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Frames in the U.S. print media coverage of the Kashmir conflict
h [electronic resource] /
by Durga Ray.
[Tampa, Fla.] :
University of South Florida,
Thesis (M.A.)--University of South Florida, 2004.
Includes bibliographical references.
Text (Electronic thesis) in PDF format.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Title from PDF of title page.
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ABSTRACT: This study examined the frames used by the U.S. print media -- The New York Times, The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times -- in their coverage of the Kashmir conflict and the parties involved in it from 1989 to 2003. It divided the 15-year period of coverage into four phases -- 1989-1990, 1991-1998, 1999-2001, and 2002-2003 -- and focused on the coverage of seven subjects. It then identified sources and keywords from 180 news reports and placed them into categories from which it isolated thematic clusters or frames. The study found that in the first two phases, the conflict was described as a violent Kashmiri separatist movement, a frame that changed to one depicting it as ongoing violent conflict between India and Pakistan. In all phases, Kashmiris were predominantly identified as armed militants fighting for secession of Kashmir from India, a goal that decreased in prominence in the last two phases. India was depicted initially as a country suppressing the rebellion in Kashmir through violent means with the help of its armed forces, a frame that shifted later to a military force fighting Pakistani troops and non-Kashmiri Islamic fighters. Pakistan was consistently identified as a country supporting the Kashmiri separatist movement with arms and training,and later as a country itself participating in the conflict through its military. The United States was consistently described as a country concerned with peace and security in South Asia. The dominant frames in all periods were found to be portraying the conflict as a war and in the last two phases, a potential nuclear war. The Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris were always characterized through their religious identities -- Indians as Hindu, and Pakistanis and Kashmiris as Muslim or Islamic. Official sources were consistently greater in number than unofficial sources for India, Pakistan and the United States but for Kashmiris, unofficial sources scored over official ones in all four periods.
Adviser: Humphrey A. Regis.
mass media framing.
x Mass Communications
t USF Electronic Theses and Dissertations.
Frames in the U.S. Print Media Coverage of the Kashmir Conflict by Durga Ray A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts School of Mass Communications College of Arts & Sciences University of South Florida Major Professor: Humphrey A. Regis, Ph.D. Derina R. Holtzhausen, Ph.D. Kenneth C. Killebrew Jr., Ph.D. Date of Approval: July 15, 2004 Keywords: mass media framing, s ources, India, Pakistan, Kashmir Copyright 2004, Durga Ray
Acknowledgments I am deeply grateful to Dr. Humphr ey Regis for his guidance, patience, accessibility, and attention to detail, all of wh ich were instrumental in helping me write this thesis. I am also extremely thankful to Dr. Ken Killebrew and Dr. Derina Holtzhausen for their interest, insight and advi ce. I wish to take this opportunity to thank the USF School of Mass Communi cations and all its faculty and staff, especially Dr. Edward J. Friedlander and Dr. Barbara Petersen, for their help and support. This thesis was made possible because of the love and faith of my friends and family; for this, I will be forever in their debt.
i Table of Contents List of Tables iv Abstract v Chapter One Introduction 1 Justification for the problem 4 Chapter Two Literature Review 6 Overview of the Kashmir dispute 6 Framing 13 Framing effects 17 Research Questions 19 Chapter Three Methodology 24 Chapter Four Results Frames for the Conflict 34 1989-1990 34 1991-1998 35 1999-2001 38 2002-2003 39 Frames for the Region 40 1989-1990 41 1991-1998 41 1999-2001 43 2002-2003 43 Frames for India and Indians 44 1989-1990 44 1991-1998 45 1999-2001 47
ii 2002-2003 48 Frames for Pakistan and Pakistanis 49 1989-1990 50 1991-1998 51 1999-2001 51 2002-2003 53 Frames for Kashmir and Kashmiris 56 1989-1990 59 1991-1998 60 1999-2001 62 2002-2003 63 Frames for the United States 64 Frames for Other Parties in the Kashmir Conflict 66 1989-1990 66 1991-1998 67 1999-2001 68 2002-2003 69 Sources used to cover the Kashmir Conflict 69 Sources used from 1989-1990 70 Indian Sources 70 Pakistani Sources 71 Kashmiri Sources 71 U.S. Sources 72 Other Sources 73 Sources used from 1991-1998 73 Indian Sources 73 Pakistani Sources 74 Kashmiri Sources 74 U.S. Sources 74 Other Sources 75 Sources used from 1999-2001 76 Indian Sources 76 Pakistani Sources 78 Kashmiri Sources 78 U.S. Sources 78 Other Sources 79 Sources used from 2002-2003 79 Indian Sources 79 Pakistani Sources 80 Kashmiri Sources 80 U.S. Sources 82 Other Sources 82
iii Chapter Five Discussion 83 Changing Frames 83 Coverage of the Conflict 84 Coverage of the Region 85 Coverage of Kashmir and Kashmiris 86 Coverage of India and Indians 87 Coverage of Pakist an and Pakistanis 89 Coverage of the United States and Others 90 Dominant Frames 91 Sources 95 Chapter Six Conclusions 99 Implications for Future Research 103 References 107 Appendices 111 Appendix A: Coding Sheet 112
iv List of Tables Table 1 Distribution of Storie s (1989-2003) in the Sample 28 Table 2 Intercoder Reliability Coefficien ts between Author and Two Coders 33 Table 3 Frames for the Kashmir Conflict 36 Table 4 Frames for the Kashmir Region 42 Table 5 Frames for India and Indians 46 Table 6 Frames for Pakistan and Pakistanis 54 Table 7 Frames for Ka shmir and Kashmiris 57 Table 8 Frames for Other Parties in the Kashmir conflict 66 Table 9 Distribution of Sources in 1989-1990 72 Table 10 Distribution of Sources in 1991-1998 75 Table 11 Distribution of Sources in 1999-2001 77 Table 12 Distribution of Sources in 2002-2003 81 Table 13 Dominant Frames for the Conflict 85 Table 14 Dominant Frames for the Region 86 Table 15 Dominant Frames for Kashmir and Kashmiris 87 Table 16 Dominant Frames for India and Indians 88 Table 17 Dominant Frames for Pakistan and Pakistanis 90 Table 18 Dominant Frames for Other Parties 91
v Frames in the U.S. Print Media Coverage of the Kashmir Conflict Durga Ray ABSTRACT This study examined the frames used by the U.S. print media The New York Times, The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times in their coverage of the Kashmir conflict and the part ies involved in it from 1989 to 2003. It divided the 15-year period of coverage into four phases 1989-1990, 1991-1998, 1999-2001, and 2002-2003 and focused on the coverage of seven subjects It then identified sources and keywords from 180 news reports and placed them into categories from which it isolated thematic clusters or frames. The study found that in the first two pha ses, the conflict was described as a violent Kashmiri separatist movement, a fr ame that changed to one depicting it as ongoing violent conflict between India and Pa kistan. In all phases, Kashmiris were predominantly identified as armed militants fighting for secession of Kashmir from India, a goal that decreased in prominence in the last two phases. India was depicted initially as a country suppressing the rebellion in Kashmir through violent means with the help of its armed forces, a frame that shifted later to a military force fighting Pakistani troops and non-Kashmiri Islamic fighters. Pakistan was consistently iden tified as a country supporting the Kashmiri separatist movement with arms and training, and later as a
vi country itself participating in the conflict through its military. The United States was consistently described as a country concerne d with peace and security in South Asia. The dominant frames in all periods were found to be portraying the conflict as a war and in the last two phases, a potential nuclear war. The Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris were always characterized through thei r religious identities Indi ans as Hindu, and Pakistanis and Kashmiris as Muslim or Isla mic. Official sources were consistently greater in number than unofficial sources for India, Pakistan and the United States but for Kashmiris, unofficial sources scored over official ones in all four periods.
1 Chapter One Introduction The mass media have been shown to have a significant impact on what issues the public thinks about and how it thinks about th em. Two of these effects of the mass media are embodied in the theories of agenda setting (McCombs and Shaw, 1972) and framing (Gamson, 1989; Goffman, 1974; Graber, 1988; Entman, 1989; Tuchman, 1978) respectively. In the works of the above expe rts on it and many of the other researchers who have investigated it, framing has been advanced as a theory that applies to the different stages of the mass communications process message formation, transmission, and assimilation. Past research in international mass communication has shown the media are very influential in setting the public agenda with regard to foreign nations. Indeed, for the American public, not only ar e the media the chief sources of information about foreign affairs, prestige newspapers such as The New York Times The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times are also sources of information for foreign policy elites, including government officials (Graber, 1980). In a surv ey of 629 randomly selected residents of Dade County, Florida, Salwen and Matera (1992) found a distinct agenda-setting influence of the news media regarding percep tions about foreign countries. Their results
2 indicated evidence in the form of changes in public assessments of foreign nations as dangerous places in relation to media coverage of those nations. The public also provided an accurate assessment of the relative frequency of coverage given to each country in the U.S. media. Since the media are the major s ources of information about foreign nations for U.S. audiences, it can be argued that th e specific information contained in media messages (frames) are also transferred to pe ople, so that they have a media-induced problem definition, sense of moral responsib ility, and treatment recommendation for whatever is happening in a part icular foreign country. It is this ability of the media through their use of frames to tell people how to think about something that makes the study of frames very important. Kashmir has been a flashpoint in relations between Indi a and Pakistan since their independence from British rule in 1947. In the past 56 years, the two nuclear-capable countries have fought four wars, three of wh ich have centered on Kashmir. As recently as the summer of 2002, the two nations were al most on the brink of war and had amassed millions of troops on their mutual border afte r an attack by a group of gunmen from the Kashmiri separatist group Lashkar-e-Toiba on Indias Parliament Building on December 13, 2001. This study will attempt to id entify and analyze the terms that have been used by the U.S. media to describe the conflict and the different parties to it India, Pakistan, and the people of Kashmir. It al so will look at whether and how these frames have changed over the years as the conflict has evolved and different actors have en tered and exited the scene. In addition, it will atte mpt to place the changes in the frames, if any, in the context
3 of changes occurring in the relationship betw een India and Pakistan, in global events and in international equations. Since international events are outside th e direct experience of most people who depend on the mass media for information on fore ign affairs, it is important to determine to what degree bias is reflected in news re porting because legislators, as well as the public, may form negative or positive stereo types of a country based on media portrayal that is disproportionate and distorted (Dickson, 1992). In order to understand whether the press revealed a bias for or against the U.S. government vis--vis the US-Sandinista conflict in Nicaragua, Dicks on analyzed the content of The New York Times and The Washington Post articles between 1983 and 1987. The pur pose of her analysis was to find out the degree to which these papers relied on U.S. government officials rather than other sources for information about the conflict. Resu lts of the content anal ysis indicated that both papers were heavily depe ndent on officials in Washington for information and an overwhelming majority of stories about the conf lict were put together by the papers staff members in the United States, particularly in Washington, DC. Several explanations have been offered for the disproportionate reliance of the media on officialdom. According to Entman (1989), the media get most of their information from officials because the least expensive way to satisfy mass audiences is to rely upon legitimate political elites for most information due to the elites cultural legitimacy and the facts they supply. The ex tent to which the media are dependent on official sources can be gauged by the fact that the beat system in most media organizations is organized along the lines of government bureaucracy. The enormity and
4 complexity of day-to-day events necessitate the establishment and practice of certain routines in order to make it possible for me dia organizations to control the task of reporting the news (Shoemaker and Reese, 1991). Therefore, the establ ished routines of newsgathering, as well as the ease of avai lability and the perceived prestige and objectivity of official sources ensure the medias depende nce on them for information. Thus, as the results of Dicksons analysis point out, the media to a great extent legitimate the prevailing government line (p. 569; emphasis in original). Apart from organizational routines, the pr inciple of objectivit y that journalists must observe while reporting on a multi-dim ensional issue also ensures that certain voices will get aired more than others. Since the practice of objectivity means journalists have to interview legitimate elites on all major sides of a dispute, it is easy for those elites who can improve their access and package their viewpoint in media-friendly terms, to make sure that they gain favorable cove rage (Entman, 1989; Noakes and Wilkins, 2002). Since the nature and identity of the sources used is important to understand the manner in which an event or issue has been covered, th is study will look at the sources used by the U.S. media in the coverage of Kashmir to determine which voices and perspectives got aired. Justification for the Problem It is important to understand how the U.S. media have covered the Kashmir conflict by studying the frames they have used in this coverage for three reasons. First, because in general the study of frames help s one to understand how the media construct
5 social reality, the study of these frames will help one understand how the U.S. media have described, explained and interpreted the Kashmir conflict. Second, since foreign news is the most obvious area where the medi a shape peoples perceptions of reality for the reason that a vast majority of people have limited resources for acquiring and interpreting information about events in foreign nations (Gamson, 1992), then this study could serve as a starting point for the study of the impact of the frames used in coverage of the conflict on the percepti on of the conflict itself and the parties engaged in it. Third, by analyzing the coverage of Kashmir for the presence of frames as well as tracking the changes in those frames over a 15-year pe riod, this study will contribute to knowledge about foreign news coverage of the U.S. medi a, particularly about an area of the world that has until recently not been of much interest to U.S. policymakers and consequently the media.
6 Chapter Two Review of Literature In order to understand the frames that have been used in the coverage of the Kashmir conflict, one needs to acquaint one self with the genesis and history of the conflict as well as the nature and significan ce of media frames. This section provides a brief account of the Kashmir issue in the cont ext of relations between India and Pakistan and also their relations with the internati onal community, particularly the United States. This chapter also discusses in some deta il the concept of framing as a means of organizing media text as well as the impact of frames on consumers of the media. Overview of the Kashmir Dispute The British left the Indian subcontinent in August 1947, but not before supervising its division into two nations I ndia and Pakistan. The basis of partition was religious while India was a seen as a Hindumajority state, Pakist an was envisioned by its founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, to be the home of the subcontinents Muslims. Hindu-majority areas were designated parts of India while Muslim-majority areas were parts of the new Pakistan. All provinces rule d by kings and princes were given a choice of acceding into either nascent state. The re gion of Kashmir (or the current Indian state
7 called Jammu & Kashmir) was a Muslim-majority province ruled by a Hindu king who procrastinated on the decision to join either India or Pa kistan (Ganguly, 2001; Dixit, 2002). In October 1947, a tribal group in the southwestern pa rt of Kashmir rebelled against the king and was provide d support by the Pakist ani army in the form of men and materials. When the rebels moved to the outsk irts of Srinagar, the capital of the region, the king panicked and approached India for a ssistance. The Indian Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, agreed to provide military assistance on the condition that the king accede to India and the accession be approve d by a popular leader and the peoples representative, Sheikh Abdullah. Once the above two conditions were met, the Indian Army was airlifted into Kashmir. The two sides fought a bitter battle till the declaration of a United Nationssponsored ceasefire on January 1, 1949. By the time the war ended, the rebels supported by the Pakistani Army had managed to capture a third of the terri tory of the former princely state. The ceasefire line was declared the Line of Control (LoC) between the two nations and it has remained as such till this day. India referred the matter in 1948 to the United Nations Security Council, which passe d several resolutions asking Kashmiri rebels and Pakistani forces to withdraw and mandating a free and fair plebiscite to determine the fate of Kashmir. Due to deep -rooted mistrust of each other, India and Pakistan have never carried out the terms of the U.N. resolution. The area captured by the rebels in the 1947 war is called Azad (F ree) Kashmir by Pakistan and Pakistanoccupied Kashmir (PoK) by India. The area und er Indian control is called the state of
8 Jammu & Kashmir by India and Indian-occupied Kashmir by Pakistan and Kashmiri separatists (Schofield, 2003). The dispute about whether Kashmir should be a part of India or Pakistan is tied to the respective identities of the two nations. While on the one hand Pakistan contends that Kashmir should legitimately be a part of its te rritory because the two-nation theory holds that Muslim-majority regions be a part of Pa kistan, India insists th at it cannot allow any part of its territory to be separated from it on the basis of religious affiliation because India was founded to be a pluralistic and mu lti-religious nation (Dixit, 2002). Pakistan has consistently demanded that India conduc t the UN-mandated plebiscite, a demand that India refuses to meet on the grounds that the plebiscite was on condition that Pakistan withdraw completely from the region, which it has not done to date. India also asserts that Kashmir is legitimately a part of its territory because the king chose to accede into India after the partiti on. Another important reason why I ndia refuses to let go of Kashmir is because it fears this will set off a domino effect and provide support to other regions in India that want to break off fr om the Indian union (Cohen, 2003). In subsequent years, the Cold War betw een the then U.S.S.R. and the United States shaped India-Pakistan relations. While Pakistan courte d western powers by advertising itself as a pote ntial protector of Western in terests in the oil-rich and predominantly Muslim Middle East, India pos itioned itself as a non-aligned nation and developed a close relationship with Russia (Ayoob, 1999). Pakistan was a major U.S. aid recipient through the cold war years and wa s given substantial arms assistance by the United States to help bring about the withdr awal of Soviet tro ops from Afghanistan
9 (Tahir-Kheli, 1997). Along with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Pakistan was a very important partner in the U.S. effort to support Afghan resistance fighters to mount a jihad (holy war) against the Soviet Union. Tensions between India and Pakistan c ontinued to simmer and reached a head several times, resulting in three more wars after the 1947 war one in 1965, when Pakistan attacked India, belie ving it to be weakened by a humiliating defeat in the hands of China in 1962; and another in 1971, when I ndia was instrumental in helping what was then East Pakistan to break away from Pakistan and become a separate nation Bangladesh (Ganguly, 2001). The third, albeit undeclared war was fought in 1999 in the Kargil sector in the upper reaches of the Himalyas in Kashmir. A decisive turn in the Kashmir dispute came in 1989, when Muslim extremists started an armed separatist movement in the Kashmir valley (Dixit, 2002; Cohen, 2003). Their objective was a Kashmir independent of both India and Pakista n. After the start of the movement for self-rule, Hindus, who were a minority in the Kashmir valley, left their homeland in hordes. As civilian massacres became an everyday occurrence, the state government was dissolved and the Indian Army moved into the state to control the situation. Throughout the 1990s, the Indian Army continued to battle militant groups in Kashmir. India routinely accused Pakistan of supporting various terrorist groups in Kashmir and repeatedly asked Pakistan to refrain from doing so. On the other hand, Pakistan persistently accused India of denyi ng Kashmiris the right to self-determination and of committing human rights violations (Dixit, 2002). Matters were further complicated and took a turn toward Isla mic fundamentalism and jihad when the
10 Afghanistan war ended in a Russian defeat in 1989 and Afghani mercenary fighters moved into Kashmir to support m ilitant groups in the early 1990s. Another turning point in India-Pakistan relations and in Kashmir as the subcontinents flashpoint came when both countri es tested their nucle ar devices in May 1998. Defying pressure from the western powers to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which stipulated a ban on nuc lear testing, India te sted five nuclear devices on May 11 and May 13, 1998 (McHorne y, 2002). Alarmed at Indias actions, Pakistan also conducted unde rground nuclear tests on May 28 and 30. As a punitive measure, the U.S administration headed by President Bill Clinton imposed economic sanctions against India and Pa kistan, limiting U.S. economic aid as well as trade and military transfers to both countries. The nuclearization of the s ubcontinent raised the profile of the Kashmir issue in the international arena, as western powers became increasingly alarmed at the possibility of border skirmishes escalating into a nuclear war between the two countries, notwithstanding Indias offer of no first use of nuclear weapons. Ironically, according to New Delhi and Islamabad, overt acquisition of nuclear weapons had significantly reduced the likelihood of war between them (Ganguly, 2001). The first post-nuclear-tests war between India and Pakistan was fought in and around Kargil in the upper reach es of the western Himalayas in the summer of 1999. Taking advantage of inadequate patrolling of this very harsh and inhospitable terrain, the Pakistani Army and Kashmiri insurgents had infiltrated across the LoC in the spring of 1999, taking the Indian Army by surprise. India conducted air strikes against the
11 intruders, who had a strategic advantag e over ground troops as they had firmly entrenched themselves in hi gh-altitude positions. The Clinton administration, in marked contrast to its policy of medi ating regional disputes, refused to support Pakistans attempt to bring the issue into the United Nations Security Council. This stance was also a departure from the traditionall y pro-Pakistani U.S. policy, an d finally forced Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to order a withdrawal from Kargil on July 4, 1999 (Ganguly, 2001; Dixit, 2002). The decade of the nineties saw the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the United States as the worlds sole supe rpower. Indo-US relations improved, with increased bilateral trade and the emergence of India as a hub for information technology. Clintons refusal to mediate in the Kargil crisis and his subsequent visit to India in 2000 marked a positive shift in relations betw een the United States and India. Taking cognizance of Indias asserti on that Pakistan was sponsor ing terrorism in Kashmir, Clinton, in a public broadcast in Pakistan during his 2000 visit, warned Pakistan of potential international is olation if the nation did not change its course. The events of September 11, 2001 and the U.S. war against terrorism changed all that and brought Pakistan back to center st age in the triangular relationship. While India courted the United States enthusiastically a marked departure from its previous policy towards the country the U.S. chose to partner with Pakistan in its attempt to uproot the Taliban from Afghanistan (Mohan, 2002). Pakist ans location and th e Pakistani Armys intimate knowledge of the Taliban no doubt play ed a decisive role in the US decision to ask Pakistani President Genera l Pervez Musharraf for support.
12 Nevertheless, the terrorist at tacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City have made the U.S. administ ration more sympathetic to Indias terrorist concerns. The administrations new pro-India attitude was reflected in its response to the spate of terrorist att acks in India after September 11, not ably the attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001. In response to this attack, India mounted a massive military deployment, cut off transportation links with Pakistan, downgraded diplomatic ties with Pakistan, and threat ened to go to war against Pakistan (Schaffer, 2002). The George Bush administration quickly inte rvened and for the first time formally acknowledged the link between Ka shmiri terrorist groups and the Pakistani state. This act pressured Pakistani president General Pervez Musharraf to declare that Pakistani soil would not be used to export terror to any pa rt of the world and resulted in formal commitments from Pakistan to end cross-border infiltration into India. He kept his promise and in January 2002 banned the Las hkar-e-toiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad, two Islamic jihadi outfits that had been invol ved in the attack on the Indian Parliament (www.rediff.com). At present, there is a debate in academic circles as to whether the United States should help India and Pakist an work out a permanent so lution to the dispute over Kashmir, going beyond its traditional role of episodic crisis management. Some argue that the moment is opportune, with India-U.S. relations im proving considerably (Mohan, 2002) and the growing realizati on in the United States that in order to check global terrorism, failing states such as Pakistan need to be addressed on a long-term basis (Schaffer 2002). Others, however, argue that U.S. mediation in Kashmir is a distant
13 possibility because the region is of little interest to the United States for several reasons (Limaye, 2002, p164). The dispute is largely unfamiliar to most Americans and Kashmir contains no resources that are of interest to the U.S. and its allies. Also, resolution of the conflict does not involve any ideological values dear to the United States. Although preventing nuclear war has been the centerpiece of U.S. policy towards South Asia in the past decade, the region still remains a low-priority area for U.S. diplomats. Framing A major and fairly recent part of media eff ects research, framing theory is used to explain the power of a comm unicating text. Framing by the mass media is an essential part of their role in the c onstruction of social reality (Tuchman, 1978). The news media have the power to shape the meanings that the audience assigns to an issue or event because they disseminate the information that people want, need, and should know (p. 2). In this way, the media actively promote the frames of reference that readers and viewers use to interpret and discuss public events and problems. McCombs, Shaw and Weaver (1997) have equated framing with seco nd-level agenda setting, which is transfer of issue attributes from the media to the publ ic. They argue that framing is an extension of agenda setting in te rms of media effects. The mass me dia have been shown to have on the public, a powerful agenda setting influe nce whereby the priority assigned by the media to certain issues gets translated into the priority assigned to them by the consumers of these mass media (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). While agenda setting describes the
14 power of the media to tell people what to think about, framing can be regarded as telling them how to think about it. Framing can be defined as the selection of some attributes of a given event or issue and the presentation of them as more pr ominent than other attributes or aspects of the event or issue in the media. According to Entman (1993), to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a co mmunicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular pr oblem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation (p. 52; emphasis in original). According to Gitlin (1980), the origin of frames lies in the medias selection of certain versions of reality over others. Day by day, normal organizational procedures define the story, identify the protagonists and the issues, and suggest approp riate attitudes toward them (p. 4; emphases in original). Since this research is limited to the print media, it will discuss only frames that are embedded in print news texts. Frames have four locations the comm unicator, the text, the audience and the culture and on any given issue, frames from different locations might be different from each other (Entman, 1993). The communicators (j ournalists) have certain ways in which they cover each event and these are dictated by news values, routines of news coverage deadline pressures, preferred use of cert ain types of sources over others, and organizational ideology and their own pe rsonal values (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991; Tuchman, 1978). These factors co ntribute to them looking at ev ents in a certain manner; this gets translated intentiona lly or otherwise into frames in the text that they write (Gamson, 1989).
15 The presence of frames in a text can be gauged by looking for the use of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments (p. 52; Entman, 1993). These frames are transferred to the readers, who in terpret them according to their mental schemata, defined as mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals processing of information (Graber, 1988). In the words of Lippman (1922), the only feeling that anyone can have about an event that he does not experience is the feeling aroused by his mental image of that event (p.13). Although each member of the audience has unique mental schemata, frames can be regarded as having a common effect on the majority, if not all, of the people subjected to them. Th is common effect on readers is what makes it important to study the frames used by the mass media. The fourth location for frames is the culture, which can be regarded as a storehouse of values, beliefs and practices that inform both the communicator and the audience. The frames embedded in popular culture assume speci al significance in international communication because journa lists reporting on a foreign nation are bound to frame their messages in a manner that is compatible with the audience and cultural frames in their home country. According to Graber (1980), American correspondents abroad must operate within the context of current American politics and the current American culture and their stories must not only reflect the American value structure, but also conform to established American stereotypes. For example, Noakes and Wilkins (2002) contend that US media coverage of the first Pales tinian intifada (popular
16 uprising against Israel in 1987), was sympathe tic to the Palestinia ns cause because the claims of the intifada resonated wi th Western social movement frames. Entman (1993) has said that the frame in a text is an imprint of power. Several powerful groups compete to get their frames in cluded in the reporting of an event or issue and therefore a communicating te xt conveys the frame of the group that won the battle to dominate it. According to Lippman (1922), si nce major issues are very complicated and subject to several different choices and opinions it is natural that everyone should wish to make his or her own choice of facts for th e newspapers to print (p. 345). An obvious example of this tussle for ensuring that ones interpretation of an issue is the dominant perception about it, is the one that goes on between interest groups on either side of a debate. Andsager (2000) studied the compara tive success of pro-life and pro-choice groups in dominating media discourse on po licymaking on late-term abortion in 1996 through their use of rhetoric. She found that although pro-choice groups had more press releases than pro-life ones, the rhetorical terms used by pr o-life groups appeared in the media twice as frequently as those used by pro-choice groups. Andsager posited that this could be because the pro-life rhetoric fit-in with journalists attitude towards late-term abortion, which most people found grisly, as well as the traditional newsworthiness value of conflict (Andsager, 200; p. 589). It is apparent from her study that the rhetoric employed by competing groups has an impact on journalistic framing.
17 Framing Effects The salience of a frame in a media text is a product of the interaction of the frames embedded in the text and in the mental schemas of the reader. Although the presence of frames in a text, as detected by researchers, does not gua rantee that audience frames will be identical to the frames in the text (Entman, 1989), media frames, by emphasizing some aspects of a problem over others, activate certai n kinds of knowledge within people, and this in tu rn affects their trains of t hought and recommended behavior. According to Price, Tewksbury and Powers (1997), media frames have two kinds of effects on the audience applicability eff ects and accessibility effects. During processing of a media text, the salient attr ibutes of the text activate in readers minds certain ideas that affect their response to the message. These are called applicability effects. Once activated, these ideas and feelings remain in the readers minds and are used in making subsequent evaluations. These are de fined as accessibility effects. Price et al (1997) conducted an experiment in which undergraduate students were asked to read articles about possible cuts in state funding. They manipulated an article to reflect three different dominant frames a conflict frame, a human interest frame, and a consequence frame. They also used a fourth group as control, subjecting its members to a story that just had the bare bones of the proposed budget cut. In the posttest questionnaire, respondents were asked to writ e down all thoughts and feelings they had while reading the stories randomly assigned to them. Coding of th e open-ended answers revealed a significant difference in the res ponses of the groups subjected to different frames.
18 To study the long-term effects of me ssage framing on readers cognitive responses, Tewksbury, Jones, Peske, Ra ymond and Vig (2000) conducted a two-wave experiment where they asked undergraduate st udents in the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, to read five experimentally manipulated versions of a news article on proposed state regulation of large-scale hog farms. One of the articles was an objective version of the issues surrou nding hog farms with equal emphasis on the environmental impact of unregulated hog fa rms and the economic impact of regulating them. Two articles moderately emphasized the environmental and economic frames respectively while the last two were ex tremely lopsided in each direction. The respondents were asked to fill out a posttest questionnaire with specific questions gauging their feelings towards largescale hog farms and whether they thought large-scale hog farms should be banned in the state of Illinois. They were also asked to summarize the large-scale hog farm issue. Three weeks later, the subjects completed an identical test. The results confirmed that subjects c ognitions were affected by the relative dominance of frames within the articles that they read. For example, the subjects in the environmental frame were more likely to s upport regulation of large-scale hog farms. The strength of the pattern was lower three weeks later but still present, reflecting the persistence of frames. As the re sults of this experiment indica te, the different frames that journalists use to report on an issue can significantly impact public thinking on that issue. However, Tewksbury et al ( 2000) caution that such promin ent effects may only be in case of issues that are not very mainstr eam. Iyengar (1991) found that the relationship between media frames and audience frames is strongly continge nt upon the issue under
19 study. For instance experimental manipula tion of a highly salient issue like unemployment did not have a significant impact on the re spondents attribution of responsibility for a problem. Since foreign news constitutes a very meager amount of coverage in the U.S. media and the American public is highly et hnocentric (Graber, 1980, it follows that the dispute over Kashmir is not a very salient issue for them and therefore media frames would have a major impact on wh at they think about the issue. From the above discussion, one can conclude that medi a frames do have an impact on audience thinking about issues, particularly regarding non-salient ones. Research Questions In light of the literature cited above, it can be argued that it is important to understand the frames that the U.S. media have used in the past and are using now in their coverage of the Kashmir dispute betw een India and Pakistan because those media frames are the source of the mental frames a bout the issue for American people as well as for American policymakers, albeit to a le sser extent. Drawing fr om Entmans (1993) perspective on frames, one can say that anal yzing the media coverage for frames would also yield information about the problem definitions, causal interpretations, moral evaluations, and treatment recommendations that the U.S. media have been promoting for the Kashmir crisis. Gamson (1989) conceptualized that me dia discourse on any issue can be conceived as a set of interpretive packages, w ith the frame as the central organizing idea forming the core of each interp retive package. Frames are the tools that help the audience
20 and even journalists in constructing meani ng and making sense of relevant events, by suggesting what is at issue. However, pack ages are not static. Media discourse on any particular issue evolves as these packages change over time incorporating new events into their interpretive frames. In the 15-year time period chosen for this study, many changes occurred in the nature of the dispute over Kashmir, in I ndia-Pakistan relations, in the two countries relationships with the United States, as well as in the global climate. At the beginning of the time period under analysis 1989 th e Cold War was ending between the United States and the erstwhile Sovi et Union, the Afghanistan war between the occupying Soviet troops and U.S.and Pakistan-supported Afgha n resistance fighters or mujahideen ended in 1989 with the withdr awal of Soviet troops, and an armed separatist movement started in Kashmir. While the movement for self-rule in Kashmir evolved with Kashmiri rebels seeing the advent of Afghani mujahid een in their ranks through the nineties, on the global front, the Cold War came to an end and the focus of international relations shifted towards nuclear containment. In 1998, both I ndia and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons establishing their identity as nuclear-capable states and in the opinion of the world Kashmir became a flashpoint that could tri gger a nuclear war. In 1999, the two countries fought the Kargil War, which ended in a ceasefire brought about by the Clinton administration. The late 1990s also saw impr oved relations between India and the United States. The next major event that shook the worl d was the terrorist attack on the twin towers in New York City on September 11, 2001, which fueled the Afghanistan war and
21 ended in the rout of the Pakistan-supported Taliban. On December 13, 2001, an armed jihadi group staged a su icide attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi killing 14 people, including the five attackers. In the summer of 2002, India and Pakistan mobilized their troops along their border in Kashmir re sulting in a massive standoff. The year 2003 saw a cooling down of tensions between India and Pakistan. This study attempts to track the changes in U.S. media discourse on the Kashmir dispute in or der to investigate whether these events had an impact on the frames employed in its coverage. Therefore, the first research question for the study is: Have the frames in the U.S. prin t media coverage of the Kashmir conflict changed in the 15-year period from January 1, 1989 to December 31, 2003 and to what extent have these changes reflected major developments in the region, in relations between India and Pakistan, and in international affairs? Since U.S. interest, threat to U.S. secu rity and threat to world peace have been found to be significant predictors of foreign news coverage by the U.S. media (Chang, Shoemaker, and Brendlinger, 1987; Chang and Lee, 1992), an analysis of the frames in the coverage on Kashmir would also show whet her these concerns are also reflected on how the issue is presented in the U.S. medi a. Exploring the frames in the coverage on Kashmir would reveal whether the contextu al statements made reflect the U.S. governments position on the issue as well as the countrys changing relationship with India and Pakistan.
22 Drawing from the above discussion, the second research question is: What have been the dominant frames in the U.S. print media coverage of the Kashmir conflict, and to what extent have these frames reflected such ma jor themes as religion, armed conflict, U.S. national interest, threat to world peace, and so on. The above literature review established the importance of sources especially official in the reporting of events and issues. It was also suggested that media frames carry the imprint of power because they ar e the outcome of the battle among sources from different sides of a disput e to get their respective version of reality to be the one that is most accepted. Frames are tools that help in the construction of reality and organize the world into manageable chunks for the ma ss media audience (Tuchman, 1974; Gamson, 1989). Since making sense of the world requires effort, it follows that tools that are prominently displayed and made cognitively readily accessible have a higher probability of being used. Consequently, the sources that have the most access to the media because they mold themselves to media requirements are more likely to ensure that their interpretation becomes the dominant one. This study will look at the sources used in the media text on the Kashmir conflict to determine their origin and nature because these characteristics are important indicators of the meanings that the media have chosen to attach to the issue. Last but not least, knowledge of the sources used from both sides of the conflict and the relative emphasis placed on them by the US media will inform the public relations and lobbying efforts of the two countries.
23 Therefore, the third research question is: What are the nature and affiliation of the sources used by the U.S. print media in the coverage of the Kashmir conflict?
24 Chapter Three Methodology Frames are difficult to detect in news texts because many of the framing devices used might appear as natural (Entman, 1991, p. 6; emphasis in original), unremarkable choices of words and images. It is this natu re of frames to be present in a very inconspicuous or natural fashion in the text that makes them instrumental in establishing a particular vers ion of reality as the comm on sense (p. 6; emphasis in original) or widespread inte rpretation of events. Both Entman (1991) and Gamson and Modigliani (1989) contend that frames can be constructed from and are manifested in the form of metaphors, keywords, concepts, symbol s, visual images, exemplars, catchphrases and depictions. In order to detect the frames used to describe the Kashmir conflict and the actors involved, one therefore needs to iden tify these framing devices. Stripped down to their grammatical basics, these devices are me rely nouns and verbs, and their modifiers adjectives and adverbs. This me thod of analyzing parts of speech to detect frames used in this research study is derived from the work s of Entman (1989), Dyer, Miller and Boone (1991) and Mills (1993). Entman (1989) compared the U.S. medi a coverage given to the shooting of a Korean Air Lines flight by Soviet fighter planes on Se ptember 1, 1983 that killed 269
25 passengers and crew with the coverage given to the shooting of an Iran Air plane on July 3, 1988 that killed 290 people on board. In orde r to identify the frames, he looked for specific words nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs chosen to describe the victims, the incident, and the act of shooting down of the pl anes. For example, some of the words that described the victims were innocent human beings, loved ones, and passengers; some words for the incident per se were a trocity, murder, and massacre; and some words used to describe the shooting act were barbaric/barbarous, deliberate(ly), and murderous (p. 19, p. 20). Similarly, in their an alysis of the content of two wire services one year before and one year after the E xxon Valdez crisis in March 1988, Dyer et al (1991) identified three kinds of issues pe rtaining to the event legal, economic and environmental. They selected terms words or groups of words that characterized each issue based on the extent to which it was felt those terms occurred in the data context and represented the occurrence of the issue. So me of the terms that categorized the issue as legal were litigation, trial, and arbitration; so me that fit under the economic category were profit, merger, and sto ck; and finally, the environmental issue category included terms like wildlife, dispersants, and otter (p. 31). Mills (1993) looked at the frames employed in the coverage of the armed conflict between U.S. agents and the members of the Branch Davidian cult led by David Koresh in Waco, Texas in the spring of 1993 by The Washington Post and the St Petersburg Times He analyzed 213 stories from these tw o newspapers for keywords, phrases, or literary devices with particular attention being paid to nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs and descriptive figures of speech in the te xts and headlines (p. 26). Mills identified
26 narrative elements in the text that were inst rumental in adding (or subtracting) meaning within the coverage. For example, any nouns used to identify or adjectives used to describe cult members were coded, provided t hose nouns and adjectives added a sense of meaning to the text. (p. 26) Mills grouped words such as standoff, fortified, and violent into a Warfare frame; words like messiah, abusive, and apocalyptic into a Religious fanaticism frame; and wo rds such as disaster, death toll, and tragedy into a Tragic victims frame ( p. 30). This study will follow the examples of Entman, Dyer et al and Mills in its coding of the text of news reports on Kashmir from January 1, 1989 to December 31, 2003 in The New York Times The Los Angeles Times and The Washington Post These three newspapers were chosen as the media to be examined because they are prestige newspapers that enjoy wide spread respect not only among the reading public but also among elites, including policymakers (Graber, 1980). The New York Times offers a comprehensive coverage of the Kashmir dispute during the time period under study 1989 to 2003. A Lexis Nexis headline search for Kashmir from January 1, 1989 to December 31, 2003 yielded a total of 188 articles from The New York Times and 53 from The Washington Post while a similar search in the database, ABI Inform Global, yielded 57 articles for the specified period in the Los Angeles Times. Since the aim of this study is to examine the frames em ployed in the news coverage given to the Kashmir conflict specifically by these newspapers, editorials, letters to the editor, and wire reports were eliminated from the populat ion. The articles were grouped under four time periods because the distribution of stories in the 15-year-period under study was
27 unequal, with some years having an overwhelm ingly large number of stories and some having none, particularly in the Los Angeles Times and The Washington Post. The first time period included stories from The New York Times and The Washington Post in the years 1989 and 1990. There were no articles on Kashmir in the Los Angeles Times for these two years. The second period of study was 1991 to 1998, and included 31 stories from The New York Times and three each from The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times The third period was from 1999 to 2001, with a significant jump in the number of stories from 1998 to 1999 in the Los Angeles Times (3 to 19) and The New York Times (4 to 24). The fourth period was the two-year period from 2002 to 2003, because there was a second increase in coverage from 2001 to 2002 in all the three newspapers under study: from 15 to 51 in The New York Times 5 to 24 in the Los Angeles Times and from 6 to 21 in The Washington Post In order to maintain a certain degree of parity with the years where there was no coverage, a random sample was chosen from the years where the number of stories was more than 10 in any of the newspapers. So since the number of articles in The New York Times and The Washington Pos t were more than 10 in 1990, 33 and 13 respectively, a random sample of 17 and 6 stories were chos en from the two newspapers respectively. Table 1 shows the composition of the sample of news stories that were analyzed for this study. In order to answer the first and second research questions which are how have the frames in the coverage of the Kashmir dispute changed in the time period under study and what have been the dominant frames, th e selected articles were analyzed for the frames used to describe the conflict, the region, and the three part ies to it Indians,
28 Pakistanis and Kashmiris. These articles we re also analyzed to determine the sources used in the coverage of the dispute. The unit of analysis was each word of interest in each of the 180 articles. Table 1: Distribution of Stor ies (1989-2003) in the Sample Time period Newspapers No. of stories The New York Times 23 1989-1990 The Washington Post 7 Subtotal 30 The New York Times 33 The Washington Post 3 1991-1998 Los Angeles Times 3 Subtotal 39 The New York Times 25 The Washington Post 6 1999-2001 Los Angeles Times 17 Subtotal 48 The New York Times 33 The Washington Post 13 2001-2003 Los Angeles Times 17 Subtotal 63 Total 180 The articles were coded for keywords, metaphors, descriptors and other such framing devices by picking out the nouns and verbs and their modifiers adjectives and adverbs that have been used to describe each of the following subjects Kashmir as a conflict per se; Kashmir and South Asia as a geographic region; Indians and India; Pakistanis and Pakistan; Kashmi ris and Kashmir; the United St ates; and Other parties. Once these terms were identified, the author grouped them into thematic clusters or frames in a manner similar to that of Entman (1989), Dyer et al (1991) and Mills (1993). After identifying the frames on the basis of the keywords found and coded in the 180
29 articles under study, the author made a list of the frames evident in each of the time periods for each subject and then compared th e frames evident in all four time phases for all subjects for any patterns that emerge over the entire 15-year period studied. The author assessed whether changes in the frames may be related to and explained by placing them in the context of developments in the region and in the world at that time. In order to answer the third research question, namely, what is the nature and origin of the sources used by the U.S. media in the coverage of Kashmir, the articles were coded for the sources used on the basis of two criteria: the first was their affiliation that is whether they were Pakistani, Indian, Kashmiri, U.S or ot her; the second criterion was their nature official or unofficial. Sources from both Pa kistan-occupied and Indianoccupied Kashmir were categorized as being Kashmiri. Government, military, political and diplomatic sources were categorized as official, whereas representatives of militant organizations, religious or ganizations, human rights organizations, academic and professional research groups, laypersons and so on were categori zed as unofficial sources. Once the sources were coded on the ba sis of their nature and affiliation, the author performed a frequency analysis on them to see the percentage of official versus unofficial sources used as well as the percenta ges of Indian, Pakistani, Kashmiri and U.S. and other sources used in the 15-year time period. In order to establish the reliability of the coding decisions, a random sample of articles was chosen and coded by the aut hor and two other coders who were both University of South Florida graduate stude nts, one in the Mass Communications track and the other in the Journalism track. Both coders were in their fifth semester of study at
USF and had knowledge of mass media theories and practices. For the purpose of establishing the reliability, the author and the two coders coded the first article appearing in all three newspapers in seven randomly chosen years from the 15-year period under study. The total number of articles coded was 13 seven from The New York Times and three each from The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times. There were no articles in The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times for four of the randomly chosen years. The author conducted a brief training session with the two other coders to explain to them the conceptual and operational definitions of each of the categories mentioned earlier. The intercoder reliability between each of the two coders and the author was computed with the help of Holstis (1969) formula, which is: Reliability = 2M N 1 +N 2 where M is the number of coding decisions on which the two coders agree and N 1 and N 2 are the total number of coding decisions taken by the two coders. After establishing the intercoder reliability, the author proceeded to code all the 180 articles with the help of a coding sheet (see Appendix A), categorizing the words in the news reports for each period according to their part of speech and subject they described. The author also coded the sources according to the subject they represented and also based on their nature official or unofficial. 30
31 Chapter Four Results Since the findings of this research study were very extensive, a detailed report of the findings has been provided in this chapte r while the specific conclusions that answer the research questions as well as explanations interpretations and implications of these conclusions are included in the fi nal chapter of this document. Mass media frames are elements words a nd groups of words that are used by journalists to describe, explai n and interpret subjects for their audiences, which are dependent on the media for information, especially about occurrences in foreign countries. The subjects may be events, occu rrences and issues, players involved in the event, the thoughts, feelings a nd attitudes of the players, as well as the situations and contexts of their occurrences. To delineate fram es in the coverage of an event or issue, one has to look at the words keywords and mo difiers that describe the subjects. In order to then identify the frames in the cove rage of a particular subject, one needs to identify the regularities in the keywords and modifiers used for it. One can then place the keywords and/or modifiers that are similar in meaning in thematic groups or thematic clusters or frames and develop names or labels for these frames. The process is somewhat similar to the development of factors in th e quantitative analysis of news coverage and has been followed in the past by Entman (1989) in his analysis of the U.S. media
32 coverage of the KAL and Iran Air accidents, Dy er et al (1991) in their analysis of the wire service coverage of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and Mills (1993) in his analysis of the shifting framework of the news covera ge of the cult crisis in Waco, Texas. In order to determine the changing frames used by the U.S. media in their coverage of the Kashmir conflict and thus to answer the first resear ch question, the author followed a process similar to the one descri bed above. First of all words nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs used to refer to the 1) conflict, 2) the Kashmir region, 3) India and Indians, 4) Pakistan and Pakistanis, 5) Kashmiris, 6) the United States and 7) other players or actors, were drawn out fr om the news articles appearing in The New York Times The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times in the 15-year period from 1989 to 2003. In order to determine whether the frames used in the coverage of these subjects have changed over the past decade and a half, the coverage of the period was divided into four phases: 19891990, 1991-1998, 1999-2001 and 2002-2003 on the basis of the frequency of news articles appearing in these years. The number of articles in The New York Times and The Washington Post dropped sharply from 1990 to 1991, but there was a leap in coverage from 1998 to 1999. One ag ain, the number of ar ticles in each of the three newspapers in 2002 and 2003 was significantly higher than in 2001. After the isolation and coding of word s, a count was done to determine the frequency with which these words appeared in each phase of coverage. For each of the seven subjects identified above, words that a ppeared with the highest frequency were identified and grouped and expressions coined to capture the themes or frames among words that seemed to form thematic groups. Depending on their relative prominence,
33 frames were categorized as major and minor The relative occurrence of these major and minor frames in each period was then assessed and compared in order to answer the first research question, which is whether the frames have changed in the 15 years of coverage from 1989 to 2003. This established the basis for answering the second research question which was of a more general nature and asked what have been the dominant frames in the coverage of the Kashmir conflict. To answer the third research question, about the nature official or unofficial and the affiliation Indian, Pakistani, Kashmiri, U.S. and other the sources used in each story were coded according to these criteria. To determine the relative frequency with which they were us ed, the number of times each source was used within each story was also recorded. However, prior to coding the 180 arti cles in the sample according to the previously described method and to establish the credibility of the results generated from the process, intercoder reliability was computed between the author and each of two other coders for 13 randomly chosen articles from the three newspapers under study. The results, which were computed with the help of Holstis formula (the acceptable level was set at 0.80 by the author), are su mmarized in the table below. Table 2: Intercoder Reliability Coeffi cients between Author and Two Coders Author and For sources For keywords Coder 1 0.97 0.86 Coder 2 0.90 0.91
34 Frames for the conflict Nouns that were synonymous with the events occurring in Kashmir from 1989 to 2003 armed struggle for separation from Indi a, suppression of the rebellion by India, training and arming of Kashmiri militants by Pakistan, infiltration of foreign fighters especially those from Afghani stan were identified, and then grouped into thematic clusters within each of the four previously identified phases. Adjectives that described these events were also code d and then grouped in the same fashion. Table 3 provides a summary of the major and minor frames in d ecreasing order of prom inence as determined by the frequency of usage of their constituent words vis--vis both nouns and modifiers that were used to describe the conflict in the four periods of U.S. media coverage under study. 1989-1990 In the first phase, in The Washington Post and The New York Times, there were a total of 30 articles on the Kashmir conflict, with 44 word s used 197 times to describe the conflict per se. Of these words, the most commonly used desc riptors for the conflict were war (quoted 40 times), movement (19) and violence (18). Due to its dominance over other words, war was defined as a frame in itself called Warfare. While movement was classified as part of a Mass-based Action frame, the word violence was cast into a Physical Violence frame. Both the latter two frames were minor frames for this period. Since all the other words used to describe the events in Kashmir in the
35 years 1989 and 1990 occurred far fewer times than the above three, those words were not taken into account. The most commonly occurring modifier for the Kashmir conflict was separatist (12) followed by independence (7), political (5) and finally anti-Indian (4), all of them describing the nature of the events in Kashmir as being motivated by the desire of the Kashmiri people to break away from I ndia. These modifiers form part of the Massbased Action frame that includes words like movem ent and struggle because they indicate the motive for the campaign be ing conducted by the Kashmiri people. In the first phase, the most commonly occurring verbs used for the conflict convey the impression of an event that is expanding in scale. Words such as escalated, growing, worsened, has spread and th eir synonyms appeared 10 times representing a Growing Unrest frame. 1991-1998 In the second phase, 48 words were used 238 times to describe the conflict in a total of 39 articles from The New York Times The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times The most prominent frame was once again Warfare with the word war occurring 51 times, followed by insurgency (29), conflict (26), violence (16), rebellion (14), and dispute (9). Insurge ncy and rebellion were grouped together to form the Internal Revolt frame. In this eight-year period of coverage, only two major frames emerge the Warfare frame and the Internal Revolt frame.
36 Although the modifiers signifying the Mass-based Action frame add up to a higher figure (18), the most prominent single mo difier in this phase is guerrilla (15), which is a part of the Internal Revolt frame because while insurgency or rebellion is a name for the action that is being done, gue rrilla signifies the method by which it is perpetrated. The modifier nuclear appear s only 9 times in this period and can be considered a minor frame named Nuclear Risk The frame for the conflict continued to be that of Growing Unrest with words such as degenerated, has threatened, and erupted, that appeared a total of 11 times. Table 3: Frames for the Kashmir Conflict 1989-1990 Major Frames Related Words Minor Frames Related Words 1. Mass-based Action movement Noun 1. Warfare War 2. Physical violence violence Modifiers 1. Mass-based Action separatist independence political anti-Indian Verbs 1. Growing Unrest escalated worsened growing 1991-1998 Major Frames Related Words Minor Frames Related Words 1. Warfare War 1. Conflict conflict Noun 2. Internal Revolt insurgency rebellion 2. Physical Violence violence Modifiers 3. Mass-based Action independence separatist secessionist independence 1. Nuclear Risk nuclear Verbs Growing Unrest degenerated erupted
37 Table 3: Frames for the Kashmir Conflict (continued ) 1999-2001 Major Frames Related Words Minor Frames Related Words 1. Physical Violence fighting violence battle 1. Terrorism terrorism 2. Warfare War Noun 3. Conflict conflict 1. Internal Revolt insurgency 1. Nuclear Risk nuclear 2. Mass-based Action freedom independence 3. Outside Interference Pakistan-backed Pakistan-based Modifiers 1. Long and Dangerous Conflict decade-old large-scale long-running dangerous protracted 4. Religious Identity Islamic Muslim Verbs Growing Unrest has raged could escalate 2002-2003 Major Frames Related Words Minor Frames Related Words 1. Warfare war 2. Outside Interference infiltration incursion 3. Physical Violence violence fighting killings Jihad battle 4. Conflict conflict tensions standoff Noun 5. Disagreement crisis dispute issue 1. Mass-based Action struggle movement campaign 1. Long and Dangerous Conflict large-scale widespread 1. Nuclear Risk nuclear 2. Mass-based Action separatist Modifiers 2. Outside Interference cross-border 3. Internal revolt guerrilla Verbs Growing Unrest continued intensified Stabilizing Unrest has calmed calming
38 1999-2001 In the third phase of the period under st udy, there were 48 articles from all the three newspapers under study. The most comm only occurring word for the events in Kashmir was again war (75 times) signifying a Warfare frame, which was very closely rivaled by conflict (70) forming a frame called Conflict , and fighting (67) which was grouped with violence (26) to form a frame called Physical Violence because both words signify physical acts of violen ce with no necessary ideological dimension. The Physical Violence frame was discovered to be the dominant frame for this period, even overtaking the Warfare frame The modifiers describing the intensity and possible extent of the Kashmir conflict labeled the Long and Dangerous Conflict frame occurred a total of 43 times with words such as decade-old, large-scale, long-running, dangerous, protracted and wider. This frame had a greater prominence than other frames such as Nuclear Risk comprising the word nuclear (16), Mass-based Action made up of words like freedom and independence (13), and Religious Identity signified by use of modifiers such as Islamic/Muslim (10). The other fr ame that emerged through the modifiers for this phase were what was referred to as the Outside Interference frame (10) that included adjectives such as Pakista n-backed and cross-border, indicating involvement of parties other than Indi ans and the Kashmiris in the conflict. Continuing the trend observed in the first two phases, Growing Unrest comprising words such as could escalate, has raged, and could deepen, with a total of 15 uses, persists as the dominant frame in the third period as well.
39 2002-2003 In the fourth period, although once again war (108 occurrences) emerged as the most commonly occurring descri ptor of the Kashmir conflict two new words to dominate coverage were infiltration and incursion. These two words were considered part of the Outside Interference frame (99) that occurred for the first time in the previous phase. These words convey the perception that the conflict playing out in Kashmir was being actively supported and/or conducted by people outside the region. A close third was the Physical Violence frame with violence occurring 41 times, fighting occurring 18 times, killings, 14 times, j ihad, 12 times and battle, 8 times. The fourth prominent frame was the Conflict frame, formed from the words conflict (30), tensions (29) and standoff (13), which to gether occurred 72 times in the last two years of the time period under study. All th ese three words signify a protracted tussle over something between tw o or more parties that are unwilling to change their positions on the issue. A third frame was constructed by grouping together words such as dispute (30), issue (20) a nd crisis (11), which implied that there was a disagreement that had become a cause of contention between two or more parties which, in this case, are India, Pakistan and th e local Kashmiris. This frame was labeled as the Disagreement frame. The Disagreement frame (51), formed by words such as crisis (27), dispute (17) and issue (7), was the fifth dom inant frame in 2002-2003. Struggle, (17), movement (9), and campaign (7) constituted a minor frame called the Mass-based
40 Action because all these three words signify a br oad-based activity aimed at changing the status quo. The most commonly occurring frame for modifiers was once again that of a Long and Dangerous Conflict (35) comprising words like al l-out, escalating, and fullblown followed by the Outside Interference frame constituted by the adjective cross-border (17). The Nuclear Risk frame, the Mass-based Action frame exemplified by the word separatist, and the Internal Revolt frame represented by the word guerrilla, were the minor frames for this period. There were two types of desc riptions for the intensity and direction of the conflict in this phase with Growing Unrest (20) still as the most prominent frame composed of words like continued, intensified, and h as escalated. However, verbs such as calming, or has calmed, or scaling back, which were grouped into the Stabilizing Unrest frame (15), also appear in this phase signifying a move towards a decrease in the intensity of the conflict in this phase. Frames for the Region The second category of subjects for which frames were identified in the 15-year coverage was the region of Kashmir, a land that lies in the extreme north end of India and Pakistan. About two-thirds of the region, whic h has a distinct histor y and a tradition of religious tolerance, lies within India, while Pakistan controls almost one-third. The remaining stretches to the north east are co ntrolled by China. The state of Jammu and Kashmir is an Indian administ rative unit, with Jammu as the winter capital of the state
41 and the city of Srinagar, which is in the Kashmir valley, the summer capital. Although there are linguistic and cultural similarities between Kashmir and Jammu, while Kashmir is a Muslim majority area, Jammu has a majority of Hindus. 1989-1990 In the first phase, 12 words for the region occurred 54 times, and the most commonly occurring word was state (18 times), signifying an identification of the region as a Political Entity that is part of a larger nati on. The second frequent description was valley (11 times), which portrays the Kashmir region as a Geographical Entity The most commonly occurring modifiers for th e region in this period were those that described Kashmir as a region where the majority of the population followed the Islamic faith. Modifiers such as Muslim-dominat ed, predominantly Muslim, and Muslim majority, were grouped to form the Religious Identity frame that appears 20 out of a total of 45 times in this period. 1991-1998 In the second period, out of 74 times, Kashmir was described 25 times as a territory, 19 times as a reg ion and 14 times and as a state, implying that it was more likely to be described as a Geographic Entity than as a Political Entity in this period. Continuing the trend of describing Ka shmir as a Muslim region, modifiers that represent the Religious Identity frame occur a total of 21 times in this period followed by disputed that is repeated 16 times and fits into the Disagreement frame.
42 Table 4: Frames for the Kashmir region 1989-1990 Major Frames Constituent words 1. Political Entity state Noun 2. Geographic Entity valley Modifiers 1. Religious Identity Muslim-dominated predominantly Muslim Muslim majority 1991-1998 Major Frames Constituent words 1. Geographic Entity territory region Noun 2. Political Entity state 1. Religious Identity Muslim-dominated predominantly Muslim Muslim majority Modifiers 2. Disagreement disputed 1999-2001 Major Frames Constituent words Minor Frames Constituent words Noun 1. Geographic Entity region territory 1. Political Entity state 1. Disagreement disputed Modifiers 2. Religious Identity Muslim Muslim-dominated 1. Geographical Entity Himalayan mountainous 2002-2003 Major Frames Constituent words Minor Frames Constituent words Noun 1. Geographic Entity region territory 1. Political Entity state 1. Disagreement disputed Modifiers 2. Religious Identity Muslim 1. Geographic Entity Himalayan beautiful rugged
43 1999-2001 The third phase did not show much change in the iden tification of Kashmir as a Geographic Entity, except that in this period regi on occurred more frequently (32 times) than territo ry (22 times). The Political Entity frame was a distant third with the word state appearing only 8 out of 98 times as a descriptor for Kash mir. In this period, the Disagreement frame comprising the word disputed, (33) surpassed the Religious Identity frame with 21 occurrences of modi fiers describing the Kashmir region. Descriptions that fit into the Geographic Entity frame such as Himalayan and mountainous occur 16 times, reinforcing the identification of Kash mir as a piece of land. 2002-2003 In the last phase of coverage, Kash mir continues to be described as a Geographic Entity as a region (41 times) and as a territory (19 times) but its description as a state (18 times), although less frequent than region or territory, is noteworthy because it shows a gradual movement towards describing Kashmir once again as a Political Entity With the modifiers, the region continue s to be described in terms of the Disagreement frame disputed (38) followed by the Religious Identity frame Muslim (27), and finally through the Geographic Entity frame Himalayan, rugged, and beautiful for a total of 16 times.
44 Frames for India and Indians The third subject for which words were identified and grouped under thematic clusters was India or Indians. In 1989, Jammu and Kashmir was and still is a state in the Indian union, although Pakistan controls a significant amount of its territory. It is important to look at the frames used for India because it is a major player in the Kashmir conflict and because the insurgency in Kash mir is being waged in order to sever the region from India and either establish it as an independent nation or integrate it into Pakistan. In the last 15 years, India has refused to let go of the region, despite heavy civilian and military casualties, allegations of human rights violations, constant efforts by Pakistan to get India to negotia te and even an undeclared war fought with Pakistan on the snowy Kargil heights. 1989-1990 In this period, the most commonl y occurring frame for India was the Military Establishment frame formed by combining troops (51 times), army (18 times), security forces (12 times) and soldiers (10 times). The second widely used frame included government (52 times), leaders (8) and officials (14), which were grouped with government to form a Civilian Establishment frame for describing India. India was described using 29 modifiers that were quoted 216 times. India is described as a Hindu country 20 tim es, signifying the prevalence of the Religious Identity frame in this period. The frame includes modifiers such as Hindu, Hindu dominated, and predominantly Hindu.
45 There were two major frames for the desc ription of the actio ns of Indians in Kashmir one was that of a Violently Repressor and the other was that of a Law and Order Maintainer The first frame, made up of word s like killed, burned, shoot, fired and their synonyms (51 occurrences), ha d a higher prevalence as compared to the second one, which was made up of words like s ealed off, arrested, to guard, and patrolling, with 42 occurrences. 1991-1998 In this period, 53 words were used 389 tim es to refer to India in a total of 39 articles. As in the last period, the Military Establishment frame, constituted by the words troops (85), army (39), security forces (30), soldier s (23) and forces (13), dominated the Civilian Establishment frame, comprising the words government (65), officials (31) and leaders (9). Continuing the use of the Religious Identity frame, India is described as a Hindu nation (29) in the s econd phase of the period under study. Other modifiers that re flect the Military Establishment frame for India are military/paramilitary used 21 times to describe Indian troops in Kashmir. While the two frames that emerged in the first phase continue to be present in the second one, this period shows a much higher dominance of the Violent Repressor frame, composed of words such as shot, raped, tortured, and assaulted (a total of 71 occurrences) as compared to the Law and Order Maintainer frame, which included words like banned, monitored, and sealed o ff (a total of 30 occurrences). The third frame that emerges in this period is identification of India as a Diplomatic Entity
46 reacting to the events in Kashmir and pu tting forth its opinion and judgments on the issues involved. This frame was constructed from words such as accused, claimed, insisting, and refus ed, which together were used 67 times. Table 5: Frames for India and Indians 1989-1990 Major Frames Constituent Words 1. Military Establishment troops, ar my, security forces, soldiers Noun 2. Civilian Establishment government, officials, leaders Modifiers 1. Religious Identity Hi ndu, Hindu dominated, predominantly Hindu 1. Violent Repressor killed, burned, looted Verbs 2. Law and Order Maintainer Sealed off, arrested, to guard, patrolling 1991-1998 Major Frames Constituent words 1. Military Establishment troops, army, security forces, soldiers, forces Noun 2. Civilian Establishment government, officials, leaders 3. Religious Identity Hindu, Hindu dominated, predominantly Hindu Modifiers 2. Military Establishment military, paramilitary 1. Violent Repressor shot, rape d, killed, tortured, assaulted 2. Law and Order Maintainer banned, monitored Verbs 3. Diplomatic Entity accused, claimed, insisting 1999-2001 Major Frames Constituent words 1. Military Establishment soldiers, tr oops, army, forces, security forces Noun 2. Civilian Establishment leaders, government, officials, power 1. Religious Identity Hindu, Hindu dominated, predominantly Hindu Modifiers 2. Nuclear Risk nuclear, nuclear-armed 1. Conciliatory Posturing defused, urged, claimed, agreed 2. Aggressive Posturing blamed, refused, accused, denied 3. Continuing Warfare have been fighting, shelling, battling 4. Violent Repressor killed, shot, fired Verbs 5. Law and Order Maintainer imposed, arrested, impounded
47 Table 4: Frames for India and Indians (continued) 2002-2003 Major Frames Constituent words 1. Military Establishment troops, so ldiers, security forces, army, military Noun 2. Civilian Establishment government, leaders, officials 1. Nuclear Risk nuclear, nuclear-armed Modifiers 2. Religious Identity Hindu, Hindu dominated, predominantly Hindu 1. Aggressive Posturing glared, reje cted, have refused, have ruled out 2. Conciliatory Posturing agrees, cut back, welcomed 3. Continuing Warfare are fighti ng, are waging, mobilized, massing 4. Violent Repressor kille d, shot dead, attacked Verbs 5. Law and Order Maintainer patrolled, policed, monitors 1999-2001 The Military Establishment frame (117) was slightly more prevalent in this period of news coverage and was revealed by the naming of Indians as soldiers (45 times), troops (27), army (22), forces (14) and security forces (9) than the Civilian Establishment frame (113), which was constitu ted by words such as leaders (43 times), government (40 times), offici als (17 times) and power (13 times). A total of 47 descriptors for Indi a were used 304 times in this period of coverage. The most common adjectives used to describe India in this period remained the ones that form the Religious Identity frame (20), followed for the first time by the use of nuclear to describe India. The words nuclear and nuclear-armed occur 19 times and can be grouped under the Nuclear Risk frame. In this phase, the Diplomatic Entity frame was split to reflect the nature of the actions being done by Indians. Words de scribing positive and neutral actions, for
48 example, claimed, defused, urged, contends, agreed, and allowed (68 occurrences), were grouped into the Conciliatory Posturing frame, whereas words that convey a defensive and confrontational stance or a refusal to move away from ones entrenched position, such as denied, accused, refused, and blamed (52 occurrences), were grouped into an Aggressive Posturing frame. Although the Law and Order Maintainer frame (21 usages) as well as the Violent Repressor frame (25 usages) continued to be present in this period in the words used to de scribe the actions of the Indian government, both were less prom inent than the two frames describing the diplomatic functions of the Indian government Another frame to emerge in this period was that of Continuing Warfare that is exemplified by usag e of words like shelling, have been waging, battling, and f ought (used 32 times) that conveyed the impression that India was engaged in a protract ed battle or fight with the Kashmiris and the Pakistanis. 2002-2003 In what has been a trend that has re mained consistent throughout the 15-year period under study, the Military Establishment frame for Indians was more prominent than the Civilian Establishment frame in this period to the extent that the former (182) occurred nearly twice the numbe r of times for the latter (92) For the former frame, the most frequently used word was troops ( 43 times), followed by soldiers (41 times), security forces (33 times), army (21 tim es and military (9 times). For the second frame, government occurred 40 times but l eaders was used 21 times and officials
49 31 times. For the first time in the 15-year period under study, among the modifiers, the Religious Identity frame vis--vis adjectives for India takes second position to the Nuclear Risk frame, with the words describing I ndia as a Hindu country occurring 19 times but those identifying it as a nuclear power occu rring 37 times. The most prominent frame to emerge in this period for Indians is that of Aggressive Posturing comprising words such as glaring, asserted, demanded, have ruled out, have refused, and reject ed that have 102 occurrences. The second major frame is that of Conciliatory Posturing made up of words like agrees, claimed, cut back, welcomed, has accepted, hoped, offered, and pulled back that occurred a grand total of 63 times Compared to the prominence of these two frames, the other three frames for India in this period Continuing Warfare (38), Law and Order Maintainer (24) and Violent Repressor (24) can be regarded as minor frames. Frames for Pakistan and Pakistanis Another major party in the Kashmir dis pute is Pakistan, Indi as neighbor to the west and a nation founded in 1947 on the princi ple that South Asian Muslims needed a land of their own separate from India, wher e majority of the population is of the Hindu faith, although the country is a secular democracy where every citizen has the equal right to practice his or her faith. Since its creation, Pakistan has asserted that Kashmir belongs to it for the reason Kashmir is a Muslim majo rity province and Paki stan is an Islamic nation. Although founded as a democracy, Pakist an has been ruled by its military for
50 most of its 57-year existence as a nati on. A democracy under Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto when the armed rebellion in Kash mir started in 1989 and later ruled by the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif Pakistan was taken over in a coup in October 1999 by then Pakistani Army Chie f General Pervez Musharraf who declared himself the Chief Executive Officer of Pakistan. 1989-1990 In the first phase of coverage, 19 words were used 53 times to describe Pakistan, compared to 216 times for Indians and 283 times for Kashmiris. Of the 19 words, the most commonly occurring was the word govern ment (12 times), officials (6 times), and leaders (6 times), indicating that the Civilian Establishment frame was dominant over the Military Establishment frame composed of the words army (6 times) and troops (4 times). As with the modifiers used for India, Pakistan was also described as a mostly Muslim, and Islamic nation, reflecting the use of the Religious Identity frame (8 out of a total of 16). Although the Pakistanis had a low profile in this pe riod as compared to the Indians and Kashmiris, a coupl e of frames emerged for Pakistanis as well. A slightly higher prevalence was of the Active Supporter frame, which was made up of verbs such as supported, armed, training, and hel ping, with a total of 19 usages that conveyed the fact that Pakistan was providing finance, training and arms to the Kashmiris. The second frame was of a Diplomatic Entity and was composed of verbs like charged, denied, accuses, and challenging, a total of 17 occurrences.
51 1991-1998 In the second phase, the Civilian Establishment frame (30) was three times more visible than the Military Establishment frame (10), with government occurring 11 times, officials 6 times, villagers 8 times and civilians 5 times. Troops (7) and army (3) were the third most commonly o ccurring words for Pakistanis, who had a total of 26 descriptors for this phase that were used 67 times. Continuing the use of the Religious Identity frame, in this phase also, Pakistan continues to be described as a Muslim country (8) and as a nuclear pow er (3) out of a total of 17 times. 1999-2001 The Civilian Establishment continues to dominate references to Pakistanis in the coverage in the third period as well. The most commonly o ccurring word for Pakistanis in this phase is leader(s) occurring 56 times. The word general, used as a reference to General Pervez Musharraf, who took over power in Pakistan in October 1999 by overthrowing the popularly-elected government appears 27 times. Officials (13) and ruler (9), again a reference to General Mu sharraf, are also part of the bigger Civilian Establishment frame which is constituted of a to tal of 137 references. The second most important frame used to name Pakistan is the Military Establishment frame (119) with soldiers occurring 42 times, troops 34 times, forces 15 times, army 12 times and military 16 times. The total number of descriptors for Pakistan in the third phase was 67. These 67 descriptors were utilized a to tal of 419 times, 115 more than those for Indians and 194 more than those for Kashmiris.
52 The most commonly used modifiers for Paki stan for this period again fit into the Religious Identity frame (39), and included words such as holy, religious, Muslimdominated, and Muslim majority. The second frame that is evident in the modifiers for Pakistan is the Military Establishment frame (31), with the use of the words army and military to describe Pakistanis. For the first time, one can see the occurrence of the Outside Interference frame here as exemplified by th e modifiers Pakis tan-based, and Pakistan-supported that occur 15 times. Othe r modifiers that occu r, albeit to a lesser extent, are militant (8) and terrorist (7). Demonstrating the growing Pakistani i nvolvement in the Kashmir conflict from 1999, the number of verbs for Pakistanis is this phase is 462, as compared to 378 for Indians and only 101 for Kashmiri s. The most evident frame for Pakistanis in this phase was that of Conciliatory Posturing, formed by words that convey positive or neutral actions and gestures, such as suggested, proposed, acknowledged, and claims, used 105 times. The second major frame was that of Violent Neighbor, formed by words like fired, shot, shel ling, and fought, that occu rred 76 times. The next major frame was the Active Supporter of Kashmiris frame, with 58 occurrences of related words, including for the first time words de scribing the movement of Kashmiri and other extremist fighters from Pakistan to India across their border that is referred to as the Line of Control. The last major frame was that of Aggressive Posturing, conveyed by words like charged, accuses, and demanded, used 43 times.
53 2002-2003 The Military Establishment frame (84) takes over from the Civilian Establishment frame (62) as the dominant one for de scribing Pakistan in the fourth and final phase of coverage. The total number of words used to describe Pakistanis in the final phase was 69 and these words were us ed 397 times. Troops appeared 28 times, forces, 19 times, army, 18 times, military, 12 times and soldiers, 7 times forming the Military Establishment frame. Part of the Civilian Establishment frame, Government appeared 37 times while leader(s) was used 25 times. However, a close rival to the Military Establishment fram e and one that surpasses the Civilian Establishment frame is a new frame composed of words such as militants (53), jihadis (14), fighters (5), extremists (6) and guerrillas (4). These words form a group called the Militant Extremists frame (82). Among modifiers, the three most common frames in decreasing order of prominence are Religious Identity, with the words Islamic or Muslim (44); Nuclear Risk with the words nuclear, nuclear-arm ed, nuclear-capable; and finally, the Militant Extremists frame, with the modifiers militant appearing 22 times and extremist 10 times. This compliments the pr esence of the same frame in the nouns used to describe Pakistan. The most prominent verb frame for the Pakistanis in this period was that of Conciliatory Posturing as evident through the use of words for positive and neutral actions such as promised, admitted, eased, has pledged, to improve, and to resolve (106 occurrences). The second mo st prominent frame was a new one called
54 Cracking Down, which was constructed from word s that expressed the Pakistani Governments actions in this phase aimed at curbing the activities of Islamic extremist organizations like Lashkar-e-Toiba, Al Q aeda, Jaish-e-Mohammed and others. This frame was composed of verbs like to end, cracked down, banned, has reined in, have closed, shut down, and stopped (95 occurrences). The third prominent frame was that of Aggressive Posturing made of denied, demanded, facing off, rejected (71 times) followed by that of Active Supporter made of arming, training, backing(61 times ) and finally, that of Violent Neighbor fired, killed, mobilizing, opened fire, to bleed, and waging ( 44 times). Table 6: Frames for Pakistan and Pakistanis 1989-1990 Major Frame Constituent words 1. Civilian Establishment government officials leaders Noun 2. Military Establishment Army troops Modifiers 1. Religious Identity mostly Muslim Islamic 1. Active Supporter training helping arming Verbs 2. Diplomatic Entity charged denied accuses
55 Table 6: Frames for Pakistan and Pakistanis (continued) 1991-1998 Major frame Constituent words Minor frames Constituent words Noun 1. Civilian Establishment government officials villagers civilians 1. Military Establishment troops army Modifiers 1. Religious Identity Muslim predominantly Muslim 1. Nuclear Risk nuclear nucleararmed 1. Active Supporter providing supporting harboring 2. Diplomatic Entity claimed denied demanded Verbs 3. Violent Neighbor bombarded fought shelled 1999-2001 Major Frames Constituent words Minor Frames Constituent words 1. Civilian Establishment leader(s) general officials ruler Noun 2. Military Establishment soldiers troops military army Modifiers 1. Religious Identity Muslim Islamic holy 1. Outside Interference Pakistanbased Pakistansupported 1. Conciliatory Posturing suggested proposed 2. Violent Neighbor fired shot shelled Verbs 3. Active Supporter helping arming 1. Aggressive Posturing Demanded charges accused refused
56 Table 6: Frames for Pakistan and Pakistanis (continued ) 2002-2003 Major Frames Constituent words Minor Frames Constituent words 1. Military Establishment troops forces army military soldiers 2. Militant Extremists militants Jihadis fighters extremists guerrillas Noun 3. Civilian Establishment government leader(s) 1. Religious Identity Islamic Muslim 2. Nuclear Risk nuclear nuclear-armed Modifiers 3. Militant Extremists militant extremist 1. Conciliatory Posturing promised admitted has pledged 1. Active Supporter training backing arming 2. Cracking Down banned rein in to end stop Verbs 3. Aggressive Posturing facing off demanded blamed 2. Violent neighbor fired waging mobilizing opened fire Frames for Kashmir and Kashmiris The Kashmiris have always regarded them selves as entitled to a special status within the Indian union and have expresse d nationalistic aspira tions since 1947, when Kashmir became a part of India (Schofiel d, 2003). In the decades of the 1950s, 1960s,
57 1970s and 1980s, the Government of India eroded Kashmirs speci al status through Constitutional amendments, a trend that bred resentment among Kashmiris who were also disillusioned by the corrupt and inefficient state administrations, lack of civic amenities and rising unemployment. To add insult to inju ry, the state legisla tive body elections in 1987 were rigged by the party in power at th at time in New Delhi, further angering Kashmiris who finally took to the streets in 1989 and 1990. There were almost daily mass demonstrations by thousands of people on the streets of Srinagar and other Kashmiri towns, and militant organizations of Kashmiri youth took up arms in order to separate Kashmir from India through violent means such as kidnappings and shootings. Table 7: Frames for Kashmir or Kashmiris 1989-1990 Major Frames Constituent words Minor frames Constituent words 1.Armed Combatant militants 1.Organized Activity groups leaders organization(s) Noun 2.Ordinary Kashmiris civilians residents demonstrators mourners 2. Separatist Rebels separatists insurgents 1. Religious Identity Muslim mostly Muslim Modifiers 2. Mass-based Action separatist pro-independence 1. Violent Protester bombed kidnapped shot Verbs 2. Non-violent Protester demonstrated demanded protested
58 Table 7: Frames for Kashmi r and Kashmiris (continued) 1991-1998 Major Frames Constituent words Minor frames Constituent words 1.Armed Combatant militants guerrillas fighters 1. Ordinary Kashmiris civilians 2. Separatist Rebels separatists rebels insurgents Noun 3. Organized Activity groups leaders 2. Religious Identity Muslims Hindus 1. Religious Identity Muslim Muslim majority Modifiers 2. Internal Revolt guerrilla militant 1. Mass-based Action separatist rebel proindependence 1. Violent Protester killed assassinated fired Verbs 2. Non-violent Protester claimed are boycotting condemned 1999-2001 Major Frames Constituent words Minor frames Constituent words 1. Organized Activity groups organization(s) 1. Ordinary Kashmiris civilians 2. Separatist Rebels insurgents rebels Noun 2. Armed Combatant militants guerrillas fighters 3. Religious Identity Muslims Hindus 1. Mass-based Action separatist freedom anti-India Modifiers 2. Religious Identity Islamic Muslim 1. Internal Revolt militant guerrilla 1. Violent Protester ambushed gunned down attacked Verbs 2. Non-violent Protester to wrench argued defying
59 Table 7: Frames for Kashmi r and Kashmiris (continued) 2002-2003 Major Frames Constituent words Minor frames Constituent words 1. Armed Combatant militant guerrillas fighters 2. Civilian Establishment government candidates leaders Noun 3. Ordinary Kashmiris civilians voters 1. Religious Identity Islamic Muslim 1. Internal Revolt militant Modifiers 2. Civilian Establishment political newly-elected coalition 2. Mass-based Action separatist 1. Violent Protester slaughtered terrorized massacred Verbs 2. Non-violent Protester seeking espoused calling for 1. Continuing Warfare are fighting are battling are staging 1989-1990 In the first two years of coverage, th e number of times 48 nouns were used for Kashmiris was 283, more than the count for Indians (210) and far above the count for Pakistanis (53). The most commonly used word for Kashmiris in this phase was militants (84) which was put into an Armed Combatant frame. A distant second was the word separatist which was used 27 times and slotted into a minor frame called the Separatist Rebels frame. Words such as civilians, residents, demonstrators, mourners, mobs appeared a total of 40 times, forming a cluster called the Ordinary Kashmiris. Also noteworthy were words like g roups (17), leaders (16) and
60 organization (3) that reflected an element of organization to the armed rebellion started by the Kashmiris in 1989. These were put into a minor frame called Organized Activity (36). The most common frame formed by the m odifiers used to describe the Kashmiris in this phase is the Religious Identity frame (33), comprising word s such as Muslim and mostly Muslim, followed by the Mass-based Action frame, comprising the modifiers separatist (16) and pro-independence (7). By grouping the verbs used to state the act ions of the people of Kashmir in this period, two frames emerged. One was that of Non-violent Protester and the other was that of Violent Protester. The Non-violent Protester fram e was constructed from words like demonstrated, protested, demanded, defying, c omplained and other such words with 41 occurrences that conveyed th e apparent dissatisfaction of the people of Kashmiris with the current state of affairs and their desire to bring about a change. The second frame conveyed the parallel militant stre am of the Kashmiri separatist/freedom movement, and included words like bombed, kidnapped, shot, and assassinated that occurred a total of 27 times. 1991-1998 In the second phase, 55 words were quot ed a total of 421 times in describing Kashmiris. The most commonly occurring wo rd was once again militants (70) which was grouped with guerrillas (47) and fighters (5) into the Armed Combatant frame (122). The second thematic cluster, called Separatist Rebels (72) in the second phase of media coverage, is composed of the words rebels (39), separatists (21) and
61 insurgents (12). The third frame that was evident in the period from 1991 to 1998 was the Organized Activity frame (56) that included the wo rds groups (34) and leaders (22). The Ordinary Kashmiris frame was also present, albe it to a lesser extent, with a total of 47 occurrences, the most commonly o ccurring word being civilians (23 times). Another minor frame that bears mention in this phase is the Religious Identity frame (41) with the people of Ka shmir being described as Muslims 26 times and Hindus 15 times. Of the 201 times that modifiers were used to describe Kashmiris in this phase, the highest frequency was of the words that are part of the Religious Identity frame (80), composed mainly of the word Muslim (56), and also by the word Hindu that indicates reference to Kashmirs religious minority Hindu Brahmins called Pandits, who fled Kashmir in hordes after the armed insurgency started in 1989. The second prominent frame formed by the modifiers used to describe the Kashmir and Kashmiris was the Internal Revolt frame, composed of the modifi ers guerrilla (19) and militant (17) and signifying the manner in which th e insurgency was conducted by armed groups in Kashmir. Mass-based Action the third important frame in this period, included the modifiers separatist (20), reb el (8) and pro-independence (2). Non-violent Protester and Violent Protester continued to be the two frames for the Kashmiris in this phase as well, with th e latter still dominating over the former. While the Violent Protester was made up of words such as torched, ambushed, attacked, detonated, and gunned down, (with 60 occurrences), the N on-violent Protester frame
62 included words like have demanded, condemn ed, to wrench, and are boycotting, with a total of 39 usages. 1999-2001 The Organized Activity and the Armed Combatant frames occurred with the same frequency in the third phase. Words lik e militants (26), guerrillas (15) and fighters (15) formed the Armed Combatant frame, while words such as groups (28), leaders (22) and organizations (6) form ed the Organized Activity frame. The third frame that occurred to half the extent of the first two ones and therefore was a minor frame was the Ordinary Kashmiris frame (24), with the word civilians again occurring with the highest frequency. Anot her minor frame in this period was the Separatist Rebel frame (22), with the word ins urgents occurring 11 times and the word rebels occurring 10 times. The Religious Identity frame (14) emerged as the third minor frame in this period, with 10 occu rrences of the word Muslims and 4 of the word Hindus. The total number of descript ors for Kashmiris in this phase was 45 and the number of timed they were used was 225. In this phase, the modifiers can be grouped into two almost equally prominent frames the Mass-based Action frame (33), which includes wo rds such as separatist, freedom, and anti-India; and the Religious Identity frame (32), with words such as Islamic and Muslim. A third but minor frame that appears in this phase is the Internal Revolt frame (23) that includes the adj ectives militant and guerrilla for describing individuals and groups carrying out the armed movement in Kashmir.
63 The verbs used for Kashmiris in this period can be grouped into the same two frames that were present in the first two phases. The more prominent frame is once again that of Violent Protester, with words like raided, shot, and fighting used 33 times, followed by that of the Non-violent Protester, with words such as argued, demanding, defying and disagree appearing 19 times. 2002-2003 In the fourth and final phase, 83 descript ors for Kashmiris were used a total of 563 times, with the Armed Combatant frame (168) emerging as the strongest in this period. Within this frame, militant occurred 123 times; guerrillas, 25 times; fighters, 11 times; and militias, 9 times. Although much weaker than the Armed Combatant frame, the second powerful frame in this phase was the Civilian Establishment frame (82), with government occurring 31 times; candidates, 20 times; party, 19 times; and leaders, 12 times. The Ordinary Kashmiris frame came in third in the this phase, with 59 occurrences dominated by the word civilians (28) followed by the word voters (10). The most common modifier fram e for this period is again the Religious Identity (57) frame, formed by the religious modifiers used to describe Kashmir and Kashmiris, such as Islamic (37), and Muslim (18). Co mplementing the surfacing of this frame in the nouns used to describe Kashmiris, the second most prominent frame among modifiers for this phase is the Civilian Establishment frame (32), formed by adjectives such as political, newly-elect ed, and coalition. The Internal Revolt frame, exemplified by
64 the adjective militant (31), is a minor fram e for this phase of the period under study. The other minor frame for this period is the Mass-based Action frame, represented by the word separatist, which appears 22 times. Continuing the trend set in the three previous phases, Kashmir and its people continue to be described as Violent Protesters who have shot, killed, slaughtered, terrorized, and massacred (88 occurrences) people, incl uding thousands of Indian security forces, security pe rsonnel and Kashmiri civilians The second major frame to emerge was that of Non-violent Protester indicated specifically by words like calling for, demonstrated, espoused, seeking, and opposed (54 usages). There were two minor frames in this period, with the more prominent among them being Continuing Warfare that was conveyed through the use of word s like have been waging, are fighting, are battling, and s taging (33 occurrences) that give the impression that the people of Kashmir have been involved in a l ong, violent campaign to achieve an end. The final minor frame is that of Violent Outsiders that is conveyed through the use of words like cross into, and infiltrated. Frames for the United States Although South Asia has not traditionally been a region of high U.S. interest, Pakistan was allied with the United States in the Cold War era and provided crucial assistance to America in its fight against th e Soviet forces in Af ghanistan waged through the local mujhahideen (Islamic warriors). Th e testing of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan in May 1998 caused U.S. attention to be focused on the region and
65 particularly on Kashmir which had been a traditional flashpoint between India and Pakistan. For all the periods under study, the most commonly occurring descriptors for the United States were administration, governme nt, officials, and diplomats, all of which fit into the Civilian Establishment frame for the United Stat es in all four phases. There were no significant modi fiers for the United States in the entire 15-year period. The United States came across as a Concerned Advisor through the usage of words like urged, warned, are worri ed, and alarmed (12 usag es) in the first phase (19891990). Concerned Advisor was the frame that surfaced in the second phase (1991-1998) from the analysis of the verbs such as appe aling, to ease, has encouraged, and to settle used for Americans (15 occurrences). The role of the United States in the th ird phase (1999-2001) of the 15-year period of media coverage under study exceeds that of even the Kashmiris regarding verbs. While 96 verbs were used for Kashmiris in this phase, the number was 125 for Americans. The frame of Concerned Advisor still dominates usage w ith verbs like called for, assured, suggested, urged, agreed, a nd underscore (68 occurrences). However, there is an undercurrent of firmness in the verbs used for Americans in this phase that was captured in words such as asserte d, pressured, rejecting, to impose, warned, used a total of 21 times and labeled the Assertive Advisor frame. In the fourth phase (2002-2003), the United States once again came across overwhelmingly as a Concerned Advisor urging, assuaging, mediating, (76 occurrences) between India and Pakistan. Other words for Americans in this phase include to defuse, to persuade,
66 discussed, called on, and offered, all fi tting into the Concerned Advisor frame and signifying the role of a nation playing a pacifist role. Frames for other parties in the Kashmir conflict All the actors in the Kashmir conflict that were not Indians, Pakistanis, Kashmiris or Americans, were placed in this category. 1989-1990 Of the total occurrence of words for othe r parties (23), the de scriptor reporters occurred 7 times followed by journalists at 6 times and news organizations, 2 times making the News Media the most commonly occurring other actor on the scene. There were no significant modifiers in this phase of media coverage. No significant frames emerged from the verbs used for the other part ies involved in Kashmir in this phase of the coverage. Table 8: Frames for Other Pa rties in the Kashmir conflict 1989-1990 Major Frames Constituent words Noun 1. News Media reporters journalists 1991-1998 Major Frames Constituent words Noun 1. Human Rights Concerns groups Modifiers 1. Human Rights Concerns human rights 1. Concerned Advisor suggested urged Verbs 2. Critical Observer denounced criticized
67 Table 8: Frames for other parties in the Kashmir conflict (continued) 1999-2001 Major Frames Constituent words Minor Frames Constituent words 1. Separatist Rebel insurgents rebels separatists Noun 1. Foreign Soldiers guerrillas fighters militants forces mujahideen 2. Outside Interference infiltrators invaders 1. Religious Identity Islamic Muslim holy 1. Separatist Rebel freedom pro-Kashmir separatist Modifiers 2. Outside Interference Pakistan-based pro-Pakistan Verbs 1. Violent Outsiders hijacked shot down 2002-2003 Major Frames Constituent words Minor Frames Constituent words Noun 1. Foreign Soldiers guerrillas militants fighters 1. Concerned Advisor lauded warned reassured 1991-1998 A total of 20 words were used 74 times to refer to other parties, with the descriptors groups at 15, tour ists at 14, hostages at 10, and Afghans at 8, the last one referring to the mujahideen from Af ghanistan who came to Kashmir after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989. Comp lementing the occurrence of groups as the most prominent noun was the use of human rights as the most commonly occurring modifier (16) implying that most of the outside actors in the conflict were international human rights organizations. Thus, the frame Human Rights Concerns
68 emerged from the analysis of descriptors a nd modifiers used to de scribe other players involved in the Kashmir conflict. Although the other players in this phase we re also mainly cast in the role of a Concerned Advisor conveyed by words such as suggest ed and urged, (10 usages), another frame that emerged was that of a Critical Observer exemplified by words like denounced, criticized, and investigate, used 8 times. 1999-2001 Indicating the growing participation of outside elements in the Kashmir conflict in this phase, 31 words were used 193 times as de scriptors for other actors on the scene. The overwhelmingly occurring thematic group or frame was the Foreign Soldiers frame (134) which included words like guerrillas (35), fighters (25), militants (24), forces (15), hijackers (15), mujahideen (1 2) and warriors (8). Two minor frames to emerge from this phase were the Separatist Rebel frame (13) with the words insurgents (7), rebels (3), and separ atists (3). The second minor frame was the Outside Interference frame (10) including the words inf iltrators (6), intruders (3) and invaders (1). The most frequently occurring modifier s in this period are religious ones (40 times) for example, Islamic, Muslim and holy providing evidence of the existence of the Religious Identity frame. Modifiers such as Pakistan-based, and proPakistan, constitute the Outside Interference frame (15) formed by the nouns that were used to identify the other player s in this period. Complementing the Separatist Rebel
69 frame formed by the nouns in the preceding pa ragraphs are modifier s like freedom (5) pro-Kashmir (4) and separatist (2). Other modifiers used for others in this phase are militant (5), guerrilla (4), and terrorist (3) which were not grouped into any frames due to their low frequency of occurrence. The verbs that were used for describing th e actions of other pa rties in this phase of the U.S. media coverage of the Kashmir conflict were grouped into a Violent Outsiders frame that includes words describing ac ts of physical violence perpetrated by people other than Indian, Pakist ani, Kashmiri or American su ch as fighting, hijacked, shot down, and threatened, used a grand total of 22 times. 2002-2003 Out of a total of 15 words used 43 times to describe the other players, the highest numbers were again for the Foreign Soldiers frame (16) including guerrillas (6), militants (5) and fighters (5). Terrorists and tourists were the other two words that were mentioned four times each. There were no prominent modifiers for this phase. The other players on the scene have been mainly characterized as Concerned Advisors through words like lauded, alarmed, reassured, urged, suggested, recognize and pressuring, with these a nd related words being used 29 times. Sources Used to Cover the Kashmir Conflict In answer to the third re search question, which was what were the nature and affiliation of the sources used by the U.S. media in their coverage of the Kashmir
70 conflict, the study found that all three newspapers The New York Times The Washington Post and the Los Angles Times used both official and unofficial sources, but the relative distribution of official versus unofficial sources for each party to the conflict, namely Indians, Pakistanis and Kash miris as well as the external parties the U.S. and other agents was different in each period. The results of the analyses of the inter-party and intra-party di stribution of sources have b een grouped below according to the four previously identified phases of the coverage given to the Kashmir conflict. For each period and each party, the to tal number of sources, both official and unofficial, was determined. Sources used from 1989-1990 The total number of sources quoted by The New York Times and The Washington Post in this two-year period was 111. Of thes e, 45 or 40 percent were affiliated with India, 33 or 29 percent with Kashmir, 14 or 12 percent with the U.S., 13 or 11 percent with Pakistan, and finally, 6 or 5 percent with other players or groups. Table 8 illustrates the sources used in this phase of media coverage. Indian sources Of the 45 Indian sources, 34 or 75 percent were official and were quoted a total of 50 times, while 11 or 25 percent were unofficial and quoted 13 times. The most commonly quoted official sources were officials (7), spokespersons (7) and ministers (6) of the Indian Government (24) or the Civilian Establishment Part of the Prime Ministers cabinet, ministers are elected representatives of the people and are in-
71 charge of different portfolios su ch as Defense, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Travel and Tourism, and Civil Aviation. Another important official Indian source was the Governor of the Jammu and Kashmir state (13), who in each state in the Indian union is the representative of the central or federal government in Ne w Delhi. After the insurgency in Kashmir started to take a viol ent turn, the elected local government was dissolved by the New Delhi government, which subsequently sent its representative the Governor to rule the state. Governme nt-controlled media or State Media constitute the third frequently used official source while the Indian media not controlled by the Indian government or Private Media feature as the top unoffi cial source quoted 10 times. Pakistani sources Of the 13 Pakistani sources, 12 were offi cial while only 1 was unofficial. Official sources were quoted 21 times, with the Pakistani Government or Civilian Establishment quoted 12 times followed by the Pakistani Army or Military Establishment quoted 10 times. Kashmiri Sources Out of the 33 Kashmiri sources used in 1989-1990 by the three newspapers under study, 12 or 36 percent were official whereas 21 or 63 percent were unofficial. Local Government constituted by the Jammu and Kash mir Police (10) who are a statecontrolled unit of the elected government of Jammu and Kashmir (9), was the most commonly quoted official source. Of th e unofficial sources quoted 29 times, Average Citizens were quoted 16 times, followed by former officials (4), local media (3), separatist leaders (3) and religious leaders (3).
72 Table 9: Distribution of Sources in 1989-1990 Affiliation Official No. Unofficial No. Total % India 1. Civilian Government officials spokespersons ministers Governor Jammu and Kashmir state 2.State Media 34 1. Private Media 2. Experts 11 45 40 Pakistan 1. Civilian Establishment officials 2. The Military Pakistani Army 12 1. Private Media 1 13 12 Kashmir 1.Local Government Police state government 12 1. Average Citizens 2. former officials 3. local media 4. separatist leaders 5. religious leaders 21 33 30 U.S. 1. Civilian Establishment Administration officials government officials 2. Military Establishment The Pentagon 10 1. Private Media 4 14 13 Other 1. Diplomats 1 1. Private Media 2. Experts 5 6 5 Total 69 42 111 100 U.S. Sources The United States was represented by 10 official sources quoted 25 times, with officials from the U.S. Government (7), the U.S. Administration (10) and the House
73 Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South Asia (3) being quoted the most making the Civilian Establishment the major official source. The Military Establishment, represented by the Pentagon, was quoted 4 times. Of the unofficial sources, other U.S. media mainly the Associated Press or Private Media were quoted 5 times out of a total of 6. Other Sources There was only one official source di plomats quoted 2 times and 5 unofficial sources quoted 7 times. Other media a nd experts were quoted 3 times each. Sources used from 1991-1998 The total number of sources used in this period in 39 stories was 171 of which 43 percent or 74 sources were affiliated w ith India, a little more than 10 percent or 18 belonging to Pakistani, 24 percent or 41 Kashmiri, 18 percent or 21 fr om the United States and 10 percent or 17 others. The di stribution of sources on the ba sis of their affiliation is demonstrated in the table below. Indian sources Of 74 Indian sources, 63 were officials quoted a total of 99 times. The Civilian Establishment or officials from the Indian Government were quoted most frequently (35 times) followed by sources from the Military Establishment (21 times). The Jammu and Kashmir Governor at 12 times was the thir d most frequently quoted source but was considered part of the Civilian Establishment. Unofficial sources from India were only 11
74 and quoted 14 times, with the Indian media (Private Media ) quoted 6 times and Indian Experts 7 times. Pakistani Sources There were only 11 Pakistani official sources all representatives of the Pakistani Government with most of the quotes from ministers (7), officials (6) and envoys (2) constituting the Civilian Establishment All Pakistani unoffi cial sources were Average Citizens most likely people living in the Pakistani side of Kashmir. Kashmiri Sources The number of unofficial Kashmiri sources (32) heavily dominat ed the number of official sources (9). Of the unofficial sources wh ich were quoted for a total of 62 times, Average Citizens again emerged as the most commonly quoted sources (32), followed by separatist leaders (19), and re ligious leaders (6). Official sources, who were quoted a mere 10 times in the entire eightyear period, were part of the Local Government. The Jammu and Kashmir Police was quoted 5 times, followed by the Jammu and Kashmir government at 3 times. U.S. Sources Unofficial sources from the United States (12) were more numerous and quoted a greater number of times (37) than offici al sources (9) quoted 19 times. Human Rights Groups emerge as the most frequently cite d American sources, followed by the U.S. media (Private Media), 5 times, and experts, 5 times. The Civilian Establishment comprising U.S. Government officials (11), followed by the State Department (4) and diplomats (2), was the only official U.S. source of information.
75 Table 10: Distribution of Sources in 1991-1998 Affiliation Official No. Unofficial No. Total % India 1. Civilian Establishment officials ministers spokespersons Governor Jammu and Kashmir state 2. Military Establishment 63 1. Private Media 2. Experts 11 74 44 Pakistan 1. Civilian Establishment ministers officials envoys 11 1. Average Citizens 7 18 10 Kashmir 1. Local Government Police state government 9 1. Average Citizens 2. separatist leaders 5. religious leaders 32 41 24 U.S. 1. Civilian Establishment government officials State Department diplomats 9 1. Human Rights Groups 2. Private Media 3. Experts 12 21 12 Other 1.Diplomats 4 1. Private Media 2. Experts 3. Human Rights Groups 13 17 10 Total 96 75 171 100 Other Sources Unofficial sources are more numerous fo r this group as well, with 13 sources being quoted 18 times, most notably Private Media (10), especially the British news
76 agency, Reuters. Experts were quoted 5 times and Human Rights Groups 3 times. Diplomats (5) are the most widely quoted ot her official sources of information for the second phase of the media covera ge of the Kashmir conflict. Sources used from 1999-2001 In this period, a total of 262 sources were used by the three newspapers in their coverage of the Kashmir conflict. Of thes e 262 sources, 99 or 38 pe rcent were Indian, 67 or 25 percent were Pakistani (25%), 31 or 12 percent were from Kashmir, 44 or 17 percent from the U.S. and 21 or 8 percent othe rs. While Indian sources still dominate, the percentage of Pakistani sources showed a significant increase from the earlier period. Another noteworthy point is th at for the first time both th e percentage of Pakistani sources used and the percentage of U.S. sour ces used is higher than the percentage of Kashmiri sources used, as Table 11 illustrates. Indian Sources The number of official Indian sources (77) used by the U.S. media was once again much higher than the number of unofficial I ndian sources used (22). Indian Government ( Civilian Establishment ) officials were once again the most widely quoted (46 times) and followed by ministers (36 times) and fi nally spokespersons (10 times). Among the ministers, the Prime Minister was quoted 12 times. The Military Establishment (21 times) was the second major official source am ong the Indians for this phase. Of the 22 unofficial sources, Average Citizens (12) emerged as the most frequently quoted
77 followed by Indian Experts and academics (9) and finall y, the Indian media (Private Media) (5). Table 11: Distribution of Sources in 1999-2001 Affiliation Official No. Unofficial No. Total % India 1. Civilian Establishment officials ministers including Prime Minister spokespersons 2. Military Establishment 77 1. Average Citizens 2. Experts 3. Private Media 22 99 38 Pakistan 1. Civilian Establishment Pervez Musharraf ministers officials 2. Military Establishment Pakistani Army 46 1. Private Media 2. Average Citizens 3. Experts 4. Guerrillas 21 67 25 Kashmir 1. Political leaders All Parties Hurriyat Conference 10 1. Average Citizens 2. Separatists 21 31 12 U.S. 1. Civilian Establishment officials President Secret Service diplomats experts 29 1. Experts 15 44 17 Other 1. Diplomats 13 8 21 8 Total 175 87 262 100
78 Pakistani Sources In this period, of the 46 official sources from Pakistan quoted a total of 103 times, the Civilian Establishment or Pakistani Government sources were the most frequently quoted, with Pakistani military ruler General Pervez Musharra f dominating as the largest single source of information (30). Pakistani ministers were quoted a total of 21 times, followed by Pakistani officials (20). An official source, the Pakistani Army ( Military Establishment ) was quoted a total of 22 times. Of the 21 unofficial Pakistani sources quoted a total of 27 times in th is period, the Pakistani media ( Private Media ) appeared 10 times, Average Citizens 7 times, Experts 6 times and Guerrillas, 4 times. Kashmiri Sources Unofficial sources were more than double (21) the number of official sources (10) for Kashmiris in this phase of the period under study. Average Citizens (20) again emerged as the most frequently quoted Kash miris followed by separatists (8). Among the official sources, Political Leaders constituted by the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, an umbrella organization of Kashmiri separatis t parties, was quoted a total of 15 times, followed by leaders at 3 times. U.S. Sources A total of 29 official U.S. sources were quoted 81 times in this period with the U.S. Government or Civilian Establishment remaining the most frequently used source. Officials were quoted 37 times, the President, 8 times, diplomats, 5 times, and experts, 5 times. The White House (8) and the Secret Serv ice (7) emerged as the other two official
79 sources of information. Experts (18) were the most freque ntly cited unofficial U.S. sources. Other Sources Official sources (13) were more numerous than unofficial sources (8) for this category. Although diplomats (18) emerged as the most frequently cited sources among other parties involved in the conflict, there was no clear majority among the unofficial sources. Sources used from 2002-2003 A total of 349 sources were used in the f ourth and final phase of the coverage of the Kashmir conflict by The New York Times The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times Of these, 126 or 36 percent were Indian, 73 or 21 percent were Pakistani, 68 or 19 percent were Kashmiri, 58 or 16 percent were American and 24 or 7 percent others. Table 12 demonstrates the relative distribution of sources accor ding to their affiliations. Indian Sources The number of official Indi an sources for the final phase of the 15-year period under study was 105. The Indian Government or Civilian Establishment was used as a source of information 143 times, with offi cials being quoted 80 times; ministers, including the Prime Minister, 58 times; and spokespersons, only 5 times. Among the ministers, the defense minister was quoted the highest number of times (28) while the prime minister was quoted 12 times. Quoted 27 times, the Indian military or Military Establishment was the second most frequently cite d official source of information for
80 the U.S. media. Army spokespersons were quoted 10 times while Indian intelligence sources emerged as the third most commonly us ed source (17). Unofficial Indian sources were only 21 of whom Experts emerged as th e ones cited most regularly (16) followed by the Indian media or Private Media (6) and finally, Average Citizens (6). Pakistani Sources A total of 53 official sources were qu oted 109 times in this phase, with the Pakistani Government or Civilian Establishment being the most important source of information. The Pakistani president was quoted a total of 44 times; officials were quoted 27 times; spokesman, 12 times; and ministers, 9 times. The Pakistani Army or Military Establishment was quoted only 8 times. Of 20 unoffi cial sources, the Pakistani media (National Media) were quoted 12 times, Extremist groups 11 times, Experts, 7 times and Average Citizens 5 times. Kashmiri Sources Although official sources (20) are less th an half the number of unofficial ones (48), there is an increase in official sources from the previous two periods. The elected government of Jammu and Kashmir is the most commonly cited official source (18), and together with the Jammu and Kashmir Police (7) represent the Local Government Political Leaders and specifically the APHC, were quoted 6 times. Of the unofficial sources, Average Citizens (39) again emerge as the most frequently quoted sources among the Kashmiri people, followed by Separatist Leaders (19), Human Rights Groups (13) and Experts (4).
81 Table 12: Distribution of Sources in 2002-2003 Aff. Official No. Unofficial No. Total % India 1. Civilian Establishment officials ministers -Defense Minister -Prime Minister spokespersons 2. Military Establishment spokespersons intelligence 105 1. Experts 2. Private Media 3. Average Citizens 21 126 36 Pakistan 1. Civilian Establishment Pervez Musharraf officials spokesman ministers 2. Military Establishment Pakistani Army 53 1. Private Media 2. Extremist Groups 3. Experts 4. Average Citizens 20 73 21 Kashmir 1. Local Government state government Police 2. Political Leaders All Parties Hurriyat Conference 20 1. Average Citizens 2. Separatist leaders 3. Human Rights Groups 4. Experts 48 68 19 U.S. 1. Civilian Establishment Secretary of State Officials Deputy Secretary of State diplomats President 2. Military Establishment 50 1. Private Media 2. Experts 8 58 17 Other 1. diplomats 14 1. Private Media Reuters 10 24 7 Total 242 107 349 100
82 U.S. Sources The number of official sources (50) fo r the fourth period is overwhelmingly higher for the U.S. than the number of unofficial sources (8). Representatives of the U.S. Government or Civilian Establishment are quoted a total of 113 times with the two most frequently quoted sources being the Secretar y of State Colin Powell (27) and officials (27) signifying high-profile U.S. involvemen t in the region in the final phase of the period under study. While the Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage was quoted 17 times, diplomats were quoted 8 times and the president was quoted 6 times. The U.S. military was the second most commonly used American official source but was only quoted 14 times. Among unofficial sources, th e Private Media were quoted 4 times and Experts, 3 times. Other Sources Diplomats were the most commonly used official sources of information (16) whereas Private Media (11), especially the Reuters News Agency were the most frequently cited source among unofficial sources.
83 Chapter 5 Discussion The preceding chapter identified the frames that the U.S. media, represented by The New York Times, The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times, have used in their coverage of the Kashmir conflict and the parties involved in it. It also listed the sources official and unofficial that have been used to cover the even ts in Kashmir and also their relative distribution among the various parties in the conflict. This chapter discusses the changes that have occurred in the frames reported in the previous chapter over the 15year period stretching from January 1, 1989 to December 31, 2003. It also describes the frames that have had an overwhelming presen ce in this coverage and the major sources the three media have cited in their coverage. In additi on, it seeks to explain these conclusions by relating them to the events occurring in Kashmir, in the Indian subcontinent and in the world. Finally, this ch apter provides the implications of this studys findings and conclusions on future mass media research. Changing Frames In order to answer the first research question, which was whether and how frames used in the coverage of the Kashmir conflict and parties to it have changed in the 15-year
84 period of study, the study compared the rela tive prominence of major and minor frames in the coverage of each subject over the four phases into which the entire period was divided. The results of the comparison, detailed in the following paragraphs, suggest that the frames indeed have changed throughout the period of covera ge under study and the changes seem to be related to local, regional and global developments. Coverage of the Conflict In the first two periods of its covera ge, spanning from 1989 to 1998, the conflict in Kashmir is framed as a movement in which the citizenry is portray ed as rising in revolt against a ruling power and trying to separate itself from th at power. This is conveyed by the prominence of the Internal Revolt frame among nouns, the Mass-based Action frame among the modifiers and the Growing Unrest frame among verbs. In the last two periods of the coverage, stretching over 1999 till the end of 2003, the frame that emerges is that of an ongoing conflict in which the concerned parties are engaged in physical violence against each other. This is conveyed through the use of words that form the Physical Violence and Conflict frame for nouns, the Long and Dangerous Conflict for the modifiers and once again Growing Unrest for the verbs. A glance at Table 3 shows the frames that dominate the last two phases were minor in the first two phases whereas the frames that were major in the first tw o phases, conveying the goal of the Kashmiri movement freedom or separation from Indi a are relegated to the background in the last two phases.
85 Table 13: Dominant Frames for the conflict Period Dominant Frames 1989-1990 Mass-based Action, Growing Unrest 1991-1998 Internal Revolt, Mass-b ased Action, Growing Unrest 1999-2001 Physical Violence, Conflict, Long & Dangerous Conflict, Growing Unrest 2002-2003 Outside Interference, Physical Violence, Conflict, Disagreement, Long and Dangerous Conflict 1989-2003 Warfare The last two phases also show the emergence of the Terrorism Outside Interference Religious Identity and Disagreement frames. Together with the focus on ongoing violence in the last two phases, these frames convey the idea that the conflict, engendered by a dispute over the region betw een India and Pakist an, was increasingly driven by people from outside Kashmir who had a strong Islamic identity and who were carrying out activities that could be labeled terrorist. Coverage of the Region In the first two phases, the Ka shmir region is identified as a Political Entity as a state within the Indian union a description that takes the backseat in the last two phases. In the first two phases, the goal of the armed movement in Kashmir separation from India is evident and therefore it follows that Kashmir is referred to as a part of what its people want to break away from. Complemen ting the greater focus on the ongoing violence and the labeling of the Kashmi r issue as more of a dispute between India and Pakistan and less of a separatist movement in the last two phases, Kashmir is identified more by the Geographic Entity and Disagreement frames. However, in all
86 phases, Religious Identity remains a prominent frame signifying that an emphasis was placed on the fact that Kashmir was a Muslim region and therefore different from the rest of India that in general th e reports described as Hindu. Table 14: Dominant Frames for the region Period Dominant Frames 1989-1990 Political Entity, Geographic Entity, Religious Identity 1991-1998 Geographic Entity, Political Entit y, Religious Identity, Disagreement 1999-2001 Geographic Entity, Disagreement, Religious Identity 2002-2003 Geographic Entity, Disagreement, Re ligious Identity, Political Entity 1989-2003 Religious Identity Coverage of Kashmir and Kashmiris In all four phases of coverage, the frame s for Kashmiris remain largely the same militants and guerrillas ( Armed Combatants ) belonging to Islamic groups ( Religious Identity and Organized Activity ) fighting through violent means ( Violent Protester ) to separate Kashmir from India ( Mass-based Action, Separatist Rebels and Internal Revolt ). The only changes that occur are in the relative prominence of the Ordinary Kashmiris frame in the four phases of coverage. In th e first phase, the ordinary people of Kashmir protesting through non-violent means have a high presence in the coverage. In the second and third phases, they are relegated to the sidelines by th e activities of the armed militants who killed, massacred, bombed and kidnapped their way into a greater presence in the media. Ironically, the reasons they cited for committing these violent activities was to draw greater international attention to their struggle to break away from India (Schofield, 2003). The Or dinary Kashmiris frame makes a comeback in the fourth
87 phase along with Civilian Government frame indicating the start of a political process in Kashmir after elections in and formation of a new state legislature. Table 15: Dominant Frames for Kashmir and Kashmiris Period Dominant Frames 1989-1990 Armed Combatant, Ordinary Kashmiris, Mass-based Action, Violent Protester, Non-violent protester 1991-1998 Armed Combatant, Separatist Rebels, Organized Activity, Internal Revolt, Violent Protester, Non-violent protester 1999-2001 Organized Activity, Armed Co mbatant, Mass-based Action, Violent Protester, Non-violent protester 2002-2003 Armed Combatant, Civilian Estab lishment, Ordinary Kashmiris, Violent Protester, Non-violent protester 1989-2003 Religious Identity Coverage of India and Indians In the first two phases of the conflict, the frames used for India portray it as a nation using its Military Establishment to crush the separatist movement of the people of Kashmir ( Violent Repressor ). These two frames, combined with the dominant frames for the conflict describing it as a separatist movement and the Kashmiris identifying them as armed militants fighting for freedom from India in the first two phases, create the master frame of a violent confrontation be tween the government and armed forces of India and the people of Kashmir. However, this frame is displaced in the last two phases, with the emphasis shifting from the people of Kashmir to the Pakistanis as the chief opponents of India. In the third and fourth phases, India emerges as a nuclear-armed country ( Nuclear Risk frame) fighting ( Continuing Warfare frame) its nuclear-armed opponent, Pakistan, in Kashmir,
88 which is a region of dispute between them ( Disagreement frame), through its armed forces (Military Establishment). Demonstrati ng this shift in focus from the people of Kashmir to Pakistan as the ma in Indian adversary is the d ecline of the Violent Repressor and Law and Order Maintainer frames for I ndia. Through all four phases, the government of India ( Civilian Establishment ) continues to present its ca se in the diplomatic arena ( Diplomatic Entity Conciliatory Posturing and Aggressive Posturing ) but its military activities are highlighted more than its diplomatic activities, perhaps because of the constant presence of the Indian military and paramilitary units in the Kashmir region. Table 16: Dominant Frames for India and Indians Period Dominant Frames 1989-1990 Military Establishment, Civilian Establishment, Violent Repressor, Law & Order Maintainer 1991-1998 Military Establishment, Civilian Establishment, Violent Repressor, Law & Order Maintainer 1999-2001 Military Establishment, Civilian Establishment, Nuclear Risk, Diplomatic Entity Conciliatory and Aggressive Posturing, Continuing Warfare 2002-2003 Military Establishment, Civilian Establishment, Nuclear Risk, Diplomatic Entity Conciliatory and Aggressive Posturing, Continuing Warfare 1989-2003 Religious Identity The portrayal of India as a nuclear-armed nation coupled with an emphasis on its ongoing violent conflict with Pakistan as well as the emergence of Nuclear Risk as one of the minor frames for the conflict in phases three and four, point to an attempt to frame the conflict and region as a nuclear time bom b, a reiteration of the opinion held and expressed frequently by Western governments and international relations experts. An
89 example of the reportage following the nuclear tests conducted by Indi a and Pakistan in May 1998 is as follows (Burns, 1998, p.1): In May, the stakes in the conflict rose immeasurably when first India and then Pakistan conducted nuclear tests and declared themselves nuclear powers. The tests raised worldwide alarm, with President Clinton and other leaders appealing to India and Pakistan to settle their differences over Kashmir to prevent the territory from becoming the flashpoint of a nuclear war. Coverage of Pakistan and Pakistanis As was the case with India, the entire period of coverage has four recurring frames for Pakistan: the Civilian Establishment of Pakistan engaged in the activities of a Diplomatic Entity including both Conciliatory and Aggressive Posturing, a Military Establishment that is a Violent Neighbor to India and a country that is an Active Supporter of the Kashmiri separatist movement. Coinciding with the greater depiction of the events in Kashmir as a separatist rebellion waged by armed militants in the first two phases, Pakistan is described more as aidi ng that struggle with ar ms, training and money than as involved in a military direct dispute with India. However, as the narrative shifts to the characterization of the conflict as ongoing violence in th e last two phases, Pakistan is increasingly framed as an active participant and not just a supporter. Introduction of the Outside Interference frame and increase in the prominence of the Violent Neighbor frame in the third phase as well as greater focus on Military Establishment frame and the entry of the Militant Extremists frame in the fourth phase, bring Pakistans direct involvement to the fo re in the last two phases. Reinforcing the greater recognition on the part of the United States and al so on the part of the media of
90 Pakistan as home to several militant Islamic organizations that were engaged in terrorist activities, is the presence of the Cracking Down frame in the fourth phase. Table 17: Dominant Frames for Pakistan and Pakistanis Period Dominant Frames 1989-1990 Civilian Establishment, Military Establishment, Active Supporter, Diplomatic Entity 1991-1998 Civilian Establishment, Active Supporter, Diplomatic Entity, Violent Neighbor 1999-2001 Civilian Establishment, Military Establishment, Conciliatory Posturing, Violent Neighbor, Active Supporter 2002-2003 Military Establishment, Militant Extremists, Nuclear Risk, Cracking Down, Conciliatory Posturing 1989-2003 Religious Identity A point to note here from the journalistic practices standpoint is that the actions that the different subjects are engaged in and the changes in these actions are more strongly conveyed through the verbs used for them as compared to adjectives and nouns. This might be because journalists paint a more colorful picture through the verbs they use to describe an action done by any actor in the story than through nouns because verbs can be used with greater va riety and accuracy in the painting of a picture. Coverage of the United States and Others The Americans do not have a very high pr ofile in the first two phases and come across as Concerned Advisors in the last two phases engage d in diplomatic parleys with India and Pakistan. As far as Other partie s are concerned, the increased presence of human rights groups ( Human Rights Concerns and Critical Observer ) in the second phase complements the Kashmiris separatists fighting the militarily repressive Indian
91 government frame that characterized the conflic t in the first two phases. At that time, international human rights organizations accu sed the Indian government of committing human rights violations agains t Kashmiri civilians. In th e third and fourth phases, reinforcing the growing part icipation of outsiders ( Outside Interference ) and Pakistanis ( Militant Extremists and Violent Neighbor ) in the ongoing violence in Kashmir is the presence of the Foreign Soldiers frame. The media coverage highlights fighters from outside Kashmir with a strong Religious Identity fighting to separate Kashmir from India (Separatist Rebels frame). Table 18: Dominant Frames for Other Parties Period Dominant Frames 1989-1990 News media 1991-1998 Human Rights Concerns, Concer ned Advisor, Critical Observer 1999-2001 Foreign Soldiers, Religious Iden tity, Outside Interference, Violent Outsiders 2002-2003 Foreign Soldiers, Concerned Advisor Dominant frames In answer to the second research question, which was what have been the dominant frames in the U.S. media coverage of the Kashmir and to what extent have these frames reflected such major themes as religion, armed conflict, U.S. national interest, and threat to world peace, this study found that th e two frames that have been present throughout the 15-year period investigated, have been the Warfare frame for the conflict reflecting the theme of armed conflict and the Religious Identity frame for the
92 Indians, the Pakistanis and the Kashmir region and the Kash miris reflecting the religion theme. The Warfare frame has been constructed from only the word war and since it emerged as the most prominent frame in three of the four phases into which the period of study was divided, it follows that the U.S. media have placed a great emphasis in highlighting the Kashmir conflict sometimes as a guerrilla or separatist war but mostly as a conflict that has sparked wars in the past between India and Pakistan and has the potential of turning into a wider war or even a nuclear war. This frame emerged as a dominant becau se in almost every news report on Kashmir, there is a standard or boiler plat e description of the ev ents that have taken place in the subcontinent since 1947, when Indi a and Pakistan became separate nations, independent of the departing British colonial power. Following is a typical description of the nature of relations be tween India and Pakistan (Burns, 1994, p.6A) : none deny that a new war, if it began, would almost certainly center on Kashmir. In two of the three wars the two countr ies have fought since Britain's departing colonial rulers partitioned the Indi an subcontinent in 1947, creating Hindudominated India and Muslim-ruled Pakist an, Kashmir has been the battleground. No issue between them so focuses the pa ssions -of religion, of nationalism, and of pride -that have made each, for the other, an object of enduring dislike and mistrust. Due in large part to this recurring de scription of the two nations historical conflict over Kashmir, the Warfare frame emer ges as dominant. These narratives tie in directly to the rules of journalistic writing that enta il a recounting of the background in
93 order to place the events in context for the read er. This is particularly true of events and issues that are covered sporadically or are far removed from the re aders experience as the Kashmir conflict undoubtedly is for an American audience. The second dominant frame that emerges from an overview of the entire period analyzed in this research is the Religious Identity frame used to describe the conflict, the region and the three parties invo lved Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris. Whereas India has been described as a Hindu or a pre dominantly Hindu country, Kashmir has been described as a Muslim or Muslim domin ated region, and Kashmiris as majority Muslim and Pakistan as an I slamic or Muslim country. Since the turn of the year, and especia lly in the last two weeks, the Kashmir Valley, a Muslim region seeking independen ce from predominantly Hindu India, has been engulfed by a storm of violence. (Gargan, 1993, p1) Kashmir, a territory about the size of Utah with a population whose majority is Muslim, is wedged between India, Pakistan an d China. Its ownership has been disputed between predominantly Muslim Pakistan a nd largely Hindu India since both gained independence in 1947. The two nations -the world's newest nuclear powers -have fought two of their three wars over Kashmir. (Bearak, 2000, p8A) Although it is a fact that Pakistan was founded as a homeland for the Muslims of South Asia, India was established as a secula r democracy where religion is a private and the Indian Constitution guarantees ever citizen the right to practice and preach his or her faith. In the past 15 years, there has been a rise in Hindu fundamentalist forces on the national scene in India, but Indias refusal to let go of Kashmir is rooted in its secular identity (Cohen, 2003, Dixit, 2002). According to Cohen (2003), India finds it difficult to turn over a Muslim majority region to a Muslim neighbor just because it is Muslim (p. 46, emphasis in original). However, the c onstant juxtaposition of the three parties and
94 their religious majorities seems to convey th e impression that the demographics of India have a major influence on Indias attitude towards the dispute and the nature of its policies in Kashmir. However, it can be argued that describing Pakistan as a Muslim country and its claim to the terr itory of Kashmir as rooted in religion is justifiable since the country was founded as an Islamic na tion and because it considers Kashmir as legitimately a part of Pakistan because the population in Kashmir is mainly Muslim (Cohen, 2003, Dixit, 2002, Schofield, 2003). The identification of the parties by their religion might be related again to the need for explaining in a simple manner a co mplex situation playing out in part of the world that for most American readers w ould arguably be remote. The assigning of religious motivation to the act ions of the parties concerne d may be the result of an attempt to provide a simple explanation to a very nuanced and multi-layered conflict that has persisted through five and half decades. Threat to U.S. national interests is refl ected in the great attention paid to the conflict in the last phase (2002-2003) as reflec ted by the quantum leap in coverage of the Kashmir conflict and the tensi ons between India and Pakistan in all three newspapers from 2001 to 2002 (see Table 1). At that time, the U.S. was actively pressuring Pakistan to ban extremist Islamic groups based in Pakistan because after the events on September 11, 2001, these groups were seen as a threat to th e security of Americans. This concern is also reflected in the high prominence of the Cracking Down frame among verbs used for Pakistanis in the last phase of the coverage. The increase in coverage was also related to the greater prominence of the frames reflecting a violent conflict in the latter two periods
95 ( Long and Dangerous Conflict, Conflict Physical Violence and Outside Interference ) as opposed to a separatist movement because there was a massive military standoff between India and Pakistan in summer 2002 and coupled with the fears expressed about the possibility of a nuclear exchange, ther e is a clear presence of the threat to word peace theme in the frames. Sources Past research has shown that the medi a tend to rely on official sources for information. In her content analysis of the The New York Times and The Washington Post Dickson (1992) found that the two elite newspapers relied heavily on U.S. government officials for information on the Sa ndinista regime in Nicaragua. One reason is that official sources are more easily accessible to journalists and this greater accessibility makes the job of ne ws gathering more efficient. Another is that these sources are perceived to be more authorit ative, with the information they provide considered to be factually accurate (Shoemaker and Reese, 1991; Entman, 1989; Dickson, 1992). Analysis of sources for the 15-year peri od of coverage of the Kashmir conflict reveals the same disproportionate reliance on o fficial sources as co mpared to unofficial ones. In the 1989-1990 phase, the Civilian Establishments of India, Pakistan and the United States were quoted more than three times as often as their unofficial counterparts. In fact for Pakistan, this ratio was 12 to 1. This finding is in accordance with past research that suggests the greater relian ce of news media on official, especially
96 government, sources. Among unofficial sour ces for these three countries, the Private Media were the most often cited source; this is not surprising, considering that these three nations have well developed press sy stems. Also, media organizations act as sources for each other and es pecially when covering a fore ign country, journalists pay close attention to the domestic media, of ten picking up leads from them and then featuring their information in, or following this information up in their own stories. Only in the case of the Kashmiris is this trend reversed with a greater presence of unofficial sources, especially Average Citizens in all fours phases of the coverage. Separatist and religious lead ers have been the two other main groups of unofficial Kashmiri sources that have been cited in more than two phases of coverage. All three newspapers in this study were found to have carried extensive quotes from the ordinary people of Kashmir in many news-based analytical stories. For example: ''They have made every Muslim a suspect,'' a businessman said of the Indian armed forces' attempts to subdue a fast-growing independence movement. ''We are all militants now.'' (Crossette, 1990, p. 1 A) "We have bullets from the left and bullets from the right, bullets from in front and bullets from behind," said an elderly Musl im cloth trader in Lal Chowk, a bazaar here. He whispered, "Everything we valu ed has been destroyed." (Burns, 1995, p. 3) In the second phase, reflecting a grow ing concern with accusations of human rights violations made against India, Human Rights Groups feature prominently among unofficial sources, which are incidentally highe r in number than official sources for the United Stats and the Other parties. India and Pakistan, however, continue to be represented by their respective Civilian Establishments. As compared to Indians and the
97 people of Kashmir, Pakistan and the United Stat es maintain a low profile in the first two phases, an indication that the conf lict at this time was mainly an Internal Revolt that India was trying to suppress by violent means ( Violent Repressor ). In the third and the fourth phases, th e profile of both Pakistan and the United States is higher than in the first two phases. In fact, Pakistani sources exceed in number even sources from Kashmir, with Pakistan i Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf heading the list of Civilian Establishment sources from Pakistan. This seems to signify the greater concentration of power and authority in him, the central figure and face of Pakistan to the world community after 1999. In contrast, India continued to be represented heavily through its Civilian Establishment officials and elected representatives including the Prime Minister an d his cabinet of minist ers in the third and fourth phases. Reflecting growing U.S. concern with the nuclear-armed status of India and Pakistan from 1999 to 2001 ( Nuclear Risk ) and its interest then in roping in Pakistan to hunt down Al Qaeda, the Civilian Establishment sources used from the United States become increasingly high-profile in the third and fourth phases of th e media coverage of the Kashmir conflict. In fact, Secretary of St ate Colin Powell is the most frequently cited U.S. source from 2002 to 2003 implying the intense U.S. involvement in the South Asian region in the last phase. In the final two phases, although the people of Kashmir still were represented by unofficial sources, mainly Average Citizens and Separatist Leaders, whose number was twice the number of official sources, there was a move towards quoting more official
98 Kashmiri sources, particularly officials of the elected Local Government and Political Leaders from the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, an umbrella organization of Kashmiri separatist political parties, signifying the start of a political process in Kashmir. Kashmiri human rights groups and experts also emerge d as other unofficial sources indicating a greater consolidation of the Non-violent Protesters in Kashmir than in the past. Therefore, in answer to the third resear ch question, which was what have been the nature and affiliation of sources in the coverage of the Kashmir conflict, this study found that among official sources, Indian sources were the most frequently quoted followed by sources from Pakistan, the United States, Ka shmir and Other parties. Among unofficial sources, those from Kashmir were the most frequently cited followed by those from India, Pakistan, the United States and finally, the Other parties.
99 Chapter Six Conclusions This study has discovered and analyzed the frames through which the U.S. print media have reported on the Kashmir conflict. As discussed in the litera ture review section of this thesis, media construct social realit y through the frames that they use. They construct these frames by singling out some f eatures of subjects, developments or their environments, and emphasizing these features over others. In the case of their coverage of the Kashmir conflict, the U.S. print media, represented by The New York Times The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times, have chosen to highli ght two aspects of the Kashmir conflict religion and warfare. Through their consistent use of religious descriptors for India, Pakistan and Kashmir, they have created a simplified version of the complex reality of the region the desires of its people and th e reasons for the tussle betw een India and Pakistan. The political reasons for the Kashmiri separati st movement discontentment with corrupt regional governments, lack of adequate civic amenities and industrial development, unemployment, disillusionment with the electoral system, and anger at being shortchanged out of their semi-autonomous status in the Indian union were never highlighted. Instead, the media chose the easy way out by labeling the conflict as
100 religious in nature, possibly because conf lict over religion resonates with current American cultural frames. It can be argued that with Islam being considered a major threat to Western countries especially af ter the events on September 11, 2001, the U.S. media might increasingly resort to this kind of religious framing, pa rticularly in cases where one of the parties involved subscribes to Islam. The second aspect of the reality constructed by the U.S. print media is that of a conflict that essentially is a war and can turn into a larger war or a nuclear war. While this frame does reflect the nature of the de velopments on the ground that were, it ties into two characteristics of U.S. media coverage of events in fo reign counties. First, it confirms what previous studies have found that U.S. media coverage of third world countries tends to be crisis-oriented defined as dissent, war, terrorism crime, coups, assassinations or disasters (Shoemaker and Reese, 1991). Th e pattern visible in the coverage of the Kashmir conflict also reflects this tendency. When the separatist movement started in 1989, since there were mass demonstrations, mass killings, kidnappings and bombings, the conflict attracted a lot of U.S. media attention in one year from December 1989 to December 1990 (40 stories in The New York Times and 15 in The Washington Post ). The coverage lagged in the eight-year pe riod from 1991 to 1998 (33 stories in The New York Times and only 3 stories each in The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times ) because there were violent events happening in areas of the world that were of greater importance to the United States and consequently to its media the crisis in the Middle east, Northern Ireland, Bosnia and later Kosovo although killings, kidnappings and bombings continued unabated in Kashmir (Schofield, 2003).
101 When India and Pakistan tested their nuclear weapons in 1998, nuclear-capable Western nations, including the United States, st arted expressing fears that there might be a nuclear war between India and Pakistan, in spite of the fact that India committed itself publicly to no first use of nuclear weapons. Despite repeated reiterations by Indian and Pakistani officials that neither country coul d afford a nuclear war and that the weapons actually decreased the possibili ty of even a conventional war and were mere deterrents, the U.S. media continued to quote U.S. a nd other Western government officials, including former President Bill Clinton and diplomats and experts, as saying that the Kashmir was a nuclear flashpoint. This reflec ts the imprint of power in media frames, with the United States emerging the clear winner in the framing of the Kashmir conflict by the U.S. media. The priorities and concerns of the United State were clearly reflected in the warfare frame that was employed thr oughout the period anal yzed in this study, a fact that leads to the conclusion that the me dia in the U.S. reflect the agenda of the government when it comes to international relations. Entamn (1989) has said that media fr ame the issues they cover not only by choosing to include certain aspects of real ity but also by choosing to exclude some aspects, and that is clearly what the U.S. media have done regarding the Kashmir conflict by not including or emphasizing certain opinions and contentions. They have chosen to look at the conflict thro ugh the straitjacket of the U.S. governments stance on the region and supplemented this stand by quotes from U. S. experts on this issue. They have not promoted to an equal extent the contentions of the Indian and Pakistani governments that the possibility of nuclear war between them is remote. Tying this analysis of the content
102 of U.S. media frames back to the initial argument that only crisis and bloodshed and possibility of a greater conflic t in Third World countries get covered in the U.S. media, the number of stories in The New York Times jumped from 4 in 1998 to 24 in 1999, the year in which India and Pakistan fought thei r undeclared war in Kargil in Kashmir. The coverage again jumped from 2001 to 2002, when India and Pakistan massed nearly a million troops along the Line of Control in Kashmir (6 to 21 in The Washington Post 5 to 24 in the Los Angeles Times and 15 to 51 in The New York Times ) reflecting once again that the possibility of violence on a larger and potentially catastrophic scale ensures coverage by the U.S. media. Another reason for the hike in coverage from 2001 to 2002 was the growing involvement of the United St ates in the region through the George Bush administrations aggressive attempts to include Pakistan in its coal ition against terrorism and the Afghanistan war, clearly reflecting increased media coverage due to increased U.S. interest in the region. A shift that clearly demonstrated the in fluence of changing U.S.-India and U.S.Pakistan relations from 1989 to 2003 was th e move towards greater recognition of Pakistans role in actively aiding the militants in Kashmir in terrorist activities, as a fact and not just an Indian alle gation. The coverage which criticized the Indian government for its alleged human rights violations and la beled Indian allegations that Pakistan was training and arming Kashmiri militants as clai ms in the first two periods, changes to being critical of Pakistan for harboring Islamic terrorist organizations that committed violent acts in Kashmir. This shift can be at tributed to the increasing closeness between the United States and India and to the U. S. governments concern with American
103 security, once again reflecting the impact of power on media frames. In conclusion, one can say that the U.S. media have construc ted the reality of the Kashmir conflict by making selected attributes of the conflict salie nt and by highlighting in their text, problem definitions and causal interpretations advan ced by the U.S. government. Also, confirming past findings on international news coverage by the U.S. media, th is study shows that media coverage of the Kashmir conflict was cris is-oriented and reflected U.S. concerns in the region. Implications for Future Research Media theorists, particularly Entman (1989, Gamson (1989) and Graber (1988), have conceptualized frames as being present in the communicator, the text, the audience and the culture, with the presence of frames in any one of these locations influencing their presence in another. A lthough this study did not look at the frames for the Kashmir conflict among the communicators, the audien ce and the culture, they no doubt had a great influence on the frames evident in the text. The events in Kashmir were definitely covered because they were newsworthy from the perspective of the news value of conflict, which is arguably the news value on which the media place a great premium and which determines most, if not all, news content. Frames that reflected journalistic pr actices and socializati on were once again the religion and warfare frames, both signifying an attempt to simplify reality and structure it in an inverted pyramid fashion, the need to provide superficial hi storical background and
104 boiler-plate descriptions to place the events in context for their readers, and also the media acceptance of the government line when it comes to foreign news coverage. Researchers have found that the mass medi a have priming effects, in that the repeated exposure of audiences to ideas a nd information in the media triggers related ideas and feelings in their minds. Salwen and Matera (1992) found distinct evidence of the second level agenda setting influence of the mass media in public perception of several foreign countries as dangerous places and as friends or enem ies, which persisted even though media coverage of those nations had started ch anging, providing evidence of the enduring impact of repeated frames on the audiences thinking about issues, or in this case, foreign countries. Drawing from thei r findings, one can argue that since the dominant frames that have characterized the conflict have been religion, with one of them being Islam, and warfare, the readers of the three newspapers in this study would undoubtedly perceive the Kashmir conflict as a potentially disa strous war involving parties that subscribe to diffe rent religions. Viewed in th e context of th e Middle East crisis between Palestinian Muslims and Israeli Jews as well as terrorist acts perpetrated by Islamic extremists in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Chechnya and Sudan, this might also add to the increasing demonization of Isla m in America as a religion that perpetuates violence. The current study therefore could serve as a starting point for a second-level agenda setting study aimed at determining such issues as a) the perceptions of Americans regarding the Kashmir conflict; b) the level of correspondenc e of these audience frames with the mass media frames discovered in th is study; and c) the persistence of these
105 media and audience frames. Such a study would add to the body of work about international news reporting and framing of in ternational news as well as to the existing research on effects of frames present in media text on the audience. This emphasis on religion and warfare as the primary frames for the Kashmir conflict can also be tied to cer tain characteristics of American culture, the fourth location of frames identified by Entman (1989). Amer ican society has been found to be highly ethnocentric, and this tendency of Americans to concern themselves mainly with their domestic affairs is reflected in the low and essentially crisis-drive n coverage given to international affairs and partic ularly events in Third World countries by the U.S. media. High ethnocentrism also breeds ignorance of other cultures and imposition of American interpretations on complex, multi-layered events occurring in other countries. These interpretations are evident in the medi a text and are maybe brought about by the journalists and imbibed by the audience, ma king it a somewhat cyclical process. Therefore, another area of research for whic h this study could serve as a base is an investigation into the frames regarding fore ign countries especially such South Asian countries as India and Pakistan that are present in the Am erican culture and how these might impact the frames communicated by journalists who cover events in these countries, editors who edit thei r reports, or the gatekeepers who select these reports for presentation to the public. A basic tenet of j ournalism is that its practitioners engage in writing for the perhaps rather specific audience of a particular mass medium. It follows that certain perceptions in the minds of reporters about what American readers would want to read might influence frames that th ese reporters would use in their coverage of
106 these countries. One major focus of future study could be the determination of the degree to which the knowledge of cultural and audien ce characteristics had an influence on the frames the reporters, editors, or gatekeepers presented in the storie s on which this study focused.
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112 Appendix A: Coding Sheet Date: ______________________ Newspaper: ______________________ Dateline: ______________________________________ Headline:________________________________________________________ Sources: Type: Official=1, Unofficial=2 Official: Military, Diplomatic, Government, Political parties Unofficial: Non-governmental, human righ ts groups, militant groups, religious organizations, journalis ts, laypersons, media Affiliation: Indian=1, Pakistani= 2, Kashmiri=3, U.S.=4, Other=5 Name Position Organization Type Aff. No. Keywords: Type: Noun=1, Verbs=2, Adjectives=3, Adverbs=4 Subject: Dispute=1, Region=2, Indians=3, Pakistanis=4, Kashmiris=5, U.S.=6, Other=7 No.= Number of times the word appears in the article Word Type Sub No. Modifier Type Sub No.