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1 of 24 Education Policy Analysis Archives Volume 11 Number 13April 22, 2003ISSN 1068-2341 A peer-reviewed scholarly journal Editor: Gene V Glass College of Education Arizona State University Copyright 2003, the EDUCATION POLICY ANALYSIS ARCHIVES .Permission is hereby granted to copy any article if EPAA is credited and copies are not sold. EPAA is a project of the Education Policy Studies Laboratory. Articles appearing in EPAA are abstracted in the Current Index to Journals in Education by the ERIC Clearinghouse on Assessment and Evaluation and are permanently archived in Resources in Education .The Massachusetts Signing Bonus Program for New Tea chers: A Model of Teacher Preparation Worth Copying? R. Clarke Fowler Salem State CollegeCitation: Fowler, R.C. (April 22, 2003). The Massac husetts Signing Bonus Program for New Teachers: A model of teacher preparation wo rth copying? Education Policy Analysis Archives, 11 (13). Retrieved [date] from http://epaa.asu.edu/epa a/v11n13/.AbstractThis article examines the Massachusetts Signing Bon us Program for New Teachers, a nationally prominent program that h as recruited and prepared $20,000 bonus recipients to teach after se ven weeks' training at the Massachusetts Institute for New Teachers (MINT) Although state officials have trumpeted this initiative as a natio nal model that other states are copying, they announced in November 2002 that they were radically changing it. The changes included halting the state's national recruitment efforts and replacing the seven-week, f ast-track training program designed by the New Teacher Project with ye ar-long programs to be designed by three of the state's education sc hools. Even though the
2 of 24state spent more than $50,000 recruiting individual s from states outside the Northeast over the first four program years, it garnered just seven bonus recipients from the non-Northeast states its recruiters visited, only four of whom were still teaching in Fall 2002. The state did, however, generate a substantial number of applicants in each program year (ranging from 783 to nearly 950), most of whom came from Massachusetts or nearby states. Contrary to state o fficials' claims, though, it appears that many of these individuals h ad substantial prior educational experience. Although officials stated t hat all bonus teachers would go to 13 designated high-need urban districts the state has never met this commitment, sending fewer bonus teachers t o these districts in each of the first three years of the program. The s tate has lost a high percentage of its bonus teachers to attrition parti cularly in state-designated, high-need districts. These attrit ion rates are substantially higher than comparable national rates Although the state has portrayed the Bonus and MINT programs, combined as highly successful, officials exaggerated many of the purpo rted positive outcomes. On the positive side, independent survey data (Churchill et al., 2002) indicated that principals rated MINT graduate s' performance favorably, when compared to traditionally-trained t eachers. It is not clear, though, whether such ratings varied either b y a) the extent of the teacher's prior educational experience or b) the na ture of the teacher's placement (urban vs. suburban). The Bonus Program h as produced relatively few urban teachers, relatively few minor ity teachers, and low rates of teacher retention, even though this effort was modeled after Teach for America and critical parts of it were des igned and often managed by the New Teacher Projecttwo organization s that the Bush administration has praised for their ability to des ign and run programs of this type. Policy makers are urged to resist calls to embrace rapid certification, an approach that has produced, in Ma ssachusetts, low numbers of urban teachers and high numbers of exiti ng teachers, all at a cost of more than four million dollars. Improving teacher supply and quality is among the m ost important educational issues the United States faces today as policy makers seek to hire, over the next ten years, both more and better teachers than ever before (Zernike, 2000). In Massachusetts, state officials have developed a number of initiatives to address this goal, the most notable being the Massachusetts Signing Bonus Program for N ew Teachers. This fast-track alternative to traditional certification programs h as garnered national attention for its $20,000 bonuses to selected candidates, its cross-c ountry recruiting campaign, its intensive seven-week training provided by the Massa chusetts Institute for New Teachers (MINT), and its claims of success (School Board New s, 2001). But the Bonus Program has also generated significan t controversy. In February 2001, independent research suggested that the Bonus Progr am had failed to live up to policy makers' promises. Twenty percent of its first cohor t of bonus recipients left teaching after one year, and less than half of its second co hort chose to teach where policy makers said they wouldin 13 state-designated, high-need s chool districts (Fowler, 2001). The Massachusetts Commissioner of Education, David Driscoll, steadfastly defended the
3 of 24Bonus Program against the preceding criticisms, cla iming that this initiative was "hugely successful" (Setera, 2001). In November 2002, howe ver, Commissioner Driscoll announced radical changes in the Bonus Program. Sta rting in March 2003, bonus recipients will be both nominated and trained by th ree "innovative" year-long post-baccalaureate teacher preparation programs (Ma ssachusetts Department of Education, 2002a). The state will continue to run t he MINT program, but Bonus recipients will not attend it.With these changes, the Bonus Program silently drop ped its cross-country recruiting campaign, stopped participating in the MINT trainin g program, terminated its relationship with the New Teacher Project (the orga nization that designed and managed many aspects of this initiative), and abandoned the 7-week, fast-track approach to training bonus recipients. Massachusetts has now tu rned to the state's schools of education, formerly portrayed by the state's policy makers as the source of poor teacher quality, as the sole source of new teachers worthy of $20,000 bonuses. Why did one of the first states to jump with both f eet into fast-track certification pull one foot out? According to Orin Gutlearner, who coordin ates the Bonus and MINT programs, this change represents "a better use of o ur resources" (Archer, 2002). Commissioner Driscoll stated that by making this c hange in our program we will not only be able to support our colleges and universiti es, but also be better equipped to truly find the most qualified recipients for our signing bonus (Massachusetts Department of Education, 2002a).The preceding statements fail to answer precisely w hy the state made radical changes to its famed bonus program. The current paper investig ates, however, factors that surely influenced state policy makers' decision to radical ly alter this program. The data discussed here were obtained from the Massachusetts Department of Education, either through its web site or through a series of Freedom of Information requests submitted to the Department between 1999 and 2002.Two factors warrant scrutiny of the Bonus Program. First, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has invested a substantial amount of money, more than $4 million, for this initiative that policy makers have used, in pa rt, as a template for recruiting and training at least ten percent of the state's new te achers (Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2001). It is critical to gather info rmation that will allow Massachusetts legislators and the public to assess the effectiven ess of this major effort. Second, the federal government is vigorously promot ing fast-track alternative certification programs that, like Massachusetts's B onus Program, "recruit highly qualified candidates who are interested in teaching but did not attend schools of education and place them quickly into high-need sch ools, providing training, support and mentoring These programs should become models for the future, as states make it less burdensome for exceptional candidates to fi nd teaching positions in our nation's schools" (U. S. Department of Education 2002, p. vi ii). Indeed, the federal government is endorsing not just the fast-track approach imple mented in Massachusetts, but the organization that inspired this initiative, Teach f or America, and its offshoot, the New Teacher Project, that the Massachusetts Department of Education hired to plan and implement central elements of the Bonus Program.For the Bush administration, the fast-track approac h to teacher preparation constitutes a
4 of 24"more promising model for the future" (U. S. Depart ment of Education 2002, p. 2), a model that, if adopted nationally, will lead to the production of both more and better teachers and thereby make it possible for the Unite d States to place highly qualified teachers in all schools, particularly challenging u rban schools. It is important to investigate, therefore, what this approach has deli vered to Massachusetts and, concomitantly, what it promises to deliver to the c ountry.BackgroundThe Massachusetts Signing Bonus Program for New Tea chers was introduced in the summer of 1998 in the wake of the great uproar over the results of the first two administrations of the Massachusetts Teacher Tests (now called the Massachusetts Tests for Educator Licensure). Concerned both about the q uality of the state's teaching force and about looming shortages of teachers in particul ar content areas (such as math and science), the legislature and then governor Paul Ce llucci supported legislation that established a $60 million endowment to improve teac her quality. The most prominent feature of this legislation was a fast-track certif ication program that was initially called Teach for Massachusetts (Massachusetts Department o f Education, 1998) but was later named the Massachusetts Signing Bonus Program for N ew Teachers. The stated aim of the Bonus Program is "to encourag e high achieving candidates to enter the profession who would otherwise not consider a c areer in teaching" (Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 15A, Section 19A). The form o f encouragement the state offers is a $20,000 bonus signing bonus, with $8,000 distr ibuted in the first year and $4000 in each of the following three years.The Massachusetts Department of Education contracte d with the New York-located New Teacher Project, an offshoot of Teach for Ameri ca, to design and oversee the recruitment and selection of the first cohort of bo nus teachers. The Department named the recipients of the first round of bonuses in spr ing 1999 and trained 59 individuals in an intensive seven-week summer training program at the Massachusetts Institute for New Teachers (MINT). These individuals began teachi ng in Massachusetts public schools in fall 1999.In order to increase the number of MINT-trained tea chers in the following years, the Department 1) increased the number of bonus recipie nts to over 100, 2) offered scholarships (worth $2,250) to selected applicants who applied for but did not receive a bonus, 3) encouraged school districts to sponsor in dividuals' MINT training, and 4) allowed individuals to attend MINT at their own exp ense. The state has now recruited and trained four cohorts of bonus recipients (FY 1 999-2002), as well as three cohorts of scholarship recipients and other MINT graduates (FY 2000-2002). Organizations that either advocate for or are invol ved in fast-track teacher certification have lauded Massachusetts's Bonus Program. The Milk en Foundation recognized it as a model for other states to follow (Hayward, 2000). The National Council on Teacher Quality (2002) listed Massachusetts as a "place to watch" for its recruiting practices. The New Teacher Project, which took the lead in concept ualizing and implementing all aspects of the state's effort, listed its work with Massachusetts as the first of four project highlights on its web page (New Teacher Project, 20 02). In February 2001, the Massachusetts Commissioner o f Education, David Driscoll,
5 of 24 stated that many other states have followed the Mas sachusetts model: "The immense influence of the potential of our new teacher recru itment program has influenced California, Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, New Yor k and other states to initiate similar programs. We are encouraged by the fact that other states are copying what we are doing and have judged that what we are doing is worth cop ying" (Massachusetts Department of Education, 2001a).But should other states copy the recruitment and tr aining methods that Massachusetts has employed in its Bonus and MINT programs? Did th e Bonus Program merit the praise it garnered? What factors influenced state o fficials to radically alter this program? To answer these and other questions, I consider nex t the Bonus Program's record in a number of crucial areas: recruitment, placement, at trition, and program effectiveness.RecruitmentOne element of the Bonus Program that garnered much national attention was its recruiting campaign, particularly its cross-country recruitment efforts. Headlines appeared across the country describing how Massachu setts was scouring the country, looking for "the best and the brightest" to come te ach in Massachusetts. Although a number of articles indicated that this effort was h ighly successful (Ferdinand, 1999; Magee, 1999), data obtained from the Massachusetts Department of Education indicate that Massachusetts's efforts to recruit bonus reci pients from states outside the Northeast (i.e., outside New England, New York, and Pennsylva nia) have been ineffective. As Table 1 indicates, through the first four years of the program (FY 1999-2002), the state garnered just seven recruits from non-Northeast sta tes, despite recruiting in five non-Northeast states in 1999, seven in 2000, nine i n 2001, and four in 2002at a cost of more than $50,000. Since three of these seven recru its have now stopped teaching, Massachusetts has spent more than $12,000 just to r ecruit each of the four active bonus teachers from these states. Table 1 Cost of Bonus Teacher Recruitment in Non-Northeast States Fiscal Year CostsNumber of states visited Number of recruits Number currently teaching Cost per current teacher TravelPersonnel (Note 1) Total 1999$7,571$3,685$11,256531$11,2562000$8,865$4,656$13,521721$13,5212001$14,513$2,631$17,144922$8,5722002$6,943$1,240$7,943500Total$37,892$12,960$50,8522174$12,713 Ironically, as described in Table 2, between 1999 a nd 2002, Massachusetts actually recruited more than twice as many bonus teachers fr om non-Northeast states where they did not send recruiters than from states where they did (1 8 vs. 7). Table 2
6 of 24 Number of Bonus Recruits from Non-Northeast States Fiscal YearNumber of recruits from non-Northeast st ates where Massachusetts: Sent recruitersDid not send recruiters FY 19993 3 FY 20002 6 FY 20012 5 FY 20020 4 Total7 18 Why did Massachusetts experience such difficulty wi th its out-of-state recruiting? One probable factor, discussed in a prior study (Fowler 2001), is that many of the areas where Massachusetts sent recruiters are experiencin g teacher shortages that are far more severe than in Massachusetts. These states include Texas, California, and Florida. Another factor may be that Massachusetts' recruiter s frequently visited states where the average starting salary, when adjusted for the cost of living, is substantially higher than in Massachusetts. According to Education Week (2002 ), Massachusetts' average starting teacher salary, adjusted for the cost of living, is $26,565 and ranks 30th in the nation. Over the last four years (1999-2002), the state's r ecruiters have frequently visited higher paying states, including nine of the twelve top-pay ing states. New teachers in these nine states can expect to earn, on average, from $2,662 to $6,120 more per year than new teachers in Massachusetts.Table 3 lists a) the states that Massachusetts's re cruiters have visited, b) how Education Week (2002) ranked each state's starting salary on a national scale (adjusted for the cost of living), c) each state's average starting teache r salary, and d) the difference between the average starting teacher in that state and in M assachusetts. Table 3 States Where Massachusetts Recruited for Bonus Teac hers (1998-2002). State Rank(1-51) AverageStartingSalary* DifferencefromMassachusetts Georgia2$32,685$6,120+Texas3$31,568$5,003+Pennsylvania5$30,911$4,346+Michigan6$30,878$4,313+Illinois7$30,745$4,180+North Carolina8$30,529$3,964+Delaware10$30,113$3,548+
7 of 24 Indiana11$29,306$2,741+New York12$29,227$2,662+U.S. Average--$27,989$1,424+Virginia20$27,383$818+Wisconsin21$27,339$774+Washington, DC26$26,896$331+Florida28$26,631$66+Massachusetts30$26,565$ -------New Jersey31$26,542$23-California36$26,225$340-Rhode Island39$25,843$722-Connecticut41$25,352$1,213-Ohio43$25,017$1,548-Maine46$24,007$2,558-New Hampshire47$23,337$3,228*Average starting salary is adjusted for the cost o f living (Education Week, 2000). A third factor that surely hindered the Bonus Progr am's national recruiting effort is the state's certification exam, the Massachusetts Tests for Educator Licensure (MTEL). While most states offer the Praxis, an exam that is administered throughout the United States, the MTEL is unique to Massachusetts. Theref ore, when Bonus Program recruitment began in 1999, candidates had to travel to Massachusetts to take (and pass) the MTEL to be eligible to win a bonus.State officials attempted to address this problem b y offering the MTEL in seven cities outside Massachusetts on one date in FY 2001 and on two dates in FY 2002. As Table 4 indicates, however, this strategy met with limited success. The Department canceled the tests for three cities (Detroit, Houston and Miami) due to low enrollment. Tests were given, however, on each of the scheduled dates in C hicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Washington, DC. In all, 205 individuals sat for the MTEL in four cities in the last two program years (2001 and 2002). Table 4 Number of Individuals Who Took the MTEL Outside Mas sachusetts. Test siteNumber who took the MTEL on: January 2001December 2001February 2002 Chicago161014Detroit0 (Canceled)0 (Canceled)0 (Canceled)
8 of 24 Houston0 (Canceled)0 (Canceled)0 (Canceled)Los Angeles112122Miami0 (Canceled)0 (Canceled)0 (Canceled)Philadelphia241820Washington, DC121414Total637270 Besides offering the MTEL in other states, the Depa rtment responded to its disappointing national recruiting campaign by cutti ng back on out-of-state trips in 2002, when they visited just four non-New England states (Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin) and Washington, DC. The Department c ontinued to exercise questionable judgment, though, when deciding where to visit. Four of the preceding areas, unlike Massachusetts, produce fewer teachers than they themselves require. For example, North Carolina needs to hire 10,000 teache rs, but expects to graduate just 2,200 from their education schools (Silberman, 2001 ); Virginia needs to hire 4,000 new teachers, but expects to graduate just 3,500 (Turne r, 2001). Data from Georgia illustrates the questionable deci sion to recruit teachers from that state. According to the Atlanta Journal Constitutio n, Georgia is desperate for teachers: Georgia schools hired 12,000 teachers this year, an d the projected annual need is expected to reach nearly 20,000 by the end of the decade. The state's colleges of education only graduated about 3,500 st udents last year. Most hires come from out of state or are former teachers returning to the profession. (Salzer, 2002) Moreover, Georgia's average teacher starting salary of $32,685 (adjusted for the cost of living) is $6,120 higher than in Massachusetts. Giv en this difference, an individual who chooses to teach in Georgia would effectively earn, over the next four years, $ 4,500 more than a Massachusetts bonus recipient would ear n. Moreover, he or she would be able to enter the classroom more quickly in Georgia because that state's fast-track certification program, TAPP (Teacher Alternative Pr eparation Program), requires four weeks of training but Massachusetts' MINT requires seven. Since Massachusetts's recruiters visited historical ly black colleges during their spring 2002 trips to Georgia, it appears that their aim wa s to recruit minority applicants. Although this is a worthy goal, only four individua ls attended the Department's two recruiting sessions in Georgia (according to recrui ters' notes I obtained from the Department via a FOIA request), and no one from Geo rgia applied to the program in that year (Churchill et al., 2002).Despite the apparent failure of the state's nationa l recruiting campaign, the state has nevertheless generated a considerable number of app lications in each of its four program years: 783 individuals applied in 1999 (Massachuset ts Department of Education, 1999a), "nearly 950" in 2000 (Massachusetts Department of E ducation, 2000a), 905 in 2001, and 932 in 2002 (Churchill et al., 2002). Not surprisin gly, given the preceding analysis, most of the applications came from Massachusetts or neig hboring states: specifically, in 2001 and 2002, 84% of applicants came from Massachusetts and 93% came from New
9 of 24 England or New York (Churchill et al., 2002).With the recent changes to the program, though, the state has abandoned its bonus teacher recruitment efforts. Henceforth, three "inn ovative" post-baccalaureate programs will nominate candidates for the bonus and the stat e will make the final selection.PlacementAlthough the state's initial set of recruitment ma terials clearly stated that all bonus recipients would teach in 13 high-need districts, ( Note 2) Massachusetts has never met this goal. 71% of the first of bonus recipients co hort (FY 1999) were placed in these districts and 48% of the second cohort (FY 2000). I n the third program year (FY 2001), only 35% of the bonus recipients went to the high-n eed areas. Table 5 shows that, from 1999 to 2001, the percentage of bonus teachers in h igh-need districts has steadily declined while the percentage in high-need district s has more than doubled. Table 5 Initial Bonus Teacher Placement, Fiscal Years 19992001 Fiscal YearNumber of bonus teachersBonus teachers i nitially placed in: High-need areasNon-high-need areas NumberPercentNumberPercent 1999594271%1729%20001054543%6057%20011053735%6865% When teacher attrition and migration are taken into account, 41% of all active bonus recipients in the 2001-2002 academic year taught in the state's designated high-need areas. This means, of course, that 59% of all activ e bonus recipients taught in non-high-need areas.Many of the bonus recipients have taught not just o utside of the designated high-need areas, but in the state's most wealthy and academic ally successful districts. In 2001-2002, 37 bonus recipients taught in school dis tricts that scored in the top 50 of the Boston Globe's (2001a, 2001b) rankings of districts according to their scores on the 2001 Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS). More than half of these bonus teachers, 21 in all, taught in nine eli te districts that scored in the top ten of the Globe's 2001 MCAS rankings. These districts are : Belmont (5 bonus recipients), Concord-Carlisle (2), Lexington (3), Lincoln-Sudbur y (1), Needham (1), Newton (5), Wayland (2), Wellesley (1), and Weston (1). Two of these highly advantaged communities, Belmont and Newton, had more bonus tea chers together (10) than eleven of the communities that the state designated as hi gh-need areas, i.e., Brockton (5), Cambridge (4), Chelsea (7), Fall River (2), Holyoke (1), Lawrence (3), Lowell (6), Lynn (6), New Bedford (2), Springfield (6), and Worceste r (6). Why did the promise of a bonus not result in the pl acement of teachers in high-need districts? At least two factors are at work here. F irst, many bonus recipients are not
10 of 24interested in teaching in the state's high-need are as. According to notes I obtained from the Department (via a FOIA request), a Boston princ ipal informed a MINT evaluator that, when he (the principal) asked for a list of ( FY 2000) bonus recipients willing "to teach in a urban school, the list was only about 1/ 3 of bonus recipients." The second factor is the inconsistent nature of th e state's commitment to high-need districts. When the media reported in February 2001 that many of the FY 2000 bonus recipients were not teaching in the high-need distr icts, two top state officials offered conflicting responses. When a television interviewe r asked Commissioner Driscoll why so many bonus recipients were not teaching in these districts (where he had said they would teach at a spring 1999 press conference), Mr. Driscoll replied, "What I said is that was our goal" (Setera, 2001). Deputy Commissioner o f Education Alan Safran told the Boston Globe, however, that the state did not have such a goal: "it is 'bizarre' to think qualified teachers should teach only in 13 urban sc hool districts" (Vaishnav, 2001, p. B1). Later he told another reporter that "there are at least 50 districts that we would consider high need" (Associated Press, 2001). Each of the preceding statements contradicts, however, prior statements from the Dep artment, (Note 3) rendering the goals of the program ill-defined at best.The Boston Herald reported in January 2002, however that the state had reaffirmed its previously denied commitment to sending bonus teach ers to urban, high-need areas. Orin Gutlearner, the Department's Director of Alter native Teacher Recruitment, stated that the Bonus Program was now seeking "people with experience in urban communities and a mindset to work where they are most needed" ( Hayward, 2002). This intention was reflected in the wording of the state's (FY 2002) recruiting materials that were subsequently on the Department's web site: "Priorit y will be given to candidates who are committed to working in an under-resourced urban di strict (i.e., Boston, Brockton, Fall River, Lowell, Springfield, and Worcester)" (Massac husetts Department of Education, 2002).Problems remained, however, with the state's new-fo und commitment to high-need schools districts. First, at the same time that the Department renewed its commitment to high-need areas in the statement cited above, it dr opped seven districts from its list of such areas. Specifically, it dropped Cambridge, Che lsea, Framingham, Holyoke, Lawrence, Lynn, and New Bedford. Although it is und erstandable that the state would drop Framingham, a district with higher MCAS pass r ates and lower poverty rates than the other high-need districts, from this list, it i s incomprehensible that it would no longer designate Lawrence and Holyoke as such. In these tw o districts, which are dead last on the Boston Globe's MCAS rankings (Boston Globe, 200 1a), 61% of 10th graders failed the math MCAS in 2001, and more than 65% of the stu dents qualify for free or reduced-price lunch. By contrast, Brockton, with fe wer math failures (38%) and fewer poor students (38%), while certainly deserving extr a resources, does not have such extreme needs. Nevertheless, Brockton was on the De partment's new list of high-need districts and Lawrence and Holyoke are not.The second problem with the state's renewed commit ment to high-need districts is that the new list of six such districts posted on the De partment's web site in spring 2002 does not match another list of nineteen such districts t hat the Department provided at the same time to researchers it commissioned to evaluat e the Bonus and MINT programs. (Note 4) Indeed, between 1998 and 2002, state offic ials referred to four different sets of high-need districts: 1) the thirteen districts name d in the FY 1999 recruiting materials; 2)
11 of 24the 50 (unnamed) districts that then Associate Comm issioner Alan Safran mentioned to a reporter in February 2001; 3) the list of 19 dist ricts that DOE officials provided to Churchill et al. (2002); and 4) the six districts n amed in the FY 2002 recruiting materials.The third problem with the state's new (spring 2002 ) commitment to high-need districts is that the state failed to fulfill this commitment Fewer than half (40%) of the FY 2002 cohort of bonus recipients (N=43) began teaching in fall 2002 in the newly-designated set of six high-need districts. (Note 5) And 12% of this, the fourth cohort of Bonus recipients, are teaching in districts that scored i n the top 50 on the 2001 MCAS.AttritionThe bonus program has lost teachers at rates well a bove comparable national averages. I describe next the attrition rates for each cohort o f bonus recipients and then discuss these findings as a whole.First Cohort (FY 1999)The first cohort of bonus recipients (N=59) began t eaching fall 1999. In fall 2000, 20% (12 of 59) of this cohort did not return to the cla ssroom, an attrition rate that is more than twice the national rate of 9% for first-year t eachers (NCES, 1998). In the 13 high-need districts, the attrition rate was higher, with 31% (18 of 42) either stopping teaching or migrating to non-high-need areas (Fowle r, 2001). In fall 2001, seven more bonus recipients did not r eturn to teaching, raising the attrition rate to 32% (19 of 59) after two years. Concurrentl y, 48% (20 of 42) of the first cohort who were initially placed in the high-need areas st opped teaching in these areas. This loss was even greater in particular districts. Acco rding to the Department's records, 91% (10 of 11) of the first cohort of bonus recipients in Chelsea stopped teaching, or left to teach elsewhere, after just two years.After the third year, eight more members of this c ohort stopped teaching, raising this group's attrition rate to 46% (27 of 59), more than twice the national 3-year attrition rate of 20% (NCES). And attrition for this cohort's high -need teachers rose to 55% (23 of 42), a loss of more teachers in three years than th e nation's cities lose in five years (i.e., 50%) (Darling-Hammond & Schlan, 1996).Second Cohort (FY 2000)The second cohort of bonus recipients (N=105) began teaching in fall 2000. In fall 2001, 12% (13 of 105) of this group stopped teaching, wit h 18% (8 of 45) of those placed in the high-need areas either exiting the profession o r migrating to non-high-need districts. In fall 2002, 16 more members of this cohort left t eaching, raising their 2-year attrition rate to 28% (29 of 105). Concurrently, five bonus r ecipients who had been teaching in high-need districts did not return to these distric ts, bringing the 2-year attrition rate for this group to 29% (13 of 45).Third Cohort (FY 2001)
12 of 24 The third cohort of bonus recipients (N=105) began teaching in fall 2001. In fall 2002, 17% (18 of 105) of this cohort stopped teaching. Of the 37 bonus teachers working in high-need areas, 30% (11 of 37) did not return to t each in a high-need area.AnalysisThe preceding data, summarized in Table 6 below, in dicates that each cohort of bonus recipients has sustained attrition rates that are a boveusually well abovecomparable national averages. While the United States loses 9% of new teachers after their first year of teaching, each cohort of bonus teachers exceeded this rate. Indeed, the first cohort's 1-year attrition rate (20%) more than doubled the n ational rate (9%), and the third cohort's first year losses (17%) came within one pe rcentage point of doubling the national rate as well. Although the second cohort's 1-year attrition rate (12%) was closer to the national average, its 2-year rate (28%) exce eded the nation's 3-year rate (20%) by eight percentage points. Table 6 New Teacher Attrition Rates Teaching PopulationPercentage of new teachers who l eft after: 1 year 2 years 3 years4 years 5 years Mass. Bonus Teachers 1st cohort(FY 1999) All20%32%46%--High-need31%48%55%-2nd cohort(FY 2000) All12%28%---High-need18%28% 3rd cohort(FY 2001) All17% High-need29% --United StatesAll*9% **20% Urban areas only ***50% (NCES, 1998); ** (Education Week, 2000); *** (Dar ling-Hammond & Schalan, 1996) There is greater variation between the three cohort s' attrition rates for bonus teachers placed in high-need districts. In the first cohort, attrition was high, with 31% leaving after the first year, 48% after the second year, an d 55% after the third. The second cohort's attrition rate for such teachers was not a s high, though, with 18% leaving after one year, although this rate climbed to 29% after t wo years. However, the third cohort's 1-year attrition rate for high-need teachers, 30%, nearly equaled the first cohort's
13 of 24attrition rate for the same interval and exceeded t he second cohort's 2-year attrition rate. The attrition rates reported above are consistent w ith previous research which indicates that teachers who emerge from abbreviated preparati on programs leave teaching sooner than those who emerge from longer preparation progr ams (Darling-Hammond, 2001). Indeed, given this fact, it may that the Bonus Prog ram's attrition rate might have been even higher had all its participants been entirely new to teaching. Data obtained from the Department indicate, however, that a surprisingly h igh number of individuals who attended MINT had substantial prior educational exp erience. Specifically, 22% of MINT 2000 participants (more than 70% of them bonus reci pients) indicated on a Department-sponsored survey that they had "attended a teacher training program (as part of their undergraduate or graduate education) befor e attending MINT." Another 5% indicated that they had substantial prior teaching experience, ranging from one year's teaching experience as a long-term substitute, to f our years' experience teaching in both and public and private schools. Consequently, 27% o f the FY 2000 MINT participants had substantial educational experience before atten ding MINT. It is possible, therefore, that the bonus recipients who were truly new to tea ching left the classroom at even higher rates than reported above.These high attrition rates entail, however, not jus t a loss of teachers, but a loss of training and bonus money. The state has now spent $ 921,250 ($748,000 for bonuses and $173,250 for MINT scholarships) for the 74 bo nus recipients who have left the program. Ironically, Churchill et al. (2002) found that 76% of MINT graduates said they would have entered MINT without a bonus, a finding that concurs with other research (Liu, et al, 2000).Program EffectivenessOne kind of evidence that Massachusetts officials o ffered in 2001 as proof of the Bonus Program's effectiveness was the large number of wor king teachers who have graduated from MINT. This number included not only Bonus reci pients (62% of all MINT graduates), but also scholarship recipients (23%-30 %) (Note 6), and other MINT graduates as well. For example, Commissioner Drisco ll stated in June 2001 that "over the last three years, this program has put more tha n 450 teachers into classrooms. These are highly talented professionals who wouldn't be i n schools today, if not for this initiative" (Massachusetts Department of Education, 2001c). If accurate, this would be an impressive contributi on over three years. However, analysis of Churchill et al.'s (2002) research indicates tha t the preceding statement inflates this contribution in a number of ways. First, the state produced not 450, but 444 MINT graduates between 1999 and 2001. Second, 44 of tho se graduates were no longer teaching in fall 2001. Third, the state was unable to confirm the teaching status of another 79 graduates. Consequently, 123 (28%) of M INT graduates had either stopped teaching or the state was unable to confirm whether they are teaching. Thus, the state may claim, at most, that 321 MINT graduates taught in the public schools in 2001-2002. This would still be a substantial contribution if, as Commissioner Driscoll has claimed, these individuals would not otherwise have entered the teaching profession. But this is not the case. Churchill et al. (2002) found that, n ot all, but 61% of MINT graduates say they would not have entered the classroom without t he fast-track approach. This further
14 of 24reduces the contribution of the MINT and Bonus prog rams to approximately 196 teachers who, to use Commissioner Driscoll's terms, "wouldn't be in schools today, if not for this initiative"(Massachusetts Department o f Education, 2001c). The effectiveness of the Bonus Program should be ju dged, however, not by the number of such teachers "in schools today," but by the num ber of such teachers in high-need schools or school districts. Why? Because one of "t he three major goals for the MINT/Signing Bonus program [is to] . address teach er shortages in high-need schools" (Churchill et al., 2002, p. 6). The Bonus Program falls short in this area, though, because Churchill et al. (2002) found that, during the 2001-2002 academic year, just 34% of MINT graduates were teaching in the 19 high-need districts that the Department identified for these researchers, which means that approximately 67 of the 196 teachers mentioned above taught in such distric ts. Consequently, the Bonus and MINT programs together have brought to state-design ated high-need schools a small number of individuals who would not otherwise have gone into teaching. Another kind of evidence that policy makers have of fered regarding program effectiveness is principals' responses to survey qu estions about MINT graduates. For example, when Commissioner Driscoll issued a statem ent defending the Bonus and MINT programs in February 2001, he wrote that "90% of their principals want to hire more" Bonus recipients and MINT graduates (Massachu setts Department of Education, 2001b). The preceding statement does not capture ac curately, however, what principals said. In the first MINT evaluation, the source of t his statistic, the author wrote that "most principals noted that hires are made following an i nterview process" (Massachusetts Department of Education, 2000b, p. 9). This comment implies that principals were open to hiring, but not necessarily actively seeking out more MINT graduates. Findings by Churchill et al. (2002) confirm this implication. W hen they asked principals how they would consider hiring more MINT graduates, 10.6% s aid they would consider them "with preference;" 10.7% said "with reservations [9 .4%] or not at all [1.3%];" and 79% said "the same as everyone else." In other words, p rincipals who have supervised Bonus and MINT graduates are neither eager nor reluctant to hire more MINT graduates, rather they are willing to consider them as they would oth er traditionally-trained teachers. Finally, state officials have pointed to principals comparatively favorable ratings of MINT-trained versus traditionally-trained teachers. For example, they reported that "71% of principals who were interviewed rate thei r MINT graduate/Bonus Recipient(s) as average (42%), above average (19%), or well above (10%) average compared to all of the teachers at their school" (M assachusetts Department of Education, 2000c).The source of the preceding statistic, the 2000 MIN T and Bonus evaluation, lacks credibility, in part because it failed to report ei ther the number or percentage of principals' unfavorable ratings for survey question s of this kind. In order to ascertain this information, I requested all of the original survey data from the Department and calculated the percentages for the statistic cited above. I found that the evaluator had calculated this statistic incorrectly: 64% (not 71% ) of principals had rated bonus teachers average or above. Further, when I weighted the principals' ratings by the number of teachers they supervised, I found that 60 % of Bonus teachers were rated as average or above. When these percentages are aggreg ated in the other direction, though, the same percentage of teachers, 60%, were rated as average or below.
15 of 24Further doubt surrounds this evaluation because it wrongly implied that the attrition rates of the first cohort of first-year teachers (F Y 1999) was less than 15%, when it was actually 20%. Moreover, its author was, at the time she wrote the evaluation, a contract employee of the Department who went on national rec ruiting trips for the Bonus Program and earned approximately $150,000, over thr ee years, while working for this and other related Department programs. This is not to say that the evaluator did not strive to be objective, but it is to say that few w ould consider a contract employee whose future employment depends on a) the continued exist ence of the programs which she is simultaneously working for and evaluating, and b) t he good will of her immediate supervisors whose performance she is indirectly jud ging, to be independent. Indeed, it is doubtful that the Department, which calls for schoo l districts to produce "outside evaluation reports" (Massachusetts Department of Ed ucation, 2000d, p. 2) as evidence of effective performance, would consider an evaluation produced by such an employee to be an "outside" evaluation.Due to the factors cited above, the 2000 Bonus Prog ram evaluation is not credible. Fortunately, Churchill et al. (2002) have conducted an evaluation that is far more credible. The authors of this Department-commission ed report a) are independent and b) surveyed far more individuals (including MINT gradu ates, supervising principals and trainers) than the author of the 2000 evaluation. A lthough it is not practical to summarize the many findings of this wide-ranging re port here, it is pertinent to note that the authors also asked principals to compare MINT-t rained and traditionally-trained teachers. They found that "overall, the principals were very positive about the quality of the MINT graduates" (Churchill et al., 2002, p. 15) when comparing MINT graduates' with other traditionally-teachers in the following areas: a) content knowledge, b) ability to employ effective instructional strategies, c) ab ility to work with students with special needs, and d) classroom management skills.It is not clear, though, whether, and to what exten t (if any), these ratings varied according to where graduates' taught (high-need vs. suburban districts). Absent such details, it is not possible to say whether principa ls in high-need districts were more or less satisfied with the performance of the MINT gra duates they supervised, particularly those with little or no prior educational experienc e. It is pertinent to note, though, that this Departme nt-commissioned evaluation questioned whether the state's seven-week fast-track approach to teacher preparation was sufficient for high-need, largely urban districts. The authors recommend, among other items, that that the state "consider whether MINT needs to be c hanged fundamentally if it is to meet its current goal of serving high-need districts. Th e demands of urban teaching are such that a Bonus and a seven-week summer session simply may not be sufficient to adequately prepare significant numbers of high-qual ity teachers who will stay" (Churchill et al., 2002, p. 39). They go on to sugg est that a variety of one-year apprenticeship type programs may be more suitable.The ultimate comment on the Bonus Program's effecti veness, though, is not what the state's policy makers have said about it but what t hey have done to it. Their recent radical revision of this initiative is an implicit admission that the program suffered from chronic problems. Although state officials have not specifically named these problems, the current research has identified a number of iss ues that have beset this initiative since its inception. As I discuss next, these problems ra ise doubts about federal policy makers'
16 of 24claims that fast-track certification programs will help the country produce more and better teachers in the coming years.Implications for State and National PolicyThe US Department of Education is a strong proponen t of fast-track certification initiatives. It claims that if more such programs a re adopted nationally, this will open up a new, previously untapped pool of teachers to the country and thereby deliver the following five benefits to the nation's schools: 1) more teachers, 2) more urban teachers, 3) more minority teachers, 4) higher teacher retent ion rates, and 5) better teachers (U.S. Department of Education, 2002). Since Massachusetts 's Bonus and MINT programs were a) designed in accordance with the principles and practices the federal government is exhorting other states to adopt, and b) managed for the most part by an organization (the new Teacher Project) that the Bush administrat ion has lauded for its ability to implement such initiatives (The White House, 2001a, 2001b, 2002), it is appropriate to consider to what extent Massachusetts has realized each of these benefits. More TeachersApproximately 196 individuals, MINT graduates who w ould not have otherwise gone into teaching, taught in Massachusetts's publi c schools in 2001-2002. This provided a moderately positive boost to the state's supply of teachers, comparable to the number of working teachers that one of the s tate's mid-sized schools of education would produce over a similar three-year p eriod. 1. More Urban TeachersThe first three cohorts of the Bonus Program produc ed approximately 67 working teachers who would not otherwise have entered teach ing and who taught in the state's high-need school districts in 2001-2002. Th is represents a negligible increase in the state's supply of urban teachers. 2. More Minority TeachersDepartment records (obtained via a FOIA request) in dicate that 9% of the 2002 MINT trainees are minority. This is one percentage point lower than the 10% of new teachers hired in Massachusetts in 1999 who wer e from minority groups (Massachusetts Department of Education, 2000e). Chu rchill et al. wrote of the Bonus Program's minority teacher recruitment, "ther e has been negligible success recruiting minority candidates, to date" (2002, p. 37). 3. Higher Teacher Retention RatesAccording to the US Department of Education, "natio nwide, about 85 percent of teachers certified through alternate routes remain in the classroom five years later, demonstrating that truncated training programs with highly qualified candidates do not result in those same teachers leaving the pr ofession early in their careers" (2001, p. 16).This has not occurred in Massachusetts, however, wh ere only 54% of the first cohort of bounus recipients remain after three year s, 72% of the second cohort 4.
17 of 24after two years, and 71% of the third cohort after one year. These retention rates were even lower in state-designated high-need distr icts, with 45% of the first cohort remaining after three years, 72% of the seco nd after two years, and 71% of the third after one year.Better TeachersTo date, the Bonus Program has not offered any obje ctive, test-based evidence (of the sort that the federal government and most state governments now require schools to produce) to indicate that its teachers a re raising children's academic achievement. Massachusetts has produced, however, s urvey data which indicates that principals rated MINT graduates' performance f avorably, when compared to traditionally-trained teachers. It is not clear, th ough, whether principals' ratings varied either by a) the extent of the teacher's pri or educational experience or b) the nature of the teacher's placement (urban vs. suburb an). Nor is it clear whether these ratings predict improved student performance. 5.ConclusionThe Massachusetts Signing Bonus Program for New Tea chers has failed to produce in Massachusetts the positive outcomes that federal po licy makers promise such programs will produce in the nation, even though this progra m was modeled after Teach for America and critical parts of it were designed and often managed by the New Teacher Projecttwo related organizations that the Bush adm inistration has repeatedly and effusively praised for their ability to both design and run programs of this type. This does not necessarily mean, of course, that fast-tra ck alternative certification will not work, either in Massachusetts or elsewhere. It stro ngly implies, however, that simply embracing the two core principles the federal gover nment has endorsed for such programs1) recruit high-achieving candidates and 2 ) get them quickly into the classroom (US Department of Education, 2002)will f ail to deliver the benefits the Bush administration is promising.Officials should respond to the current research by resisting calls to embrace rapid certification. It would be unwise to devote extensi ve funding to an approach that has produced, in Massachusetts, such low numbers of urb an teachers and such high numbers of exiting teachers, all at a cost of more than fou r million dollars. Given the current teacher shortages in many states, though, it is und erstandable that policy makers at all levels of government are increasingly willing to ex periment with alternative forms of teacher preparation. It is critical, however, that when officials fund such initiatives, they do so with a spirit of experimentationand with the rigor, transparency, and objectivity that characterize proper experimentation.Policy makers must insist on ongoing and independen t evaluations of any experimental program, evaluations that track participants' chara cteristics, such as prior educational experience, eventual teaching placements, retention rates, and more. Absent rigorous collection and independent analysis of such data, the public will not know whether such initiatives are effective. Independent analysis of carefully collected data is critical if other states are to avoid what happened in Massachu setts, where state officials have a) offered inaccurate information regarding the number and characteristics of MINT graduates working in schools, and b) issued an audi t in 2000 that inflated the program's
18 of 24favorable statistics (principals' ratings) and unde rreported its unfavorable statistics (the first-year attrition rate). This inaccurate informa tion helped convince some that Massachusetts is developing a model of teacher prep aration for other states to follow. When independent data are brought to bear on this p rogram, however, this initiative looks less like a model of teacher preparation wort h copying and more like an expensive quick-fix that has failed to solve a complex proble m.ReferencesArcher, J. (2002, December 4) Education Week. Mass. Bonus program to favor ed schools. Available from: http://www.edweek.org/ew/ewstory.cfm?slug=14bonus.h 22 Associated Press (2001, February 16). Teacher bonus program criticized. Cape Cod Times. Boston Globe (2001a). Comparing the districts. Avai lable from: http://www.boston.com/mcas/scores2001/globe_distric ts_rank01.htm Boston Globe (2001b). Top-ranked 10th grade distric ts. Available from: http://www.boston.com/mcas/scores2001/10th_district _rank01.htm Churchill, A., Berger, J., Brooks, C,. Effrat, A., Grifin, L., Magouirk-Colbert, M., McDermott, K., Sharick, R., & Sheehan, A. (2002, Ma y 21). Revised interim report: The Massachusetts Institute for New Teachers and Ma ster Teacher/NBPTS Programs Amherst, MA: Center for Education PolicyUniversi ty of Massachusetts. Commonwealth of Massachusetts (2001, July 26). Swif t urges alternative teaching paths: Praises MINT teachers for commitment. Availa ble from: http://www.state.ma.us/gov/press/pr072601shrewsbury high.htm Darling-Hammond, L. (2002, September 6). Research a nd rhetoric on teacher certification: A response to "Teacher Certification Reconsidered," Education Policy Analysis Archives 10 (36). Retrieved April 8, 2003 from http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v10n36.html Darling-Hammond, L. & Schlan, E. (1996). Who teache s and why? Dilemmas of building a better profession for twenty-first centu ry schools. In J. Sikula (Ed.), Handbook of research on teacher education. (2nd. ed., pp. 67-101). New York: MacMillan. Education Week (2000). Quality Counts 2000: Who Should Teach? Education Week (2002). Quality Counts 2002: Who Should Teach? Ferdinand, P. (1999, February 2). $20,000 bonus pro mpts a rush for Massachusetts teaching jobs. The Washington Post p. A02. Fowler, R. C. (2001, February) An analysis of the recruitment, preparation, attrit ion, and placement of the Massachusetts signing bonus te achers Available from: http://www.massteacher.org/html/Public_area/Of_Inte rest.html
19 of 24Hayward, E. (2000, July 6). Bay State teacher recru iting cheered as model for the nation. Boston Herald p. P 26. Hayward, E. (2002, January 30). Applications for te acher signing bonuses drop. Boston Herald p. P23. Liu, E., Kardos, S., Kauffman, D. Peske, H., & John son, S. (2000, April). "Breaking even:" Incentives, rewards, and the high costs of c hoosing to teach. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Education Res earch Association, New Orleans, LA. Magee, M. (1999, January 16) New teachers become ho t commodity in nationwide hunt. San Diego Union-Tribune p. B-1. Massachusetts Department of Education (1998, Septem ber 15). 12 to 62 Teacher enhancement legislation: timeline for proposed roll out. Available from: www.doe.mass.edu/eq/news98/1262tmln.html Massachusetts Department of Education (1999a) Board of Education 1999 Annual Report. Available from: http://www.doe.mass.edu/boe/annual99/toc.html Massachusetts Department of Education (1999b) Massa chusetts Signing Bonus Program: questions and answers. Massachusetts Department of Education, (1999c, May 24) "20,000 Signing Bonus Press Conference, May 24, 1999" (videotape). Massachusetts Department of Education (2000a, March 21) Commissioner's Update. Available from: http://www.doe.mass.edu/mailings/2000/321/cm032100. html Massachusetts Department of Education (2000b). Mass achusetts Institute for New Teachers Report. Available from: http://www.doe.mass.edu/eq/mint/history.html Massachusetts Department of Education (2000c, Decem ber 26). Massachusetts School Principals Give High Ratings to Signing Bonus Teach ers. Available from: http://www.doe.mass.edu/news/news.asp?id=167 Massachusetts Department of Education (2000d). Dist rict performance evaluation instrument. Available from: http//www.doe.massedu/ata/dpe00/instrument/section_ 4.html Massachusetts Department of Education (2000e). Educ ation Reform Staff System Report: August 1, 1999-Ocober1, 1999. Massachusetts Department of Education (2001a, Febru ary 15). Driscoll Driscoll, Massachusetts Commissioner of Education: A statemen t regarding the teacher signing bonus program and MINT (Massachusetts Insti tute for New Teachers) programs. Available from: http://www.doe.mass.edu/news/archive01/su021601_2.h tml Massachusetts Department of Education (2001b, June 1) 230 to get accelerated training
20 of 24to teach this fall. Available from: http://www.doe.mass.edu/news/news.asp?id=295 Massachusetts Department of Education (2002a, Novem ber 20). Colleges and universities tapped to nominate future bonus recipi ents under new guidelines. Available from: http://www.doe.mass.edu/news/news.asp?id=1292 Massachusetts Department of Education (2002b). The Massachusetts Signing Bonus Program. Available from: http://eq.doe.mass.edu/mint/overview.html National Council on Teacher Quality (Ed.) (2002) Un conventional Recruiting: Places to Watch. Available from: http://www.nctq.org/issues/recruiting.html New Teacher Project (Ed.). ( 2002) Project highligh ts. Available from: http://www.tntp.org/cli/hlt.html NCES (1998). The condition of education 1998 Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education. Salzer, J. (2/4/02). Budget crunch may hurt teacher incentive plan. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution School Board News (2001, February 20). Teacher bonu ses paying off in Massachusetts. Available from: http://www.nsba.org/sbn/01--feb/022001-5.htm Setera, K. (Segment Producer). (2001, February 15). Teacher Bonuses. Fox 25 News at Ten: WXFT A transcript of this broadcast is available at http://www.fox25.com/ Click on "Fox25 Undercover" and then "Teacher Bonus es." Silberman, T. (2001, July 3). "Code Red" in teachin g. Charlotte News and Observer Turner, J. (February 1, 2001). Teacher recruitment is top priority in Western Virginia. The Roanoke Times p. B4. U. S. Department of Education (2002). Meeting the highly qualified teachers challenge: The Secretary's annual report on teacher quality. Washington, DC. Available: from: http://www.edgov/offices/OPE/News/teacherprep/index .html Vaishnav, A. (2001, February 16). Cities said to lo se teacher recruits, The Boston Globe p. B3. Vaishnav, A. (2002, March 21).Teachers' signing bon uses cut back. The Boston Globe p. B1. The White House. (2001a, April 3) Remarks of Laura Bush at Senate Spouses Luncheon. Available from: http://whitehouse.gov/firstlady/news-speeches/spech es/fl20010403-2.html The White House. (2001b, April 3) Remarks of Laura Bush to DC Teaching Fellows Launch. Available from: http://whitehouse.gov/firstlady/news-speeches/spech es/fl20010222.html The White House. (2002, February, 26). Remarks by M rs. BushTransition to
21 of 24Teaching/New Teacher Project. Available from: http://whitehouse.gov/firstlady/news-speeches/spech es/print/fl20020226.html Zernike, K. (2000, August 24). Less Training, more teachers: new math for staffing classes. New York Times p. A1.About the AuthorClarke FowlerEducation DepartmentSalem State CollegeSalem, MA 01970(978) 542-7041 firstname.lastname@example.org Dr. Clarke Fowler, an Associate Professor in the Ed ucation Department at Salem State College, has published written articles on socio-mo ral and cognitive development. His most recent articles have focused on the Massachuse tts Teacher Tests, Title 2 of the Higher Education Reauthorization Act of 1998, and M assachusetts's fast-track teacher certification initiatives.NotesTo calculate these costs, I obtained, via a series of Freedom of Information requests, all recruitment-related travel documents from the Department. To calculate personnel costs, which the Department did not include in its recruiting budget, I identified the employees who went on each trip and then used salary schedules to estimate how much these individuals ea rned while recruiting. 1. The Department's initial set of recruiting material s explicitly stated, in a Question-and-Answer format, that bonus recipients w ould teach in thirteen high-need urban districts: "Q: What are the possibl e placement sites? A: Boston, Brockton, Cambridge, Chelsea, Fall River, Framingha m, Holyoke, Lawrence, Lowell, Lynn, New Bedford, Springfield, and Worcest er" (Massachusetts Department of Education, 1999b). 2. Note 2 (above) contains the wording of the 1999 rec ruiting materials. Commissioner Driscoll reaffirmed this commitment or ally during a May 1999 press conference, when he announced the awarding of the first round of bonuses: "We're working with the urban areas in Massachusett s where these recipients will be placed." Later, he said, "We have commitments fr om all of the major urban areas Boston, Cambridge, Chelsea, Fall River, New Bedford, Holyoke, Springfield, Lawrence, Lowellso we have commitment s from all of the schools districts. It's just a matter of matching them up" (Massachusetts Department of Education, 1999c). Finally, the Massachusetts Board of Education' s199 9 Annual Report says: "New teachers begin their four-year commitment in the su mmer in an intensive, seven-week teacher-training institute, and groups o f four to five began teaching in thirteen high needs Massachusetts public school dis tricts in the fall of 1999" (Massachusetts Department of Education, 1999a, p. 2 0). 3. Churchill et al. (2002) reported that "The Departme nt of Education has identified nineteen districts as being high-need, based on ove rall number of students, percent 4.
22 of 24 of students qualifying for freeor reduced-price l unch, and MCAS scores" (p. 26). These districts are Boston, Brockton, Cambridge, Ch elsea, Chicopee, Fall River, Haverhill, Holyoke, Lawrence, Lowell, Lynn, New Bed ford, Pittsfield, Revere, Salem, Somerville, Springfield, Taunton, and Worces ter. Whereas the state sought to recruit 125 bonus teach ers in 2000 and 2001, in 2002 they planned on recruiting no more than 50. The Bos ton Herald reported that, due to the poor performance of the bonus program's endo wment, much less money was currently available to pay for bonuses (Hayward 2002). At 43, the FY 2002 cohort of bonus teachers is the smallest cohort the Bonus program has placed in schools to date. 5. I report a range of scholarship recipients because the Department's records are incomplete: officials are unsure of the award statu s of 39 of their MINT graduates. That is, the Department did no know whether the sta te, the individual, or a school district paid the $2,250 tuition for these individu als to attend MINT. 6.Copyright 2003 by the Education Policy Analysis ArchivesThe World Wide Web address for the Education Policy Analysis Archives is epaa.asu.edu Editor: Gene V Glass, Arizona State UniversityProduction Assistant: Chris Murrell, Arizona State University General questions about appropriateness of topics o r particular articles may be addressed to the Editor, Gene V Glass, email@example.com or reach him at College of Education, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 8 5287-2411. The Commentary Editor is Casey D. Cobb: firstname.lastname@example.org .EPAA Editorial Board Michael W. Apple University of Wisconsin David C. Berliner Arizona State University Greg Camilli Rutgers University Linda Darling-Hammond Stanford University Sherman Dorn University of South Florida Mark E. Fetler California Commission on Teacher Credentialing Gustavo E. Fischman California State UniveristyLos Angeles Richard Garlikov Birmingham, Alabama Thomas F. Green Syracuse University Aimee Howley Ohio University Craig B. Howley Appalachia Educational Laboratory William Hunter University of Ontario Institute ofTechnology Patricia Fey Jarvis Seattle, Washington Daniel Kalls Ume University
23 of 24 Benjamin Levin University of Manitoba Thomas Mauhs-Pugh Green Mountain College Les McLean University of Toronto Heinrich Mintrop University of California, Los Angeles Michele Moses Arizona State University Gary Orfield Harvard University Anthony G. Rud Jr. Purdue University Jay Paredes Scribner University of Missouri Michael Scriven University of Auckland Lorrie A. Shepard University of Colorado, Boulder Robert E. Stake University of IllinoisUC Kevin Welner University of Colorado, Boulder Terrence G. Wiley Arizona State University John Willinsky University of British ColumbiaEPAA Spanish Language Editorial BoardAssociate Editor for Spanish Language Roberto Rodrguez Gmez Universidad Nacional Autnoma de Mxico email@example.com Adrin Acosta (Mxico) Universidad de Guadalajaraadrianacosta@compuserve.com J. Flix Angulo Rasco (Spain) Universidad de Cdizfelix.firstname.lastname@example.org Teresa Bracho (Mxico) Centro de Investigacin y DocenciaEconmica-CIDEbracho dis1.cide.mx Alejandro Canales (Mxico) Universidad Nacional Autnoma deMxicocanalesa@servidor.unam.mx Ursula Casanova (U.S.A.) Arizona State Universitycasanova@asu.edu Jos Contreras Domingo Universitat de Barcelona Jose.Contreras@doe.d5.ub.es Erwin Epstein (U.S.A.) Loyola University of ChicagoEepstein@luc.edu Josu Gonzlez (U.S.A.) Arizona State Universityjosue@asu.edu Rollin Kent (Mxico)Universidad Autnoma de Puebla email@example.com Mara Beatriz Luce (Brazil)Universidad Federal de Rio Grande do Sul-UFRGSlucemb@orion.ufrgs.brJavier Mendoza Rojas (Mxico)Universidad Nacional Autnoma deMxicojaviermr@servidor.unam.mxMarcela Mollis (Argentina)Universidad de Buenos Airesmmollis@filo.uba.ar Humberto Muoz Garca (Mxico) Universidad Nacional Autnoma deMxicoAngel Ignacio Prez Gmez (Spain)Universidad de Mlagaaiperez@uma.es
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Educational policy analysis archives.
n Vol. 11, no. 13 (April 22, 2003).
Tempe, Ariz. :
b Arizona State University ;
Tampa, Fla. :
University of South Florida.
c April 22, 2003
Massachusetts Signing Bonus Program for New Teachers :a model of teacher preparation worth copying? / R. Clarke Fowler.
Arizona State University.
University of South Florida.
t Education Policy Analysis Archives (EPAA)