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Educational policy analysis archives.
n Vol. 11, no. 21 (July 13, 2003).
Tempe, Ariz. :
b Arizona State University ;
Tampa, Fla. :
University of South Florida.
c July 13, 2003
Educational policy formation in loosely coupled systems : some salient features of Guatemala's public and private school sectors / Carlos R. Ruano.
Arizona State University.
University of South Florida.
t Education Policy Analysis Archives (EPAA)
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1 of 27 A peer-reviewed scholarly journal Editor: Gene V Glass College of Education Arizona State University Copyright is retained by the first or sole author, who grants right of first publication to the EDUCATION POLICY ANALYSIS ARCHIVES EPAA is a project of the Education Policy Studies Laboratory. Articles appearing in EPAA are abstracted in the Current Index to Journals in Education by the ERIC Clearinghouse on Assessment and Evaluation and are permanently archived in Resources in Education Volume 11 Number 21July 13, 2003ISSN 1068-2341Educational Policy Formation in Loosely Coupled Systems: Some Salient Features of Guatemala's Public and Private School Sectors Carlos R. Ruano El Bosque University Bogota, ColombiaCitation: Ruano, C. R. (July 13, 2003). Educational policy formation in loosely coupled systems: Some salient features of Guatemala's public and private school sectors. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 11 (21). Retrieved [date] from http://epaa.asu.edu/epa a/v11n21/.AbstractThe purpose of this article is to analyze the formu lation and implementation of educational policy processes in r elation to private schools in Guatemala. Specifically, how bilingual e ducation is defined and implemented in the private education sector in Guatemala City where the largest number of privately run establish ments exist. Given the great deficits in the provision of educational coverage in the public sector, there has been an explosive expansio n of private institutions which have very different levels of qu ality. Through an analysis of the administrative processes within the Guatemalan Government in general and its Education Ministry in particular as well as of the governance arrangements existing in the p rivate school sector, an overall view of the curricular and polic y decisions taken by private schools in the formulation and implementati on of bilingual
2 of 27 education is presented. This study was based on a s ample of six private schools which cater to higher income segmen ts of Guatemala CityÂ’s student population. Some of the relevant fin dings of this study include, the existence of a situation of quasi auto nomous institutional functioning of the private sector, extreme differen tials in the quality of services provided, inadequate levels of teacher and school administratorÂ’s training as well as lack of coopera tion between public and private sector schools.IntroductionMany researchers of Education are familiar with Gua temalaÂ’s multilingual and multicultural traits. That is to say, the presence of large Maya and Spanish speaking populations plus the smaller Garfuna and Xinca linguistic groups. Much less is known, however, about the internal dynamics of GuatemalaÂ’s educational system particularly in relation to the formulation and implementation of bilingual education policy in privately run schools. In a cou ntry of some 10 million inhabitants and a landmass about the size of Switzerland, there are some 22 indigenous languages spoken by half of the population. Neverth eless, this rich cultural diversity is strikingly absent from the school curricula in t he private schools (England 1998, Artiles 1995). One goal of this article is to inves tigate the process of bilingual curriculum formulation and implementation in order to understand the sociolinguistic choices made at the school level. A nother goal is to analyze the internal governance processes within the countryÂ’s education apparatus and their relation to the salient bilingual education curricu lar and linguistic arrangements deployed by those schools which are privately run.To accomplish these goals, this article is divided in five sections. First, a sociopolitical overview of the conditions where the education system evolved is given. Secondly, a review of the legislative proces s within the Guatemalan State is presented including the general legislative framewo rk in relation to educational policy. This refers to the interactions between the main lawmaking body, the National Congress and the Presidential or Executive level of decision making. The third point consists of a description of the Guatem alan governmentÂ’s administrative mechanisms. Such description is given in order to u nderstand the flow of decision making processes within the bureaucratic structures This segment also addresses the role played by the Ministry of Education or MINEDUC from an administrative standpoint in the sh aping and execution of educational policies and the differential outcomes that Ministerial decisions have for private education institutions. The fourth aspect o f this research deals with research design issues such as methodology, fieldwork condit ions and the establishments selected for this study. The fifth point is an anal ysis of the salient characteristics of private bilingual education institutions that cater to higher income population in Guatemala City including their governance, financia l, curricular and parental involvement aspects. Lastly, the appropriate conclu sions are presented. For purposes of this analysis, private institutions of education (known as Colegios Privados in Guatemala) are defined as those which are for t he most part organizationally and financially self-sustaining. F urthermore, the term bilingual
3 of 27 education is used to denote schools in which most o f the learning activities are conducted in two languages. To this authorÂ’s knowle dge, not a single private school which caters to the middle and higher income segmen ts of the population in Guatemala City defines bilingualism as the inclusio n of Maya languages in its curriculum alongside Spanish. For these establishme nts, bilingual education is regarded as the teaching of Spanish in addition to another European language, generally English.Private schools located outside of Guatemala City w ere not analyzed as part of this research due to the fact that the overwhelming majo rity of establishments of this kind are located there: Guatemala City concentrates over 80% of all private schools in the country (Revista Cronica 1997, Revista Proce so 1998). Lastly, the analysis is centered around schools that cater to the Primary a nd Secondary Levels. The latter is further divided into Lower Secondary and Higher Secondary or Vocational Track students.That is to say, those between 7 and 17 years old. T he majority of enrolments take place within this age band. While some initiatives are being implemented in terms of bilingual education in Indigenous Maya languages particularly in rural areas, (Enge & Chesterfield, 1996), such initiatives are s till in their early stages and cannot be compared with the practices reviewed here.Sociopolitical overviewWe live in a blind, repressive society with brutal coercion and instinctive passion rather than reason as its guiding principle s. In our social environment injustice and lack of respect are the n orm while a Neanderthal contempt for ideas dominates us all. (Note 1) You neednÂ’t kill everyone to complete the job...[Du ring the 1980's] We instituted Civil Affairs which provides development for 70% of the population while we kill 30%. (Note 2) Politically, Guatemala, is organized on a republica n system with an Executive or Presidential branch, the Legislative or Congression al arm and the judiciary. Both Executive and Legislative branches are elected simu ltaneously for a period of four years. By law, the Executive is forbidden from seek ing re-election. Congress is made up of some sixty deputies from all 22 Departments who are also elected to a four-year term. There are no term limi tations for deputies. As the legislative branch, Congress either passes laws pro posed by its members or by the President who can veto any laws passed. With the ex ception of the short-lived Serrano government (1990-1993), there has never bee n a congressional majority made up of deputies from a party different than tha t which controls the Presidency. Therefore, a Presidential veto is never reversed. T his form of government with different political parties alternating in the exer cise of power via the electoral process is relatively new. Nevertheless, as recentl y as 1993, the inability to govern from a divided powers perspective was illustrated d uring J. SerranoÂ’s Presidency when antagonism between Congress and the Executive resulted in an attempt by the Executive to abolish Congress and to impose rul e by decree, Caudillo style. The attempt to shut down Congress failed and Serran o was forced to flee the
4 of 27 country.For the most part of its existence as an independen t State, the country has been ruled by a series of strong men or Caudillos. The C audillo is a persistent feature of Guatemala's sociopolitical landscape. Since Indepen dence from Spain in 1821, with brief respites of democratically elected gover nments, Caudillos have been the standard feature of Guatemala's Presidential system of government. between 1837 and 1944, four Caudillos ruled the country during 7 6 years: Jos Rafael Carrera 1837-1865Justo Rufino Barrios 1871-1885Manuel Estrada Cabrera 1898-1920 andJorge Ubico 1931-1944. Between 1944 and 1954 two democratically elected go vernments headed by Juan Jos Arvalo and Jacobo Arbenz respectively, introd uced fundamental changes at many levels of society. Expropriation of lands belo nging to the United Fruit Company put the governments of Guatemala and the Un ited States on a collision course. In 1954, an invasion force organized by the Central Intelligence Agency entered the country. The Army refused to fight it o ff and soon thereafter, President Arbenz went into exile never to return (Immerman 19 82, Gleisejesses 1991). The subsequent counterrevolutionary regime proceeded to roll back many of the reformist measures of the previous decade. Civil an d political freedoms were repressed also. Between 1954 and 1985 all but one o f the governments were headed by military men. These governments created a nd maintained a vacuum in the political center by killing or forcing into exi le, leaders not only of left-wing groups and guerrilla sympathizers but of moderate center-r ight parties, university professors, rural and urban labor union organizers, teachers, business leaders, healthcare workers, artists, intellectuals and Cler gy along with anyone else who might be perceived as an emerging civilian leader ( Aguilera Peralta 1980, Albizures 1980, Chomsky 1991, Frundt 1987, Levenson 1989).From 1960 onwards, as leftist Guerrillas began to m ount a series of armed operations, the levels of government-sponsored terr orism rose dramatically, culminating in the scorched earth policies of the p eriod 1980-1984 (Falla 1994, Handy, 1992, Lebot, 1992, ). Numerous teachers were murdered as part of this policy of extermination. The Army and paramilitary groups targeted them as potential leaders or guerrilla sympathizers (CEH, 1 999). By 1990, the entire country was under military control with military detachment s and bases in 20 of the countryÂ’s 22 Departments (Smith,1990). At the heigh t of the carnage, some 25 percent of the countryÂ’s population was displaced a nd tens of thousands were killed or disappeared. In areas where the policy of exterm ination of civilian populations reached its logical conclusion, up to 80 percent of the population was displaced. Ninety percent of the Human Rights violations docum ented between 1960 and 1996 are directly imputable to the Guatemalan State and its agents (army, police and paramilitary Death Squads). Some 7% were commit ted by leftist Guerrillas while the remainder 3% cannot be attributed to eith er party (REMHI, 1998). Despite relatively stable levels of economic growth during the period 1950-1980, no long term re-investment policies in education or he alth were developed. Thus, socioeconomic prosperity remained confined to a sma ll segment of the population
5 of 27 (Barry & Preusch 1986, CEPAL 1984, Demyck 1983). As early as 1978, a World Bank study had identified the single most important factor in GuatemalaÂ’s weak performance in several key economic and social indi cators: The lack of a well developed education system.For example [...] KoreaÂ’s industrial investment dur ing the period 1965-1973 was only three times that of Guatemala, but its industr y provided employment to 965,000 people, fifteen times more than did Guatema lan industry. Critical to the success of KoreaÂ’s development stra tegy was the highly developed education system which produced a literate populati on able to acquire industrial skills quickly. GuatemalaÂ’s education system needs to be upgraded markedly if the country is to reduce unemployment through the devel opment of industry. In these fields GuatemalaÂ’s efforts are still far from adequ ate (p. 16). As Ibarra de Calix (1997) found twenty years later, the educational system continues to be the Achiles Tendon in all efforts t o modernize the national economy: Two of the factors which greatly reduce GuatemalaÂ’s workforce competitiveness are the lack of skilled workers and the low level of training among the general population. [...] Should these trends continue in terms of quality and overall training levels, th e country will not be able to overcome its underdevelopment thereby preempting society as a whole from benefitting of the technological advance s and transfer of new technologies produced elsewhere. (p. 318). (Note 3) The resulting cycle of underemployment and under ed ucational achievement has exacerbated the levels of socioeconomic inequalitie s: GuatemalaÂ’s Income Distribution disparities are the greatest in the We stern Hemisphere second only to BrazilÂ’s (CEPAL, 1997).The legislative frameworkAll citizens have a right and an obligation to rece ive education at the Pre-Primary, Primary, Lower and Higher Secondary le vels within the age limits established by law. (Note 4) Some laws are made by God and those are untouchable Some laws are made by men and those can be argued about. Then there are laws made for Guatemalans. Them laws are like hot cinder s; good to keep the rich manÂ’s house warm but never enough to bring light to a poor manÂ’s ranch. (Note 5) The passing of legislation is a lengthy and convolu ted process with lots of procedural delays and wrangling over the most minut e drafting technicalities, the formal elements of law clearly having precedence ov er their actual significance. Hence, only those legislative items which top the p residential agenda receive appropriate attention and are dealt with within a r easonable time frame. Thus, it can take several months or even years for those legisla tive items not pushed by the President to be passed.
6 of 27 Educational regulations must undergo several layers of legislative approvals before coming into force. The first such layer is Congress ional approval. According to GuatemalaÂ’s legal system, all administrative change s and policies enacted by government departments must be approved by Congress Such approval usually takes between two or three years depending on the p riority given to the changes by the Executive. Because of these lengthy procedural delays, Ministries and sometimes the quasi-ministerial agencies issue bind ing regulations known as Acuerdos Ministeriales [Ministerial Decrees]. The P resident can also issue binding regulations; in this case they are known as [Acuerd os Gubernativos [Executive Decrees]. All these types of regulatory acts have t he same legal force as laws passed by Congress. In addition, all of these diffe rent types of Decrees are issued with or without Congressional approval nor oversigh t thereof. Such parceling of public policy results in a panoply of intricate and oftentimes contradictory sets of regulations set up by different levels of governmen t Since the restoration of democracy, most government s have been headed by members of the same political parties in both the E xecutive and Legislative branches. As a result, all major educational policy initiatives are initiated by the Executive. The inability to govern from a divided p owers perspective was illustrated during J. SerranoÂ’s Presidency in 1993, when antago nism between Congress and the Executive resulted in an attempt by the Executi ve to abolish Congress and to impose rule by decree, Caudillo style. The attempt to shut down Congress failed and Serrano was forced to flee the country. In shor t, educational policies are generally imposed on the educational system top-dow n fashion with little or no input from the affected parties. Once new legislati on is approved, Congress must then issue specific regulations which spell out in great detail the scope and limitations of the acts that can be performed under the new laws. Again, the passing of the specific regulations can take a long time unless it is high on the ExecutiveÂ’s agenda. As a result, although Guatemala had several major educational reform initiatives over the last two de cades, the actual functioning of the Ministry of Education is still governed by the regulations dating back to 1977. Therefore, administrative and policy changes requir ed to bring MINEDÂ’s internal organization in line with the legislative changes p assed by Congress never took place (Galo de Lara, 1997).To compensate for the absence of appropriate regula tions, a full panoply of ad-hoc Ministerial Decrees has been enacted over the years In addition, numerous Executive Decrees have also been issued in an equal ly haphazard fashion and with no apparent policy direction nor long term objectiv es. Both of these deal with every conceivable action su ch as setting up of new interministerial agencies, execution of educational reforms, licences to operate private schools and even to day-to-day administrati ve matters. Their exact number is unknown. As of 1998 there was no centralized l egal database or catalog of existing laws or newly approved ones.It was estimated that some 15 thousand pieces of le gislation and other 30 thousand Decrees from different levels were neither registered in a database nor properly catalogued (Larra, 1998). These legal enta nglements are partly responsible for the considerable delays and institu tional weaknesses noted in many
7 of 27 aspects of the internal operations at MINED.Administrative processes in GuatemalaÂ’s governmentAdministratively, the country is divided in 22 Depa rtments and some 325 municipalities. Mayors are the only locally elected authorities. They are elected to periods of two to four years depending on the size of their municipality. In addition, there are Departmental Governors who are directly a ppointed by the Executive. Neither municipal authorities nor Governors have an y decision-making input in the educational policy process at the national level. R ural areas participation in national policy making processes is further constrained by t he legal and administrative operational definitions which date back to 1938 and remain unchanged (United Nations, 1999). The national government is organized in a myriad of administrative units of varying size and competencies, oftentimes with high degrees of duplication. At the top there are the Ministers who are appointed by the Ex ecutive. These individuals are almost always appointed to their positions as a res ult of their loyalty to the President rather than by their professional suitabi lity for the post. Underneath the ministerial echelons there are Deputy Ministers [Vi ce-Ministros in Spanish]. They are in charge of day to day operations of their dep artments. Again, loyalty to the person who appointed them rather than competency or the fulfilment of organizational priorities is the main criterion for appointment to the position. This is a feature of public administration in Pre-Modern St ates known as the Loyalty Principle (Ruano, 1999). Simply stated, the Loyalty Principle posits that regular bureaucratic channels which support organizational control mechanisms, lines of accountability and policy implementation are bypass ed in favor of decision making processes based almost entirely in the pre-eminence of personal ties to the individual from whom appointees derive their power base. In this type of Pre-Modern administrative arrangement, people are n ot expected to work for the objectives of the bureaucracy but for the person wh o appointed them (Ruano 1999 p. 2ff).A third level of administration is composed by the Directors General who oversee specific agencies within a Ministry. Each Ministry has many agencies which operate in a quasi-autonomous manner and are known as Direc ciones Generales [General Directorates].These Directorates and Sub-Directorates have branch es throughout the nation where further atomization of public policy has been identified by previous research (Dignard 1987, Galvez-Borrel 1996, Dunkerley 1988, ). Other administrative shortcomings observed include critical shortages of qualified managers, high turnover, excessive duplication, inadequate taxatio n rates and feeble fiscal accountability procedures, lack of clear hiring and promotion criteria, nepotism, constant shifts in administrative and public policy priorities, weak enforcement capabilities and corruption (Brewer-Carias 1979, Cl ark 2000, El Periodico 1998, Heyman 1995, Handy 1991, International Monetary Fun d 1995, United Nations 1998). Other government agencies with quasi-ministe rial characteristics include the Taxation Administration Authority, the Judiciary, N ational Housing Administration and dozens of others.
8 of 27 All ministries follow a similar organizational patt ern except the Ministry of Defense which has its own internal arrangements and for all practical purposes is only accountable to the military High Command (Black 198 5, Goldman 1999, McClintock 1985, Nairns & Simon 1986 Ruano 1997). (Note 6) Furthermore, within this organizational pattern, numerous instances of Loose Coupling (Churchill et al.1979, Gamoran & Dreben 1986) are observed. That is to say patterns of administrative behavior whereby managers and employees are mostly concerned with the operational survival of the units under their contr ol rather than the overall functioning of the Civil Service. This results in f urther diffusion of lines of accountability at all levels of the government. The specific consequences of these regulatory arrangements for the implementation of b ilingual curricula in private schools are also analyzed in this research.MINEDÂ’s structure and role in the education system The defining characteristics of the education secto r are inequity, low coverage and low quality (Note 7) In principle, the Ministry of Education or MINED is responsible for educational policy, including planning and coordination as well as curriculum design and quality assurance for both public and private education. MI NED supervises all levels of instruction [kindergarten, primary, lower and highe r secondary] except Higher Education which is self governing due to Constituti onal Mandates which grant Self-Government or Autonoma Universitaria to the University. MINED is GuatemalaÂ’s largest government department in terms of its number of employees, overtaking Defense and Public Health Ministries. Fo llowing the organizational pattern found elsewhere in the Guatemalan governmen t, MINED is composed of a myriad of Departments, General Directorates and aut onomous units all of them functioning with high degrees of loose-coupling. Ac cording to a World Bank study (1995), some 1,400 agencies, units or departments w ere found to be under the nominal control of MINED. Many of these units had b een created to oversee specific projects or multilateral agreements and co ntinued to exist long after their original purpose had ceased to exist. Between 1980 and 1990, the number of teachers remained unchanged while administrative pe rsonnel increased by 15 percent (UNESCO, 1991).At the same time, other Ministries such as Agricult ure, Health and Defense maintain educational facilities of their own and, i n the case of Defense, they are in charge of training for large numbers of conscripted soldiers in non-military occupations inside military installations. All thes e expenditures and resources deployed are outside the control of MINED or its ov ersight. There is also a large number of Spanish language sc hools which cater to foreigners. These schools are under the control of the Guatemalan Institute of Tourism which issues licences authorizing the funct ioning of such facilities. There is a sharp division of tasks between MINEDÂ’s administrative employees and teachers. The latter have little or no input in any administrative and procedural matters nor is their input sought when drafting edu cational reform initiatives which are always prepared by administrative personnel wit h the assistance of
9 of 27 international agencies or consultants.Moreover, duplication and compartmentalization of t he simplest tasks can reach extraordinary proportions, forcing even the simples t administrative decisions to go through a number of steps and procedures. For insta nce, it takes up to two years after graduation for a student to receive her posthigh school or vocational track graduation diploma, such is the number of signature s and approvals required. As no clear lines of authority are defined, and given the patron-client relations established between different individuals within MI NED, diffuse decision-making is constantly exercised. In practice this means that n obody can or wants to assume responsibility for anything that is not clearly out lined in a legal procedure. Simple decisions take months to be made -if at all. Many o f these individuals report directly to the Minister who is perceived as the final decis ion-maker. This perception is not groundless; he or someone acting on his authority i s required to sign and approve every single appointment and promotion at all level s. These micro management traits result in lower level employees fearing for reprisals from their superiors should the approval of the latter not be obtained before m aking a decision however simple it may be. These restrictive practices result on re duced level of institutional accountability while increasing the isolation betwe en MINEDÂ’s agencies. Passive resistance becomes the behavior of choice for those whose livelihood depends on the existence of their unit in isolation from all t he others. As one MINED employee put it, "I can feed the Minister three kinds of inf ormation: false information, misleading information and the truth. None can forc e me to give him what he wants." All these characteristics tend to reinforce the publicÂ’s perception of MINED as a non-responsive, closed institution with little or no regard for their concerns. Hierarchically speaking, MINED is essentially a top -down structure consisting of four strata. At the top level we find the Minister and about ten or so associates who are recruited by him on the basis of loyalty and -o nly secondarilyability. Some of these individuals are not classified as regular civ il service personnel. Instead, they are known as Advisors ( Asesores ) to the Minister while others are appointed as technical and administrative Deputy Ministers.This group advises and shapes the general orientati on of the Ministry in accordance with the Minister's priorities. Those at the top level regard all levels below them as unmanageable dead weight "unless you work with a group of like-minded technocrats or bring in your own people from outside, it is very hard to get anything done at MINED" (Galo de Lara, personal communication). The interests of the top echelon are fully political, t ied as they are to the fortunes of the Minister who brought them on board. Their time in o ffice is unpredictable, ranging from a few months to four years as all new Minister s bring in their own group of advisors and no government carries on the education al policies of previous ones. Below the Minister and Deputy-Minister levels, all Departments are staffed by civil servants. The third level is occupied by the Direct ors General at the national level. As a result of administrative regionalization in th e mid-1980's, further departmental directorships were created. There are some twenty u nits headed by a Director General. The units in charge of primary and seconda ry/vocational education are the Direccin general de educacin primaria and the Direccin general de educacin media respectively.
10 of 27 The fourth level in the administrative chain is the Supervisor. They are the only operational link between private schools and the MI NED bureaucracy. In 1999, there were some 55 supervisors in charge of oversee ing all of the elementary and secondary schools in Guatemala City. (Note 8) The figure given in the text was compiled by the author from interviews during field work throughout Guatemala City.. Their main task is to enforce ministerial po licies and regulations at the school level for they constitute the only direct link betw een MINED and school principals in the private and public schools. Each supervisor is in charge of a school district ( distrito escolar ) which is simply a group of schools treated as a u nit due to geographical proximity. There are approximately 93 districts in Guatemala City. The number of schools within each district varies widel y depending on its size, some covering 30 schools while others covering 50 or mor e. Supervisors are usually former school teachers with no additional pedagogic al nor administrative training and whose oversight functions entail large amounts of time spent on revising paperwork submitted by the schools under their char ge. Those individuals who are promoted to the SupervisorÂ’s position receive no sa lary increases nor any other type of incentives to further their professionaliza tion. Over the last three decades few if any training programs or mechanisms specific ally aimed at improving the long-term performance and/or qualifications of Supe rvisors' have been set up by MINED. MINED does not allocate any additional resou rces to carry out the supervisor's duties. As a result, in many areas of the country, it is common for private schools to contribute with some of his/her expenses, for instance, office space, stationary supplies and clerical support. Se veral school districts hire secretarial help and donate office space for superv isors. In other instances, such support extended to "salary supplements". In a chro nically underfunded Ministry, this is hardly surprising. Even less so, given the regularity of complaints from teachers about late or no payment of their salaries (Siglo XXI, 1999). Theoretically, the Directorates of Primary and Seco ndary Education oversee all private schools. In practice, however, not even the Directors General of the Primary and of the Secondary Divisions can agree on a commo n agenda to harmonize those aspects of the policy process which affect bo th these divisions even though all supervisors in Guatemala City are required to o versee both primary and secondary schools within their individual districts Thus, it is not uncommon to find children and teachers without schools; schools unab le to have facilities of their own, while empty buildings await those who were sup posed to occupy them; empty installations bereft of basic equipment or textbook s and poorly trained personnel; these are some of the consequences of MINED's organ izational configuration which were identified by a UNESCO study in 1980. Si xteen years later, another study (Ruano de Flores, 1997) found that the proble ms identified in 1980 had become even worse. The most recent manifestation of this administrative inconsistency took place during the failed attempt to incorporate students from the senior year in vocational career tracks into the na tional literacy campaign. The campaign was coordinated not through MINED but thro ugh the National Directorate for Literacy and the Presidential Secretariat for S ocial Affairs, an office traditionally used as an executive branch outlet to give visibili ty to the PresidentÂ’s wife through charity projects. Needless to say, the decision to incorporate the students had been taken without consulting schools, parents nor the s tudents concerned. As word began to spread out that students would be required to give up part or all of their senior year of studies to participate in the litera cy campaign, widespread protests
11 of 27 erupted throughout Guatemala. In the resulting fias co, the government was forced to back down and had to redefine the entire scope o f the literacy campaign (Prensa Libre, 2001).Lastly, MINED has very limited research and develop ment capabilities. MINED does not foster any long term cooperation initiativ es between public and private schools at either the Departmental or National leve l. Research comparing curricular, administrative or financial aspects of private and public education in Guatemala is virtually non-existent (Ruano, 2002). There are no formal mechanisms to allow private and public schools to e xchange information on best practices, sharing of facilities such as libraries, information technology or teacher professional development programs.Researching Education in Guatemala: Fieldwork, meth odological and sampling issuesThe majority of fieldwork was undertaken between 19 97 and 1999 as part of a Doctoral Dissertation. Subsequent observations and follow up interviews took place in 2001 through a University Research Grant. Some o f the schools observed follow the standard Guatemalan Academic Calendar from Janu ary through October while others use the North American one from September th rough June. While the original fieldwork included observations, interview s and statistical analysis of some 40 private and public schools throughout the City, the findings presented here are based on work carried out in six private establishm ents which shared similar characteristics as follows: Between 700 and 1000 students total enrolment more or less evenly divided between Primary and Secondary Divisions (be tween 7 and 17 years old).Fully Bilingual Curriculum from first grade Element ary to Senior year Secondary where English is the Second Language taug ht and Spanish the primary one.Total financial autonomy from public funding source s. Fully funded from student fees and other types of private contributio ns. Fully self-governing through a Board of Trustees or as a family run and owned institution.Non denominational. During fieldwork preliminary open ended questionnai res were administered to both teaching and administrative staff in order to get b aseline data on teaching assignments, administrative tasks and student perfo rmance indicators. Further data was obtained through focus groups with parents, stu dents and administrative and ancillary staff. Data on Governance arrangements wa s obtained via interviews with key decision makers in the schools. Documentary cro ss checking was carried out through examination of schools records, Ministry of Education documentation (when available) and related materials. Nevertheles s, the research effort faced clear and at times severe restrictions. Some of the most important involve
12 of 27 categorical refusals on the part of most schools to go on record as to financial and governance aspects. Not a single school from which data was obtained in this study would allow its name or the identities of its Offic ials to be named. Only exceptionally was the researcher allowed to make co pies of school records. With rare exceptions no interviews were taped and no par ticipants in focus groups or individual interviews could be named or implied if such implication could lead to their identification. Other restrictions involved a greements made between the researcher and the schools so as to prevent sharing of Curricular and pedagogical practices with other schools.Some of the arguments given by school officials reg arding the restrictions imposed are related to security concerns; Guatemala City is regarded as one of the most violent regions in the world (World Bank 1997, Buvi nic, Morrison, & Shifter 1999) sharing top murder and kidnaping rankings in a list where one can find cities such as Bogota (Colombia), San Salvador (El Salvador) an d Johannesburg (South Africa). Evidently, some of the students enrolled i n these schools are prime targets for extortion and kidnapping and their security bec omes a basic concern at the schools they attend. Other rationales given are rel ated to economic considerations, as in the case of restrictions imposed on the shari ng of Curricular and pedagogical practices with other schools. Such practices are re garded as Â“trade secretsÂ” by the schools. Hence their reluctance to have those pract ices known by other schools regarded as competitors in a market segment that is very small due to the extreme socioeconomic stratification noted previously. Base d on these limitations, the data and analysis thereof is presented in a composite-ty pe fashion from which an overall picture emerges. That is to say, the data is integr ated into a general framework from which analytical categories can be discerned a nd conclusions drawn. For instance, rather than focusing on specific financia l or governance arrangements of individual schools, an overall analysis is presente d. Lastly, where it is necessary to refer to the large r context of private education in Guatemala, the analysis presented is based on the b aseline data obtained throughout fieldwork. Due to the scarcity of previo us research in this area, much of the data was generated and is presented in a system atic fashion for the first time.Private bilingual education: organizational and gov ernance aspectsLook, what do you think this is? An American Indian Reservation or something? Our studentsÂ’ parents want their kids to learn English, not Mayan languages. (Note 9) In terms of ownership arrangements, elite bilingual private schools in Guatemala City can be divided in three large categories. Firs t there are those who are run as family businesses by members of a family. In this m odel, certain administrative tasks are delegated to a Principal or School Coordi nator while the owners retain overall control in all other aspects including, tex tbook selection, hiring and firing of teachers, performance assessments, academic and oth er fees charged to students as well overall curricular orientation. Members of the owning family usually hold positions such as teachers, counselors, librarians or accountants for the school. The second category is made up of establishments th at are run by a Board of
13 of 27 Governors (Consejo Directivo). This board is usuall y made up of parents and other individuals who have contributed financially to the setting up of the school and can in fact be construed as shareholders with overall c ontrol of the schoolÂ’s activities. Usually, the board hires a Principal and other admi nistrative staff upon whom many of the day to day functions are delegated.The third category is made up of those schools whic h are controlled by religious or denominational entities. Historically, the majority of denominational schools are from Evangelical and Catholic denominations (Rose & Brouwer, 1990). In recent years, the Church of Latter Day Saints or Mormons h as set up schooling facilities for its members throughout Guatemala. In the case o f Church owned establishments, overall control is retained by the religious entity with limited or no input from non-Church participants. All of the scho ols where data collection took place for this study where non-denominational. As a general rule, denominational schools are quite difficult to gain access to due t o a number of factors such as mistrust towards outside researchers, lack of inter est in educational practices not approved by their superiors and an overall climate of defensiveness on the part of school officials. A very small segment of the priva tely run schools is made up of so-called bi-national schools. These were set up by German, French and United States immigrants and expatriates resident in Guate mala. The binational schools tend to follow the curricula r arrangements of the countries they are associated with, granting exit diplomas co mparable to those of schools in the home country. Their clientele is made up of wea lthy Guatemalan families children of expatriate workers and descendants of i mmigrants. In terms of organizational arrangements there is al so variability. While the establishments dealt with in this study have a mult i-layered organizational pattern composed of teachers, principals and administrative support staff, the vast majority of private schools have a simple structure comprise d of teachers and a principal who can also be the school's owner. Affordable priv ate education usually consists "of large numbers of students crammed into matchbox -sized classrooms with school facilities and teachers not worthy of the na me" (Fernndez Garca, 1998, p. 4). A standard private school is usually a recondit ioned home with a small courtyard and few -if anypedagogical aids. It must be remem bered that, with limited public investment in education in previous decades, demogr aphic pressure forced many lower-income families to enrol their children in th ese private institutions which were the only ones they could afford and are still prefe rable -in their viewto many public schools (Galindo, Personal communication).Supervision of private schools takes place on paper only. This means that they are required to present large amounts of forms and docu mentation attesting to the schools' program content, teaching staff and facili ties. Nevertheless, supervisors will seldom visit a school to verify the validity o f the claims made. Once a school is registered its licence to operate is granted throug h a Ministerial Decree in some instances while other schools are authorized under an Executive Decree. It is unclear why some establishments were authorized to operate under different types of Decrees. Nevertheless, such licenses must be revalidated on an annual basis. This means that Supervisors spend a great amount of time dealing with the paperwork generated by private schools when renewin g their licenses.
14 of 27 Curricular organization and teaching aspectsIn terms of Curriculum formulation, the Education L aw requires a threshold of compliance with the basic curricula which is compri sed of Mathematics, Spanish Language, Social Studies and Biology whenever they are taught in Spanish. Any other activities, subjects and programs of study de livered beyond the basic curricula and delivered in languages other than Spa nish are considered to be optional and are neither subject to administrative nor academic oversight. Overall compliance with the basic curricula is enforced by MINED supervisors. As has been noted earlier in this section, Supervisors have ver y limited enforcement capabilities to bear upon the very institutions which oftentimes supply them with basic office equipment and Â“salary supplementsÂ”. As a result the re is virtually no way of enforcing compliance with basic curricular content. Furthermore, private schools are at complete liberty to set up their own admissi ons standards which can include entrance examinations, financial screening and pers onal interviews with both parents and prospective students. Results of examin ations are never made public and there is no mechanism to compare performance ac ross schools. There are no nation-wide standardized tests, process indicators nor any other recognized input or output indicators used with enough consistency t o allow for proper assessments of the private education sector to be carried out. This is an institutional weakness which is present in various degrees throughout Lati n America (Birdsall & Sabot 1996, Dignard 1986, Lowden 1996, Otis 1997, Savedof f 1998, Silva 1996, Vos 1996).Generally speaking, Private institutions have an al most unlimited discretion in curriculum design and teachable subjects so long as schools claim that part or all of their instruction takes place in a foreign language For example, almost all private schools claim to offer one or more bilingual -mostl y English/Spanishvocational tracks. Because English is considered to be an addi tional subject it is usually off limits to ministerial oversight. Thus, most private schools' advertisements profess to be "fully bilingual" meaning English-Spanish. In re lation to the establishments analyzed for this study, the preferred approach is to set up a situation of parallel bilingualism whereby a certain number of subjects i s taught entirely in English alongside their Spanish counterparts. The main curr icular and governance consequence of such arrangement is that a school is effectively split in two separate areas along linguistic lines. Thus, there is a Principal in charge of the English language segment while another runs the Spa nish one. Little or no coordination was observed to exist between both seg ments. Hiring and firing of teachers takes place at the di scretion of the schoolÂ’s owner with no right to appeal by the teacher. None of the scho ols researched by the author throughout Guatemala City have seniority nor tenure provisions for their teaching staff. Thus, teaching salaries remain stagnant or a ccrue only small increases over the span of many years of service. Retirement plans or Pension Funds for private school teachers are virtually unheard of. There are no legal avenues to counter these arbitrary practices as the working conditions and contracts set forth by private schools are not regulated by MINED but by the Minis try of Labor. There is no professional organization to represent private scho ol teachers nationwide and no initiatives to improve their professional standing and working conditions have ever been undertaken by MINED or other stakeholders.
15 of 27 Working conditions for most teachers are difficult. As salaries are low, it is not unusual to find teachers who work in two or even th ree different jobs to make ends meet. This is a critical factor behind low teaching standards and poor student performance. It is also a phenomenon found in many developing countries (Farrell & Oliveira, 1993). Even the elite bilingual schools studied spend little or no resources for professional development. Not a singl e private school visited during fieldwork offers financial incentives or time off s upport for teachers who wish to further their training at the university level. Sim ilarly to their public sector counterparts, private school teachers need no addit ional training nor credentials to become principals at either the Primary or Secondar y level (AMEU 1998, Fadul 1997). Likewise, pay scales, in-service training an d additional support mechanisms for teachers are left entirely at the discretion of the establishmentÂ’s owner whose ultimate decision-making authority is never questio ned. As pointed out previously, school owners are rarely qualified school administr ators. Â“My father gave me my Colegio as a wedding presentÂ” said the owner of a school i nterviewed by the author. During fieldwork, this author observed how principals almost invariably deferred to the establishments' owners opinion even in areas which were clearly Curricular in nature.Financing the autonomy of private schoolsDue to constantly increasing demand for educational services, private schools became an important provider of educational facilit ies. According to article 73 of the Constitution, all private educational establishment s are exempt from payment of all taxes on all their activities. This exemption exten ds to school supplies and materials, tuition fees and ancillary fees as well as to infrastructure. In the case of schools looked at in this study the range of fees v aries between three and five-thousand dollars a year. Thus, total tax exemp tions amount to millions of dollars. It is important to point out that private schools receive no direct funding from the government. Therefore, each of them must m eet its financial needs through registration and ancillary fees charged dir ectly to students. There is no publicly funded system to support attendance of chi ldren from lower income background whose parents wish them to attend privat e schools Demographic pressures during the 1970's and 1980's coupled with declining government investment in the construction of new sc hools created an ever increasing demand for privately-run facilities. The growth in private education has not been matched by national regulations on the qua lity and type of instruction offered. As a result, schools tend to focus more on their economic viability rather than their academic performance. This is true of th e vast majority of establishments and probably more so of the elite bilingual schools whose only claim to superior academic standards lies in the prestige levels they project to society. In other words, brand name recognition reinforced by percept ions of economic success of the families of attending students have more weight in a decision to choose a school over their competitors. Many parents in focu s groups were particularly explicit on their motivations in selecting individu al establishments. In the families researched in this study, such selection is usually made by the mother as opposed to the father. Among the rationales given one can f ind: Â“ThatÂ’s where I went to school, therefore, thatÂ’s w here my children will
16 of 27 go.Â”Â“I heard from other mothers that this school has a good reputation.Â” Â“I know the Principal of this school. SheÂ’s very go od.Â” Â“The school is in the neighborhood. You know, one l ess security risk to be worried about.Â”Â“I want my children to learn good English and math. This school is one of the best in preparing kids to go to universities in the United States and succeeding in those academic environments.Â”Â“Most of the families of my childrenÂ’s friends have sent their kids here. ItÂ’s a way of keeping things in the family so to sp eak.Â” To a certain extent, attendance at these elite esta blishments reinforces and reproduces the social networks which are necessary to maintain oneÂ’s own position in the social hierarchy. In a social environment su ch as GuatemalaÂ’s where socioeconomic advancement prospects are conditioned by the Loyalty Principle rather than by individual talent, educational crite ria take a back seat to socioeconomic status considerations. It is not surp rising then that, with some exceptions, most parents did not seem to be interes ted in having nationwide educational standards that could allow them to comp are schools based on clear performance indicators.Â“We know just which schools would come on top of an y classification anyhow. So, no, I donÂ’t see a need to classify themÂ” said a con fident upper class parent when asked about educational standards. While it can be argued that subsidizing private education via tax exemptions is necessary and even desirable in light of the large coverage and quality deficits extant throughout the country, it can also be argued that some or all of these deficits would not have a risen had the government been able to generate enough revenue via general taxatio n revenues to finance the quantity and quality of additional public schools. Guatemala's overall tax collection rates are among the lowest in the Americas (World B ank, 1995). Moreover, a great deal of resources was spent for military purposes p articularly during the period 1980-1995. The resulting diversion of resources awa y from educational activities have turned MINED into a chronically underfunded Mi nistry with no hope of reversing this trend in the foreseeable future. Fiv e years after the end of Civil War, Military expenditure still consumes substantial por tions of the countryÂ’s budget. In addition to tax breaks, private schools obtain s ubstantial revenues from several activities. The most widely used are: Entrance examinations ( Exmenes de admisin ) School supplies lists ( Listas de tiles escolares ) Registration bonuses Fundraising events. These sources of income will be discussed in turn.Entrance examinations The majority of private schools conduct entrance
17 of 27 examinations at the beginning of the school year. T hese tests are not standardized or regulated by MINED in any way. As is the case in most private school decisions, the criteria used for grading these tests are not m ade public nor are their results subject to appeal. Essentially, each school decides what it is going to test and how much students must pay to sit the examinations. In practice, entrance examinations fees operate as a preliminary financial screening d evice for parents: if they cannot afford to pay the entrance examinations fees to beg in with, then their children are not suitable for attendance at that school. Usually the higher the cost of school fees, the higher the cost of the entrance examinati ons. The examination itself is used as a negative selection device in that it refl ects the schoolÂ’s own curricular standards thereby preempting access by students who were not exposed to such prior knowledge.School supplies lists At the beginning of the school year, each private school decides which school supplies are to be purchased b y the students. Most of those supplies can only be found at the school store or f rom suppliers approved by it. Each student is expected to follow the lists' requi rements to the letter. Lists are outrageously detailed and are viewed by both parent s and teachers as an outward sign of the school's academic standard. In most cas es, schools buy new textbooks and other materials and lease them to students duri ng the school year. The same materials are leased for several years. Through suc h leasing schemes, the school recuperates the costs of materials several times ov er. Periodically, MINED threatens to impose fines and other sanctions on sc hools whose lists are deemed utterly extravagant in pedagogical and financial te rms. Nevertheless, it appears that no such action has ever been taken.Registration bonuses Registration bonuses are set amounts which parent s are required to pay upon first registration of their ch ildren. A number of justifications are given for this charge, among them, infrastructure e xpansion, decreased enrollments, increased enrollments or some other un expected contingency. It is worth noting that teachers' salary increases is not among the reasons for requesting these bonuses. The amount payable appear s to be completely arbitrary and to depend exclusively on the schools' authoriti es. One parent described the bonus as a "dowry payment we make so that the schoo l will find my child acceptable, so to speak." Under the current legal f ramework parents have very limited ability to challenge decisions made by priv ate schools. Fundraising events Fund-raising events are activities organized by s chools to generate income for a variety of reasons. Again, th ey are decided upon by the school with little or no input from parents. Many s chools simply ask of students a certain amount for "Fundraising activities" for the school year, in addition to the bonuses discussed previously. Since few if any priv ate schools release yearly financial reports, it is impossible to know the act ual destination of these and any other "contributions" demanded from students.Concluding remarksResearch to understand the differential impact of e ducational policy and curriculum formulation in private institutions in Guatemala is at best very limited. There are neither formal nor institutional mechanisms to allo w private and public schools to exchange information on best practices, sharing of facilities such as libraries,
18 of 27 information technology or staff development program s. No initiatives to promote cooperation between the two sectors have been imple mented. Despite their stated goal of focusing on quality and the improvement of academic standards, no comparative assessments between private schools exi st. Thus, parents have no way of comparing test scores, repetitions and dropo ut rates or costs per student across establishments. Rodolfo Bianchi, former Pres ident of the Association of Private Schools could not offer an explanation as t o why such comparisons were unavailable (Personal communication).In the absence of any common guidelines for quality assessment, national standardized testing procedures and teaching perfor mance indicators, ability to pay becomes the only criteria separating the different types of private schools. A school's perceived quality is thus inextricably lin ked to its costs. Ability to pay as the sole criterion to measure for quality also results in academic tracking systems which mirror those of society at large. Only those children from higher income families can afford to attend the same schools atte nded by their parents. The rest of the student population must rely on the assuranc es of each individual school as to its educational standards.Bilingualism in the elite schools is regarded by al l parties concerned as primarily the attainment of English language skills at a level wh ich meets parental expectations of social mobility or the preservation of social st anding. Other languages, particularly Indigenous ones, need not apply. There is no discussion of the role played by Maya, Xinca or Garifuna languages in the educational reality of the country (Ruano 2001, AVANCSO 1998). Thus, Guatemala n elite bilingual schools tend to reflect the different realities Guatemalans are forced to live in. On the one hand a world of entrenched privilege and dependency on foreign markets which make the survival of exclusionary sociopolitical ar rangements possible. On the other, a world of great destitution and inequality which is also endowed with great cultural diversity and resilience. In terms of financial arrangements, private schools are exempt from all taxation duties. Furthermore, creative accounting practices and other devices insure that financial records remain virtually immune to govern ment scrutiny. At the same time, no private institution in Guatemala City receives d irect funding from the government and there is no system to support attendance of chi ldren from lower income backgrounds whose parents wish them to attend priva te schools. In addition, many institutions raise funds through different measures such as obligatory purchases of school uniforms, exorbitant graduation fees, entran ce examination payments and ancillary fees. Others purchase textbooks which the y then rent out to students for several years at handsome margins. Still others req uire students to pay hefty entrance fees, the so-called Bonuses (bonos in Span ish). Few if any higher income schools have ever been charged under the provisions of the education law for these abuses (Vsquez, 1998). Though not justifiabl e, these measures are partly the result of the extremely low priority accorded t o education by the Guatemalan government. In the ensuing climate of survival of t he financially fittest, private schools have little choice but to make use of such practices. As for the formulation and implementation of curric ula, the lack of clear administrative and legal guidelines allows private schools to decouple themselves from most decision making and policy-formulation pr ocesses emanating from the
19 of 27 government. For purely ideological reasons, (privat e schools' perceived conservatism and pro-business stance, attendance by higher social strata, differential fees charged), the Guatemalan governme nt simply assumes that private schools are of better quality than public ones. Thi s insures little scrutiny from both MINED's authorities and the public at large. This p erception is also shared by all major international development agencies who usuall y do not include the private sector initiatives in their overall designs of educ ational reform packages. Few explanations are offered as to why private schools should neither participate nor be asked for their input in the educational policy pro cess. This exclusion from the policy process is very difficult to understand give n that there are five times more private schools than public ones serving the 12-17 age group and that virtually all pre-primary establishments are private (Rodas Marti ni, 1998). For almost 40 years, Guatemalans were engaged in a brutal Civil War that essentially originated in the socioeconomic chasm w hich separates the haves from the have nots. After decades of military stalemate, the conflict ended in 1996, nevertheless, without resolving the outstanding soc ial, economic and political issues which originated it in the first place. With the war over, Guatemalans must now decide whether to pursue social change through the avenues of the democratic electoral process and through increased participation in the national life. In this sense, true and meaningful educational refo rm is one of the key instruments in the attainment of a more equitable and prosperou s outlook for future generations.Whether Guatemalans are prepared to leave behind th e disheartening premises of the present educational system and replace them wit h alternatives that hold more promise for the future is a question only time can answer.Notes 1. Press Editorial in Diario el Grfico newspaper (1977) by widely respected journalist and center right politician Jorge Carpio Nicolle. Mr. Carpio Nicolle was murdered in 1993. His assassination bore all the ha llmarks of Army Death Squads operations. To this day, the identity of his killer s remains unknown. 2. Former Guatemalan Defense Minister General Hector G ramajo quoted in NACLA Report on the Americas (July, 1995). Vol XXV: p.2. 3. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are the au thorÂ’s responsibility. 4. Article 74th of GuatemalaÂ’s Constitution. 5. Remarks made by a rural teacher in the Eastern Depa rtment of Chiquimula on GuatemalaÂ’s Constitutional provisions which make at tendance to school compulsory for all children aged 7-17. 6. The Guatemalan ArmyÂ’s obsession with social control and political repression is still a central element to understand the current s ocioeconomic outlook. Several years after the end of the Civil War the ArmyÂ’s net work of political terrorism headed by the nefarious Military Intelligence Services or G-2, along with several other agencies, remains remarkably intact.
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23 of 27 Washington, DC: InterAmerican Development BankOtis, J. (1997). Education Crisis Latin Trade. Vol.5:(8), pgs. 32-37. Prensa Libre Newspaper (2001). Alfabetizacin entre s y no. Electronic Edition, February 22.Prensa Libre.comREMHI, (1998). Guatemala: Nunca Mas. Informe Proyecto Interdiocesa no de recuperacin de la memoria histrica. ArchbishopÂ’s Office for Human Rights. Guatemala City: Author.Revista Crnica, (1997). Guatemala en nmeros Special Issue, pp. 17-18. Revista Proceso, (1998). Cuando la educacin se convierte en negocio [When schooling becomes a business]. 12:4-7.Rodas Martini, P. (1998). Urge la revolucin Pre-pr imaria. El Periodico Newspaper, March 3 p. 11.Rose, S.D. & Brouwer, S. (1990). The export of fund amental Americanism: U.S. Evangelical education in Guatemala. Latin American perspectives 17, 4:42-56. Ruano de Flores, E. (1997). La calidad de la educacin. Guatemala: ASIES Publications.Ruano, C.R. (2002) Reforma educativa en sistemas ad ministrativos con caractersticas premodernas: el caso de Guatemala. Revista Electrnica de Investigacin Educativa, 4 (1). Internet Document: http://redie.ens.uabc.mx/vol4no1/contenido-ruano.ht ml Ruano, C.R. (2001) La participacin de las Minorias Nacionales dentro de sistemas educativos Pre_Modernos: El caso de los Garifunas d e Guatemala. Eduation Policy Analysis Archives. 9 (23). Retrieved July 12, 2003 from http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v9n23.htmlRuano, C.R. (1999). An Examination of centralized educational policy pr ocesses and their impact in Guatemala City, 1976-1995. Doctoral Dissertation, The University of Toronto. Ottawa: National Library of Canada. http//: www.nlc-bnc.ca Ruano, C.R. (1997). Living the truth in Guatemala. Outlook Magazine. (35) 3: 8,30. Savedoff, W.D. Ed. (1998). La organizacin marca la diferencia. Educacin y sa lud en Amrica Latina. Washington, DC: InterAmerican Development Bank. Silva, A. (1996). The politics and techniques of im plementing policy innovations: Cross-case analysis and conclusions [pp 139-165]. I n Implementing policy innovations in Latin America. Antonia Silva, Ed. Washington, DC: InterAmerican Development Bank.Siglo XXI Newspaper (1999). Maestros de San Juan Sacatepequez no reciben sus
24 of 27 salarios desde febrero October, 4th p.13. Author. Smith, C.A. (1990). The militarization of civil soc iety in Guatemala: Economic reorganization as a continuation of war. Latin American perspectives 17, 4:8-41. United Nations System (1999). Guatemala: el rostro rural del desarrollo humano AuthorUnited Nations System (1998). Guatemala: los contrastes del desarrollo humano Author.UNESCO [United Nations Education Science and Cultur e Organization] (1991). World education report. Paris: Author. Vsquez, B. (1998). Que los investiguen! Prensa Libre Newspaper, (January 11th, p. 12).Vos, R. (1996). Educational indicators; What's to b e measured? INDES Working Papers. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank. World Bank: (2000). Poverty and policy in Latina Am erica and the Caribbean. World Bank Technical Paper No. 467 Washington, DC: Author. World Bank (1997). Crime and Violence as Developmen t Issues in Latin America and the Caribbean. The State of Rio de Janeiro and The Inter-American Development Bank. Seminar on The Challenge of Urban Criminal Violence Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, March 24.World Bank: (1995). Guatemala, basic education stra tegy: equity and efficiency in education. Latin America and the Caribbean regional office rep ort No. 13304-GU Washington, DC: Author.World Bank (1978). Guatemala: Economic and social position and prospec ts. Washington, DC: Author.About the AuthorCarlos R. RuanoEl Bosque UniversityBogota, ColombiaEmail: firstname.lastname@example.org@yahoo.caCarlos R. Ruano is Senior Education Specialist, Ame ricas Branch with the Canadian International Development Agency CIDA-ACDI in Hull, Canada. He is also Associate Professor of Educational Foundations at El Bosque University in Bogota, Colombia. He obtained B.A. degrees in Lingu istics and History from the University of Ottawa as well as an M.Sc from Georgi a State University and Doctor of Education from the University of Toronto. Dr. Ru ano's interests deal with the formulation and implementation of educational polic y in multicultural and multilingual societies from a comparative and inter national perspective. The views
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