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An analysis of the United Nations :
b two peace operations in the Congo
h [electronic resource] /
by Sofia Fargo.
[Tampa, Fla] :
University of South Florida,
ABSTRACT:This thesis studies the peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace-building efforts undertaken by the United Nations (UN) in the Congo. Part one investigates the UN mission in Congo 1960 to 1964 and the second part looks at the current mission that started in 1999 which is currently ongoing. The final part makes a comparative analysis of the two case studies. Peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building are some of the approaches the UN uses in order to manage and settle conflict. While these concepts are often related to one another, they possess certain characteristics making them distinguishable. I solemnly use these concepts when conducting the two case studies and the comparative analysis. I study the mandates as well as the activities in the field. My main argument is that while the mandates differed between the two peace operations, the actual activities in the field shared many common features.I will show that the first peace operation in the Congo deviated from all others undertaken by the UN thus far. The Congo crisis in the sixties took place at the height of the Cold War. What commenced as a traditional peacekeeping operation eventually turned into a mission of peace enforcement. These enforcement measures were never supported by a Chapter VII mandate. There were also elements of peace-building efforts such as trying to install functioning governmental institutions. As such, it deviated from other peace operations During that time. Although these are considered as pioneering for many current peace-building missions, they cannot be considered as broad as todays efforts. The current peace operation in Congo also started as a peacekeeping operation. As the conflict escalated, a Chapter VII mandate was provided to use force. Similarly to the peace operation during the Cold War, it also went from a peacekeeping operation to one of peace enforcement.However, the ongoing peace operation is provided with much clearer and less arbitrary mandates. The peace-building efforts are also much broader. Central to the mission is to aid in the implementation of a democratic system that will survive once the peace operation has ended. These forms of efforts are quite typical since the end of the Cold War.
Thesis (M.A.)--University of South Florida, 2006.
Includes bibliographical references.
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t USF Electronic Theses and Dissertations.
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An Analysis of the United Nations : Two Peace Operations in the Congo b y Sofia Fargo A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of Government and International Affairs College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida Major Professor: Earl Conteh Morgan, Ph.D. Dajin Peng, Ph.D. Jorge Nef, Ph.D. Date of Approval: April 1, 2006 Keywords: ONUC, MONUC, peacekeeping, peace building, peace enforcement Copyright 200 6, Sofia Fargo
ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT v CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 MONUC and ONUC Â– A Comparative Approach 2 Clarification of Concepts 6 Peacekeeping 7 Peace Enforcement 8 Peacemaking an d Preventative Diplomacy 9 Peace Building 9 Charter of the United Nations 11 CHAPTER 2 THE UNITED NATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR 15 The Evolu tion of Peace keeping 17 Peace Opera tions during the Cold War 19 CHAPTER 3 THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA 25 An Agenda for Peace 27 Peace Op erations in the Nineties 29 CHAPTER 4 The Congo Crisis 1960 1964 34 Th e establishment of ONUC 36 ONUC and Peacekeeping 37 The Mandat es 37
iii Peacekeepin g in the field 39 Th e Constitutional Crisis 41 ONUC and Peace Enforcement 41 The Mandates 42 Enforcement in the field 43 ONUC and Peace Building 45 The Interpretat ion of the Secretary Genera l 46 Pea ce Building in the field 48 CHAPTER 5 BACK TO CONGO 51 Th e Establishment of MONUC 53 MONUC and Peacekeeping 53 The Mandates 54 P eacekeeping in the field 56 MON U C and Peace Enforcement 58 The Mandates 59 Enforcement in the field 60 M ONUC and Peace Building 62 The Mandates 64 Pea ce Building in the field 65
iv CHAPTER 6 COMPARATIV E ANALYSIS OF MONUC AND ONU C 68 Peacekeeping 68 Peace Enforcemen t 69 Peace Building 70 CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION S 72 LIST OF REFERENCES 74
v AN ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS : TWO PEACE OPERATIONS IN THE CONG O Sofia Fargo ABSTRACT This thesis studies the peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building efforts u ndertaken by the United Nations (UN) in the Congo. Part one investigates the UN mission in Congo 1960 to 1964 and the second part looks at the curren t miss ion that started in 1999 which is currently ongoing. The final part makes a comparative analysis of the two case studies. Peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building are some of the approaches the UN uses in order to manage and settle conflict While these concepts are often related to one another, they possess certain characteristics making them distinguishable. I solemnly use these concepts when conducting the two case studies and the comparative analysis. I study the mandates as well as the activities in the fi eld. My main argument i s that while the mandates differed between the two peace operations the actual activities in the f ield share d many common features. I will show that the first peace operation in the Congo deviated from all others undertaken by the UN thus far. The Congo crisis in the sixties took place at the height of the Cold War. What commenced as a traditiona l peacekeeping operation eventually turned into a mission of peace enforcement. These enforcement measures were never s upported by a Chapter VII
vi mandate. There were also elements of peace building efforts such as trying to install functioning governmental institutions. As such, it deviated from other peace operations during that time. Although these are considered as pione ering for many current peace building missions, they cannot be considered as broad as todayÂ’s efforts. The current peace operation in Congo also started as a peacekeeping operation. As the conflict escalated, a Chapter VII mandate was provided to use forc e. Similarly to the peace operation during the Cold War, it also went from a peacekeeping operation to one of peace enforcement. However, the ongoing peace operation is provided with much clearer and less arbitrary mandates. The p eace building efforts are also much broader. Central to the mission is to aid in the implementation of a democratic system that will survive once the peace operation has ended. These forms of efforts are quite typical since the end of the Cold War.
1 C h apter 1 Intro d uction At the time of writing, the United Nations (UN) is celebrating its 50th Anniversary. The international organization was born at the end of the World War II with the hope to prevent wars and conflicts of such large magnitudes. Its record is varied in cluding both notable successes as well as less achieved triumphs. For the first forty years, the Cold War affected the way the UN operated. Since the world was divided into two hostile blocs, the West and the Soviet Union, the envisaged global collective s ecurity never materialized. The UN was instead involved in trying to prevent a major clash between the two power blocs although they at times succeeded in bringing smaller conflicts to an end. Despite the status quo the Cold War brought, peacekeeping duri ng this time still evolved, changing with every conflict at hand. Depending on the conflict, the UN used mediation between parties, monitoring of ceasefires and at times deploying lightly armed forces in trying to settle conflicts The Cold War also coinc ided with many countries gaining independence. These decolonization efforts were often m arked with hostilities stemming from multi ethnic demands in which the UN intervened. Many of these ethnic hostilities flared up as the as the support by the maj or powe r blocs ended. Yugoslavia is just one example where civilians were victims of ethnic cleansing. However, the last decade has also seen conflicts over territory and resources, as in Somalia and conflicts over political control as in Rwanda.
2 The UN is curr ently in high demand. However, the complicated conflicts and wars it tries to settle have put the UN under great pressure. Many of these wars take place in countries with no functioning state, so called failed states. It means that consent and respecting the sovereignty of a state, often crucial before intervent ion during the Cold War, is abandoned. In effect peacekeeping has lately moved towards peace enforcement. Although the latter is inscribed in the Charter, it is costly both in terms of money and li ves. And while the numbers of UNÂ’s missions have exploded in recent years, many countries are unwilling to pay the bill or to send troops to a zone of conflict. ONUC and MONUC Â– A Comparative Approach The UN has been engaged in sixty peace operations since its first inception. This thesis l ooks at the peacekeeping, peace enforceme nt and peace building efforts in two of those missions. Both of them were launched in Congo, now the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The first called ONUC (Op ration des Natio ns Unies au Congo) was launched at the height of the Cold War, between 1960 and 1964. The second MONUC (Mission de lÂ’ONU en RD Congo), is currently ongoing although the war that began in 1998 officially ended in 2003. The purpose of this study is to firs t examine and then compare the two UN peace missions in Congo from the perspectives of peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building. T here are two central questions; what are the differences and similarities between the two operations? A case study i s dedicated to each of the two peace operations. This approach includes studying the mandates as well as how the mandates were carried out in each operation. I have followed a structured, focused comparison as developed by Alexander George (George 2005). I t is structured insofar I ask the same
3 q uestions for each case study, what m andate s were provided and how were they carried out in the field This method is focused in that it only deals with c ertain aspect of the cases examined. The focused part of this t hesis is the investigation into the peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building of the two pe ace operations. The last part of the thesis compares the two peace ope rations making the study comparative in nature. The concepts described below are cru cial in revealing the similarities as well as the differences between them. I am interested in studying UNÂ’s approach in peace operations. Any evaluation of the missions as successful or failed has thus not been undertaken. This had also been fruitless sin ce one peace operation is still on going. My inquiry into MONUC ended on December 31, 2005. The analysis would not be complete unless attention is also given to how peace operations have evolved since its first ini tiation. A review on this is therefore app ropriate. There is a vast amount of literature on this subject. Traditional peacekeeping operations during the Cold War were often deployed to mere monitoring cease fires (Richmond 2004). They have lately moved beyond this task to include a variety of acti vities that often intersect wi th other concepts such as peace building (Dreyer 1995, 148; Hill, Malik 1996). Reviewing this literature will allow us to analyze the conceptual questions derived from the changes in UNÂ’s peace operations (for a similar approa ch, see Thakur, Thayer 1995). My main argument is while the mandates provided for the two peace operations differed, they still resemble one another in how they were carried out in the field. This is per haps striking since peace operations have evolved and fundamentally transformed during the past forty years The two missions started as traditional peacekeeping
4 missions, both in their mandates and how they were carried ou t in the field. Similarly, they had their peacekeeping activities turn into enforcemen t actions. In the area of peace building there are similarities as both has undertaken efforts to build strong governmental institutions. As such the Congo peace operation in the 60Â’s deviated from almost all other missions that had until then been embark ed up on. The background to UNÂ’s intervention is similar as the phenomenon of state collapse occurred in both instances. As Zartman has argued, collapse means that the state can no longer perform the basic functions required to pass a s a state. He bases h is definition on the state as sovereign, the state as an institution and the state as the security guarantor for a populated territory (Zartman 1995). The collapse of Congo in the 1960Â’s was an exception as most countries in Africa had a relatively smooth transfer to independence. Occurrence of state collapse in the nineties was much more common (Zartman 1995). The wars in themselves also resemble one another. International and regional actors were involved then as they are now. While UNÂ’s involvement in in trastate conflicts has become very common, this was more of an anomaly in the Congo crisis of the 1960Â’s. H owever, there are also vast differences between the two missions Because of the Cold War, the Security Council provided ONUC with very unclear and a rbitrary mandates. This caused disarray in the field as how to read the mandates. W hen the Security Council authorized the use of force they did it without referring to Chapter VII. Instead, the interpretation of the mandates of the Secretary General guid ed the mission. Invoking enforcement has been repeated today in the DRC But in contrast to ONUC, the current peace mission operates under much clearer and specific mandates.
5 This holds true for its peacekeeping, enforcement and peace building activities. Enforcement is authorized by a Chapter VII mandate. Peace building efforts are specified in the mandates, something that was nearly omitted forty years ago. Building a longstanding peace is one of the main goals of todayÂ’s mission so that the state can fu nction once the mandate has expired. This was never the goal for ONUC. The Cold War and the prevention of a major power conflict loomed over the mission from the very beginning. Today t here are attempts to find the root of the conflict so a p ermanent peace can be achieved. Assisting the transitional government is crucial for MONUC so free and fair elections will lead to a democracy. Throughout this study the terms conflict and war will be used intermittently. They both refer to a prolonged armed conflict between states and/or intrastate. A similar approach is used for the terms mission and operations. Both terms refer to UNÂ’s organized intervention in areas of conflict. The first part of the thesis is allocated to a brief description of the Charter of the United Nations. This document serves as the guiding principle for how to settle conflicts. Two Chapters of the Charter will be dealt with in detail, Chapter VI and Chapter VII, as they contain provisions for activities intended to maintain peace. The secon d part reviews UNÂ’s peace operations during the Cold War as well as during the Post Cold War era. This is followed by the empirical inquiry of UNÂ’s missions to Congo, including a brief overview on the wars that led up to UNÂ’s involvement. The study will co nclude with the comparative analysis of the two peace operations.
6 Clarification of Concepts The UN has several approaches at its disposal to prevent and ma naging conflicts. Studying these can be confusing. Almost every mission shows va riations between th em as the conflicts that the peace operation is trying to settle differ In addition, the confusion surrounding the conceptual definitions has p roven challenging, to say the least. In recent years these concepts sometimes inters ect with one an ot h er both th eoretically and in practice. While peacekeeping is the most widely term used, is just one tool used in trying to cope with a conflict at hand. It is a concept problematic to define as it is not mentioned in the UN Charter. This ch apter will clarify these concepts that include peacek eeping, peace enforcement peace making preventative diplomacy and peace building Although I have not included preventative diplomacy and peace making in my study, t hey are crucial in understanding the historical development of peace operations and how the two operations under study were carried out. First, these concepts must be put within an analytical boundary This is particularly imp ortant for this stu dy since many current UN missions include all of the above. Secondly, although these co ncepts are often linked to one another they sho w their own characteristics. T hey are also ofte n applied at different times during a mission. However, t here is a symbiotic relationship between these tools; they all depend on e ach other whe n carrying out a peace operation
7 Peacekeeping There are as many peacekeeping operations as there are types of conflict (Uesugi 2004, 103). In addition, peacekeeping is often adjusted to fit each circumstance. It is adjusted ad hoc, as conceptualizatio n has followed its practice (Uesu gi 2004 103 ). However, peacekeeping shows certain characteristics separating it from other UN approaches. Peacekeeping is the use of a multinational force usually including military and/or civilian personn el in a field of conflict. It also operate s under consent ; t he host country must provide permission for the peacekeeping force to operate on its territory. Sovereignty of states is thus recognized by the peacekeeping operations and as soon as the permission is withdrawn t he force must leave. Peacekeeping has also typically involved lightly armed military personnel. Use of force is used only in self defense. In effect, peacekeeping is sometimes termed as a Chapter VI peace operation, residing somewhere between the peacefu l resolution of conflicts (chapter 6 of the UN Charter) and enforcement (chapter 7) (Ruggie 1996, 67). Neutrality and impartiality are crucial for a peacekeeping operation. The nationality of the troops is also important, as members of aligned nations can be regarded as taking sides. Countries such as Canada and Norway have traditionally been involved in peacekeeping operations whereas the deployment of American troops must be deployed carefully, especially in Middle East where they can be perceived as sidi ng with Israel. Equally important is that the peacekeeping force does not support one warring faction over the other. This has become a difficult task since many peacekeeping missions have recently become in volved in intrastate conflicts with apparent trib al hostilities.
8 Tas ks of the peacekeeping force include but are not limited to implementing and monitoring peace agreements or ceasefires, separation of forces and to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance (Mingst, Karns 2000, 76; Ues ugi 2004, 10 1; Thakur 1995, 7). While this definition can be attributed to peacekeeping throughout much of its history, peacekeeping became much more complex and multifaceted after the end of the Cold War. Alan James has called this Â“pr ickly peacekeepingÂ” (James 1995, 267 269 ). I will account for these changes in peacekeeping in each definition in the following subchapters. By putting peacekeeping in contrast to each concept we will be able t o understand what separates it from other tools Peace E nforcement Unlike pe acekeeping, peace e nforcement operations are applied when Chapter VII of the Charter is invoked. It is needed when achieving a peaceful settlement has failed. Armed force may be necessary if the Security Council sees the situation as a threat to peace, a b reach of peace or an act of aggression (UN Charter 1945) In effect, a peacekeeping operation can quickly turn in to a peace enforcement mission if the situation is called upon. Peace enforcement troops are in contrast to peacekeeping forces in that they a re actively militarily involved in trying to end a conflict. Peacekeepers on the other hand can only use force in self defense. While many peacekeeping operations in the last decade have been labeled peacekeeping operations they have in fact been both pea cekeeping and peace enforc ement missions (Christie 1995, 256 ). Yugoslavia is one ex ample where these two concepts were integrated together with peacemaking (Ghebali 1995, 14 ).
9 Peace M aking and P reventative D iplomacy At first glance, these two concepts seem almost identical. Both are concerned with making peace. There are those who are proponents of putting both of these concepts under the same rubric (Allan 1996 5 10 ; Bertrand 1995, 164 ).While the same method of diplomacy is often applied to these tool s, the time frame it is used is entirely different. Preventative diplomacy serves to prevent t he outbreak of hostilities in the first place. An effort to achieve this is done before the deployment of peacekeepers. Peace making is on the other hand used to dealing with conflicts that are ongoing (Maley 1995 239 ). More importantly, peace making is concerned with aiming for a peace that is capable of lasting once the peacekee pers have withdrawn (Maley 1995, 239 240 ; Norton, Weiss 1991, 25 ). Peacekeeping is of ten linked to peacemaking in that peacekeeping is concerned with stopping or containing conflict so peacema king can take place (Maley 1995, 239). Peace B uilding Peace building i s relatively new, as it was first defined by the UN in the early 1990Â’s. In an Agenda for Peace, then Secretary General Boutros Ghali defined peace building as the construction of a new environment that fosters economic and social cooperation with the purpose of building confidence among previously warring parties By developing the social, political and economic infrastructure it is possible to prevent future violence and laying the founda tions for a durable peace The UN has an obligation to strengthening new democratic institutions (Boutros Ghali Chapter VI, 1992). The internati onal organization has thus moved beyond just settling conflicts to embrace a more wholesome approach to transform countries that have experienced conflict and war. This broadly defined concept raises the question of what is included in
10 peace building opera tions. Roland Paris includes a wide variety of functions such as the administration of elections; the retraining of police officers, the nurturing of political parties, the design and implementation of economic reforms; the reorganization of governmental institutions; the promotion of free media; and the delivery of emergency humanitarian and financial assistance (Paris 2004, 38 39). There are others, who for instance stress that a definition of peace building must also include a gender perspective ( McKay 2002, 129 ), or that public health must be included since it can add to the sustainability and stability of a community (Mori, Meddings, Bettcher 2004). Peace building encompasses program s ranging from micro level changes of conflicting communities to macr o level institutional changes that address the structural causes of conflict (Lil l y 2002). I use this very broad definition of peace building. I thus take the approach that p eace building efforts must be targeted in many areas in order to prevent the recur rence of violence and achieve a sustainable peace. There is one more issue on peace building that need to be addressed. It concerns at what point peace building missions are launched. An Agenda for Peace called it Â“post conflict peace buildingÂ”. Similarl y, Roland Paris defined peace building as an operation that is deployed when hostilities have ended (Paris 2004, 39). I use what Jeong calls short term and long term peace building (Jeong 2002 6). The first is launched during a conflict and includes short term objectives that are regarded as important to reach long term goal s. For example, a program that disarms and repatriate s soldiers is usually regarded as important in order to reach a long term political stability. Potentially, these programs of former combatants constitute one such activity, and within the context of the war to peace transition, it can have a number of important effects upon the wider
11 transitional process (Knight, Ozerdem 2004 ) I have put these short and long term efforts into the sa me rubric of peace building. In sum, the above concepts possess their own characteristics while simultaneously being linked to one another. They are often in reality interconnected in order to achieve peace and security. In the Post Cold War era security has become more focused on human security as compared to national security which was more concerned with conflict between states. Human security means protection of fundamental freedoms that are the very essence of life (Shinoda Jeong 2004). Freedom from poverty, environmental degradation, ethnic cleansing is just but a few of these fundamentals. While this is no easy task for the UNÂ’s peace approaches, it has nevertheless become an element in its overall goal to achieving peace and security Charter of th e United Nations The end of the World War II opened up discussions that the League had failed to prevent aggressions from countries such as Germany and Italy (Diehl 1993, 20) Steps were taken to create a stronger international organization so that wars co uld be prevented. Several conferences were held before the final adoption of the UN Charter in San Francisco on 26 June, 1945. There are nineteen so called Chapters in the UN Chart er. The first five Chapters describe the principles and purposes of the UN, membership of the UN followed by how it is organized including the Security Council and the General Assembly. Chapter VI and Chapter VII are the most important for this study. Chapter VI includes articles regarding the Â“pacific settlements of disputesÂ” a nd Chap t er VII includes guidelines regarding Â“action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace,
12 and acts of ag gressionÂ” (UN Charter 1945 ) These two Chapters represent the two means in how to achieve international peace and security. Nat ions wanting to join the UN have to sign the Charter. By doing so, they must adhere to certain standards and acceptable co nduct. One article outlines what acceptable conduct should be: Â“ The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to enda nger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peac eful means of their own choiceÂ” (UN Charter, Chapter VI, Article 33). Any member of the UN may bring attention to a dispute as well as a non member as long as they are part of such a dispute (UN Charter, Chapter VI, Article 35). In contrast, Chapter VII only allows the Secur ity Council to deal with actua l breaches to peace. It states: Â“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken i n accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and securityÂ”. (UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 39). Article 41 states that actions can be taken to interrupt economic relations while Article 42 states that it may take acti on by air, sea, or land forces if previous action have proven inadequate to maintain or restore international peace and security. At least on paper, the Security Council is here given an enormous amount of power. However, the veto power of the permanent m embers often stifled the UN during the Cold War This had two effects. First, it prevented the Security Council from taking any action against any of the major powers. Second, the escalation of the Cold War meant that few
13 states found themselves outside of the bipolarized international system. Many conflicts around the world were of the interest of the major states (Diehl 1993; 24). Disagreement between the major powers made the notion of co llective security superficial. During the Cold War, only once was t he Article 42 formally proposed. The Soviet Union wanted the UN to provide naval, air and ground forces to assist the Egyptians. But, as described below, the action taken was different from the one outli ned in Article 42. The first execution of Chapter VII did not take place until after the Cold War when Iraq was thrown out fro m Kuwait in 1990 1991. The end of the Cold War had opened up new expectations for what the international community could do to ensure international peace. The Security Council consi sts of five permanent members; China, Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom and France. There are also ten non permanent members that are elected by the General Assembly for a two year period. All members have one vote. There is however differences in how these votes are carried out. Matters that concern procedures such as adoption of new rules and creation of new organs are taken if nine of the fifteen members vote affirmatively. Substantive matters also require nine votes, but if any of the perman ent members use their veto a resolution fails. Matters such as decisions on ending disputes and application of sanctions are regarded as substantive matters (Hill, Malik 1996, 12 13). One of the crucial functions for the Secretary General is found in Art icle 99 in the Charter. It states that Â“the Secretary General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and securityÂ”. Although the Secretary General does not poss ess the same amount of power as the Security Council, his role has at times been at the forefront in conflicts. One
14 example is Dag Hammarskjld the Secretary General during the Congo crisis in early 1960Â’s, who himself negotiated with a leader of a Congol ese province who was seeking independence (Young 1965 324). Javier Perez de Cuellar also held several meetings with the foreign ministers from both Iran and Iraq to bring about a ceasef ire during the war (Thakur 1995, 31).
15 Chapter 2 The United Nations D uring the Cold War The signing of the UN Charter in San Francisco in 1945 expressed hope that a new global security arrangement could prevent major wars and achieve peace. Despite their differences, the United States, the Soviet Union (now Russia), Great Britain, France, and China, became key players in the founding of the UN. The discussions regarding the founding of the UN included careful optimism. Although many believed the international organization would be limited in creating a comple tely peaceful world, there was simultaneously a belief that it could prevent human misery on such scale as seen dur ing the World War II (Wang 2004, 207 209). However, as tensions grew between the major powers, optimism was quickly replaced by pessimism. Th e Cold War and the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union would become to prevail for forty years. Simply speaking, the Cold War was a conflict between the two superpowers the United States and the Soviet Union. The Americans wanted to pro tect the Wes tern civilization, claiming it was the only system that protected individualsÂ’ freedom. T he Soviets were proponents of creating a world where international socialism was the ideology (Kalb 1982 ) The clash over these two ideologies took place i n an unprecedented military build up including arsenals of nuclear weapons (Bernstein 2004).The military build up in both countries reached enormous proportions. Some argue that the m assive allocations to the military industrial complex drove the economy o f the Soviet Union into oblivion (Bernstein 2004, 127).
16 The UNÂ’s main role during this time was to prevent the superpowers and their allies to engage in direct conflict (Allan 1996, 12; Thakur 1995, 4 ; Cousens 2004, 102). States attempted to prevent aggre ssion by uniting through the UN. This concept, collective security, was not supposed be based on the interests of individual countries but on a collective effort to prevent aggression wherever it occurred. However, during the Cold War, world peace was rega rded only as threatening if there was a clash between major states. The failure of collective security became obvious since any enforcement against any such power could result in war (Thakur 1995, 4). Another problem with the concept of collective security is what Johnson calls Â“quasi statesÂ” (Johnson 1990). He argues that the very existence of many African states is support ed more by the international community than by the efforts and abilities of their governments and people. The Cold War and TrumanÂ’s de claration on containing Communism would limit the UNÂ’s potential achievements. Diplomatic, economic and military support was given to African leaders who allied themselves with either of the two superpowers (Taylor, Williams 2004, 6). Cold War terror in La tin America supported in one way or another by the United States, enhanced intolerant forces, militarized societies, and broke the link between freedom and equality. In the 1950Â’s, the US undertook two operations unilaterally that completely disregarded th e UN Charter. The first in Guatemala by overthrowing the democratic government (Johnson 2004, 256) followed by the CIA sponsored re installment of the Shah in Iran (Wang 2004, 214). During part of the Cold War era there was also a process of decolonizatio n. Many UN operations took place in countries where European powers had withdrawn. In 1945, more than 750 million people lived in non self governing territories. By 1990, fewer than 2
17 million people remained in such territories. The UN was often directly o r indirectly involved in the decolonization process of these areas (Baehr, Gordenker 1994, 116). Although the power politics between the United States and the Soviet Union played a central role during the Cold War, opinions were raised fro m smaller nations in the world. A lthough many of them criticized UNÂ’s part in many of its missions, such as in the Middle East, there was still a belief that the UN could uphold the principles laid out in the Charter (Wang 2004, 220). In the 1960Â’s former colonies formed G roup 77, an organization within the UN that promoted social and economic development. This became known as the North South issues, dividing the more developed countries with those less developed (Mingst, Karns 2000, 5). The Evolution of Peacekeeping The U NÂ’s principal tool of maintaining peace during the Cold War was throug h peacekeeping (Hill, Malik 1996 ; Richmond 2004 ). Peacekeeping grew out of the failure of the collective sec urity arrangement (Diehl 1993; Richmond 2004). It became a tool that substitut ed collective securit y ( Hill Malik 1996, 14 ). During the Cold War, the UN did not provide a definition of the term. It is not until recently that attempts have been given to put it into a separate category, both in content and in context. I t would be to s implify t he mat ter by stating that peace operations during the Cold War were one of uniformity. They all differed from each other and the UN showed various levels of assert iveness. Peacekeeping efforts during the Cold War are often referred to by many as f irst generation approaches (Richm ond 2002; Mingst, Karns 2000 ). These efforts were not however uniform and were instead tailored to each specific situation. There are however certain characteristics that can be accounted for.
18 Peacekeeping during this time was not focused on human security; it was colored by the in terest of the states (Richmond 2004). Preventative d iplomacy and formal communication were used in trying to maintain ord er in the international system (Richmond 2004). The UNÂ’s missions were based on consent between the warring parties. T he host country had to provide its consent to the UN to be able to operate on its soil (Thakur 1995, 7; Abi Saab 1995, 3). In addition, it included consent from the opposing party in the conflict. Otherwise there w ould have been little possibility of disengagement and a peaceful deployment of the UN force. The political consent of the two superpowers was important to prevent a conflict from becoming spread world wide Impartiality was crucial for the engagement of p eacekeeping missions. The task was and still is completely international, trying to ensure the impartiality. The UN thus served as a third party trying to negotiate. If negotiations could achieve a ceasefire, the Security Council could decide to send inter national observers (Baehr, Gordenker 1994, 61). Peacekeeping missions were often placed in buffer zones to prevent further escalation of conflict. Use of force was considered the last resort. Preventative diplomacy and negotiations were tools that were fav ored as opposed to military action. The UN thus operated under a mediatory capacity, trying to settle conflicts through peaceful m eans (Thakur 1995; Richmond 2004 ). The term confli ct management is often used to describe how confli c ts were dealt with (Rich mond 2004 41; Christie 1995, 252). There were perhaps ag reements on how to end conflicts but peacekeeping often became a tool to freeze the conflict. Very litt le attention was paid to resolving the underlying cause to conflict. Many peacekeeping efforts w ere also launched in countries that went through processes of decolonization (Rikhye 1984).
19 Although many conflicts were old they had been suppressed during the era of colonization (Rikhye 1984; Kaldor 2001). Peacekeeping was and still is an ev olving conc ept (Uesugi 2004 ; Richmond 2004; Thakur 1995; Hill, Malik 1996).The term peacekeeping did not come into general usage until after the Suez Crisis in the late 1950Â’s. Up to the end of the Cold War UNÂ’s peace efforts were not as uniform as one may anticipate For this reason there is some danger in treating the entire Cold War era as one analytical period. To avoid generalization this chapter will briefly describe some peacekeeping operations that have, according to the literature, been im portant in how peace keeping has evolved. Peacekeeping Missions during the Cold War The UNÂ’s mission to the Balkans (UNSCOB) between 1947 and 1951 was the first time the UN used impartial military personnel as observers. These two elements; impartiality and observation, becam e important elements of UNÂ’s formula for peacekeeping during much of the Cold War (Richmond 2004; Thakur 1995, 7). The mission, that took place in Greece, was responsible for investigating whether Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were responsible for provi ding assistance to guerilla groups acting to overthrow the Greek government. GermanyÂ’s occupation of Greece during the Second World War had given rise to liberation groups that included both communists and non communists. Disagreements of the groups finall y led to a civil war where the neighboring countries aided groups on the communist side. What is important to note in this conflict is the tension bet ween the two power blocs. The Security Council was deadlocked because of the Soviet UnionÂ’s veto which fo rced the issue of f the table. This illustrates the inactiv e role the Security Council had in its role
20 of maintaining peace And although UNSCOB had problems, such as being accused of bias and Yugoslavia and Albania refusing to allow observers on their grou nd, the UN had learned the difficulties of influencing other states (Hill, Malik 1996 29.) Indeed, this still pose a challenge to the UN when intervening with peacekeeping efforts. But the element of impartiality in peacekeeping was an important lesson t he UN learned. Perhaps no other conflict has been more prevalent since the end of the World War II than the Arab I sraeli conflict. The UN has launched several missions to this area and many are still active. The first UN intervention came in 1948 and is s till ongoing. Jewish immigration into Palestinian territory after the war created hostility that is still prevalent today. When Israel proclaimed its independence, neighboring countries invaded Israel in May 1948. Although Israel came out as the victors, U nited Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was set up to by the demands of the Security Council. The Arab countries were forced into a series of agreements that the UNTSO was in char ge of supervising UNTSO also carried out its own investigations and became more proactive in resolving violent incidents. UNTSO was the first UN peacekeeping observer mission (Thakur 1995, 49 50). However, the mission has been largely powerless in resolving conflicts between the two sides (Richmond 20 04 44; Hill, Mal ik 1996 30). The region has experienced several wars since the c reation of UNTSO. But UNTSO has played an importa nt role in serving as a point of contact between states without diplomatic relations. Many observers remained on the cease fire lines providin g both humanitarian and political assistance (James 1990, 154 156). Perhaps the biggest disappointment for the UNÂ’s involvement in the Middle East has been the continuing Israeli distrust of the international organization. The UN had
21 proposed a partition of the Palestinian territory in 1947. But some African countries, the Soviet Union and other non aligned countries had supported the Arabs which led to the General AssemblyÂ’s adoption of a resolution that Zionism was racism. This led to the IsraeliÂ’s view on the UN as a dishonest and partial mediator. Even after the Cold War had ended, and the resolution on Zionism was repealed, Israel continued t o distrust the UN (Richmond 2004 47). If peacekeeping efforts were to prevent and resolve conflicts, as Diehl has suggested (Diehl 1993), the first years of UNÂ’s mission must be regarded as relatively small successes. But as stated earlier, peacekeeping was not defined within the UN. More importantly, the UN operated within the framework of state centrism where p ower politics and statesÂ’ strategic interests steered the Security Council to act unassertively In effect, UNÂ’s interest and level of commitment was often the interests of the dominant states. The challenges the UN had faced in its early years of peaceke eping efforts were taken into account in the years that followed. Its experiences led the way to a formalization of UNÂ’s peacekeeping efforts. Starting in 1956 with the case of the Suez Canal, the UN took a large step towards peacekeeping as an essential t ool in its international operations (Hill Malik 1996, 33 ) The UNÂ’s peacekeeping operation in the Suez Crisis turned out to be unprecedented (Baehr, Gordenker 1994, 83). President Nasser of Egypt announced in July 1956 that the Suez Canal would be nationa lized. In response to the rejection of American financial aid to build the Aswan Dam, Nasser decided to make the Suez Canal a national property and charge dues to cover the expenses of the Aswan Dam project. The announcement led Israel to attack Egypt. The tension between the two countries was
22 already in full bloom mainly because of EgyptÂ’s assistance to Palestinians raids on Israel. Britain and France also became involved in an effort to secure their national interests. The Suez Canal was not only the shor test sea route to the Far East but also served as point of entry for the majority of crude oil. Potential closure of the Canal could have had serious implications to their economies. In addition, EgyptÂ’s nationalistic movement and NasserÂ’s rhetoric was reg arded as a serious threat to the whole region. The General Assembly proposed a resolution in November 1956 that called for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli, British and French troops. The Secretary General at the time, Dag Hammarskjl d was called upon to set up a United Nations Command. Shortly thereafter the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) was established to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities ( Hill, Malik 1996, 33 ). What makes the UNEF I important is that is s et up some principles that was later to be used in several peacekeeping operations. UNEF I was set up to supervise the withdrawal of foreign troops, patrolling border areas and securing the ceasefire. The latter was a remarkable step forward from previous operations where UN missions had only served as to observe ceasefires (Hill, Malik 1996, 33). Israel did withdraw its troops, also a crucial accomplishment for UNEF I. Since Egypt had to give consent to the UN mission to operate within its borders, UNEF I was forced to convince the Egyptian government that EgyptÂ’s sovereignty was not compromised and that the fate of the Suez Canal would be negotiated without any intimidation. The consent given by the Egyptian government gave legitimacy to UNEF I and the Uni ted Nations in general. The UNEF I stayed in position until 1967 when another war broke out.
23 The limitations of UNEF I to maintain a lasting peace became obvious when Nasser withdrew the consent of UN troops on Egyptian soil (Thakur 1995, 49). But what is important is that for eleven years UNEF I was able to maintain peace in an area filled with hostility. Regarded as the first peacekeeping operation it also contributed to some v aluable lessons later applied in other peaceke eping operations (Hill, Malik 19 96, 35). However, the limitation of the UNÂ’s peacekeeping efforts in the area was obvious. Wars continued and the UN did not manage to eliminate the causes of the origin of the wars. The last two decades of the Cold War saw very few peacekeeping initiative s from the UN. The UN undertook two missions in the Middle East during this timeframe ; UNEF II and UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Observer Force) When Egypt insisted on the withdrawal of the UN forces in 1967, UNEF I had to comply. In 1973 Israel was attacked by both Syria and Egypt. Considered one of the biggest threats to the world peace, and a potential clash between the two superpowers, UNEF II was created to pose itself in the middle between Israel and Egypt. Observation posts and investigative c omplaints were its main tools at hand. Israel and Egypt both accepted UNÂ’s presence and in effect reduced the tension between the superpowers (Hill, Malik 1996, 47 48 ). UNDOF was similarly constructed as UNEF II. Its mandate started in May of 1974 to set up posts in the Golan Heights to supervise the disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria. Although tensions remained high between the two countries, UNDOF managed to keep the area relatively calm. The Golan Heights were divided into two zones and a buffer zone between them was patrolled by UNDOF personnel. This UN mission was successful in the sense that from 1974 and on, this part of the region has be en relatively quiet ( Hill, Malik 1996, 48).
24 Nicaragua and El Salvador are two other countries that saw tumultuous events unravel in the 1980Â’s. Nicaragua experienced tense confrontations between the Reagan administration and the Sandinista government. The Contadora Group was established on a Latin American initiative to prevent a military intervention by the U.S. This group operated outside the realm of the UN. The peace process began in the early 1980Â’s and gained support from the U.S and the Soviet Union. Although the Cold War was still in effect, the bilateral cooperation between the superpowers was aided by the President GorbachevÂ’s openness. The UN was eventually invited to become part of the peace process, mainly through its regional organization, the Organisation of the American States (OAS). They managed to disarm the U.S supported Contras in Nic aragua and put an end to the civil war. When elections were held in 1990, OAS and the UN were invited to observe and a small force was also established to monitor the peace process throughout the country. The case of Nicaragua is important because it was t he first peace operation in Latin America. And although there continued to be civil unrest in parts of the region, the mission was considered relatively successful. Cooperation between the two superpowers made the negotiations easier for all parties. Mikha il Gorbache vÂ’s new openness hinted the end of the C old War (Smith, Durch 1993 )
25 Chapter 3 The United Nati ons in the Post Cold War World A s the tensions of the superpowers began to fade, optimism grew that the UN would take on a larger role i n preventing conflicts and war. From the mid eighties cooperation between the US and the Soviet Union emerged, a case in point are the negotiations that took place in resolving conflicts in Central America as briefly described above These approaches, ofte n referred to as second generation approaches became the principal tool in peacekeeping operations during this time (Richmond 2004 ). The consensus in the Security Council, aided by Mikhail Gorbachev, meant that the UNÂ’s peacekeeping efforts became facilit ated. As the Cold War came to an end, the UN embraced the task of going beyond just being a neutral third party. Second generation approaches attempted to understand the root of conflict. Resolving these conflicts still took place in a state centric approa ch, although human security became more important (Richmond 200 4 99). Second generation approaches became part of a larger parcel. Goals were set to aiding in the implementation of peace accords and the long term settlin g of conflicts ( Ghebali 1995, 13). Examples of these efforts could be seen in Cambodia and Central America. Although the United Nations evolved as an international organization during the Cold War, the last decade has expanded the role of the UN. Peacekeeping missions have more frequently been deployed in areas experiencing intrastate conflict. S ince 19 89 the United Nations only set up three peacekeeping operations to deal with conflicts between states. O ver ninety percent of UN Â’s peacekeeping has been established to intervene in
26 intrastat e conflicts or conflicts in so called faile d states (Uesugi 2004 96 97). Out of 111 armed conflicts in the world from 1989 to the year of 2000, as many as 104 were intrastate conflicts ( Wallenstein Sollenberg 2001, 632). Intrastate conflicts are increasi ngly the most prevalent form of violence today (Maley 1995, 242; Diehl 1995, 223; Kaldor 2001). The civil war in Somalia took hundreds of thousands peoples lives. The conflict in former Yugoslavia during the nineties is an other example ( Kaldor 2001). Many of UN operations are now engaged in disarming internal factions, although they may still have support from various states. In the Cold War era, mo st conflicts were interstate. Armed conflict is today best understood as intrastate conflict (Shinoda, Jeong 2 004, 2). Civilians constitute the majority of the victims (Kaldor 2001). Millions have been reported dead in the DRC since the war broke out in 1998. However, the majority of the casualties were not killed in battle but died as a result of starvation and d iseases that resulted from the war (Vick 2001). In effect, the humanitarian aspect of modern conflicts is becoming increasingly important (Gheba li 1995, 13 ). The United Nations is an organization just as the name states; an international organization joi ned by nations. It was founded on the principle of sovereignty. Since most conflicts are internal the UN faces problems on how to deal with them (James 1995, 263 280). In addition, many so called failed states have no government to invite the UN to try to intervene in an internal conflict. Consent was crucial for most peacekeeping effort during the Cold War. Many conflicts in the past decade have involved UNÂ’s involvement without consent. Consent by warring parties is therefore difficult to obtain (Thakur 1 995, 11). Peacekeeping forces are at times forced to operate in conflict where sporadic or partial consent has been given (Berdal 1995, 133). While the conflict in
27 Congo during the 1960Â’s deviated from the norm of peacekeeping operations, this method has b ecome more the rule than the exception in the post cold war environment (Abi Saab 1995, 7). This is in complete contrast to the peacekeeping efforts during the Cold War. The demise of the Cold War and the superpowers termination of aiding smaller nations o ften led to conflict. (Hill, Malik 1996; Kaldor 2001; Duffield 2002). The wars in Somalia and former Yugoslavia showed that the disengagement of the superpowers left a political vacuum. In addition, historical hostility combined with religious and national istic competition for power triggered these regions into war (Hil l, Malik 1996, 93 ). Although the United Nations have substantially increased its members in the last decade, the number of conflicts has escalated. During the Cold War there were attempts to manage conflicts, not to resolve them to achieve lasting peace. Lately there have been attempts by the UN to develop strategies trying to do just that. These third generation approaches have moved beyond previous attempts to end conflict (Richmond 2004) They are multilevel and multidimensional. Roots of conflict are not only considered, there has been an increased role in trying to build peace. An Agenda for Peace Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former General Secretary, wrote a report stating a new approac h for the UN to achieve its ultimate goal of achieving peace. It was published in 1992. The report, An Agenda for Peace Â– Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping was an unprecedented document in that peacekeeping is mentioned as a tool to reach just and long term political solutions (Boutros Ghali 1992)
28 The first part of the document lists some of the changes that have taken place since the end of the Cold War. While the report affirms the UN as an organization of sovereign states, it continues by stating that it must not be crippled by the rivalry that existed during the Cold War. Positive changes are mentioned such as increasingly democratic forces that have replaced authoritarian regimes. States have joined to form associations, making nation al boundaries blurred. Increased communication and trade have deepened cooperation between states and individuals. At the same time, the report also asserts a simultaneous opposite trend. Technological advances have altered the nature and expectations of life. Progress has brought instability such as ecological damage, disruption of family and community and the rights of individuals. New assertions of nationalism are threatening the state. Ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic frictions have in creasingly become more brutal. An Agenda for Peace takes on these issues in its largest sense. Roots of conflict must be addressed in order to achieve peace. Economic despair, social injustice and political oppression must also be dealt with to ensure las ting peace. P eacekeeping in the nineties is, both in context and content, part of a larger parcel. They go beyond being a neutral third party between interstate conflicts. Quite often they have had to secure implementation of agreements between guerilla mo vements and a government. Examples of these have been in Angola between 1990 and 1991 and in Central America 1989 to 1992. Humanitarian intervention is playing a much lar ger role in todayÂ’s peace operations. Humanitarian intervention can be equally, and a t times more important, than the military action (Christie 1995, 261). Civil war in Yugoslavia and Somalia were two
29 regions where UN forces, at times with military assistance, aided the population with humanitarian assistance. The military aspect of peace missions has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War ( Berdal 1995, 132). Very often, peacekeeping missions turn into ones of peace enforcement. The case of Somalia also shows another dilemma for peacekeeping missions. Since many conflicts are i nternal, the UN has to communicate and negotiate with many actors (Maley 1995, 242). In addition, the UN sometimes has to negotiate with groups who do not have popular support. In effect, the UN can give it s support to an undeserving group (Maley 1995, 243 ). Impartiality is also threatened. The UN was heavily criticized in Somalia for siding with one of the warring factions. Peace Operations in the N ineties The peacekeeping mission in Cambodia in the early nineties was understood as an important element in forming a completely new government (Baehr, Gordenker 1994; 152). The UN became engaged in securing implementation between warring factions and the State of Cambodia (SOC), the established government. In 1990 negotiations had failed to bring an end to Camb odiaÂ’s 20 year long war. The permanent members of the Security Council negotiated an unprecedented role for the UN, implemented by UNTAC, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (Ratner 1995, 41 42). Pressure from the Security Council finally forced the warring factions, the Khmer Rouge, Prince Sihanouk and the forces backed by the Han Sen government of Vietnam, to support a ceasefire. The UN undertook a number of activities. It supervised the ceasefire, disarmed the forces, promoted human rig hts and oversaw the return of refugees. It also undertook an unprecedented mission in that they administered the country during the transition period. At its peak there were 22,000 UN personnel in Cambodia, both civilian and
30 military. Elections were held in 1993 leading to the return of civil authority. The mission in Cambodia was not however carried out without fault. While the repatriation process went relatively smooth, proof was uncovered that the biggest party had intimidated individuals and oppositi on leaders. UNTAC failed to provide a neutral political environment (Ratner 1995, 51; Thayer 1995, 138). The promotion and protection of human rights remained an issue as hundreds of political prisoners did not receive a trial. The Khmer Rouge continued at tacks on civilians and the State of Cambodia murdered opposition leaders. Despite these failures, the peacekeeping mission was instrumental in bringing peace to Cambodia. However, in 1997 there was another coup. The UNÂ’s mission illustrates the complexity and the multi functional operation of its approach. One of the reasons Cambodia did not receive the fullest international attention was due to the ongoing crisis in former Yugoslavia and Somalia (Ratner 1995, 47). These two regions faced a humanitarian cri sis that was shocking to the outside world. By the end of 1995, only 13,000 Muslims had survived ethnic cleansing in Northern Bosnia, out of an original population of 350.000 (Kaldor 2001, 53). The Security Council also reacted in 1992 to the situation in Somalia, where 1,000 people were dying every day because of starvation due to the civil war (Mingst, Karns 2000, 92). Somalia became one of the most controversial peacekeeping efforts in the nineties. Since its independence in 1960, Somalia had struggled w ith internal fighting among various groups. UNÂ’s involvement in 1992 started as an attempt to safeguard food and medical supplies to a starving population. However, soon a mandate was given to set up another mission, the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II ) to deal with the
31 continuous warring factions in the country. It was adopted the day after 26 Pakistani peacekeepers had been killed. The mission quickly turned into a bloody confrontation with General Aideed, a Somali warlord (Patman 1995, 85). The war did not end however and a number of Somalis lost their lives. Fighting escalated between the UNÂ’s force, mainly made up by troops from the United States, and AideedÂ’s group. The televised images of the American soldier dragged through the streets of Mogadi shu put an end to UNOSOM II (Hill, Malik 1996, 176 177). The case of Somalia shows the difficulties of peacekeeping. First, peacekeeping efforts and peace enforcement merged into one operation (Berdal 1995, 134). Consent, an important elements found in mo st peacekeeping missions during the Cold War, was replaced by little or no consent from the warring parties (Allan 1996, 143). Second, impartiality was violated as the UN had declared war on AideedÂ’s Haber Gedr Â’s sub clan although it just represented one of fourteen fighting groups (Hill, Malik 1996, 177). Finally, UNOSOM II did not receive more military power; it was ill equipped and had fewer troops than UNITAF. The case of Somalia is one example where peac ekeeping rapidly transformed into peace enforcem ent The Security Council can deny the consent of a host state and may forcefully place troops in a country or part of a country (James 1995, 264). Also, troops may be equipped to engage in military actions and thus departing from traditional peacekeeping operation to enforcing peace (James 1995, 264). The Iraq Kuwait Observation Mission in 1991 is one example where jurisdictional sovereignty was curbed (James 1995, 268). Neither country de facto gave consent to the presence of UN troops on their territory.
32 The war that raged former Yugoslavia was another challenge for the UN. The collapse of the country led to the surfacing of suppressed ethnic, religious and politic al differences (Durch 1993, 468). The country had been the scene for competing interests be tween the superpowers during the Cold War (Mingst, K arns 2000, 97) Fighting started as Yugoslavia disintegrated with the proclamation of independence for both Croatia and Slovenia in 1991. The European institutions failed to prevent the escalation into t he multi ethnic Bosnia Herzegovina. The UN became involved later in 1991 stating primarily humanitarian reason after heavy discussions wheth er to intervene ( Ghebali 1995, 27 29). When Bosnia Herzegovina declared its independence in 1992, nationalistic frac tions fuelled ancient hostilities through military forces. Serbs who lived in both Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia were against the new independent states and wanted to maintain the unity of Yugoslavia. Ethnic cleansing took place, in particular in Muslim a reas occupied by the Bosnian Serbs. Since the UN Protection Force for Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) mandate included using limited force, preventing ethnic cleansing became difficult. Individual countries, acting under NATO, were deployed to conduct air strikes ag ainst Bosnian Serbs. This was the first time that the UN cooperated with a military regional alliance (Mingst, Karns 2000, 99). As atrocities continued, bombings escalated. In 1995, the Serbs finally accepted a ceasefire that led to the Dayto n Peace Agreem ent (Richmond 2004 164). The UN operations in former Yugoslavia and Somalia were much more multidimensional than previous peacekeeping efforts. The boundaries between peacekeeping and peace enforcement became blurred as the UN tried to intervene in these intrastate wars. The multilevel cooperation between regional and global
33 organizations became crucial in trying to end conflict. Humanitarian assistance was on a large scale and served as one of the main reason to intervention. These three operations were also involved in trying to rebuilding the states during a time when various actors had territorial claims. UNÂ’s intervention in intrastate conflicts has escalated in the past years and peacekeeping has become linked to building state institutions and human rights. With no reference to the UN Charter, peacekeeping has emerged from experience. The above description of peacekeeping missions and other efforts undertaken by the UN shows that peacekeeping is a concept difficult to put into a neat definition. It emerged from being applied to mere observation of ceasefires and positioning of forces between warring factions to a more wholesome effort to prevent and resolve the root of conflicts. During the Cold War, peacekeeping became a tool to prevent a clash be t ween the two superpowers. It often tried to maintain a non coercive and neutral approach to conflicts. As the Cold War came to an end, the international community turned to the UN to settle an increasing number of intrastate conflicts. While many of these conflicts are not new, they were uncovered as major powers withdrew from supporting repressive regimes that had kept hostilities Â“under c ontrolÂ”. The UNÂ’s approach has become more multifaceted, often including peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace buil ding in trying to end and resolve conflicts and wars
34 Chapter 4 The Congo Crisis 1960 1964 T he events that were enacted in Congo during this time were complex. It is not the intention to account for every detail of the conf lict. Excellent description s have already been made (see Young 1965; Kalb 1982) A brie f account of the crisis must however be included. After more than seventy years of brutal Belgian colonialism (Hochschild 1998), the Republic of Congo gained independence in 1960. Within two weeks the euphoria of independence was swiftly d ampened as Katanga, CongoÂ’s richest region, de clared independence and the Arm e National Congolaise (ANC) mutinied against its all Belgian officers. The effect of the break down of law and order led Belgium to int ervene stating security reasons for its citizens residing in Congo It was in this context the Security Council adopted its first resolutio n on the Congo The resolution was adopted in a rare moment of consensus (Lefever 1968, 4). Congo faced particular pr oblems in dealing with its independence. The Belgian colonial authority had put ethnicity at the heart of the political and economical structure. Some groups of people were favored over others. Belgium also refused to provide a political adjustment for the Congolese to deal with independence ( Young 1965, 203 ). There was also a severe shortage of Congolese who had a university degree; there was neither a single Congolese engineer nor a medical doctor. One day after the arrival of Belgian troops, the provinci al leader of Katanga, president Tshombe, declared the province independent. He appointed several Belgians to
35 the civil administration as well as to the army. Belgium supported the Katanga secession, an action that went beyond their presence as pure humanit arian. It was obvious Belgium had other interests in Katanga than simply providing aid to the white Belgians (Young 1965, 318). Besides the secession of Katanga, t he mutiny of the army against its entire officer corps was the important element in the crisi s It began almost immediately after independence (Young 1965 316). Soldiers were discontent with the slow acceleration of promotion as no Congolese could be found among its officer corps. Resentment escalated as Belgian officers were still in charge. Pri me Minister Patrice Lumumba answered the soldiersÂ’ demands by dismiss ing all Belgian officers, replacing them with Congolese. The Belgian white communi ty in Leopoldville panicked and started to escape. Belgium decided to intervene to impose order despite a lack of invitation from the Congolese government. Citing hum anitarian reasons for its intervention, Belgium stated they respected Congo Â’s independence (Kalb 1982, 6). Belgian troops were deployed throughout the country but their presence in the province o f Katanga caused many Congolese to question their presence as humanitarian (Young 1965, 318) The mineral rich province generated 80% of the CongoÂ’s export revenue and half of its total income. The Belgian company Union Miniere du Haut Katanga had exclusiv e mining rights (Durch 1993, 316). In early July of 1960, Lumumba an d President Kasavubu asked the UN for military intervention to end the Katanga secession. Specifically, the Congolese government asked for the United States to provide troops under the a uspices of the UN. While the UN debated on what action to pursue, matters deteriorated in the Congo. Belgian troops took over the airport in the capital Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) and began
36 to restore order in the European part of the city. Lumum ba and Ka savubu decided to contact the Soviet Union asking them to keep a close eye on the ev ents that unfolded in the Congo and what they viewed as the Western plot agai nst its sovereignty (Young 1965, 319). Congo thus became an open and covert Cold War battlegrou nd (Durch 1993, 319). During this time, t he Soviet leader Khrushchev tried to convince many African countries that the Soviet offered an alternative to the dependence of imperialists. He forcefully argued that the Soviet Union supported an end of coloniali sm and spoke of trade in a fair manner (Kalb 1982, 115). The United States position was to pr event the spread of Communism. Many countries that insisted or had already gained independence were viewed by the West as vulnerable to the influence of Communism (Wang 2004, 216). T he Establishment of ONUC On Dag HammarskjldÂ’s initiative, the Secretary General at the time, the first resolution on Congo came on 14 July 1960, only two weeks after independence. The resolution was very vague as no article in the UN C harter was referred to (UN Security Council resolution 143, 1960; hereafter SC Res. ) It simply called for the withdrawal of the Belgium troops without any mentioning of a deadline, and authorized the Secretary General to take necessary steps to provide t he Cong olese Government with military assistance. The Secretary General wanted pacific procedures to guide the UN Force, similar to those during UNÂ’s Emergency Force in the Middle East. He did not want the UN to interfere in any internal conflicts as he ha d a strict policy of political neutrality (Durch 1993, 315)
37 ONUC and Peacekeeping The UN and Lumumba did not share the same objective regarding the peacekeeping forces goal in Congo. Lumumba wanted to restore the national territory and viewed Katanga as having been invaded by the Belgian forces. The UN wanted to prevent the crisis in Congo from escalating to a larger world conflict (Young 1965, 323). As the first resolution was adopted, Lumumba thought there would be no need for assistance from the Soviet Union (Kalb 1982, 33). In a rare moment of agreement, t he resolution had been supported by both the Soviet Union and the United States. How ever, as ONUC did not take any active measures to end the secession and Belgian troops still present Lumumba again asked for SovietÂ’s assistance (Kalb 1982, 14 15). He delivered an ultimatum to the UN saying that unless all Belgian troops were removed by midnight of J uly 19 1960 the Soviet Union would be asked to intervene (Kalb 1982, 24). The Mandate s It was in this context t he second resolution cam e on 22 July 1960 The Security Council could not just dismiss the question of the presence of Belgian troops in Katanga (Abi Saab 1978, 25) The resolution was more specific in that it called for Belgium to speedily withdr aw its troops and authorized t he S ecretary General to use all necessary actions to achieve this goal Mentioned was also a request for all states not to intervene in Congo. The resolution also invited specialized UN agencies to provide assistance to Congo as requested by the Secretary General (SC Res. 145, 1960 ). The second resolution basically emphasized what had been stated earl ier. The request for all states not to intervene did not only mean Belgium France and Great Britain also used methods which made it more difficult for the UN to operate. France permitted the
38 recruitment of mercenaries for Katanga on it s territory and never paid its assessment to ONUC. Similarly, Northern Rhodesia ( A former British colony, now Zambia) granted refuge for Tshombe at o ne point during the crisis. British authorities in Uganda also delayed flight and fueling rights for UN troops (Durch 1993, 324). Tshombe responded to the second resolution with a promise to use f orce if the UN entered Katanga. In effect, Hammarskjld deci ded to stop the UN entry as it may have been viewed as an occupying force (Bunche 1965, 130). He went back to the Security Council for a more specified and enlarged mandate. A third r esolution was adopted on August 9 calling for the UN to enter Katanga (SC Res. 146, 1960 ) Although the question of Katanga was crucial in the crisis it was the first time the province was mentioned in a resolution. The resolution a lso included references to Article 49 Chapter VII of the Charter that states the Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council. Although there was a slight insinuation, the use of force was still not being authorized by the UN. Hammarskjld had advised the Sec urity Council to include Katanga in the resolution although he still adhered to his principle that the UN should not use force to a dispute he viewed as an internal affair of Congo (Kalb 1982, 43 44). The language of the resolution was successful insofar t hat Tshombe allowed ONUC to enter Katanga although the UN had to accept a set of conditions (Abi Saab 1978, 36 45 ).
39 Peacekeeping in the Field Within two days of t he adoption of the first resolution approximately 3,500 peacekeepers were deployed in Con go. After two months, shortly after the adoption of the third resolution, the number of peacekeepers had increased to almost 15,000. It became the largest peacekeeping operation ever mounted during the Cold War During the first two months the peacekeepers were tasked to oversee the withdrawal of Belgian paratroops and to serve as an impartial force for p ublic order (Durch 1993, 342). The vague and general nature of the mandate caused d isarray in the field of who was in charge of the peace operati on (Lefeve r 1967, 35 ). For example, Ralph Bunche who was in Congo to oversee the UN aid program was appointed to control military matters (Durch 1993, 337 ) He hastily deployed troops to parts of the Congo before any communication had been set up. They were thus lef t without few means to communicate with the headquarters in Leopoldville. The initial understanding of ONUCÂ’s role in carrying out the mandate was to assist the Government in maintaining law and order (Abi Saab, 1978, 17) However, i t was not equipped to do so until the mandate had expanded (Durch 1993, 342). According to military leaders, principles of war and basic tactical conceptions were deliberately ignored by ONUC's civilian leadership in the control and deplo yment of the Force (Dorn, Bell, 1995, 14 ) They also had no direct function in relation to the withdrawal of the Belgian troops. The peacekeepers were not authorized to use any force against the foreign troops. ONUC's mandate covered a traditional peacekeeping operation such as the interposition between hostile parties and the maintenance of neutral zones (Dorn, Bell 1995). The UN personnel were not immune against violence. ONUC forces operated in a
40 volatile political environment, in which their relations with various factions frequently changed from amicability to animosity (Dorn, Bell 1995). The first three resolutions only called upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw its forces. They never included any language on the use of any enforcement in this regard. Hammarskjld interpreted the reso lutions as the secession of Katanga was a domestic affair and that the UN must remain impartial. He also did not interpret the mandate as authorizing the use of force ( Boulden 2001, 25 26) The third resolution did not change the mandate but it was the fir st to mention Katanga and for Â“Belgium to immediately withdrawÂ” (SC Res. 146, 1960 ) It also stressed the impartiality of the UN force in a separate chapter saying Â“the United Nations force in the Congo will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwiseÂ” (SC Res. 146, 1960 ) In effect, the first three resol utions contained elements of my definition of a peacekeeping operation; impartiality and neutrality, the consent o f the host state (in this case both from the central Congolese government as well as from Katanga), and no use of force by the peacekeeping troop. After two months ONUC had largely achieved its two goals as law and order was largely restored and Belgian t roops had withdrawn from most parts of Congo. However, this success could not be applied to Katanga where paratroops were still present and Tshombe still cla imed the province independent. It turned out ONUC was just at the beginning of a very complicated p eace operation.
41 The Constitutional Crisis Lumumba and the Soviet Union shared a view contrary to that of the UN; the Belgian support of the Katanga secession should not be viewed as an internal matter. Making matters worse part of the neighboring provin ce of Kasai had at this time proclaimed its independence. This proved too much for Lumumba and the Soviet Union who proceeded with their own military campaign. Lumumba and his forces attacked South Kasai in late August where approximately one thousand Balu ba people were massacred (Durch 1993, 320). The Secretary General viewed this as a potential conflict between th e two superpowers. T he Soviet UnionÂ’s military aid to Congo was in violation of the resolutions as it intervened in CongoÂ’s internal affairs wit hout the co nsent of the UN (Abi Saab 1978, 54 55). President Kasavubu openly blamed Lumumba for the massacre in Kasai and dismissed him This was followed by LumumbaÂ’s action to discharge Kasavubu as pres ident. A constitutional crisis became a fact and ONU C found itself in a situation few had anticipated. ONUC and Peace Enforcement The mutual dismissal of President Kasav ubu and Lumumba should perhaps not have come as a surprise. The two men had never had a close relationship, before or after independence. A ll along, potential conflict had loomed over the duality of the constitution of which Lumumba was the Prime Minister and Kasavubu the Head of State (Young 1965, 322 323). The legality of LumumbaÂ’s dismissal was heavily debated (see Young 1965, 326 328). Th e UN finally sided with Kasavubu who had already appointed Joseph Ileo as the n ew Prime Minister In effect, the UN departed from its position as a neutral organization. Ileo never obtain ed a parliamentary majority for his new
42 government. Instead, Colonel Joseph Mobuto a pro Western Chief of Staff of the Congolese army took control of the government although Kasavubu remained as the supposed president. M eanwhile Lumumba resided in his house in Leopoldville, guarded by forces from ONUC. Both Mobuto and r epresentatives from South Kasai, holding him responsible for the massacre, wanted him arrested. Lumumba managed to escape and tried to reach Stanleyville where many of his supporters were. He was howeve r captured and on February 13, 1961 it was announced he had been killed. T he Mandates Lumumba had been a proponent for using force to end the secession of Katanga It is perhaps ironic the Security Council on February 21 1961 adopted a resolution authorizing the use of force after LumumbaÂ’ s death. It declare d t hat use of force, if necessary and in last resort be taken to preve nt the occurrence of civil war ( SC Res 161, 1961) It thus became the first peace operation that used Chapter VI as a disguise for enforcement (Mnsson 2005, 386). The same resolutio n also urged to take measures to withdraw all Belgian and other f oreign military, paramilitary pe rsonnel and mercenaries not acting under UN command. A majority of the Belgian troops had left Congo after the deployment of ONUC, however some were still pres ent in Katanga supporting Tshombe (Durch 1993, 324 325). The reason why a more forceful mandate was taken is that Stanleyville, under the leadership of a man named Gizenga, experienced revolt in response to LumumbaÂ’s death. Attacks on UN personnel also int ensified. Also, Tshombe seemed unlikely to settle the confli ct in a peaceful manner. Faced with a constitutional crisis, the UN pressed Congolese leaders to find a solution so the Parliament to reconvene. The Gizenga regime finally ended its opposition but Tshombe refused to
43 attend the mediation process. The Parliament reconvened on 19 July 1961 and Cyrille Adoula was named the new Prime Minister (Ohaegblum 1982, 49 50). The Constitutional Crisis had thus come to an end. The final Security Council resoluti on came in N ovember 1961. It included language more forceful than any previous resolution calling for the use of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehensio n of all foreign military, para mil i tary and political advisors not under UN command. In contr ast to the February resolution, it specifically authorized the Secretary General to use force to implement the mandate (SC Res. 169, 1961 ) Although Chapter VII was not referred to, there was no room for any particular interpretation of the mandate by the Secretary General (Abi Saab 1978, 164). In addition, U Thant, the new Secretary General, was not as reluctant to use force as his predecesso r (Durch 1993, 329). Peace Enforcement in the Field The February resolution granted ONUC with far more authority to use force than in any previous peace operation conducted by the UN (Diehl 1993, 51). Violence rose in Katanga, with Tshombe attacking the Baluba people in the northern part of the province. T he UN force managed to push Tshombe back and also captured sever al foreign mercenaries. Belgium still supported Katanga and some military officers that served with the secessionist forces. During the summer of 1961 the UN faced both cooperation and hostility from Katanga ( Franck, Carey 1963, 35). Weapons were provided from Belgium via a Sabena flight to the province as late as in September of 1961 (Vaccaro 1998, 80 81). The UN was still not capable of stopping the violence in Katanga.
44 It took the United Nations almost two years to end the secession of Katanga. Specific ally there were two attempts to expel foreign troops from Katanga. Operation Rumpunch was launched in August followed by Operation Morthor in September. The first was met by surprise by the Katangese and ONUC managed to take control over the gendarmeriesÂ’ headquarter. Some foreign mercenaries were captured although several remained at large after the operation had ended. Operation Morthor was launched under somewhat different circumstances. The aim this time was not only to expel the foreign mercenaries but also to end the very secession of Katanga (Abi Saab 1978, 139 140). The operation did not go according to plans as the UN force was met by heavy resistance. Tshombe managed to escape as ONUC failed to seal off his residence. These two operations were not authorized by the Secretary General. The decision was made by the director of UNÂ’s civilian operation in Congo and the regional civilian director for Katanga. They both interpreted the mandate as to include the forceful expulsion of foreign soldiers and t o use force to end the secession (Durch 1993, 340 341). The Secretary General tried to end the status quo by asking to meet with Thsombe to arrange a ceasefire. On his way to the meeting Dag Hammarskjld was killed in a plane crash in September 1961. His efforts to reach a cease fire were continued an d an agreement was reached upon in mid October. Thsombe violated the agreement by continuing the build up of arms. Expelled mercenaries were filtered back into Katanga ope nly helping Tshombe. The Congo Governm ent became more impatient with the in action of the UN and started its own military campaign against Katanga. They were quickly forced to retreat by ThsombeÂ’s military strength The ANC succeeded in creating nothing but disorder for the civil ian population and ONUC. The chaos culminated in an
45 attack on several Italians under UN command who were brutally killed (Abi Saab 1978, 162 ). It was not until the adoption of the final resolution in November 1961 that ONUC could end the secession of Katanga and fulfill its mandate. The new General Secretary in combination with a functioning Congolese government led the UN to perform more forceful ly. In its campaign against Katangese mercenary forces, ONUC carried out air attacks, the only UN peacekeeping operation to do so to date (Dorn, Bell 1995). After increased UN military actions in Katanga, Tshombe finally signed a declaration ending the secession on February 15, 1962. ONUC also managed to disarm mercenaries and other military groups. The peace operation had in ef fect abandoned all its pretense of staying neutral in the conflict by supporting the Central Government ( Dobbins et al. 2005, 15). After the secession had ended ONUC gradually started to withdraw from Congo They stayed until June 1964, ending a four year presence. ONUC and Peace B uilding A proponent of preventative diplomacy, Hammarskjld did send a UN representative to Congo before independence. He was concerned that Congo would have problems with the transition towards an independent state (Abi Saab 197 8, 6). Because of the rapid events immediately following independence, he was not given another chance to act on this approach. The transformation from a colonial state to a functioning independent African led state had failed and quite rapidly so (Young 1965, 307). Instead, ONUC became the organization that would try to prevent the Congo from falling into complete disintegration It was the first peace operation that combine d civil and military functions in what is now referred to as a Â“multi componentÂ” operation (Durch 1993, 337). ONUC became engaged i n activities that tried to strengthen the
46 stateÂ’s institutions, so called Â“state buildingÂ” (Jacobson 1964 75). These activities are considered pioneering for todayÂ’s state building missions (Ruggie 1996 6 8 ). Never before had the international organization be come so involved in trying to bu ild a countryÂ’s administration. These efforts took place through ONUCÂ’s Civilian Operations and included a variety of tasks. As many as 2,000 experts were tasked to assis t the Congolese governm ent in administrative and humanitarian matters (Mnsson 2005, 386). The Interpretation of the Secretary General The mandates on peace building were very vague. No mandate was ever adopted that authorized any specific p eace building effort Instead the General SecretaryÂ’s interpretation of the mandates laid down the basis of what some sc holars refer to as an u n traditional peacekeeping force (Paris 2004, 18). Through ONUCÂ’s Civilian Operation t he United Nations undertook functions tha t involved elements of peace building. In October 1960 the Security Council determined that to preserve the unity, territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, it would be essential for the UN to assist the Central Government of the Con go The protection and advancement of the welfare of the Congolese people were also included (Lefever 1967 193). The Security Council thus endorsed the agreement already reached by Hammarskjld and Lumumba in July the same year (Lefever 1967 198). Hamma rskjld immediately began to develop a plan that would include numerous tasks for ONUC beyond the military operations. Initially h e asked several countries as well as UNÂ’s specialized agencies to ai d in emergency type activities. This invitation was formal ly included in the second resolution. Several countries responded positively to the request, including the Soviet Union and the United States The United Nations ChildrenÂ’s
47 Fund (UNICEF) and The World Health Organization (WHO) also became involved to coord inate the relief efforts and to supply medical personnel (Jacobson 1964, 84). Beyond this, t he General Secretary outlined a much more comprehensive plan for Congo. He based it on the very broad resolution the Security Council had adopted in July, 1960 whe re ONUC was authorized to provide technical assistance to the Congolese government (SC Res. 146 ) He saw the political role of ONUC as one to fill the vacuum in Congo caused by the breakdown of law and order (Abi Saab 1978, 18). The General S ecretary discu ssed an unprecedented plan that would c all for a range of civilian responsibilities (West 1961, 603 ). I t also called for placing UN personnel in si gnificant posts. T h roughout ONUC Â’s four years presence they operated in the following areas: Administrative. ONUC coordinated a Consultative Group consisting of experts in agriculture, communications, education, finance, foreign trade, health, instruction, labor markets, law, natural resources, industry and public administration (Jacobsson 1964, 84 ). The General Secretary wanted UN officials to receive a new and so far untried status that would serve at the request of the Government. Humanitarian ONUC were instructed to protect civilians and to provide emergency food shipments to the population. In addition, ON UC coordinated medical training and launched vaccination programs. There was one resolution that noted although not specifying, the severe violation of human rights. It is found in the resolution adopted in February 1961 where it is stated; Noting with de ep regret and concern the systematic violations of human rights and
48 fundamental freedoms and the general absence of rule of law in the Congo (SC Res. 161, 1961 ). The interpretation of this resolution instructed the peacekeepers operating in Congo to give p rotection to all civili ans threatened by violence (M nsson 2005, 388). Hammarskjld had envisaged other programs as well. However, t he Cold War rivalry affected ONUCÂ’s mission considerably. For instance, it stopped t he envisaged training of the Armee Nati onal Congolais (ANC) It never materialized as they could not agree on who would be responsible for the training (M ns son 2005, 394). The Soviet Union also criticized the Civilian Operation because it did not include one single person from the Eastern Bloc while employing several from the United States. But more fundamentally, the Soviet Union did not interpret any mandate as to give the UN the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of a state (Jacobson 1964, 87 88). HammarskjldÂ’s interpretation of th e mandate was never supported by the Soviet Union and the schism between them widened considerably. Democratization w as also not a principal goal of ONUC. The territorial integrity of Congo and avoiding a direct conflict between the super powers served as the priorities for the UN ( Dobbins et al. 2005, 21). Despite these international influences, ONUC still managed to coordinate and execute several activities. Peace Building in the Field ONUCÂ’s Civilian Operations performed many tasks in various categories They reactivated the ports and railway system and supplied most of the technical staff to improve the transportation system. Because of the high unemployment rate, a modest public works was initiated by ONUC in order to create jobs (West 1961, 603). Besi de these emergency type activities, ONUC was also involved in trying to build institutions
49 that would survive once they had departed. The Consultative Group played a significant role in the administrative field. In the area of reforming and protecting gove rnmental institutions the UN played a noteworthy role (Jacobson 1964) From September 1960, a few months after independence, to August 1961 there was no legally instituted Congolese government. As the government reconvened, the Consultative Group assisted in policy advice and also served in executive capacities. Formal organizational structures were developed for the different ministries to strengthen the bureaucratic power of t he government (Dobbins et al. 2005, 19 20 ) There were also UN experts involved in the drafting of a new constitution. ONUC was also instrumental in revising the education system. The Consultants in education redirected attention from the classics, such as Latin and Greek, and put an emphasis on vocationa l training. At the end of 1963, they were also supplying over 800 secondary school teachers (Jacobsson 1964, 92). In order to deal with the severe financial crisis, ONUC collaborated closely with Congolese ministers in order to diminish the complete administrative collapse af ter the Be lgians had left. The essential tasks were to stop the decline in economic activity and to provide a temporary administration until a permanent institutional organization was in place (West 1961, 608 609). In the humanitarian field, ONUC took on an unprece dented role. Although resolution 161 included language on human rights, there was no explici t mandate to protect civilians. However, t he interpretation of the mandate by Hammarskjld included t he deployment of troops for their protection. For example, ONUC employed an entire battalion to protect a refugee camp in Kasai where 40,000 refug ees had sought UN protection (M nsson 2005, 389).
50 Despite these efforts, t he civilian government did not survive as Mobuto Sese Seko seized control of Congo in 1965. Mobuto managed to hold the country together despite efforts from rebel movements to overtake parts of Congo He was aided by Western governments and as late as 1997 France allegedly sent mercenaries to Congo to avoid MobutoÂ’s fall from power (Lemarchand 2001). A t the end of the Cold War, MobutoÂ’s corrupt regime and CongoÂ’s poor economic performance made him more marginalized. However, it was the turmoil in neighboring Rwanda that eventually led to his fall.
51 Chapter 5 Back to Congo The war that star ted in 1998 is often referred to AfricaÂ’s First World War The complexity of the war, with several actors involved, has claimed millions of lives. International Rescue Committee (IRC) reported that 4 million people have lost their lives in this conflict th at is regarded as one of the most devastating wars in recent history (IRC 2004 ) The war in Rwanda is directly correlated to what would become the war in Congo. Rwanda had experienced fighting between the Hutus and the Tutsis since 1990. It escalated when BurundiÂ’s and RwandaÂ’s presidents were shot down in an airplane in 1994. To this date it is unclear who is responsible for the attack but the Hutus soon began a systematic genocide of the Tutsi minority. RwandaÂ’s president was himself a Hutu. Almost one mi llion people were killed in a period of just a few months Many Hutus, fearing revenge from the Tutsis and the new Tutsi dominated government, fled the country and settled in the nearby provinces of Congo. Mobuto saw an opportunity to become a player on th e international arena and agreed to host the refugees. More importantly, Mobuto used the Hutus to increase hostility towards the Banyamulenge, people of Tutsi origin who had inhabited eastern Congo for generations. In 1996 the Banyamulenge were ordered to leave the area and seeked help from the Tutsis in Rwanda. The Hutu population in the Kivu provinces, aided by Mobuto, continuously attacked the new Rwanda government. In the fall of 1996, the Rwandan government the Banyamulenge and several anti Mobuto for ces attacked the Hutus in Congo and fought
52 the government forces. Laurent Kabila was the leader of the Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL). He had served as the Lumumba faction but had gone into hiding in the Kivu region si nce Mobuto came to power. KabilaÂ’s army and other Tutsi mov ements were well trained and Mob utoÂ’s weak forces, unpaid and divided among themselves, withered away as Kabila killed hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees. In 1997 Kabila and his forces managed to seize power over Kinshasa (former Leopoldville) the capital of Congo, and Mobuto had to escape. Kabila was initially seen as the bearer of democracy and economic growth, especially by Western countries. In time, however, he turned out to be just as co rr upt as Mobuto (Kassimir, Latham and Callaghy 2001). He appointed many Tutsis, both Rwandan and Congolese, in political and military positions. For many Congolese this was regarded as illegitimate since the Tutsis were regar ded as foreign occupiers. Sensi tive to the political message, Kabila dismissed the Tutsi chief of staff for the Congolese armed forces and also dismissed several other Tutsis and Banyamulenge members of the administration. Preventing a potential coup, Kabila sent his forces back to Rwan da in the summer of 1998. Several rebellions started in both Kinshasa and Goma and although they failed to overthrow the government, a line of countries deployed troops in Congo (Olsson, Fors 2004). C laiming security reasons, Uganda and Rwanda who had help ed Kabila oust Mobuto, entered Congo in August 1998. Rwandan troops later tried to take over Kinshasa with the help from Uganda. However, Angola and Zimbabwe intervened on behalf of Kabila. Although Zimbabwe does not share any border with Congo, it stated economic reasons for the interventions since both the government and Zimbabwean businesses had financial investments in Congo. AngolaÂ’s intervention was mainly due to it was fighting
53 its main rebel force UNITA, who used parts of Congo as training grounds. KabilaÂ’s team was later helped by Namibia, Chad and Sudan although the latter two withdrew their forces quite early. Namibia had no immediate security concern over the situation in Congo but may have feared the war would spill over into neighboring Angola (Olsson, Fors 2004) The Establishment of MONUC The Lusaka accord was signed in July 1999 by Congo, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Zimbabwe and Uganda. It was brought about by diplomatic negotiations facilitated by the Organization for African Unity (OAU). The pe ace accord called for a cease fire, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Congo, a dialogue between Kabila and the armed opposition groups dis arm am ent of all civilians, militias and groups, the creation of a national army and the re establishment of a state administration (Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 1999 ) The Security Council established MONUC, after its French acronym in November 1999. Its initial purpose was to aid and monitor th e implementation of the Lusaka acco rd (Smith 2004, 233) MONUC an d Peacekeeping While all parties signed the Lusaka peace accord, it was ignored by most of them. The rebel groups in eastern Congo did not disarm, Rwanda and Uganda stated securi ty concerns for their continued involvement and Kab ila claimed t he needed supp ort from Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia to protect Congo from its invaders (Wren 2000 ). In effect, the Lusaka peace ac cord provided little progress for ending the war.
54 The Mandate s Although the Security Council adopt ed its first resolution on DRC in April 1999, MONUC was not deployed until November, one year after the war had commenced. The resolution stated a consideration to use the active involvement of the United Nations and to assist in implementin g a cease fire agreement (SC Res. 1234, 1999). The Counc il thus made it cle ar not to involve the UN unless the warring parties had signed a peace accord. The signing of the Lusaka peace accord offered the UN an opportunity to finally get involved. However, b ased on a recommendation by the General Secretary, Ko fi Annan, the deployment of any UN personnel should be deployed in three phases. First, military liaison officers would be deployed to areas of the signatories of the ceasefire agreement. Second, up to 500 military observers would be based inside the DRC a nd third, the full deployment of a peacekeeping f orce ( Cilliers, Malan 2001 ) Based on these recommendations, t he Security Council adopted two more resolutions that year, specifying the activities MONUC would undertake. In August it authorized to deploy up to 90 military liaison personn el for three months (SC Res. 1258 1999 ), and in November the deployment of 50 0 military observers (SC Res. 1279 1999 ). This initial phase of MONUC looked like a traditional peacekeeping mission. The aim was after all to moni tor the ceasefire. However, the Lusaka accord was constantly being violated putting the UN mission in a difficult situation. T he number of UN staff was not sufficient to oversee such a large territory as the DRC The mission was also not able to deploy thr oughout the country because of lack o f security guarantees (Cilliers, Malan 2001 )
55 In resolution 1291, adopted in February 2000, the Security Council authorized MONUC to take necessary action under Chapter VII of the Charter to protect its personnel and civ ilians under imminent t hreat of physical violence (SC Res. 1291 2000 ). However, this authorization was postponed as the UN did not regard the situation as adequat ely secure (Cilliers, Malan 2001 ). MONUC also increased its personnel to approximately 5000 pe acekeepers At this time, forces backed by Uganda Rwanda Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia kept fighting in the eastern part of the DRC. Despite continued violence, no resolution had called for the withdrawal of foreign troops. In addition, MONUC had not depl oyed any contingents to the eastern part of the DRC, by far the most volatile area in the country. In June 200 0, the Security Council adopted a resolution that finally called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces on Congolese territory (SC Res 1304 2 000 ) The resolution fell however on deaf ears as no tro ops withdrew. In January of 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated in Kinshasa. His son, Joseph Kabila, took over the office as the Head of State. In contrast to his father, Joseph Kabila was more eage r to negotiate a peace agreement. He supported an Inter Congolese Dialogue (ICD) based on the Lusaka peace accord aimed at establishing a new political dispensation for the DRC (Apuuli 2003, 69). The dialogue officially started in the fall of 2001. Most pa rties in the conflict showed defiance and disbelief during the peace process I t would take nineteen months before a true peace agreement was reached in April 2003, called the Sun City II agreement. During the time of peace negotiations, the Security Counc il authorized a few more resolution As far as peacekeeping is concerned, they more or less reiterated previous resolutions The exception was one resolution adopted in February 2001 which
56 stated a deadline for the disengagement and redep loyment of warring parties (SC R es. 1341 2001 ). They w ere given two weeks to withdraw with a deadline of the complete withdrawal of all troops by May 15, 2001. Between the initial deployments of MONUC in 199 9 to the spring of 2003, the peacekeepers tried to implement the m andates the Security Council had authorized. These efforts were not easy as the mandates could not prevent that many military factions continued to fight. Civilians were naturally the victims. At rocities were uncovered and wave s of mass refugees continued. Peacekeeping in t he Field The peacekeepers did not thus have a mandate to use force or to disarm the diff erent militia members. F ighting in the east continued with the peacekeepers watching atrocities being committed without means to interfere. MONUCÂ’s ma in task was to aid in the delivery of humanitarian aid and to protect civilians. Initially, there were no peacekeepers present in the Kivu and Ituri regions. Although the Security Council had authorized 5,537 troops, it took years before MONUC forces reach ed this level Many Western governments would not contribute troops and African countries were also hesitant in sending troops to such a dangerous area. The situation was so explosive that groups on all sides were said to be preparing new massacres (Human Rights Watch 2003 ). But the small siz e of the mission and its limited mandate led some people to suggest that the international community was getting very late to its African peacekeeping obligations and arriving with t oo little (Fleshman 2000). It was not until March 2001 that MONUC deployed its first contingents to the eastern part of DRC They could do little to settle the conflict. They operated under a
57 traditional peacekeeping mandate and were also outnumbered by the many military factions. The mandate from February 1961 that provided a deadline for the foreign troops to withdraw was completely ignored. Rwanda, just one of many countries involved, had at this time as many as 30 000 troops in the DRC In 2 002 the Rwandan president sign ed a peace accord w ith the DRC including the withdrawal of all its troops. In exchange, the DRC would disarm and repatriate all soldiers aff iliated with the ALiR who were responsible for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Uganda also followed suit a few months later, promising to withdraw all its troops from the DRC. The glimmer of hope was short lived as violence continued. In April of 2003, Bunia was the scene of fierce violence. Approximately 700 peacekeepers had set up camp in this small town. Thousands of refugees were seekin g their protection. When as many as 20,000 militias, from various rebel groups, tried to take control of the town, two peacekeepers were killed. The mandate given to the peacekeeping force was to protect themselves and civilians. Such a small force was not able to do either. In addition, the resolution 1445 from December 2002 only stressed the importance of the voluntary nature of the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration or resettlement (DDRRR) of the armed groups according to the Lusaka peace accord (SC Res. 1445, 2002). Needless to say, the rebel groups had not disarmed and the UN force did not have the mandate to enforce any disarmament. They were only allowed to use fire in self defense. In the summer of 2003, the Hema militia contr olled the city while its rivals, the Lendu lingered in the outskirts of Bunia Clashes between the two led to massacres in Bunia and in other parts of the Ituri region ( Sengupta 2003). Even four years after the first resolution on the DRC, the situation i n t he eastern part of the country deteriorated.
58 The Ituri district was particularly vulnerable. Relief workers uncovered mass graves of bodies, many of them women and children. In just two weeks, approximately 400 people had been killed in Bunia alone. The situation was deemed so dangerous that an account of slaughters outside of Bunia could not be inv estigated (Maharaj, Masciarelli 2003). MONUC and Peace Enforcement The signature of the Â“Final ActÂ” in April 2003 demonstrated a will by most warring factions to put an end to the war. Officially, this date also marks the end of the war. The two biggest factions, the UPDF (The Uganda PeopleÂ’s Defence Forces) and the MLC (Mouvement de Liberation Congolaise) signed the peace accord. The Lendu m ilitia and the UPC (The Union of Patriotic Congolese) abstained. Meanwhile many of these units had also split into other factions destabilizing the situation in eastern Congo even further. Some also switched sides, for example the UPDF, who now received support from Rwanda Although both Rwanda and Uganda signed the peace accord, they continued supporting various factions (Itano 2003). All parties involved violated the peace accord and it was not until Joseph Kabila, the son of the assassinated president took over and showe d some eagerness to end the war. Several agreements have been signed and foreign troops have largely been withdrawn. However, the eastern part of the country is still plagued by violence. A s violence and atrocities continued, th e Security Council met in Ju ly 2003 where its members unanimously adopted a Chap t er VII mandate ( SC Res 1493). MONUCÂ’s operation went from focusing on monitoring the situation to Â“use all necessary meansÂ” to fulfill its mandate. Peace enforcement thus became a reality.
59 The Mandate s Despite a shaky peace accord, the Security Council gave an International Emergency Military Force (IEMF) the mandate to use Â“all necessary meansÂ” in response to the grave situation the DRC. The resolution 1484, adopted on May 30, 2003, allowed the mainly French led military force to take on a military enforcing role in the Ituri (SC Res 1484, 2003). It was clear that the IEMF was only to be deployed temporarily as the Security Council gave MONUC until mid August take over t he role as the peace enforcers. On July 28, 2003 MONUC inherited the Chapter VII mandate. Resolution 1493 was adopted unanimously by the m embers of the S ecurity Council. MONUC was allowed to enforce peace by interposing peacekeepers between the parties in conflict making the mission mor e responsive and influential (Boshoff 2004, 136). The resolution also entails a yearlong arms embargo on all foreign and Congolese armed groups ( SC Res. 1493, 2003) The new mandate increased the number of military personnel from 8000 to 10,800. As an effe ct of criticism of having such a relatively small troop size, the number of MONUCÂ’s personnel w as increased a year later to 16 700 (International Crisis Group, 2004). Approximately half are stationed in the troubled Ituri region. This increased number of p ersonnel makes MONUC the largest peace operation currently in the world. MONUC still operates under a Chapter VII mandate. The latest, at the time of writing, was adopted in December, 2005 (SC Res. 1649, 2005) The enforcement measures now also apply to an y political or military leader who impedes the disarmament efforts and who receives military equipment to be used for t he pu rpose of war. The reason for this enlarged enforcement mandate can be attributed to what Lawrence Smith
60 has called a Â“chicken and eg g situationÂ” (Smith 2004, 243). Without stability, DDRRR programs cannot take place. On the other hand, uncontrolled armed forces also contribute to instability. The Security Council h as also made it clear in nearly all its resolutions that the situati on i n the eastern part of DRC is a threat to inter national peace and security Enforcement in t he Field With such an enlarged mandate, MONUC has been able to act more robustly. Although the Chapter VII mandate was adopted to include the entire country, the enf orcement strategy has mainly taken place in the eastern part of the country The presence of foreign and local armed forces in this region has a deteriorating effect on the entire DRC. The peace and democratic process cannot take place unless the issue of the Ituri is resolved. Although the majority of the militias disarmed at the time of UNÂ’s deadline on April 1, 2005, some have been determined to continue the war. Reviewing some of the incidents that have occurred since the enforcement mandate was adopt ed reveals that MONUC has moved from being a bystander of slaughters of civilians to embrace a more forceful approach. As a response to the murder of nine UN peacekeepers in October of last year, MONUC killed approximately sixty members of the militia grou p responsible for the act (Jordan 2005). However, the enforcement action was slow off the ground. Very few countries have been willing to send their forces to such a volatile area. I t also takes time before the troops are on the actual ground. For example MONUC could not stop a massacre of ap proximately sixty five Hemas Despite a Chapter VII mandate MONUC could not prevent another spree of ethnic violence in the troubled Ituri province (Raghavan 2003 ).
61 UN personnel have also been targeted. Even when MO NUC increased its forces, a rmed militi amen still continued attacking them. In one incident a United Nations boat convoy in northeastern Congo was attacked forcing the peacekeepers to abandon a mission checking repor ts on the killing of more than one hundr ed people (New York Times 2004) However, w ith the increased number of MONUC troops, the situation in eastern Congo has improved within the last year. The city of Bunia, the capital of Ituri, was the scene of atrocities ever since the war started. Bunia is now slowly reemerging to a functional city with schools and t he local court open (Sengupta 2004). But the largest peace operation in the world is still unable to protect civilians, despite the mandate to use all necessary means to do so. Kofi Annan, the S ecretary General, stated in 2005 that MONUC was understaffed to perform its task of protecting as many as six million civilians (Wax 2005 ) In May 2005 the peacekeepers were blamed for their inaction during an attack in the city of Bukavu, where a faction of the army briefly took over the airport despite the presence of U.N forces. More than 100 Congolese were killed in the crisis. MONUC and Peace Building For the first time since 1960 the DRC is planning to hold democratic elections in 2006. The preparat ions have not been easy and they are still on going. A majority of the population voted yes in December of 2 005 to a referendum adopting a post war constitution. These were the first national elections in over forty years. The peace building efforts under taken by MONUC have been quite extensive. It can be considered as a peace building effort ty pical of the post Cold War era. These efforts did not begin immediately after MONUC had been set up. I nitially it started with a
62 general humanitarian assistance pro ject. This mandate was adopted by resolution 1291 back in February 2000, the same resolution that allowed military observers to be deployed. The resolution stated that MONUC should facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring as deemed wi thin its capabilities and under acceptable security conditions (SC Res. 1291 1999 ) In the past three years, the mandates have been enlarged to include a number of peace building efforts. MONUC n ow operates in four core areas in trying to promote a longs tanding peace (Swing 2003) These include: Peace and Security MONUC is focusing on the Ituri region and The North and South Kivu to end the violence; ensuring effective disarmament, demobilizat ion and reintegration (DDR) of armed forces and to support dis armament, democracy, development and reconciliation programs (DDDR). Facilitating the Transition leading to fair and free elections. The vote on the referendum was just the beginning of the path towards democracy. MONUC is currently assisting the Congole se to hold nationwide elections. Establishment of the Rule of Law and Human Rights to end impunity and to build stable institutions Training of police and criminal justice professionals is currently ongoing in the east of DRC as well as in Kinshasa. MONU C is also assisting in the establishment of a Human Rights Observatory and Rule of Law Taskforce.
63 Improve Human Conditions for Sustainable Peace MONUC is focusing on programs that address the devastating effects of war; child soldiers, HIV/AIDS; sexual v iolence. Gender is another element not specifically mentioned in these four core areas of operation. However, the importance of gender is stated in a resolution adopted by the Security Council on October 31, 2000. The resolution that not only applies to t he UNÂ’s mission in the DRC, states that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combat ants and armed elements, and recognizing the consequent impact this has on d urable pe ace and reconciliation. Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace building, and stressing the importance of their equa l participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision making with regard to con f lict prevention and resolution (SC Res. 1325 2000 ) Gender thus beca me recognized as an important issue for peace building efforts, an effort MONUC has adopted both in its mandates and in practice
64 The Mandates T he first resolution that touc h ed upon the elements of Peace and Security and the role of Rule of Law came on June 15, 2001, two years before the official end of the war. Much of the authorization provided was based on the eighth report by the Secretary General such as the creation of a civilian police component and of an integrated military/civilian section to c o ordinated DDRR operations (SC Res. 1355 2001 ). The resolution also requested that the civilian component of MONUC must be expanded to include civilian political affairs personnel. The Security Council also stressed the importance of establishing United Nat ions radio stations to promote public awareness of the peace process as well as the role of MONUC. In November the same year, the Security Council authorized the launchin g of programs of DD R in yet another resolution (SC Res. 1376 2001 ). I t was bas ed on re commendations to include a more wholesome approach to peace building (Swing 2001 ). The main role for MONUC in its peace building efforts was to coordinate the demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and the reintegration of the ex combatants. F acilitati ng the transition has been an extremely important endeavor for MONUC. As soon as the Sun City agreement was signed, efforts we re targeted towards setting up the transitional gov ernment that has been in power since 2003. The resolution that put MONUC under a Chapter VII mandate also stresses the importance of supporting the transitional government (SC Res. 1493, 2003). The government is headed by President Joseph Kabila and four vice presidents. This political formula is now being abandoned as the new consti tution has been adopted.
65 Emphasis on human rights was adopted in a resoluti on from 2004 (SC Res. 1565 2004 ). MONUC tasks are to assist the Transitional Government in the promotion and protection of human rights, with particular attention to woman, childre n and vulnerable persons. In addition the importance of the protection of children in armed c onflict is found in resolution 1379 (2001) The importance of including a gender perspective was also adopted specifically for MONUC (SC Res. 1493, 2003). It call ed for MONUC to be actively involved in this issue as well as the need to address the violence against women and children. Resolution 1493 from 2003 did thus no t only authorize the use of force under a Chapter VII mandate. It also called for a number of pe ace building efforts in order to facilitate the process of democracy. The Security Council took the position that enforcement cannot take place without simultaneously putting efforts into promoting such issues such as democracy and human rights Peace buil ding and enforcement have become dependent on each other. Peace Building in the Field Initially, t he rhetoric of many mandate s did not translate into action. MONUC faced serious p roblems deploying to Kisangani and Kindu, in eastern DRC. Many combatants ha d not repatriated and many of the countries with foreign forces stat ioned in the country ha d not withdraw n their support. Uganda who had withdrawn from the DRC, announced its intention to send troops back into the north eastern part of the country. With o nly 5.537 UN pea cekeepers deployed, the task seemed overwhelming. At the end of 2002, MONUCÂ’s staff was increased to approximately 8,000. Considering the number of armed combatants, this number was not sufficient.
66 The signing of the Final Act in April 2003 signaled a new commitment to the peace process. A transition period of two years was agreed upon that would culminate in democratic national elections. The transitional government was in place by June 2003, which allowed MONUC to rejuvenate its efforts to peace building. In a keynote address, UN Special Representative to the DRC, Ambassador William Lacy Swing, stated that the peace process had arrived at what he termed Â“the Kinshasa PhaseÂ”, where the Transitional Government was expected to lead the process of peace building in the entire country (Swing 2003 ). The fact that the Security Council also adopt ed a strong Chapter VII mandate during this time facilitated the efforts of building peace. In effect, MONUC was again expanded to a force level of almost 1 1,000. MONUCÂ’s role in securing Peace and Security is still challenged by the continuing violence in the east. For example, Rwanda has insisted that Rwandan armed groups be disarmed but U.N. officials have reported a pattern of non cooperation by Rwanda n and RCD G oma soldiers over disarmament efforts over a period of years. However, MONUC has managed to coordinate the disarmament of many soldiers. The Security Co uncil strengthened the MONUC mandate in October 2004, authorizing the MONUC to use of all nec essary means to carry out the disarmament (SC Res. 1565). More than 12,000 armed soldiers have been forced to join disarmament programs, leaving less than 2,000 at large (The Economist, June 9, 2005). In the area of improving human conditions f or sustaina ble peace, MONUC has not undertaken any significant programs It does, however, have the largest Child Protection Section in any peacekeeping mission, with staff based in the regions as well as in the missionÂ’s HQ. But the number of staff is quite small. T hroughout the country there
67 are only 22 people deployed. In the area of HIV/AIDS MONUC collaborates with other UN agencies and non governmental organizations. MONUCÂ’s HIV/AIDS Office has no funds or budget to provide financial support to awareness buildin g projects in the country. In response to the reso lution on women and children, a Gender Unit was set up to integrate a gender perspective within MONUC It also work s with the Congolese population to bring the conflictÂ’s effect on women to the attention of decision makers. MONUC is engaged in various activities to increase the awareness of gender such as capacity building for women leaders, advocacy, monitoring and evaluation of womenÂ’s participation in the peace and tran sition process (SC Press Release 790 8, 2003 ). The peace building efforts embarked upon by MONUC were se verely undermined last year. In a report, the UN wrote of sexual abuse by its employees in the DRC. The investigation entailed about 150 allegations of sexual abuse by UN civilian staff and soldiers in the Congo. It found that the worst of the cases included pedophilia, prostitution and rape of war refugees, includi ng both women and children. One case included a UN soldier who had raped a girl under gunpoint (Colum Lynch 2004)
68 Ch apter 6 MONUC and ONUC A Comparative Analysis The two peace operations in Congo took place during two completely different ti me periods. The Cold War and its global influence certainly affec ted ONUC. However, the personal decision making style of the lea ders was a huge factor in determining the course of the crisis (Namikas 2002 ). The interpretation of the mandates by the Secretary General had a big impact on how ONUC operated in the field. In effect, ONUCÂ’s actions sometimes resembled the tasks the curre nt peace operation although much also differs. These similariti es and differences are accounted for below. Peacekeeping A clear mandate is one of many elements of a successful peacekeeping mission (Durch 1993, 345). ONUC did not enjoy clear mandates throug hout its peacekeeping mission. The resolutions were colored by each governments own interest in the Congo. The Soviet Union wanted a socialist revolution in Central Africa while the West wanted to curb chaos that could lead the adoption of Communism (Lefev er 1968 4 ). The Security Council was also slow in calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops and addressing the secession of Katanga, although these two issues were central to the conflict. In contrast, MON UC has been endowed with more lucid mandates. The Security Council made it clear not to intervene until a ceasefire had been signed. However, that is not to say much criticism was mounted during this initial face of MONUC. Many viewed
69 the situation as call ing for a more forceful mandate since there w as no peace to keep. Few of the signatories paid much attention to the Lusaka peace accord. When the Security Council adopted a Chapter VII mandate, no such forces were deployed since the eastern part of the country was not ad equately secured. It took two years before any troops were deployed in the east, even though it was at the center of the conflict. The two peacekeeping operations resemble one another more in how they operated in the field. Both ONUC and MONUC were deployed to monitor the withdrawal of fo reign troops. However, the warring factions had no intention of leaving B o th missions also operated in a failed state. ONUC had a t the time to central government to cooperate with. The ANC was also in disarray making the upholding of law and order al most impossible. Similarly, MONUC was deployed when Laurent Kabila was president. The combined looting by him and the previous president, Mobuto, had put the DRC into the category of a failed state. Both peacekeeping missions had no authorization to use fo rce. They were merely deployed to monitor and observe the withdrawal of foreign troops and in MONUCÂ’s case, also to monitor the ceasefire. It was not until the assassination of Lumumba and Laurent Kabila respectively that peace seemed to have a chance. Sho rtly after LumumbaÂ’s death, the Security Council adopted a more forceful resolution. In MONUCÂ’s case, the death of J os e p h Kabila initially led to hopes that peace could be attained.
70 Peace E nforcement MONUC is in its third year und er a Chapter VII mandat e. ONU C never received such a forceful authorization. The Security Council was careful in adopting such a mandate f or ONUC. Initially, when the use of force was authorized, HammarskjldÂ’s interpretation of the mandate excluded any such measures. He adhered to the strict policy of non intervention. He was determined the mandate adopted in February 1961 did not mean to wage war in Katanga His view was it only authorized ONUC to expel all foreign military and para military personnel (Urquhar t 1972, 555). At the time of the adop tion of the November resolution, the situation had changed dramatically. Hammarskjld had been replaced by U. Thant. The unity of the central government was threatened as its forces waged its own military campaign in Katanga. In additio n, ONUC had failed in its military operations to end the secession in Katanga. The November resolution differed from any other mandate in that it authorized the Secretary General to use force to end the secession (Abi Saab 1978, 164). In effect, there was no other interpretation available than to use force. Again, unclear and arbitrary mandates guided ONUC in its enforcement efforts. It took the peace mission over two years to finally end the secession of Katanga and settle the conflict. While MONUC has be en authorized with clearer mandates, it took a long time before enforcement was implemented in the field. Once a military force was deployed in the east, it was not enough to end the violence. There are still warring factions operating in the Ituri region and they seem adamant not to put down their arms. It is still uncertain whether MONUC will be able to bring peace to the region.
71 Peace Building There was no mandate that specifically authorized ONUC to undertake any peace building efforts. This was not th e goal of the peace mission. The focus was to prevent the escalation of the conflict. As such, any democratization process was not included. MONUC, on the other hand, embarks upon a process that specifically includes democratization that can survive once t he peace operation comes to an end. This can be seen in both its mandates and how they are implemented in the field. It is a peace mission typical of the post cold war era. However, as demonstrated, ONUC undertook activities that were unprecedented making it an atypical peace missi on at the time. It contained elements of todayÂ’s peace building missions such as efforts to build strong institutions and enhancing the education system. The Secretary General launched these pioneering programs since he anticipate d Congo would have difficulties in coping with its decolonization efforts. Hammarskjld set up the mission including both a military and civilian comp onent since he viewed them both as crucial in trying to deal with the acute situation. As such, it resembl es many current peace operations; the civilian components are just as important as the military. However, although there were elements of todayÂ’ s peace building efforts, they cannot be considered as broad as MONUCÂ’s undertaking s Important issues such as t he inclusion of gender in the current peace process are found in both the mandates and the activities in the field. Furthermore, reintegrating ex combatants are crucial for a longstanding peace. MONUCÂ’s support of the transitional government which will hop efully lead to free and fair elections is central to the mission. The very goal is to leave the DRC as a democracy.
72 Chapter 7 CONCLUSION S The first peace operation in Congo lacked strong and clear ma ndates. The circumstances surrounding the conflict and the interpretation of the mandates would steer the mission into unknown territory. ONUC initially operated as a peacekeeping mission t ypical of the Cold War. As the situation deteriorated the Security Council finally adopted a strong mandate although Cha pter VII was never invoked. The peace operation finally ended the secession of Katanga and did prevent the outbreak of a civil war, but only with the use of force. The mandate was thus fulfilled. This achievement came at a high cost as all pretenses of the UN remaining neutral had to be abandoned. In contrast to ONUC, t he current peace operation acts under much clearer mandates. Initially it was also set up as a regular peacekee ping operation. As violence in the eastern part of the country escalated, the S ecurity Council adopted a Chapter VII mandate. The international organization made it clear M ONUC must enforce peace. In contrast to ONUC, the current peace mission has not been forced to operate under any interpretations of mandates. In the area of peace building, ONUC took on efforts that were unprecedented. Never before had the UN embarked on such a large scale effort to build strong institutions. However, there were no mandates supporting these activities and again the recommendations of the Secretary General served as the guiding hand. In stark contrast to the current peace mission, ONUC never had the goal to develop a strong democracy.
73 Shortly after the departure of ONUC, the country fell into the hands of Mobuto who never tried to democratize the Con go. The UNÂ’s current mission in the DRC has as its goal to leave the country as a democracy. Its support of large scale programs such as supporting the democratic process and the transitional government reflects this view They are also involved in micro level programs such as providing information on the importa nce of gender in the democratic process. In both its mandates and activities MONUC is taking on a peace building role quite typical of this era. These activities are closed linked to its enforcemen t capacity as building a long term peace cannot be sustained as violence is still occurring in the eastern part of the country. Whether the mission will succeed in attaining its goals remains to be seen. Hopefully the UN will leave the DRC in a better stat e than it did in the 1960Â’s. Naturally, the responsibility does not only lie in the hands of the international organization but also on the Congolese themselves. The high turn out in the referendum supports the notion that democracy may be instated in the country after such a long time of suppression.
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