credentialing Gustavo E. FischmanArizona State Univeristy Richard GarlikovBirmingham, Alabama Thomas F. GreenSyracuse University Aimee HowleyOhio University Craig B. HowleyAppalachia Educational Laboratory William HunterUniversity of Ontario Institute of Technology Patricia Fey Jarvis Seattle, Washington Daniel KallsUme University Benjamin LevinUniversity of Manitoba Thomas Mauhs-PughGreen Mountain College Les McLeanUniversity of Toronto Heinrich Mintrop University of California, Los Angeles Michele MosesArizona State University Gary OrfieldHarvard University Anthony G. Rud Jr.Purdue University Jay Paredes ScribnerUniversity of Missouri Michael ScrivenUniversity of Auckland Lorrie A. ShepardUniversity of Colorado, Boulder Robert E. Stake University of Illinois—UC Kevin WelnerUniversity of Colorado, Boulder Terrence G. WileyArizona State University John WillinskyUniversity of British Columbia


Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 10 No. 19 24EPAA Spanish & Portuguese Language Editorial BoardAssociate EditorsGustavo E. Fischman Arizona State University & Pablo Gentili Laboratrio de Polticas Pblicas Universidade do Estado do Rio de JaneiroFounding Associate Editor for Spanish Language (199 8—2003) Roberto Rodrguez Gmez Universidad Nacional Autnoma de Mxico Argentina Alejandra Birgin Ministerio de Educacin, Argentina Mnica Pini Universidad Nacional de San Martin, Argentina Mariano NarodowskiUniversidad Torcuato Di Tella, Argentina Daniel Suarez Laboratorio de Politicas Publicas-Universidad de Bu enos Aires, Argentina Ana Ins Heras Monner SansUniversidad Nacional de Jujuy Jos Luis Bernal AgudoUniversidad de Zaragoza Carlos Mora-NinciUniversidad Nacional de CrdobaBrasil Gaudncio Frigotto Professor da Faculdade de Educao e do Programa de Ps-Graduao em Educao da Universidade Federal Fluminense, Brasil Vanilda Paiva Lilian do Valle Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro, Brasil Romualdo Portella do OliveiraUniversidade de So Paulo, Brasil Roberto Leher Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro, Brasil


Renzulli: Entrepreneurial Ambitions in the Public S ector 25 Dalila Andrade de Oliveira Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizont e, Brasil Nilma Limo Gomes Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizont e Iolanda de OliveiraFaculdade de Educao da Universidade Federal Flumi nense, Brasil Walter KohanUniversidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro, BrasilCanad Daniel Schugurensky Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, Univers ity of Toronto, Canada Chile Claudio Almonacid AvilaUniversidad Metropolitana de Ciencias de la Educaci n, Chile Mara Loreto Egaa Programa Interdisciplinario de Investigacin en Edu cacin (PIIE), Chile Espaa Jos Gimeno SacristnCatedratico en el Departamento de Didctica y Organ izacin Escolar de la Universidad de Valencia, Espaa Mariano Fernndez EnguitaCatedrtico de Sociologa en la Universidad de Sala manca. Espaa Miguel Pereira Catedratico Universidad de Granada, Espaa Jurjo Torres SantomUniversidad de A Corua Angel Ignacio Prez Gmez Universidad de Mlaga Mxico Hugo Aboites Universidad Autnoma Metropolitana-Xochimilco, Mxi co Susan StreetCentro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropologia Social Occidente, Guadalajara, Mxico


Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 10 No. 19 26 Adrin AcostaUniversidad de Guadalajara Teresa BrachoCentro de Investigacin y Docencia Econmica-CIDE Alejandro CanalesUniversidad Nacional Autnoma de Mxico Rollin KentUniversidad Autnoma de Puebla. Puebla, Mxico Per Sigfredo ChiroqueInstituto de Pedagoga Popular, Per Grover PangoCoordinador General del Foro Latinoamericano de Pol ticas Educativas, Per Portugal Antonio TeodoroDirector da Licenciatura de Cincias da Educao e do Mestrado Universidade Lusfona de Humanidades e Tecnologias, Lisboa, PortugalUSA Pia Lindquist WongCalifornia State University, Sacramento, California Nelly P. StromquistUniversity of Southern California, Los Angeles, Cal ifornia Diana RhotenSocial Science Research Council, New York, New York Daniel C. LevyUniversity at Albany, SUNY, Albany, New York Ursula CasanovaArizona State University, Tempe, Arizona Erwin EpsteinLoyola University, Chicago, Illinois CarlosA. Torres University of California, Los Angeles


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