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Stevens, Phillip W.
Considering security in Florida's transportation project development process
h [electronic resource] /
by Phillip W. Stevens.
[Tampa, Fla] :
b University of South Florida,
ABSTRACT: The transportation decision-making process takes on different forms in different states. The purpose of this study was to include and move considerations for national, state, and local security needs into the transportation project development arenas with a focus on Florida. A thorough and updated literature review was completed to determine the current state of the industry regarding incorporating security considerations into the transportation planning process. A review of current Federal, State, and Local laws and regulations concerning planning requirements was conducted to outline planning parameters and limitations. An information request letter was mailed to the key planning staff members for all 50 states in the United States, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico and other key stakeholders. An online survey was conducted to determine public opinion about transportation security. As a result of these efforts, a modified PD&E process was developed, key findings were identified, future research needs were defined, and an outline of next steps was developed.
Dissertation (Ph.D.)--University of South Florida, 2006.
Includes bibliographical references.
Text (Electronic dissertation) in PDF format.
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Title from PDF of title page.
Document formatted into pages; contains 207 pages.
Adviser: Ram Pendyala, Ph.D.
x Civil Engineering
t USF Electronic Theses and Dissertations.
Considering Security in FloridaÂ’s Transportation Project Development Process by Phillip W. Stevens, P.E., AICP A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement s for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Civil Engineering Department of Civil Engineering College of Engineering University of South Florida Major Professor: Ram Pendyala, Ph.D. Jian Â“JohnÂ” Lu, Ph.D. Edward Mierzejewski, Ph.D. Steven Polzin, Ph.D. Stuart Silverman, Ph.D. Date of Approval: March 31, 2006 Keywords: planning, alter natives, PD&E, NEPA, screening Copyright 2006, Phillip W. Stevens, P.E., AICP
Dedication This research effort and this degree are dedicated to my family. It is dedicated to the sacrifice of time and a ttention that they have made to allow this success. It is dedicated to my wife Lisa who has gone for periods of time without her husband and to my children L auren, Andrew, Alex, Jared, and Ryan who have gone for periods of time without their father. It is dedicated to my mother Charlene who always made me Â“finish the gameÂ” no matter how much I wanted to quit.
Acknowledgements This research effort is the culminati on of 14 years of effort in pursuit of knowledge. It would not have been pos sible without the support of many people and agencies over the ye ars. The faculty and staff of the University of South Florida have continuously s upported this effort and through their professionalism and love of education, made this accomplishment possible. Special recognition is given to Dr Frank Young for mentorship during undergraduate studies, Dr. An ita Callahan, P.E. for mentorship during the pursuit of a MasterÂ’s D egree, and Dr. Ram Pendyal a, E.I. for guidance and mentorship during pursuit of this Do ctorate Degree. These individuals have sacrificed their own time and energy to ensure the success of this effort. Recognition is given to Dr. Jian Â“JohnÂ” Lu, P.E., Dr. Edward Mierzejewski, P.E., Dr. Steven Polzin, P.E., and Dr. St uart Silverman for their participation, expert guidance, and commitment to make this effort succeed. This effort has been supported by my employers including the Florida Department of Transportation, Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade and Douglas, Inc., AIM Engineering & Surveying, Inc., and MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc. These companies have both encouraged and supported continuing education through their polic ies and practices. Without their support, this endeavor would not have been possible.
i Table Of Contents List Of Tables.......................................................................................................v List Of Fi gures......................................................................................................vi Abstract ..............................................................................................................viii Chapter 1 Introduction And Appr oach..................................................................1 1.1 Problem St atement.........................................................................1 1.2 Purpose And Ob jectives..................................................................2 1.3 Value Of Re search..........................................................................2 1.4 Signific ance.....................................................................................3 1.5 Scope Of St udy...............................................................................4 1.5.1 Content Limi tations..............................................................4 1.5.2 Spatial Limi tations...............................................................4 1.5.3 Temporal Li mitations...........................................................4 1.5.4 Contextual Li mitations.........................................................5 1.6 Consumers Of Research.................................................................5 1.7 Methodolog y...................................................................................6 1.7.1 Data Inst rument...................................................................9 1.8 Study Organi zation ........................................................................12
ii Chapter 2 Litera ture Re view...............................................................................15 2.1 Emerging Transportation Security Issues.....................................16 2.2 General Planning Needs...............................................................23 2.3 Modal Integr ation..........................................................................26 2.4 Mode Attracti veness ......................................................................28 2.5 System R edundancy .....................................................................29 2.6 Application Of Technol ogy............................................................30 2.7 Cost And Funding Priori ties..........................................................38 2.8 System Perf ormanc e.....................................................................43 2.9 System Inte rdependenc y..............................................................44 2.10 Land Use Intera ction.....................................................................48 2.11 Risk Assess ment...........................................................................49 2.12 Public Partic ipatio n........................................................................52 2.13 Information Av ailabili ty..................................................................53 2.14 Planning Levels: Feder al, State, Local .........................................54 2.15 Organizational Structure...............................................................59 2.16 Legal Consider ations ....................................................................60 2.17 Facility Design ...............................................................................62 Chapter 3 Framework Fo r Security Planning ......................................................63 3.1 FloridaÂ’s Existing Project Development Pr ocesses.......................65 3.1.1 Existing Initiali zation P hase...............................................69 3.1.2 Existing Data Colle ction P hase..........................................73
iii 3.1.3 Existing Analysi s Phase.....................................................76 3.1.4 Existing Finalizat ion Phas e................................................83 3.1.5 Existing Informati onal Phas e.............................................86 3.1.6 Existing Public Involvem ent Consider ations......................87 Chapter 4 Survey Resu lts And A nalysis .............................................................89 4.1 State Reques t Letter.....................................................................89 4.1.1 State Request Lette r Respon ses.......................................90 4.1.2 Request Letter Analysi s.....................................................93 4.2 Online Ques tionnaire ....................................................................95 Chapter 5 Revised Project Development Process..............................................96 5.1 Revised Initializ ation P hase..........................................................98 5.2 Revised Data Colle ction Phas e...................................................104 5.3 Revised Analysi s Phase..............................................................106 5.4 Revised Finalizat ion Phas e.........................................................117 5.5 Revised Informati onal Phas e......................................................118 5.6 Revised Public Involvem ent Consider ations...............................119 Chapter 6 Findings A nd Next St eps.................................................................122 6.1 Key Findin gs...............................................................................122 6.1.1 Security Evaluatio n Criter ia.............................................123 6.1.2 Agency Review In volvement ............................................123 6.1.3 Revision/Clarification Of P ublic Involv ement...................124
iv 6.2 Next St eps..................................................................................125 6.2.1 Validatio n.........................................................................125 6.2.2 Implementat ion................................................................127 6.2.3 Future Research Needs...................................................129 6.2.4 Local Partici pation...........................................................129 6.2.5 National Applicabilit y Of Resear ch..................................131 Referenc es.......................................................................................................133 Bibliogra phy......................................................................................................143 Appendice s.......................................................................................................149 Appendix A: Acronyms ..........................................................................150 Appendix B: List Of Stat e Security C ontacts.........................................156 Appendix C: R equest Lette r..................................................................164 Appendix D: State Responses To Inquiry Letter...................................167 Appendix E: Key Trans portation Legisl ation.........................................175 Appendix F: Transportation Planni ng And Security Agencies ...............185 About The Aut hor...................................................................................E nd Page
v List Of Tables Table 1-1 Research Beneficia ries.........................................................................5 Table 2-1 Vulnerability Assessment Sc enarios...................................................21 Table 2-2 FBI Fundi ng For FY 2005....................................................................43 Table 2-3 Transit Risk Lev els.............................................................................51 Table 2-4 Location Of Attacks On Pub lic Transportati on Systems.....................58 Table 3-1 COA Im pact Fact ors...........................................................................76 Table 3-2 Standard PD&E Ev aluation Cr iteria....................................................79 Table 3-3 Suggested DEIS And FEIS Re viewers...............................................85 Table 4-1 Request Le tter Res ponses .................................................................90 Table 5-1 Recommended Securi ty Agency Revi ewers.....................................107 Table 5-2 Security Ev aluation Crit eria..............................................................112 Table 6-1 Minimum Da ta Collect ion..................................................................131 Table A-1 List Of AcronymsÂ…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…150 Table B-1 List Of State Security ContactsÂ…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…Â…...Â…Â….Â…Â…....156
vi List Of Figures Figure 2-1 Typical Pr oject Proc ess.....................................................................62 Figure 3-1 Safety Legisl ation/Regu lations ..........................................................64 Figure 3-2 Key Transportat ion Planning Agencies.............................................65 Figure 3-3 FloridaÂ’s Existing Pr oject Development Process...............................68 Figure 3-4 Decision Process for AN Process Ap plicabilit y..................................70 Figure 3-5 Advance Noti fication Fact Sheet .......................................................71 Figure 3-6 Class of Ac tion Form Â– Page 3 ..........................................................75 Figure 3-7 COA Di scussion Ite ms......................................................................77 Figure 3-8 Corridor Pres ervation Pr ocedure .......................................................78 Figure 3-9 Evaluation Matrix Cr iteria..................................................................83 Figure 4-1 State Reques t Letter Re sponse........................................................94 Figure 4-2 Online Questi onnaire Observ ations ...................................................95 Figure 5-1 Revised Project Development Process.............................................97 Figure 5-2 Project Type Ex clusion Modi ficati on..................................................98 Figure 5-3 AN Response S ystem Modifi cation...................................................99 Figure 5-4 AN Fact Sh eet Modifica tion.............................................................100 Figure 5-5 Modifi ed AN Fo rm...........................................................................100 Figure 5-6 Graphical Exhi bit Modifica tion.........................................................101
vii Figure 5-7 LAP Program Modifica tion...............................................................102 Figure 5-8 Private Devel opment Modifi cation...................................................103 Figure 5-9 Local Comprehensiv e Planning Modifi cation...................................104 Figure 5-10 COA Form Modifica tion.................................................................105 Figure 5-11 Modifi ed COA Fo rm.......................................................................105 Figure 5-12 Corridor Anal ysis Modifica tion.......................................................106 Figure 5-13 ETDM Modificati on........................................................................107 Figure 5-14 ETAT Member ship Modifi cation....................................................108 Figure 5-15 GIS Layer Modifica tion..................................................................109 Figure 5-16 Evaluation Ma trix Modifi cation .......................................................110 Figure 5-17 Evaluation Fa ctors Modifi cation....................................................111 Figure 5-18 Environmental Docum ent Review Modi fication .............................117 Figure 5-19 Security Docum entation Modifi cation............................................118 Figure 5-20 Final Distri bution Modifi cation .......................................................119 Figure 5-21 Public Involv ement Modifi cation....................................................120 Figure 5-22 Information Disse mination Modifi cation .........................................121
viii Considering Security in FloridaÂ’s Transportation Project Development Process Phillip W. Stevens, P.E., AICP ABSTRACT The transportation decision-making pr ocess takes on different forms in different states. The purpose of th is study was to include and move considerations for national, state, and loca l security needs into the transportation project development arenas with a focu s on Florida. A thorough and updated literature review was completed to dete rmine the current stat e of the industry regarding incorporating secu rity considerations into the transportation planning process. A review of current Federal State, and Local la ws and regulations concerning planning requirements was c onducted to outline planning parameters and limitations. An information request lette r was mailed to the key planning staff members for all 50 states in the United States, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico and other key stakeholders. An online survey was conducted to determine public opinion about transportation security. As a result of these efforts, a modified PD&E pr ocess was developed, key findings were identified, future research needs were defined, and an outline of next steps was developed.
1 Chapter 1 Introduction And Approach 1.1 Problem Statement Federal Code defines terro rism as Â“Terrorism includes the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian popul ation, or any segment t hereof, in furtherance of political or social objecti ves.Â” (Code of Federal Regulat ions, Title 28, Volume 1, Section 0.85, July 1, 2004). United States Code defines security as Â“Protection from terrorist threats or actions due to acts of extreme violence resulting in significant loss of life, injury, and/or damage or destructi on of facilities and infrastructure, whether or not these acts ar e intended to further political or social objectives.Â” (United States Code, Title 18, Part 1, Chapter 113B, Section 2331(5), January 7, 2003). The transportation decision-making pr ocess takes on different forms in different states. There are clear federal guidelines that motivate and facilitate these processes. However, these guide lines lack provisions for security considerations in the trans portation planning and decision-making processes. As with other issues, such as landscaping and Intelligent Transportation Systems
2 (ITS), that have historic ally migrated through the pr oject cycle backwards, there is a high potential for security considerat ions to take the same path. This path would involve beginning in a retrofit, operations, and/or maintenance phase and proceeding backwards through asset ac quisition, design, programming, and finally residing in the planning process. 1.2 Purpose And Objectives The purpose of this study was to include and move considerations for national, state, and local security needs into the transportation planning arena, specifically into FloridaÂ’s Project Develo pment Process. They currently exist in the operational phases of proj ects but are not involved in early project phases. This study accomplished this through the development of a se t of guidelines for planners and decision-makers to use when developing and screening reasonable and feasible projects and alternatives and when implementing their planning and work programs. 1.3 Value Of Research Specific benefits of t hese guidelines include: Established a methodology for co mparing alternatives regarding transportation security.
3 Can justify management decisions for altering programming, budgeting, and staffing assignments that may di ffer from previous norms. Encouraged identification of technica l and research needs in transportation security planning. Increased efficiency and effectiveness of transportation decision-making by educating decision-makers on potential fatal flaws. Allowed for the information to be used in other similar situations, such as natural disasters. 1.4 Significance This study can be used to provide specific recommendations for inclusion of security considerations into the tr ansportation planning process that would have an immediate utilit y at various levels (i.e., federal, state, local) throughout Florida. This study can facilitate plann ing efforts between these levels and result in an additional screeni ng tool that can be used to evaluate potential transportation projects and more accurately assess the benefits and costs of those alternatives. This study can also be used as instructional material for training those decision-makers on security sensitivity in the planning and project development phases.
4 1.5 Scope Of Study 1.5.1 Content Limitations The content of this study was limit ed to that material that could be researched, documented, printed, r eproduced, presented in any form, and discussed without violating any federal, st ate, or local laws, including those policies and procedures relating to issues of security. 1.5.2 Spatial Limitations This study examined the transportation project development process as it exists in the State of Florida. Ev en though some discussion concerning the methodologies and status of decision-making initiatives of other states occurred, this study focused on Florida. 1.5.3 Temporal Limitations The topic of this study is rapidl y developing. The most current and available information was used during the life of this study. However, due to the significance of this topic in the projec t development process, and the current cultural sensitivities that may exist regar ding the topic of security, this topic will continue to develop for several years.
5 1.5.4 Contextua l Limitations The application of the guidelines estab lished during this st udy will primarily apply to the current transportation project development process in Florida. It can be expected that certain elements of the guidelines will be un iversally applicable but other elements will only appl y to the conditions within Fl orida. In addition, the research was limited to those issues t hat are not currently developed within the industry. 1.6 Consumers Of Research This effort will prove beneficial to a large number of consumers (Table 1-1). Table 1-1 Research Beneficiaries 1. Federal, state, and local policy makers 2. Key project staff involv ed in Project Development & Environment (PD&E) studies or other similar National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) studies 3. Staff involved in work program development and maintenance 4. Designated safety staff at all levels 5. Designated security staff at all levels 6. Transportation planners 7. Transportation consultants 8. Transportation system managers 9. Elected officials and appointees 10. Metropolitan Planning Organiza tions (MPOÂ’s) and their staff
6 1.7 Methodology The development of transportation pl anning strategies that include enhanced security considerations requires tremendous commitment to developing models for implementation over t he long term. Specifically, there is considerable evidence to suggest that many transportation planning processes are weak and are ill-prepar ed to manage the needs of todayÂ’s users without extensive modifications to processes a nd procedures. Unfortunately, with the continuous threats of violence, terrorism and other criminal behaviors in the United States, transportation systems hav e become increasingl y vulnerable to these challenges. As a result, effectiv e strategies must be developed that will accommodate the needs of users around the country. For the purposes of this chapter, Florida transportation planning sys tems will serve as the primary focus of this research study, with an emphasis placed upon the ability to develop effective security methods and processe s that will lead to safer routes. The methodology for the proposed research study will employ a qualit ative method of research, as this will require extensive attention to the qualit y of the processes currently in place, which will lead to new conclusions regardi ng the development of new and enhanced programs that will promote security at an even greater level.
7 Any research study involving trans portation planning processes requires that there must be a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of existing strategies in order to ident ify areas that require impr ovements, as well as the direction in which these processes sh ould lead in the future. There is considerable evidence throughout transpor tation planning to suggest that the quality of these strategies and their c ohesiveness with existing transportation channels is a key indicator of their likelih ood of success or failure. For example, if a program exists that does not provi de effective measures for promoting and enhancing security, then it is very likely that transportation security planning is doomed for failure in one way or another. Therefore, strategic measures must be taken that will enable transportation plan ners to develop processes that are designed to fill the voids of current processes, emphasizing security-enhancing measures that are seriously lack ing in many moder n systems. The level of security that is prov ided by a transportation system is perhaps the key measurement that trans portation planners must cons ider in today's world. Since there are many thr eats to the livelihood and int egrity of transportation systems, there is an impor tant lesson to be learned with regards to the development of security measures t hat will offer passengers the best possible sense of comfort and ease in their travels. Regardless of the location across the United States, transportation planning has become a tricky and complex
8 phenomenon, whereby there ar e considerable challenges for planners in the areas of strategic development and securi ty administration. Despite government and local influence, there ar e a number of challenges with respect to modifying systems to accommodate changing needs, and t herefore, it is cr itical that the appropriate methods are utiliz ed in order to accomplis h the desired tasks. The proposed research study will define t he overall effectiveness of a multidimensional transportation planning system in promot ing a greater understanding of the needs of communities and leaders, as well as to address major security issues and complications that might ensue during planning and implementation. The following efforts were co mpleted to determine the current transportation planning practice, possibl e arenas to incorporate security considerations, possible methodologies to incorporate security considerations, and effectiveness of those methodologies to properly consider security in the planning process: A thorough and updated literature review to determine the curr ent state of the industry regarding incorporating security considerations into the transportation planning process. A review of current Federal, State, and Local laws and regulations concerning planning requirements was conducted to outline planning parameters and limitations.
9 An information request letter was mail ed to the key planning staff members for all 50 states in the United States, t he District of Columbia and Puerto Rico and other key stakeholder in Florida. The responses received were then used to assess the current condition and/or need for this study in the planning practices currently underway in their respective states. The responses were also used to determine staging scenario s involving deploym ent nationwide. An online questionnaire (http:// home.earthlink.net/~securityplanning/ ) was developed and administer ed to obtain general perceptions about the transportation planning process and secu rity concerns. The survey was distributed, via email notific ation, in January of 2006 to about 500 recipients, all of whom reside in Florida. The recipients were comprised of planners, engineers, and private citizens. The responses were used to determine perceived needs in the transpor tation planning process, as related to security considerations. Interviews were conducted with lead ing transportation officials and private security experts to develop initial guidelines and to determine effectiveness and utility of proposed modification s to the existing process. 1.7.1 Data Instrument For the purposes of this study, a questionnaire provided the most interesting prospects for feedback and real-time data for consideration. The
10 questionnaire addressed various aspects of transportation planning at various stages of commitment, incorporating the necessity to implement enhanced security measures that will provide add itional protection against a variety of events that could potentially lead to harm or damage to system infrastructures. The questionnaire involved questions t hat required a simple yes or no response. Responses varied depending upon their role in the process and their assessment of current conditions. T he questionnaire instrument required a specific method of implement ation in order to obtain a wide variety of responses and important results for consideration. For the purposes of this study, it was estimated that an online ques tionnaire would offer the most effective means of gathering data and obtaining a wide variet y of responses from participants all over the State of Florida. The advantages of this method included the following: 1. These types of surveys are relatively inexpensive; 2. Limited personal information wa s required for dissemination to participants; and 3. Online questionnaires enabled participants to have more time than in other strategies, where t here may be specific time constraints in place. Since the questionnaires required so me thought and consideration of a number of transportation-related issues, t he researcher provided ample time for
11 completion and submission of these surveys. The res earch study required that these questionnaires discuss a number of issues relative to transportation planning, strategic development, as we ll as current and future needs. The questionnaires made available to partici pants were identical in nature, and therefore, all questions were simple ye t specific enough to provide sufficient detailed information for examination and eval uation. Since the target participant population was educated and possessed an ac ceptable level of intelligence, these questionnaires did not present too many challenges in term s of completion. Each questionnaire cont ained questions that could be divided into three sections, with a section emphasizing each of the following primary issues: 1. Security; 2. Perceptions of Trans portation Planning; and 3. Federal, State, and Loc al support strategies The questionnaire was developed as a 30-item scale, with questions related to each designated section. Part icipants were required to complete all questions in order to have their respons es counted as valid in the evaluation process. Each questionnaire was brief, with a short explanation at the beginning of the online form to discuss the specifics of the submission process. Emails were sent to various State and Local ag encies throughout the state with links to the questionnaire site, as well as a disclaime r regarding the confidentiality of this
12 information. No names or other personal information were used in the study with the exception of the individualÂ’s affiliation or relationship to transportation planning, and these records wil l remain confidential at all times. It was critical that each participant was notified of confidentiality, since there were concerns regarding the content of the questionnaire or liability or perceived endorsement related to their answers. The protecti on of each participant's identity was of primary concern for the researcher, and th erefore, great lengths were taken to promote confidentialit y at all times throughout the process. 1.8 Study Organization This study is organized as follows: Chapter 1 Introduction and Approach: This chapter includes a discussion of the problem statement, val ue and significance of re search, study limitations, and methodology. Chapter 2 Literature Review: This chapter documents the state of practice as determined by a thorough literature review. Chapter 3 Framework for Security Planning: This chapter outlines the legislative and regulatory in struments involved in security planning along with agencies involved in the process and the current project development process.
13 Chapter 4 Â– Survey Results: This chapter includes anal ysis and discussion of results obtained from the informati on request letter mailed to the state DepartmentÂ’s of Transportation and analysis and discussion of results obtained from the security planning questionnaire that was administered online. Chapter 5 Revised Projec t Development Process: Th is chapter reflects the new and revised PD&E process that explicitly incorporates security considerations into the process Chapter 6 Conclusions and Recomm endations: This chapter summarizes the study by stating conc lusions about the research and recommendations for improvement to the planning proc ess and recommendations for further research. References: This section contains re ferences to all literature quoted or referenced in this study. Bibliography: This section contains references to all literature that was studied, but not directly used, in this study. Appendix A Â– Acronyms: This appendix defines all acronyms used in the study and report. Appendix B Â– List of State Security Contacts: Th is appendix lists all of the recipients of the initial request letter.
14 Appendix C Â– Sample Request Letter to State Planning Agencies: This appendix presents a sample of the request letter that was sent to all planning agencies as listed in Appendix B. Appendix D Â– State Respons es to Inquiry Letter: This appendix documents all responses from the request letters. Appendix E Â– Key Transpor tation Legislation: Th is appendix contains a description of key transportation legislation and regulations. Appendix F Transportation Planning and Security Agencies: This appendix contains a description of key transpor tation agencies involved in the transportation planning process. About the Author: This secti on gives an overview of the author.
15 Chapter 2 Literature Review There are many challenges involv ed in maintaining an effective and secure transportation system in modern so ciety, and therefore, it is often very difficult to identify resources and strategi es for improving these processes without specific attention to past research and ca se studies regarding the proposed topic. For the purposes of this study, existing research regarding security issues in transportation was evaluated for contributio n to new strategies for improvement in this arena, and specifically, research concerning the State of Florida was particularly advantageous in promoting change and progress. The following discussion will identify and evaluate various resource s from existing literature that provided insights into security and sa fety concerns in modern transportation systems throughout the State. As a part of this study, an in-depth literature review was conducted to determine the state-of-theindustry with regards to transportation security planning. This review in cluded obtainable literature, both written and online, from a variety of sources including governmen t, education, and industry. As a result of that review, several topic areas emer ged. Even though all of these topics are
16 not fully explored as a part of this st udy, they must be considered in the transportation planning process. 2.1 Emerging Transportation Security Issues A report generated by Di llingham (2003) identifies ma ny of the emerging threats to and concerns of modern transportation systems, which have significantly increased since September 11t h. During the identification process, many weaknesses in security have been noted, including flaws in the luggage screening process at airports, easy access to restricted areas at airports, and limitations in air traffic control towers with respect to security measures (Dillingham 2003). With these weaknesses in mind, it is not surprising that the federal government continues to reassess its priorities with respect to homeland security and transportation protection, and substantial measures have been taken to ensure that these problems are resolved and new solutions are implemented on a long-term basis (Dillingham 2003). With respect to mass transit al ternatives, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) established its own se t of security initiatives in order to accommodate the needs of passenger s and these systems as a whole (Dillingham 2003). Furthermore, it has been suggested that funding for transit security initiatives should be allocated fr om a variety of resources as a means of
17 facilitating new strategies for secu rity improvements across these systems (Dillingham 2003). However, the challenges of enhancing security in transportation systems continue to cause concern in federal, state and local agencies, although immediate and long-te rm planning initiatives involving risk assessments have been created (Dillingham 2003). However, there are additional considerations wi th regards to funding such programs, as there is limited funding in place, which is far bel ow the projected estimates required to fund these strategies (Dillingham 2003). Furthermore, it is necessary to consider that human contributions to enhancing transportation planning processes are just as significant as financial considerati ons, as the knowledge and expertise that these contributors bring to the mix are critical to t he long-term development of key strategic initiatives in trans portation planning (D illingham 2003). Nonetheless, transportation security initiati ves are still in their infancy stages, as there are still marked vulner abilities across these channels that are difficult to ignore: Â“Today, we have better intelligence, coordination, and communication; we have plans to aler t the public to threats; and we are all more alert to the possibility of th reats. Yet major vulnerabilities remain, particularly in air cargo, general aviation, mass transit, and port securityÂ…Addressing these vulnerabilities
18 will continue to require risk assessments and plans that balance security concerns against mob ility needs, and that consider how much the nation can afford to s pend for security improvements in light of other, competing demand s for limited fundsÂ” (Dillingham 2003). These challenges continue to provide particularly difficult circumstances for transportation planners, and although the federal gover nment possesses considerable influence in advancing these objectives, they also serve as a limiting factor in inciting change and progr ess, due in large part to the lack of funding for such programs on a widespread basis (Dillingham 2003). It appears that in many instances, lim ited funding opport unities are secured for only larger metropolitan. However, there are many other regions th roughout the United States that also face abundant threats of different types that require the attention and financial resources of the federal gove rnment in order to advance security measures into the coming years. The optimization of resources serv es as a key indicator of advanced initiatives for transportation planning pr ocesses. Berrick (2005) argues that continuous federal funding for transportation security initiatives requires that the President, Congress and the Senate must agree upon the key objectives for promoting advanced security capabilities in all types of transportation systems.
19 However, it should be noted that by integr ating resources from all agencies into one cooperative system is likely to serve as the most feasible alternative in advancing transportation security initiative s to the next level (Berrick 2005). Therefore, the consolidation of efforts from one agency to the next is one of the most effective strategies in developi ng a cohesive effort that will facilitate transportation planning as desired (Be rrick 2005). It is often necessary to reconstruct programs or strategies fr om the ground up in advancing these objectives; however, this strategy requi res extensive time, capital and other resources that might not be readily availa ble for use (Berrick 2005). Therefore, it is possible that integrating new models and strategies one at a time is perhaps the most effective strategy to ensure that transportation pl anning progresses to the next level without falling behind in the process (Berrick 2005). With this in mind, it is important to identify the cr itical steps in advancing transportation planning to the next level, achieving those steps on an individual basis, and then moving on to more advanced initiative s as time and fundi ng permit (Berrick 2005). Transportation planners must assume responsibility for their actions and must affirm their commitment to thes e strategies as a primary means of advancing transportation to a new level, one that will provid e the best possible outcomes for the end users (Berrick 2005).
20 Because of changes in our security st ate resulting from increased terrorist activity, it is absolutely imperative that the transportation planning process more thoroughly consider security implic ations when planning, screening, and selecting projects. The Na tional Research Council (1999) identified scenarios (Table 2-1) that would be considered in the United States Department of Transportation Vulnerability Assessment. Even though these possibilities have been published since 1999, little has been done to accommodate these concerns into the transportation planning process. These issues have found refuge in the o perations, maintenance, and emergency response arenas. It is necessary to bring these issues forward into the early planning processes in order to better control the possibilities.
21 Table 2-1 Vulnerability Assessment Scenarios 1. Car bomb at bridge approach 2. Series of small explosives on highway bridge 3. Single small explosive on highway bridge 4. Single small explosive in highway tunnel 5. Car bomb in highway tunnel 6. Series of car bombs on adjacent bridges or tunnels 7. Bomb detonated at pipeline compressor stations 8. Bomb detonated at pi peline storage facility 9. Bomb detonated on pipeline segment 10. Simultaneous attacks on ports 11. Bombing of waterfront pavilion 12. Container vessel fire at marine terminal 13. Ramming of railroad bridge by maritime vessel 14. Attack on passenger vessel in port 15. Shooting in rail station 16. Vehicle bomb adjac ent to rail station 17. Bombing of airport transit station 18. Bombing of underwater transit tunnel 19. Bus bombing 20. Deliberate blocking of hi ghway rail grade crossing 21. Bombing of rail tunnel 22. Bomb detonated on train in rail station 23. Vandalism of track st ructure and signal system 24. Bombing of rail bridge 25. Explosives attack on multiple rail bridges 26. Explosive in cargo of passenger aircraft 27. Biological release in multiple subway stations 28. Anthrax release from freight ship 29. Anthrax release in transit station 30. Anthrax release on passenger train 31. Sarin release in multiple subway stations 32. Physical attack on railcar carrying toxics 33. Cyber attack on highway traffic control system 34. Cyber attack on pipeline control system 35. Attack on port power/telecommunications 36. Sabotage of train control system 37. Tampering with rail signals 38. Cyber attack on train control center
22 A literature review on this subject has to-date revealed very little directly concerning the subject matte r. Literature reviewed to date is broken into the following security considerations that will be focal issues during the study. General Planning Needs Modal Integration Mode Attractiveness System Redundancy Application Of Technology Cost And Funding Priorities System Performance System Interdependency Land Use Interaction Risk Assessment Public Participation Information Availability Planning Levels: Federal, State, Local Organizational Structure Legal Considerations Facility Design
23 2.2 General Planning Needs Transportation processes have becom e increasingly complex over the past decade, as issues related to secu rity have increased in importance on a widespread basis across the United States. It is very difficult to develop new strategies for security improvements w hen the appropriate financial resources are unavailable, or if there are political or leadership challenges involved in these processes. It is increasingly difficult to develop processes that incorporate the appropriate level of security measures, especially since ther e are governmental bodies and leaders that ar e unable to secure the pr oper level of support and financial resources to perform such tasks as effectively as requ ired. Therefore, there are considerable c hallenges that are evident in modern transportation systems, as the ability to advance security is not always readily available without modifying these systems dramat ically in scope and premise. It has been recognized by several i ndividuals that there is a need for considering security in the transportati on planning process. Khattak (2002) concurred that there was no substantial literature on transportation security planning prior to the September 11th attacks. Dillingham (2003) recently dealt with the issue of long term challenges to transportation security. He identifies five major challenges. These are:
24 1. developing a comprehensive trans portation risk management approach; 2. ensuring that transportation securi ty funding needs are identified and prioritized and that co sts are controlled; 3. establishing effective coordinati on among the many public and private entities responsible for transportation security; 4. ensuring adequate workforce co mpetence and staffing levels; and 5. Implementing security standards for transportation facilities, workers, and security equipment. A comprehensive planning effort is necessary for each of these five challenges to be met. Flynn (2000) iterat es that there is a need for Â“An ambitious, comprehensive approachÂ” to raise awareness, advance standards, promote partnerships, and get adequat e resources. Flynn also believes that transportation security cannot be treated as a Â“secondary or even tertiary issue.Â” Khattak (2002) reiterates the i dea that the September 11 events have increased the importance of national security Most of the events and incidents shared success because they were largel y unexpected. They exposed Â“gapsÂ” in security planning. The gaps included lack of identification of critical assets and security concerns in the transport ation system, planning and preparation by
25 governments, and erroneous perceptions of security risk by the general population. Dornan and MaierÂ’s white paper (2005) serves as a strong example of a key strategic process involv ed in planning for transport ation security needs on a long-term basis. The authors indicate that in developing any type of wide-range transportation planning strat egy, the following elements must be considered as critical factors in these processes: Provide support for economic development and stability in la rger metropolitan areas, where there is the greatest opportunity to engage in globalization efforts and to prom ote competition; In planning for any type of transporta tion, there must be a long-term safety and security process in place to ensure t hat all users are protected as best as possible; Facilitate new and innovative options for transportation users so that their needs are met, particularly if they are unable to utilize traditional methods; All transportation planning efforts mu st encourage protecting the environment from harm while allowing in dividuals to experience an enhanced quality of life whenever possible; Enable transportation routes to be effi cient at all times, facilitating a greater level of communication and ease in travel for all users;
26 Facilitate the effective management and cohesiveness of all transportation system operations; and to Allow existing forms of transportation to maintain their effectiveness and to encourage their efficiency under any and all circumstances These criteria serve as critical markers in the maintenance of current transportation processes, and they also pr ovide a glimpse into the possibilities that are available to facilitate effective security measures into these processes, without interrupting the flow and progress of these system s as they are currently maintained. 2.3 Modal Integration In determining the best possible course of action regarding security for a given transportation system, it is necessa ry to identify and understand the level of progress that has already been made. There are a number of key issues to consider in developing transportation strat egies that incorporate mode specific security needs into their processes, and a white paper cr eated by Dornan and Maier (2005) addresses such issues in a comprehensive and detailed format. This paper begins with an introduction to the issues that have emerged since the September 11th terrorist attacks, which have created new challenges for transportation experts with regards to systemwide planning and strategic
27 development on a long-term basis, includ ing issues facing general operations and the sustainability of such systems over time (Dornan and Maier 2005). It is advantageous for field experts to begin to manage these chal lenges with an allinclusive examination of current modal processes, many of which may appear outdated and ill-equip ped to accommodate emerging security needs; however, there is a marked lack of understanding between what is perceived as critical and how to promote such issues in moder n systems (Dornan and Maier 2005). With this in mind, it is not surprising that tr ansportation planners cont inue to struggle in their efforts to identify the specific problems of each system and to develop strategies to overcome these problems wi thout lengthy or severe interruptions to current processes, which might caus e even further delays in maintaining adequate systems on a long-term basis (Dor nan and Maier 2005). Nonetheless, these challenges must be faced directly and without fear, as transportation continues to evolve and to require t he expertise and support of a wide body of groups in order to thrive, since indivi duals depend upon transpor tation in order to conduct their lives normally and without se rious disturbance to their routines. Polzin (2002) indicates that intersystem connectivity co uld be impeded by security concerns. The transportation industry has encouraged intermodal connectivity. Florida, along with other states, has been considering a high-speed
28 rail for several years. These initiatives will most likely be a ffected and impaired by the incorporation of security co ncerns into the planning process. Khattak (2002) discusses the need for a comprehensive approach, with security in mind. This compr ehensive approach must include different transportation modes. 2.4 Mode Attractiveness Modal attractiveness, both existing an d influenced, is an important factor for transportation planners. Being able to determi ne the modal split is a fundamental consideration in the transpor tation and traffic modeling systems. It seems logical that if a planning study does not consider transportation alternative to be viable due to concerns associated with the security of that mode then the attractiveness of that mode woul d be artificially altered as a result of that finding. This would most likely be a short term ef fect due to the resilience of modal patrons and the dependency of those users on the systems. However, it could prove annoying and difficult to properly an alyze revenue potenti al of a particular mode and to deal with other long-term planning issues such as infrastructure needs. There should be sensitivity to the ef fects of identifying modes, routes or infrastructure that are more vulnerable to security issues. Polzin (2002) discusses the issue of modal attrac tiveness in light of September 11th. He
29 discusses the impacts that September 11th had on the airline industry and the subsequent shift in mode choice. He al so discusses the possible discrepancies that could occur as a result of mode bas ed security funding differentials. These differentials, or publicly perceived diffe rentials, could great ly influence modal attractiveness. 2.5 System Redundancy It is most important to recognize that in promoting new security measures for implementation in modern transportati on systems, any number of possible scenarios or opportunities for security mi shaps can occur, such as with natural disasters or with threats of terrorism. Transportation plann ing processes have long been ill-equipped to handle these types of threats, which have exposed serious defects in how these systems account for emergencies, regardless of their source (Dornan and Maier 2005). These flaws could potentially lead to fatal errors if they occur, and therefore, it is critical that transportation planning strategists are well-prepared to manage these challenges on a widespread and long-term basis (Dornan and Maier 2005). System redundancy can provide alte rnative transportation modes and routes when available. A traditional uti lity of redundancy is th at of alternatives associated with primary system failure as a result of events, such as crashes, or
30 lack of capacity. The value of r edundancy is clear when observed from the userÂ’s perspective. However, the val ue becomes less apparent or is mitigated when dealing with funding t hese redundant systems. Honea (2000) ventured into the topic of the planning of excess capacity. Excess capacity was recognized as a necessity for the national defense. Ce rtain types of industries, like the rail industry, struggle to redeploy or add c apacity due to the fixed nature of their infrastructure. This occurs even in the presence of relia ble demand forecasts that justify the need for additional capaci ty. Other modes, like containers, deal with a trade imbalance of high import, low expo rt of containers. Therefore, ships are already making trips with empty containe rs. For example, in the port of New York, there is not enough staging area. Excess capacity for redundancy or capacity considerations is extremely difficu lt and costly. New York is not alone in this dilemma. Every port in the eastern United States faces this problem as the public demands greater access to water fr onts. Morgan (2000) believes that the existing surface transportation system has a tremendous amount of redundancy built in as evidenced by the systemÂ’s r apid recovery after natural disasters. 2.6 Application Of Technology Technology presents many tools to be used in th e transportation operation and maintenance processes. Some of t hese tools may have limited utility when planning for security. For example, the use of Intelligent Transportation Systems
31 (ITS) and databases for drivers license processing hold great potential for preventing security events through detecti on of potential terrorists before they have the opportunity to strike. However, the value of those technologies is unclear when dealing with pl anning of infrastructure. The installation and operation of these technologies requires coordination and the utility in the planning phase needs to be completely explored. In the modern world, technology inf iltrates almost each and every aspect of existence in one way or another. In transportation planning, technology is utilized in many different areas, as t here are specific nee ds that are best accommodated through technological means. T herefore, it is not surprising that transportation systems have evolved in rec ent years utilizing a combination of computer-based and other technology-based solutions in orde r to satisfy all desired objectives. A study conduct ed by Siwek and Associates (1999) examines the implementati on of ITS as a means of promoting change and progress within these systems in order to provide a greater level of service for users. In order to satisfy the eve r-changing needs of technol ogy-based solutions in modern transportation systems, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 was es tablished as a means of promoting efficiency and advanced solutions to pr oblems in transportation systems (Siwek and Associates 1999). ITS has evolved over time as a primary method of
32 providing exemplary service to transportation users, and it offe rs a greater level of understanding of the chal lenges of modern transpor tation systems, including but not limited to emergency response (Siw ek and Associates 1999). However, the integration of various technologies into trans portation systems has always been a challenge for leaders and experts in the field, as existing frameworks have often been unequipped to manage t hese challenges without serious interruptions to service (Siwek and A ssociates 1999). Nonet heless, there are considerable advantages to the implementation of thes e technologies, as they provide a greater level of efficiency, increased response times, and financial savings over the long term (Siwek and Associ ates 1999). It is expected that with continuous improvement on st rategies incorporating emerging technologies, these systems, in theory, wil l be prepared for security events, such as terrorist threats or attacks (Siwek and Associates 19 99). In determining the best possible course of action for a given transportation system, it is necessary to conduct the following evaluation: Â“As part of plan development, State or regional goals, objectives and performance measures can be identified to take into account how transportation facilities and services addres s, now and in the future, the social, environmental and economic go als of the State or regi onÂ” (Siwek and Associates 1999). It is not surprising that these obj ectives represent tremendous challenges for many transportation systems, as t heir existing frameworks may not be prepared to identify or to manage such goals. However, they must be ultimately
33 incorporated into existing systems as a means of promoting change, progress, and to enhance existing security meas ures to satisfy users (Siwek and Associates 1999). In general, ITS serves two primary purposes, that of providing information to users so that these system s work more efficiently for their needs, and to provide improvements to general o perations that will ensure long-term efficiencies at the operations level (Siwe k and Associates 1999). Since there are a number of options avail able in the ITS portfolio, decisions regarding these systems must be made with considerations of current processes, the end users, and the entire well being of the system in question (Siwek and Associates 1999). Although ITS serves as a helpful strategy in promoting progress throughout a given transportation system, it is necessary to consider these alternatives as only one component of a larger and more widespread set of strategies for implementation (Siwek and Associates 1999). In other words, ITS could potentially serve as the backbone or driving force of any given system, but it should not be the sole solution, as it is not capable of accommodating all possible system needs (Siwek and Associat es 1999). Therefore, continuous improvement strategies must ultimate ly be considered as one of the key indicators of advanced progress in tr ansportation systems (Siwek and Associates 1999). Other challenges remain that mu st also be evaluat ed and modified when necessary, and these include the following:
34 Developing a greater understanding of IT S and its role with t he cooperation of a variety of public and private agencie s involved in transportation planning; Developing the technical capacity t hat is necessary to accommodate ITS initiatives of all types; Developing the capabilities that are necessary to implement and support ITS on a widespread basis; Evaluating all financial opportunities and limitations, many of which may require the support of members of pr ivate agencies (Siwek and Associates 1999). It is not surprising that many tr ansportation systems require extensive modifications to their existing processe s in order to adapt to ITS, but these objectives may be realized with a concentra ted effort from all involved parties (Siwek and Associates 1999). It is important to identify locations that have successfully implemented ITS strategies into their existing transporta tion systems. For exam ple, Chicago, IL possesses a complex network of associ ations amongst various agencies and other groups that are invo lved in transportation planning and implementation, and these groups have been successful in effectively communicating with each other through an established committee know n as the Metropolitan Area MayorsÂ’ Caucus (Volpe Center 2000). By utilizing this committee to communicate ideas,
35 express concerns, and share challenges, Chicago has been able to satisfy a number of objectives with respect to trans portation systems, and this serves as a strong example of change and the ability to work cohesively towards a common goal (Volpe Center 2000). It is impor tant in developing any transportation planning strategy involving ITS to perform the following: Include stakeholders from local and regi onal groups in order to secure the support of these key players in ITS strategies; Provide knowledge and information to lo cal officials with respect to ITS so that the decision-making process is effectively promot ed and implemented; Initiate project development strategies for future use, all of which depend upon ITS information that is readily available for use; Provide information to the general public regarding IT S, so that all objectives are appropriately communica ted to the end users; Engage in networking strategies that will facilitate shared knowledge and resources; and Develop the appropriate strategies with respect to collecting data for use in ITS implementation (Volpe Center 2000). These objectives serve as import ant indicators of the overall receptiveness of ITS planners, stakehol ders, and general publi c involvement in any projects that may occur (Volpe Center 2000). With these strategies in place,
36 ITS initiatives are likely to be well rece ived by key stakeholders and the general public at large. Another key example of the success of an ITS initiative is Miami, FL, whereby an active committee was formed in order to identify the capabilities and advantages of ITS systems within existing transportation frameworks, and the committee included members of many di fferent organizations, as a means of understanding how these chang es could shape the direct ion of transportation planning in future years (Volpe Center 2000) With the committe e firmly in place, a variety of ITS initiatives have been cons idered across the Stat e of Florida, with specific concentrations in fiber optic c onnectivity and other re lated technologies (Volpe Center 2000). These opportunities have provided some insights into the current gaps in technology and strategy that have been observed, due in part to a prior lack of knowledge and resources for implementation (V olpe Center 2000). However, with respect to these chal lenges, the committee has created new strategies for consideration and possible implementation in future years (Volpe Center 2000). Other considerations for transpor tation planning involving ITS must include the widespread dissemination of knowledge and info rmation regarding these processes to elected leaders and other officials (Volpe Center 2000).
37 According to the text, after this educ ational endeavor had taken place in the Dallas-Fort Worth area, Â“Including both elected officials and technical staff enhanced these discussions and improved communicati ons between the two groups in terms of their expectations from ITS products and services. Operations staff gained a better understanding of the nontechnical concerns of the elected official s, and elected officials better understood the level of effort and timelines associated with deploying ITS projectsÂ” (Volpe Center 2000) These initiatives are particularly import ant in facilitating the change that is necessary in providing the best possible measures for security and related support across all transportati on systems, as they offer the appropriate personnel the knowledge and information that is required to make educated and well informed decisions that are likely to in fluence transportation systems in positive ways (Volpe Center 2000). Furthermore, it should be noted that transportation planning without the implem entation of ITS initiative s will not be successful in providing effective options for end users, w ho serve as the most critical receivers of these systems (Volpe Center 2000). With this in mind, it is critical to continue the education and advanc ement of ITS initiatives for leaders, officials, experts, and even the end users (Volpe Center 2000).
38 2.7 Cost And Funding Priorities Costs associated with security planning can consist of both direct and indirect costs. Direct costs can inclu de design, construction, maintenance, and operation of improvements for both retrofit and new projec ts. Indirect costs can include right-of-way value impacts, cost of additional labor, tourism impacts, investment attractiveness, and delays asso ciated with changing priorities. It is common in current practices to consider these costs when making transportation decisions. These considerations usually take the form of Benefit/Cost analyses. The current practices do not assign quantifiable benefits to a particular security consideration. Therefore, it is not possible to adequately incorporate those considerations into the analyses. Transportation planning strategies serv e as a substantial portion of the United States gross economic product, wit h approximately $1 trillion in spending on an annual basis (Dornan and Ma ier 2005). This figure is highly significant, as it represents a relatively large portion of federal spending for programs, and since transportation infiltrates almost every aspect of daily living, this funding must be expended wisely and without wa ste in order to preserve the integrity of these processes (Dornan and Maier 2005). With th e increased interest in promoting security within these processes, it is not surprising that continuous assessments of transportation planning must take place in order to utilize such allocations as
39 best as possible so that residents are protected and supporte d by their own tax dollars (Dornan and Maier 2005). Howeve r, transportation planning has long been weak in many of these areas, as there have been considerable flaws in how security measures are provided to t he public, their flexibilit y, and their overall long-term sustainability, considering the fina ncial resources that are available for use (Dornan and Maier 2005). There is considerable evidence to suggest that transportation planning strategies require a comple x evaluation of current pr ocesses and routine needs assessments in order to promote c hange and progress regarding security measures. For example, some of t he key required steps include financial forecasting of projected costs r egarding operations and new program implementation; the utilizatio n of existing land versus new land requirements; the feasibility of growth opport unities in existing regions in order to accommodate new users; the ability to ut ilize new and existing capital resources to maximize transportation opportunities; and identify ar eas of weakness and the potential for widespread improvements t hat will best influence tran sportation system users without serious interruptions to daily activities (Dornan and Maier 2005). The development of modified transporta tion planning processes requires extensive funding from a wide variety of sponsors, includi ng federal, state and local agencies. Federal fundi ng is especially critical in developing new security
40 strategies for transportation, and there is a general rule that as spending is incurred upon approval of a given project, costs will be reimbur sed by the federal government for the work that is performed in a given location (The Metropolitan Transportation Planning Process 2004). Ea ch year, Congress is responsible for allocating a specific amount of funding fo r specific projects deemed necessary for the general operations of the U.S. Depar tment of Transportation, with specific spending guidelines for ma ny programs (The Metropo litan Transportation Planning Process 2004). Much of this f unding is required to maintain existing operations within a given loca tion; however, some proj ect-specific funding is usually available for facilitating new pr ograms that may include measures for security and other related issues (The Metropolitan Transportation Planning Process 2004). It is expected that as these needs arise, funding will be requested by states and local government s for specific projects, and that transportation experts, upon notification of funding, will implement their chosen strategies in order to prom ote greater effectiveness in the transportation planning process (The Metropolitan Transportation Planning Process 2004). There are many different aspects of the transportation planning process that require specific attention to securi ty details as well as measures for longterm improvements. With the specific allocations by the federal government provided on an annual basis, it is not su rprising that an ever-increasing amount
41 of funding is being allocat ed for security-specific projects; nonetheless, there are many weaknesses in these plans, due in large part to funding constraints at all levels. Simply put, the amount of funding a llocated for security strategies is still relatively low, which challenges trans portation planners to develop additional cost-effective measures for supporting se curity needs in metropolitan areas and beyond. Funding for transportation projects c an be controlled, in both amount and allocation, by many factors. Unfortunately, security is not one of them. Safety is a very prominent factor in that it can gen erate funds in a very short time frame. For instance, in Florida, if a hurricane causes a high degree of scour on a major bridge that requires replacement of that structure, that project will receive priority funding due the importance of that linkage to the regional interests and the safety concerns associated with leav ing the existing bridge. However, the new bridge may not receive additional funds to enhance its security attributes. Changes to existing systems will not go unchallenged because the addit ion of a single factor will cause competition for limited funds with other projects. Dillingham (2003) addresse s funding and risk management issues. The most critical funding criter ia are identified as ridership level, population, identified vulnerabilities, and criticality of assets. Funds should also use risk-based criteria for fund distribution. Two key funding and accountability challenges will be (1)
42 paying for increased transportation security and (2) ensuring that these costs are controlled. The funding estimates for se curity projects do not come close to matching the project demand. In August 2002, the Congre ss appropriated $93 million to fund security improvements at the nationÂ’s 361 ports in fiscal year 2002, but the Transportation Security Admi nistration (TSA) received applications for as much as $697 million for these impr ovements. This is a differential of $604 million between what is pr ovided and what is needed. Polzin (2002) summarized the resource pressures resulting from security concerns as: Diversion of resources to security needs outside of transportation programs Diversion of funds to operating security enforcem ent, policing, planning, training Diversion of funds to capital investment s in security (i.e. barriers, fencing, inspection) Use of funds to support network redundancy/connectivity Use of funds to support modal choice/redundancy The PresidentÂ’s Fiscal Year 2005 Budget calls for significant increases in the security budget. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has a proposed
43 doubling of funding for counterterrorism and counterintelligence. This equates to 44% of their total budget (Table 2-2). (2004) Table 2-2 FBI Funding For FY2005 Element Budget (US$) Percentage (%) Construction $1,242,0000.02% Forensic $166,615,0003.26% Security $262,083,0005.12% National Security $2,241,114,00043.81% Criminal $1,638,867,00032.04% Cyber Investigations $283,041,0005.53% Technology Investments $522,308,00010.21% TOTAL $5,115,270,000100.00% 2.8 System Performance Polzin (2002) discusses the iss ue of system performance as the Â“most obvious area of impact to transportation.Â” He proposes that security concerns can impact the following performance measures: Cost to user Speed Accessibility Reliability Safety/security
44 Convenience Connectivity The consideration of security in the planning process will mean a redefining of traditional perfo rmance criteria and formulas. 2.9 System Interdependency Currently, most systems are evaluat ed independently when dealing with planning, design, funding, operation, and maintenance c onsiderations. This is partially driven by the condition that systems are funded thro ugh different means that are directly related to the type of system. For example, federal roadway resurfacing dollars are not normally us ed to fund a new bus station along a roadway. The current transportation planni ng process struggles to consider different modes or systems collectivel y or it simply considers them independently. This is not a desirable situation from a se curity planning perspective or from an overall effici ency standpoint. The planning processes should take into consideration the interdependency of these systems in evaluating security issues and in resour ces allocations. Morgan (2000) stated that the Department of Transportati on should implement Research and Development, for security, across transpor tation modes, not separately for each mode.
45 It is strongly suggested that all transportation planning processes must account for enhanced security measures and objectives whenever possible. However, these goals are very difficult to achieve and maintain without a specific strategy, which involves a variety of public agencies and priv ate groups, as well as general public awareness of the possibl e threats to the security of these systems. An article by Ne lson (1999) examines these associations in greater detail, noting that there are many chall enges involved in building cohesive and effective associations amongst these differe nt groups, as they each possess their own agendas and objectives, many of which may not be supportive of one another. The article suggests that in pr eparing any transporta tion system for the real threat of terrorist attacks, all organi zations involved in the planning process must develop what is known as a Â“dre ss rehearsal,Â” whereby all parties work together in conjunction with each other in a mock disaster incident, so that each team is aware of the respons ibilities involved in achi eving all desired objectives (Nelson 1999). In any transit system, t here must be a compr ehensive evaluation of entrance and exit points, where many users are lik ely to be found waiting for their chosen mode of transportation to a rrive and depart (Nelson 1999). These locations are particularly vulnerable to pot ential acts of terrorism, since terrorists are indeed aware of the increased numbers of user s at these points, thereby creating the potential for mass destruc tion in one concentrated area (Nelson 1999). Furthermore, fuel used for buses, el ectrical switches, train or rail tracks,
46 and computer systems must be continu ously evaluated for any unexpected changes or threats (Nelson 1999). T hese steps are necessary in the development of any routine transportati on planning process, and officials must not take these concerns for granted, si nce it is possible that terrorists may identify these vulnerabilities and take danger ous action if it is known that there are weaknesses in a given system (Nels on 1999). The author also notes that there must be comprehensive and detailed ev aluation strategies in place at all times, since passengers must be prot ected from additional harm whenever possible (Nelson 1999). T he author states that Â“Eva cuation plans should include the selection of staging areas, where pas sengers can await transport to safe locationsÂ…if possible; alternatives to t he affected transit line or system must be established in order to diminish the cr owds that would other wise accumulate at the sceneÂ” (Nelson 1999). Therefore, it is strongly suggest ed that emergency response plans must incorporate these ty pes of objectives into the mix, since there is a strong likelihood of serious dam age and casualties if these plans are not considered prior to an attack (Nelson 1999). If at all possible, the development of emergency response pl ans that include the evaluation of possible tampering of system s and vulnerable areas is par ticularly advantageous in developing an effective security planni ng process (Nelson 1999). Much of the lack of preparedness for terrorist threat s to transportation systems has been in faulty designs and the lack of knowl edge regarding threat s when these systems
47 were created; therefore, it is often required that systems must undergo modifications in order to update equipm ent, exit and entrance locations, and computer systems in order to better recognize threats that may occur, as well as to better prepare users for the possibilitie s that might exist, allowing them to increase their awareness of such events (Nelson 1999). It is also expected that as transpor tation planning initiatives continue to emerge throughout the United St ates, there must be cons iderable measures in place that will accommodate the many user s of public transit systems, including buses, railways, and subways. However, prior to the development of any revised guidelines for emergency preparedness in transportation systems, the following assessments must be conducted and evaluated: 1. A general risk assessment must be performed in order to evaluate the potential threats against a system in a given location; 2. The likelihood of serious hazards ste mming from acts of terrorism must also be considered; and 3. There must be a comprehensive strategy in place to manage any perceived risks or hazards that might occur as a result of a terrorist attack or threat (Boyd and Sullivan 2000).
48 There is a critical need in transportation planning processes to evaluate and consider the long-term outcomes of terrori st acts or threats, since these may incite fear in passengers, leading to a reduction in use of such systems over time. Therefore, if passengers are assur ed that their time spent in the transit system is as secure as possible; t here is a greater likelihood that these circumstances will be managed more effectively and without serious consequences. Nonetheless, passengers mu st also be assured that their time spent on the public transit system will be secure, and this requires an extensive effort from all responsible agencies to ensure passengers that all measures are being taken to facilitate smooth travel time. 2.10 Land Use Interaction There are many issues surrounding a discussion of land use interaction with security planning. Many questions arise about what effect security considerations have upon this such as zoning and access management. The current planning processes consider land use when establishing system routes and alignments. When perceived through a security planning framework, that process of alternatives evaluation will need to be modified. Polzin (2002) recently discussed this issue. He identif ied implications rangi ng from an increase in employment dispersion and sprawl to a refocus on the function and importance of the city. If additional security ev ents occur in highly populated areas, some
49 shifts in migration patterns may occur as a result. This may become more important as Florida is beginning to look at transpor tation corridor preservation. If security becomes one of the main criter ia in evaluating and establishing these corridors, land use will be affected. 2.11 Risk Assessment The strategic development of tr ansportation planning processes that involve security require that there must be substantial know ledge of the risks involved with maintaining these elements, as they are often very difficult to achieve without adequate fina ncial resources. Much of the interest in transportation security planning processes has emerged in large part due to postterrorism fears after September 11th, and there is a marked interest in emergency response efforts throughout al l types of transportation planning mechanisms (Dornan and Maier 2005). Ho wever, throughout the evaluation process, highly visible flaw s in security have been expo sed to the general public and to experts in the field, which have created considerable challenges in their efforts to overcome these gaps in know ledge and information (Dornan and Maier 2005). In metropolitan areas, where thes e processes are highly visible and prominent, it is especially critical to develop and implement security strategies that will accommodate the specific needs and calm the fears of residents that utilize various forms of transportation, incl uding but not limited to the subway and
50 bus lines (Dornan and Maier 2005). Howeve r, it is just as important to understand that security effo rts are limited by the abilit y to secure funding for such projects at the local, state and federal levels, and that if these resources are scarce or are lacking altogether, little if any progress is anticipated in ensuring that transportation users feel more secu re in their travels (Dornan and Maier 2005). It is important to recognize the vary ing degrees of risk t hat are involved in threats to transportation systems, and this often requires an extensive examination of risk levels, as noted in Table 2-3 (Boy d and Sullivan 2000). Upon review and evaluation of the appropriate le vels of risk involved in a given transit system, it is critical that the corres ponding emergency preparedn ess strategy is also established in order to provide the best possible shortand long-term outcomes (Boyd and Sullivan 2000). According to the authors, Â“In general, emergency plans used in the transit environment provide guidance for reporting and evaluating the incident, using the incident command system, not ifying emergency response personnel/agencies, protecting per sonnel and equipment at the incident site, dispatching emergency response personnel and equipment to the site, evacuating passengers, providing briefings
51 and information updates, managing the emergency, and restoring the system to normalÂ” (Boyd and Sullivan 2000) Table 2-3 Transit Risk Levels Risk Level Definition 1 Facilities whose loss or damage would have a major financial impact or result in the extended interruption of critical services. 2 Facilities containing items of physical value, confidential information, or computer access to sensitive data/operational proc essing networks. 3 Facilities whose disrupti on would be moderately serious. 4 Facilities relatively unimportant to operations 5 Criticality cannot be assessed Risk considerations are often mi tigated through improving design practices. This is somewhat of a self-policing process which involves modifications to current practices once a ri sk threshold has been crossed. In the planning process, risk must be estima ted for at least two reasons: (1) to determine what additional costs may be associated with a project due to increased risk that requires additional consi derations, or (2) to determine if a potential project is considered feasible due to properly considering security risks. It may be necessary and beneficial to a dapt and transfer current practices in other industries to the transportation pl anning arena. This would most likely greatly reduce the Â“learning curveÂ” and al low more rapid application of these
52 assessment methods to transportation planning by taking advantage of the lessons learned in other areas. 2.12 Public Participation One of the major initiatives over the past 10 years has been to provide and encourage the public to be more invo lved in the transportation planning process. These initiatives have occu rred nationwide. These practices will present a problem when secu rity considerations are factored into the planning and decision-making processes. These processes will lose some of their transparency and the public may feel cheated out of their right to know when in fact the information may simply be classi fied. It is most probably not reasonable to expect the public to accept a decision without knowing all of the factors that went into that decision. Guidelines should be developed to a ssist those agencies presenting alternatives to the public with explanations without security compromises. Depending upon the metropolitan loca tion under consideration, there might be varying degrees of interest in se curity, as the need to develop strategies for natural disasters may be more import ant than the needs involving threats of terrorism, with examples including hurricanes and earthquakes (Dornan and Maier 2005). Since the proposed study is primarily concerned with transportation
53 security planning processes for the State of Florida, it is not surprising that the marked threat of hurricanes during peak season is considered to be an overwhelming challenge to most resident s. In 2005, one of the most active hurricane seasons in history emerged and l ed to considerable threats to the livelihood of many residents of Florida, and theref ore, it should be noted that many challenges involving transportation, security and the overall well being of residents were identified and compromised as a direct result these disasters. Therefore, the emergency pr eparedness of Floridians fo r such events continues to be of great concern for all residents. However, this is not the only issue that is cause for alarm, as threats of terrorism, although not clearly obvious in Florida, nonetheless continue to creat e apprehension for residents throughout the state. Florida residents want to know what plans are in place to protect them from both natural and man-made disasters. 2.13 Information Availability In Florida many transportation pl anning studies involve data that is considered the Â“best available.Â” This limit is imposed by both the cost of collecting additional data or the time constraints associated with the project. Transportation planners need some guidance on how to properly consider transportation security when the information available is not the Â“bestÂ” or is simply not Â“availableÂ” because of security concerns. It is important for
54 transportation planners to know what assump tions or Â“rules of thumbÂ” are most accurate, even without having all of the relevant data. Although there has been much interest over the year s in how to effectively prepare for safety in transportation planni ng, security measures have long been ignored, perhaps due in large part to a lack of knowledge and available resources for such projects (Dornan and Maier 2005). However, it should be duly noted that security and safety are not considered as the same, and that they should be evaluated and managed with different strategies in mind, as noted in the following: Â“Safety initiatives oft en have no bearing on the security of transportation facilities or services, and security initiatives may not impact the safety of transportation facilities or servicesÂ” (Dornan and Maier 2005). Therefore, this study was not used as a means of grouping these concepts together, because their prim ary objectives and strategies should remain unique and distinct from one another thro ughout all planning processes. 2.14 Planning Levels: Federal, State, Local Current planning practice s allow control of key transportation decisions at different levels. Some decisions are m ade at the federal level whereas others are made at the state or local level. For example, the Florida De partment of Transportation controls the flow of feder al roadway and bridge dollars but the
55 local Metropolitan Planning Organizations or County Commissions assign project priorities. The local governments contro l which projects go to the top of the priority list. There should be a clear definition of who is responsible for addressing security issues during transpor tation planning. There should also be clarification of who else needs to evaluat e those issues. For example, should a federally-controlled project be subject to loca l government scrutiny or visa versa. In 1997, a study was conducted by J enkins as a means of identifying the challenges of developing strategies in re sponse to threats of terrorism across transportation channels. There are a number of key consideratio ns that must be identified, implement ed and evaluated with respect to te rrorist threats, and there must be effective measures in place in the transportation planning process in response to these needs (Jenkins 1997). According to the author, Â“The general framework of preparedness pr ogresses from planning and mitigation measures through response and recovery. The pre-inci dent mitigation steps incorporate, at a minimum, security and detection devic es, environmental design, training, and outreach activities. The preparedness step focuses on the institutional capacity and capability of both internal and ex ternal emergency-response organizations and teamsÂ” (Jenkins 1997). This statement demonstrates that there must be a concentrated effort from a team of i ndividuals that are focused on the same objectives in order to pr omote the best possible outcomes for transportation
56 planning processes, and that if emergency incidents occur, there will be a learning curve that is designed to encour age new types of response methods to promote improved outcomes (Jenkins 1997). It is important to recognize that te rrorist threats have increased in scope and incidence over the past quarter-c entury, and consequently, transportation systems continue to require additional securi ty measures to be prepared for such events (Jenkins 1997). One of the key object ives of any terrorist threat or attack is to incite fear in mass numbers of trans portation users, and th erefore, it is not surprising that terrorists utilize thes e systems as a means of facilitating widespread panic and uproar (Jenkins 1997). It should also be known that such attacks are planned over a long period of time in order to maximize the potential for the greatest possible level of dam age and destruction, which signifies the intelligence and research that is performed in deciding the location and extent of terrorist attacks on existing transporta tion systems (Jenkins 1997). Table 2-4 provides a historical pers pective regarding terrorist targets over the past few decades, and it demonstrates that there is a widespread mix of attack targets that terrorists utilize in order to satisf y their desired objectives to create fear, panic and destruction within a given location (Jenkins 1997). It is not surprising that bombings are the most common stra tegy that is used by terrorists, responsible for approximately 61 percent of all attacks for the period under
57 consideration (Jenkins 1997). According the author, public transportation serves as a notable and relatively easy target, as noted in the following statement: Â“These events clearly indicate t hat contemporary terrorists have made public transportation a new t heater of operations. For those determined to kill in quantity and wi lling to kill indiscriminately, public transportation offers an i deal target. It is public, used by millions of people daily. There is necessarily little security with no obvious chokepoints (like those at airports) to inspect passengers and parcels. The passengers are st rangers promising attackers anonymity and easy escape. Concentra tions of people in contained environments are especia lly vulnerable to conv entional explosives and unconventional weapons. Also, attacks on public transportation, the circulatory systems of urban environments, cause great disruption and alarm whic h are the traditional goals of terrorismÂ” (Jenkins 1997). This statement is not surprising, cons idering the importanc e of terrorism in modern society as a primary means of gener ating fear and panic in a given group of unsuspecting individuals ; in other words, acts of terrorism via public transportation allow terrorists to advance th eir cause and to spread the word in a significant way (Jenkins 1997). Therefore, field experts and government officials
58 must be effectively prepared to manage su ch attacks on their systems without creating additional panic or harm whenever possible (Jenkins 1997). Table 2-4 Location Of Attacks On Public Transportation Systems Location Percentage (%) Buses 29 Subways and Trains 27 Subway and Train Stations 13 Rails 8 Bus Terminals 7 Tourist Buses 7 Bridges 6 Other 2 School Buses 1 Tunnels 0 (2 Incidents) In developing an effective security st rategy for transportation systems, it is critical to reexamine current priorities and involved parties to determine if any new stakeholders or key players must be considered in the planning process (Dornan and Maier 2005). For example, it is necessary to include local emergency response teams, as well as nat ional teams, such as FEMA and the FBI in such processes, since these teams may possess additional knowledge and skills that will facilitate a greater re sponse to these challenges (Dornan and Maier 2005). A greater le vel of oversight and guidance from national response teams is absolutely critical in developing an effective response strategy, as these teams are much more knowledgeable of the requirements and cost of enhanced security measures in the desired location (Dornan and Maier 2005).
59 Furthermore, these teams often provide manpower and other resources that are not readily available at the local level d ue to limited financial resources or other limiting constraints (Dornan and Maier 2005). Regardless of the type of system under consideration, it is anticipated that extensive know ledge and resources from federal agencies is requ ired in order to develop effective long-range security strategies (Dornan and Maier 2005). 2.15 Organizational Structure Most governments seem to be us ing existing departments and staff to handle security considerations by simply adding those responsibilities to the primary duties of those sta ff. In most instances, the designated staffs are those associated with law enforcem ent or emergency response. However, few to none of these people have the training or experience to evaluate transportation alternatives based on security considerat ions. Ideally, there should be people who are uniquely qualified to deal with the planning imp lications of security and these duties should be their primary responsibility. It is very important to identify t he key roles and responsibilities of all federal, state and local agencies that are involved in developing effective transportation security planning strategies The following key objectives must be satisfied in any unified transportation strategy:
60 Developing a single response to any in cidents that might occur so that all resources are utilized wisely; All goals are satisfied in a cohesive manner; Information is gathered and shared so that all agencies ar e provided with the data that is necessary to conduct an effective response; All agencies are well aware of their limitations in these processes; and All possible efforts that would lead to duplication are eliminated whenever possible (Boyd and Sullivan 2000). Although these objectives appear to be relatively simple, they are in fact very difficult to accomplish if all supporting agencies do not take their responsibilities seriously and without consid eration of the roles of other teams in these processes, since these actions coul d be detrimental to t he overall integrity of the chosen strategy and the potentia l outcomes for managing the disaster without dire or long-term consequences (Boyd and Sullivan 2000). 2.16 Legal Considerations There are many legal issues in volved in transportation planning with regards to security issues. A security ev ent usually results in a loss of property or life. Those affected will seek resolu tion concerning the level of preventative efforts taken. Current practices do very little to address these liability concerns.
61 Actual cases will go a long way in determining the parameters concerning adequate levels of considerat ion. However, there ar e secondary issues that must be addressed, includin g the inadvertent identificat ion of critical assets through consideration during the tr ansportation planning processes. Recent legislation, Senate Bill 1138, in the State of Florida has allowed Construction Engineering & Inspection C onsultants (CEI) to be considered agents of the state. This was done to protect CEI companies from lawsuits that put an undue strain on the co st of doing business in Fl orida. Contractors are already protected as agent s of the state. Howe ver, people will seek deep pockets. In should be expected that la wyers representing citizens who are seeking compensation for an injury would essentially work their way upstream in the process. Figure 2-1 shows the typica l project process consists of planning, design, asset acquisition, construction, and Operations & Maintenance. The process starts at time equal zero with the Planning Phase and progresses along the timeline as shown. If constructi on contractors and management companies are agents of the state then the next phas e upstream would involve the project designers. Next to these people are the planners.
62 Figure 2-1 Typical Project Process PlanningDesignAsset A cquisition Construction Operation & Maintenance Time (Years) 0 2 4 6 8 Inf Level Of Effort Guidelines should be developed that contain recommendat ions on how and when to protect planners who are making decisions that consider security, especially when those projects involve design, right-of-way acquisition, or construction that may be contrary to the traditional processes. 2.17 Facility Design The focus of this study did not in volve reinventing the ways in which transportation design is done. Transportati on design, whether it be roadways or railways is an established science wi th proven methodologies. The study focused on sensitizing designers to potential safety and security issues that result from challenges to security. This exposure may generate different combinations or permutations of des ign elements in response to these challenges. It may also involve the us age of additional design elements whose sole use is to protect the users of the facility or adjacent interests. These additional elements will impac t the projectÂ’s budget.
63 Chapter 3 Framework For Security Planning In order to better understand the projec t development process in Florida, it is important to understand t he legislative background th at mandates the process and the major stakeholders that have a role in transportation security. Historically, aspects of the transpor tation planning process were addressed separately in different legislation and regulations (Figure 3-1) and have traditionally only addressed safety. More importantly, the National En vironmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the current and past two highway acts have done the most to shape the current state of project development. They are par ticularly important because the PD&E process is the manifestation of NEPA in Florida. Oth er key legislation includes the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), and Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU). A more detailed discussion of these key pieces of legislation is included in Appendix E.
64 Figure 3-1 Safety Legislation/Regulations Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1934 Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 Highway and Motor Vehicle Safety Acts of 1966 Department of Transportation Act of 1966 The National Highway Safety Act of 1966 Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 Highway Safety Act of 1973 Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1976 Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1981 The Highway Safety Improvem ent Program (HSIP) (1982) 23 United States Code 134 Metropolitan Planning 23 United Stated Code 135 Statewide Planning There are a large number of agencie s involved in the transportation planning process. Each of these organiza tions has their own versions of plans and goals related to their transportation netwo rks. All of these organizations are moving towards improving the overall effici ency and security of their networks. However the different methodologies and organizational structures can be counterproductive to the over all emphasis on transportati on security planning. A detailed description of roles, responsibil ities, and objectives are included in Appendix F. The key player s are shown in Figure 3-2.
65 Figure 3-2 Key Transportation Planning Agencies Transportation Planning Agencies Transportation Research Board (TRB) Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Private Organizations United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) Â•Office of the Secretary (OST) Â•Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Â•Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) Â•Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) Â•Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) Â•Federal Transit Administration (FTA) Â•Maritime Administration (MARAD) Â•National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) Â•Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) Â•Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA) Â•Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (SLSDC) Â•Surface Transportation Board (STB) Â•Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Â•Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Â•Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Â•American Public Transportation Associations (APTA) Â•American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) Â•Institute of Transportation Engineers (ITE) 3.1 FloridaÂ’s Existing Pr oject Development Processes Florida approved Procedure Num ber 650-000-001 on November 21, 1991 which established the use of the Proj ect Development & Environment (PD&E) Manual to be used for the project developm ent process. The PD&E Manual must be used any time the FDOT is involved, in any way, with th e preparation of an environmental document in compliance wit h the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969. The authority to use the PD&E Manual as the basis of process comes from an informal agreemen t between the FDOT and the Federal
66 Highway Administration (FHWA) ( 2003). The Central Environmental Management Office has responsibility for development of the manual and subsequent updates. The procedures as doc umented in this manual serve to meet the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other federal and state laws. The PD&E manual requires a multi-disciplined approach to project development. The Fl orida Department of Transportation works closely with the local governm ents and the Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) as they develop their Long Range Tran sportation Plan (LRTP). The LRTP determines the transpor tation improvements required over the next 20 to 25 years. The MPO's also develop a Transportation Improvement Program (TIP) which identifies and priori tizes transportation projects to be implemented within a 10 year period based on the LRTP. On ce the priorities are identified in the TIP, they are programmed in the FDOT's 5 Year Work Program. Once a project is programmed, the Proj ect Development & Environment (PD&E) Study phase can begin. The PD&E Study phase for planned transportation projects provides the interface between the Planning and Design phases to evaluate and document solutions to transportation needs that ar e compatible with the environment. The PD&E study determines if there is an engineering and environm entally feasible alternative to meet the need determined in the Planning phase. This process is
67 mandated by the NEPA and St ate law. It represents a combined effort by technical professionals who analyze information and document the best alternative to meet transportation needs. The PD&E process is well documented in the PD&E Manual (FDOT 1997). In order to underst and how and where security considerations should be integrated, it is necessary to explain this process in some detail, especially those steps or phases where c hanges are recommended. Proc esses addressed in this chapter will only focus on those elem ents of the process that require transportation security considerations. The steps in the process can be gr ouped into the Initialization, Data Collection, Analysis, Finalization, and Inform ational Phases (Figur e 3-3). It is also important to note that, during all of the Phases, Public Involvement activities occur and are extremely important to educ ate and inform the public of programs, projects, and strategies.
68 Figure 3-3 FloridaÂ’s Existing Project Development Process Need Advance Notification Existing Conditions Class Of Action Alternatives Development Social Impacts Alternatives Screening Public Workshop Public Hearing Documentation Publication Select Preferred Alternative Engineering Impacts Environmental Impacts Initialization Phase Data Collection Phase Analysis Phase Finalization Phase Informational Phase
69 3.1.1 Existing Initialization Phase The Initialization Phase includes t he recognition of a transportation need and adherence to the Advance Notification (A N) Process. The first step is to determine project need which requires proof that a pr oposed alternative is consistent with local plann ing efforts. The PD&E M anual, Part 2, Chapter 5 requires that all proposed projects be consistent with local transportation and comprehensive planning, land use plann ing and growth management efforts. The local planning efforts must be updated to reflect the necessary short-term and long-term security needs for their region s. Otherwise, proposed alternatives involving security considerations cannot be consistent with loca l planning efforts. The AN Process is the process in which Federal, State, Local agencies and other stakeholders are in formed of a proposed project by the FDOT. It serves to notify those same agencies that the FDOT intends to seek federal funding for the project. It, due to geographic location, will trigger other federal or state processes such as the Florid a Coastal Zone Management Program (FCMP). The AN process is required by the Presidential Ex ecutive Order 12372 and the Florida GovernorÂ’s Executive Order 95-359. Transportation projects must be evaluated to determine if the AN process applies. The process for screening project for AN applicabilit y is shown in Figure 3-4.
70 Figure 3-4 Decision Process for AN Process Applicability Needs determination Project on new location? Change in functional characteristics or significant change in access? Significant impact on social, cultural, or natural environment? Construction or Reconstruction of waterway or significant wetland? Non-Federally funded project requiring SEIR? Involve controversy, substantial environmental alteration or community impacts? Modernization requiring no additional right of way on existing highways by resurfacing, minor right-of-way acquisition, widening less than a single lane width, adding shoulders, landscaping, rest areas in a nonurbanized area, adding auxiliary lanes for localized purposes, increasing superelevations, skid hazard resurfacing, restoration and rehabilitation, median development, bridge widening (unless permits are required), additional bridge deck pavement layers? Lighting, signing, pavement markings, signalization, freeway surveillance and control systems, railroad protective devices, break-away posts, progressive signal systems, pedestrian safety improvements? Safety projects, and others such as grooving, glare screen, safety barriers, guardrails, energy attenuators, removal of signs, removal of roadside obstacles, removal of trees, addition of fog devices, and correction of road safety hazards? Reconstruction of existing crossroad or railroad separations, railway/highway crossings, minor improvement or replacement of existing drainage structures, minor alterations or extensions of existing highway? Non-Major State Actions? Project MUST follow AN Process No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Project is EXEMPT from AN Process Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No
71 The AN process is facilitated through t he use of the AN Fact Sheet (Figure 3-5). This form is completed for t he initial disseminat ion of the AN. Figure 3-5 Advance Notification Fact Sheet
72 Another possible element of the initial efforts c an include the decision to implement the Local Agency Program (LAP) process. The FDOT can contract with other governmental agencies for trans portation services provided to the traveling public. Local governments mu st be LAP certified before entering into this process. This program includes the involvement of the FHWA in the contractual relationships between the De partment and Local Agencies. The use of LAP has dramatically increased over the past few years as the FDOT struggles with inadequate resources and funding to accomplish its planning efforts using their own staff and consultant s. As the use of the LAP increases, there is a dependency, from t he FDOT, on city or county st aff to provide all of the required expertise necessary to sati sfactorily conduct a PD&E study. It is also important to consider privately funded projec ts during initial coordination with other agencies. In Fl orida, more agencies are looking to Public-Private-Partnerships as a means to accelerate project construction and to aid with funding delays or def icits. Currently, privatel y funded projects use their own processes to document complianc e with NEPA. However, in many instances, there may be a high likelihoo d of transference of ownership of a certain facility.
73 3.1.2 Existing Data Collection Phase The Data Collection Phase includes collection of all existing data or procurement of new dat a that will be required to ac curately assess alternatives. This phase also includes the Class of Action (COA ) determination once enough data is collected to assess significance of issues associated with the improvement. The NEPA established that the Envir onmental Impact Statement (EIS), the Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) and the Categor ical Exclusion (CATEX) would serve as the administrative reco rd of compliance with its policies and procedures for federally f unded project. It further det ermined that the State Environmental Impact Report (SEIR) and the Non-Major State Action (NMSA) would serve as the record of complianc e for non-federally funded projects. The decision as to which level of documentatio n is appropriate is made by the FDOT in consultation with the FHWA. Th e EIS is the appropr iate level of documentation for actions that Â“signific antlyÂ” affect the human environment. The normal types of projects that fall into this category are a new controlled-access freeway, a highway project of four or more lanes on a new location, new construction or extension of fixed rail tr ansit facilities, and new construction or extension of a separate roadway for buses or high occupancy ve hicles. An EA is
74 prepared for projects in whic h the environmental impact is not known. The EA is prepared in order to determine what le vel of document is required. The administration of NEPA is typically done by the Federal Highway Administration or, in some cases, by other federal transportation agencies such as the FRA, the FAA, or the FTA. The lead state agency is typically the FDOT. It can be a specific county or city given the proper delegation of administrative authority by the FDOT. This can be accomplished through the LAP. The determination of class of action begins with a review of the responses received during the AN process. After evaluation of the comments received, the FHWA is consulted and t he COA is determined. In some cases, the COA determination may be delayed until later in the project development process in order to collect more data and better dete rmine impacts associated with a project as alternatives are developed. T he primary documentat ion of the COA determination is the Environmental Class of Action Determination form. Potential impacts of a particular project are used as the qualitative metric in order to determine the COA. Page 3 of the form (Figure 3-6) lists the considerations when evaluating a project.
75 Figure 3-6 Class of Action Form Â– Page 3 These factors are qualitatively eval uated as being Sign ificant, Minimal, None, or No Involvement. They are defined in Table 3-1.
76 Table 3-1 COA Impact Factors Term Definition Significant The perceived impact is significant in the sense of the use of the term by CEQ regulations. Minimal The project involves an environmental issue and has a perceived impact, which may r ange in level of magnitude varying from minor to substantial. None The project has been evaluated for an environmental issue; the issue exists but there is little or no impact No Involvement The environmental issue in ques tion is not a part of or in anyway involved with the project. Based upon the evaluation of t hese individual criteria, a COA determination is made. 3.1.3 Existing Analysis Phase The Analysis Phase includes the devel opment of alternatives, the analysis of environmental, social, and engin eering impacts associated with the alternatives, the screening of the alternatives based upo n the impacts, and public involvement efforts, usual ly in the form of a Public Workshop or Public Information Meeting. A major element of this phase is the development of reasonable and feasible alternatives, which must be di scussed (Figure 3-7) in the COA (CEQ 1978). A critical component of this phase is the documentation of which alternatives are reasonable and feasible and which are eliminated early in the
77 process for not meeting established cr iteria and all necessary background information and analysis used in the decision-making process. Figure 3-7 COA Discussion Items 1. Thoroughly and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives and document why alternatives are eliminated. 2. Provide enough details and analysis fo r reviewers to completely evaluate individual alternatives. 3. Include reasonable and feasib le alternatives that are not within the purview of the lead agency. 4. Clearly identify the preferred alternative 5. Mitigate the preferred alternatives as necessary 6. Include the no-build alternative The alternatives discussion section generally discusses four types of solutions which include the no-build (noaction) alternative, the Transportation System Management (TSM) alternatives, the multimodal alternatives, and any construction alternatives. A construction alternative must be consistent with local comprehensive plans. An important consideration during this phase is corridor preservation. It is the intent of the corridor analysis proce ss to evaluate alternative corridors where deemed reasonable and feasible Alternative corridors are typically considered reasonable and feasible if the existing or currently preferred corridor would experience significant impacts as a result of the proposed project. In order to avoid these impacts, other existing or new corridors may be considered.
78 Considerations of a new corridor tr aditionally include community values and concerns, contamination, archaeological or historical sites, publicly owned lands, threatened and endangered species, and wetlands. The corridor preservation procedure is defined in t he FDOT PD&E Manual and consists of four primary steps (Figure 3-8). Figure 3-8 Corridor Preservation Procedure
79 The process begins with a component of the Florida Transportation Plan (FTP) that designates corridors that ar e necessary for future development and needs. The FDOT will prepare a Corridor Designation Report (CDR) or its equivalent. An approved NEPA document, a state level environmental report, or other approved master or modal system plan can serve as an equivalent document to the CDR (FDOT Topic No 525-030-201). The process continues with an environmental assessment of t he proposed corridor through the Corridor Planning and Design Report (CPDR) or its equiva lent (FDOT Topic No. 525-030137). One of the most import ant steps in any PD&E study is to establish evaluation criteria. There are many factors that are typically evaluated. In Florida, they are standardized, as outli ned in the PD&E Manual. These criteria are shown in Table 3-2. Table 3-2 Standard PD&E Evaluation Criteria Criteria Assessment Community Impacts Social, economic, land use, aesthetic/livability, relocation issues, and compliance with civil rights Air Quality Existing/future conditions and determining if the project conforms to the Clean Air Act
80 Table 3-2 (Continued) Standard PD&E Evaluation Criteria Noise Noise levels and if they meet criteria reasonable and feasible noise abatement Wetlands Avoidance, minimization and mitigation of short-term and long-term impacts Water Quality Prevention, reduction and/or e limination of pollution of ground and surface water Wildlife/Habitat Impacts Identification/Prot ection of threatened and/or endangered species and their habitat Contamination Identification and ev aluation of potentia l contamination problems within and/or adjacent to a project Floodplains Avoidance, minimization and mitigation of encroachment within the floodplain Archaeological & Historical Significance of sites and avoidance methods for projects involving recreation lands/histo ric/archaeological features Section 4(f) Properties Protection and preservation of the natural beauty of the countryside, public parks, re creation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites Conceptual Design Development and evaluati on of engineering design concepts for environmental com patibility and satisfaction of the transportation need Public Involvement Informing and involving all stakeholders about the planned project using a Pub lic Involvement Program Aquatic Preserves Impacts to sovereignty subm erged lands that are to be preserved Wild & Scenic Rivers Impacts to those water bodies designated as wild river areas, scenic river areas, or recreational river areas Outstanding Florida Waterways (OFW) Impacts to specially designat ed water bodies in Florida that have outstanding natural attributes
81 Table 3-2 (Continued) Standard PD&E Evaluation Criteria Farmlands Impact to farmlands as designated by the Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS) Scenic Highways Impacts to the natural, physi cal, visual and cultural qualities of transportation facilities such as highway Construction Impacts Impacts to the local community as a result of the actual construction of the tr ansportation project Visual & Aesthetic Impacts Aesthetic effect of the propos ed project on a community Essential Fish Habitat (EFH) Impact to fish habitat that involves anadromous and certain important marine species of fish Coastal Barrier Resource Evaluation Impact to designated undeveloped coastal barriers and their associated aquatic habitat Utilities & Railroads Conflicts between the transpor tation project and existing and future utilities, ra ilroads, and their users Permits Early coordination to dete rmine if project is permittable Bicycle & Pedestrian Impacts Impacts of the transportation pr oject on different types of existing non-motorized transportation modes along with the potential impacts of future non-motorized modes Corridor Preservation Compliance with the FDOTÂ’s plan for preservation of specific transportation co rridors, which may include advanced right-of-way acquisition One of the tools that are used to empl oy these evaluation criteria is called the Efficient Transportation Decision Making (ETDM) Process. In response to TEA-21 and in response to FloridaÂ’s citizens w anting faster project implementation, the Florida Department of Transportation has initiated the ETDM Process which addresses alternatives screening from the planning phase
82 through permitting. The main tool associ ated with this process in an Internetaccessible interactive database called the En vironmental Screening Tool (EST). Two main alternatives screening m ilestones occur in the process (FDOT ETDM Overview 2005). These are known as the Plan ning Screen and the Programming Screen. The Planning Screen occurs in conjunction with the costfeasible plans and the Programming Sc reen occurs before projects are considered for the FDOT Work Program. The Programming Scr een is the more detailed of the two phases an d is intended to identify te chnical issues that must be addressed by project staff, agencies, and other stakeholders. Another screening tool that is us ed is the Environmental Technical Advisory Team (ETAT). The Florida Depa rtment of Transportation is divided into seven geographic districts. Each of these districts has an ETAT. The ETAT consists of agency representatives or anyone having statutory responsibility for consultation as defined by NEPA. The ET ATÂ’s responsibility is to interact with the FDOT throughout the lif e cycle of a project. The ETAT does contain members of law enforcem ent and emergency response. One of the early guidelines of ETDM established that each agency wa s responsible to ensure the validity of data in existi ng databases and to update as necessary to ensure accuracy.
83 The evaluation of these alternativ es usually takes the form of an evaluation matrix (Figure 3-9). This matrix is a combination of quantitative comparisons, usually in the form of cost s, and of qualitative factors, such as a determination of involvement or not. Figure 3-9 Evaluation Matrix Criteria 1. Construction costs 2. Right-of-way costs 3. Engineering costs (Design and C.E.I.) 4. Business damages 5. Bicycle and pedestrian facilities 6. Traffic control 7. Environmental impacts (noise, air, 4(f), contamination sites, trees, etc.) 8. Socioeconomic (R/W requirements, relocations, aesthetics, traffic flow improvements, neighborhood and social impacts, etc.) 9. Operational analysis 3.1.4 Existing Finalization Phase The Finalization Phase includes the se lection of a Preferred Alternative, public involvement efforts in the fo rm of a Public He aring, and final documentation of the study in the form of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), an Environmental Assessment (EA) a Type 1 or 2 Cate gorical Exclusion (CATEX), or a Programmatic for Federally funded projects. For non-federally funded projects, the documentation takes the form of a State Environmental Impact Report (SEIR) or a NonMajor State Action (NMSA).
84 The alternatives development and an alysis efforts are documented in the Preliminary Engineering Report (PER) and in the Location Hydraulics Report (LHR). They can be supported by several other documents including the Wetlands Evaluation Report (WER), t he Endangered Species Biological Assessment Report (ESBA), the Cultural Resource Assessment Survey (CRAS), the Preliminary Pond Siting Repor t (PSR), the Noise Report, and the Contamination Screening Evaluation Report (CSER). This study will not review these support documents in any detail but will instead focus on the PER, which serves as a culmination of all of those efforts. All Draft Environmental Impac t Statements (DEIS) and Final Environmental Impact Statements (FEIS) ar e circulated to a determined group of government agencies for their review. This is done to satisfy the Â“Implementing Procedural ProvisionsÂ” of NEPA found in CEQ, Section 1502.10(i)). The list of reviewers is developed by the Centra l Environmental Management Office (CEMO) in cooperation with the FH WA and the District Environmental Management Offices (DEMO). This list of reviewers will change project to project depending on the geographical location and t he specific project issues expected to be encountered. The PD&E Manual lists the agencies that must be considered when developing the reviewer list. The agencies are shown in Table 3-3.
85 Table 3-3 Suggested DEIS And FEIS Reviewers Advisory Council on Historic Preserva tion Office of Cultural Resources Preservation Appropriate local planning agencies Appropriate Metropolit an Planning Organization Appropriate Regional Planning Council Colorado State University The Libraries, Documents Librarian Federal Aviation Administration Airports District Office Federal Aviation Administra tion Regional Director Federal Emergency Management Agency Associate General Counsel for Insurance and Mitigation Federal Emergency Management Agency Natural Hazards Branch, Chief Florida Department of Community Affairs Federal Railroad Admi nistration Office of Economic Analysis, Director Florida Department of En vironmental Protection Florida Department of Health Florida Department of State Div ision of Historical Resources Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Police Department United States Army Corps of Engineers Regulatory Branch, District Engineer United States Coast Guard Co mmander (oan) Seventh District United States Coast Guard Co mmander (obr) Eighth District United States Department of Agricult ure Natural Resources Conservation Service, State Conservationist United States Department of Agricu lture Southern Re gional Forester United States Department of Commerce National Marine Fisheries Service Habitat Conservation Division United States Department of Commerce National Marine Fisheries Service Southeast Regional Office United States Department of Commerc e National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration United States Department of Hous ing and Urban Development Regional Environmental Officer United States Department of Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs Office of Trust Responsibilities
86 Table 3-3 (Continued) Suggested DEIS And FEIS Reviewers United States Department of Interior Bureau of Land Management Eastern States Office United States Department of Interior Fish and Wildlife Service, Field Supervisor United States Department of Interior National Park Service Southeast Regional Office United States Department of Interior Office of Environmental Policy and Compliance, Director United States Department of Interior United States Geological Survey Chief United States Department of State Office of Envir onment, Health and Natural Resources United States Dept. of Health and Human Services Center for Environmental Health and Injury Control United States Environmental Protec tion Agency Region IV, Regional Administrator United States Environmental Prot ection Agency, Washington, D.C. Water Management District 3.1.5 Existing Informational Phase The Informational Phase involves the dissemination of the final commitments and recommendations to all appropriate agencies and to the public and other stakeholders. The distribution of these final elements is accomplished by the use of the same mailing list that is discussed in the AN process. Other means of notifying th e public are employed such as newspaper advertisements and putting the final documents on display at public libraries.
87 3.1.6 Existing Public Involvement Considerations The intent of the public involvement process is to inform the public about a specific transportation project. It prov ides opportunities for stakeholders to provide input into the decision-making pr ocess. The FDOT PD&E Manual states, Â“An effective public involvement plan can foster understanding and cooperation between t he Department and the public; help develop a transportation system that meet s real community needs; saves money by reducing or eliminating the need to redesig n; and prevent last minute blow-ups or delays because of unresolved issues.Â” The key to the process is in its co mprehensive nature. Public involvement during the planning and progr amming phases is done to accomplish several things. These include determination of prio rities, identification of social/economic impacts associated with projects, and identi fication of additional needs or wants associated with the proposed projects. (Virginia Depar tment of Transportation 2004) Public involvement during planning phases deals more with projects and features whereas public involvement during progr amming deals more with prioritization and funding of solutions. The requirements for public invo lvement are derived from Federal requirements for transpor tation planning (23 U.S.C. 134(g)(4) and 23 U.S.C.
88 135(e)(3)) mandating that publi c involvement must employ proactive practices within the context of systematic proces ses; Public involvement processes provide complete information, timely p ublic notice, full public access to key decisions, and supports early and contin uing involvement of the public in developing Statewide and metropolitan tr ansportation plans and programs; public involvement involves a holistic understanding of the environment and community culture; and pub lic involvement processes must be consistent with Title VI of the Civil Right s Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
89 Chapter 4 Survey Results And Analysis Due to the developing nature of secu rity planning nationally and due to the complexity of the project development proc ess in Florida, it was important to provide some relevant background rega rding perceptions with respect to transportation security planning, bo th nationally and in Florida. Two methods were used to establish this background. The first was a letter that was mailed to transportation l eaders across the nati on, and the second was an online questionnaire that was co mpleted by professi onals and general public, all of whom are resident s of Florida. This chapter reports on the results of these two instruments. 4.1 State Request Letter The State Request Letter, shown in Ap pendix C, was mailed in November of 2003. This letter was mailed to all 50 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. The intent of this letter was to: Establish a contact list of personnel cu rrently dealing with security issues in each state.
90 Determine the level of effort for each state when dealing with security issues. Indicate a state in which to conduct this research based upon development in that state and interest level of its staff. Get an initial indication of the validity of the research. Get an initial indication of the utility of the research. 4.1.1 State Request Letter Responses The results (Table 4-1) are doc umented as No Response, Mailed Response, Emailed Response, or Phone Inte rview. In the case of a response, information is provided to indicate the agencies response and any information provided. Table 4-1 Request Letter Responses California Mailed Response: Gathered and forwarded data concerning security measures/efforts currently being used. Connecticut Mailed Response: They stated they do not "incorporate security consideration in its transportation planning and decision-mak ing processes". However, they did express interest in receiving the final results of this research effort. Florida Phone Interview: They stated that they do not consider security issues during planning. They recommended I speak with the emergency management agencies. They mentioned the possibility for ETDM screening for security. They forwarded information on sea port security and guidelin es for implementation of flexible airport funding, They mostly funded projects rela ted to security, like fencing, camera systems, lighting, etc. They are participa ting in conference call with other states.
91 Table 4-1 (Continued) Request Letter Responses Georgia Mailed Response: Stated they are unwilling to participate at this time. Indiana Mailed Response: They stated that their planning/project programming process is carried systematically by means of a bl end of activities-some more judgment-based (such as reliance on our district personnel's field experience and interaction with local officials and the public), some more analytically based (such as continual evaluation of the entire state highway network usin g FHWA's Highway Ec onomic Requirements System, or HERS program)-to arrive at a list of candidate projects. They mentioned that transportation security may be an explic it factor at the project alternatives' assessment level (e.g., redundancy in major river crossings). They stated that the DOT, as a matter of policy and standards, des igns into its facilities risk-reduction measures for such things as floods (e.g., bridges designed to convey specific, infrequent flood events) and earthquakes (e.g., bridges in SW Indiana receive enhanced earthquake load design requirements). Kentucky Phone Interview: They stated that they have 2 MPO's that border military bases, Ft. Campbell and Ft. Knox. They work with representatives from each through their committees. Airport for Ft. Campbell affected intersection because of flight line. ITS branch handles part of it. There are 15 area development districts, which are local planning offices. These districts deal with Safety as part of agenda. They have only had presentations about security but it is not part of their normal focus. Unique issue is planning of vice presidential debate held in Danfield where they worked closely with security forces to assess needs including parking garages and speech needs. New Mexico Phone Interview: State has formed a "sec urity task force" to deal with security issues. New York Emailed Response: They stated that they are unsure of the organizational structure in terms of security planning and that th ey were not aware of any single point of contact because it is being handled by se veral departments. They are currently consolidating policy. Ohio Mailed Response: Forwarded copy of "draft" chapter on "Transportation Security" from their Long Range Plan. The information summarizes ODOT's program, policies, and procedures relative to security.
92 Table 4-1 (Continued) Request Letter Responses Oregon Mailed Response: They forwarded information from draft guidelines that they were preparing concerning security operations as part of the Oregon Transportation Plan. They have fo rmed a committee stru cture to discuss security. The committee structure includes a Steering Committee and 3 policy committees, one of which is entitled Safety and Security. Pennsylvania Phone Interview: They do work in emergen cy response. They are structured as highway department. They have Volpe center doing a gap analysis to look at where they are, best practices, current guidance for transportation security. One areas already touching on was confidentia lity of bridge plans but havenÂ’t started changing bridge plans. They will identify critical infrastructure, do common sense types of things. Nothing yet on planning & programming. One thing to come out of study will be organizati onal structure issues. Ar e amateurs going to do the jobs of professionals? On highway side may involve tunnels, bridges, facilities. They also run DMV and there is licensing stolen plates, etc... issues. Motor carriers carrying inappropriate materials, bad routes, improper labels. Planning & Programming will be focused on highway side. How to deal with funding, emergency response, training, material location beyond the normal natural disaster. One issue that they deal with is nuclear generating stations that they have. Who plows radioactive snow? They have been talking to different states to find out what each state is doing diffe rently, how they ar e organized and what advice can they give to Pennsylvania DOT. They are only dealing with broad brush themes. Some states have staff de voted full time looking for money. They contacted only select states that are considered leaders. Tennessee Phone Interview: They responded with a list of contacts concerning security response efforts. Washington Phone Interview: They responded with a list of contacts concerning security response efforts. They have developed a Â“Gray Note BookÂ”, which is used as an accountability tool. Washington DC Phone Interview: They stated that securi ty was being discussed from 2 different perspectives (1) infrastructure protection and (2) emergency preparedness. They are discussing ITS regional architecture, partnerships, stakeholders that cross all disciplines, similar to hurricane arena. Request letters were mailed to all 50 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. Of those 52 entities, 14 re sponded in some fashion (Figure 4-1). The states that responded include Califo rnia, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, and Washington, D.C. This equates to a 27% response
93 rate. Of those responding, only Georgia declined participation or discussion of security planning. 4.1.2 Request Letter Analysis The first objective of the State R equest Letter was to establish a list of personnel currently deali ng with security issues in each st ate. As a result of this effort, a contact database was generated and is contained in Appendix B. A more long-term benefit of this effort is that this contact list can be used in further analysis of this topic area. Another purpose of developing th is list of planning, security, and emergency management personnel was to establish the leve l of effort that each state is putting forth in the area of transpor tation security planning. As evidenced by the responses, only a very few states had initiated efforts along this path. Most of the states that responded were in vesting the majority of their efforts and funding towards operations and ma intenance and were concerned with retrofitting their existing facilities. Also, based upon the responses and the activity of each state with regards to transportation security planning, the results of this effort confirmed the approach of using Florida and their proce sses as the basis of study and analysis for this research effort.
94 This request letter, through the lack of response and indication of little effort being expended by the stat es, demonstrated that this is a topic area that is largely unexplored nat ionally. Of the 52 letters ma iled, 38 states (approximately 73%) did not respond to multiple efforts to contact them regarding the subject. This clearly demonstrated the validity of the research effort. There was also a large interest, from those states that responded, to receive the results of this research effort. All of the states that responded, except for Georgia, gave an initial indication that this res earch had utility in their states. Figure 4-1 State Request Letter Response No Response Participated Did Not ParticipateLegend
95 4.2 Online Questionnaire The online questionnaire (http:// home.earthlink.net/~securityplanning/ ) was developed and administered to obtai n general public perceptions about security concerns in Flori da. Public perception is an important consideration as related to the Project Development Proce ss in Florida. Public Involvement is mandated throughout the proces s and, as long as there are no overriding safety concerns involved, can greatly influenc e the outcome of a PD&E Study. It is necessary to consider the results of the online questionnaire as a means of understanding the perceptions about securi ty that Floridians possess and how that may affect the proj ect development process. There were some basic principles (Figure 4-2) revealed with respect to how Floridians perceive transportation planning in their state. Figure 4-2 Online Questionnaire Observations Floridians will participate in security programs Overall sense of loss of control over security Some advances in Security are being made Floridians feel fairly safe
96 Chapter 5 Revised Project Development Process This chapter will serve as a supple ment to FloridaÂ’s PD&E Manual and will address how to adequately c onsider and incorporate trans portation security into FloridaÂ’s PD&E process. The Project Development Process has been modified, as shown in Figure 5-1, to reflect thos e considerations. T he following sections will address each of those steps, identify th e Â“DeficiencyÂ” associated with each step, determine a Â“Security SolutionÂ” to properly deal with the deficiency, and then explain the Â“Benefit Â” of the solution.
97 Figure 5-1 Revised Project Development Process Need Advance Notification Existing Conditions Class Of Action Alternatives Development Social Impacts Alternatives Screening Public Workshop Public Hearing Documentation Publication Select Preferred Alternative Engineering Impacts Environmental Impacts Security Impacts Modified Process Existing ProcessLEGEND Initialization Phase Data Collection Phase Analysis Phase Finalization Phase Informational Phase
98 5.1 Revised Initialization Phase The AN Process should be modified to eliminate certain exclusions (Figure 5-2). Figure 5-2 Project Type Exclusion Modification Deficiency: The exclusion of certain types projects from the AN process allows a project, especially a safety or signalization project, to progress without review from critical security agencies. This is especially important when many signalization projects now involve advanced technologies such as ITS and complicated fiber optic networks. Security Solution: Safety projects, signalization projects and NonMajor State Actions (NMSA) must comply with the Advance Notification (AN) process. Benefit: All projects will be review ed for security concerns. This will ensure coordination and communication and no projects will fall in the gaps. The AN response system should be modified to provide an active response requirement (Figure 5-3).
99 Figure 5-3 AN Response System Modification Deficiency: The AN response syst em is a passive response system and any agency failing to respond is considered to have no concerns or involvement. Security Solution: Implement an active response system that requires a written response from all agencies on the distribution list, regardless of involvement in the project. Benefit: This will ensure review by qualified personnel. Security concerns will not fall victim to lack of time or personnel. The AN Fact Sheet should be modified to add a section providing security comments (Figure 5-4). The form should be modified as shown in Figure 5-5.
100 Figure 5-4 AN Fact Sheet Modification Deficiency: The AN Fact Sheet does not currently contain a specific section for discussion of security considerations. Security Solution: Modify the AN Fact Sheet to include a section to indicate whether the project may involve critical infrastructure, critical corridors, or other potential targets of terrorist acts. Benefit: All agencies will know about the potential security concerns and allocate resources more efficiently and effectively. Figure 5-5 Modified AN Form __________________________ ____________ ___________ 6.Security: Does this project involve critical infrastructure, critical co rridors, or other potential targets of terrorist acts? _______Yes________No The AN process should be modified to not require inclusion of any graphical exhibit that may represent sensit ive security information (Figure 5-6).
101 Figure 5-6 Graphical Exhibit Modification Deficiency: The current process requires certain graphical elements to orient the recipient to the project and its associated issues. Security Solution: Do not include graphical or detailed representation of any security sensitive sites, those that are deemed Â“Critical InfrastructureÂ” by the State of Florida, in the Advance Notification (AN) package or any other published document. Rely on the security agency to review their secure databases and provide a fatal flaw analysis of the project. Benefit: This will protect sensitive information and reduce the risk of additional circulation of AN. The LAP Program should be modified to require ETAT review of all projects conducted using t he program (Figure 5-7).
102 Figure 5-7 LAP Program Modification Deficiency: As the use of the LAP increases, there is a dependency, from the FDOT, on city or county staff to provide all of the required expertise necessary to satisfactorily conduct a PD&E study. Most cities and counties do not have the adequately trained personnel to deal with security concerns on a state level. Security Solution: Require all LAP participants to adhere to all of the security considerations discussed in this research and that their ability to implement these considerations is a deciding factor in their LAP approval. Benefit: This will reinforce the core process and allow a complete review of projects, regardless of funding sources. The private development proce ss should be modified to require compliance with all FDOT requirements (Figure 5-8).
103 Figure 5-8 Private Development Modification Deficiency: In Florida, more and more agencies are looking to PublicPrivate-Partnerships as a means to accelerate project construction and to aid with funding delays or deficits. Currently, privately funded projects use their own processes to document compliance with NEPA. Security Solution: Require privately funded projects to adhere to the same processes involving security review as those publicly funded projects, especially if there is any potential for transference of ownership of the facility to the government. Make demonstration of compliance with FDOT processes mandatory before ownership can be transferred. Benefit: This will protect the FDOT from liability associated with lack of due diligence regarding security concerns. Local comprehensive planning efforts should reflect security planning elements (Figure 5-9).
104 Figure 5-9 Local Comprehensive Planning Modification Deficiency: A proposed alternative must be consistent with local planning efforts when establishing need. Currently, local plans do not contain a security element not does it address security concerns on specific projects mentioned in their planning efforts. Security Solution: The local planning efforts must be updated to reflect the necessary short-term and long-term security needs for their regions. Otherwise, proposed alternatives involving security considerations cannot be consistent with local planning efforts. Benefit: This will force local governments to direct resources towards identification and planning of critical assets. 5.2 Revised Data Collection Phase The COA form should be modified to reflect security impacts (Figure 5-10). The resulting form should incl ude those items shown in Figure 5-11.
105 Figure 5-10 COA Form Modification Deficiency: The current COA form does not reflect any consideration of transportation security in its evaluation of appropriate level of effort or documentation in the PD&E process. Security Solution: The potential risk to the proposed project from either a man-made or natural disaster should be included in the determination of the level of study required to analyze the project. A section should be added to the COA form, page 3, in Section 6 (Â“Impact EvaluationÂ”) that addresses security concerns for a particular proposed project. Benefit: This will allow a security concern to dictate the COA of a particular project and thereby potentially allow a greater level of analysis. Figure 5-11 Modified COA Form F. SECURITY1.Stand-Off Distance[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 2.Access Restriction[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 3.Time on Target Reduction[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 4.Protection of Key Elements[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 5.Role in Economy[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 6.Replacement Cost[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 7.Lost Time[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 8.Visibility[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 9.National Symbol[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 10.National Defense[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 11.Site Hazards[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 12.Interdependency[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 13.Maintenance[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 14.Operations[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 15.Vulnerability[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 16.Community Impact[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
106 5.3 Revised Analysis Phase The corridor analysis process should be modified to consider security needs (Figure 5-12). The list of reviewers should list t hose shown in Table 5-1. Figure 5-12 Corridor Analysis Modification Deficiency: Security should a primary consideration when considering a new corridor. Related to corridor analysis is the concept of corridor preservation. The FDOT has established a procedure for preserving land for the future needs of infrastructure and the transportation systems. As development in Florida accelerates, there is a great potential for development of land that, due to geographic location, is critical to the future needs of FloridaÂ’s transportation network. This process does not currently provide for security as a viable motivation for corridor preservation. Security Solution: Security experts should review the proposed corridors for potential concerns or fatal flaws. Amend the corridor preservation process to allow for advanced right-of-way acquisition, or at least easements acquisition, to preserve the continuity of necessary transportation corridors from both connectivity and security perspectives. Benefit: This will ensure review by qualified personnel. Security concerns will not fall victim to lack of resources.
107 Table 5-1 Recommended Security Agency Reviewers 1. Federal Motor Carrier Safe ty Administration (FMCSA) 2. Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) 3. Federal Transit Administration (FTA) 4. Maritime Admini stration (MARAD) 5. National Highway Traffic Sa fety Administration (NHTSA) 6. Pipeline & Hazardous Material s Safety Administration (PHMSA) 7. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 8. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 9. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 10. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Office of National Security Coordination 11. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Preparedness Division 12. Local Emergency Management Agencies The ETDM tool should be modified to provide a security screening module (Figure 5-13). Figure 5-13 ETDM Modification Deficiency: The ETDM does not currently use any security based evaluation criteria for identification or project issues nor do any security qualified personnel participate in the electronic screening efforts. Security Solution: A security screening module should be included in the program that would allow security experts to be involved in the process of screening alternatives. This module should be attached to both the Planning and Programming Screens. Benefit: This would allow those security personnel assigned to the ETAT to review the project with regards to security and provide selection of the best alternative.
108 The ETAT membership should be m odified to require participation of security experts on the committee (Figure 5-14). Figure 5-14 ETAT Membership Modification Deficiency: The ETAT does contain members of law enforcement and emergency response, but does not include anyone who is trained and qualified to make security assessments. Security Solution: Because of the internet based review process, it would be simple for an expert, located anywhere in the United States, to review projects. Therefore, requi re a representative from the same agencies that are added to the review phase also participate electronically via the internet. Benefit: This would ensure that a properly qualified individual is reviewing projects for security concerns and allow rapid update of that information via the internet.
109 A GIS layer should be developed to r epresent critical in frastructure and other facilities that represent secu rity considerations (Figure 5-15). Figure 5-15 GIS Layer Modification Deficiency: The ETDM screening tools depend on members on the team to ensure accuracy of data available from their own respective agencies for screening alternatives. There currently exists no data layer available with regards to critical infrastructure because there is no security representation either in ETAT or the ETDM process. Security Solution: This data could consist of Geographic Information System (GIS) data or other data deemed relevant. The FDOT should develop a security based, GIS layer that could be easily overlaid onto proposed projects as an initial screening tool to determine fatal flaws in proposed projects or alternatives. Benefit: This will allow ETAT members to determine fatal flaws with particular projects or alternatives early in the process and continuously throughout the process.
110 The evaluation matrix s hould be modified to account for security costs and considerations (Figure 5-16). Figure 5-16 Evaluation Matrix Modification Deficiency: The evaluation matrix and the minimum requirements for such, used to evaluate alternatives, do not consider security issues in the evaluation of alternatives. Security Solution: Include the following factors in the evaluation matrix: (1) Overall cost of security provisions, which would consist of all design, construction, maintenance, and operations costs associated with recommended improvements to prot ect infrastructure, and (2) a qualitative assessment of whether a particular alternative involves a higher likelihood of attractiveness or vulnerability as a result of recommended improvements. Benefit: This will indicate to the pub lic that there are security concerns associated with particular alter natives and allow them to see the impacts of those concerns on the decision making process.
111 The list of standard eval uation criteria should be modified to reflect security considerations (Figure 5-17). T he list should include th e 16 factors listed in Table 5-2. Figure 5-17 Evaluation Factors Modification Deficiency: There are many evaluation factors that are typically evaluated in Florida. They are largely standardized and are outlined in the PD&E Manual. There are no evaluation criteria for security considerations. Security Solution: Include a list of standard security evaluation criteria in the overall list of evaluation criteria. Benefit: These new criteria will provide both qualitative and quantitative measures that will allow a proper screening of alternatives based on security concerns.
112 Table 5-2 Security Evaluation Criteria Criteria Evaluation Costs Benefits Stand-Off Distance Cost associated with provision of adequate stand-off distance (Sufficient distance as determined by the most current criteria). Acquisition of additional rightof-way not required otherwise Modification of horizontal alignment Corridor preservation Increased corridor security Reduction of primary and secondary impacts to transportation facility and adjacent facilities Reduced vulnerability Access Restriction Cost associated with the limitation of access to critical areas such as transportation system or adjacent critical infrastructure (i.e. petroleum tank farms, chemical plants) Limitation of access (connecting facilities) Improved barrier systems to prevent deviation from established corridors Reduced vulnerability Detection Deterrence Time-onTarget Cost associated with the reduction of allowable delay time along specific corridors that may be within the allowable stand-off distance Reduction of facility features (shoulders on roadways) Increased speed limits Increased enforcement activity Increased surveillance Increased security Reduced vulnerability Deterrence
113 Table 5-2 (Continued) Security Evaluation Criteria Criteria Evaluation Costs Benefits Protection of Key Elements Cost of protection of critical infrastructure through attack on key elements such as bridge pilings. Hardening costs Increased maintenance costs Applies to manmade and natural disasters Reduced vulnerability Economic Role Impact of loss of the facility or of reduced capacity on the local or regional economy. This is a qualitative factor that can be assessed as Low, Medium, or High for comparative purposes. Redundancy Network Development Applies to manmade and natural disasters Accurate budgeting Efficient funding allocation Encourage asset hardening by other parties Replacement Cost Evaluate the potential cost to replace the infrastructure. Value assessments Updates to assessments Applies to manmade and natural disasters Lost Time Cost associated with increased travel time or other delays caused by the loss of the facility. Travel time studies Redundancy Applies to manmade and natural disasters Network flexibility Multi-use capability Visibility Costs associated with economic losses, caused by a loss of a facility, associated with public perception. Value assessments Identification of public concerns Monitoring of public opinion Applies to manmade and natural disasters Accurate budgeting Efficient funding allocation
114 Table 5-2 (Continued) Security Evaluation Criteria Criteria Evaluation Costs Benefits National Symbol Impact associated with the loss of a facility deemed a national symbol. This is a qualitative factor that can be assessed as Low, Medium, or High for comparative purposes. Any alternative ranking Medium or High should not be considered feasible. Access restrictions Route circuity Hardening Shielding National morale Encourage asset hardening by other parties National Defense Importance of the facility to national defense, primarily related to transportation of needed resources. Facilities that are on Strategic Highway Network (STRAHNET). This is a qualitative factor that can be assessed as Low, Medium, or High for comparative purposes. Priority treatment Design restrictions Higher standards Protects STRAHNET Allows increased response efficiency
115 Table 5-2 (Continued) Security Evaluation Criteria Criteria Evaluation Costs Benefits Site Hazards Impacts associated with the specific site conditions. This may include increased secondary damages resulting from on-site storage of hazardous materials. This is a qualitative factor that can be assessed as Low, Medium, or High for comparative purposes. The ranges for each category will be determined by the types of hazards present. Database of site conditions Update site conditions database Applies to manmade and natural disasters Encourage asset hardening by other parties Interdependency Costs associated with reduction of service of other elements of the infrastructure as a result of the loss of this facility. Communication equipment compatibility Redundancy Increased coordination Study requirements beyond the immediate project area Applies to manmade and natural disasters Improvements to alternative modes Encourages multi-modal consideration to meet needs
116 Table 5-2 (Continued) Security Evaluation Criteria Criteria Evaluation Costs Benefits Maintenance Costs associated with additional maintenance of protective measures. Increased maintenance costs over the life of the infrastructure Accurate budgeting Efficient funding allocation Operations Costs associated with additional operations of protective measures. Infrastructure Human resources Equipment Training Accurate budgeting and allocation Effective communication Increase responsiveness Applies to manmade and natural disasters Vulnerability Impact associated with a change in vulnerability of an asset as a result of the developed alternatives. This is a qualitative factor that can be assessed as Low, Medium, or High for comparative purposes. Assessment Resolution Tracking Decrease vulnerability Encourage asset hardening by other parties. Community Impact Impact to community function and integrity. This is a qualitative factor that can be assessed as Low, Medium, or High for comparative purposes. Hazards Analysis Monitoring of public concerns Public acceptance of project Ability to accurately access impacts
117 5.4 Revised Finalization Phase The distribution of the environmenta l documentation for review should be modified to include certain agencies (Fig ure 5-18). The agencies that should be included are shown in Table 5-1. Figure 5-18 Environmental Document Review Modification Deficiency: All Draft Environmental Impact Statements (DEIS) and Final Environmental Impact Statements (FEIS) are circulated to a determined group of government agencies for their review. These agencies address the historical aspects of transportation planning but do not adequately provide input from those agencies concerned with transportation security. Security Solution: Security experts from several agencies should be involved in the review of these significant projects. Benefit: This will ensure review by qualified personnel. Security concerns will not fall victim to lack of resources. A security document should be developed to adequately document the decision making process as related to transportation security (Figure 5-19).
118 Figure 5-19 Security Documentation Modification Deficiency: There is no mechanism, document, or report that is currently produced to chronicle the decisions that were made on alternatives development, analysis, and selection with regards to transportation security. This cannot be accomplished in the traditionally published documents such as the PER or the environmental document due to the sensitive nature of the information. Security Solution: Develop a technical memorandum or report entitled Â“Security Assessment ReportÂ” (SAR) to fully document the decisionmaking process for security based decisions. This information would then become a controlled informational items treated similarly to bridge reports. Benefit: This will document decision making process related to security concerns and allow reproduction of those decisions at a later date. 5.5 Revised Informational Phase Security experts should receive final distribution of the final environmental and security documentation (Figure 5-20). The distribution list should include those listed in Table 5-1.
119 Figure 5-20 Final Distributi on Modification Deficiency: The final version of the Environmental Document is sent to reviewing agencies for their files and for incorporation into their planning efforts. However, security experts from several agencies are not currently on the distribution list. Security Solution: Security experts from several agencies should be involved in the distribution list for the final environmental documents. Benefit: This will ensure review by qualified personnel. Security concerns will not fall victim to lack of resources. 5.6 Revised Public Involvement Considerations Revisions to the Public Involvement Process should be made that would allow adequate response by the public (Figure 5-21).
120 Figure 5-21 Public Involvement Modification Deficiency: With the widespread diversity of the Florida population, there is a strong interest in accommodating the needs of both the Spanish and English-speaking populations in the state. Therefore, all transportation initiatives must consider the influence of these population characteristics prior to implementation of any new processes or strategies that are likely to impact the population as a whole. Most importantly, transportation planners must involve the general public in some aspects of the development process as a means of identifying new areas of influence and the overall direction of transportation throughout the state. Security Solution: Security measures that lead to implementation must evolve slowly, taking the population and their needs into consideration, such as language barriers and tourist limitations. Therefore, security enhancements must be well publicized throughout all transportation channels as a means of promoting t hese changes in all areas of the state. Transportation users must experience a sense of confidence and support for these initiatives, and if they are introduced gradually to the general public, their impact will be even greater and more widespread. Benefit: Will allow solutions that meet the needs of a multi-cultural state where growth and tourism can dramatically change the face public opinion over a short period of time. An education program should be devel oped to train proj ect personnel on process for security information dissemination (Figure 5-22).
121 Figure 5-22 Information Dissemination Modification Deficiency: The challenge with regards to transportation security is in the discussion of how much and what kind of information can be revealed to the public in order to convince them that the best, most secure, alternative is being chosen. This has to be done without violating any federal or state laws with regards to secure information dissemination. Security Solution: Efforts should be made during the implementation of the entire public involvement phase to screen information for appropriateness. In order to educate staff, training should be conducted that will inform them of the appropriate types of information that can be given to the public. Also, all information should be reviewed by appropriate security personnel prior to being released to the public or media. This should occur at project milestones which may include the community awareness memorandum, a public information meeting, a project website, a project newsletter, or a public hearing. Benefit: This will increase information security and standardize, through education and process, information dissemination. The modified PD&E process descr ibed in this chapter will enable practitioners to adequately consider security in the project development process. The cost of implementation will be minimal. These changes can be accomplished in a short time frame wit hout jeopardizing the existing methods and results.
122 Chapter 6 Findings And Next Steps 6.1 Key Findings Based upon this research effort, there are three (3) key findings. The most critical findings in clude the criteria to evaluate a project based upon security, the necessity for adequate partici pation by other federal agencies, and the consideration of public opinion and input into th e modified process. These findings were based upon exhaus tive efforts to determine the most critical needs and opportunities that lie in the existing process, thereby enabling realistic integration of security considerations with minimal change to the existing organizational culture. After completion of this research effort, a vetting phase ensued wherein the reasonable ness and effectiveness of the modified process was discussed with transportation practi tioners in Florida. Based upon conversations with leading transportation officials with the FDOT and private security consultants, there is a distinct need for security considerations in the development process and it is expected t hat there will be great interest in implementation of the modifi ed process. The inoculat ion of security into the project development process will take time to mature and take on a stable form in
123 the long term process, but this resear ch effort, based upon post-research interviews, seems to be a necessary step in accomplishing those goals. 6.1.1 Security Evaluation Criteria This research effort has resulted in a project security evaluation toolbox that can be immediately applied to Fl oridaÂ’s project devel opment process with minimal efforts. The sixtee n (16) evaluation criteria w ill allow project participants to practically evaluate the reasonablene ss and feasibility of projects within a security framework. They will provide a means to accurately estimate potential impacts, both social and economic, asso ciated with both man-made and natural disasters. These assessments will al low accurate budget ing and efficient allocation of resources. These new criter ia will sensitize planners to the security needs of transportation projects and will re sult in decreased vulnerability and increased safety and security. 6.1.2 Agency Review Involvement A critical factor to the success of this modified project development process lies in the will ingness and ability for key agencies and personnel to participate in the process. The basic re quirement that projects be reviewed by qualified, competent staff that has access to the information they need to properly and accurately review projects is paramount. This need exists in every
124 phase of the modified process. The effe ctiveness of the modi fied process cannot be realized if we depend on other discipl ines (i.e. safety engineering) to determine applicability of security a ccommodations during the development process. The modified process gives an efficient venue in which agencies can readily participate with minimal resource commitment. The phased implementation process allo ws acclimation and adequate preparation during the move towards full utilization. 6.1.3 Revision/Clarificati on Of Public Involvement Security is a public issue. It is impo ssible to properly consider security in the project development process without fu lly considering the impact of public participation in the proc ess, especially when the process mandates public involvement. The selection of the preferr ed project or the viabi lity of project need can be controlled by public opinion alone, as long as a safety issue is not involved. It is imperative that, during t he modified project development process, we continue to involve the public and make the process as transparent as possible. The modified process does not change the requirements for public involvement; it simply adds another focal po int for practitioners. The efforts to involve and educate the public of secu rity consideration during project development must continue, especially when Floridians are struggling to understand all of the im plications that security has on their daily lives. These
125 efforts will manifest themselves in the proj ect evaluation and selection process, in public workshops and hearings, and in other efforts to inform the public. 6.2 Next Steps This research effort can be applie d immediately in order to consider security in FloridaÂ’s project development pr ocess. As the topic of security and planning continue to develop at a rapi d pace, so will the needs for continued efforts along this line of study. Thes e needs will include validation of the process, implementation efforts, future research needs, participation by local governments, and application of revised processes. 6.2.1 Validation There are three apparent methods to validate the revised process. One method would include the use of a panel of experts to review the existing and modified processes and comment on its ut ility and effectiveness. This panel could consist of FDOT PD&E personnel, representatives from the federal agencies involved in transportation pl anning and security (Appendix F), designated security personnel from t he local and state governments, and recognized national security experts. The panel would provide important feedback in order to further develop the process. However, there will be a great reluctance on the part of local, state, and fe deral agencies to officially review and
126 comment on the procedure d ue to perceived endorsement and the liability associated with that perc eption. During the cour se of this study, this phenomenon was experienced several times and would therefore be expected to occur during implementation. Another method that could be used to validate the model would be to exhume completed projects apply the revised process, and determine what changes would occur in the process and where those changes happened. This would allow further devel opment of the process and possibly determine certain threshold criteria for implementation of t he process. However, the only way in which this would work would be to have the additional federal security agencies (Table 5-1) participate in the process as if this were a new project. The likelihood of this occurring, given the resource c hallenges of most feder al agencies, would be remote. Most of those agencies expend all of their resources interacting with current projects and could not afford to invest additional resources in past projects. Participation would be mi nimal and would t herefore not prove informational. A final method would be the use of pilot projects along with a phased implementation plan. This would allow governmental ent ities to participate in an official capacity, within the boundaries of their duties and respons ibilities, and be expending resources on active projects This method would prove the most
127 realistic and proper way to advance this re search effort to the next level of analysis. 6.2.2 Implementation Implementation of new policies and procedures occurs through pilot projects in Florida. There have been seve ral other initiatives, like ETDM and ITS, that have followed the same process and have been successfully implemented within the state. It is expected that the revised project development process would follow this same path. It is envis ioned that a certain number of sample projects would begin to utilize the new process on an annual basis with the ultimate intent of widespread utilization in the next 3 to 5 y ears. The mitigating factor of the revised process is that it does alleviate or relieve practitioners from fulfilling the requirements of the existing pr ocess. This means that if a problem occurs on a pilot project, the existing syst em can be used to complete the project as normal. Organizational change, especially in the public sector, can sometimes take long periods of time. This research effort was undertaken with the intent of working within the existing organizational framework in order to reduce the amount of change that needed to occur. Th is would allow greater acceptance of the revised processes and allow immediat e implementation at some scale. The revised process does not require any new committees to be formed, new
128 software to be developed, new infrastr ucture to be acquired, or any new employees to be hired. The greatest am ount of change that will be required will lie in changing the thought processes of those conducting the studies. There will be additional efforts and ener gy expended for the incr eased coordination and communication, but no additiona l expertise is required for this to occur. The changes to existing chapters of the PD &E Manual are minimal, with only form changes and additional procedure in tegration to occur. Attention will have to be given to par ticipation by the additional federal agencies. As it stands, there would be li ttle motivation for th em to expend the additional efforts to review large num bers of projects above their normal workloads. The phased implementation pl an will help reduce the amount of additional review time and personnel needed at the onset of the program. The FDOT should encourage the lead federal a gency, typically the FHWA or FTA, to encourage participation by its sibling federal agencies. This encouragement from other agencies and the impli ed liability associated with the reluctance to participate in such an impor tant program should generat e sufficient interest and response to the program. It is also noted that many of the federal agencies could easily and quickly determine if they had any facilities involved with the proposed project through the use of the online ETDM screening tool. ETDM would provide them with location information and they co uld quickly discount involvement of
129 certain agencies. For example, the C BP could readily determine an assessment of no involvement if the project did not involve a national border. 6.2.3 Future Research Needs This research is the initial effort at incorporating securi ty considerations into the project development process. In order to fully develop and deploy security to our nationÂ’s infrastructure, additional research mu st be done. There must be additional research on the integration of technol ogy into the process to allow detection, deterrence, and response. The public involvement process must be reviewed for determination of adequate public education and involvement levels. The interaction of land use with security and transportation networks must be explored. Methods and cost s of hardening existing and proposed infrastructure must be developed. Fundi ng priorities must be established and a funding implementation plan written. A system of metrics should be developed in order to allow planners to accurately estimate costs and impacts associated with security considerations. The legal ra mifications of security concerns must be structured to include responsibility and liability. 6.2.4 Local Participation The revised process does not require a dramatic increase in resource needs from the local government agencies. Since the revised process works
130 within the existing process, little new reso urces are required. There are already several initiatives underway by local gov ernments to inventory and assess critical infrastructure and security sensitiv e sites within their geographic area of responsibility. However, in order to make the revised process efficient and effective, there is a minimum amount of data that would need to be collected. The minimum data to be collected would c onsist of location and descriptions of those facilities, both existing and planned, listed in Table 6-1. This data should be collected and made available in some electronic format, preferably as a GIS layer.
131 Table 6-1 Minimum Data Collection 1. Bridges 2. Tunnels 3. Essential interchange structures 4. Technological or other monitoring infrastructure 5. Traffic management centers 6. Telecommunications networks or hubs 7. Utilities, such as power or natural gas 8. Tourist attractions 9. Public transportation networks and hubs 10. Transportation networks 11. National landmarks 12. Industrial sites, such as chemical or nuclear plants 13. Commercial traffic hubs, such as container ports 14. Significant environm ental protection areas 15. Water supplies 16. Banking and financ ial institutions 17. Agricultural/Food producing facilities 6.2.5 National Applicability Of Research There are two elements of application t hat must to be addressed. The first is that of spatial transferab ility and the second is that of application transferability. The Florida Project Devel opment Process is sometimes used as a model of a complete and thorough satisfaction of t he requirements of NE PA. The nature of the PD&E manual is that of a framework for addressing the necessary elements of NEPA. The PD&E Manual was dev eloped as an agreement between the FHWA and the FDOT and reflects satisf action of NEPA for roadway projects. The PD&E Manual does not present a detailed prescr iption of quantitative and qualitative factors. Instead, it establishes the pr ocess and allows the user to
132 apply industry standards, st andard practice, and local conditions to the formulation of reasonable and feasible alternatives and the selection of a preferred alternative. Because of th is, the process lends itself to easy transference to any other state in the nati on. All states must comply with NEPA and, because of the flexibility of the process in accommodating site specific conditions, this revised process can be employed effectively anywhere. This flexibility also allows the process to be applied to different modes. Even though the process in Florida is commonly used fo r roadway facilities, this method would prove effective for any mode of transportation. It could even be used for private developments to include sites and facilities.
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146 Program Management Handbook (Oct ober 18, 2002), Â“Metropolitan Transportation OrganizationÂ”. Public Law 104-88 (December 29, 1995), Â“Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995Â”, 104th Congress. Public Law 105-178 (June 9, 1998), Â“Tr ansportation Equity Act for the 21st CenturyÂ”, 105th Congress. Public Law 107-296 (Novem ber 25, 2002), Â“Homeland Security Act of 2002Â”, 107th Congress. Public Law 107-71 (November 19, 2001), Â“Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001Â”, 107th Congress. Public Law 108-426 (Novem ber 30, 2004), Â“Norman Y. Mineta Research and Special Programs Improv ement Act of 2004Â”, 108th Congress. The American Association of State Hig hway and Transportation OfficialsÂ’ (AASHTO) Security Task Force as National Cooperative Highway Research Program Project 20-07/Task 151B (May 2002 ). Â“ContractorÂ’s Final Report, A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asse t Identification and ProtectionÂ”, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), Transportation Policy and Analysis Center. The White House (September 2002), Â“T he National Security Strategy of the United States.Â”
147 Transcore (January 1998), Â“Integrating Intelligent Transportation Systems within the Transportation Planning ProcessÂ”. Transportation Research Board (May 2003) Â“Transportation Security: A Summary of TRB Activities.Â” Slide show. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) (September 2002). Â“Strategic Plan for Homeland Se curity.Â” Washington, D.C. United Stated Department of Trans portation (1999), Â“A Guide to Metropolitan Transportation Planning Under ISTEA Â– How to Fit the Pieces TogetherÂ”. United States Code, Title 23 (May 1999), Â“Transportation and Infrastructure CommitteeÂ”. United States Department of Trans portation (2003), Â“Framework for Action: Building the Fully Coordinat ed Human Service Transportation SystemÂ”. United States Department of Transportation (February 2004), Â“Considering Safety in the Tr ansportation Planning ProcessÂ”. United States Department of Tr ansportation (September 1997), Â“Incorporating ITS into Transportation Pla nning: Phase 1 Final ReportÂ”, Federal Highway Administration.
148 United States Department of Tr ansportation and Federal Transit Administration (January 2003), Â“Public Transportation System Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide.Â” United States General Accounting Of fice (USGAO) (GAO-03-502). (May 2003). Â“Transportation Security Research Coordination Needed in Selecting and Implementing Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments.Â” Report to Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives United States General Accounting Offi ce (USGAO) (GAO03-616T). (April 1, 2003), Dillingham, Gerald L., Directo r, Physical Infrastructures Issues, Â“Transportation Security, Post Sept ember 11th Initiatives and Long-Term Challenges.Â” Testimony before the National Commission on Terrorist Attack Upon the United States Wegmann, Frederick J., Ph.D., (2004), Â“The Role of Security in The Surface Transportation Programming ProcessÂ”, Southeastern Transportation Center Â– Issues in Transportation Security
150 Appendix A: Acronyms Table A-1 List Of Acronyms AASHO American Association of State Highway Officials AASHTO American Association of St ate Highway and Transportation Officials AN Advance Notification APTA American Public Transportation Association ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials ATA American Trucking Association BTS Bureau of Transportation Statistics CAAA Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990 CATEX Categorical Exclusion CBP Customs and Border Protection CDR Corridor Development Report CE Categorical Exclusion CEI Construction Engineering & Inspection CEMO Central Environm ental Management Office CEQ Council on Environmental Quality COA Class of Action
Appendix A (Continued) 151 Table A-1 (Continued) List Of Acronyms Consultation Consultation means that one party confers with another identified party and, prior to ta king action(s), considers that party's views. Cooperation Cooperation means that the parti es involved in carrying out the planning, programmi ng and management systems processes work together to achieve a common goal or objective. Coordination Coordination means the comp arison of the transportation plans, programs, and schedules of one agency with related plans, programs and schedules of other agencies or entities with legal standing, a nd adjustment of plans, programs and schedules to achieve general consistency. CPDR Corridor Planning and Design Report CRAS Cultural Resource Assessment Survey CSER Contamination Scr eening Evaluation Report CTAA Community Transportation Association of America CTBSSP Commercial Truck and Bus Safety Synthesis Program CUTR Center for Urban Transportation Research DEIS Draft Environmental Impact Statement DEMO District Environmental Management Office DHS Department of Homeland Security EA Environmental Assessment
Appendix A (Continued) 152 Table A-1 (Continued) List Of Acronyms EIS Environmental Impact Statement ESBA Endangered Species Biological Assessment EST Environmental Screening Tool ETAT Environmental Technical Advisory Team FAA Federal Aviation Administration FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FCMP FloridaÂ’s Coastal Management Program FEIS Final Environmental Impact Statement FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FHWA Federal Highway Administration FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration FRA Federal Railroad Administration FTA Federal Transit Administration FTP Florida Transportation Plan FY Fiscal Year GIS Geographic Information Systems HSIP Highway Safety Improvement Program ISTEA Intermodal Surface Transpor tation Efficiency Act of 1991
Appendix A (Continued) 153 Table A-1 (Continued) List Of Acronyms ITE Institute of Tr ansportation Engineers ITS Intelligent Transportation System LBR Legislative Budget Request LHR Location Hydraulics Report MARAD Maritime Administration MIS Major Investment Study MPO Metropolitan Planning Organization NCHRP National Cooperative Hig hway Research Program NEPA National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 NHTSA National Highway Transit Research and Development Program NMSA Non-Major State Action NRCS Natural Resource Conservation Service NSA National Security Agency NTSB National Transportation Safety Board OFW Outstanding Florida Waterway OST Office of the Secretary PD&E Project Development & Environment PDO Program Development Office
Appendix A (Continued) 154 Table A-1 (Continued) List Of Acronyms PER Preliminary E ngineering Report PHMSA Pipeline & Hazardous Mate rials Safety Administration Plan Transportation Plan PPP Public-Private Partnerships Programmatic Type 1 Ca tegorical Exclusion PSR Pond Siting Report RITA Research and Innovativ e Technology Administration SAE Society of Automotive Engineers SEIR State Environmental Impact Report SLSDC Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation STB Surface Transportation Board STIP Statewide Transporta tion Improvement Program STRAHNET Strategic Highway Network TCRP Transit Cooperative Research Program TEA-21 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century TIP Transportation Im provement Program TRB Transportation Research Board TSA Transportation Security Administration
Appendix A (Continued) 155 Table A-1 (Continued) List Of Acronyms TSI Transportation Safety Institute TSM Transportation System Management USDOT United States Depar tment of Transportation USF University of South Florida VOLPE John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center WER Wetlands Evaluation Report
156 Appendix B: List Of State Security Contacts Table B-1 List Of State Security Contacts Alabama Transportation Planning Engineer Alabama Department Of Transportation Alaska Planning and Program Administrator Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facilities Arizona Director Arizona Department Of Transportation Arkansas Director Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department California Division Manager California Department Of Transportation Colorado Manager Colorado Department Of Transportation Connecticut Chief Connecticut Department Of Transportation Delaware Director Delaware Department Of Transportation District of Columbia Chief District of Columbia Department Of Transportation Florida Director Florida Department Of Transportation Florida District Planning Manager Florida Department Of Transportation Florida Director of Production Florida Department Of Transportation
Appendix B (Continued) 157 Table B-1 (Continued) List Of State Security Contacts Florida District Planning Manager Florida Department Of Transportation Florida District Planning and Environmental Engineer Florida Department Of Transportation Florida Director of Planning and Public Transportation Florida Department Of Transportation Florida District Planning Manager Florida Department Of Transportation Florida District Planning, Public Transportation, and Environmental Management Manager Florida Department Of Transportation Florida District Planning Manager Florida Department Of Transportation Florida District Director of Operations Florida Department Of Transportation Florida District Director of Planning & Production Florida Department Of Transportation Florida District Public Transportation Manager Florida Department Of Transportation Florida District Public Transportation Manager Florida Department Of Transportation Florida District Public Transportation Manager Florida Department Of Transportation
Appendix B (Continued) 158 Table B-1 (Continued) List Of State Security Contacts Florida District Director of Planning & Production Florida Department Of Transportation Florida District Director of Planning & Production Florida Department Of Transportation Florida District Modal Development Administrator Florida Department Of Transportation Florida District Planning and Public Transportation Manager Florida Department Of Transportation Florida District Planning and Public Transportation Manager Florida Department Of Transportation Florida District Director of Planning & Production Florida Department Of Transportation Florida District Public Transportation Manager Florida Department Of Transportation Florida District Director of Planning & Production Florida Department Of Transportation Florida District Director of Planning Florida Department Of Transportation Florida Assistant Secretary for Intermodal Systems Development Florida Department Of Transportation Florida Manager Florida Department Of Transportation
Appendix B (Continued) 159 Table B-1 (Continued) List Of State Security Contacts Florida Project Development Engineer Florida Department Of Transportation Florida District Secretary Florida Department Of Transportation Florida Executive Director Florida Department Of Transportation Florida Manager, District Environmental Management Office Florida Department Of Transportation Florida District Project Development Engineer Florida Department Of Transportation Florida Modal Development Administrator Florida Department Of Transportation Florida Emergency Coordination Officer Florida Department Of Transportation Georgia State Transportation Planning Administrator Georgia Department Of Transportation Hawaii State Transportation Administrator Hawaii Department Of Transportation Idaho Public Involvement Coordinator Idaho Department Of Transportation Illinois Director Illinois Department Of Transportation
Appendix B (Continued) 160 Table B-1 (Continued) List Of State Security Contacts Indiana Chief Indiana Department Of Transportation Iowa Director Iowa Department Of Transportation Kansas Director Kansas Department Of Transportation Kentucky Secretary Kentu cky Transportation Cabinet Louisiana Assistant Secretary Louisiana Department Of Transportation and Development Maine Director Maine Department Of Transportation Maryland Director Maryland Department Of Transportation Massachusetts Director Massachusetts Department Of Transportation Michigan Director Michigan Department Of Transportation Minnesota Director Minnesota Department Of Transportation Mississippi Director Mississippi Department Of Transportation Missouri Transportation Program Manager Missouri Department Of Transportation
Appendix B (Continued) 161 Table B-1 (Continued) List Of State Security Contacts Montana Planning Administrator Montana Department Of Transportation Nebraska Division Manager Nebr aska Department Of Roads Nevada Deputy Director Nevada Department Of Transportation New Hampshire Administrator Department Of Transportation New Jersey Assistant Commissioner New Jersey Department Of Transportation New Mexico Director New Mexico Highway and Transportation Department New York Director New York Department Of Transportation New York Director New York Department Of Transportation North Carolina Manager North Carolina Department Of Transportation North Dakota Director North Dakota Department Of Transportation Ohio Deputy Director Ohio Department Of Transportation Oklahoma Division Engineer Oklahoma Department Of Transportation
Appendix B (Continued) 162 Table B-1 (Continued) List Of State Security Contacts Oregon Planning and Research Unit Manager Oregon Department Of Transportation Pennsylvania Planning Deputy Secretary Pennsylvania Department Of Transportation Pennsylvania Researcher Volpe Center Puerto Rico Director Puerto Rico Department Of Transportation Rhode Island Deputy Chief Engineer Rhode Island Department Of Transportation South Carolina Pl anning Engineer South Carolina Department Of Transportation South Dakota Planning and Programs Manager South Dakota Department Of Transportation Tennessee Chief Tennessee Department Of Transportation Texas Director Texas Department Of Transportation Utah Director Utah Department Of Transportation Vermont Director Vermont Department Of Transportation Virginia Chief Virginia Department Of Transportation
Appendix B (Continued) 163 Table B-1 (Continued) List Of State Security Contacts Washington Transportation Planning Manager Washington Department Of Transportation Washington DC Director FHWA West Virginia Director West Virginia Department Of Transportation Wisconsin Director Wisconsin Department Of Transportation Wyoming Director Wyoming Department Of Transportation
164 Appendix C: Request Letter
Appendix C (Continued) 165
Appendix C (Continued) 166
167 Appendix D: State Responses To Inquiry Letter Connecticut
Appendix D (Continued) 168 Indiana
Appendix D (Continued) 169 New York Oregon
Appendix D (Continued) 170 Georgia
Appendix D (Continued) 171 Florida
Appendix D (Continued) 172
Appendix D (Continued) 173
Appendix D (Continued) 174 Ohio
175 Appendix E: Key Tran sportation Legislation National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) In 1969 Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The law was in response to increased conc ern for the natural environment. This is the primary legislation that has shaped todayÂ’s Project Development & Environment (PD&E) process in Florida. This Act satisfied the following goals: Created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) Created basic requirements of Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) which must be prepared an all major Federal acti ons that significantly affect the environment. Established a national environmental policy Required federal agencies to use an interdisciplinar y approach in planning and decision-making for any actions affecting the environment. The creation of the CEQ was a majo r product of NEPA and has several primary functions which include: Creation of environmental policy Monitoring of environmental policy Preparation of reports concerning status of environmental quality Monitoring of all federal involvement in NEPA
Appendix E (Continued) 176 The NEPA process regiments the alte rnatives development and selection process by mandating that certain areas of analysis occur. Compliance with NEPA is mandated when at leas t one of the following occurs: Federal support will be required for any single phase of t he project. This support would most likely come in the form of funding. There is the possibility that federal support may be needed for a project and there is a need to maintain t he eligibility of the project. Federal permits may be required. An example may be a Un ited States Coast Guard permit for a new bridge crossing over a navigable waterway. Generally, federal approval of the project may be necessary. Federal agencies can include the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the Federal Transit Administ ration (FTA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Federal Ra ilroad Administration (FRA). A significant amount of guidanc e has been developed concer ning the intent of the NEPA process. However the approac h to implementation often varies substantially. Many states have adopted um brella policies or procedures under which they apply the NEPA process. Federal agencies involved in the sponsorship of projects within these st ates have supported the guidelines for
Appendix E (Continued) 177 each state and have developed a list of criter ia that must be met for a project to be considered for federal funding. Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) The Intermodal Surface Transportat ion Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) implemented broad changes in the way gov ernments plan for all modes of surface transportation. The objective of ISTEA was to improve the performance of transportation systems by making transportation decisions with due consideration for social, economic, and environmental factors early in the planning process, coordi nate planning efforts among affected agencies, and involve the public earlier in the decisio n-making process. This legislation established many of the alternative ev aluation criteria t hat are required in FloridaÂ’s PD&E process. Security conc erns alone are not a primary focus. ISTEA involved many aspects of the tr ansportation process that had not been previously considered. IS TEA considered the following: System preservation, rather than new systems became a priority. Acknowledged changing patterns in metropolitan areas in areas of development, economics, and cultural di versity and established stronger coordination and control for those areas.
Appendix E (Continued) 178 Dictated a more integr ated planning process. Increased emphasis on stak eholder participation in the process, especially the public. Increased awareness of expansion constr aints of the transportation network in highly urbanized or developing areas and the need for intermodal considerations. Created a direct link bet ween transportation improv ements to the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990 (CAAA) and state air quality plans. Provided for a more flexible funding approach to transportation projects. Traditionally, there was little flexibi lity between funding sources for highway and transit projects. The possibility of moving monies between these two areas greatly increased. Required State Depart ments of Transportation (DOT) and Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPO) develop cost feasible long-term and short-term transportation improvement plans based upon forecast revenues. Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century On June 9, 1998, the President signed into law Public Law 105-178, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) authorizing highway,
Appendix E (Continued) 179 highway safety, transit and other surface transportation programs for the next 6 years. Subsequent technical corrections in the TEA 21 Re storation Act have been incorporated; thus, the material presented here reflects the combined effects of both Acts and the two ar e jointly referred to as TEA-21. TEA-21 builds on the initiatives est ablished in the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (I STEA), which was the last major authorizing legislation for surface trans portation. This new Act combines the continuation and improv ement of current programs wit h new initiatives to meet the challenges of improving safety as tr affic continues to increase at record levels, protecting and enhancing communities and the natural environment as we provide transportation, and advancin g AmericaÂ’s economic growth and competitiveness domestically and internat ionally through efficient and flexible transportation. Significant features of TEA-21, that are reflec ted in FloridaÂ’s project programming and development processes, include: Assurance of a guaranteed level of Feder al funds for surface transportation through FY 2003. The annual floor for highwa y funding is keyed to receipts of the Highway Account of the Highway Trust Fund (HTF). Transit funding is
Appendix E (Continued) 180 guaranteed at a selected fixed amount. A ll highway user taxes are extended at the same rates when the legislation was enacted. Extension of the Dis advantaged Business Enterprises (DBE) program, providing a flexible nat ional 10 percent goal for the participation of disadvantaged business enterprises, including small firms owned and controlled by women and minorities, in highway and transit contracting undertaken with Federal funding. Strengthening of safety programs acro ss the Department of Transportation (DOT). New incentive programs, with gr eat potential for savings to life and property, are aimed at increasing the us e of safety belts and promoting the enactment and enforcement of 0.08 per cent blood alcohol concentration standards for drunk drivi ng. These new incentive funds also offer added flexibility to States since the grant s can be used for any Title 23 U.S.C. activity. Continuation of the proven and effe ctive program structure established for highways and transit under the landmark IST EA legislation. Flexibility in the use of funds, emphasis on measures to improve the environment, focus on a strong planning process as the foundation of good tr ansportation decisionsÂ— all ISTEA hallmarksÂ—are continued an d enhanced by TEA21. New programs
Appendix E (Continued) 181 such as Border Infrastructure, Tr ansportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation, and Access to Jobs target special areas of national interest and concern. Investing in research and its applicat ion to maximize the performance of the transportation system. Special emphasis is placed on deployment of Intelligent Transportation Systems to help improve operations and management of transportation syst ems and vehicle safety. Maintained ISTEA program struct ure and decision-making processes; Increased Federal funding leve ls and guaranteed annual funding; Stressed simplification and streamlini ng of transportation decision-making processes; and Established seven planning factors for consideration in Statewide and metropolitan planning processes. SAFETEA-LU On August 10, 2005, the President signed into law (Public Law 109-59) the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users. This federal transportation law provided funding for highway and transit improvement through the y ear 2009. According to a brochure published by the
Appendix E (Continued) 182 Florida Department of Tr ansportation (FDOT September 2005), this new law provides the following: Approximately $2 billion per year for transportation funding Increased return on federal gas tax dollars Protection of the Efficient Tr ansportation Decision Making Process Additional transit services Increased funding on safety It also modified some of the existi ng planning requirements for both Metropolitan and Statewide Planning (FDOT, August 17, 2005). Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) are required to develop longrange transportation plans (LRTP) and tr ansportation improvement programs (TIPs). The MPO process was changed as follows: Provided additional funding sources for planning Changed the existing 7 planning factors into 8 factors by separating safety and security into 2 distinct factors Added requirements to the Long Rang e Plan for discussion of mitigation and consultation.
Appendix E (Continued) 183 In Florida, changed the Long Range plan update cycle from every 3 years to every 5 years. Modified the period for t he TIP from 3 year cove rage with a 2 year update cycle to 4 year coverage with a 4 year update cycle. Extended the federal ce rtification of Transporta tion Management Areas (TMAs) from 3 years to at not less than every 4 years. The State of Florida is requi red to develop long-range statewide transportation plans and stat ewide transportation improvement programs (STIP). The statewide planning proc ess was changed as follows: Changed the existing 7 planning factors into 8 factors by separating safety and security into 2 distinct factors Modified the Long Range St atewide Transportation Plan to require more consultation with State, tribal, and local agencies Modified the period for the STIP from 3 year coverage with a 2 year update cycle to 4 year coverage with a 4 year update cycle. The 8 planning factors now include the following:
Appendix E (Continued) 184 1. support the economic vitality of t he metropolitan area, especially by enabling global competitiveness, productivity, and efficiency; 2. increase the safety of the transportation system for motorized and nonmotorized users; 3. increase the security of the tr ansportation system for motorized and nonmotorized users; 4. increase the accessibility and mobility of people and for freight; 5. protect and enhance the environmen t, promote energy conservation, improve the quality of life, and promote consistency between transportation improvements and Stat e and local planned growth and economic development patterns; 6. enhance the integration and connectivi ty of the transportation system, across and between modes, for people and freight; 7. promote efficient system management and operation; and 8. Emphasize the preservation of th e existing transportation system.
185 Appendix F: Transportation Pl anning And Security Agencies United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) The United States D epartment of Transportation was established by an act of Congress on October 15, 1966. Their mission is to Â“Serve the United States by ensuring a fast, safe, efficient, accessible and convenient transportation system that meets our vi tal national interests and enhances the quality of life of t he American people, today and into the future.Â” (USDOT 2006) The USDOT contains several organizati ons that include the Office of the Secretary (OST), the Feder al Aviation Administration (FAA), the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the Federal Mo tor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), the Federal Railroad Administ ration (FRA), the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the Maritime Administration (MARAD), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administrati on (NHTSA), the Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (P HMSA), the Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA), The Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (SLSDC), and the Surf ace Transportation Board (STB). Office of the Secretary (OST) The OST oversees the formulation of national transport ation policy and promotes intermodal transportation. Other duties include negotiation and implementation of internat ional transportation agreements, assuring the fitness of
Appendix F (Continued) 186 United States airlines, enf orcing airline consumer protection regulations, issuance of regulations to prevent alcohol and illegal drug abuse in transportation systems and preparing trans portation legislation. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) The FAA is responsible for the safety of all civil aviation in the United States. Their mission statement is that Â“Our mission is to provide the safety, most efficient aerospace system in the worl d.Â” Their vision is to Â“Â…improve the safety and efficiency of aviation, while being responsive to our customers and accountable to the public.Â” (FAA 2006) The duties of the FAA include: issuance and enforcement of regulat ions and standards relating to the manufacture, operation, certificat ion, and maintenance of aircraft certification and rating program for ai rmen and airports serving air carriers oversees the program to protec t the security of civil aviation enforces regulations under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act for air shipments operates a network of air towers, air r oute and traffic control centers and flight service stations develops air traffic rules
Appendix F (Continued) 187 allocates use of air space provides for security control of air traffic to meet national defense requirements construction/installation of electroni c and visual aids to air navigation and safety licenses commercial and private space launch facilities In the aftermath of the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, primary responsibility for civil aviation security was transferred to the newly created Transportation Security Administration. Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) is an agency of the United States Department of Tr ansportation (USDOT). The FHWA is tasked with the safety and technological status of the nationÂ’s roadway network. The FHWA typically provides funding to stat e and local agencies in support of the maintenance of the roadway network. Their funding is directed towards two programs; (1) state and local governm ents and (2) the Federal Lands Highway funding for national parks and forests. The Vision statement of the FHWA is Â“Improving Transportation for a Strong Amer ica.Â” Their mission is Â“Enhancing
Appendix F (Continued) 188 Mobility through Innovation, Leadership, and Public Service.Â” (FHWA 2006) Their strategic goals include: Safety Mobility and Productivity Global Connectivity Environment National Homeland Security Organizational Excellence They also state they have a few Â“Vit alÂ” priorities that include Safety, Congestion Mitigation, and Environmental Stewardship and St reamlining. By these statements, it can be seen that the FHWA has a strong emphasis on safety and also somewhat of security. The safe ty program is focused on reducing the 42,000 traffic crash related deaths each year in the United States. However, it is apparent that security concerns are not yet considered Â“VitalÂ” in the nationÂ’s primary, roadway focused, organization. As securi ty concerns continue to become more prevalent, it is expected that these concer ns would mandate additional resources.
Appendix F (Continued) 189 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration was established as a part of the Department of Trans portation by the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 (Public Law No. 106159, 113 Statute 1748, December 9, 1999). The FMCSA historically was a part of the FHWA. The FMCSAÂ’s mission is to Â“Â…reduce crashes, injuries, and fatalities in volving large trucks and buses.Â” It is based in Washington, D.C. and current ly employs over 1,000 people. The FMCSAÂ’s strategy to ca rry out its mission involves: Development and enforcement of regul ations which balance motor carrier safety with efficiency. Use of safety information systems to i dentify high risk carriers and to focus of enforcement of safety regulations. Implementation of training and educational programs fo r carriers, drivers, and the public. Partnership with federal, state, and loca l law enforcement ag encies and motor carrier specific groups.
Appendix F (Continued) 190 The key programs of the FMCSA are: Federal Motor Carrier Safe ty Regulations (FMCSRs) Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMRs) Commercial DriverÂ’s License Program Motor Carrier Safety Identif ication and Information Systems Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP) Performance & Registration Inform ation Systems Management (PRISM) Research and Technology (R&T) Border and International Safety Safety Education and Outreach Household Good Program Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) The FRA was created by the Departm ent of Transportation Act of 1966 (49 USC 103, Section 3(e )(1)). The FRA promotes safe and environmentally sound rail transportation. It has the respon sibility for railroad safety throughout the United States. It employs safety inspectors to enforce federal safety standards which include track maintenance, inspection, and operation issues. It also conducts research and development to evaluate projects for safety
Appendix F (Continued) 191 compliance. It also administers an education program for highway-rail grade crossing and trespassing on rail property. The FRA operates through its seven offices. These offices include Administration and Finance, Chief Counsel, Civil Rights, Policy, Public Affairs, Railroad Development, and Safety. The Off ice of Safety promotes and regulates safety throughout the NationÂ’s railroad indust ry. Its inspectors focus on 5 safety disciplines. These safety disciplines incl ude: Track, Signal and Train Control, Motive Power and Equipment, Operating Pr actices, Hazardous Materials, and Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety. (FRA 2006) Federal Transit Administration (FTA) The FTA assists in developing mass transportation systems for cities and communities. FTA helps to plan, build and operate transit sy stems, primarily through grant programs. Their primar y mission is to Â“Improve public transportation for AmericaÂ’s communities.Â” (FTA 2006) Their 3 core values are Excellence, Leadership, and Community. T hey deal with all types of public transportation including buses, rail vehicles, ferryboats, trolleys, inclined railways, subways, and people movers. The FTA ha s 4 strategic goals which include:
Appendix F (Continued) 192 Attract and retain the best people Deliver products and services that are valued by FTA customers Establish effective business processes and leverage technology Position public transportation as the mode of choice in America They also have 4 Core Acc ountabilities which include: Transit Ridership Growth Safety and Security Readiness Major Project Cost Control Grant Processing Efficiency Maritime Administ ration (MARAD) The MARAD serves to promote development and maintenance of an adequate, well-balanced, United States merchant marine that is sufficient to carry the United StatesÂ’ domestic waterborne commerce and a substantial portion of it waterborne foreign commerce. It also has the capability to serve as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or a national emergen cy. MARAD also ensures that the Nation has adequate sh ipbuilding and repair serv ice, efficient ports, effective intermodal water and land trans portation systems, and reserve capacity.
Appendix F (Continued) 193 The mission of MARAD is Â“To strengthen the U.S. maritime transportation system including infrastructure, industry and labor to meet the economic and security needs of the Nation. MARAD programs promote the development and maintenance of an adequate, well-balanced United States merchant marine, su fficient to carry the NationÂ’s domestic waterborne commerce and a subst antial portion of its waterborne foreign commerce, and capable of service as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency. MARAD also seeks to ensure that the United States maintains adequate shipbuilding and repair services, effi cient ports, effective intermodal water and land transportation systems, and reserve shipping capacity for use in time of national emergency.Â” (MARAD 2006) Its goals include commercial mobility, national security, the environment, organizational excellence, and vision. Their national security goal focuses on assuring an intermodal sealift capacity to support vital national security interests.
Appendix F (Continued) 194 National Highway Traffic Safe ty Administration (NHTSA) The NHTSA is responsible for reduc ing deaths, injuries and economic losses resulting from motor vehicle cras hes. They determine and enforce safety performance standards for motor vehicles and equipment. The NHTSA responsibilities include: investigation of safety defects establishment and enforcement of fuel economy standards assistance to states and communities to reduce the threat from drunk drivers promotion of the use of safety bel ts, child safety seats and air bags investigation of odometer fraud establishment and enforcement of vehicle anti-theft regulates Consumer information on motor vehicle safety. Their mission statement is to Â“Save lives, prevent injuries and reduce economic costs due to road traffic crashes through education, research, safety standards and enforcement activity.Â” (NHTSA 2006) They are dedicated to achieving the highest standards of safety through its core values of Integrity, Service, and Leadership.
Appendix F (Continued) 195 Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) The PHMSA was created through t he Norman Y. Mineta Research and Special Programs Improvement Act (P ublic Law 108-426) on November 30th, 2004. The PHMSA oversees the safety of more than 800,000 daily shipments of hazardous materials in the Nation and abo ut 64 percent of t he NationÂ’s energy transported by pipelines. They are ta sked to eliminate transportation related deaths and injuries related to hazardous materials and pipeli ne transportation. They also promote progr ams that enhance communities and protect the natural environment. Their emphasis is on safety. Their safety focus is defined as follows: Hazardous Materials Safety Risk Management Hazardous Materials Safety International Standards Pipeline Compliance and Safety Pipeline Dam age Prevention Pipeline Safety Research and Development The PHMSA focuses on 2 programs, hazardous materials and pipeline safety. They have an active education and training program to educate industry, transportation system operators, and governm ents. They use cooperation with
Appendix F (Continued) 196 industry, academia, professional associat ions and government to facilitate the education and training programs. Another key role is that of regulation. The PHMSAÂ’s Office of Hazardous Materials Safety develop s regulatory standards for classifying, handling and pa ckaging of daily shipment of hazardous materials within the United States. The Office of Pipeline Safety ensures safety in the design, construction, operation and ma intenance, and spill response to 2.3 million miles of pipelines. Research and Innovative Tec hnology Administration (RITA) RITA as formed under the Norman Y. Mineta Research and Special Programs Improvement Act (Public Law 108-426, 2004). Their mission is centered on the desire to advance DOT prio rities for innovation and research in transportation technologies and concept s. These concepts would improve mobility, promote economic growth, and de liver a better integrated transportation network. They focus on collaboration, info rmation sharing, coordination, support, and advocacy. RITA includes the Volp e National Transportation Systems Center. The Volpe Center is dedica ting to enhancing the effectiveness, efficiency, and responsiveness of other Federal organizations with critical transportation functions and mission. RITA also includes the Bureau of
Appendix F (Continued) 197 Transportation Statistics and the Transportation Safety Institute and the University Transportation Centers program, such as the Center for Urban Transportation Research (CUTR) located at the University of South Florida (USF). John A. Volpe National Trans portation Systems Center The Volpe Center is a center for transportation and logistics expertise. The Center helps decision makers solve transportation related problems through research and development, engineering, and analysis. Their work includes projects that involve multip le modes and disciplines. Their vision is Â“To be a world-recognized Center of excellence, a leader for innovation and a forum for government, industry, and academic co operation in t he development and improvement of transportation and logist ics systems.Â” (Volpe 2006) Their mission is Â“To anticipate future national, state, local and international transportation and logistic issues and requirements, to dev elop tools and technologies addressing them for our clients, and to be a cata lyst for innovation in transportation technologies and management processes to make t he transportation system safer and more effective and efficient.Â” (Volpe 2006)
Appendix F (Continued) 198 Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) The Intermodal Surface Transportat ion Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 established BTS for data collection, analysis, and reporting and to ensure the most cost-effective use of transportation monitoring resources. The mission of BTS is Â“Â…to lead in developing trans portation data and information of high quality, and to advance their effect ive use in both pu blic and private transportation decision making.Â” Their vi sion is that their Â“Data and information of high quality will support every significant transporta tion policy decision, thus advancing the quality of lif e and economic well being of all American.Â” (BTS 2006) The strategic goals of the BTS incl ude Relevance, Quality, Timeliness, Comparability, Completeness, and Utility. Transportation Safety Institute (TSI) The TSI was established in 1971 to assist the DOT accomplish their training needs. The TSI dev elops and conducts worldwide safety, security, and environmental training, products, and services for both public and private sectors. The training offered by TSI includes trans it, aviation, pipeline, motor carrier, highway safety, hazardous material, and ri sk management. The divisions of the TSI include Aviation Safety Division, The Coast Guard Inspection Training &
Appendix F (Continued) 199 Assistance Team, The Hazardous Materi als Division, The Highway Safety Division, The Pipeline Safety Division, the Special Program s Division, and the Transit Safety & Security Division. Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (SLSDC) The SLSDC was created on May 13, 1954. The SLSDC operates and maintains a safe, reliable and efficient waterway for commercial and non commercial vessels between the Great Lakes and the Atlantic Ocean. The SLSDC works in conjunction with the Sa int Lawrence Seaway Authority of Canada to oversee operations safety, ve ssel inspections, traffic control, and navigation aids on the Great Lakes and the Saint Lawrence Seaway. Surface Transportation Board (STB) The STB was created by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) of 1995 (Public Law 104-88). The STB is an economic regulatory agency responsible for: resolving railroad rate and service issues rail restructuring transactions to include mergers, line sales, construction, and line abandonment
Appendix F (Continued) 200 certain trucking company, moving v an, and non-contiguous ocean shipping company rate matters certain intercity passenger bus company structure, financ ial, and operational matters rates and services of certain pipelines not regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission The STB is divided into the Office of Compliance and Enforcement, the Office of Congressional an d Public Services, the Office of Economics, Environmental Analysis and Administrati on, the Office of Proceedings, and the Office of General Counsel. Transportation Research Board (TRB) The TRB is a unit of the National Research Council (NRC). The NRC is charged to serve as an independent advi sor to the federal government and others on scientific and technical questions of national import ance. The mission of the TRB Â“is to promote innovation and progress in transportation through research.Â” (TRB 2006) The TRB acts as an information clearinghouse of transportation practice and policy, stimul ates research and offers research
Appendix F (Continued) 201 management services that promote technica l excellence, and provides Â“expertÂ” advisory services. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) The DHS was formed as part of t he Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296). The DHS provides the main mass for the variety of national organizations and instit utions involved in national security efforts. Their mission is Â“We will lead the unified national e ffort to secure America. We will prevent and deter terrorist attacks and pr otect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation. We will ensure sa fe and secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants and visitors, and promote the fr ee-flow of commerce.Â” (DHS 2006) Their strategic goals include Awareness, Prevention, Protection, Response, Recovery, Service, and Organizational Ex cellence. Three agencies comprise the DHS. These include the Transportation Se curity Administration (TSA), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the F ederal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Appendix F (Continued) 202 Transportation Security Administration (TSA) The TSA was created in direct re sponse to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 as part of the Avia tion and Transportation Security Act (Public Law 107-71) that was enacted on November 19, 2001. The mission of the TSA is to protect the nationÂ’s transportation network through ensuring movement of people and goods The TSA is also respon sible for security at the nationÂ’s airports. It strives to se t the standard in transportation security. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) The CBP is a part of the DHS. T heir mission is to protect our borders against terrorism. Federal Emergency Manage ment Agency (FEMA) FEMA was formally organized on July 20, 1979 by President Jimmy Carter (Executive Order 12148). FEMAÂ’s mission is Â“to lead the effort to prepare the nation for all hazards and effectively manage federal response and recovery efforts following any national incident. FEMA also initiates proactive mitigation activities, trains first responders, and manages the National Flood Insurance Program and the U.S. Fire Ad ministration.Â” (FEMA 2006)
Appendix F (Continued) 203 Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) The CEQ was established within the Ex ecutive Office of the President by Congress as a part of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and supplemental responsibilit ies were added by the Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970. The CEQ coor dinates federal environmental efforts and works closely with agen cies and other White House offices in the development of environmental policies and initiatives. The CEQ reports to the President of the United States annually on the state of the environment, oversees federal agency implementati on of the environm ental impact assessment process, and acts as a referee when other agenc ies disagree over the adequacy of assessments. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) The NTSB was created on April 1, 1967. The NTSB is a federal agency that is responsible for investigating and recommending corrective actions for every civil aviation accident in the United States and for Â“significantÂ” accidents for other modes. In addition, the NTSB conducts special studies of safety issues of Â“national significance.Â” The NTSB does not regulate transportation equipment, personnel, or operations nor does it handle enforcement. Their
Appendix F (Continued) 204 recommendations have achieved an 82 per cent adoption rate with over 12,000 recommendations being adopted. Private Organizations There are a large number of priv ate organizations involved in the transportation planning process. The key players are the American Public Transportation Association (APTA), the Am erican Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO), and the Institute of Transportation Engineers (ITE) and their general roles in transportation planning are discussed in the following sections. American Public Transportation Association (APTA) The APTA is a private organizati on that focuses on advocacy in Washington, coordination of meetings and conferences, training and education, industry information clearinghouse servic es, data collection and dissemination, and an awards and recognition pr ovider for the Public Transportation Industry. Their mission statement is Â“To strengt hen and improve public transportation, APTA serves and leads its diverse member ship through advocacy, innovation,
Appendix F (Continued) 205 and information sharing.Â” (APTA 2006) T hey currently have 6 strategic goals which include: Ridership Economic Vitality Advocacy Image People and Organizations Safety and Security Association Development Their fifth goal, Safety and Security, has 5 desired outcomes. These include: Enhanced public confidence in the safety and security of public transportation Programs to encourage safer and more secure public transportation systems Sustained development and impl ementation of industry standards Programs and services on standards and effective safety practices for public transportation systems. Full engagement of the public transportation industry in shaping government safety and security policies and programs
Appendix F (Continued) 206 Their strategies for accomp lishing these outcomes include: Maintain regular communication wit h members regarding APTA and industry safety and security res ources and initiatives. Continue the exchange of effective safety and security practices through committees, conferences, and workshops. Educate governmental security agencie s and facilitate part nerships with them to foster responsiveness to industry and user needs. Continue to develop operational and co st-effective industry standards that promote safety and security. Assess APTAÂ’s safety audit program and identify opportunities for improvement. Continue to promote the vital role of public transportation in local and regional emergency preparedness. Identify, promote, and encour age the use of industry best practices for safety and security initiatives developed in partnership wit h governmental organizations. Facilitate partnerships to develop and implement innovative responses to transit security threats.
Appendix F (Continued) 207 The American Association of State Hi ghway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan or ganization representing highway and transportation departments in al l 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Their mission is to advocate trans portation policies and provide technical services to support agencies to efficient ly and safely move people and goods. Institute of Transporta tion Engineers (ITE) The ITE was founded in 1930 as a private multimodal professional international organization. Its membership is compris ed of professional who are responsible for meeting societyÂ’s needs for safe and efficient surface transportation through planni ng efforts, system design, system implementation, and operation and maintenance of networks.
About The Author Phillip W. Stevens received his Bac helorÂ’s Degree in Civil Engineering from the University of S outh Florida in June of 1996 and a MasterÂ’s Degree in Engineering Management from the University of South Florida in 1997. Afterwards, he entered the Ph.D program at the University of South Florida. All of Mr. StevensÂ’ education at the University of South Florida has been as a parttime, non-traditional student. In addition to his academic involvement as a student, Mr. Stevens teaches Engineering Ec onomics at the University of South Florida, as an adjunc t professor. Mr. Stevens is a licensed practicing pr ofessional engineer in Florida and is also a registered professi onal planner with the American Institute of Certified Planners. He is involved in many profe ssional organizations including the Florida Engineering Society, the National Society of Professional Engineers, the American Society of Civil En gineers, the Institute of Transportation Engineers, and the American Planning Association.