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The shift in United States foreign policy in the Middle East since 1989

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Title:
The shift in United States foreign policy in the Middle East since 1989
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Language:
English
Creator:
Ward, Brandon M
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University of South Florida
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Tampa, Fla
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Subjects / Keywords:
Uni-polar
Bi-polar
Containment
Democratization
Terrorism
Dissertations, Academic -- Political Science -- Masters -- USF
Genre:
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )

Notes

Abstract:
ABSTRACT: A bi-polar world emerged at the end of World War II. The United States and the Soviet Union were the world's superpowers and tensions between them spiraled consequently bringing about the Cold War. United States foreign policy during the Cold War revolved around containment policy. The Middle East during the Cold War was a region that the bi-polar world's superpowers wanted to influence, and protect. The United States during the Cold War warned the Soviet Union through presidential doctrines that it would fight to keep the Middle East from communism, and the Soviet Union's influence. The bi-polar international power structure did not allow the United States the ability to pick its battles. The power structure that constrained the Cold War forced the United States to react to the Soviet Union, and it forced foreign policy makers to always consider the Soviet Union's response to its policies. United States foreign policy in the Middle East during the Cold War threatened wit h military methods to solve local and regional instabilities. However, the United States was constrained by the bi-polar world thus, it was cautious of committing military troops in the region permanently and upsetting the region's delicate balance of power. United States foreign policy toward the Middle East has changed between 1981 and 2006. This change is in the direction of greater use of military methods to resolve what various administrations have perceived to be local and regional instability. This change in policy is partly attributable to changes in the United States power position in the world. A United States foreign policy shift in the Middle East occurred due to a change in the distribution of political power within the interstate system. This change has had the following result: the United States is no longer constrained by the bi-polar international power structure that characterized the Cold War period. The collapse of the Soviet Union created the uni-polar internationa l power structure. United States foreign policy is now capable of deploying the military to resolve local and regional instabilities in the Middle East, and that deployment has tended to become increasingly permanent in nature.
Thesis:
Thesis (M.A.)--University of South Florida, 2006.
Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references.
System Details:
System requirements: World Wide Web browser and PDF reader.
System Details:
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Statement of Responsibility:
by Brandon M. Ward.
General Note:
Title from PDF of title page.
General Note:
Document formatted into pages; contains 108 pages.

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aleph - 001910347
oclc - 173360585
usfldc doi - E14-SFE0001698
usfldc handle - e14.1698
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The Shift in United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East Since 1989 by Brandon M. Ward A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of Government and International Affairs College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida Major Professor: Mark Amen, Ph.D. Earl Conteh-Morgan, Ph.D. Abdelwahab Hechiche, Ph.D. Date of Approval: July 7, 2006 Keywords: uni-polar, bi-pol ar, containment, democr atization, terrorism Copyright 2006, Brandon M. Ward

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Dedication It is impossible thank my wife for all sh e has done for me while I have been in graduate school. She has been patient, s upportive, a sugar mamma, a barber, a cook, a loving mom to Nutmeg and Sophie, and my be st friend. Ryan our life journey is just getting started. I love you and thank you for just being you. Mom and dad you have always believed in me and have encouraged me to dream big, and work hard. I will forever be thankful for your love and s upport. Shannon you have unintentionally made me the competitive, ambitious person I am today. By always demanding the best from yourself, you motivated me to do the same. It is a curse and a blessing to have our attitude but I like, so than k you. Nonnie and Granny thank yo u for your love and always believing in me. Rick and Janet thank you for all your support, love, and of course your daughter. Diane and Steve thank you for all you have done for Ryan and I while we were in Tampa. And of course no dedication page is complete without saying thank you to my Martha.

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Acknowledgements Dr. Amen, Dr. Conteh-Morgan, and Dr Hechiche thank you for your time, energy, assistance, and input which assisted me on writing my thesis. Dr. Amen thank you for your patience, understand ing, and flexibility over the last several months as my life plans were up in the air, and my thesis topic did an about-face. Additionally, thank you to Doris Kearney who has helped me through out my experience at the University of South Florida.

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i Table of Contents Abstract iii Chapter 1-United States Middle East Policies: Problems and Context 1 The Start of the Cold War 3 The Truman Administration 4 The Eisenhower Administration 6 The Kennedy Administration 8 The Johnson Administration 9 The Nixon Administration 11 The Ford Administration 13 The Carter Administration 14 Conclusion 17 Chapter 2Scholarly Accounts of United Stat es Foreign Policy: 1945-2005 18 Organization 19 Literature-Cold War and Post-Cold War Analysis 19 Literature-Post-Cold War Analysis 32 Summary 40 Where does this literature lead us? 42 Chapter 3The Collapse of the Bi-Polar World 44 The Ronald Reagan Administration 1981-1989 44 Lebanon 45 Reagan Doctrine 47 Iran-Iraq War 49 Summary 51 Chapter 4A New World Order 52 The George H.W. Bush Administ ration 1989-1993 53 The New World Order 54 The Persian Gulf War 56 The Meridian House Address 60 Summary 62

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ii Chapter 5The Search for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy 65 The Bill Clinton Administration 1993-2001 66 Address to the Jordanian Parliament 67 Dual Containment 70 Iraq 72 The Arab-Israeli Peace Process 74 Summary 76 Chapter 6A New United States Foreign Policy 78 The George W. Bush Admini stration 2001-2006 79 The War on Terrorism 81 The Iraq War 84 Summary 89 Chapter 7Conclusion 91 Literature Cited 98 Bibliography 105

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iii The Shift in United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East Since 1989 Brandon M. Ward ABSTRACT A bi-polar world emerged at the end of World War II. The United States and the Soviet Union were the world’s superpower s and tensions between them spiraled consequently bringing about the Cold War. United States foreign policy during the Cold War revolved around containment policy. The Middle East during the Cold War was a region that the bi-polar world’ s superpowers wanted to influence, and protect. The United States during the Cold War warned the Soviet Union through presidential doctrines that it would fight to keep the Middl e East from communism, and th e Soviet Union’s influence. The bi-polar internationa l power structure did not allow the United States the ability to pick its battles. The power struct ure that constrained the Cold War forced the United States to react to the Soviet Union, and it forced foreign policy makers to always consider the Soviet Union’s re sponse to its policies. United States foreign policy in the Middle East during the Cold War threatened with military methods to solve local and regional instabilities. However, the United St ates was constrained by the bi-polar world thus, it was cautious of committing military troops in the region permanently and upsetting the region’s de licate balance of power.

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iv United States foreign policy toward the Middle East has changed between 1981 and 2006. This change is in the direction of greater use of military methods to resolve what various administrations have perceived to be local and regional instability. This change in policy is partly at tributable to changes in the United States power position in the world. A United States foreign policy shif t in the Middle East occurred due to a change in the distribution of political power w ithin the interstate system. This change has had the following result: the United States is no longer constrained by the bi-polar international power structure that characterized the Cold War period. The collapse of the Soviet Union creat ed the uni-polar international power structure. United States foreign policy is now capable of deploying the military to resolve local and regional instabilities in the Middl e East, and that deployment has tended to become increasingly permanent in nature.

PAGE 8

1 Chapter 1— United States Middle East Policies: Problems and Context —Historical Background— “Whether by design or by an accident of history, the United States assumed a protective role in the Gulf, and it was hard to imagine how it could abdicate this responsibility w ithout causing a major shift in the power relationships in the world (Lenczowski 1990, 283).” “Until 1945 the nation-state system was multi-po lar, and always with five or more powers. In all of modern hist ory the structure of the intern ational politics has changed but once (Waltz 1979, 163).” Thus, with the end of World War II the power structure of the international system had changed to a bi-polar system with the United States and the Soviet Union balancing power, and competing for influence in the post-World War II era. In a bi-polar international system, the tw o superpowers compete over influence, and attempt to gain advantage in the self-hel p system. The competition between the United States and the Soviet Union became a comp etition between two opposing ideologies, and a battle over influence, thus giving rise to the Cold War. A strategic area of influence between the antagonist superpow ers was the Middle East. In this chapter, I give an historical background of United States foreign policy in the Middle East from the start of the Co ld War through the Carter administration. By examining, the United States’ foreign policy ap proach during this pe riod I will establish a framework for United States foreign policy du ring the Cold War in the Middle East, and how the bi-polar system influenced United St ates foreign policy deci sions in the Middle East. The bi-polar system stru ctured how the United States w ould respond to crises in the

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2 Middle East, supply aid and modern technol ogy, broker peace, and supports its allies (Rubin 1987, 453). In the subsequent chapter, I analyze scholarly research on United States foreign policy during the Cold War, and in the post-Cold War in the Middle East. Since the end of the Cold War, the Un ited States’ foreign policy in the Middle East has slowly been changing. During the Ge orge H.W. Bush administration, some shift in Middle East foreign policy began. Examples of this are the Persian Gulf War, and the administration’s claim of a “New World Orde r.” The Clinton administration advanced the United States’ Middle East policy to prom ote “pluralism and liberal values” while defending its economic interests in the area (Gerges 1999, 110). The current administration of George W. Bush made th e War on Terror and spreading freedom its main foreign policy initiatives. It also deci ded to implement military methods to pursue these foreign policy initiatives. I hypothesize that the United States’ implementation of foreign policy in the Middle East has shifte d due to a change in the distribution of political power within the interstate sy stem. Chapters 3 through 6, will analyze government documents, media coverage to find public statements, and foreign policy actions taken by Presidential administrations from 1981-2006. In addition, I use scholarly books written on the subjects of United States foreign policy, and the Middle East. I rely on secondary materials to describe change s in the United States worldwide power position. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will be the main indicator of a change in worldwide dist ribution of power from bi-polar to uni-polar. I evaluate the Cold War United States foreign policy from 1981 through 1988, the shift of United States foreign policy in the post-Cold War from 1989 through 2006, and the impact created by the United States’ sole superpower status on its foreign policy to wards the Middle East.

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3 This change had the following result: the Un ited States is no longer constrained by a bipolar distribution of power th at characterized the Cold Wa r period, thus allowing United States foreign policy to use more offensiv e military methods in the Middle East to achieve United States foreign policy goals of providing security and stability to the regions natural resources, pushing forward th e Arab-Israeli peace pr ocess, opening-up the Middle East economy, bringing freedom to citi zens of the region, and democratization. The Start of the Cold War— In February 1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Josef Stalin meet at the Yalta Conference to discuss World War II peace arrangements. The Yalta Conference established when the nations of Eu rope are liberated following the war, each nation will establish governments of its own choosing, through free and fair elections. As World War II was ending, the Soviet Union be gan expanding in East ern Europe and was establishing communist governments in nati ons that fell under the path of Soviet expansion. The Soviet Union’s actions were a flagrant violation of the agreements reached at Yalta (Ohaegbulam 1999, 27-28). Te nsions between the Soviet Union and the United States kept rising in the aftermath of World War II. As the Soviet Union was expanding influence in Eastern Europe it never withdrew its military. This was seen as a threatening act against the West. Additiona lly, the Soviet Union challenged the United States in strategic nations such as Gre ece, Turkey, and Iran. In 1947, in defiance of Soviet aggression President Truman espoused the Truman Doctrine. President Truman feared that if Greece fell to the Soviet Un ion, Turkey would subsequently fall, thus jeopardizing the stability of the Middle East region, and threaten the United States’ national security and interest. The Truman Do ctrine marked the beginning of the Cold

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4 War between the United States and the Sovi et Union. President Truman implemented George Kennan’s containment strategy as th e United States’ foreign policy towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Containment policy would be central in the making of United States foreign policy for the next five decades. Truman Administration 1945-1953— With the sudden death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt on April 12, 1945, Harry S Truman became President of the Un ited States. President Truman’s immediate foreign policy decisions were focused on endi ng World War II. The United States and its allies won the European theater on May 8, 1945, subsequently achieving victory over Japan on September 2, 1945. October 24, 1945 the United States ratified the Charter of the United Nations The United Nations was a part of United States post-World War II foreign policy designed to “establish a global system of collective security, led by the United States, to prevent fu ture wars (1999, 146).” The United States and the Soviet Union we re left in the aftermath of World War II as the world’s superpowers. However, in the latter stages of World War II animosity between the two powers had been growi ng, and by the end of World War II the relationship between each nation was strained. The threat of the S oviet Union expanding communism and influence caused United States foreign policy to follow the containment strategy set forth by George Kennan. In 1947, the Soviet Union attempted to “r atify the Soviet-Iranian oil agreement (Lenczowski 1990, 12).” This agreement woul d give the Soviet Union control over Iranian oil with a 51 percent ownership (1990, 12). The United States condemned Soviet actions in Iran. The United States supported th e Iranians in voting against the agreement,

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5 and President Truman forced Josef Stalin to withdrawal Soviet troops from Iran (1990, 12-13). Iran’s oil supply and geographic prox imity to the Soviet Union made it a vital ally in containing communism. President Truman addressed Congr ess on March 12, 1947, an espoused the Truman Doctrine. The doctrine assisted Tu rkey and Greece by giving $400 million in aid to prevent each nation from collapsing to Sovi et pressure and influence. The aid supplied political, military, and economic assistance in order to contain the threat of communism in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle Ea st. “The Truman Doctrine and its support by Congress marked the beginning of the Unite d States’ commitment to a global strategy against communist and Soviet threats (Ohaegbulam 1999, 31).” “On May 14, 1948, the State of Israel was proclaimed in Tel Aviv…within eleven minutes of Israel’s proclamation of statehood the president gave de facto recognition of the newly created Jewish state (Lenczowsk i 1990, 26)” The United States shortly after the recognition of the Jewish state be gan to give it financial assistance. During President Truman’s presidency the United States became one of two world superpowers. Thus, United States fore ign policy could not retreat into pre-war isolationism. The bi-polar world positioned the United States versus the Soviet Union in a battle for global influence. The Truman admi nistration took actions to insure that the Soviet Union did not gain influence over the Middle East’s oil rese rves, or control the fate of the state of Israel. The foreign policy of containment established during the Truman presidency would become a model for United States foreign policy during the Cold War.

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6 Eisenhower Administration 1953-1961— When President Eisenhower was inaugur ated there was immediate concern over the Iranian oil crisis. Iran’s Premier Mossadegh tried to break ties with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company due to inadequate profit sharing; he attempted to gain the shah’s political powers, consequently communist influen ce was rising in Iran (1990, 32, 36). Premier Mossadegh became such a political liability th at United States and the British devised a plan “to ensure his removal fr om office and the restoration of the shah’s authority (1990, 37).” When Mossadegh was removed from power and the shah’s power was restored, the United States and Iran began an era of close co operation. Iran was an ally of the United States in the struggle to contain communism. The United States promised Egypt fi nancial assistance to help build a hydroelectric dam in Aswan, Egypt. But “i n 1956, President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt obtained weapons from the Soviet Union,” the Eisenhower administration immediately cancelled assistan ce funds for the dam (Ohaegbulam 1999, 78). Therefore, in order to fund the dam project President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. The canal operated under an “internationa l, Paris-based company (Lenczowski 1990, 41),” until the Egyptian takeover. The canal’s takeover enra ged the British and the French, thus plans were made for military action against Egypt. Israel who was prohibited from the use of the canal allied with the Britis h and French. When the fighti ng broke out the Israelis took control of positions in the Sinai Peninsula, and the Gaza Strip, and the British and French attacked strategic positions from the air (1990, 43). The ev ents around the nationalization of the Suez Canal exasperated President Eisenhower. His concern was the actions of the

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7 British, French, and Israelis would upset the delicate balance in the Middle East, and allow the Soviet Union to pe netrate influence within the region with arms deals. On January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower pr esented a plan to Congress to inhibit the support of communism in the Middle East President Eisenhower claimed the Soviet Union’s interest in the Middl e East is based around “power politics (1990, 52).” Thus, the Eisenhower Doctrine proposed “three types of action: to develop economic strength of Middle East nations; to enact programs of military assistance and cooperation;” allow Middle East nations to employ the United Stat es military against international communist threats to territory, or sove reignty (1990, 52). President Nasser’s Pan-Arabism not only cr eated tension in the Middle East, but with the United States. In Syria, the B aath Socialist Party and the Communist Party gained influence in Syria’s “rapid process pf radicalization both in her internal politics and in her foreign policy (1990, 54).” Both Egypt and Syria allied with the Soviet Union, furthermore making military arms, and economic deals with Moscow (1990, 55). The rise of Syria’s leftist parties di scouraged its neighbors Turke y, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. President Eisenhower fearing Sovi et penetration in the Middle East began following the Eisenhower Doctrine to attempt to control the crisis developing in Syria. By using the doctrine President Eisenhower was able to prevent Syria’s neighbors from taking military action against them, thus k eeping the Soviet Union out of military involvement within the Middle East. Pan-Arabism eventually was matched by n early every Arab regime on the basis of resisting Pan-Arab ideology, and its intimate ties with the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower during his administ ration had to balance the s ituation developing in the

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8 Middle East, with its correlation to the c ontainment of communism and the Soviet’s response to the United States’ acti on within the Middle East region. Kennedy Administration 1961-1963— President Kennedy’s residence in the White House coincided with tensions in the Middle East among radical a nd conservative governments. Egypt’s President Gamal Abdul Nasser was the key figure behind Arab radicalism in the re gion. “Thus relations with Cairo by the time Kennedy came to power have been aptly desc ribed as being in a “deep freeze” (1990, 72).” President Kennedy a pproached the Middle East cautiously. He made clear his intentions of protecting Isra el, with the sale of weapons. Additionally, President Kennedy changed the United States’ relationship with Isra el by expressing his intentions of forming closer ties with Isra el. This “was illustrated by the comprehensive political guarantees that were made to Is rael. These guarantees did not only include security, but also extended to such specifi c matters as interpretations of territorial boundaries and water allocations from the Jo rdan (Miglietta 2002, 133).” However, he was able to thaw the United States’ relations hip with Cairo, by treating President Nasser as an important ally. Thus, Kennedy informed President Nasser about the United States’ deals and intentions at certain times in or der to keep the Egyptian president informed. The greatest act of goodwill in the United Stat es-Cairo relationship during the Kennedy administration was the PL-480 Food Program, wh ich provided wheat to Egyptian citizens (Lenczowski 1990, 76-77). In 1962, Yemen had a coup d’tat. Th e Yemen monarchy was overthrown and replaced by revolutionaries w ho claimed that Yemen was a republic. President Nasser of Egypt assisted the republican movement, in the spirit of Pan-Arabism. Saudi Arabia gave

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9 refuge to the overthrown king. Saudi Arabia and Jordan assisted the royalists in a counterrevolution (1990, 79-80). However, the revolution was upheld and President Kennedy recognized the Republic of Yemen. It was a delicate situa tion in the Middle East for the administration. The United States did not want to turn its back on Saudi Arabia, or appear to give in to Nasser, most importantly it did not wa nt to appear to not support modernizing movements in the Middle East (1990, 84). The Kennedy administration abruptly ended November 22, 1963, when the President was assassinated in Dallas, Texas. President Kennedy’s foreign policy in the Middle East did not achieve in dramatic succes s, however he did prevent crisis in the Middle East from b ecoming debacles. Johnson Administration 1963-1969— President Johnson early in his administrati on did little to stray from the previous Middle East policies of Kennedy. The Johnson administration had other foreign policy goals taking precedent over the Middle East, such as escalating problems in Vietnam. However, a crisis did occur on the island of Cyprus in the Mediterranean Sea. The islands’ Greek, and Turkish heritage, were ha ving disputes across cultural backgrounds. It was imperative for President Johnson to bring a diplomatic end to the crisis in order to prevent Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey from going to war over problems stemming from Cyprus. Preventing war was essential to cont ainment. War would allow Soviet influence into the Middle East, and Eastern Mediterra nean. Cyprus’ Presiden t Makarios was close with the Soviet Union, and in 1964 “called fo r military intervention by the Soviet Union (1990, 103).” Fighting continued on the island of Cyprus, as well as bickering between

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10 Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, then the conflict on Cyprus took less precedence with the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. The United States popularity in the Middle East sin ce the end of World War II had gone from moderate and impartial, but during Johnson’s administration the United States leaned pro-Israeli, so “from 1967 on the United States emerged as the most distrusted if not actually the most hate d country in the Middle East (1990, 105).” President Johnson’s policies towards Israel led to the sale of offensiv e military weapons, assuring Israel’s military superiority in the Middle East (Miglietta 2002, 139). The Six-Day Arab-Israeli War of 1967, stemmed from disput es between Israel and Arab nations. Water rights on the Jordan River were creating tensions in the Middle East in the 1960’s, then President Nasser of Egypt proclaimed a blockade of Israeli shipping on the Strait of Tiran, and sought the remova l of United Nations troops in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, thus moving the region closer to war. Israel took President Nasser’s actions as an opportunity for a preemptive attack on Egypt, thus Israel mobilized its military (Lenczowski 1990, 107). On June 5, 1967, the Israeli military attacked Egypt Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. The Israeli military conquered the Sinai Peninsula up to the Suez Canal, the We st Bank, and the Golan Heights. After the war “six Arab states—Egypt (U.A.R.), Sy ria, Iraq, Yemen, Algeria, and Sudan—broke diplomatic relations with the United States (1990, 112-113).” Additionally, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and South Yemen strengthened economic and military connections with the Soviet Union. President Johnson’s foreign policies to wards the Middle East did not create stability in the region. His administration set a precedent for a United States-Israel

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11 support. The United States’ support for Israel and the proven effectiveness of its military helped create a balance in the Middle East against the developing alliances within the region with the Soviet Union. The result of President Johnson’s administration and the “1967 war was to intensify regional instability (Miglietta 2002, 138).” Nixon Administration 1969-1974— “The nation in 1969 seemed more divided than at any time since the Civil War (Melanson 2005, 45).” Presiden t Nixon was resolute in changing the United States’ foreign policy direction. When he entered in to the White House the United States was involved in the Vietnam War, Is rael and Egypt were in an entrenched stalemate at the Suez Canal, Arab nations were rebelling ag ainst the United States and its pro-Israeli foreign policy, and the Soviet Union was gain ing influence around the globe, particularly in Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. President Nixon espoused what became known as the Nixon Doctrine, as part of his foreign pol icy agenda for getting the United States less involved in international crises. The Nixon Doctrine advocated keeping our treaty commitments; the United States will give military arms, or economic assistance to countries that are threatened and viewed as allies or essential to United States national security, but responsibility will be given to countries to protect itself, “except for the threat of a major power involving nu clear weapons (Kissinger 1979, 224).” The Nixon Doctrine came about during a vu lnerable time in the Middle East. At the beginning of 1972 Great Br itain was renouncing its imperi al status, and withdrawing troops from the Persian Gulf, leaving a pow er vacuum in the region (Lenczowski 1990, 117). United States foreign policy leaders used the guiding principles of the Nixon Doctrine to “fill this strategic gap by build ing up the militaries of Iran and Saudi Arabia

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12 and fostering their close cooperation (Migli etta 2002, 48).” Vital to President Nixon’s foreign policy was containing communism a nd preventing Soviet infiltration in the Middle East. Nixon viewed the Soviet Uni on as the main source of Middle East instability. On Yom Kippur / Ramadan October 6, 1973, Egypt attacked Israel’s positions on the Sinai Peninsula. “Simultaneously, Syria attacked Israeli positions in the Golan Heights (Lenczowski 1990, 129).” Israel wa s being pushed-back by the Egyptians and Syrians. The United States in order to gain mo re influence over Israel and its policies in the Middle East’s land dispute decided to s upply Israel with military arms, and economic assistance. The Arab nations struck back at the United States for supporting Israel during the war. “The Organization of Petroleum E xporting Countries (OPEC) cut back its oil production, embargoed oil exports to the Un ited States… and quadrupled oil prices. Although the embargo was eventually lifted, th e United States had become well aware of its dependence on foreign energy and on its econ omic interdependence with the rest of the world (Papp, Johnson, and Endicott. 2005, 172-173).” President Nixon during this time was in the middle of the Watergate Scandal. Nixon entrusted Kissinger to prevent escala tion of the war in the Middle East. A ceasefire supported by the United Nations was accep ted by the warring nations. However, in the Sinai Peninsula Israeli forces surrounded the Egyptia n Third Army (Lenczowski 1990, 130). The Soviet Union began aggressive dialogue towards the United States and Israel, claiming it would send Soviet troops to the Sinai Peninsula. President Nixon adamant on keeping the Soviet Un ion out of the Middle East cr isis “put all United States

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13 conventional and nuclear forces on military alert (1990, 131),” then warned the Soviet Union about unilateral ac tion in the Middle East. President Nixon resigned after the disclo sure of the Watergate Scandal. His administration typified the containments yoke around United States foreign policy during the Cold War. The United States’ national interest in the Middle East during the Cold War was to aid Israel, contain the Soviet Un ion, and keep oil supplies flowing to the United States and its allies. The Nixon administ ration showed the delicate balance in the Middle East, and how important the region is to United States security, and economic interests. The Nixon Presidency brought the Un ited States-Israeli alliance closer, thus changing the United States’ evenhanded approa ch to foreign policy in the Middle East. Ford Administration 1974-1977— After abusing presidential power Rich ard Nixon resigned as President of the United States, leaving Gerald Ford as Pres ident. President Ford continued most of Nixon’s foreign policy plans. Ford attempted to continue Nixon’s dtente strategy for guiding United States-Soviet Union relations However, United States-Soviet Union relations became strained due to crises in Africa, and the Cubans getting involved internationally aided by the Soviet Union. The United States’ dtente policy had one exemption; it specifically wanted to keep the Soviet Union out of the Middle East negotiations after the Yom Kippur / Ramadan War of 1973 (1990, 141). During President Ford’s administration tens ions in Cyprus erupted again. Turkey invaded Cyprus after Greece orchestrated a coup d’tat of the Cyprus government. The new Cyprus government asserted its intenti ons to join Cyprus with Greece. The new government on Cyprus was weak, and ineffec tive due to political in stability on Greece.

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14 Turkey thus extended its occupation of the eas tern Mediterranean island so it controlled forty percent of Cyprus (1990, 143). In res ponse to Turkey’s aggressive actions the United States Congress banned arms sales to Turkey. Turkey’s reaction to the United States was swift and acute. Turkey banned the use of United States military bases in Turkey, sought arms deals via the Soviet Union; Turkey banned United States ships access to Turkish ports and military flights, lastly permitting Soviet military vessels to pass through the Turkish Straits (1990, 144-146) The tensions between the United States and Turkey were not resolved during the Ford presidency. President Ford and Secretary of State He nry Kissinger attempted to bring peace to the Middle East, specifically between Israel and Egypt. Presid ent Ford grew increasingly frustrated with peace negotiations, due to Isra el’s belligerence. Ford then ended new aid to Israel until it became open-minded toward s meaningful negotia tions. An agreement was reached between Egypt and Israel on September 1, 1975 (1990, 151-152). The agreement “provided for an expansion of United States military and economic aid, as well as agreeing to supply Isr ael with the oil it would lose from giving back the Sinai oil fields (Miglietta 2002, 142).” The Ford administration left probl ems with Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus unresolved. However, despite tensions between the United States and Israel during his administration, Israel became one of th e world’s most formidable armies. Carter Administration 1977-1981— President Carter’s initial foreign polic y focused on human rights issues, bringing peace to the Middle East, and supporting dtent e. President Carter believed the ArabIsraeli conflict had been stal emated to long. He wanted to bring a peaceful end to the

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15 conflict before tensions spar ked in the Middle East agai n, or the Soviet Union got involved in the situation. President Carter “s trove to have a peace that would be based on UN Resolution 242 of 1967 (Lenczowski 1990, 160) .” The Egypt-Israel i tensions thus became a focal point for the Carter admini stration. President Carter invited Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat and Israel Prime Minister Menachem Begin to Camp David Maryland, where he would lead negotiations be tween the two nations. After several days of secret negotiations a framework for peace in the Middle East, and between Egypt and Israel was signed. “The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel” had several key principles: Egypt would regain full control of the Sinai peninsula; freedom of Israel’s use of international waterways and overflights in previously restricted Egypt te rritory; Egypt and Israel woul d begin normal relations after signing a peace treaty (1990, 177). The Egyptia n-Israeli Peace Treaty was signed on March 26, 1979. During the latter half of the 1970’s the United States’ police man of the Persian Gulf, the Shah of Iran was ousted from power and an Islamic fundamentalist became Iran’s new leader the Ayatollah Khomeini. His Islamic republic caught United States foreign policy officials offguard (Gerges 1999, 64). As l eader of the new Islamic Republic of Iran, Khomeini confiscated pr ivate property, occupi ed private homes, changed women’s dress, and redistributed wealth among the poor (Lenczowski 1990, 198). The impact of the Iranian revolution wa s seen throughout the Middle East region. “United States diplomats and embassies were attacked and burned in Pakistan, Libya, Kuwait, and Afghanistan (Gerges 1999, 66).” The Iran hostage crisis left the United States and Carter administra tion feeling frustrated and pow erless. “The hostage crisis

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16 revealed an element of vulnerability in the United States and other democracies, demonstrating that terrorists’ methods coul d be used successfully to achieve their objectives (Lenczowski 1990, 203).” President Carter during the second-ha lf of his term in office faced many challenges coming from the Middle East. Th e Iranian revolution, and Iranian hostage crisis were serious threats to United States national interests, but the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was viewed as on e of the biggest crises of the Cold War. The Soviet Union was impending on the Middle East and upsetting th e sensitive balance of power in the region. If the Soviet Union could gain a foothold in the Middle East through conquering Afghanistan it potentially co uld gain access to the oil rich Persian Gulf region. President Carter in his 1980 Stat e of the Union Address espoused the United States foreign policy response to the Soviet Union’s advanc e in Afghanistan. The Carter Doctrine stated: “Any attempt by an outside fo rce to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on th e vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force (Ohaegbulam 1999, 41).”1 President Carter during his administrati on was deeply involved in the Middle East. However, his administration never de veloped clear foreign policy towards the Middle East (Gerges 1999, 68). The Carter Do ctrine was aimed at the containment of communism, and United States oil interests not the Middle East. “I n the American mind, populist, revolutionary Islam came to be asso ciated with terrorism and the promotion of 1 President Jimmy Carter, “State of th e Union Address,” (January 23 1980): Weekly Compilations of Documents XVI (23 January 1980), pp. 194-200 In, F. Ugboaja Ohaegbulam. 1999. A Concise Introduction To American Foreign Policy New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc.

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17 subversive activities (1999, 69). It is not surprising that wi th the foreign policy issues faced by President Carter he was replaced after one term in office. Conclusion— The United States’ containment policy duri ng the Cold War influenced its foreign policy in the Middle East. The three main c oncerns in the Middle East for the United States were oil, protecting Israel, and containing communi sm made the United States’ foreign policy in the region defensive, reac tive, and pragmatic. The burden of having to balance the Soviet Union’s re sponse to foreign policy, and the Arab-Israeli response was a tremendous responsibility in a bi-polar world. The United States sought peace and stability within the Middle Ea st region in order to prevent Middle Eastern countries from taking sides between the two superpowers. Pr eventing war was essential to containment policy. Thus, the United States was willing to support authoritarian regimes in the Middle East on the basis they did not support comm unism, in order to maintain a favorable balance of power within the region. The Mi ddle East’s geographic proximity with the Soviet Union gave it a perceived advantag e for influence in the region. The Middle Eastern nations during the Cold War were seemingly pawns in a chess match between two superpowers. The bi-polar system did not encourage the United States to execute foreign policy goals by using the United Stat es military. United States foreign policy options were limited in the bi-polar system, and in order to prevent war between the two superpowers the United States avoided war a nd direct military involvement at all costs within the Middle East. The Un ited States if given a provoca tion that threat ened Israel, oil, or involved nuclear weapons the military was placed in the proximity of the Middle East for an immediate response to such a threat.

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18 —Chapter 2— Scholarly Accounts of United States Foreign Policy: 1945-2005 —Literature Review— In chapter 1, I outlined the United States ’ foreign policy towards the Middle East during the Cold War through the Carter admi nistration. The containment policy practiced by the United States influenced its forei gn policy towards the Middle East. The United States was concerned with protecting the Mi ddle East’s oil, pr otecting Israel, and preventing the Soviet Union from expanding in fluence in the Middle East. Thus, keeping the region’s delicate power balance under the United States’ influence was imperative in the bi-polar internationa l power structure. In chapter 2, I analyze claims by scholar s on United States foreign policy towards the Middle East during the Cold War, a nd United States foreign policy towards the Middle East in the post-Cold War. Research ing previous works on the topic will allow me to conclude this chapter with an eval uation of similarities, and differences among scholars on United States foreign policy towa rds the Middle East. After analyzing the literature, I determine if the United States’ fo reign policy objectives in the Middle East in the post-Cold War changed, or if its method for achieving foreign policy goals shifted due to the influence of the uni-polar international power structure. The literature review will focus on the last presidential administration of the Cold War through the present administration of George W. Bush. I focus on the last presidential administration of the Cold War to show that policies were pragmatic and

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19 constrained by the bi-polar international system, and shaped by the United States’ containment policy. Then by researching the three post-Cold War administrations I will be able to evaluate the United States’ forei gn policy changes in the Middle East in a unipolar world. Organization— In this literature review, I divided th e literature into two categories, thus organizing each scholar’s contribution to Unite d States foreign policy towards the Middle East. First, I review scholarship focusing on what if any differences do authors claim about the Cold War and post-Cold War United States foreign policy in the Middle East. The second section will review what scholar s claim about post-Cold War United States foreign policy in the Middle East only. By dividing the literature review into two categorical sections I will be able to evaluate United States foreign policy shifts from the Cold War to the post-Cold War by the simila rities and differences of each scholar. Literature-Cold War & Post-Cold War Analysis — Steven L. Spiegel wrote an essay in the book Eagle Adrift called “Eagle in the Middle East.” With the collapse of the bi-pol ar world some global tensions eased while others strengthened, this was especially true for “Africa and the Persian Gulf (1997, 295)” in the post-Cold War worl d. The Middle East plays a stra tegic role in United States foreign policy making for three reasons: oil, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction which Spiegel claims “the most serious worldwide danger in the post-Cold War era (1997, 296),” and the th reat of nuclear weapons fr om “Islamic fundamentalism and/ or domestic extremism (1997, 296)” to Unite d States allies in the region. In order to understand the changes within United States fo reign policy in regards to the Middle East

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20 Spiegel wants to compare Cold War versus pos t-Cold War interests, and situations (1997, 297). Spiegel claims that the Cold War Unite d States foreign polic y strategy regarding the Middle East was fourfold. First, the Unite d States wanted to c ontain Soviet expansion into the region. Second, oil was critical for the United States and its allies. Third, the United States wanted to expand diplomatic relations with Arab states, in order to influence their loyalty in a bi-polar world. Finally, protecting Israel was an imperative and it was a democratic nation in the Middl e East (1997, 297-298). Th ese policies are not much different from the post-Cold War objec tives of United States foreign policy. The difference comes from “Arab radicals and potenti al challengers to the United States have no superpower to which they can turn for ai d or for arms assistan ce and support in case they begin to lose a war (1997, 302).” Soviet bankrolling and diplomatically supporting Arab resistance to the Jewish state were no longer a threat to the region. Thus, leaving fewer restraints on the Arab-Israeli peace process (1997, 303). Spiegel believes that the United States in the post-Cold War world has to leave troops in the Middle East region. This is necessitated by the fact that there is no “regional gendarme (1997, 304).” The Soviet threat has left the Middle East region only to be replaced with regional intimidators, and en emies to the United States. Iran and Iraq are apart of the Clinton administra tions “dual containment” in the Middle East. United States foreign policy in the Middle Ea st is more flexible in the post-Cold War. However, domestic pressures cause United States forei gn policy leaders to lessen the importance of the Middle East region.

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21 Spiegel’s essay was a succinct analysis of United States foreign policy in the Middle East in the post-Cold War. The role of Israel and the Un ited States’ connection with them is vividly seen in his work, and the Arab-Israeli peace process seems to be an underlying tension across the board in the Mi ddle East. Spiegel’s greatest concern was weapons of mass destruction. The proliferati on of the weapons in the Middle East he believed was going to potentially ha ve a grave effect on the region. In F. Ugboaja Ohaegbulam’s book A Concise Introduction To American Foreign Policy he gives an historical and structural account of United States foreign policy from its conception through the middle of the Clinton administration, while establishing throughout the book America’s motivations behind its policy. Ohaegbulam gives a comprehensive background of United States fo reign policy; modern United States foreign policy does not begin until World War II. Th e United States up until that point had played minor role in internati onal politics, due to the Monroe Doctrine and its isolationist attitude from the time of George Washi ngton. The end of World War II put the United States and the Soviet Union in possession of world power. The United States and the Soviet Union’s ideological differences and th e Soviet’s “flagrant violation (Ohaegbulam 1999, 27)” of the 1945 Yalta Agreement, raised tensions between the two superpowers and escalated into nearly a half-century Cold War. United States foreign policy during the Cold War was centered on the concept of containment. The containment mission was to prevent the spread communism, and Soviet influence (1999, 28, 29). The containment strate gy affected United States foreign policy towards the Middle East from the start of the Cold War into the post-Cold War world. United States foreign policy leaders devoted tremendous resources to fighting the Cold

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22 War, however these leaders did not reflect su fficiently on the world power structure in a post-Cold War world (1999, 366). United States foreign policy leaders failed to address issues “such as the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism (1999, 366).” Ohaegbulam concludes the Reagan admini stration followed the Reagan doctrine. This doctrine espoused, “assisti ng nationalists rebels, called “freedom fighters,” against Soviet and communist supported governments in the third world (1999, 42).” The Reagan doctrine assisted the “freedom fighters” in Afghanistan who were opposing the Soviet invasion. The United States containment strate gy was a major contributor to the end of the Cold War, and “left America without a sing le great power or coal ition of powers as a “clear and present danger” to its national security (1999, 44).” The end of the Cold War created a unipolar world power structure, with the United States as the leader. The end of the bi-polar world did not make the world more peaceful, it actually became less secure a nd with increased violence (1999, 46). Iraq’s dictator Saddam Hussein invaded the sovere ign state of Kuwait, which threatened the stability of the entire Middle East region. George H.W. Bush believed that the United Nations should play a greater role in the pos t-Cold War, led by the United States. United Nations coalition troops and United States. troops defeated Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in Operation Desert Storm. President Bush im plemented his ‘New World Order’ strategy by using the United Nations as a vital pa rt of United States foreign policy. Ohaegbulam, claims that Ge orge H.W. Bush and Bill C linton had similar “foreign policy perspectives (1999, 49).” Clinton believed in multilateral United Nations solutions like George H.W. Bush, despite the failed mi ssion in Somalia in 1993. Clinton often used economic sanctions against countries of th e Middle East. The1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions

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23 Act “authorized the imposition of sanctions against foreign companies investing more than $40 million in either Iran or Libya (1999, 157).” Clinton often used diplomacy or the threat of force when dealing with Saddam Hussein. In 1998 President Clinton assembled public support for air-strikes against Iraq’s Saddam Hussein who was continuing to build weapons of mass destruction, despite the coun try’s obligation to disband “large scale weapons of mass destructions (1999 160)” after the 1991 Gulf War. Ohaegbulam’s book established the unit y, and simplicity that containment provided to United States forei gn policy. With the collapse of the bi-polar world and the rise of the uni-polar world Ohaegbulam s uggests that a lack of consensus on United States foreign policy in the post-Cold War ha s caused the United States to take multiple approaches towards its national interests: “an economic appro ach, neoisolationist approach, unilateralism, and mulitlateralism under United States leadership (1999, 367370).” Ohaegbulam does not claim that any of these approaches are the direction that United States foreign policy should follow, rath er that the United States should continue making pragmatic foreign policy decisions “on a case-by-case ba sis (1999, 372).” Richard A. Melanson in his book American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War outlines United States foreign policy from President Nixon, to George W. Bush. He researches whether any of the post-Vietna m War presidents created a foreign policy consensus equal to that of the pre-Vietna m War era. Melanson uses public opinion polls to show how the United States public reac ts to the post-Vietnam War presidential policies. The importance of public opinion to the post-Vietnam pr esidents was “the salience of foreign policy issues for the public declined in the wake of Vietnam (Melanson 2005, 17),” domestic issues were now a far greater anxiety.

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24 In the evaluation of the post-Vi etnam presidents, Melanson gives a comprehensive evaluation of each administration’s foreign policy. Analyzing all aspects of each administration’s polic ies allows Melanson to search for a foreign policy consensus among the post-Vietnam presiden ts. However, the Middle East plays a significant role in each post-V ietnam presidential administ ration. President Reagan uses the Reagan Doctrine to “unseat Third Wo rld Communist governments (2005, 142).” This policy involved low involvement for the United States and allowed it an effective tool to “chip away at the periphery of the Soviet empire (2005, 142).” Pres ident Reagan foreign policy towards the Middle East centered on containing communism. The United States and the Soviet Union had vital interests in the Middle East. The United States needed to protect the indispensable resources in th e Middle East from the Soviet Union. Additionally, the PalestinianIsraeli peace-process would be crippled if it fell under Soviet control (2005, 166). When the Cold War ended the United States was now the world’s sole superpower. This left the United States with foreign policy decisions “quite unlike those of the Cold War or the post-Vietnam er a (2005, 27).” In September 1990, George H.W. Bush announced a “new world order” was immi nent and that Iraqi aggression constituted its first challenge (2005, 209).” President Bu sh’s new world order required the United States to take a more dynamic role in global affairs. The new world order declared that new threats faced the world that did not exis t during the Cold War. “The president argued that “terrorism, hostagetaking, renegade regi mes with unpredictable rulers, new sources of instability—all require a st rong and engaged America” with military “forces able to

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25 respond to threats in whatever corn er of the globe they may occur.”2 While establishing a new foreign policy in the aftermath of the Co ld War, President Bush encouraged global leadership for the United States. Global leadership was a foreign policy strategy that attempted to maintain the uni-polar worl d, and protect the Eura sian landmass from potential enemies, and threats (2005, 212). Bill Clinton was the only post-Cold Wa r president Melanson claims (2005, 233). The foreign policy situation inherited by Pres ident Clinton compelled the White House to respond to multiple international crises in th e first years of his presidency. The Clinton administration responded to these crises under the United Nations’ banner, however public, and congressional pressure after the failed Operation Restore Hope in Somalia forced President Clinton to issue PDD-25. Th e directive changed the way in which the United States foreign policy would be conducted, and the United States relationship with the United Nations. PDD-25 “rejected the idea of a permanent UN army, endorsed multilateral missions only if they served United States interests, and warned that strict conditions would have to be met before the United States would support any peacekeeping initiative (2005, 244).” During Clinton’s administration he faced many foreign policy challenges from the Middle East. The Iranian President Mohammed Khatami began moderate rhetoric that nearly brought the United Stat es and Iran to negotiations, until they tested “missiles with and eight-hundred-mile range in July 1998 ( 2005, 258).” President Clinton also had to deal with the aftermath of the Persian Gulf Wa r. His policies toward Iraq called for five 2 President George H.W. Bush, “Remarks at the Aspe n Institute Symposium in Aspen, Colorado,” (August 2, 1990), pp. 1190, 1191. In Richard A. Melanson. United States Foreign Policy Since The Vietnam War 4th ed. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Publishing, Inc.

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26 mandates: unrestricted United Nations arms inspectors access to suspected sites; economic sanctions toward Iraq; find and suppor t Iraqis that could pot ential lead a fight against Saddam Hussein; enforce northern a nd southern no-fly zones imposed in 1991; protect the Kurds from Saddam Hussei n (2005, 258-259). Saddam Hussein did not cooperate well with the United Nations arms inspectors, and would not allow them access to certain presidential palaces. Saddam Hu ssein’s continued defiance of the United Nations and the United States compelled the United States foreign policy toward Iraq to shift. This shift came in the form of air strikes against Iraqi targets suspected of the capability to manufacture weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (2005, 258-260). President Clinton was the first and last post-Cold War president according to Melanson. The events of September 11, 2001 ch anged United States foreign policy and shaped George W. Bush’s presidency. Operation Enduring Freedom was the Bush administration’s response to the terror att acks on the United States, this operation had a global objective (2005, 291) After the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and with the continued hunt for global al -Qaeda members, President Bush made clear his next phase for his War on Terror with the “axis of evil” State of the Union Address of January 29, 2002. Subsequently, the Bush doctrine claimed a preemptive strike policy for the United States. This policy led the way for Presiden t Bush to invade Iraq and depose Saddam Hussein. President Bush’s proclaimed goals are to democratize the Arab world and “create a balance of power that favors human freedom (2005, 291, 313).” Melanson’s outlines major United States foreign policy issues that have faced presidential administrations fr om the end of the Vietnam War to the present. His work is vital for it gives a detailed analysis of th e global influences on United States foreign

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27 policy, and the shifting policy responses from each United States president to each crisis. Melanson provides a strong argument for the effect the Cold War containment policy created for defining post-Cold War United States foreign policies. Fawaz A. Gerges in his book America and Political Islam researches how presidential administrations from Carter through Clinton developed foreign policy towards Islamic countries. A theme running throughout Gerges’ work is found in the subtitle Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests? Gerges uses speeches, and documents in his book to allow the policy makers to speak w ith their own words, thus allowing for his findings to be placed in an hist orical context, and to analy ze how policy shifts over time. Gerges begins the book by looking at differe nt ways the United States approaches foreign policy in the Middle East. Questions of security become a central focus in the United States foreign policy debate. The United States has many interests in the stability, and protection of the Middle East, thus maki ng this issue vital in understanding United States foreign policy toward Islam. Gerges li sts key United States foreign policy concerns in the Middle East: Arab-Israeli conflict, “vulne rability of access to Persian Gulf oil, the vulnerability of pro-U.S. Middle Eastern regime s to an Islamist assault, the collapse of Soviet Communism, the prorogation of terrori sm, and potential proliferation of nuclear weapons (Gerges 1999, 11).” The United States during the late 1980’ s foreign interests shifted from the Cold War to “the intensification of Islamic activism in the Middle East and North Africa (1999, 13).” 1981 saw the inauguration of Ronald Reag an. President Reagan’s administration would confront many critical United States fore ign policy events in the Middle East such as: the end of the Iranian hostage crisis, Ir an-Iraq War, and the bombing of the Marine

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28 barracks in Beirut. However, the Middle Ea st was not the fundamental United States foreign policy concern. President Reagan devot ed his administration towards “the real enemy (1999, 70)” communism and the Soviet Union. President Reagan’s foreign policy of containment led him to espouse the Reag an Doctrine. This doctrine supported any nation, group, or faction resi sting communism. “He often re iterated his support for the Islamically oriented mujaheden “freedom fi ghters” because they resisted the Soviets (1999, 71).” The containment policy of the Cold War constrained Reagan’s foreign policy, allowing for an acceptance of a policy that reinforced “militantly Islamic elements (1999, 71)” in the Middle East. Immediately after President George H. W. Bush took office in 1989 questions over political Islam were being debated among Un ited States foreign policy makers (1999, 73). During the Reagan presidency concerns ove r the Middle East consisted of the Soviet Union and Iran. Iran at the time “was the onl y theocracy in the re gion (1999, 74).” The Islamic movement had been spreading during the 1980’s; the compatib ility of Islam was being discussed at the end of the Cold War with questions regardi ng democratization now that the United States was the wo rld’s sole superpower (1999, 74). Gerges focuses attention to the Algerian election crisis that escalated in 1991. During this crisis Bush’s administration espoused a new United States foreign policy toward Islam, the Meridian address was “t he first thorough statement given by any U.S. administration on the Islamist question (1999, 78).” The Meridian address recognized the United States and the Middle East have cr eated policies around “two major pillars – resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and access to Persian Gulf oil…. The end of the Cold War…necessitated the addi tion of a third pillar to Un ited States foreign policy: a

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29 core of fundamental values – such as suppor t of human rights, pluralism, broad popular participation in government, and rejection of extremism, oppression, and terrorism (1999, 80-81).” The Meridian address established a framework that the United States could base its policies, there was never a subsequent policy shift after the address towards the Middle East. The importance of the Meridian address is seen when President Clinton retains Edward Djerejian in his new administra tion. He was “the main architect of Bush’s Islam policy (1999, 85).” Throughout Gerges’ work he outlines polit ical developments in the Middle East and how the United States responded to each si tuation. In his conclusion Gerges does not see any real foreign policy shift from the Cold War to the post-Cold War. His claim stems from the fact that the United States as the world’s sole superpower “is still preoccupied with stability and security a nd economic relationships, rather than with issues of democracy and human rights (1999, 229).” Warren I. Cohen in his book America’s Failing Empire begins his work by giving an historical review of significant events in United St ates foreign policy during the Cold War. Cohen reveals a strong associat ion with containment policy, and a deep mistrust of the Soviet Union among the Unite d States foreign policy makers during the Cold War. The containment policy and mistrust of the Soviet Union led the United States foreign policy leaders to support regimes based around the fact they did not support communism. However, in the Middle East dur ing the end of the R eagan administration the United States attempted a dual containm ent. This dual containment focused around the Soviet Union and Iran. Since the Irani an revolution the United States has been harassing Iran. The United States did not wa nt Iran’s government upsetting the delicate

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30 balance in the Middle East with its theocr atic governance. During the Iran-Iraq War the Reagan administration as part of its dual c ontainment policy “provided Iraq with export credits, covert military assistance, and in telligence (Cohen 2005, 22).” The United States foreign policy makers were more afraid of “Iran’s Islamic Fundamentalism and intense anti-United Statesism than of Saddam’s secular megalomania (2005, 22).” In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s the world witnessed the decline of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. During this time in the post-IranIraq War, Saddam Hussein threatened Iraq’s neighbors, principally Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. “On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces sw ept across the border into Kuwait (2005, 22).” This move by Saddam Hussein incense d the international community. The United States immediately took action ag ainst Iraq and froze its asse ts. The United States and the Soviet Union issued a join t statement denouncing Saddam Hussein and encouraged the international community to stop milit ary supplies to Iraq (2005, 22-23). During the George H.W. Bush administ ration the United States foreign policy leaders began to formulate foreign policy that did not have to corroborate with containment policy. The Bush administration fo rmulated the ‘new world order’ to guide United States foreign policy. This new polic y was going to create global conditions in which United States values would thrive (2005, 56). Cohen claims the George H.W. Bush’s presidency caused foreign policy issues to become seemingly obsolete, with the exception of trade-issues (2005, 57). Presiden t Bill Clinton entered the White House in January 1993, not concerned with the Cold War, but rather getting the United States back on track economically. The United States wa s in Somalia on a humanitarian mission. The Clinton administration continued George H.W. Bush’s initiative to assist the United

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31 Nations in the multilateral humanitarian effort in the failed-state. In the aftermath of the Somalia disaster PDD-25 was ordered by Pr esident Clinton, the directive outlined the policy for the United States and its re lationship with the United Nations. In 1994 the power within the United Stat es Congress shifted to the Republican Party. The Republicans wanted the Clinton ad ministration to place tougher policies on Iran and Iraq. A “dual containment” was create d in order to keep each rogue nation in check (2005, 95). Middle Eastern countries we re not pleased with the sanctions being placed upon their neighbors; they too were begi nning to feel the effect of the policies. Clinton’s foreign policy agai nst Saddam in the mid-1990’ s consisted of the Iraqi Liberation Act, Operation Desert Fox, and an occasional tomahawk missile (2005, 9697). Cohen reveals in his book the rising thr eat of terrorism. Terrorism had struck during the 1980’s but had become an increasi ngly effective tool during the 1990’s. The United States was no longer safe by simply staying at home. Cohen did recognize that some terrorist attacks in the United States had been committed by United States citizens, but in large part the majority of terrorist attacks on th e United States had been by nonstate extremists predominately from the Midd le East. After George W. Bush entered the White House, and the events of Septembe r 11, 2001 transpired United States foreign policy was changed ad infinitum In conducting the War on Terror, beginning in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al Qaeda the United States had globa l support for its mission, but the Bush administration did not want a large coali tion, it “wanted no interference with the implementation of the plan (2005, 133).” Af ter chasing the Taliban out of power, the

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32 Bush administration set its new foreign policy objectives against an “axis of evil.” The containment strategies of the Cold War we re no longer useful policies towards North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. The United States needed to take the offensive and “remake the world in America’s image (2005, 135).” Literature-Post-Cold War— In the book Eagle Adrift multiple scholars give their analysis of United States foreign policy at the turn of the 21st century. In the essay by Robert J. Lieber titled “Eagle Without a Cause: Making Foreign Policy W ithout the Soviet Threat,” he avers the difficulty in making “coherent policy initiati ves (Lieber 1997, 4)” w ithout a galvanizing threat or crisis. The structure of the intern ational system had fundamentally changed with the lack of a Soviet presence. Without an evident foreign threat, domestic factors began to control the making of United States forei gn policy and a peaceful international system was expected with the rise of a uni-polar world (1997, 5). Lieber claims the greatest multilateral mission “to maintain international order was the conduct of a war: Operation Dese rt Storm, authorized by the UN Security Council Resolutions and led by the United Stat es (1997, 6).” This point is of great importance to the post-Cold War world, it re vealed the world now only contained one nation that could unite other nations around a military objective or operate unilaterally (1997, 6). Additionally, during the Cold War th e United States and its allies formed a bloc against the Soviet Union. Nations-states were forced to cooperate or potentially loose security between them all (1997, 11). The post-Cold War does not have the unifying threat of a bi-polar international power structure, leaving the United States as sole superpower the only nation-state capable of creating an inte rnational coalition.

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33 Lieber’s essay was formulated around realist thought. In his work he quoted Kenneth Waltz on several occasions, and views the international system as a self-help system. This system is based around power. He concluded that the United States’ foreign policy in the post-Cold War world will not be a priority “unless there emerges some clear unambiguous threat, or there a ppears a set of policymakers unusually determined to give priority to foreign policy (1997, 20).” Bruce W. Jentleson wrote an essay in the book Eagle Adrift titled “Who, Why, What, and How: Debates Over Post-Cold War Military Interv ention.” Jentleson began the essay claiming “two empirical facts” the post-Cold War has led to approximately 90 armed conflicts by 1995, and United States “f orces have been actively deployed more times to more places thus far in the 1990s th an any comparable length of time during the Cold War (Jentleson 1997, 39-40).” In the post-Cold War the United States espoused a multilateral position in the world, while maintaini ng the right to act unilaterally if needed. Its interests around the globe ha ve heightened in the post-Cold War, its interests have shifted to consist of not only national defe nse and democratization, but also defending human rights, and assisting marg inalized citizens of the worl d. Jentleson wants to answer four questions with his essay. First, who should have the ri ght to determine the use of United States military force in the post-Cold War? Second, why is it in the United States’ interest to consider military action? Third, what is the best strategy for the military to use in the post-Cold War world? Finally, how s hould intervention be spread-out across the powers of the world, from the United St ates, United Nations and other regional organizations (1997, 40-41)?

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34 In the post-Cold War who should determin e if the United States military is used? The president has the authority to make war, Congress the authority to declare war and finance a war, and United States citizens can ca st their vote in electi ons. In the early years of the post-Cold War the presid ent, and Congress allowed pub lic opinion polls to affect its missions abroad. This caused an interna tional concern over the United States being committed to its objectives, and policies. Addi tionally, it showed that foreign policy was of less concern to the United States public than domestic issues. Why should the United States consider military action? The United States should consider military action to protect its national interests, and stand-up for its foreign policy. However, in the post-Cold War there is a lacking foreign policy consensus that creates caveats in the course of action pursued by members of the executive and legislative branch. There is also a danger in creating criteria for using military action. This could be used to the advantage of th e enemy, by allowing them to push the United States knowing there would be no reprisal. What is the best strategy for the militar y to use in the post-Cold War world? Now that the United States is the world’s so le superpower, should United Nations play a greater role in military and diplomatic e fforts (1997, 54)? In a post-Cold War world the United Nations represents the majority of the collective view of the international community. Or should the United States follo w the model set in th e Persian Gulf War where it created a coalition and sought permi ssion for military action through the United Nations Security Council. The force assemble d against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was like one the world had never seen. The United St ates, the Soviet Uni on, Europe, and Arab nations all standing together in opposition to an aggressor, this was proven a powerful

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35 force (1997, 54-55). The United States in th e post-Cold War has to stand strong and committed. Often the United Nations and the inte rnational community are hesitant to get involved, but the United States risks its credibility by gett ing involved or over-committed in a unilateralist mission (1997, 61). How should intervention be spread-out acr oss the powers of the world, from the United States, United Nations and other re gional organizations (1997, 40-41)? Jentleson believes this to be the toughest question to answer. When the United States is directly threatened a unilateralist option is valid. Ho wever, when the United States wants to operate in an intra-state conflict the United Nations or regional multilateral organizations seem to have an equal authority. “The ch allenging and crucial que stions on strategy are those that address the structur al, procedural, political, opera tional, and other problems of action multilaterally, and do so for the many forms that multilateral action can take (1997, 65).” The post-Cold War does not create an envi ronment of predictability, or stability. The freshness of the uni-polar world is causi ng growing pains within foreign policy, and international community. The structural di mensions of foreign policy making have changed in the post-Cold War (1997, 65). Jentle son tries to answer the question of who, why, what, and how the United States military should be used in the post-Cold War. This question is imperative for the study of Unite d States foreign policy. Jentleson does not reach any definitive conclusions with his ar gument, other than to say it is a tough question, with mixed results. In American Foreign Policy authored by Daniel S. Papp, Loch K. Johnson, and John E. Endicott, they outline the historical and structural framework th at is United States

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36 foreign policy. The authors devote a chapter in their book to the post-Cold War. This chapter outlines the struggles from George H.W. Bush through George W. Bush. When George H.W. Bush was campaigning for President of the United States he ran on the platform that he was going to follow President Reagan’s foreign policies. However, when President Bush took office in January 1989 “the world had changed so much that U.S. foreign policy had to be revised (Papp, Johnson, and Endicott 2005, 227).” President George H.W. Bush began to worry about Saddam Hussein threats to expand Iraq, which could lead to him controll ing the world oil prices. The United States first reacted by sending troops into the region. Then a “political-milita ry alliance of over 30 states (2005, 197)” was created to oppose Saddam’s attack on Kuwaiti sovereignty. Additionally, the United States used the United Nations to impose economic sanctions on Iraq. This was not enough to force Saddam Hu ssein’s troops out of Kuwait. The Persian Gulf War only lasted 100 hours, but Saddam Hussein remained in power but severely weakened. George H.W. Bush did not wa nt to invade Baghdad and remove Saddam Hussein from power due to the fragile nature of the region, the coal ition, and the belief in a potential internal uprising against Saddam Hussein (2005, 198). President Clinton entered the White H ouse dealing with the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, and several international crises left unsettled by President Bush. The Clinton administration believed in a policy of enlargement. This meant “the United States promoted democracy, open markets, and othe r Western political, economic and social values (2005, 204).” This was thought of as another word for democratization. President Clinton’s foreign policies focused on strengthening the world’s economy, and the domestic economy.

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37 Terrorist began to attack with frequenc y during the Clinton presidency. Terrorism was not new but “international terrorist ne tworks (2005, 216)” were just beginning to make a name for themselves, most notably al Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden. The problem of international terro rism would be a problem that the Clinton administration handed to President George W. Bush and his administration. In the first nine months of the Geor ge W. Bush presidency he had avoided most foreign policy issues regarding the Middl e East. On September 11, 2001 George W. Bush’s foreign policy would not overlook the Middle East any longer. The United States after the attacks had three fo reign policy priorities: defend the homeland, execute war on terrorism, prevent terrorist from gaining w eapons of mass destruction (2005, 221). As the war in Afghanistan began to shift towards c onstructing a nation, the war against the axis of evil began. The majority of the world di d not support George W. Bush’s preemptive policy for war against Iran, North Korea, Ir aq, or any aggressor that harbored or supported terrorist. The Bush administration’ s approach toward prosecuting the war began to isolate it from the coalition on th e war on terror. Papp, Johnson, and Endicott concluded by claiming that President Bush’s foreign policies in Iraq have been based around realist policies, and un ilateralism (2005, 228). Fraser Cameron in his book US Foreign Policy After The Cold War perceives United States foreign policy not having a ny unified direction until the September 11, 2001 attacks. Since 1990, the United States was “the only nation on earth able to project power in every part of the world…and it ha s been involved in resolving conflicts on every continent (Cameron 2005, xvi ).” The United States at the beginning of the postCold War used ambiguous language and rhetoric to describe its ne w position in the uni-

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38 polar world. This language incl uded “new world order,” global leadership, and “it is our opportunity – to lead (2005, 16) .” Creating a United States foreign policy in the postCold War, while foreign policy issues wher e no longer what public opinion polls deemed important, and the declining economy forced the George H.W. Bush administration to take a selective approach to its foreign po licy formulation. However, at the end of the George H.W. Bush presidency he agreed to send United States troops to Somalia on a United Nations humanitarian mission. This mission had not been resolved upon Bill Clinton’s arrival in the White House. George H.W. Bush “presented a poisoned chalice (2005, 18)” to President Clint on, the Somalia calamity would have major ramifications on the Clinton Presidency, United States foreign policy, and the United States’ relationship with the United Nations. President Clinton in his inaugural addr ess spoke on creating a new foreign policy “for a world that had fundamentally changed.”3 Despite facing foreign policy problems leftover from the Bush administration (Iraq, Haiti, Somalia, and the Balkans), President Clinton focused the majority of his forei gn policy on creating, and opening new markets. Clinton’s goal was to increase the economic breadth of foreign policy. When George W. Bush entered the Wh ite House in January 2001, he like Clinton had little foreign policy experi ence. In the first nine months of George W. Bush’s presidency the administration had done littl e in the way of creating a foreign policy. There were critics that sugge sted the only thing that Pres ident Bush had accomplished was to undo everything President Clinton had done in the past eight years (2005, 25). Thus, George W. Bush’s administration had be gun to isolate itself fr om the international 3 President Bill Clinton, “Presidential Inaugur al Address, Washington D.C.” January 1993. In Fraser Cameron. US Foreign Policy After The Cold War, 2nd ed. NY: Routledge Publishing.

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39 community. On September 11, 2001 the George W. Bush presidency was defined. In order to conduct the war on te rrorism, and to fight the “axi s of evil,” George W. Bush “accepted the neocon thesis that United States military power could resolve most foreign policy problems. The Iraq war was to demonstrate both the potency and the impotency of US military power (2005, 33).” Fraser Cameron’s book on United States foreign policy in the post-Cold War provides an analysis of each administration of the post-Cold War. However, the majority of his work focused on George W. Bush presidency and the implications that administration has had on the international polit ical scene. He starts to show trepidation in the George W. Bush administration, and its handling of forei gn policy after the Iraq War. Jon Kraus begins his essay claiming th at George W. Bush’s foreign policy strategy is contradictory (Kraus, McMa hon, Rankin 2004, 167). When the George W. Bush wanted to conduct the war on terror against the Taliban and al Qaeda, his administration formulated a global coaliti on. After the removal of the Taliban from power, the administration switched the focus to its “axis of evil” initiatives. The first country the administration targeted was Iraq. This move “divided severely the political coalition of support so important to the “war on terror” (200 4, 167).” Kraus believes that the Bush administration is determined to show America’s uni-pol ar world dominance, and that the United States has the will and capability to act unilaterally. President Bush spoke at the United States Military Academy at West Point about the shortcomings of containment and deterren ce against stateless terrorists. Thus, the United States reserves the right to use preemptive military action in order to avoid an

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40 attack on the United States or its citizens The United States rationalizes its policy by claiming that terrorists, or nations of evil do not follow rules, consequently “the United States is not obliged to resp ect their sovereignty and can launch preemptive strikes (2004, 175).” Kraus deems that the United States now needs to start rebuilding some of its global relationships. The United States unilate ralist’s attitude is viewed as counterproductive, now that the job of rebuilding nations, and regions has begun. Kraus still believes that George W. Bush can have a successful administration “if Bush heeds the less arrogant, more multilateral voices in gove rnment, the United States can recover the support of its allies (2004, 192).” Summary— The literature shows a strong correlati on between the United States’ Cold War foreign policy of containment, and the Unite d States’ post-Cold War foreign policy shift towards the Middle East in the form of greater use of its military to achieve foreign policy goals. When the Cold War ended, and containment was no longer a vital foreign policy concern the United States foreign polic y makers were ill prepared to handle the emergence of a uni-polar world. The lack of a unified foreign policy direction in the postCold War created conditions for shifts in Un ited States foreign policy towards the Middle East. The foreign policy shifts began to occu r as the international power structure moved from a bi-polar to a uni-pol ar power structure. Scholars writing about the Cold War discuss the impact the bi-polar system had on the making of United States foreign policy towards the Middle East. However, the post-Cold War writers only mention to shift in the

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41 power structure during the Geor ge H.W. Bush presidency, not mentioning the effects of a uni-polar world after its initial inception. During the latter stages of the Cold War terrorism was on the rise in the Middle East. Weapons of mass destruction during the Cold War were ostensibly a concern for nation-states. However, weapons of mass de struction became a common concern within the literature in regards to the Middle East and United States foreign policy in the postCold War. Issues surrounding weapons of ma ss destruction in the post-Cold War have ranged from protecting the former-Soviet Unio n’s vast quantity of nuclear weapons from the wrong people, groups, terrorists and rogue states, and supporting nuclear nonproliferation. The prevention of terrorist a nd or rogue states from obtaining weapons of mass destruction has brought about foreign policy initiatives to combat these issues with military force. Israel and the United States’ relationship still affect foreign policies in the Middle East region. The Arab-Israeli p eace process is an issue ever y post-Cold War president has attempted to resolve. The United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East in regards to Israel has shifted. In the Co ld War the Soviet Union supported some Arab resistance toward Israel. Thus the United States supporte d and protected Israel as a way to contain the Soviet Union’s influence in the Middle Ea st. In the post-Cold War the United States attempts to achieve peace in the Middle East by forcefully installing freedom via democracy, instead of achieving this thr ough diplomacy, self-determination and prodemocracy grassroots Middle East social movements. Iraq and Iran since the end of the Cold War have been problems in United States foreign policy. Both nations have experienced economic sanctions, a nd are targets of the

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42 “axis of evil” plan that George W. Bush espoused. During the Iraq War between the United States and Iraq, the United States used its new preemptive st rike policy, in order to prevent from being threatened by Sadda m Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. Where does this literature lead us? — With the collapse of the bi-polar world, th ere has been an increase in the number of armed conflicts around the world. The Unite d States has increasi ngly been deployed to areas of regional and local conflict. The Unite d States has foreign po licy interests in the Middle East’s oil, the Arab-Isra eli peace, the democratization of the globe, the opening of foreign markets, protecting the United Stat es and its citizens from weapons of mass destruction, a doctrine of preem ptive warfare, and the United States wanting to maintain its power position in th e world. This literature does not address thoroughly the impact the change in the international power structure fr om a bi-polar to a uni -polar world had on United States foreign policy in the Middle East. The bi-polar international power structure had a tremendous impact on the execu tion of United States foreign policy in the Middle East. The bi-polar international power structure forced the United States to use peripheral methods to achieve foreign policy goals. The United States’ bi-polar world foreign policy strategy in the Middle East consisted of containment policy, which aimed at preventing war at all cost, and presidential doctrines that deterred the Soviet Union’s involvement in the Middle East, or suppor ted groups within the region that did not support communism. These foreign policy in itiatives were fundamental in the implementation of United States foreign polic y in the bi-polar wo rld. Why has there not been a focus on the uni-polar international power structure’s impact on the execution of United States foreign policy in the Middle Ea st? I hypothesize that the United States

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43 foreign policy shifts in the Middle East occu rred due to a change in the distribution of political power within the interstate system This change had the following result: the United States is no longer constrained by a bi-polar distribution of power that characterized the Cold War period. The uni-polar international power structure allows the United States to directly use its military to achieve foreign policy objectives within the Middle East.

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44 —Chapter 3— The Ronald Reagan Administration —The Collapse of the Bi-Polar World— The last United States president duri ng the Cold War was Ronald Reagan. His administration was the last to be effected by the constraints of the bi-polar international power structure. In this chapter I analy ze the Reagan administration’s foreign policy towards the Middle East and how it was aff ected by the Cold War’s bi-polar power international power structure. Once I estab lish how the United Stat es’ foreign policy was affected by the bi-polar world at the end of the Cold War, in the subsequent chapters 4,5, and 6, I analyze the shift in United States fo reign policy in the postCold War’s uni-polar international power structure. The Ronald Reagan Administration 1981-1989— President Carter “had tried to focus on the central Israeli-Palestinian impasse, the Reagan administration prefe rred to fit the Middle East into a much broader global framework of American foreign policy (Fra ser 1989, 159).” At the beginning of the Reagan administration the Mi ddle East was an unstable tinderbox of regionalized and local activity, which could poten tially spread and effect broa der parts of the Middle East. The Soviet Union was fighting resistance forces in Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq War was ongoing, Lebanon faced continued civil discontent, and Israel was still an explosive issue in the Middle East (Lenczowski 1990, 212). R eagan’s foreign policymakers claimed the Soviet Union was the source of regional instab ility in the Middle East, thus the United

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45 States was willing to protect its national intere sts in the Middle East with the threat of military force; this policy caused third-world conflicts to result into a United StatesSoviet Union battle for power and in fluence (Dallin and Lapidus 1987, 223-224). Additionally, during the Reagan administration terrorism became a popular tool used by groups within the Middle East. These organi zations and groups saw the success of the Iranian hostage crisis and believed terrorism to be an effective tool versus a more powerful adversary. Despite the potential for unde sirable balance of pow er shifts within the Middle East stemming from these vulne rable foreign policy situations, the United States’ real enemy and threat according to President Reagan was the Soviet Union. Lebanon— President Reagan viewed Israel as a “s trategic asset and important ally in the Middle East (Miglietta 2002, 143).” Thus, the United Stat es foreign policy response toward the crises in Lebanon during the Reagan administration had broad regional implications. Israel and the Palestinians in Lebanon were honoring a cease-fire when “on June 6, 1982, Israel launched a major inva sion of Lebanon…called “Operation Peace for Galilee” (Lenczowski 1990, 217).” Israel’s want ed to knockout the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon. Unfortunately, in order to achieve this objective Israel was going to have to invade Lebanon, something the international community and the United States would not approve. The Reagan administration not wanting to be unsupportive of Israel’s securit y, gave only a placid diplomatic warning to the Israeli offensive plan. “The United States would never tell Israel not to defend herself from attack, but any action she took must be in response to an internationally recognized

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46 provocation, and the response must be pr oportionate to that provocation (Haig 1984, 169170).” In August 1982 peace talks were ongoing between Israel, Lebanon, Syria and the PLO. Eventually, peace meant the Lebanese would regain sovereignty over Lebanon, and various members of the PLO would leav e Lebanon. “If that happened, it would clear the way for the Israeli Defense Force, and even the Syrians and Iranians, to withdraw as well (Wills 2003, 50).” The PLO began leaving Lebanon on August 21 while a multinational peacekeeping force was monito ring the exodus, including United States Marines of the Sixth Fleet (Lenczowsk i 1990, 221). The multinational peacekeeping force oversaw the withdrawal of the PLO fr om Lebanon to Arab-na tions in the Middle East and Africa. The United States military forces left after seve nteen days, nearly two weeks ahead of what was originally planne d (Fraser 1989, 174). The Italians, and French believed that the United States removed troops prematurely. Bashir Gemayel was elected by the Le banese parliament as Lebanon’s new president, but on September 14 he was a ssassinated (1989, 175, 178) The assassination encouraged Israeli military leaders to advan ce in Beirut to help thwart any anarchy. Subsequently, what happened was the assassinat ed president’s Phalange party went to the Sabra and Shatila camps massacring over 800 Palestinian men, women, and children (Lenczowski 1990, 222). This massacre destabil ized the region once again and brought United States military forces back to Le banon. The multinational peacekeeping force’s mission was to provide assistance in rebuildi ng the Lebanese army, and maintain peace and order so that the Lebane se government could gain eff ective control over Lebanon. However, the multinational peacekeeping fo rce soon became targets for terrorist. On

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47 October 23, 1983, the United States Marine Co rps headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon was attacked by a suicide car-bomber. “In jus tifying American presen ce President Reagan stated soon afterward that the United Stat es has “vital interest s” in Lebanon and the American troops were there to prevent the Mi ddle East from becoming “incorporated into the Soviet bloc (1990, 224).”4 Reagan Doctrine— The Soviet Union invaded its southe rn neighbor Afghanistan in December 1979. This action prompted President Carter to issue a presidential doctrine known as the Carter Doctrine. The Carter Doctrine claimed that the Persian Gulf region was vital to the national interest of the United States and that any attempt to contro l this region would be a threat to the United States national intere sts, and any aggressor potentially would be met with military force. The Soviet Union continued to occupy Afghanistan during the 1980’s. United States foreign policy was under the constraints of the bi-polar world to maintain a balance of power in the Middle Ea st and to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining access to the Middle East ’s oil and the warm water ports of the Persian Gulf, thus President Reagan issued the Reagan Doct rine. The Reagan Doctrine supported who President Reagan referred to as “freedom fighters,” Afghanistan’s resistance forces the Mujaheden. The doctrine supported the “freedom fighters” providing “moral and material assistance” to allow the “freedom fighters” th e Mujaheden not just the ability to “fight and die for freedom but to fight and wi n freedom—to win freedom in Afghanistan.”5 The 4 President Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation on Lebanon and Grenada,” (October 27, 1983), In The Middle East Journal 38, no.2 (Spring 1984), 286. Quoted In George Lenczowski. 1990. American Presidents and the Middle East Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 5 President Ronald Reagan, “State of th e Union Address,” (February 4, 1986): from < http://www.reagan.utexas.edu /archives/speeches/major.html >.

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48 Reagan Doctrine was a part of the United St ates’ foreign policy of containment, but it was an offensive strategy against the Soviet Union’s advances within strategic third world countries (Spanier and Hook 1995, 206-207) Unlike previous doctrines during the Cold War, the Reagan Doctrine wanted to drain the Soviet Union’s resources by providing peripheral support to resistance fighters. The doctrine revealed the constraints on United States foreign policy in the bipolar world by espousing the support of a repressive third party to ta ke low-scale aggressive ac tion against the antagonist superpower, thus preventing the United States from having to take direct action against the Soviet Union. “Assistance to the Afghan rebels was one of the largest operations of this kind mounted by the U.S. government (Lenczowski 1990, 228).” The Reagan administration believed its foreign policy had to be tough against the Soviet Union thus; it supported the “freedom fighters” cause despite their despo tic history. This was th e nature of the bipolar international world power structure; the United St ates supported a repressive regime in order to maintain a balance of power against the anta gonist superpower. The United State feared the Soviet Union’s presen ce in the Middle East. When the Soviet Union began discussing withdrawing troops fr om Afghanistan the United States stood firm, to prevent the Soviet Union from es tablishing a puppet regime sympathetic to the Soviet Union’s interests. President Reagan said, “We support the Mujahidin. There can be no settlement unless all Soviet troops ar e removed and the Afghan people are allowed genuine self-determination.”6 The foreign policies of the Reagan administration in response to the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan are dire ctly linked to the 6 President Ronald Reagan, “State of th e Union Address,” (January 25, 1988): from < http://www.reagan.utexas.edu /archives/speeches/major.html >.

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49 containment of communism and the effect of the bi-polar world power structure. The bipolar world’s affect on United States forei gn policy in the Middle East caused the two world superpowers to “heavily militarize third world states (Tilly 1991, 40)” in the name of balancing power, and promoting its fore ign policies. By supporting the ‘freedom fighters” the Reagan administration was atte mpting to maintain a balance of power, and prevent the Soviet Union’s e xpansion and involvement in th e Middle East, disregarding the fact that it was arming the “most “militant Islamic element” within the mujaheden alliance, particularly the Pa rty of Islam (Gerges 1999, 71).”7 The bi-polar world forced the Reagan administration to support the Muja heden, the enemy was the Soviet Union not Islamism (1999, 70). Iran-Iraq War— The Iran-Iraq War jeopardized the ba lance of power in the Middle East, threatened oil supplies, and th e Persian Gulf states economies. Early in the war Iran was able to destroy Iraq’s oil industry based in the Persian Gulf, thus forc ing Iraq to rely on “land-based pipelines th rough neighboring territori es (Lenczowski 1990, 244).” Concurrently, Iraq sabotaged Iranian oil supplies in the Pers ian Gulf creating a tremendous economic drain to Iran’s war effo rt. In 1986-7 Iran advanced into Iraq and began taking audacious steps in preventing third parties from assisting Iraq. Due to the advance of the Iranian army Kuwait was th reatened. Kuwait began calling for outside assistance to protect its oil resources. If Iran was capable of winning the Iran-Iraq War and gain control over Kuwait, the United States national interests would be in peril from 7 Richard W. Cottam, “U.S. and Soviet Responses to Islamic Political Militancy,” In Neither East nor West pp. 279-280, quoted in Fawaz A. Gerges. 1999. America and Political Islam Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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50 Iran’s control of vast amounts of the worl d’s oil supply (Payne 1991, 104). On December 10, 1986, Kuwait “asked the United States to put eleven of its tankers under American registry, in the hope that the U.S. Navy woul d escort and protect them through the Gulf waters. Implied in Kuwait’s initiative was th e idea that if the United States refused, Kuwait would turn to the Soviet Union to seek protection,” thus on March 7, 1987, the United States put the eleven Kuwaiti tankers under the protection of the American flag (Lenczowski 1990, 245-6). The Soviet Union and the United States shared common interests in the Middle East and the Iran-Iraq War provided a stage fo r these interests to play themselves out. Kuwait’s tactic for gaining pr otection against the Iranians wa s to negotiate with the two world superpowers. The bi-polar world put th e United States and the Soviet Union in a head-to-head confrontation to provide assistan ce the distressed third world country. This power rivalry caused great concern in the R eagan administration and influenced foreign policy decision-making. The Soviet Union had a “longstanding objective of gaining access to a warm water port (Payne 1991, 118),” thus the United States had to provide protection or it would be inviti ng the Soviet Union into the Middle East by its inability to perform duties of a superpower. President R eagan stated in a speech on June 15, 1987: “Most recently there's been some c ontroversy about 11 new U.S. flag vessels that've been added to ou r merchant fleet. Let there be no misunderstanding: We will accept our re sponsibility for these vessels in the face of threats by Iran or anyone else. If we fail to do so simply because these ships previously flew the flag of another country, Kuwait, we would abdicate our role as a naval power, and we would open

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51 opportunities for the Soviets to move into this chokepoint of the free world's oil flow. In a word: If we don't do the job, the Soviets will. And that will jeopardize our own nationa l security as well as our allies.”8 Summary— The Reagan administration viewed the Soviet Union with great mistrust. The Reagan Doctrine allowed the United States to halt the Soviet Union’s expansion in Afghanistan, by providing assistance to “freed om fighters.” The bipolar international power structure that defined the Cold War unambiguously shaped United States foreign policy in the Middle East. The United States had to account for the Soviet Union before implementing any policy within the region. Alli ances, allies, arms deals, and financial assistance with Middle Eastern nations all considered the reacti on, and response of the Soviet Union. The United Stat es’ containment policy was centered on limiting Soviet expansion and influence within the Middle East thus affecting the United States’ foreign policies towards the Middle East. The Reagan administration’s Middle East foreign policies focused on the Soviet Union firs t, then protecting economic interests, maintaining national security interests, a nd providing military assistance as a means of insuring the success of its foreign policy goals The Cold War’s bi-polar power structure made United States foreign policy decisions pragmatic in order to contain communism, protect Israel, and keep vital oil supplies open for the United States and its allies in a world of increasing economic interdependence. 8 President Ronald Reagan, “An Address to the Na tion on Arms Reduction & the Venice Summit,” (June 15, 1987): from < http://www.reagan.utexa s.edu/archives/speeches/major.html >.

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52 —Chapter 4— The George H.W. Bush Administration —A New World Order— In chapter 3, I discussed how the world’ s bi-polar power stru ctured shaped United States foreign policy in the Middle East at the end of the Cold War. The United States was cautious to take direct military action in the region, for fear of a communist response. The foreign policy objectives of the United States during the Cold War in the Middle East had focused on preventing the Soviet Union’s influence in the Middle East, protecting Israel, and protect ing oil reserves. During the Reagan administration the United States achieved its foreign policy goals via supporting peripheral groups to disrupt the Soviets attempt to gain a foothold in the Middle East region, providing peacekeeping troops in a multinational mission in Lebanon, and by providing temporary protection of Kuwaiti vessels during the Iran-Iraq War by adding them to the United States merchant fleet. The bi-polar world influenced the Reag an administration’s res ponse to the Middle East during the Cold War. President Reagan wa s the last United States president to be involved with major Cold War foreign po licies. Containment policy was the United States’ major foreign policy st rategy since the Truman admini stration. It became obsolete during George H.W. Bush’s term in office. When George H.W. Bush took office in 1989 the Cold War was ending, and the bi-pol ar world power structure was collapsing. However, in 1989 the Bush administration view ed the Soviet Union as a threat to the Middle East. This is seen in National Security Directive 26. “The United States should

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53 continue to engage the Soviets in a dial ogue on regional issues, doing what we can to discourage arms sales and meddling in Iran and elsewhere in the region.”9 In this chapter, I outline the shift in Unites States foreign policy in the Middle East, as the United States became the worl d’s sole superpower. The uni-polar world caused United States foreign policy makers to make an unexpected about-face; Cold War foreign policies were no longer practical. Addi tionally, in this chapte r, I present George H.W. Bush’s steps towards constructing new United States foreign policy goals in the uni-polar world in the Middle East. In th e subsequent chapters 5, and 6, I study the development of foreign policy by President Clin ton and George W. Bu sh in the uni-polar world in the Middle East. The George H.W. Bush Administration 1989-1993— In 1989 when George H.W. Bush became President of the United States the world’s power structure was changing. Ea stern Europe had been under the Soviet Union’s control since the end of World Wa r II, was now witnessing anti-communist movements. The Soviet Union’s leader Mikha il Gorbachev made drastic changes to the foreign policies of the Soviet Union, thus easing tensions between the two superpowers, causing political changes across Eastern Europe. “By the end of 1989, no communist government except Yugoslavia’s remained in Eastern Europe (Papp, Johnson, and Endicott 2005, 195).” Simultaneously, the Soviet Union withdrew troops from Afghanistan. 1989 saw peaceful political power change in Eastern Europe, given hope that future conflicts will be solved dipl omatically and not by militaries (2005, 197). As tensions were thawing in the Cold War, the Middle East became the hotspot for 9 President George H.W. Bush, “National Security Di rective: U.S. Policy Towards the Persian Gulf, NSD 26,” (October 2, 1989): from .

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54 international conflict and was a catalyst fo r ushering in the uni-polar world. “As the overlay of Cold War conflict has been re moved, a significant external restraint on regional conflicts…has disappear ed…. This ‘regionalization’ of international security represents an important distinguishing feature of the post-Cold War world military and security order (Held et al 1999, 101).” Consequently, President George H.W. Bush devised a “new world order,” responded to Saddam Hussein’s aggression in the Middle East, and espoused the democratization of the Middle East in order to more sufficiently provided peace, and security to the Middle East. The New World Order— President George H.W. Bush spoke be fore a joint session of Congress on September 11, 1990, and began laying out gui delines for America’s post-Cold War foreign policy. He declared there was a “New World Order” and that the bi-polar world power struggles had ended. His new world orde r promoted global security and stability, and it warned that the intern ational community would put down any aggression. The new world order took into consider ation globalization’s affects on the world. Nation-states were now not the only source of significant world power. With the collapse of the bipolar world, the uni-polar world allowed for greater influence and significance from nonstate actors, regional, an d transnational organizati ons (Ohaegbulam 1999, 46). Globalization caused local matters to have a global affect, thus President George H.W. Bush’s new world order created a system th at allowed the United States to react and resolve international crisis that had local origins. The administ ration perceived that “States in the periphery…operate within a syst em in which political instability, militarism and state expansion remain endemic and in whic h there is no effective deterrent to war as

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55 a rational instrument of state policy (Held et al 1999, 101).” Thus, the new world order proclaimed by President George H.W. Bush focused on responding to local events such as “terrorism, hostage-taking, drug, traffick ing, renegade regimes with unpredictable rulers intent on dominating cr itical regions of the worl d, and nuclear proliferation (Ohaegbulam 1999, 47).” The United States’ new status as the world’s sole superpower forced President H.W. Bush’s foreign polic y makers to apply new methods to achieve foreign policy goals. President George H.W. Bush attempted to pursue multilateral policies, create a global cooperation, in essenc e majority rule, instead of the United States appearing to act as a global hegemony. Additio nally, “there is a gradual shift taking place towards cooperative defense or multilateral s ecurity arrangements. The desire to avoid interstate conflict and the enormous costs, technological requirements and domestic burdens of defence are together contributing to the historic strengthening…of multilateral and collective defence arrangements as well as international military cooperation and coordination (Held et al 1999, 101).” The first challenge to President Geor ge H.W. Bush’s new world order was Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. In his September 11, 1990 speech, the President outlined the need for the international comm unity to demonstrate determination, defend common vital interests, support rule of law, and stand up to aggression; then President George H.W. Bush established the United Stat es as the leader of the new world order by claiming that “in the pursuit of these goals America will not be intimidated.”10 The new world order will be led by the superpower United States, but ideally multinational participation gives the new world order its strength. The concept of multilateralism gives 10 President George H.W. Bush, “Address Before Jo int Session of Congress,” (September 11, 1990): from .

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56 the United Nations a greater role in global issues, now that the world is not divided among East versus West. “National security, in an anarchic interstate system, can never be disentangled entirely from the global syst emic conditions. All this suggests that the contemporary geopolitical order, far from si mply fragmenting, remains beset by problems of global strategic interconnectedness (Held et al 1999, 102-103).” Therefore, by President George H.W. Bush promoting more integrative trading policies with regions around the globe, President George H.W. Bush could preserve peace and stability in the uni-polar world through the promotion of democracy and increasing wealth around the globe. The Persian Gulf War— “The absence of superpower rivalry left a power vacuum that one regional leader, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, attempted to fill (Spanier and Hook 1995, 255).” On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, thus cont rolling its rich oil fields, and was a potential threat to Saudi Arabia’s sovereignt y and massive oil reserves. President George H.W. Bush declared in the Na tional Security Directive 45: “U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf are vital to national security. The inte rests include access to oil and security and stability of key friendly states in the re gion. The United States will defend its vital interests in the area, through th e use of U.S. military force if necessary and appropriate, against any power with inte rests inimical to our own.”11 After the invasion by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the United Nations sought economic sanctions against Iraq. “The United St ates and its allies built a massive military presence in and around Saudi Arabia as the UN passed resolutions condemning Iraq 11 President George H.W. Bush. “Natio nal Security Directive: U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, NSD 45,” (August 20, 1990): from .

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57 (Papp, Johnson, and Endicott 2005, 198).” Presid ent Bush wanted to bring about a new era in United States foreign policy over the i ssue of Iraq. The end of the Cold War left the United States the world’s lone superpower. In President Bush’s speech on September 11, 1990, President Bush began constructing th e foundation for a new American foreign policy for the uni-polar world. “We stand today at a unique and extrao rdinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times… a new world order—can emerge…. This is the vision that I shared with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. He and other leaders from Europe, the Gulf, and around the world understand that how we manage this crisis today could shape the future for generations to come.”12 With the multinational coalition established the United States led fight in Operation Desert Storm that began on January 16, 1991, and when the multinational forces began its ground assault to drive the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait the war was over within 100 hours. President George H.W. Bush ended the Pers ian Gulf War after the terms outlined in National Security Directive 54 were met. Th ese terms included: withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; restore Kuwait’s pre-i nvasion government; protect Americans in the region; advance security and stability within the Persian Gulf region.13 Throughout the Iraq-Kuwait conflict the United States took a leadership role against Iraq’s aggressions. The United States ’ foreign policies during the Cold War were 12 President George H.W. Bush, “Address Before Jo int Session of Congress,” (September 11, 1990): from < http://millercenter.virginia.edu >. 13 President George H.W. Bush, “National Security Dir ective: Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf, NSD 54,” (January 15, 1991): from .

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58 to prevent the spread of communi sm and Soviet influence, to maintain the stability of the Middle East, protect Israel, and protect the Middle East’s vast oil supplies. W ith the shift in the United States’ power position to sole superpower, it was in its national interest to take direct military action to protect the oi l supplies, and promote peace and stability within the Middle East. If Saddam Hussein’s aggression went unchecked it would have left George H.W. Bush’s concept of a ‘New World Or der’ in ruins (Cameron 2005, 15), and the global economy would be in jeopar dy if one nation monopolized a major world energy supply. Despite the Bush administration’ s efforts to work so intently with the United Nations and allies from around the worl d on a diplomatic end to the Iraq-Kuwait crisis, President Bush was very forthright about military action ag ainst Iraq. In every speech given by President Bush from August 1990 through March of 1991, President George H.W. Bush never hesitated about hi s military option against Iraq. With numerous United Nations Security Council resolutions the United States foreign policy actions against Iraq were aggressive, since there wa s no balance-of-power check on direct United States military involvement within the regi on. However, President George H.W. Bush made his foreign policy stance very clear that this was a multinational, multilateral mission to remove Iraq from Kuwait. Additiona lly, President Bush emphasized, “this is not, as Saddam Hussein would have it, the Unite d States against Iraq. It is Iraq against the world.” 14 The Persian Gulf War brought the world into the uni-polar international power structure led by the sole worl d superpower the United States. President George H.W. Bush’s foreign policies towards the Middle East became increasingly aggressive, and 14 President George H.W. Bush, “Address Before Join t Session of Congress,” (September 11, 1990): from < http://millercenter.virginia.edu >.

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59 eventually lead the deployme nt of military methods to resolve conf lict, and the establishment of United States military bases in the Middle East. The United States had “conducted a low-intensity war consisting of economic sanctions, UN inspections for weapons of mass destruction, a heavily patrolled no-fly zone in northern and southern Iraq, and periodic bombings to degrade the Iraqi military, especially its radar and communications divisions…. this “containment” policy had the added virtue of giving the United States the excuse and opportunity to maintain a permanent military presence in the Persian Gulf (McCormick 2005, 84).” The United States’ foreign policy in the bi-polar world threatened the use of military force by placing the United States military in the proximity of the Middle East ready to respond, or deter any threats. Howeve r, Cold War presidents were cautious to use this option due to the constraints on Unite d States foreign policy from the bi-polar international power structure. The United States during the Cold War attempted to achieve its objectives by supporting the Shah in Iran, then by supporting Iraq in the IranIraq war. The collapse of the bi-polar inte rnational power struct ure allowed the United States’ foreign policies in the Middle East not to be constrained by the Cold War’s containment strategy. In the uni-polar intern ational power structure the United States foreign policy makers no longer feared a world war between the bi-polar world’s superpowers; thus enabling the United States to enforce its Middle East foreign policy with an offensive military method. Additio nally, the United States’ old methods for achieving foreign policy had come to a d ead-end “The Saudis, having expended huge sums on both the Iran-Iraq War and the Persian Gulf War, are hardly in a political or military position to become Washington’s surrogate (Spiegel 1997, 304).” Additionally,

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60 Egypt and Syria are not in the right political position to be the protector of the Middle East (1997, 304). With no Middle East nation cap able of maintaining peace and stability in the region, the United States took the responsibility. Thus, as the world’s sole superpower President Bush placed the United States military in the Middle East to provide protection and stability in the region to advance the United States’ foreign policy goals “there is no one else.”15 The Meridian House Address— The Assistant Secretary for Near Easter n and South Asian Affairs, Edward P. Djerejian delivered “the first thorough statem ent given by any U.S. administration on the Islamist question (Gerges 1999, 78).” Djere jian gave this address on June 2, 1992. The address began by claiming the Cold War was ove r, United States foreign policy needed to move beyond East-West politics, but toward a policy of “collective engagement.” Collective engagement is intern ational cooperation which can be seen by the response to Saddam Hussein’s aggression toward his ne ighbor Kuwait, and gi ves the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations a new hope. The Cold Wa r had limited international responses to crises in the Middle East, and it hampered productive talks in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Djerejian claimed the United States ha d two goals in the Middle East region. First, peace between Isra el and its neighbors, second, pragmatic security and stability for the Arabian Peninsula and the Pe rsian Gulf’s vast oil suppli es. “These are not new goals, of course we have striven toward both fo r decades. What is new is the opportunity afforded us by recent global and regional events to make real progress toward achieving 15 President George H.W. Bush, “Address at West Point,” (January 5, 1993): from .

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61 them.”16 Djerejian is referring directly to the shift to a uni-polar international power structure, which enables United States foreign policy to take a more active role in protecting its foreign policy in terests in the Middle East. A dditionally, the security and stability within the Middle East is not simply a national interest of the United States, but a vital economic interest to th e “world economy.” However, th e United States is the lone superpower, and desires to prevent the reemer gence of a bi-polar world, the United States must protect the Middle East and its resources. The United States encouraged the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to engage in “selfdefense and collective defense planning.” Until the GCC is ready for the burden of provi ding Persian Gulf security and maintaining stability the United States will provide its necessary defense needs. However, Djerejian makes it clear that American troops will not be permanently stationed within the Middle East, and arm sales are for strengthening Middle Eastern defenses against aggressors, to prevent the United States involveme nt in minor local conflicts. The address averred that United States interests in the Middle East go beyond conflict resolution, and stated th at the United States’ desire to protect the Middle East’s natural resources for itself and the world economy. Additiona lly, the Bush administration wanted to promote human rights, and pluralism within the Middle East. The administration recognized there are differences between the United States and the Middle East, but similarities do exist. Djerejian also wanted it known the United States does not view Islam as the next “ism,” or that Isla mism is replacing the Soviet Union as its adversary. The United States wants to enc ourage and promote democracy of a local origin within the Middle East. Locally prescr ibed democracies are important for stability 16 Edward P. Djerejian, “The United States and Middle East in a Changing World,” (June 2, 1992): from .

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62 and identity. The Bush administration promoted Turkey as its democratic model for the Middle East; Turkey was viewed as “moderat e” and “pro-Western (1999, 95).” Djerejian claimed that democratization in the Middle Ea st would allow the region to work closer with the West, and be beneficial for the world. The Meridian Address concluded by espousing continued support for “repelling aggression and in promoting a negotiated pea ce to a seemingly intractable conflict in the region…. We can get there through close e ngagement and constr uctive interaction between the United States and all the countries of the Near East region at all levels— government-to-government, group-to-group, person-to-person, and faith-to-faith.”17 The Meridian Address was the George H.W. Bush administration’s only “major” attempt to build a stronger relationship with the Middle East, and “set the intellectual framework that would influence American policy th inking for years (Gerges 1999, 85, 89).”. Summary— United States containment policy duri ng George H.W. Bush administration became unraveled due to the collapse of the bi-polar world. Containment policies practiced by United States leaders and foreign policymakers since the Truman administration were no longer relevant for th e uni-polar world. The new world order was an attempt by George H.W. Bush to crea te international orde r around United States leadership. By incorporating multilateral policies, and encouraging increased participation from the United Nations, President George H.W. Bush was attempting to dispel any notions the uni-polar world woul d cause the United States to become the world’s policeman, or global hegemon. 17 Ibid

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63 The Persian Gulf War demonstrated the United States’ leadership at the inception of the uni-polar world. The Un ited States’ foreign policy in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War took a more active military role in maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East region, to protect what the George H.W. Bush administration and previous administrations consider vital interests to th e United States. A secure and stable Persian Gulf and the protection of oil were demands of the increasingly interdependent global economy. The United States had attempted to find a partner with in the Middle East strong enough to protect the region, and work w ith the United States and its allies, but after decades of foreign policy failures the United States used its military to provide the Middle East with its security demands. Edward P. Djerejian espoused the Geor ge H.W. Bush admi nistration’s policies towards the Middle East in the Meridian Addr ess. The administration wanted to promote democratization of the Middle East to allow for a close c ooperation with the West. The policies outlined in the address attempted to reach out and create alliances with the United States and the Middle Eastern nations. A key for United States foreign policy in the region is security and stability. The Meri dian Address outlined th e George H.W. Bush administration’s ideal development for the Middle East. The foreign policy objectives espoused in the address supported active Unite d States military presence in the Middle East until the region has achieved peace, stab ility, prosperity, and locally prescribed democracy. The United States did not have decisive strategy in the unipolar world, as it had experienced in the bi-polar world. As the worl d’s sole superpower the United States took a more aggressive and protective role in the Middle East by deploying its military to

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64 provide security and st ability to the region. The United St ates’ foreign policy goals in the uni-polar world focused on protecting the acce ss to the Middle East’s oil for the global economy, democratization, and pushing forward the Arab-Israeli peace process. These issues were vital for the United States nationa l interests in the unipolar world, according to the George H.W. Bush administration. Theref ore, the United States as the world’s sole superpower took an active milita ry role in the Middle East region in order to preserve its power position in the uni-polar world, a nd achieve its foreign policy objectives.

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65 —Chapter 5— The Bill Clinton Administration —The Search for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy— In chapter 4, I revealed how Presid ent George H.W. Bush and his foreign policymakers shifted United States foreign polic y after the collapse of the bi-polar world. The new world order was President George H. W. Bush’s attempt to find a United States foreign policy to replace the void left by th e Cold War’s containm ent policy. President George H.W. Bush put his new foreign policy in action after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The uni-polar world was going to be led by th e United States, and Pr esident George H.W. Bush was not going to let any aggressor threaten the security or stability of the Middle East. As the world’s sole superpower the Un ited States led the multinational effort to restore security and stability in the Middle East, thus protecting oil reserves in the region. The United States’ foreign policy approach used direct military involvement in the region, subsequently defending its power posit ion, the economy, and its allies against regional instability. With the collapse of the bi-polar world, the George H.W. Bush administration began an attempt to establish close diplomatic ties in the Middle East through democratization by promoting the “Turkish model (Gerges 1999, 95),” while promoting peace, security, stability and protec ting the regions vital oil supplies with the United States military. In this chapter, I research how the Clin ton administration continued to search for a new world order in the uni-polar world. President Clinton attempted to push

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66 democratization, and pluralism in the Middl e East. Additionally, he practiced a “dual containment (Hyland 1999, 172)” of Iraq and Iran, and advanced th e Arab-Israeli peace process. Not wanting to come across hege monic, the Clinton administration moved “slowly and cautiously with regard to advocati ng social and political change in the region (Gerges 1999, 104).” In chapte r 6, I exam how President Geor ge W. Bush continues to develop the post-Cold War United States foreign policy in a uni-polar world. The Bill Clinton Administration 1993-2001— “Clinton began his presidency by focusi ng on domestic policy, especially foreign economic policy (Ohaegbulam 1999, 49).” Howeve r, Clinton was forced to respond to missions left uncompleted by the George H.W. Bush administration. Somalia’s civil war brought about a United States response by Pr esident George H.W. Bush. United Nations troops had already been de ployed to Somalia when President Bush “deployed 28,000 U.S. troops to Somalia (Papp, Johnson and Endicott 2005, 208)” for a humanitarian mission as part of his new world order pol icies (Melanson 2005, 242). President Clinton supported the United States’ mission in Somalia. Violence and an increasingly deteriorating humanitarian situ ation in Somalia forced the United States troops to use deadly force. “In 1993, 18 Americans were ki lled in a firefight and Congress called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces (Papp, Johnson and Endicott 2005, 211).” The Clinton administration’s response to the event wa s PDD-25. “This directive restricted U.S. participation in collective s ecurity operations under UN auspices. Among other points, this directive also rejected the concept of a standing UN Army, and it endorsed U.S. participation in UN multilateral missions only when these missions served United States interests and had a realistic endpoint (Oh aegbulam 1999, 52).” The failure of Somalia’s

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67 Operation Restore Hope, forced the Clint on administration to espouse PDD-25; this Presidential Decision Directive stifled the Clinton administration’s plans to use the United Nations as the nucleus in it s post-Cold War foreign policies. In speeches and policy, President Clinton underlined the compa tibility of Middle Eastern culture and democracy. President Clin ton also distanced the idea Islamic culture and terrorism is synonymous. The Clinton ad ministration was not quick to judge the Middle East or the Islamic community af ter the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, 1995 bombing in Saudi Arabia, 1996 Khobar Towe rs bombing in Saudi Arabia, 1998 U.S. embassies attacks in Africa, or the 2001 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole. President Clinton faced many new foreign policy challenges in th e post-Cold War, thus his idealist attempt to replace containment was to promote democratization, capitalism, and peace. The Clinton administration used pragmatic case-bycase solutions for the Middle East, rather than an all-encompassing foreign policy approach such as the Cold War’s containment policy (1999, 372). Address to the Jordanian Parliament— On October 26, 1994, Jordan and Israel signed the “Treaty of Peace Between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel.” On the same day, President Clinton gave a speech to the Jordanian Parliament, commending its devotion to peace, and encouraging its continued leadership in the Middle East. The peace treaty was an historic moment for the world, and the world’s sole superpower. The signing of the treaty allowed the Clinton administration an oppor tunity to advance the democratization movement for the Middle East.

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68 President Clinton in his address to the Jordanian Parliament applauded the nation of Jordan for its efforts to create peace in the Middle East. By signing a peace treaty with Israel, the Jordanian’s had “rejected the da rk forces of terror and extremism” and “embraced the bright promise of tolerance and moderation.”18 President Clinton then goes on and praises Jordan for embr acing “pluralism” and “openness.”19 By establishing peace with Israel, President Clinton promised that the United States would work to establish Jordan in the globalizing world. Clin ton stresses that Jordan “will not stand alone.”20 The United States will assist Jordan in strengthening “defense and security requirements.”21 Apart of Clinton’s foreign policy is that “peace has to produce benefits.”22 Therefore, peace must create economic stabil ity and prosperity. Additionally, Clinton makes the claim that to “live in harmony with our neighbors and to build a better life for our children is the hope th at links us all together.”23 This rejects the clash of civilization thesis debated among certain scholars. By focusing on commonalities, President Clinton attempted to breakdown stereotypes, biases, a nd prejudices between the West and Islamic culture. By breaking down what is foreseen as differences between Islamic culture and the West, President Clinton attempted to la y the foundation for demo cratization of the Middle East. This is done by revealing the be nefits of cooperation with the West, and stating that our societies are not that different and can be nefit from a relationship of 18 President Bill Clinton, “Remarks to the Jordanian Parliament,” (October 26, 1994) in Amman, Jordan: Weekly Compilation of Pr esidential Documents from . 19 Ibid 20 Ibid 21 Ibid 22 Ibid 23 Ibid

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69 understanding and respect. “In the Middle East as elsewhere across the world, the United States does see a contest, a contest between forces that tr anscend civilization, a contest between tyranny and freedom, terror and secur ity, bigotry and tolera nce, isolation and openness. It is the age-old st ruggle between fear and hope.”24 The fear is from a lack of understanding, respect, and accepta nce; thus causing a rise in terrorism, and extremism in nationalistic and religious forms. President Cl inton’s claim is that hope uses our deeply rooted commonalities to build a relationship of trust, respect, stability, prosperity, and peace. President Clinton’s remarks to the Jordanian Parliament commended Jordan for establishing peace with Israel, and expressed the United States’ support of the Jordan and Arab-Israeli peace process. Additionally, his sp eech encouraged other Arab nations to follow the path of the Jordanians. This is done by focusing on the benefits to be gained by establishing peace with Israel, and by praising the Jordanian efforts to democratize, and respecting the values of its citizens. The Clinton administration seizes this opportune moment to promote its foreign policy ideals of democratization of the Middle East, its support of pluralism, and stressed the common bonds between the East and West. President Clinton also applauds Jordan’s efforts to denounce terrorism, and extremism, while promoting modernization and acceptance. The lack of another superpower in the uni-polar world allowed President Clinton to push forward the Middle East peace proce ss. With the quick and decisive victory by the United States military in the Persian Gulf War, and its continued presence in the Middle East region after the wa r, the United States used increased military methods to 24 Ibid

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70 achieve foreign policy objectives in the Middle East, such as peace, stability, and democratization. Dual Containment— The Clinton administration’s foreign policy objectives in the uni-polar world were to protect its power position and global engagements “by su staining a steadily growing, low inflation, and solvent domestic economy (Melanson 2005, 256);” and pursue policies of democratization, thus opening-up the world economy (2005, 256). In order for the Clinton administration to achieve these fore ign policy goals, it need ed to protect the United States’ global interest from “backlash states.” President Clinton’s National Security Advisor Anthony Lake developed the Clinton administrations plan against “backlash states” in an article in Foreign Affairs “Confronting Backlash States.” Anthony Lake’s article claime d that backlash states are “often aggressive and defiant (Lake 1994, 45).” Additionally, Lake claims that the United States has a responsibility towa rds the backlash states as th e world’s only superpower to develop “a strategy to neutralize, contai n and through selectiv e pressure, perhaps eventually transform these back lash states into constructive members of the international community (1994, 46).” Lake stated the Unite d States’ foreign policy problems towards the Middle East’s two backlash states Iraq and Iran, clearly: first, they are threats to nonproliferation; second, between the two nei ghboring backlash states they contain 65 percent of the world’s oil reserves (1994, 47) United States foreign policy goals for the Middle East’s backlash states are to “establis h a favorable balance of power, one that will protect United States interest in the security of our friends and in the free flow of oil of stable prices (1994, 47-48).”

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71 Iraq and Iran each demonstrated hostile policies towards the United States’ interests in the Middle East, t hus the Clinton administration began “dual containment” of the backlash states. In th e post-Cold War, the United States was no longer going to protect its vital interests in the Middle East by strengthening one adversary over the other. Unlike the Cold War, the United Stat es now used regional allies such as Egypt, Turkey, Israel, and Saudi Arabia to st rengthen its dual containment (1994, 48). Additionally, the presence of th e United States military assisted in keeping the backlash states under control. The uni-polar world a llowed the United States to use increased military foreign policy methods to advance its goals. Without the Cold War, Iraq and Iran had no superpower to rely-on against th e United States’ foreign policies. Dual containment took advantage of Iraq and Iran’ s recent history. The Iran-Iraq War during the 1980’s created a deep mistrust between the two Middle East neighb ors. Iraq’s victory diminished Iran’s offensive military capabilities, and Iraq’s defeat in the Operation Desert Storm weakened its military offe nsive capabilities (1994, 48-49). Additionally, after Iraq invaded its sma ller, weaker neighbor the Gu lf Cooperation Council (GCC) became increasingly willing to assist the Unite d States military for deployment within the Middle East (1994, 49). Dual cont ainment represents the Clinton administrations foreign policy efforts to establish multilateral solutions for Iraq and Iran, use United Nations sanctions to legitimize the efforts led by th e United States “to protect United States strategic interests, stabilize the internationa l system and enlarge the community of nations committed to democracy, free markets and peace (1994, 55).”

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72 Iraq— Despite the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the United States maintained vital interests in Iraq, and the Middle East. Since becoming the world’s sole superpower the United States expanded its “military presence in the Gulf and the establishment of bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain (Nuechterlein 2001, 277).” Additionally, the “International Atomic En ergy Agency (IAEA) inspectors found that Iraq was only a few years away from de veloping nuclear weapons. Thus, Clinton supported UN weapons inspections of Iraq a nd continuation of sanctions against the country (Papp, Johnson and Endicott 2005, 215) .” Soon after President Clinton’s inauguration, Saddam Hussein continued to show his defiance towards the United Nations sanctions, and the United States’ fo reign policies. On June 26, 1993, the Clinton administration fired cruise missiles on Iraq, when there was evidence suggesting Saddam Hussein plotted to assassinate former Presid ent George H.W. Bush while touring Kuwait earlier that year (Hyland 1999, 171, 172). Th e Clinton administration maintained a substantial amount of military and civilian personnel in Ira q’s southern and northern nofly zones. The no-fly zones had been in place since Operation Desert Storm as a means of protecting Iraq’s neighbors, and protec ting the Iraq citizens from Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein in 1994 sent Iraqi troops to the Kuwaiti border. The forces withdrew after the Clinton administration deployed a carrier group, warpla nes and 54,000 troops to the Persian Gulf region. In August 1996, Kurdish groups in northern Iraq began fighting. The United States military responded to the Kurdish fighting only after Saddam Hussein began to assist one Kurdish faction ov er the others. Once again, the Clinton

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73 administration used cruise missile strikes against Iraq military targets and extended the southern no-fly zone. After the Iraqi military backed-out of northern Iraq’s Kurdish territory, the Clinton administration believed United States foreign policy against Iraq’s aggression was working. The northern and southern nofly zones were protecting Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the Kurds; Saddam Hussein seem ed to be contained. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in a speech on March 26, 1997, stood firm on United States foreign policy in Iraq and the Middle East. She en couraged a domestic overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and stated how Iraq could become a productive member of the international community through democratiz ation, improving human rights, rejecting terrorism, complying with the United Nations, and establishing a military of modest size.25 However, in 1997 Saddam Hussein “once again challenged the UN, even more directly confronting the United States by refu sing to admit United States members of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) to inspect his suspicious wea pons facilities (1999, 175).” Moreover, after much deal making the United States allowed Iraq to sell oil for food, if it allowed the weapons inspectors to return to Iraq. Members of the United Nations Security Council wanted to avoi d military action against Saddam Hussein’s despite his defiance. The Clinton administration at the beginni ng was not willing to act unilaterally against Iraq, and allowed diplomacy to conti nue to run its course. However, it was not long until the United Nations inspection teams were denied entry into weapons inspection sites, and Saddam Hussein still unwaveringly re fused inspections of several presidential 25 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albri ght, “Speech on Iraq,” (March 26, 1997): from .

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74 palaces (1999, 179). This m ove by Saddam Hussein pushed the Clinton administration towards unilateral action. The cat-and-mous e diplomatic games between the United States, and the United Nations against Iraq finally ended in December 1998, when “Saddam announced that he would no longe r cooperate with the UN teams (Melanson 2005, 259).” The United States and the Britis h commenced Operation Desert Fox, which was “a four-day bombing campaign against Ir aq defenses (2005, 259).” The uni-polar power structure enabled the United States to act against Iraqi aggres sion without the need for a multinational force, or worrying about upsetting the regions balance-of-power, which existed in the bi-polar world. The Arab-Israeli Peace Process— A result of the end of the Cold War and “for the first time since the founding of Israel, the outline of a settlement with its Ar ab neighbors, as well as the Palestinians, was beginning to take shape (Hyland 1999, 167) .” On September 13, 1993, Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat signed the Oslo Accords, a step toward peace in the Middle East. The shift from a bi-polar to a uni-polar worl d enabled the stalemated peace negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors move forward. The Arab Nations no longer had the Soviet Union for protection, the Persian Gulf War revealed to Mi ddle East nations the United States “could and would fight in the Middle East (1999, 156-157).” When the Clinton administration took office in January of 1993, it wasted no time trying to assist in establis hing peace between Israel and its neighbors Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. After the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres became the Prime Minister. Eventually, after a tight election Benjamin Netanyahu became Israel’s new Prime Minister. After negotiations between Israel, and the

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75 Palestinian Liberation Organiza tion (PLO), with assistance of the United States, Israel withdrew from Hebron. With the withdrawal of Israel from Hebron, the “piece by piece (1999, 161)” process of peace in the Middle East was stalling. Henr y Kissinger wrote an article in 1996 claiming that Israel and th e Palestinians should work towards final negotiations (1999, 161). Secretary of State Madeline Albright av erred in a speech on August 6, 1997, that terrorist strike at a moment of progress in the Middle East peace process. Terrorism will not slow-down the Middle East peace process, and the United States will remain steadfast in its commitment to Israel’s security. Add itionally, Secretary of St ate Albright stated, “we must respond to those who have declared war on peace by waging war on terror— understanding that forging peace and fighting terrorism are not separate struggles, but rather two halves of the same struggle. We cannot succeed in one if we do not prevail in both. The path ahead is difficult, but so was the journey already made.”26 Later, in her speech she encouraged moving beyond the Os lo Accords, and sides with Henry Kissinger’s approach of establishing “permane nt status negotiations.” President Clinton took on the challenge of perusing “permanent status negotiations” in 1998, by getting the Wye River Memorandum signed by Prime Mini ster Netanyahu, Chairman Arafat and King Hussein as an observer. The Wye River Memorandum broke the stalemated peace talks, and established a framework for las ting peace, with a promise from President Clinton to support “both sides of the endeavor.”27 26 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, “The Is raeli-Palestinian Peace Pro cess,” (August 6, 1997): from < http://www.state.gov/www/statements/970806.html>. 27 President Bill Clinton, “Remarks at the Wye River Memorandum signing ceremony,” (November 2, 1998) In Washington, D.C.: Weekly Compilation of Pr esidential Documents from .

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76 The Arab-Israeli peace process is vital to United States post-Cold War foreign policy. The critical goals of the post-Cold Wa r United States foreign policy in the Middle East are establish peace, secu rity, prosperity, and democracies. In order for the United States to achieve these goals, it must ensu re there is an Arab-Israeli peace. With the United States military present in the Middle East region, and its leadership role in Operation Desert Storm, the United States is capable of pushing forward, and encouraging change in the Middle East, and the Arab-Israeli peace process. The conditions of the uni-polar world made th e United States an “indispensable nation (Melanson 2005, 283).” Summary— The Clinton administration’s forei gn policies towards the Middle East demonstrated the United States’ position in the world as sole superpower. The Clinton administration worked diligently to open-up the Middle East by promoting democratization, pluralism, and peace. The uni-polar world allowed the United States greater flexibility in its foreign policies in dealing with the Middle East. The lack of an opposing superpower shadowing foreign policy in the region, and with the sole ability to act unilaterally, the United States was capable of maintaining its military presence in the Persian Gulf region to promote democratiz ation, practice dual cont ainment of Iraq and Iran, and push forward the Arab-Israeli peace process. The United States increased its involvement in the Middle East, in order to protect the region and es tablish stability, thus maintaining its power pos ition in the uni-polar worl d by through democratization, opening economic markets, and advocating peac e. The uni-polar world gave increased

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77 flexibility to the United States’ foreign policy methods, allowing increased military involvement to achieve foreign policy initiatives.

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78 —Chapter 6— The George W. Bush Administration —A New United States Foreign Policy— In Chapter 5, I illustrated how the Clinton administration moved beyond searching for a new world order, to handli ng foreign policy situations on a pragmatic case-by-case basis (Ohaegbulam 1999, 372). Th e Clinton administration demonstrated the United States’ post-Cold War foreign policy was more flexible, and could take a more hands-on approach to foreign policy, and use increased militaristic methods in its foreign policy since; it was the only nation that coul d influence unilaterall y. President Clinton’s foreign policy approach focuse d principally on economics. In dealing with the Middle East, President Clinton pursu ed foreign policy goals of democratization, opening of markets, increasing stability, increasing securi ty, and advocating peace. He kept United States troops in the Persian Gulf in order to practice dual containment, promote peace, stability, and protect global oil interests. Hi s foreign policy used the United Nations to contain Saddam Hussein by issuing economic sanctions, weapons facility inspections, and protecting the Middle East’s oil. Additionally, he was not afraid to threaten with unilateral military response to Iraq’s defiance of the United Nations and the United States. He was also capable of many breakth roughs in Arab-Israeli relations by pushing both sides to work out differences as the Un ited States played the role of mediator. In this chapter, I research how the George W. Bush administration changed United States foreign policy. The uni-polar wo rld established the United States as the

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79 world’s sole superpower and the previous pr esidential administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton favored multilateral institutions and global engagement to achieve the majority of its foreign policy initiativ es in the Middle East (Cameron 2005, 29). The George W. Bush administration in its first ei ght months in office were more “realist and unilateralist (Papp, J ohnson, and Endicott 2005, 218)” than the previous post-Cold War presidents. However, the September 11, 2001 terr or attacks on the United States changed American foreign policy. “The 11 September terrorist attacks signified the end of the post-Cold War era in dramatic fashion. Th e post-Cold War era was characterized by pragmatic internationalism in US foreign polic y. The new era is characterized by a single obsession—the war on terrorism (Cameron 2005, 201).” The George W. Bush Administration 2001-2006— George W. Bush began his presidency making drastic changes to United States foreign policy. He began exploring the idea of a ballistic missile defense system, rejected the Kyoto Protocol, and backed out of the International Criminal Court (Papp, Johnson, and Endicott 2005, 218). His administration bega n pursuing strong unilateralist policies, and rejected the concept of th e United States as a global peac e broker. On the morning of September 11, 2001, the George W. Bush pres idency would be defined and the world changed. The terror attacks on the World Trade Ce nter towers, the Pentagon, and Somerset County, Pennsylvania gave the Bush administra tion new priorities in its foreign policy. The foreign policy result of the Septem ber 11, 2001 terror attacks was the war on terrorism. The Bush administration’s first target in the post-September 11, 2001 world was Afghanistan, and the hunt for Osama bin Laden. The Taliban government of

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80 Afghanistan had “provided safe haven for bi n Laden and al Qaeda’s terrorist training camps (2005, 219).” In 2002, President Bu sh announced the United States’ new preemptive defense doctrine. This would allow the United States the ability to take the offensive in the war on terror. In 2002, the preemptive defense doctrine espoused by President George W. Bush began to focu s on Saddam Hussein and Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction threat. The Iraq War ended a nd the United States searched for weapons of mass destruction found little if any evidence of a threat, thus far. For this reason “the United States emphasized the overthrow of Sa ddam Hussein, the end of his brutality, and the democratization of Iraq as its chief war aims (2005, 225).” President George W. Bush’s foreign policy advocated freedom in the Middle East. The Bush administration’s foreign pol icy believed that demo cracy brought freedom to a nation, deterrence was an ancient con cept that no longer protected the American people, and “preeminent military, economic, a nd political power of the United States was conducive to peace and welcomed by other st ates (Melanson 2005, 352).” President Bush stated his support for locally prescribed demo cracies that are respect ful of human dignity, accountable to its citizens, and responsible to its nei ghbors. Basic human rights of religion, conscience, speech, assembly, asso ciation and press were to be protected. Governments are expected to be responsive to its citizens, submit to the will of the people, especially when people voted for a ch ange. Governments are to maintain its own borders, protect an independent and impartial system of justice, punish crime, embrace rule of law, and resist corruption. The new democracie s had to limit the reach of

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81 government and protect civil society.28 United States foreign policy was no longer aimed at protecting, or preserving peace, but ra ther creating peace by installing democracy, through offensive military means. The foreign policy intent of George W. Bush was to install democracies in Afghanistan, and Iraq, thus sowing the seeds for freedom, modernization, and reform for the rest of th e Middle East. Democracy in the Middle East is seen as vital for the United States and the world according to President George W. Bush’s foreign policy. The War on Terror— The United States soon discovered that al Qaeda was responsib le for the heinous acts of September 11, 2001. On September 20, 2001, President Bush spoke before a joint session of Congress and stated, “ our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terro rist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”29 Terrorism moved to the forefr ont of United States foreign policy, President Bush and his administration we re steadfast in its re solve to respond the new foreign policy objectives. After giving the Taliban government of Afghanistan the ultimatum to provide protection for foreign nationals, diplomats, journalists and aid workers the Bush administration also dema nded immediate cooperation from the Taliban to stop harboring terrorist, s hut-down terrorist training camp s, turnover all terrorists in Afghanistan, and provide the United States full access to inspect the acquiescence of these demands. The Taliban government failed to comply. 28 President George W. Bush, “National Secur ity Strategy 2006,” (March 16, 2006): from . 29 President George W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress,” (September 20, 2001): from .

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82 On October 7, 2001, President George W. Bush announced the United States had begun military operations in Afghanistan, as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. The war on terror was espoused to be a long sustai ned war, with uncertain battlefields. The path to victory may be long but freedom and the United States will prevail. President Bush had already made clear in a speech on September 20, 2001, that “every nation, in every region, now had a decision to make. E ither you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forw ard, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.30 The war on terrorism set as an objective to restore freedom and hope to citiz ens of nations that are ruled by fear and oppression. The war on terror’s mission is to “defend not only our (the United States’) precious freedoms, but also the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear.”31 By the United States taking th e responsibility of freeing the world from terrorist and rogue st ates, it reveals its intent to create a world accepting of its leadership, and influence. Without any rival, or opposition to the United States afforded to it by the uni-polar international power struct ure, it is able to take on a global mission and predominately unilateral met hods to achieve its policies. The United States and its coalition of a llies defeated the Taliban government, and disrupted the al Qaeda terrorist network ope rating in Afghanistan. The war on terrorism was moving along slowly, but successfully in Afghanistan as of December 2001. On December 11, 2001, the Bush administration br oadened the initiatives of the war on terror. President Bush gave a speech to th e Citadel where his foreign policy goals began 30 Ibid 31 President George W. Bush, “President Address to the Nation,” (October 7, 2001): from .

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83 to define themselves further. He began em phasizing the prevention of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of te rrorist or rogue states. “Rogue states are clearly the most likely sources of chemical and biological a nd nuclear weapons for terrorists…. America's next priority to prev ent mass terror is to protect agains t the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them I wish I could report to the American people that this threat does not exist—that our enemy is content with car bombs and box cutters—but I cannot.”32 The war on terror’s initiatives would be de fined even further by President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address. In his speech, President Bush stated that an “axis of evil” is present in the world. North Korea, Iran, and Iraq constituted the axis of evil, including its terrorist allies.33 These rogue regimes threaten the peace and stability of the world in its pursuit of weapons on mass dest ruction. More importantly, President Bush asserted “that the United States reserved the right to launch preventive attacks on looming threats before they had become “clear and present dangers” (2005, 309).” In the uni-polar world, the United Stat es has no balance towards its power, leaving the Bush administratio n’s foreign policies capable of implanting a doctrine of preemptive warfare. The doctrine of preemption not only applies to the axis of evil, but to the regional and local terroris t groups operating globally. Pres ident Bush’s foreign policy established that “our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action wh en necessary to defend our liberty and to 32 President George W. Bush, “President Speaks On the War Effort To the Citadel Cadets.” (December 11, 2001): from . 33 President George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” (January 29, 2002): from .

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84 defend our lives.”34 The majority of President Bush’s rhetoric is aimed at the Middle East, despite the talk of a globa l war on terror. The instability in this region is perceived as threatening to the United States national interests, and a breeding ground for terrorism. The United States has been stationed in the Middle East since the Persian Gulf War, and has had influence in the region since the Trum an administration in order to protect the vast oil reserves. Despite the ongoing nature of the war on te rror, President Bush in his National Security Strategy 2002 outlined th e ultimate goal of the United States mission in the war on terror. The National Security Strategy reve aled the administration’s path to victory, and protection of the United St ates’ national and global intere sts will be that “we will actively work to bring the hope of democrac y, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.”35 The United States in the post-Cold War, and the postSeptember 11, 2001 world is the only nation ca pable of leading a war on terror. The unipolar world allows the United States to pur sue its foreign policy goals, and implement them unilaterally if necessary. The Iraq War— In 2002, the Bush administration increased pressure towards Iraq by demanding the re-entry of United Nations weapons inspectors, compliance with the United Nations Security Council resolutions, and to denoun ce terrorism. Saddam Hussein’s government was listed as one of the three nations apart of the axis of evil. June 1, 2002, President Bush gave the commencement address at the United States Military Academy at West 34 President George W. Bush, “Commencement Address at West Point,” (June 1, 2002): from . 35 President George W. Bush, “National Security Strategy 2002,” (September 17, 2002): from .

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85 Point. In his address, he made clear that any nation seeking or developing weapons of mass destruction would be targeted in the war on terror. “Unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver thos e weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies…. We must take the battle to the enemy, di srupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge.”36 President Bush espoused his concerns ove r Iraq to the United Nations General Assembly on September 12, 2002. There he stress ed that regional conflict affected global security. However, an immediate threat was ro gue states providing deadly technology to terrorists. Saddam Hussein has broken all of the United Nations resolutions that Iraq was obligated to uphold, and is harbor ing al Qaeda terrorists. Presid ent Bush then revealed his foreign policy initiative th at underlined the United States’ war on terror, the democratization of the Middle Ea st. “Liberty for the Iraqi pe ople is a great moral cause, and a great strategic goal. The people of Ira q deserve it; the secu rity of all nations requires it. Free societies do not intimidat e through cruelty and conquest, and open societies do not threaten the wo rld with mass murder. The Unit ed States supports political and economic liberty in a unified Iraq.”37 President Bush made clear in his speech that if Saddam Hussein does not comply with the re solutions by the Unite d Nations Security Council, action against Iraq will be taken, and Saddam Husse in will lose his power. The ultimate goal of President Bush’s foreign policy for the Middle East is for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine to be the leaders in de mocratic change in the Middle East. 36 President George W. Bush, “Commencement Address at West Point,” (June 1, 2002): from . 37 President George W. Bush, “Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly,” (September 12, 2002): from .

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86 The Bush administration continued pressure on Saddam Hussein to comply with the United Nations resolutions. Neverthele ss, Saddam Hussein continued his usual defiance. President Bush in his 2003 State of the Union Address, stated, “A brutal dictator, with a history of r eckless aggression, with ties to te rrorism, with great potential wealth, will not be permitted to dominate a vital region and threaten the United States.”38 Later, in the State of the Union Address, President Bush made clear the United States would strike Iraq if they did not comp ly with the United Nations. The Bush administration’s policies will not allow Iraq to th reaten the stability of the Middle East or the security of the United Stat es and the world. Iraq’s only opti on is to “disarm, fully, and peacefully.”39 As the prelude to war with Iraq concl uded, President Bush began pushing the idea of freedom in Iraq. Freedom according to the Bu sh administration would allow Iraq to be a beacon in the Middle East for modernization, and hope; thus being a step in the process towards peace, stability, pr osperity, and openness in th e Middle East. The Bush administration’s foreign policy towards the region was steadfast. It used nominal diplomatic and multilateral met hods to attempt to resolve issues within the region it believed threaten the United States and its global vital interests. Using the war on terrorism as a platform, the Bush administra tion pursued unilateralist interests in the Middle East region. Democratiza tion of the Middle East was seen as the only way to reform this region of instability. “The worl d has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free na tions do not breed the ideologies of murder. 38 President George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” (January 28, 2003): from . 39 President George W. Bush, “President Discusses Future of Iraq,” (February 26, 2004): from .

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87 They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better life. And there are hopeful signs of a desire for freedom in the Middle East…. A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region.” 40 Saddam Hussein failed to comply with the United Nations Security Council resolution 1441, by refusing to disarm Iraq. President Bush then charged the United Nations Security Council of not taking init iative, and fulfilling the obligation of its position by forcing Iraq to comply. Therefor e, President George W. Bush on March 19, 2003, addressed the nation about the beginning of military operations in Iraq. Operation Iraqi Freedom objectives were to remove Saddam Hussein from power, find and destroy Iraq’s weapons of mass destruc tion capabilities, and bring freedom to Iraq’s citizens. The United States and coalition forces did not take long in capturing Baghdad. On May 1, 2003, President Bush announced the majo r combat operations in Iraq were over. In addition, on December 13, 2003 the United States captured Saddam Hussein. Meanwhile, the search for weapons of mass de struction in Iraq was not revealing any clues, or evidence of Saddam Hussein’s weapon s of mass destruction threat. This turn of events in the Iraq War led the Bush admini stration to begin rallying behind another motivation for going to war with Saddam Husse in; thus the United States began focusing on Saddam Hussein’s “notorious human rights violations (2005, 317).” President Bush had stated before the Iraq War that, “It will be difficult to cultivate liberty and peace in the Middle East, after so many generations of strife. Yet, th e security of our nation and the hope of millions depend on us…. Free people will set the course of history, and free 40 Ibid

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88 people will keep the peace of the world.”41 Now, after the Iraq War the Bush administration’s foreign policy towards Iraq can begin focusing on bring freedom to the Iraqi people, in the form of locally prescribe democracy. In the National Security Strategy issued by President George W. Bush on March 16, 2006, he outlined clearly his foreign policy intentions for “spreading democracy in the broader Middle East.”42 Two pillars support the Nationa l Security Strategies first; make the international community accepti ng of democracy by promoting “freedom, justice, and human dignity,” s econd, leading the world to crea te democracies in order to establish allies in the war against terror. The United States went to war with the Taliban government after it refused to stop harboring te rrorists, then the Bush administration used preemptive defense to take-down a regional th reat in the Middle Ea st by going to war with Saddam Hussein. The United States’ only two wars in the post-September 11th world have been against Middle East nations. Therefore, the United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East has shifted in the post-Co ld War due to its power position in the unipolar world. The United States in the war on te rror is using offensive militaristic foreign policy methods to establish conditions favor able to maintaining international order around the principals of democra tization. “The goal of our (United States’) statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system This is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.”43 41 Ibid 42 President George W. Bush, “National Secu rity Strategy 2006,” (March 16, 2006): from . 43 Ibid

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89 Summary— The George W. Bush administration ha s taken many bold steps in defining its vision of United States foreign policy in the post-Cold War. The terror attacks on September 11, 2001, caused President Bush to ca st aside old policies of deterrence, and brought about the United States’ new initiative to create peace, prosperity, and freedom through instilling democracy. The Bush admini stration views democratization vital for the United States national security interests, and for global peace and prosperity. As the world’s sole superpower the Bush, administra tion believes that it is the United States’ responsibility to bring freedom to world ci vilizations, especially to the Middle East. President Bush’s foreign policies started a tw o-front war in the Middle East, in order to bring freedom, openness, hope, stability, a nd democracy to Afghanistan and Iraq. The Bush administration’s foreign policies on establishing democracy in the Middle East do not stop with Af ghanistan and Iraq. It also influenced the Arab-Israeli peace process. Palestine democratically el ected its first president under multilateral pressure lead by the United States. President Mahmoud Abbas became Palestine’s leader after President Bush espoused his plans fo r the Arab-Israeli peace process on June 24, 2002. President Bush pushed Palestine and Israel to work out a peace th at allows them to live side-by-side as democratic neighbors in pea ce, and respect. The uni-polar internationa l power structure does not confine the United States’ power. After the September 11, 2001 terror a ttacks on the United States, the Bush administration has been beating the war drum s. The war on terror took the United States to Afghanistan, and Iraq. The United States ha d become impatient with previous foreign policy attempts to preserve peace, and stabilit y in the Middle East. The foreign policies of

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90 the United States became vigilant in creating democracy and installing locally prescribed democracy. The uni-polar world allows the Un ited States the opportuni ty to take up this bold crusade. As the world’s sole superpower it is in the United States’ vital national interests to protect its economy, allies, a nd create conditions favorable to its rule. President George W. Bush used the uni-polar world’s lack of a counter to United States supremacy to implement its foreign policy ob jectives, achieved through the increased use of militaristic foreign policy methods.

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91 —Chapter 7— Conclusion In the last chapter, I concluded that the uni-polar world allowed United States foreign policy during the George W. Bush ad ministration to take an activist role in defending freedom by installing democracies in the Middle East. The war on terrorism started in Afghanistan aimed at the al Qaed a terrorist networks. The United States and coalition forces after ousti ng the Taliban government began the process of establishing democracy in Afghanistan. Then President George W. Bush’s war on terror’s mission expanded to prevent rogue states from a ttaining, or distributing weapons of mass destruction. Subsequently, the United States overthrew Saddam Hussein, and began steps towards creating democracy in Iraq. The Bush administration’s policies after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, left nations of the world no choice, you either sided with the United States or you were the en emy. The uni-polar worl d has brought about an increase in regional and local instabilities. However, the United States’ superpower status enables its policies to force changes that will strengthen the in ternational system favorably to the United States as the world’s sole superpower. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were cautious of offensive military involvement, on a permanen t basis in the Middle East region. The bipolar world made each superpower cautious of one another, thus not wanting to provoke the other into action. From President Trum an through the foreign policies of Ronald Reagan the United States used the foreign policy guidelines of containment towards the

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92 Middle East. Cold War presidential administra tions issued doctrine s that deterred the Soviet Union from taking some actions in the Middle East. Another foreign policy method was to fund third parties to harass, a nd disrupt the Soviet Un ion’s initiatives in the Middle East region. When the United States did send troops to the Middle East, it was a multinational peacekeeping mission and was temporary in nature; such was the case of Lebanon in the early 1980’s. After the 1967 wa r between Israel and its Arab neighbors, many Arab nations grew closer to the Soviet Union as a balance to Israel’s intimate connection with the United States. The Unite d States could not act aggressively in implementing foreign policy objectives during the Cold War. Preventing war between the superpowers was essential to the United St ates’ containment policy. During the Cold War the United States had a constant wiliness to use military force if necessary to repel the Soviet Union’s aggression. Co ld War presidential administrations placed the United States military in the proximity of the Middle East but never used offensive military methods to solve local and regiona l crises in the Middle East. During the Cold War, the United States a ttempted to gain allies other than Israel in the region to limit the Sovi et Union’s influence in this vital region. The United States attempted to back the Shah in Iran, and then later Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War. Each of these Middle Eastern countries turned against the United States in the latter stages of the Cold War. Consequently, when the Soviet Union co llapsed at the end of the 1980’s, the United States had no powerful moderate Arab allies in the Middle East to maintain security and stability over the regions critical oil reserves. When the bi-polar world collapsed and the United States became the world sole superpower, containment no longer was a pragma tic option. In the unipolar international

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93 power structure, no rival to the United Stat es existed. Imperative to the United States’ new world power position was maintaining its position in the uni -polar world. Thus, United States foreign policy s ought to protect regions of v ital national in terests. The Middle East with its vast oil reserves was v ital for the United States national interest and security. When Saddam Hussein threatened the peace, stability, and oil in the Middle East with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, President Geor ge H.W. Bush wasted no time forming an international coalition against Iraq’ s aggression in the Middle East. The Persian Gulf War showed the shift fr om the bi-polar world to the uni-polar world. The result of Operation Desert Storm was the establishment of the United States military in the Middle East. Additionally, th e United States proved to the Arab world it would go to war, and win in the Middle Ea st. The United States during George H.W. Bush’s presidency advocated the increased us e of the United Nations in its foreign policy. President George H.W. Bush believed in th e United Nations, and did not want the United States to be perceived in the uni-polar world as hegemonic. By creating global cooperation the George H.W. Bush admini stration believed the United States could achieve its foreign policy goals through mu ltilateral channels, and majority rule. When Bill Clinton became President of the United States he pushed for multilateral solutions, and democratization of the Middle East. It was his belief that by maintaining the military in the Middle East and using the continued deployment of military methods to enforce United States foreign policy goals, the United States could maintain peace and stability within the re gion thus protect its global economic oil interests. With the United States’ military presence in the Middle East, the Clinton administration was capable of a dual contai nment of Iraq and Iran. The administration

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94 used the United Nations as an instrument of foreign policy to ma intain security, and stability against Iraq. When the United Na tions Security Council resolutions failed, the United States was not deterred from using unilateral action against Saddam Hussein in the form of tomahawk, and cruise missiles fire d from established bases, and warships in the Middle East. The Clinton administration also pursued the democratization of the Middle East. The United States encouraged, supported, and championed nations that were viewed as modernizing and pro-Western, like Jorda n, Turkey, and Pakistan. Encouraging democratization, opening markets and capitalis m in the Middle East was perceived by the Clinton administration as a method towards planting the seeds of peace, stability, and modernization of the Middle East. The Clinton administration supported adam antly the Arab-Israeli peace process. The peace process was vital to the overall stab ility, peace, and prosperity for the Middle East region. The uni-polar wo rld allowed for negotiations between the Arabs and the Israelis to move forward. There was no longer the outside influence of the Soviet Union the bi-polar world provided. The United States ’ quick and decisive victory in Operation Desert Storm proved to the Arab world its abili ty to achieve its fore ign policy objectives thus, bringing about the first round of final peace negotiations talks. September 11, 2001 shaped the George W. Bush presidency. The war on terror became the administration’s focus. The previous post-Cold War presidents had advanced United States foreign policy in the Middle East to include the use of offensive military methods to achieve foreign policy, and the establishment of bases in the region. The George W. Bush administration used the uni-polar internatio nal power structure to allow

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95 the United States military to pursue preemptive foreign policy goals in the Middle East. The previous administrations had been sati sfied with protecting the Middle East, and preserving a form of peace with its militar y. The George W. Bush administration took foreign policy a step further by using the military to install its foreign policy objectives in the Middle East. President George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton had pursued the democratization of the Middle East by championing seemingly moderate Arab states such as Pakistan and Turkey. These countries we re to sow the seeds of democracy to the surrounding Middle Eastern states. President Ge orge W. Bush wanted to protect the United States vital interests, and stop having to use the United States military to preserve a limited peace in the Middle East as estab lished by President George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Consequently, he pursued the democratization of the Middle East after conquering the Middle East nations of Af ghanistan and Iraq. The uni-polar power structure enabled President George W. Bush the ability to deploy the use offensive military methods, establish bases permanent in nature in the region to pursue longstanding foreign policy obj ectives in the Middle East. The United States’ foreign policy goals in the Middle East of modernization, locally prescribed democracies, opening-up of ma rkets, capitalism, stability, security, and peace have yet to achieve fruition. However, the uni-polar world allowed the United States foreign policy makers an un-restrain ed hand in the Middle East. The result was United States foreign policy no longer threat ened the use of force, but deployed the military on a seemingly permanent basis in the post-Cold War. The Cold War foreign policies of the United States placed the military in the proximity of the Middle East to deter aggression with the threat of military force. The uni-polar international power

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96 structure that was established in the post-C old War, allowed United States foreign policy to establish bases and deploy offensive m ilitary methods to achieve foreign policy objectives, to resolve what various administ rations have perceived to be local and regional instability. The bi-polar world constrained the Unite d States’ foreign policy. Are there any constraints to United States foreign policy in the uni-polar world? The uni-polar world has allowed non-state actors a greater role in the international co mmunity. Unfortunately, some non-state actors have used the adva nces in communications technologies to organize global terrorist netw orks such as al Qaeda. The United States’ war on terrorism is aimed at nation-states, a nd non-state actors. Non-state actors are thus becoming an effective force in the uni-polar world, by causing the sole superpower to wage war against networks it views as detrimental toward s its sole superpower status, and its vision for the uni-polar world. The United States is attemp ting to create democracy in the Middle East with the use of its military. What effect is the war on terrorism going to have on a country’s newly formed democracy that has been created thr ough foreign military force? When a country has been ruled by force, and then subsequent ly forced to accept democracy, can a country successfully establish a governme nt of freedom of choice, a nd rule of law when it has never been capable of developing government with its own vision, or have no history of freedom? The United States as the world’s so le superpower is attempting to create a world that will maintain its power position in the uni-polar world. The United States is attempting to create global freedom through fo rce, and in the process acting uni-laterally. Can the United States maintain neo-isolationi sts foreign policies that require it to empty

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97 its coffers, in order to establish governments accepting of its leadershi p, and influence? If the United States continues its foreign policy objectives in the war on terrorism will it cause the United States to overextended its milit ary, and deplete its treasury to the point a new international power structure is born? Since the end of the balan ce of power system in the twentieth century, the United States is acting as the world’s sole super power. Will the United States be capable of maintaining its power position, and in creating a world accepting of its global leadership?

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98 Literature Cited —Chapter 1— Historical Background Carter, Jimmy. “State of the Un ion Address,” (January 23 1980): Weekly Compilations of Documents XVI (23 January 1980), pp. 194-200 In, F. Ugboaja Ohaegbulam. 1999. A Concise Introduction To American Foreign Policy New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc. Gerges, Fawaz A. 1999. America and Political Islam Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kissinger, Henry. 1979. White House Years Boston: Little, Brown. Lenczowski, George. 1990. American Presidents and the Middle East Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Melanson, Richard A. 2005. American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War 4th ed Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. Miglietta, John P. 2002. American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1992 Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books. Ohaegbulam, F. Ugboaja. 1999. A Concise Introduction To American Foreign Policy New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc. Papp, Daniel S., Loch K. Johnson, John E. Endicott. 2005. American Foreign Policy New York: Pearson Education, Inc. Rubin, Barry. 1987. “The Reagan Administ ration in the Middle East.” In Eagle Resurgent? ed. Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild. Boston: Little, Br own and Company. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics Boston: McGraw-Hill, Inc.

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99 —Chapter 2— Literature Review Bush, George H.W. “Remarks at the Aspe n Institute Symposium in Aspen, Colorado,” (August 2, 1990), pp. 1190, 1191. In Richard A. Melanson. American Foreign Policy Since The Vietnam War 4th ed. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Publishing, Inc. Cameron, Fraser. 2005. US Foreign Policy After The Cold War 2nd ed. New York: Routledge Publishing. Clinton, Bill. “Presidential Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C.” January 21, 1993. In Fraser Cameron. US Foreign Policy After The Cold War, 2nd ed. NY: Routledge Publishing. Cohen, Warren I. 2005. America’s Failing Empire Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. Gerges, Fawaz A. 1999. America and Political Islam Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jentleson, Bruce W. 1997. “Who, Why, What, a nd How: Debates Over Post-Cold War Military Intervention.” In Eagle Adrift ed. Robert J. Lieber. New York: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc. Kraus, Jon. 2004. “Acting Like A Colossus: Bu sh’s Foreign Policy, Unilateralism, and The Pursuit of Primacy.” In Transformed By Crisis eds. Kraus, Jon, Kevin J. McMahon, and David M. Rankin. New York: Palgrave Macmillan Publishing. Lieber, Robert J. 1997. “Eagle Without a Ca use: Making Foreign Policy Without the Soviet Threat.” In Eagle Adrift ed. Robert J. Lieber. New York: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc. Melanson, Richard A. 2005. American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War 4th ed. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. Ohaegbulam, F. Ugboaja. 1999. A Concise Introduction To American Foreign Policy New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc. Papp, Daniel S., Loch K. Johnson, John E. Endicott. 2005. American Foreign Policy New York: Pearson Education, Inc. Spiegel, Steven L. 1997. “Eagle in the Middle East.” In Eagle Adrift ed. Robert J. Lieber. New York: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc.

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100 —Chapter 3— The Ronald Reagan Administration Cottam, Richard W. “U.S. and Soviet Respons es to Islamic Political Militancy,” In Neither East nor West pp. 279-280, quoted in Fawaz A. Gerges. 1999. America and Political Islam Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dallin, Alexander and Gail W. Lapidus. 1987. “Reagan and the Russians: American Policy Toward the Soviet Union,” In Eagle Resurgent? ed. Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothch ild. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Fraser, T.G. 1989. The USA and the Middle East Since World War 2 New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc. Haig, Jr., Alexander M. 1984. Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy New York: Macmillan. Lenczowski, George. 1990. American Presidents and the Middle East Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Miglietta, John P. 2002. American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1992 Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books. Payne, Richard J. 1991. The West European Allies, the Third World, and U.S. Foreign Policy New York: Greenwood Press. Reagan, Ronald. “Address to the Nation on Lebanon and Grenada,” (October 27, 1983), In The Middle East Journal 38, no.2 (Spring 1984), 286. Quoted In George Lenczowski. 1990. American Presidents and the Middle East Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Reagan, Ronald. “An Address to the Nati on on Arms Reduction & the Venice Summit,” (June 15, 1987). Reagan, Ronald. “State of the Union Address,” (February 4, 1986). Reagan, Ronald. “State of the Union Address,” (January 25, 1988). Spanier, John, and Steven W. Hook. 1995. American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 13th ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc.

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101 Tilly, Charles. 1991. “War and State Power.” Middle East Report 171:38-40. Wills, David C. 2003. The First War on Terrorism Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

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102 —Chapter 4— The George H.W. Bush Administration Bush, George H.W. “Address at West Point,” (January 5, 1993). Bush, George H.W. “Address Before Joint Session of Congress,” (September 11, 1990). Bush, George H.W. “National Security Direct ive: U.S. Policy Towards the Persian Gulf, NSD 26,” (October 2, 1989). Bush, George H.W. “National Security Direct ive: U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, NSD 45,” (August 20, 1990). Bush, George H.W. “National Security Dir ective: Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf, NSD 54,” (January 15, 1991). Cameron, Fraser. 2005. U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War 2nd ed New York: Routledge. Djerejian, Edward P. “The United States and Middle East in a Changing World,” (June 2, 1992). Gerges, Fawaz A. 1999. America and Political Islam Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Gol dblatt and Jonathan Perraton. 1999. Global Transformations Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. McCormick, Thomas. 2005. “American Hegemony and European Autonomy, 1989-2003: One Framework for Unders tanding the War in Iraq,” In The New American Empire ed. Lloyd C. Gardner and Marilyn B. Young. New York: The New Press. Ohaegbulam, F. Ugboaja. 1999. A Concise Introduction To American Foreign Policy New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc. Papp, Daniel S., Loch K. Johnson, and John E. Endicott. 2005. American Foreign Policy New York: Pearson Education, Inc. Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. 1995. American Foreign Policy Since World War II 13th ed Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc. Spiegel, Steven L. 1997. “Eagle In the Middle East.” In Eagle Adrift ed. Robert J. Lieber. New York: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc.

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103 —Chapter 5— The Bill Clinton Administration Albright, Madeleine K. “Sp eech on Iraq,” (March 26, 1997). Albright, Madeleine K. “The IsraeliPalestinian Peace Process,” (August 6, 1997). Clinton, Bill. “Remarks to the Jord anian Parliament,” (October 26, 1994). Clinton, Bill. “Remarks at the Wy e River Memorandum signing ceremony,” (November 2, 1998). Hyland, William. 1999. Clinton’s World Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Lake, Anthony. 1994. “Confronting Backlash States.” Foreign Affairs 73, 2:45-55. Melanson, Richard A. 2005. American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War, 4th ed Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. Nuechterlein, Donald E. 2001. America Recommitted, 2nd ed Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press. Ohaegbulam, F. Ugboaja. 1999. A Concise Introduction To American Foreign Policy New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc. Papp, Daniel S., Loch K. Johnson, & John E. Endicott. 2005. American Foreign Policy New York: Pearson Education, Inc.

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104 —Chapter 6— The George W. Bush Administration Bush, George W. “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress,” (September 20, 2001). Bush, George W. “Commencement Addr ess at West Point,” (June 1, 2002). Bush, George W. “National Security Strategy 2002,” (September 17, 2002). Bush, George W. “National Secur ity Strategy 2006,” (March 16, 2006). Bush, George W. “President Addre ss to the Nation,” (October 7, 2001). Bush, George W. “President Discusses Future of Iraq,” (February 26, 2004). Bush, George W. “President Speaks On th e War Effort To the Citadel Cadets.” (December 11, 2001). Bush, George W. “Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly,” (September 12, 2002). Bush, George W. “State of the Union Address,” (January 29, 2002). George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” (January 28, 2003): Cameron, Fraser. 2005. US Foreign Policy After The Cold War, 2nd ed New York: Routledge. Melanson, Richard A. 2005. American Foreign Policy Since The Vietnam War, 4th ed Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. Ohaegbulam, F. Ugboaja. 1999. A Concise Introduction To American Foreign Policy New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc. Papp, Daniel S., Loch K. Johnson, & John E. Endicott. 2005. American Foreign Policy New York: Pearson Education, Inc.

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105 Bibliography Albright, Madeleine K. “Sp eech on Iraq,” (March 26, 1997). Albright, Madeleine K. “The IsraeliPalestinian Peace Process,” (August 6, 1997). Bush, George H.W. “Address Before Joint Session of Congress,” (September 11, 1990). Bush, George H.W. “Address at West Point,” (January 5, 1993). Bush, George H.W. “National Security Direct ive: U.S. Policy Towards the Persian Gulf, NSD 26,” (October 2, 1989). Bush, George H.W. “National Security Direct ive: U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, NSD 45,” (August 20, 1990). Bush, George H.W. “National Security Dir ective: Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf, NSD 54,” (January 15, 1991). Bush, George H.W. “Remarks at the Aspen Institute Symposium in Aspen, Colorado,” (August 2, 1990), pp. 1190, 1191. In Richard A. Melanson. American Foreign Policy Since The Vietnam War 4th ed. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Publishing, Inc. Bush, George W. “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress,” (September 20, 2001). Bush, George W. “Commencement Addr ess at West Point,” (June 1, 2002). Bush, George W. “National Security Strategy 2002,” (September 17, 2002). Bush, George W. “National Secur ity Strategy 2006,” (March 16, 2006). Bush, George W. “President Addre ss to the Nation,” (October 7, 2001). Bush, George W. “President Discusses Future of Iraq,” (February 26, 2004). Bush, George W. “President Speaks On th e War Effort To the Citadel Cadets.” (December 11, 2001). Bush, George W. “Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly,” (September 12, 2002).

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106 Bush, George W. “State of the Union Address,” (January 29, 2002). Bush, George W. “State of the Union Address,” (January 28, 2003). Byman, Daniel L. and Matthew C. Waxman. 2000. Confronting Iraq Santa Monica, CA: RAND. Cameron, Fraser. 2005. US Foreign Policy After The Cold War, 2nd ed New York: Routledge. Carter, Jimmy. “State of the Un ion Address,” (January 23 1980): Weekly Compilations of Documents XVI (23 January 1980), pp. 194-200 In, F. Ugboaja Ohaegbulam. 1999. A Concise Introduction To American Foreign Policy New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc. Clinton, Bill. 2004. My Life New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Clinton, Bill. “Presidential Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C.” January 21, 1993. In Fraser Cameron. US Foreign Policy After The Cold War, 2nd ed. NY: Routledge Publishing. Clinton, Bill. “Remarks to the Jord anian Parliament,” (October 26, 1994). Clinton, Bill. “Remarks at the Wy e River Memorandum signing ceremony,” (November 2, 1998). Cohen, Warren I. 2005. America’s Failing Empire Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. Cottam, Richard W. “U.S. and Soviet Respons es to Islamic Political Militancy,” In Neither East nor West pp. 279-280, quoted in Fawaz A. Gerges. 1999. America and Political Islam Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dallin, Alexander and Gail W. Lapidus. 1987. “Reagan and the Russians: American Policy Toward the Soviet Union,” In Eagle Resurgent? ed. Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothch ild. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Djerejian, Edward P. “The United States and Middle East in a Changing World,” (June 2, 1992). Fraser, T.G. 1989. The USA and the Middle East Since World War 2 New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc. Gerges, Fawaz A. 1999. America and Political Islam Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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107 Haig, Jr., Alexander M. 1984. Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy New York: Macmillan. Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Gol dblatt and Jonathan Perraton. 1999. Global Transformations Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Hook, Steven W. 2005. U.S. Foreign Policy Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc. Hyland, William. 1999. Clinton’s World Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Jentleson, Bruce W. 1997. “Who, Why, What, a nd How: Debates Over Post-Cold War Military Intervention.” In Eagle Adrift ed. Robert J. Lieber. New York: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc. Kissinger, Henry. 1979. White House Years Boston: Little, Brown. Kraus, Jon. 2004. “Acting Like A Colossus: Bu sh’s Foreign Policy, Unilateralism, and The Pursuit of Primacy.” In Transformed By Crisis eds. Kraus, Jon, Kevin J. McMahon, and David M. Rankin. New York: Palgrave Macmillan Publishing. Lake, Anthony. 1994. “Confronting Backlash States.” Foreign Affairs 73, 2:45-55. Lenczowski, George. 1990. American Presidents and the Middle East Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Lieber, Robert J. 1997. “Eagle Without a Ca use: Making Foreign Policy Without the Soviet Threat.” In Eagle Adrift ed. Robert J. Lieber. Ne w York: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc. McCormick, Thomas. 2005. “American Hegemony and European Autonomy, 1989-2003: One Framework for Unders tanding the War in Iraq,” In The New American Empire ed. Lloyd C. Gardner and Marilyn B. Young. New York: The New Press. Melanson, Richard A. 2005. American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War 4th ed. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. Miglietta, John P. 2002. American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1992 Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books. Nuechterlein, Donald E. 2001. America Recommitted, 2nd ed Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press.

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108 Ohaegbulam, F. Ugboaja. 1999. A Concise Introduction To American Foreign Policy New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc. Papp, Daniel S., Loch K. Johnson, John E. Endicott. 2005. American Foreign Policy New York: Pearson Education, Inc. Payne, Richard J. 1991. The West European Allies, the Third World, and U.S. Foreign Policy New York: Greenwood Press. Reagan, Ronald. “Address to the Nation on Lebanon and Grenada,” (October 27, 1983), In The Middle East Journal 38, no.2 (Spring 1984), 286. Quoted In George Lenczowski. 1990. American Presidents and the Middle East Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Reagan, Ronald. “State of the Union Address,” (February 4, 1986). Reagan, Ronald. “An Address to the Nation on Arms Reduction & the Venice Summit,” (June 15, 1987). Reagan, Ronald. “State of the Union Address,” (January 25, 1988. Rubin, Barry. 1987. “The Reagan Administ ration in the Middle East.” In Eagle Resurgent? ed. Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild. Boston: Little, Br own and Company. Spanier, John, and Steven W. Hook. 1995. American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 13th ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc. Spiegel, Steven L. 1997. “Eagle in the Middle East.” In Eagle Adrift ed. Robert J. Lieber. New York: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc. Tilly, Charles. 1991. “War and State Power.” Middle East Report 171:38-40. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics Boston: McGraw-Hill, Inc. Wills, David C. 2003. The First War on Terrorism Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.