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Educational policy analysis archives.
n Vol. 13, no. 12 (February 07, 2005).
Tempe, Ariz. :
b Arizona State University ;
Tampa, Fla. :
University of South Florida.
c February 07, 2005
Globalization, statist political economy, and unsuccessful education reform in South Korea, 1993-2003 / Ki Su Kim.
Arizona State University.
University of South Florida.
t Education Policy Analysis Archives (EPAA)
E DUCATION P OLICY A NALYSIS A RCHIVES A peer reviewed scholarly journal Editor: Sherman Dorn College of Education University of South Florida Copyright is retained by the first or sole author, who grants right of first publication to the Education Policy Analysis Archives EPAA is published jointly by the Colleges of Education at Arizona State University and the University of South Florida. Articles are indexed in the Directory of Open Access Journals (www.doaj.org). Volume 13 Number 1 2 February 7 2005 ISSN 1068 2341 Globalization, Statist Political Economy, and Unsuccessful Education Reform in South Korea 1993 2003 Ki Su Kim Memorial University Canada Citation: Kim, K. S. (2005, February 7 ). Globali zation, s tatist p olitical e conomy, and u nsuccessful e ducation r eform in South Korea, 1993 2003 Education Policy Analysis Archives, 13 (12). http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v13n12/. Abstract This article examines the relationship between globalization and nationa l education reforms, especially those of educational systems. Instead of exploring the much debated issues of how globalization affects national educational systems and how the nations react by what kinds of systemic education reform, however, it focuses o n what such a method often leaves out the internal conditions of a nation that facilitates or hampers reform efforts. Taking South Korea as an example, it explores that countrys unique national context which restricts and even inhibits education reforms Especially noted here is the established statist political economy in education. In the papers analysis, although South Koreas statist political economy has made a substantial contribution to economic and educational development, it is now considered increasingly unviable as globalization progresses. Nevertheless, the internal conditions, resultant from the previous statist policies, set limits on policy makers efforts to alter the existing educational system. The analysis suggests that a fuller asse ssment of globalizations impact upon national educational systems or their reforms requires a perspective which is broad enough to encompass not only the concepts
Kim: Unsuccessful Education Reform in South Korea 2 and/or theories of globalization and nation states but also the power relations and ideologi cal setup of individual nations. I begin by exploring the meaning of globalization and pointing out the need to consider individual nations internal conditions F ocus ing on South Korea, t hen, I identif y a statist political economy that is in place and the policy making venues it implicates. Then, the analysis moves on to identif y the statist educational policies employed during the developmental years of military dictatorship and the structural educational problems resulted from such policies. Th is is f ollowed by an examination of the educational reform agendas of liberalization and diversification that emerged at a time of globalization and civilian democracy and of the way in which the countrys internal conditions obstructed reform efforts I conclud e by suggesti ng that, in spite of such negative functions, the internal conditions will eventually be altered as statism becomes increasingly unviable under the forces of globalization Globalization and the Internal Conditions of Nations A salient them e of the globalization discourse concerns the emergence of transnational capital financial and industrial capital which freely roams around the world in search of profits and efficient production sites (Fudge and Glasbeek 1997, 219) According to Cox (19 93, 259 60) globalization exhibits two principal aspects. One is the global organizations of production involving complex transnational networks of production which take advantage of costs, markets, taxes, and access to suitable labor as well as politi cal security and predictability. The other principal aspect is global finance, which involves a very large unregulated system of transactions in money, credit, and equities. These aspects of globalization are also, in his view, the principal aspects of the global economy which follows globalization and, in operation, transcends national boundaries, thus reducing the nation states autonomy and demanding that national economies be adjusted to its own exigencies (Ibid.; Ohmae 1993; Gummet 1996) Further, the integration of domestic economies into the global economy places the nation states under insecurity (R atinoff 1995, 147) notabl y of revenues which generate financial resources for governing and protecting domestic activity. While state revenues depend on the nations economic performances, the latter now rely on the transnational behavior of the global economy. The nation state, it follows, has not only to conform to the global economy but also to reduce its domestic role to an affordable level. If so, th en, public education, which has been expanding at the time of the states ever increasing commitment, may no longer do so R ather, it may have to go through a restructuring process involv ing such policies as liberalization, decentralization and privatizati on. The globalization discourse also involves another theme, that globalization is related not only to transnational capital and the global economy but also to other factors, notably global cultural forces that affect national educational system s ( Mazru i 1990; UNESCO 19 98 ) and prompt transformations and transitions (Mebrahtu et al. 2000). Included in such forces and noted among the m, are information and communication technology (ICT) and the innovative processes it foment s (Carnoy 1999 ; Nelson Richards 2003 ). In this theme, a nations economic prosperity depends on its performance in the global economy, which, in turn, relies on the
Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 13 No. 12 3 3 workforces adjustment to, and leadership in, the knowledge intensive mode of production buttressed by ICT Of importance f or this is to have a workforce that has the foundation to enhance the quality and efficiency of product development, production and maintenance, and the flexibility to acquire the new skills required for new jobs and a cadre of highly trained scientific technical and processing personnel (Haddad 1997, 37). The former requires solid primary and secondary education while the latter calls for quality higher education. These requirements can be met by increased state investment in education and a reinforce d national educational system In this theme, thus, the state has to enhance its role in education. The two conflicting themes have generated different responses regarding the impact of globalization on national education al systems. One such response is f ound often in the works by those who are outside the field of education. It speaks of public educations continuity at a time of crisis and points to the necessity of restructuring national education al systems in order to make them cost effective, decentra lized, market friendly, and viable in the new environment ( World Bank 1995; Burnett and Patrionos 1997 ; Po p kewitz 2000; Daun 2002 ; Mok and Chan 2002 ) The second response, which is prominent in the works of those within the education field runs in the opp osite direction. It defends state commitment to education for equity and justice and denounces the more or less harmful effects of globalization for instance, on the educational system s o f Third World countries (Pannu 1996) or in advanced industrial natio ns such as Canada ( OSullivan 1999) on the worse offs in public schools in comparison with the better offs in private schools (Espinola 1992 ; Reynolds and Griffiths 2002 ) on neglected primary and secondary education in comparison with favored higher educ ation ( e.g., Samoff 1994) on tensions between global and local dynamics in culture and education ( Burbules and Torres 2000; Stromquist and Monkman 2000; Torres 2002), on the need of resistance to globalization (McLaren and Farahmandpur 2001), and so on. T o be fair, these responses are both empirical and moralistic empirical because they draw upon facts collected from individual nations and moralistic because they are disposed to condone or condemn globalization. A third response is more moralistic than em pirical. It denies both of the above mentioned themes and demands that nation states increase their commitment to education because globalization elevates and does not lower their status, allegedly, as is evident in East Asian countries (Green 1997 ; Gree n 1999 ) Meanwhile, a fourth response, which is more empirical than moralistic, states that globalization has rendered little effects to national education al systems (McGinn 1997). Such diverse responses, however, commonly leave out one area which is im portant for a fuller account of the relationship between globalization and national education al systems. This area is actually hinted at in the fourth cited response, in which decentralization confronts resistance from conservative teachers, parents and local actors who do not want changes to the status quo (Ibid.) Education reforms are initiated and pursued by those who recognize the necessity of change. More often than not, however, their policy agendas and ideas are not finalized as policies straightf orwardly. In the policy making processes, such agendas and ideas confront opposing agendas and views, and are compromised, revised and even discarded to the good or bad For this reason, what is observed in state education policies, school statistics, chan ges or no changes to national educational system s shows the outcome of the negotiations and compromises which have taken place in a relatively short time span. It does not readily reveal the kind of impact of globalization that is now canceled out by oppo sing forces but will
Kim: Unsuccessful Education Reform in South Korea 4 resurrect later on when the opposing forces recede. Important to consider in this light is the internal conditions which play a crucial role in the policy making and implementation process es especially the states established politica l economy which is institutionalized in state society, state education relationship s In their application to individual nations, globalization triggered reform measures such as liberalization, decentralization and privatization confront the states establ ished way of dealing with societal and educational matters. If the established way is one of relatively open and permissive of freedom of activity in society and education, such measures may be applied with relative ease. If not, however, it may not. The r eason is that the reform measures are, in this case, more than mere reform measures: they aim to alter the established political economy itself. If a states established political economy is closed and not permissive of freedom in society and education th erefore, such measures are either unlikely to be employed or to be employed superficially as if nothing has happened in spite of globalization, or even as if the nation state has enhanced its status due to globalization as Green (1997; 1999) mistakes Her e it is interesting to examine how South Koreas established political economy influences policy making and implementation in education. It is so because the countrys statist political economy has created internal conditions that are not susceptible to globalization but, rather, inhibit s changes to existing state society, state education relationship s Statist Political Economy and Its Policy Making Process Statism as a Political Economy Concept Statism is a concept of political economy which denotes a peculiar way in which the political state deals with the economic activity of individuals and groups in the civil sphere (or civil society or society). 1 In the statist political economy, roughly, the state subjugates the interest of individuals or g roups to its own interest or the interest of the nation (or society at large). However, statism in this rough sense is too broad to be useful as an analytic tool, for any intervention by the state in civil matters can be seen as the subjugation of individu al or group interest to the states own interest. In fact, all modern states intervene in civil matters in one way or another, so all of them can be statist as the libertarian s would claim. Statism in such a broad sense proffers no help to distinguishing a states way of dealing with civil matters from another states. To be a useful analytic tool, it needs circumscription against the concrete context of specific countries. Statism as it is found in South Korea is, generally, a legacy of Japans colonia l rule, 1910 1945, and Japan, in turn, imported it from Prussia. Therefore, statism in South Korea shares certain general features with those in Japan and, indirectly, in Prussia (and also with other East Asian countries which employ the Jap anese model of market economics [Sakakibara 1993] such as Taiwan and, arguably, China). An important common feature of this type of statism is that the state maintains big power, bureaucracy and institutional networks by which to control and manage the activity of civ il society in order to make the nation wealthy and its military strong ( fukoku kyohei ; pugug kangbyong ) as proclaimed in the past or to promote economic development and social well being as emphasized more recently. State intervention in society in South Korea and Japan is so extensive and intensive that its influence is felt at all tissues of social fabric so much so that it is often questioned whether these countries
Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 13 No. 12 5 5 really have a civil society in the sense of a collectivity of self seeking indi viduals (see McVeigh 1998) In Prussia, as well, the individuality of a person was considered for instance, in the works of Hegel in reference to the totality of the state. On the contemporary scene, however, statism in Japan and South Korea shows differe nt features from what remains in Germany. While Germanys political economy is often characterized by social partnership and corporatism, such characteristics are not visible in those two countries. Policy making and implementation in Japan is a process in which the state unilaterally decides for society according to its own agendas (Schoppa 1991) The state does not seek public consultation or consultation with the parties to be affected by the policies under consideration except through some nominal proce dures. Policy negotiations and compromises occur within the governing circle, involving government leaders, the ruling political party and state bureaucrats, in the manner of patterned pluralism ( Muramatsu and Krauss 1987, 543). Particularly noteworthy h ere is the bureaucrats prominent status. According to Schoppa, the Liberal Democrats long one party domination allowed the bureaucrats to accumulate power to the extent that in the mid 1980s, they successfully thwarted government leaders efforts to lib eralize the overly state controlled educational system in order to better cope with globalization. 2 The states unilateral process of policy making and imposition is conspicuous also in South Korea. 3 But the roles of political parties and the bureaucrats in the process are not as powerful as they are in Japan. Whil st in Japan the long domination by the elected Liberal Democrats did not generate serious issues about the legitimacy of power, South Koreas military dictatorship did so. General Pag Cho ng His government was installed after the 1961 coup and ended in 1979 upon his assassination. Then, Generals C ho n Du Hoan and Ro Tae U usurped power through a multi stage coup completed with the K w angju massacre of 200 protestors, and took turn to rule the countr y until 1993. During the th ree decades the military elite confronted repeated challenges to the legitimacy of their power. In response, they tightly controlled the population and employed the state bureaucracy as a n instrument for this. And in order to se cure the efficiency of this instrument, they meticulously prevented the bureaucrats from acquiring prerogatives in the ir respective fields. 4 Although the military elite had political parties for the legislature, as well, such parties were not permitted to air independent voice s As a result, the state society relationship established during the military years was characteristic in that the state tightly control led or at least tried to control the population and the bureaucrats and political parties remaine d subservient. Venues to Policy Making A unique policy making process emerged from this state society relationship. The military elite s principal concern in handling the persistent legitimacy crisis was the maintenance and legitimation of their power. T hey addressed this concern through a few typical venues to policy making The first and foremost venue was, of course, the control of civilian activity, the suppression of resistance by means of the state apparatus, and the justification of such policies b y pointing to the constantly imminent North Korean invasion. This venue, however, promised only short term benefits; in the long run, it was detrimental rather than beneficial because it invited further resistance. The long term security of power had to be sought for through another venue: a mobilization strategy (Brown 1998) with which to draw the unsupportive population to their side and thus legitimate their power. For this strategy, Pags
Kim: Unsuccessful Education Reform in South Korea 6 military junta in 1961 put forward a project of legitimation by economic development (or developmental legitimation) and all successive military governments adhered to this project albeit with modifications. The gist of this project was the messages to the population that everyone would have a fair share of the frui ts once development became reality, and that the military elite who offered such a great promise were far greater than the corrupt and incompetent civilian leaders. This second policy making venue, however, contravened the first venue The juntas devel opmental legitimation project was one of planned economic development. The state configured the final outcome of development, set necessary developmental tasks for intermedia ry stages, and t ried to meet such tasks by allocating resources and opportunities to strategic industries and economic actors in order thus to boost their performances. This approach alienated non strategic industries and actors and entailed the latters discontent and the egalitarian outcry for equality, equal opportunity, social justi ce, and so on. The 1961 juntas reaction, and the reactions of subsequent military regimes took two routes. In one route it suppressed the display of discontent and open discussi ons on the egalitarian issues; i n the other, it employed egalitarian policy measures (Lee CJ 1980) for a temporary mollification of the discontent. Such policy measures, however, aimed mostly at short term effects in limited areas and did not address the problem directly. Even so, however, such measures conflicted with, and hamp ered, the developmental legitimation project. For example, the military government forbade and suppressed labor activity in favor of the manufacturers capital accumulation but, at the same time, it enforced price control, especially of daily necessities, in order to ease the underpaid workers troubles, in effect, restricting capital accumulation. The developmental legitimation project was impeded also by a third policy making venue. Although the project was useful for the mobilization strategy, it was by nature a call for support in reference to a remote, uncertain future. The present legitimacy crisis required immediately effective means. For this, the military elite took advantage of the traditional personalist ethic, 5 in which transactions were made through personal connections rather than through open competition. In this ethic, the military governments allocated strategic resources and opportunities through personal connections bridged by common regions of origin, alumni relationships, military cama raderie s as well as the personal knots bonded by bribery. This venue led to a considerable success because powerful support groups indeed emerged in various sectors, for example chaebol groups (or business conglomerates) in raising irregular political f unds for the military elite the residents of North K yo ngsang P rovince (the home of the military rulers) in casting supportive votes on election days, and the alumni of the province s prominent high schools in promoting pro government sentiments among the population The resources and opportunities paid to such loyal support groups involved the channeling of strategic resources loans from state controlled banks and state guaranteed foreign loans to the chaebol groups, the concentration of industrial center s in the favored region the monopoly of governmental and military posts by th e alumni of schools in th e region and so on. The efficiency of the strategic allocation of resources and opportunities thus became significantly compromised These were the ma jor venues through which the military rulers unilaterally made and implemented policies for civil matters in the larger society Education policies, like economic policies, were generated through the same venues and, as in the case of the economic policies followed by a huge expansion in education as well as serious structural problems.
Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 13 No. 12 7 7 Statist Policies a nd Structural Educational Problems Statist Education Policies The military elite s concern about the security and legitimation of power was apparent in their policy to control educational institutions. The purpose of this policy was t o prevent and suppress resistance to their power and t o garner support. To this end, the y sought to ensure that all educational institutions, public or private, as well as t he teaching staff, operated as instruments to carr y out their decisions. The measures taken for this included the legal stipulation of educational institutions as public institutions in the case of public schools and as public legal bodies in the case of private schools, and all teachers as public agents in the field of education. With this legal arrangement, the military elite controlled major spheres of all educational institutions operation: institutio n al licenses student quotas, student selecti on, the curriculum and textbooks, examinations and tests, employment and management of the teaching personnel, and even day to day operation. Especially notable was the policy of uniform instruction ensured by one common curriculum for all schools and the textbooks which were either written by the state or app roved according to given specifications. Such textbooks supplied a right answer to each question or issue to be dealt with in class rooms The developmental legitimation project also bore upon educat ion policies. When Pags junta developed this project in 1961, it did not consider education to be a strategically important field. The attainment of full participation in primary education in the late 1950s had already secured a sufficient number of educa ted workers for the low tech industrialization in pursuit (Cho 1994, 101n) Since available resources fell too short for the developmental legitimation project (which was to be launched in eight years after the destructive Korean War, 1950 1953), it was un desirable that education drained too much of them. O n this judgment, the junta decided, for the time being, to freeze educational finance at a lowest possible level and prevent potential pressures for increased state funding for education. The policy it th us adopted was reduction in the supply of student places at the levels of secondary and higher e ducation. It froze school licens es, cut down on student quotas, and downsized the existing education programs of schools and universities in order to make them small in size but good in quality (L ee IY 1996). Such developmental education policies took immediate effects in the forms of intensified entrance competition (especially at lower secondary education), popular outcry against the schools high threshold, and disputes over the fairness of student selection procedures. 6 Here, the junta turned to the egalitarian policy venue. It introduced a state entrance examination for each level of schooling and instructed all educational institutions to admit students according to the scores from the state examination Th e latter indeed assured of a sense of procedural fairness in student selection but, simultaneously, it made entrance c ompetition a major educational problem. Since all students who wanted to advance to the next level of schooling had to write the once a year examination, this examination activated a nationwide competition for higher scores and the latter invited inter school competitions for more successful graduates in the state examination. The situa tion worsened so quickly that, by 1966, Pags (now) government had rescinded its original downsizing policy and allowed for a moderate rise in student quotas (Table 1) while tightly controlling tuition fees in order to allay parental discontent. These egal itarian measures, however, fell far short of addressing the growing
Kim: Unsuccessful Education Reform in South Korea 8 problem. In 1968, therefore, the government decided to drastically increase student quotas and school licenses at the level of lower secondary education where entrance competition was fie rcest and began to allocate more funds to this level of schooling in order to increase the number of schools. Then, it switched the focus of quota and license control to the next level of schooling: upper secondary education. Table 1 University Enrolment s During the Early Pag Years 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 State universities 33,472 30,223 25,964 26,893 32,265 Private universities 82,033 82,739 79,679 97,136 100,665 Total 133,709 105,238 105,6 43 124,029 132,930 Source: KEDI (1997b), pp. 171. Through the remaining military years, state intervention in the supply and demand of student places alternated between, and often straddled, developmental and egalitarian policy venues. The former always led to the containment of educational expansion and, therefore, restrictions on student quotas and new school licenses while the latter persistently escalated entrance competition. Here, the uniformity of instruction supplied a common ground for the examination competition. Moreover, the states concern about the state entrance examination as an efficient and fair devise for ranking aspirants of admission established a principle that its questions should be prepared exclusively from within th e uniform textbooks. Entrance competition, thus, became a highly technical matter of who remembered more o f what was written in the textbooks. The schools which got swept in the competition taught students to memorize textbooks and ranked and re ranked the m through repeated tests, thus turning them against each other and alienating underachievers. Entrance competition quickly expanded beyond the school gate to after school cramming classes and home tutoring. When, thus, it engulfed the entire nation, the de mand for more and higher education soared up for the competitive atmosphere both inside and outside the school continually coerced students, even those with no serious interest in advanced learning, to partake in it and move toward higher levels in school ing. 7 And when, as in 1968, the aggravating competition inflamed a social crisis, the state decided to drastically raise the supply of student places at the troubled level of schooling thus switching entrance competition to the next level of schooling A s a result of alternating or straddling such polic y venue s, secondary and higher education grew rapidly Between 1960 and 1990, the number of schools increased 2.4 times in lower secondary education, 2.6 times in upper secondary education, and 4.2 times in higher education. Meanwhile, student enrolment grew more quickly : 4.8 times, 9.2 times, and 19.0 times respectively (data from Kim CC and Lee CJ 1994, 61) In 1990, thus, participation rate at those levels of schooling became respectively 99.8 percent, 95 .7 percent, and 46.0 percent (data from MOE 1998). From the perspective of political economy, however, such a speedy expansion of education prepared serious structural problems.
Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 13 No. 12 9 9 Structural Problems (1) Financial problems. The most serious problem was re lated to the soaring numbers of schools and students, which directly challenged the policy makers who pursued to contain educational expansion in order to prevent pressure for additional financi al responsibility T he ever intensifying entrance competition and the rising demand for more and higher levels of education made it inevitable for the m to permit educational expansion and, thus, prompt the pressures for increased state funding. As suggested by the above figures, the students enrol l ed in middle school s doubled during the thirty years while those in high school s and universities quadrupled and quintupled respectively. Since the schools revenues were restricted by the states tuition fee control and low education funding, the infrastructure of education al institutions deteriorate d quickly (see Table 2). The state in itially attempted to address this problem by inducing additional investment from the owners of private institutions (where the infrastructure was much worse) but in vain. The owners did not ha ve the money and would not spend it for their schools even if they had it, for reasons that will be presented shortly He re the state chose to transfer the burden to the parents by gradually increasing tuition fees. But this policy could not persist indef initely. 8 From 1980 on, therefore, the military government began to increase its education budget until its size hit a peak in 1993 at 23.4 percent of the total state budge t (MOE 1997, 870) 9 Table 2 The Deteriorating Educational Infrastructure during th e Pag Years 1965 1970 1975 1980 Students 105,643 146,414 208,986 403,989 Students per professor 19.9 18.8 20.7 27.9 (State universiti es) (13.7) (13.3) (16.2) (24.6) (Private universities) (23.4) (21.1) (22.6) (28.7) Library items N/A 33.2 30.7 23.0 Building space per student (m 2 ) 15.2 14.3 12.3 11.5 (State universities) (19.1) (15.6) (10.4) (11.5) (Private universities) (14.0) (13.9) (13.0) (11.4) Source: KEDI (1997b), pp. 171, 173, 175, and 184 5. C onsidering the large defense budget and the increasing demand for welfare programs, 10 it was fair to say that the military government, by 1993, had come to spend for education up to the limit of its available resources. By that year, however, parental fina ncial burden also had reached a peak: 58.4 percent of the total operation cost of all schools and universities (Koh 1998, 26) 11 plus a sum of after school cramming fees which well exceeded the total operation cost of all schools and universities (Kong and Paeg 1994). In other words, the parents paid directly out of their pocket at least 1.6 times of the money spent for operating the entire school system while the state, on its own, committed to education al financing as much as it could
Kim: Unsuccessful Education Reform in South Korea 10 (2) Dependence on entrance competition and low cost educational programs A nother serious p roblem was that more money had to be spent for education outside the formal educational institutions than inside and this entirely at parental burden. The principal cause of this pr oblem was of course the intense entrance competition which drove students to after school cramming classes. Were there no intense entrance competition, the huge sum s of cramming fees would be unnecessary. Logically, the problem was not hard to solve. Since the intense entrance competition was caused by the education policies of seeking uniformity of education and containing educational expansion, the problem would vanish if the state stopped such policies. Such a simple solution, nevertheless, was unavailab le to the military rulers because their political interest required the maintenance of power by uniform instruction and its developmental legitimation project While the former laid a common ground for the nationwide competition, the latter dictated the mi nimization of educational expenses by keeping student places in short supply. In this sense, it is fair to say that the security and legitimation of power necessitated the intense entrance competition. More important to note, however, is that educational institutions became dependent on the intense entrance competition. While the state s student quota and tuition fee control together with curricular and textbook control, restricted the freedom and autonomy of education, entrance competition and the subseq uently rising demand for education on the other hand, guaranteed student supply and, th ereby tuition fee generated revenues. Although such revenues were limited, they allowed the institutions to run education programs without or with insufficient state f unding if only the y did not spend more than absolutely necessary. The schools and universities thus settled in a low cost mode of operation The schools widely practiced rote learning and drill in the uniform textbooks and testing and ranking students in p reparation for the state entrance examination and this in classrooms equipped and staffed minimal ly University instruction, on the other hand, was widely perceived to be superficial. This mode of operation provoked complaints neither from the schools, wh ere every student was driven by entrance competition, nor from the universities, where all students had already had enough study. Moreover, this mode of operation became increasingly profitable as the cyclical entrance competition crises compelled the st ate to increase student quotas and tuition fees. The guaranteed supply of students, thus, deprived educational institutions of the incentives for improving and ability to improv e, educational quality through mutual competition for new student s The entir e system of education thus came to turn on the single hinge of entrance competition. And the state policies which provoked entrance competition gradually became part and parcel of the institutionalized network of a statist political economy a concrete set of institutionalized channels (Evans 1992) in which they sustained themselves despite, actually th anks to repeated education reforms. (3) Private and public education A third structural problem concerned the incorporation of private education into t he public system Private education has been defended in North America in light of consumer choice. The typical argument for this was that where public education served the population as a whole, the consumers ought to have alternative venues in their purs uit of education. Also, North American advocates pointed out that private education allowed for the freedom of dissentient educational practices outside the public system. An important point in the political economy perspective, however, wa s that it help ed public education by reducing the states financial and other burdens for education, for more students in private education
Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 13 No. 12 11 11 mean t less in public education. P rivate education in this sense wa s a safety valve to the financial stress under which the state pro vide d education. In South Korea, ho wever, statist policies have obliterated private education while keeping private schools and universities under private ownership. The states uniform control of education deprived private schools and universities of auto nomy and independence and turned those institutions to pseudo public institutions, or institutions of public education ( konggyoyuggigoan ). Financially, this meant an additional burden on the state side because the difference between the tuition fee gene rated revenues and the reasonable cost of operation (including profits in one form or another) had to be paid out by the state given that the latter set limits on revenues. From the 1980s, therefore, the government began to fund private schools and, by 199 3, it had come to defray 70.6 percent of the operation cost in lower secondary education and 42.5 percent in upper secondary education Mean while it paid public schools only 77.4 percent of the operation cost in lower secondary education and 78.0 percent in upper secondary education (Koh 1998, 28). Apparently, here, the state brought private education into the public sphere at the ex pense of public education This caused another financial trouble. Since full participation was attained at both levels of se condary education, it would now be hard for the state to sidestep the pressure to equalize funding for private and public schools and, furthermore, to offer full funding to both types of school. The actual financial impact of this pressure was extraordinar ily great, because, in 1993, private schools accommodated 24.5 percent of all students in lower secondary education and between 58.4 percent and 66.3 percent of the students in upper secondary education (Ibid.). The potential pressure for increased state f unding was much greater at the level of higher education. While 83 percent of the students in higher education w ere enrol l ed in private institutions, state grants for such institutions accounted for less than 2 percent of their operation cost. (4) The per sonalist ethic The prevailing personalist ethic was also a problem in the educational system for it wasted, through corruption, a large portion of financial resources allotted to public and private s chools. Financial irregularities in private schools an d universities were frequent despite, or because of, state supervision and control. Efficiency in the states management of school and university licenses was also impaired by the personalist ethic. When the state decided to raise student quotas and new sc hool and university licenses for instance, the benefit was often distributed via personal connections. As a result, some institutions received additional student quotas and approval of new programs even though they did not possess necessary infrastructure s As well, licenses were often issued to those who did not have resources necessary for open ing a school or university and even to those with no experience in education. 12 Thus, the personalist ethic contributed to the decline of quality while educational expansion was rapidly in progress. By 1993, the structural problems had deteriorated to such a degree that many South Koreans considered their educational system to be in a major crisis. In that year, the military government was replaced by President Kim Yo ng Sams civilian government. Also in that year, globalization became a burning issue among the debaters on education reform as well as among policy makers. N aturally, the debaters and the policy makers both considered the structural problems of educati on in light of how to cope with the new environment created by globalization and civilian democracy
Kim: Unsuccessful Education Reform in South Korea 12 Globalization a nd Inability t o Reform Structural Problems and Respon se s to Globalization and Civilian Democracy As summarized earlier, the themes broug ht up with respect to the relationship between globalization and national education al systems are two: (1) that the nation state now ha s to restructure the educational system to reduce its own role in education by employing such reform measures as liberali zation, decentralization and privatization, and (2) that, nevertheless, it has to prepare a well trained, flexible and versatile workforce by reinforcing primary and secondary education and at the same time, secure a cadre of highly trained professionals by improving quality in higher education. Generally, these themes were also addressed by South Korean debaters on the needs and directions of education reform at the time of restor ing civil democracy and grappling with globalization (Kim and Jung 1994) In spite of the diversity of the views they advanced from different angles, the debaters shared a common opinion that the existing educational system needed a large scale overhaul if it was to be viable in the new age The frequently employed grounds for thi s common opinion were roughly three: (1) that the existing educational system had evolved through the military years and, for this reason, stifled educational actors free initiatives; (2) that the rapid educational expansion had degraded educational quali ty at all levels of schooling; and (3) that the imminent opening of South Koreas education market to the globalizing world would jeopardize the future of the educational institutions settl ing in the complacen cy of low cost, low quality mode of operation o n guaranteed student supply. I t was also pointed out that the entrance competition dependent schools and universities did not supply adequate manpower to the business community which now had to compete with foreigners on their own home ground. This idea le d to a widely supported view that the overly state controlled educational system had to be democratized liberalized, and decentralized (Ibid.). T he objectives of this envisioned education reform were clearly to diversify educational activities and, th ereby cope with the growing pressure for increased state funding, to eliminate entrance competition based on the uniformity of the curriculum and textbooks, to revitalize private education, and to have a system of education that was to be operated ratio nally not along personal ist connections. The first civilian President Kim Yong Sam 1993 1998 incorporated this view into his political platforms. During his 1992 election campaign, he promised to employ epoch making and revolutionary measures to libe ralize and decentralize the educational system to solve the entrance competition question, and to upgrade educational facilities and performances to the global standards ( segehoa ). Then, in 1994, he appointed reform minded educational ist s to a Presidentia l Commission on Education Reform (PCER) with a mandate to develop policies for the promise d education reform. The environment was even more favorable to this type of education reform in 1998 when the next President Kim Dae Jung took over in the wake of the November 1997 financial meltdown (His government remained in charge until 2003.) The immediate cause of that crisis was the sudden pullout of transnational funds, which shook hard the state controlled financial institutions and, subsequently, the chaebol groups which relied on favorable loans from those financial institutions. The crisis aroused a n even strong er public opinion for economic and education al reforms aiming to terminate the statist political economy which, by excessive state
Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 13 No. 12 13 13 control, obstruct ed development of a free market economy and deprived the economic actors of market competitiveness. Kim Dae Jung, therefore, promised a thorough education reform of which goals remained the same: liberalization, decentralization, segehoa and the terminat ion of entrance competition. Negative Internal Conditions In spite of such a favorable environment however, the reform measures which the civilian governments employed did not bring significant changes to the existing education al system. The most import ant reason for this was their obvious underestimation of the magn itude of promised reform s. Liberalization meant that excessive state control of education would be withdrawn and the educational a ctors schools and universities, teachers and professors and students and their parents would be allowed to operate freely and responsibly. Decentralization implied the transfer of power from the central authority to local residents. Finally, the termination of entrance competi tion meant the abolition of established state policies to control t he curriculum and textbooks, student selection, tuition fees and student quotas, and the state entrance examination. Employing such measures meant a Copernican turn from a statist political economy to a political economy based o n the educational actors free and responsible initiatives The internal conditions did not permi t such drastic measures, however. First and foremost to note the governments of the civilian leaders were not literally civilian by the nature of their pow er basis The military elites effort to build supportive groups and regions along the traditional personalist ethic had tremendous impact upon South Korean voters. By the time the military elite relinquished their rule, South Koreans were divided into ant agonistic groups and regions on the basis of what they called sarcastically group egoism ( chibdan igiju yi ) and regional egoism ( chi yog igiju yi ), so much so that neither of the two civilian leade rs was able to garner a nation wide support. They both mana ged to g ain power by coalition with the influential military factions, each with its own group and regiona l support base s. Kim Y ong Sam, the politician from the South Ky ong sang Province received endorsement from the voters in his province and the urban mid dle class. He grasped power by allying with Ro Tae Wu of the second generation military group supported by the North K yo ngsang Province and Kim Chong Pil of the first generation military group supported by Chungc ho ng Provinces. When Kim Chong Pil broke wit h Kim Y ong Sam, Kim Dae Jung, who was supported by Cholla Provinces and the urban lower classes, worked out with him a power sharing agreement ( kongdong jo nggu on ) The heterogen e ous constituencies within the power groups and the complicated regional and group affiliations, practically forbade reforms which were injurious to the interests vested in the status quo. The civilian leaders weak power bases, on their own, had restrictive effects on available policy options. Although their power was obtained th rough fair electoral processes and did not generate disputes about legitimacy, their failure to draw nationwide support made it inevitable for them to continue with the developmental mobiliz ation strategy, egalitarian policy measures, 13 and oppressive meas ures where necessary. There was another stumbling block. The years of state policies to control and manage education had left a huge body of bureaucrats. The ending of military rule released the bureaucrats from the tight grips of governmental leaders. Mo reover, the civilian leaders lack of experience in running the state apparatus gave rise to the bureaucrats importance in policy making and implementation. The bureaucrats took advantage of all this in their effort to
Kim: Unsuccessful Education Reform in South Korea 14 maintain their own interest vested i n big offices with ample resources and power. They obstructed the employment of such reform ideas as liberalization and decentralization by exhibiting reluctance to cooperate ( pokjibudong lying with face down and making no movement) and, at opportune ti mes, by manipulating the policy making process es in order to filter reform ideas to policies suitable for their own interest by maintain ing or further enhanc ing state control and management The bureaucrats thus began to intercept in the state education re lationship to the effect of holding educational policy making and implementation within the existing statist political economy. And such efforts easily found endorsement from the educational institutions and their teaching staff equally dependent on the gu aranteed supply of students under the entrance competition hinged education al system. 14 Gradually, thus, such internal conditions shifted the t hemes of education reform debate from liberalization, decentralization, and so on, to a reform that would enhanc e educational performances in particular, quality, excellence and the nations competitiveness within the existing arrangement but with enhanced state intervention and financial commitment (Kim and Jung 1994 ; Kim KS 1997 ). After all, it was now argued, education was public by nature ( kyoyug yi konggongso ng ) and the states extensive and intensive intervention in education was a prerequisite for the integrity of th e education al system The influence of such negative internal conditions becomes clear upo n examining the two civilian governments policies on entrance competition. Entrance Competition Policies (1) Maintaining Entrance Competition When appointed in 1994 PCER members understood liberalization, decentralization and the revival of free educ ational initiatives as necessary reform measures to solve the entrance competition question and rearranging the educational system for the new era of globalization. 15 The y generally perceived that the entrance competition question originat ed from the milit ary governments extensive and intensive control of education and unsuccessful efforts to manage the supply and demand of student places. The refore in their view, the question would easily banish in the civilian era if educational activities were diversif ied by means of liberalization and so on But the N ew Educational S ystem , which the PCER laid down in its official report after a year of work with Ministry of Education bureaucrats and other interested parties demonstrated substantial modifications to those members original views (PCER 1995) Basically, the PCER R eport maintained that the new age into which South Korea was entering was going to be one of a great turning point in the history of civilization , in which the industry guided world would become one dominated by information and new knowledge. From this outlook, it observed that an education reform that was in pursuit had to aim to endorse the nations economic prosperity in the new age by rectifying the structural problems of the existing e ducational system As such structural problems, it pointed to entrance competition and such related problems as: r ote learning and drill in fragmentary knowledge which wiped out creativity and diversity from classroom; s uperficial instruct ion in schools a nd universities; h eavy parental financial burden for after school cramming classes ( the cost of which in 1994, according to the R eport, accounted for 5.8 percent of the gross national product in comparison with the states education budget which remained a t 3.8 percent),
Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 13 No. 12 15 15 t he states uniform control of education which restricted the educat ors professional autonomy, and d isappearance of moral character from the students (referring to the selfishness of students engaged in entrance competition) (Ibid., 11 4) T he R eport thus brought up some key structural problems in relation to the entrance competitio n question. Ho wever, its approach to solving the problems did not differ from that of the previous military era It stated that entrance competition was caused by the simple fact that student places were in short supply as evident in the bottleneck phenomenon at university gates (Ibid., 13). As the cause was simple, so was the solution: widen the narrow university gates by increasing student quotas and new univ ersity licenses until supply met demand. Once supply met demand, the PCER Report predict ed entrance competition and after school cramming practice would disappear altogether and schools would return to their normal operation (Ibid., 101 7). This was exa ctly what the policy makers of military regimes had been say ing when ever they decided to increase the supply of student places at times of crisis. It is here to be noted that the PCER s policy making, as reflected in its Report, followed the venues establ ished by the military elite egalitarian and developmental. In the egalitarian venue, it recommended the increase of student quotas new university licenses and increased state funding of education In the developmental venue, however, it sought to maintai n t he system of state imposed student quotas to contain new school licenses to keep uniformity of the curricul um and textbook and the institution of annual state entrance examination It only sought to mend the institution for improved efficiency throu gh a newly created National Institute of Educational Evaluation (KIEE) Given that such policies would not stop entrance competition, the PCER now turned to the egalitarian venue and recommended t o suppress private cramming by resorting to the 1980 law of the Chon military junta and to offer free state cramming services via a satellite television network (which was to be established exclusively for that purpose) in order thus to alleviate parental financial burden. In either of the two venues, the institut ions of state control of education became reinforced by new institutions and increased fun ds in the hands of bureaucrats. The effects of implementing PCER recommendations w ere what had actually happened repetitively during the military years: persistent e ntrance competition, further expansion of education and further enhanced pressure for increased state funding for education. By 1998, thus, the total of student quotas in higher educational institutions had grown to the capacity of accommodating 94 percen t of the years high school graduates. The institutions of higher education, however, managed to attract only 84 percent of the m (Kim KS 1999) (4) Extending Entrance Competition to Graduate Schools The surplus of student places created new problem s for policy makers to deal with. Since the high participation rate in higher education was due to the drive toward universities and colleges triggered by intense entrance competition, the students who managed to enter one such institution included many who coul d not remain there due to financial reasons. 16 The student places vacated by such students were filled with those transferred from other universities. Here, most students in less popular universit ies c ontinued to look for opportunit y to move to a more popu lar university Th us, the over suppl y of student places inflamed an unprecedented crisis for the universities which had
Kim: Unsuccessful Education Reform in South Korea 16 been relying on the student supply guaranteed by entrance competition. In re action the PCER in 1997 devised a policy agenda f or resear ch focused, graduate s choo l centered u niversities ( y on gu jungj o m taehagu o n jungshim taehag ) (PCER 1995, 23). The underlying ideas of this program were three fold. The first was that since large scale increases in student quotas and new licenses did not b ring entrance competition to a halt due to the popular preference of the top universities in the hierarchy, the PCER felt it necessary to close those top universities undergraduate programs or to reduce their student quotas to a degree of near closure. Instead, second, it felt that those universities should be transformed to research focused, graduate school centered universities while other universities were guided to concentrate their effort on teaching undergraduate students Finally, the state shou ld provide the research focused, graduate school centered universities with massive funding in order to transform them to very attractive ( world class ) research universities. In the PCERs developmental perspective, this would ensure the supply of high q uality research personnel for the countrys competitive performance in the global economy I n its egalitarian perspective, it would extend entrance competition to graduate programs and thus sustain the supply of students for the troubled undergraduate pr ograms of middle to low ranking universities The subsequent Kim Dae Jung government has taken over this program and implement ed it with a new nam e, Brain Korea 21 (or BK21 ). In doing so, it also follow ed the military elites footsteps on the road to mass education at the level of graduate studies. The Viability of the Statist Educational System The foregoing analysis shows the difficulties of changing a national educational system that has been established during the decades of statist political e conomy. 17 T he policy makers of the civilian governments understood that their nations prosperity in an era of globalization depended on having a viable educational system and, for this, it was essential to liberalize and decentralize the existing educatio nal system The process of policy making, however, guided them to policy measures which maintained the existing educational system and left its structural problems un addressed What remains to be examin ed, then, is how the unresolved structural problems w ould bear upon South Koreas economic future. South Korea cannot go ahead with the current educational system if it desires educational endorsement of continual economic prosperity. Note, in the first place, that participation in higher education is now al most full and, in addition, the policy to extend entrance competition to graduate schools will stimulate demand for education in those institutions. Full participation in higher education suggests either of two possible scenarios: that the nations workfor ce will soon consist entirely of university or junior colleges trained professionals, or that many higher educational institutions will actually be producing non or semi professional workers instead of professional workers. The former means serious manpo wer shortage in the industries demanding non professional workers; 18 the latter on the other hand, implies the waste of precious financial resources. There is one more problem. If the observation is correct that ICT trigger s perpetual innovation in the wo rkplace, then the vitality of the workforce will rest on the periodic reeducation and retraining of workers by the institutions which deal with new knowledge and technology: universities and colleges.
Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 13 No. 12 17 17 However, the method of selecting students by ranking ap plicants in terms of how much they know about what high schools now teach will prevent most currently employed workers from reeducation and retraining at the level of higher education. Therefore, those workers will be quickly invalidated by the perpetual i nnovation. Financial problems are an even more serious concern. In 1997, according to OECD (2000, 32) the total expenditure of South Koreas educational institutions, inclu ding state funds and parental expenses (yet exclu ding after school cramming fees), was the highest of all OECD nations in terms of its proportion in the gross domestic product (GDP): 7.4 percent. In 2000, according to Bank of Korea estimation, the states education budget alone accounted for 5.7 percent of the GDP (KEDI 1997 a 59). Even so, however, educational institutions remain very much under fund ed. Compulsory education is still limited to six years in primary schools except in some rural areas where it also covers additional three years in middle schools. Compulsory education of su ch a short time span, none the less, is not free. 3 percent of public primary schools operation cost ( in governmental statistics and no less than 10 percent in reality ) i s collected from par ents. Moreover, in urban centers, as many as 1,000 public school classes operate on a two shift basis. Meanwhile, state grants to private institutions of higher education still cover s less than 3 percent of their operation cost. Higher education being practically universal, and graduate programs attracting more and more students, the pressure for the states increased financial commitment will become much higher from now on than ever before. Parental financial burden, meanwhile, has already gone well beyond a tolerable level. These problems alone, aside from other equal ly serious problems, would be sufficient to warrant a prediction that when globalization progresses further the current educational system will not be viable in terms of ensuring the continuity of public education and of producing a flexible and versatile workforce and a cadre of highly trained professionals. Only one solution seems workable: a big surgery on the statist educational system by means of a substantial degree of liberalization, decentralization, and the emancipation of private education as the PCER members originally con templated South Korea, however, cannot go for the solution because of the entrenched statist political economy of education for the time being, at least. N otes 1 Depending on the discursive context, it may also refer to a pol itical concept or a functional logic of political membership (Kvistad 1999). Political economy is the way in which the political state deals with the economic sphere of civil society. In his Laws of Ecclesiastical Society (1593), which is perhaps the ear liest English document to distinguish the political state from civil society, Richard Hooker wr o te, The state is not identified with civil society . Civil society is the organization of production in society; the state is not the organization of that production, it is the product of the relation between political economy and society (cited in Krader 1976, 21). 2 On his reading of Schoppas work, Green (1997, 24) observes that Anglophone countries neo liberal dogmas of free market economy [which pr evail the global economy and liberalization of education] run against the bedrock opposition in [East Asian] countries which have strong traditions of state regulation, social partnership and corporatist planning. He mistakes Japan to be Germany and patt erned pluralism to be social partnership. Schoppa says that in Japan not
Kim: Unsuccessful Education Reform in South Korea 18 only interest groups such as the Japan Teachers Union ( Nikkyoso ) but also political parties with representation in the Diet are left out of policy making processes. 3 This may sug gest that statism in East Asia is a modern version of the old mode of government dubbed Asiatic despotism rather than an imported political economy. Whether this name is fair or not, the states overwhelming status in relation to society is still apparen t. In the Chinese, Japanese and Korean languages, the state ( kuojia, kokka and kugga the kings family) can substitute the nation ( kuomin, kokumin and kugmin the kings subjects), but not the other way round. In the contemporary use, the word for the nation is equated with the members of a nation or the citizens but not vice versa. The members of a nation and the citizens both remain subject to and cared for by the state which is the same as the nation Whether or not the speakers of those languages are aware, their discourse on the state society relationship must be affected by the semantic linkages of the words. 4 A good example of this is the system of frequently rotating bureaucrats from one office to another. This rotation system was initiated by the military elite who feared the bureaucrats independence. But Amsden (1989) observes that South Koreas economic development under the military regimes was due to the bureaucrats enlightened leadership. Her observation is apparently short sighted. 5 For the personalist ethic, see Dore (1982) and Chang (1991). For a critical response, see Kim KS (1999). 6 Seth (1997) observes that developmental policies were not thoroughly enforceable because of the demand from the social forces of teachers, school officials, private foundations, and especially parents for equitable distribution of educational opportunity in secondary and higher education. 7 For analysis of the relationship between state intervention, entrance competition and the rising demand for education, see Kim KS (1999) and Koh (1998, 33 63). 8 Parental educational expenditure rose from 64,350 million won in 1966 to 251,288 million won in 1970 and to 458,305 million won in 1975 (Kim YB 1980, 263). 9 The states educati on budget fluctuated between 14.4 and 18 percent in its total budget during the Pag years (1961 1979), and between 18.6 and 22.8 percent during the Chon Ro years (1980 1992) (Ibid., 821). Although the economy grew fast, educational expansion made the cost of education grow much faster. From 1970 to 1998, the GDP grew 164 times while the cost of education, including governmental and parental portions, rose 221 times. Kyoyugbi nyongan chichul 25 jowon, GDP y i 5.7 posentu, Dongailbo 14 February 2000. 10 T he defense budget was similar in size to the education budget. Due to the growing pressure, the Chon government introduced Workmens Compensation Insurance, Medical Insurance, and National Pension Insurance. For these programs, in 1987, the state spent mer ely 2.19 percent of the GDP. See Lee HK (1999, 29).
Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 13 No. 12 19 19 11 In 1997, a new student in Seoul paid $1,073 in Canadian currency in both public and private middle schools, $1,882 in both public and private high schools, $7,202 in a state universitys science facu lty, and $11,482 in a private universitys science faculty (MOE 1997, 870). 12 In 2000, for instance, 24 university licenses and 15 junior college licenses did not materialize as operating institutions. Pobinman mandullgo mun an yon taehag 39 kot, Chos unilbo 3 October 2000. 13 During President Kim Yong Sams term, for instance, the states welfare expenditures grew from 3.5 percent of the GDP in 1992 to 4.47 percent in 1996 (Lee HK 1999, 34). 14 Most schools and universities opposed changes to the existing educational system. Vocal in the opposition was teachers and professors. When abolishing the state entrance examination became an issue in 1998, for instance, a professor of education at a private university in Seoul wrote, Should the state aboli sh the examination, it would have to tell universities how to select students. Reference is withheld to protect identity. 15 I interviewed three key members of the PCER in 1994 when they were exploring a general direction of education reform. 16 The n umber of such students at state universities was 102,937 in 1998. This figure accounts for a third of those universities student quotas. Hyuhagsaeng chungga kyoyugjaejong abbag, Hankyoreh 17 October 2000. 17 After examining the economic reforms seekin g liberalization and deregulation, J.A. Matthews (1998, 757) concludes, South Koreans have no intention of replacing their former highly interventionist model of development with an Anglo American style non interventionist economy based on unfettered market forces. 18 While participation rate in higher education grew rapidly, manpower supply to the industry decreased quickly. In 1980, participation rate in higher education was 16.2 percent and the manufacturing sector felt 3.46 percent short of neces sary manpower. In 1990, the participation rate reached 48.8 percent and the manufacturing sectors manpower shortage surged to 6.85 percent (Kang 1996).
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Kim: Unsuccessful Education Reform in South Korea 24 About the Author Ki Su Kim Faculty of Education, Memorial University St. John's, NL, Canada A1B 3X8 Email: firstname.lastname@example.org Ki Su Kim is Professor of Philosophy of Education and Educational Policy at Memorial University Canada. He is a graduate of Seoul National University, South Korea, and the University of Alberta, Canada. He has published ninety scholarly papers, three books, and several commissioned research reports, all on philosophical and policy issues in educati on. Recently, he has been exploring ways to make sense of educational policies within the established traditions of modern political economy. This article is a partial outcome of the ongoing exploration.
Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 13 No. 12 25 25 Education Policy Analysis Archives http://epaa.asu.edu Editor: Sherman Dorn University of South Florida Production Assistant: Chris Murrell, Arizona State University General questions about appropriateness of topics or particular articles may be addressed to the Editor, Sherm an Dorn, epaa editor@shermando rn .com EPAA Editorial Board Michael W. Apple University of Wisconsin David C. Berliner Arizona State University Greg Camilli Rutgers University Linda Darling Hammond Stanford University Mark E. Fetler California Commission on Teacher Credentialing Gustavo E. Fischman Arizona State Univeristy Ri chard Garlikov Birmingham, Alabama Gene V Glass Arizona State University Thomas F. Green Syracuse University Aimee Howley Ohio Univers ity Craig B. Howley Appalachia Educational Laboratory William Hunter University of Ontario Institute of Technology Patricia Fey Jarvis Seattle, Washington Daniel Kalls Ume University Benjamin Levin Universi ty of Manitoba Thomas Mauhs Pugh Green Mountain College Les McLean University of Toronto Heinrich Mintrop University of California, Berkeley Michele Moses Arizona State University Gary Orfield Harvard Univer sity Anthony G. Rud Jr. Purdue University Jay Paredes Scribner University of Missouri Michael Scriven Western Michigan University Lorrie A. Shepard University of Colorado, Boulder Robert E. Stake Universit y of Illinois UC Kevin Welner University of Colorado, Boulder Terrence G. Wiley Arizona State University John Willinsky University of British Columbia
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