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Re-Islamization in higher education from above and below

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Title:
Re-Islamization in higher education from above and below the University of South Florida and its global contexts
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Wonder, Terri K
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Islamism
Muslim Brotherhood
Censorship
Academic freedom
Human rights
Dissertations, Academic -- Interdisciplinary Education -- Doctoral -- USF   ( lcsh )
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non-fiction   ( marcgt )

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Summary:
ABSTRACT: This study explores Islamism's interplay with higher education as the movement advances an agenda for worldwide reformation. Over an eighty-year period, Islamism has appropriated higher education institutions, professional associations, on- and off-campus organizations, and publications as a primary means to achieve its utopian objective of the Nizam Islami, or "Islamic Order." Findings show how the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt developed a Weberian bureaucratic organizational and administrative structure to exert influence not only in Egypt but also the world. A Qutb-inspired "hijra" of Muslim Brothers in universities proved itself adroit at filling macro-and micro-level policy vacuums in Soviet-aligned post-colonial societies, marginalizing traditional forms of Islamic faith. However, the movement was as likely to establish itself in other types of authoritarian states that alternately tried to appease and suppress the movement.The Islamist "hijra" came to North America in the 1960's, founding the Muslim Students Association and the Islamic Society of North America. Then, early leaders in those groups taught and studied at The University of South Florida (USF) in Tampa, Florida. Following the "successful" paradigm of the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamism's academic leaders brought to USF a program called "Islamization of society and knowledge"-disguised in the more benign term "civilizational dialogue"-which regards higher education as but another territory of reformation and conquest, or the dar al-harb. USF never addressed that aspect of re-Islamization from below (denoting quiet subversion of society) as a serious, possible academic freedom problem involving the politicization of USF's research and teaching mission.Re-Islamization from above (denoting violent destabilization of society) was debated, however, in a media campaign of Islamist dissembling that divided the university and its community for over a decade. Because of the stated hostility of Islamist education theory and practice to the academic enterprise, itself founded upon Enlightenment values of free inquiry, the study recommends that USF re-investigate the case about Sami Al-Arian, who was convicted in 2006 of providing services to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, in part, by using the university as a front for his cause.
Thesis:
Dissertation (Ph.D.)--University of South Florida, 2008.
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Includes bibliographical references.
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by Terri K. Wonder.
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Document formatted into pages; contains 580 pages.
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Includes vita.

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aleph - 002007388
oclc - 403775397
usfldc doi - E14-SFE0002323
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Re-Islamization in Higher Education from Above and Below: The University of South Flor ida and Its Global Contexts by Terri K. Wonder A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Psychological and Social Foundations College of Education University of South Florida Co-Major Professor: Ar thur Shapiro, Ph.D. Co-Major Professor: Stephen B. Permuth, Ed.D Abdelwahab Hechiche, Ph.D W. Steve Lang, Ph.D. Date of Approval: January 16, 2008 Keywords: Islamism, Muslim Brotherhood, cen sorship, academic freedom, human rights Copyright 2008, Terri K. Wonder

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Dedication This work is dedicated to the memory of the late Dr. George H. Mayer, USF Professor of History who died in 1999 at the age of 78. In his final month of life, George expressed a wish that I would write about the changes in hi gher education over the past thirty years. This thesis attempts that but only tacitly. The knowledge of American intellectual history and ideas that he passed on to me dur ing undergraduate school is infused throughout this work. Like the hero in a novel on Georges recommended fiction list, The Glass Bead Game, George was a true master of the game yet understood the fragility of the enterprise. He therefore expr essed measured criticism of it. Not a day passes in my life that I do not shed a t ear for his departure from this world.

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Acknowledgements I would like to express my sincerest gr atitude for all those people who have endured with me since the 2001 fall semester when consideration of this thesis topic began. Most of them know me well enough to appreciate the shif t in consciousness within me that this work produced. These pr ofessors, colleagues, friends, and loved ones in Florida, the United States, and around the worl d are also fully aware of the risk to life and property that this work might and did e ngender, especially after the summer of 2005 when the first full draft was delivered to my examining committee. From that point onward, the actions of a few people on campus apparently proved some of the findings, although those individuals appa rently did not recognize that themselves. Fortunately, with the support of a loving husband, Dr. Ra ymond E. Wonder, and the assistance of Dr. Arthur Shapiro, Dr. Steven B. Permuth, Dr Abdelwahab Hechiche, Dr. W.S. Lang, Dr. Howard Johnston, Dr. Erwin V. Johanningmei er, and Dr. Brent Wiseman, civility, due process, thesis governance policy, academic fr eedom, and civil liberty prevailed for both the committee members and me. I want to th ank everyone who did for suffering with me as I refrained from sensationalizing my case in the media and bringing an already wounded institution I love so much to the point of political convulsion. The emotional and financial toll has been tremendous. I hope th ey will stand with me in the future, as I continue to follow the logic of inquiry wherever it may lead.

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Table of Contents List of Tables viii List of Appendices ix Abstract x Chapter One Introduction 1 Section 1: Mass Social Movements in Higher Education 1 Islamism and Totalitarianism 4 Islamisms Borrowing of Totalitarian Symbols and Strategies 6 Islamism, the Social Psychology of Mass Movements, and Problems in Higher Education 9 Problem Statement 18 The Al-Arian Case 20 The Mohamed and Megahed Case 22 Purpose of the Study 24 Research Questions 27 Method 27 Section II: Extended Discussion of Major Themes for Answering the Research Questions 29 Section III: Limitations 33 Section IV: Definition of Terms 36 Section V: Significance of the Study 43 Section VI: Chapter Summary 47 Chapter Two Review of the Literature 49 Introduction 49 Section I: Psychoanalytic Social Psychology of Civilizations and Totalita rian Mass Social Movements 50 Social Contagion: Prefatory Remarks 50 Sigmund Freud, Death Instin ct, and Society 53 Freuds Influence on American Social Psychology: Herbert Marcuse 55 Carl Jung and Twentieth-centu ry Totalitarianism 61 Jungs Essays about a Nation Overtaken by its Shadow 62 The Repression of a Pre-Christian Archetype 63 The Collective Guilt of German Socialism 64 i

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Section II: Non-psychoanalytic So cial Psychology of Mass Social Movements, Islamic Fundamentalism, and Islamist Totalitarianism 67 The Non-Psychoanalytic Frame: Prefatory Remarks 67 Blumers General Contributions to the Study of Collective Groups and Their Institutions 68 Hannah Arendt and the Collective Behavior of Totalitarian Movements 71 Ibn Khalduns Contributions to Social Psychology: Group Feeling Predating Blumer by Six Hundred Years 73 Fundamentalisms : Socio-religious Perspectives on Sacred Terror and Islamism 78 Introduction: A Sacred Cosmos, Scandalous Code, and Defiant Society 78 Accounting for Islamic Fundamentalisms 79 Religious Fundamentalisms and the Sciences 83 Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalists 84 Fundamentalist Impact on Education and the Media 86 Reshaping Personal Relations in Egypt 88 Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups 89 Hizbullah: The Calculus of Jihad 91 Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases 92 The Moral Logic of Hizballah 93 The Western Mind of Radical Islam 96 Section III: Organizational and Administrative Theory and Practice in Higher Education 99 The Role of Higher Educati on in Attracting Islamism: Prefatory Remarks 99 Organizational and Administ rative Theory in Higher Education 100 Contemporary Issues Regardi ng Curriculum Planning and Change 116 Section IV: Chapter Summary 124 Chapter Three Methodology 129 Section I: Introduction 129 Section II: Purpose of the Study 131 Types of Scholarship Repres ented in This Inquiry 133 Research Questions 136 Population Samples 137 Methods of Analysis 138 Textual Analysis: Three Inte rrelated Levels of Social Movement Discourse 138 ii

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Examples of World-Historical Discourse in the Studys Findings 140 Examples of Organizational Discourse in the Studys Findings 140 Examples of Individual Discourse in the Studys Findings 141 The Studys Historiography: Textual Analysis Based on the Assumptions of Foucau lt, Richards, and Derrida 144 Will to Truth and Power Located in the Research Study 149 Other Findings in the In quirys Excursion into Taboo Discourse 152 Coding of Collected and Studied Information into a Finished Work 159 Coding and the Studys Thematic Findings of Characteristics and Conditions of Islamisms Interplay in Higher Education 160 Explication of Coded Findings: Table 1, Conditions of Islamisms Interplay in Higher Education in Sel ected Locales and at USF and Its Service Area 161 Explication of Coded Findings: Table 2, Characteristics of Islamisms Interplay in Higher Education in Selected Locales and at USF and Its Service Area 165 Methods of Data Collection: Historical-Case Study Research, Archival Documents and Sources, and Observation of Institutional Events 168 Historical-Case Study Research 169 The Global Referent as Overarching History and Case 171 The Local Referent as Part of the Ebb and Flow of Its Global Antecedents 173 Archival Documents and Sources 174 Observation of Institutional Events 174 Validity and Reliability: Triangulation of Vision, Purpose, and Methods 175 Vision 177 Purpose 178 Methods 179 Bias and Limitations 181 External Validation of the Findings 181 External Validators 182 Section II: Chapter Summary 185 iii

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Chapter Four Re-Islamization in Hi gher Education in Selected Middle Eastern and African Countri es: A Prelude to the USF Case 187 Section I: Introduction 187 Research Question 190 Population Samples 190 Section II: Egypts Muslim Br otherhood, The Mother of Re-Islamization in Higher Education: Conditions and Characteristics 191 Conditions of Islamisms Interplay in Higher Education 191 Condition One: The Fall of the Ottoman Caliphate Engenders Ikwhan Ideologies, Strategies, and Legacies 191 Condition Two: Exposure of Sa lafist Doctrine to Radical Western Ideologies and De-Westernizing Ferment in Western-style Universities 193 Condition Three: Exposure to European Fascism through Strategic Alliance with the Nazis 199 Condition Four: Alternating Attempts to Appease or Repress the Mass Movement 202 Characteristics of Islamisms Interplay in Higher Education 212 Characteristic One: External and Internal Organizational Networks Run by highly Educated Elites Interacting with Universities and Their Service Areas for Purposes of Re-Islamization from Above and Below 212 Characteristic Two: Codified Education Theory for Purposes of Promoting Monolithic View of Islam and Subverting Universities and Surrounding Society from Above and Below 224 Characteristic Three: Campus Holy War and Other Problems Associated with Universities and Interactive Organizations toward Advancement of Re-Islamization from Above and Below 238 Characteristic Four: Transnational Influence of Islamism and its Esprit de Corps through the Migration of Professors and Students to Other Locales 255 Section II: Saudi Arabias Hi gher Educational Interplay of Corporate Wealth and Mus lim Brothers in Exile: Conditions and Characteristics 259 Conditions of Islamisms Interplay in Higher Education 259 Condition One: Transnational Influence of Islamist Thought and its Esprit de Corps through the Migration of Ikwhan Professors and Students to Saudi Arabia 259 Condition Two: Changes in Saudi Arabian Educational Policy Resulting from Accu mulation of O il Wealth 265 iv

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Characteristics of Islamisms In terplay in Higher Education 269 Characteristic One: External and Internal Organizational Networks Run by Highly Educated Elites Interact with Universities for Purpose of Re-Islamization from Above and Below 269 World Association of Muslim Youth 270 Muslim Students Association 273 Islamic Society of North America 277 Association of Muslim Scientists and Engineers 287 Institute of Islamic-Arabic Studies of America 287 Characteristic Two: Codified Education Theory for Purpose of Promoting Monolithic view of Islam and Subverting Universiti es and Surrounding Societies from Above and Below 288 Characteristic Three: Campus Holy War Advocated and Exported to Other locales for Purposes of Re-Islamization from Above and Below 312 Section III: Parallel Hierar chies in Levantine Higher Education: Conditions and Characteristics 316 Conditions of Islamisms Interplay in Higher Education 316 Condition One: Transnational Influence of Islamism and Its Esprit de Corps from Non-Indigenous Organizational Networks Toward Advancement of Re-Islamization from Above and Below 318 Characteristics of Islamisms In terplay in Higher Education 318 Characteristic One: External and Internal Organizational Networks Run by Highly Educated Elites Interacting with Universities for Purpose of Re-Islamization from Above and Below 318 Characteristic Two: Codified Educational Theory for Purposes of Promoting Monolithic View of Islam and Subverting Universiti es and Surrounding Societies from Above and Below 323 Characteristic Three: Campus Holy War and Other Problems in Universities Associated with Interactive OrganizationsAdvanc ement of Re-Islamization from Above and Below 328 Section IV: The University as L adder to Power in Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan: Ikwhan Interplay with Post-colonial Vacuums of Intellectual Thought and Social Policy 334 Conditions of Interplay in Higher Education 334 Condition One: Transnational In fluence of Islamism and its Esprit de Corps through the Migration of Professors and Students from other Locales 334 Characteristics of Islamism in Higher Education 336 Characteristic One: External and Internal Organizational v

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Networks Run by Highly Educated Elites Interacting with Universities for Purpose of Re-Islamization from Above and Below 336 Characteristic Two: Codified Edu cational Theory for Purposes of Promoting Monolithic View of Islam and Subverting Universities and Surrounding Societies from Above and Below 343 Characteristic Three: Campus Holy War and Other Problems in Universities Associated with Interactive Organizations Advancement of Re-Islamization from Above and Below 346 Characteristic Four: Transnational Influence of Islamism and its Esprit de Corps through the Migration of Professors and Students to other Locales 352 Section V: Chapter Summary 357 Chapter Five Toward Local Conf irmation of a Global Narrative: Islamism Comes to USF and Its Service Community 360 Section I: Introduction 360 Research Questions 362 Population Samples 364 Section II: Re-Islamization at USF and its Service Area Community: Conditions and Characteristics 367 Conditions of Islamisms Interplay in Higher Education 367 Condition One: Temporal Developments Related to Expansion of The Universitys Mission with Eventual Formation of a Partners hip with Sami Al-Arians Think-tank, World Isla m Studies Enterprise 367 Condition Two: Epistemological Developments in Higher Education Giving Rise to De-Westernizing Intellectual Trends Affecting an Inte rnationalizing USF Community 387 Condition Three: Transnationa l Influence of Islamist Thought and its Esprit de Corps through Migration of Ikwhan Professors and Students to USF and its Service Area Community 403 Characteristics of Islamism in Higher Education 410 Characteristic One: External and Internal Organizational Networks Run by Highly Educated Elites Interacting with USF and its Service Area Community for Purpose of Re-Islamization from Above and Below 410 Characteristic Two: Signs of Islamist Hidden Curriculum at USF,With Strong Linkages to the Theory, Strategy, Practice, and Practitioners Associated with the International Institut e of Islamic Thought 450 Characteristic Three: Campus Holy War and Other Problems at USF and its Mi lieu Associated with Use of the University and Inte racting Organizations 469 vi

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vii Section III: Chapter Summary 496 Chapter Six Summary, C onclusions, Implications and Suggestions for Future Research 499 Problem Statement 499 Purpose of the Study 502 Research Questions 503 Method 504 Response to Research Question One 507 Response to Research Question Two 509 Relevance to the Literature Review 511 Higher Educations Charact eristics and Conditions 511 Islamisms Characteristics and Conditions 512 Major Implications 524 Suggestions for Future Research 528 References 538 Appendix 576 About the Author 581

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viii List of Tables Table 1 Conditions for Islamisms Interplay in Higher 162 Education in Selected Locales and at USF and Its Service Area Table 2 Characteristics for Islamisms Interplay in Higher 167 Education in Selected Local es and at USF and Its Service Area

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ix Appendix List Appendix A: Excerpt from a Muslim Br otherhood Movement 600 English-Language Website, with Names of Known Sami Al-Arian Associates Highlighted In Upper Case Bold Lettering under Sub-Heading Titled Intellectual Development

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ix Re-Islamization in Higher Education from Above and Below: The University of South Flor ida and Its Global Contexts Terri K. Wonder ABSTRACT This study explores Islamisms interplay with higher education as the movement advances an agenda for worldwide reformation. Over an eighty-year period, Islamism has appropriated higher education in stitutions, professional associ ations, onand off-campus organizations, and publications as a primary means to achieve its utopian objective of the Nizam Islami or Islamic Order. Findings show how the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt developed a Weberian bureaucr atic organizational and admini strative structure to exert influence not only in Egypt but also the wo rld. A Qutb-inspired hijra of Muslim Brothers in universities proved itself adro it at filling macro-a nd micro-level policy vacuums in Soviet-aligned post-colonial soci eties, marginalizing traditional forms of Islamic faith. However, the movement was as likely to establish its elf in other types of authoritarian states that a lternately tried to appease and suppress the movement. The Islamist hijra came to North America in the 1960s, founding the Muslim Students Association and the Islamic Society of Nort h America. Then, early leaders in those groups taught and studied at The University of South Florida (USF) in Tampa, Florida. Following the successful paradigm of the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamisms academic leaders brought to USF a program called Islamization of society and knowledge

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x disguised in the more benign term civilizational dialogue which regards higher education as but anothe r territory of reformation and conquest, or the dar al-harb USF never addressed that aspect of re-Islamization from below (denoting quiet subversion of society) as a serious, possible academic freedom problem i nvolving the politicization of USFs research and teaching mission. Re-Islamization from above (denoting violent destabilization of society) was debated, how ever, in a media campaign of Islamist dissembling that divided the university and its community for over a decade. Because of the stated hostility of Islamist education theory and practice to the academic enterprise, itself founded upon Enlightenme nt values of free inquiry, the study recommends that USF re-investigate the case about Sami Al-Arian, who was convicted in 2006 of providing services to the Palestinian Islamic Ji had, in part, by using the university as a front for his cause.

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Chapter One Introduction Section I: Mass Social Movements in Higher Education Social psychologists, political scient ists, historians, and higher education experts discuss within thei r own professional disciplines the impact of mass social movements in higher education. In this in troduction, the researcher considers those fields of study in order to provide an in terdisciplinary foundation for the study of the mass social movement known as Islamism--whi ch an array of inte rnational scholars argue is either totalitarian or on the way to becoming tota litarian. The interdisciplinary approach also seeks answers as to how and why Islamism intersects with higher education institutions throughout the world a nd at The University of South Florida (USF). As is widely known and as shall be discussed in this thesis, some university professors, students, and former students at USF from 1986 to 2007 have been accused, indicted, deported, and sentenced va riously for materially supporting and conspiring to commit terrorist acts overs eas and possibly within U.S. territory. Undisputed evidence brought forward in the pr oceedings of one trial associated with some of those USF professors and students, U.S.A. v. Al-Arian (2006), indicates that at times university personnel and resources we re appropriated in fu rtherance of such activity. And in September 2007, two USF engineering students from Egypt were 1

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arrested for transporting explosives acro ss state lines. One of them had posted previously a personal video on YouTube demo nstrating how to use a toy as a remote detonator for those mujahideen or holy warriors, who wanted to save themselves for martyrdom for another day (qt d. in Silvestrini, September 14, 2007). As described in Chapter 3, the researcher immerses the analysis in what some scholars call New Historicis m, a form of textual critici sm which arose in the 1970s in reaction to an earlier analytical appro ach called New Criticism, which itself posits case or textual analysis in a vacuum, ruli ng out potential psychol ogical, intellectual, ideological, institutional, and historical context. While th e British theoretician I.A. Richards is sometimes called the father of the earlier New Criticism, the researcher suggests that his works such as The Meaning of Meaning (1923, with C.K. Ogden) and Practical Criticism (1929) actually render him a fa ther of New Historicism, for Richards advocates interpretati on of not a single case (or text) in and of itself, but rather of a single case (or text) as a pr oduct of other types of circumstances. He called this approach to interpretation theory of context. The researcher submits here that a ca se involving a major public research university with an internationalized mi ssion and people in it who are predisposed toward what Kuhn (1962) calls ideological paradigms of their academic disciplines are better understood through the New Historical met hod, attributed to the French scholar Michel Foucault. Ne w Historicism, despite criticisms that the method is unscientific or lacks systema tic rigor, allows a research er to traverse where many other methods do not: into the history of ideas and ideologies and how and who attempts to institutionalize them. In addition and as a result, in this study the method 2

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allows for a direct challenge to widely he ld assumptions about the Islamist movement at USF. The process of contextualizati on in the findings belies a common defense on the part of some university officials: that public concern about U SFs possible role in facilitating terrorism through the repeated admission of faculty and students from overseas is unwarranted. For example, a recent USF spokesperson stated, Were educators, not investigators and that the continued arrests and convictions of people working or studying at USF are isolated inci dents (qtd. in Silv estrini and Altman, 2007). To the contrary, the findings of this st udy suggest that thes e incidents are not isolated. An unfortunate reality to be sure and as the findings of this study bear witness, the USF case about terrorist op eratives having inserted th emselves in the university and its service area to advance their caus e is consistent with approximately eighty years of activity on behalf of a worldwid e socio-religious movement that enjoins support by intellectuals and intellectual id eas disseminated on university campuses. Moreover, the findings show that the orga nizational environment of universities is vital toward advancing that movements unlimited aims objectives of what the movement calls and what is called hereinafter Islamization or re-Islamization of society and knowledge. That stated, this study never advances a position that USF and other people in it have engaged willfully in any malfeasance. Indeed, the study could not because no hard evidence has been found to substantiate such an argument. Neither does this study suggest that solution to re-Islami zation in higher education--which the researcher does conclude is inimical to the purpose of higher education--involves 3

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censorship of intellectuals and exclusion of protected classes based on what people believe or where they were born. Islamism and Totalitarianism In this inquiry, the term Islamism a nd the adjectival and nominal variants Islamist are not equated with the terms I slam, Islamic, or Muslim, which refer respectively to a faith and not a political ideology supported by a religious, ultranational mass movement. A theoretical unde rstanding of that movement, which appropriates the accoutrements of higher educa tion in the service of its objectives of worldwide societal reformation rests in Herbert Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) and his colleague Hannah Arendt (1948 /1951/1966/1968/1976/1979/1994) who studied the social psychology of mass movements a nd group behavior at The University of Chicago in the middle part of the Twentie th Century. From Blumers corpus of research, one learns that a salient feature of mass movements is soc ial contagion or a non-rational dissemination of a moo d, impulse, or form of conduct (pp. 175-176) that requires an appealing setting (p. 194) like a university for the purpose of cultivating a semblance of legitimacy in that sanctioned forum (p. 194). From the latter scholars corpus of research, one learns that in an appealing educational setting, an ultr a-national mass movement caus es the loss of distinction between research and propaganda in the se rvice of its utopian goals (pp. 453). In addition, both Blumer (1939/ 1946/1951/1955) and Arendt (1948/1951/1966/1968/1976/1979/1994) recognize that, indeed, ideological mass movements with a codified educational reform program are created and later cultivated in universities. 4

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Predating those Western scholars from the Twentieth Century is the historiography of Ibn Khaldun (1377/1969), a Tunisian scholar and diplomat who describes the conditions that caused the decl ine of ancient Islamic civilization. First, Khaldun (1377/1969), a forerunner to modern social psychology, write s about what he calls group feeling by Arab leaders who lose their questioning spirit and resort to political violence after they have established themselves in a new region through Islamic conquest. Second, he writes of an intellectual coup in the ancient Islamic universities by a religious orthodoxy called th e School of Recent Scholars, who caused a contraction of civilizat ional progress by merging matters of faith and reason (Khaldun, 1377/1969). Those few who have studied him regard Khaldun as one of the most influential thinkers to have ever appeared on the world stage, despite that his work fell out of favor in Islamic civilization almost as soon as it had appeared, and again later when liberal Arab-Muslim intellectuals in the Midd le East attempt to revive it in the 1930s (Enan, 1993). The following statemen t is a typical assessment: Herein lies, no doubt, his most origin al contribution, though his keen mind opened new paths in many directions. In s eeking for the causes of the rise and fall of political governments, he reali zed that they could not be looked for solely in the motives and ambitions, the aims and purposes, the strength of will and the intellectual power of individuals. He observed that their influence was determined, not only by the character of the groups to which they belonged, but also by the general social conditions. This led him to consider the factors that influenced and shaped these social conditions. He recognized that they were due to ethnic and racial character istics. But he perceived likewise that these peculiarities were themselves traceable to the physical environment, climate, water, soil, location, and food. . Hence the widening of the scope of history, and the broadening of the historians task. History becomes the science of human society. It is sociology. (Enan, 1993: p. 165-166). 5

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Islamisms Borrowing of Total itarian Symbols and Strategies What totalitarian signifi es, then, is that Islamism is a worldwide social movement like Fascism or Communism concei ved by a handful of Islamist leaders whose quest for power through actions of free will are justifie d as Gods will. Evidence thereunto, as explained throughout th is chapter exposition, is very clear in that when Islamists are asked to compare th eir religious beliefs to other beliefs, they cite capitalism and Communism --and not other traditiona l world religions (Pipes, 1997a). Another comparative example rests in the Islamist borrowi ng of Communist symbols and strategies, such as those depict ed in a work about education and social reform by Ali Shariati, an Iranian Islamist who conceives of a utopian system of education by an elite group of intellects to purge the Muslim mi nd of Westoxication and to instill in it the right pa th (1986, p.51). That work, entitled What is to Be Done: The Enlightened Thinkers and an Islamic Renaissance bears great similarity in name, vision, and scope to another work penned by Russian intellectual Vladimir Ilich Lenin, What is to Be Done (1902), which formulates the Bo lshevik doctrine that trade union organizers were insuffici ent to lead the Communist revolution because they were too busy working to take up the task ; and that therefore the task fell to intellectuals because they possessed both the time and the theoretical equipment for such a mission (R. Pipes, 2001: p.31). The similarity should not surprise us, for Muraweic (2006) explicates in his work Pandoras Boxes: The Mind of Jihad II that Shariati had translated the works of the Communist Intern ationals leading intellectuals into Arabic and Farsi when Shariati was a student in France. 6

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Islamisms borrowing from other totalitarian ideologies extends as far back as the 1920s with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in E gypt and the Jamaat-E-Islami in Pakistan, both of which are now intern ational mass movement s with grassrootslevel institutions in Europe and North America. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-E-Islami refer to themselves as poli tical parties, although the former is banned in Egypt and the latter operates legally in Pakistan. As is shown throughout this thesis, Islamisms antidemocratic nature has been a hard pill for academics to swallow, so much so that international affairs scholar Walid Phares asks in his most recent book, published after the findings of this work we re finished: Why is it that the vast literature of the modern West particularly since the 1970s, denies the totalitarian nature of jihadism? (2007, p. 68)--jihad ism being the violent offshoot of an overarching Islamist mass movement. Despite avoidance of the topic by lead ing Middle East and Islamic studies scholars, since the 1920s the major leader -theoreticians of Islamism have crosspollinated their ideas, turning a faith in to a puritanical ideology. Among the more influential of those theoreticians has b een Mawlana Maududi, a Pakistani scholar who advanced in 1939 the concept of Islam as a revolutionary political party: It must be evident to you from this discussion that the obje ctive of the Islamic jihad is to eliminate the rule of a non-Is lamic system and establish in its stead an Islamic system of state rule. Islam does not intend to confine this revolution to a single state or a few countries; the aim is to bring about a universal revolution. . to effect a world revol ution. . . Truth cannot be confined within geographical borders. . No portion of mankind should be deprived of Truth. . [As such] Islamic jihad is both offensive and defensive. It is defensive because the Muslim Party assa ults the rule of the opposing ideology and it is defensive because the Muslim Party is constrained to capture state power in order to arrest the principles of Islam in space-time forces. (A World Revolution qtd. in Laqueur, 2006: p. 398) 7

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Another book by Maududi, Understanding Islam is disseminated in North American mosques. While devoid of strong political st atements in other essays like the one above, even milder appeals to potential conv erts do not rule out Islamic jihad, which for the Islamist movement is not a mere spir itual exercise aimed at deflating individual ego. Another document showcased as undis puted evidence in a HAMAS terrorism financing trial in Texas, U.S.A v. Holy Land Foundation (2007), declares the strategic bonds between Muslim Brotherhood and Ja maat-E-Islami organizations in North America as being part of civi lization-jihadist process toward future theocratic rule. In this thesis the terms Islamism and Islamist are not meant in the pejorative sense; indeed, the following pages show that they are terms commonly accepted by Islamists themselves and many other scholars and independent investigators. Moreover, the term totalitar ian is not intended pejoratively; to the contrary, the term comes from political science and denotes a type of social reform movement in which all aspects of life, from the personal to the political to the religious, are subsumed under the banner of th e state, a centralized power as such, in which state actors who hold power neither re cognize nor tolerate parties of differing political opinion (Sabine, 1937/1950/1959; R. Pipes, 2001). Ergo totalitarianism denotes belief in such a social system. In addition to expectations that people under their rule follow the straight or right path, totalitarian leaders and followers characteristically maintain beliefs that if their way of life is good for their society, th en it must be good for all societies. So it follows logically that their movements lay claim to an ultranationalist agenda often 8

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based on the restoration of thei r group perceptions of past im perial grandeur (see Tibi, 1998; Kepel, 2002 for worldwide examples of this behavior), which leaders propound through legal channels of social educati on, along with subversiv e activity, terrorism, and militarism (Sabine, 1937/1950/1959; R. Pipes, 2001). Moreover, R. Pipes (2001), a Baird Professor of History, Emeritus, at The Harvard University, and expert witness in 1992 in the Russian Constitutional Courts trial against the Comm unist Party of the Soviet Union, also illustrates that totalitari anism differs from other social systems in that law is not a means of protecting the individual but is a mechanism of governance (p.105) that enjoys a political monopoly underpinned by the assistance of a security police (p.105). Islamism, the Social Psychology of Mass Movements, and Problems in Higher Education From social psychology, theorists and practitioners such as Sigmund Freud, Carl G. Jung, Herbert Blumer, Hannah Arendt and others have described mass social movements and their affinity for higher e ducation, not always in noble terms. Freud, for example, laments in Civilization and its Discontents (1930) the trend of educational institutions to obscure the da rker nature of social groups and whole civilizations in the process of prepari ng young people for life and work. In addition, Jung (1936, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1973), in his variou s letters and essays on German socialism, notes how German society welcom ed Nazism into the German universities where anti-Semitic bias and ultranationalis t folk ideology in the social sciences influenced German societys mass prepara tion for Jewish persecution and unchecked military aggression across the European continent. In addition, another work by Mark 9

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Walker (1995) illustrates how the step-by-step coordination of every aspect of German society which followed Hitlers appointment as German Chancellor culminated in the purging of all civ il servant-professors who opposed the new government and also purged German physics of non-Aryans and leftist scientists (p.2). Moreover, the German government sought control over all future university appointments, scientific publicati on, and funding of research (p.2). By the middle of the Twentieth Ce ntury, the problem of mass social movements in Western society apparently led Blumer (1946/1951/ 1963) to articulate a theory of collective behavior for mass soci al groups, who, in part, blur the boundaries between propaganda and other forms of disc ourse while also using social institutions such as, and in concert with, higher edu cation to advance thei r causes. Also, Ted Robert Gurr (1990/1998) notes the correlation between universities and violent radical social groups. Furthermore, Hendershott (2002) observes how more recent rejections of hierarchies in the academy, along w ith the value of honoring claims of multiculturalism and diversity (p.154), cau se educators to refrain politely from making judgments about the behavior of nonWestern social groups both in education and in society, in general, even when those groups maintain subversive agendas. Finally, scholars who study the religious underpinnings of Islamism and Islamic terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, also note the interplay between Islamism and higher education, although the ro le of higher education is se ldom the direct thesis of their inquiries (Piscatori, 1993; Mendel sohn, 1993; Tibi, 1993; Tehranian, 1993a; Rugh, 1993; Ramadan, 1993; Keddie & Monian, 1993; Kramer, 1993, 1990/1998; 10

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Hoveyda, 1998; Duran, qtd. in Emerson, 2002; Jurgensmeyer, 2002; Pipes, 2002; Berman, 2003). Of that latter list of aforementioned scholars, Khalid Duran (2002) has perhaps the most unique and forceful thoughts about the intersection between higher education and Islamism. In an interview with Steven Emerson, an expert in the field of international terrorism and a critically acclaimed investiga tive journalist, Duran (2002) discusses one of his earlier works, The Role of Political Islam (1978), written when he was a scholar at the German Middle East In stitute. In that prescient 1978 work, Duran studied how the revenue from Saudi Arabian oil wealth was spreading a divisive form of Islamic fundamentalism in the Muslim world, in part, through the Saudi support of Islamic academies and think-tanks that would attach themselves to universities for purposes of achieving legitimacy and mass promotion of puritanical religious doctrine. According to Frank Viviano (2003), eviden ce suggests that the Saudi government engaged in this part of the so-called Isl amization process at the expense of not expanding its own educational system. For example, the national library in Riyadh holds 500,000 books, or one-tenth of the holdings of the main public library in Cincinnati, Ohio (p.40). Duran (2002) recognizes that contempor ary Islamic fundamentalism, or the religious doctrine that underpins the mass so cial movement of Isla mism, started in the 1930s in Egypt and was the di rect result of diplomatic alliances among various Arab religious and political leaders and Nazi Ge rmanys leadership, who also had staged a revolt against modernity and provided Ar ab leaders with their own advice about social reform through mass re-education (q td. in Emerson, 2002: p.172). In Italy and 11

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Germany you had the brownshirts and th e blackshirts. In Egypt you had the greenshirts, which was the Muslim Brotherhood It failed in Europe but survived in Egypt and spread to other parts of the Islamic world (p.172). Middle East and international affairs sc holar Abdelwahab Hechiche suggests that the ideological transmission of twen tieth-century Islamic fundamentalism, the religious foundation of Islamism, also ha s occurred through Egypts exporting of teachers and professors to other Middle Eastern and North African countries (October 2002, personal communication). However, the use of teachers and professors may not represent the only means for the direct transm ission of Islamist doctrine. Pressure from external advocacy groups on higher education institutions also might influence the aforementioned trend. For example, a recen t WorldNetDaily report states that the United Muslims Association of Florida (U MA), Tampa Bay chapter, which closely aligns itself with the Council on American -Islamic Relations (CAIR) and other Islamist organizations announced that U SF included two new courses on Islam for the spring 2004 term (Islamists Police the Classroom, Jan. 2, 2004). In its announcement, the UMA expressed concern for the content of those courses by having some Muslim students in the classroom because the UMA wants to make sure that these professors, of course all in good faith, inshaAllah, portray Islam correctly (qtd. in Islamis ts Police the Classroom, Jan.2, 2004). Middle East historian Daniel Pipes, in that same article, calls this common practice on behalf of Islamist groups, incipient dhimmitude (discussed fu rther below), a state in which (among other features) non-Muslims dare not say anything critical about Islam and Muslims (Jan. 2, 2004). 12

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In addition to the educational role of Saudi Arabian doctrine and Egypts Muslim Brotherhood in spreading Islamic funda mentalism to other parts of the Islamic world, Duran (2002) discusses th e professional attraction of university-trained engineers to Islamism. Theres even a joke about it in Arabic. . In Egypt they always say the Muslim Brotherhood is really the Engineering Brotherhood (p.172) According to Duran (2002), some of that attraction involves the nature of engineering education: Engineers dont exercise their fantasy and imagination. Everything is precise and mathematical. They dont study what we call the humanities. Consequently when it comes to issues that involve religion and personal emotion, they tend to see things in very stark terms. (p.172-173) The dogmatism of those Islamist leaders sta nds in sharp contrast to the views of Islamic scholars like the aforementioned Khalid Duran, who practices a more poetical form of traditional Islam owing to his scholar ship in the Islamic worlds great seats of religious study, for, as Bassam Tibi (1998) Abdelwahab Meddeb (2003), and Daniel Pipes (1997a) note, the political imams of Islamism tend to be self-taught and therefore unschooled in the richness of Is lamic scholasticism and textual exegesis. The discourse of political science an d history also details directly the intersection between mass social movements a nd higher education. In that respect, the political theories of George H. Sabine (1937/1950/1959) and of Richard Pipes (2001) are highly relevant for their discussions about the role of higher education in the expansion of twentieth-century totalitarian ism, an idea that Mi ddle East historian Daniel Pipes (1997b, 2002), who has publishe d nineteen books about Islamic and Middle East history, reiterates when he describes the Western Mind of Radical 13

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Islam, which he regards as the previous centurys third totalitarian mass social movement, a point that, admittedly, other notable scholars such as Leon T. Hadar (1992/1995), Edward Said (1978, 2001), Noam Chomsky (2001), Esposito (1992, 2002), and Scranton (2002) deny in that they view Islamism as a kind of nationalist liberation theology with beni gn intentions, as opposed to being a pathological mass social movement with layers of leadership and intricate networks of institutional support groups, covert terror groups, and surv eillance apparatuses in nations where the movement exists (Berman, 2003). Finally, another scholar, Meddeb (2003) suggests that higher education reform could help in reversing the Islamist ferment, which he understands, too, as an in ternational mass movement conceived by people with graduate degrees and that starts on univer sity campuses in the Middle East and other parts of the world. Leading academics and higher education experts also study and criticize the presence of mass movements in colleges a nd universities. Perhaps the most wellreasoned and yet unabashedly critical is Edwa rd Shils (1997) who asks his audience to recall the intrusion of German socialism in German higher education when that audience considers the advent of mass social movements that maintain as part of their core doctrine for curriculum theory and pract ice egalitarian ideals and social justice (p.206). Shils (1997) states therein that Ge rman universities found appealing the new socialism that had arisen in their society for the advancement of those same social values. In addition, Shils (1997) asserts th at politicization of uni versities through the support of terrorist social groups also viol ates the traditional ethos of the academy. Donald E. Walker (1979) also discusses mass social movements that fomented student 14

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disturbances in the 1960s and 1970s, asserting that militant third-sector groups such as ethnic social groups and the Students for a Democr atic Society (SDS) represent a dilemma for universities becau se they provide stimulation from the periphery (p.35); yet, because they may threaten poli tical convulsion (p.84), the university is a kind of Trojan horse for them. In contrast to Shils (1997) and Walk er (1979), other highe r education experts regard mass social movements and groups with either less skepticism (Graff & Ratcliff, 1997; Musil, 1997; Johnston & Spalding, 1997; Yamane, 2001) or greater reverence (Rozak, 1968/1969/1995; Cohe n, 2001; Margolis, 2001; Margolis, Soldantenko, Acker, & Gair, 2001; So ldantenko, 2001; Mattson, 2002; Miller, 1987/1994) than those educators (Walker, 1979; Shils, 1997) who perhaps possess a living memory of Nazism and Stalinism-militant ideologies in which all human activity, public and private, was subsumed by the state--or who might have studied those earlier social movements as part of their academic careers. De spite the history of totalitarianism, which characteristically insi nuates itself into higher education for the purpose of reforming societies intellectua lly, culturally and politically, later generations of higher educa tion experts often state that ideological conflict over diversity and multiculturalism in the cu rriculum (e.g., the potential for excessive politicization of research and teaching), two goals that frequently coincide with contemporary social movements in higher e ducation, can be elided altogether or overcome through serious efforts at strategi c planning and the inclusion of a broad array of internal and extern al cultural groups and other c onstituencies in the planning 15

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process (Garcia & Ratcliff, 1997; Musil, 1997; Johnston & Sp alding, 1997; Stark & Lattuca, 1997). Arguably, that kind of incl usion among constituencies can be realized but perhaps only when the major actors among those constituencies welcome social assimilation and critical interaction in the university milieu. Marty and Appleby (1993) in the seminal, multivolume work of sociology researched through The University of Chicago, Fundamentalisms assert that Islamist groups, ultimately, do not welcome assimilation and criticism. To that extent, the leaders of Islamist groups and their followers may not respect inter-gr oup cooperation and the spirit of criticism in higher education. Indeed, an unwillingness to compromise to the point of exacting violence to achieve objectives on the part of militant third-sector groups maintains important parallels in higher education history, as exemplified by the studentand faculty-led revolutions in the United States severa l decades ago (Miller, 1987/1994). Miller (1987/1994) writes with affirmative nostalg ia for the SDS in The 1960s in the 1990s and laments that the revolution is far from fini shed in a chapter justification of the Movements radicalism and terrorism (p.8): But listening to a song like Sympathy for the Devil and pondering, too, the sometimes frightening nihilism that was an essential facet of the student movement that my book describes, I cannot help thinking that our culture, like our political life, would be richer if we would stop tr ying to run away from the recklessly questing spirit that informed the artworks and activism of that era. (p.8) In addition to expressing kindred ideo logical values based on communitarian concepts of social justice, however, higher educations an archic organizational style 16

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(Birnbaum, 1988) and pluralistic ethos of academic governance (Walker, 1979) also may represent a kind of fresh territory for Islamism, a social movement with overtones of religious fundamentalism (Marty & Appleby, 1993). Indeed, that Islamists seek to reinvent the societies in which they live by turning them into Islamic caliphates is abundantly clear from the record Islamists themse lves have created (Marty & Appleby, 1993; Pipes, 2002; Trifkovic, 2003). Supporting such scholarship is another original document co mmanding public attention: The Akram Document (1992) is another strategic plan for the Muslim Brotherhoods stated conquest of North America similar to the groups earlier Muslim Brotherhood Project (1982), noted above. The Akram Document was revealed in summer 2007 as undisputed factual evidence in a federal terrorism financing trial in Texas against a charity called the Holy Land Foundation. Written by a Muslim Brotherhood leader named Mohammed Akram, the document details how grassroo ts Islamic organizations can act as beehives to wage information warfare in non-Muslim institutions, including the academic kind. Arguably, the United States and its educa tion system maintain a strong history of that kind of reinvention by social movements marked by dominant religious features. Here, the famous sermon by Massachusetts Bay Colony leader, John Winthrop, seems most pertinent. Seeing the North American continent as a place to establish a theocratic community for seventeenth-century Puritans who would later establish our nations first universitie s, Winthrop, from the decks of the Mayflower viewed the New World as a great shining city on the hill fo r his people to reinvent in accordance with their religion. In comparison, Meddeb (2003) in The Malady of Islam 17

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follows that argument about Islamism in hi s assessment of why it has found a niche in the United States. Meddeb (2003) charges that Islamism has found a home in the United States because both are characteristically religious fundamentalist, which for fundamentalists, by default, means reinventi ng social systems, including educational ones, according to a divinely-inspired plan of human existence (Marty & Appleby, 1993). Problem Statement Leading scholars in the field of Middle Eastern studies, especially through its professional group, The Middle Eastern St udies Association (MESA), have not studied the interplay of Islamism, if view ed as a totalitarian mass social movement, with higher education. By interplay, this inquiry means the ideologies, strategies, and legacies of direct and indirect action a ssociated with Islamist movements as those movements interact with highe r education. In short, that interplay may be referred to as re-Islamization from above and below. The term re-Islamization refers to a mid-twentieth-century intellectual trend in the Middle East that c ontradicted an earlier one known as de-Islamization in which modernizing societies began separating sacred and profane spheres of life (Duran & Hechiche, 2002). The terms from above and from below also require some defin ition, owing inspiration to Tibis (1998) and Kepels (2002) histories of the Islamist movement. From above is a term employed in political and military science to denote dramatic, direct action aimed at preparing a society for the ultimate objective of whol esale governance changethe creation of a new socio-political order. From below is a term employed in political and military science to denote indirect action, especially through covert propaganda campaigns and 18

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institutional subversion, aimed at prepar ing a society for wholesale governance change. As Arendt (1948/1951/1966/1968/1976/ 1979/1994) overtly conveys, and Tibi (1998) and Kepel (2002) imply, where ther e manifests the above strategy, there manifests the below kind, as well. In addition to the absence of inquiry in Middle East st udies, experts in the field of higher education have not studied Isla misms interplay with higher education, which ostensibly could lay out baseline information about the characteristics and substantive causes and conditions that invo lve Islamism in higher education. While this study considers terrorism or political vi olence as a potential characteristic of the Islamist movement, coverage in this an alysis extends to the mass movements nonviolent characteristics. While radical Islamic fundamentalism, or Islamism, has been studied widely in the academy, the tendency of the most publicized and, arguably, the most influential of intellectuals is to palliate its more in imical aspects (e.g., intellectual persecution, religious persecution, rarefaction of know ledge), favoring it as a revolutionary liberation theology that champions the self -determination of oppressed cultures (see, inter alia Said, 1978, 2001; Chomsky, 2001; Esposit o, 2002). That view represents a core element of post-colonialism and anti-W estern resistance theory fashionable in Middle East studies (see, inter alia Lewis, 1994, Tibi, 1998: Kramer, 2001). Outside the academys orthodox point-of-view, however, are many scholars throughout the world who do regard Islamism as a totalitarian threat or at least as a mass social movement with hegemonic objec tives that destabilizes societies and discriminates against women, secularists, humanists, Westerners, Jews, Christians, 19

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non-Arab minorities, and liberal Muslim s (Tibi, 1998; Duran & Hechiche, 2001; Kramer, 2001; Pipes, 2002; Yeor, 2002; Meddeb, 2003; Warraq, 2003; Phares, 2007). What that may signify, in effect, then, is that few in the academy, owing to professional views that might cause them to look positively or naively toward mass social movements in education, simply ha ve not conceived that there may be a difference between Islam, the religious fa ith of millions of Muslims around the world, and Islamism, a violent, repressive polit ical ideology with aspirations of global hegemony (Fregosi, 1998; Tibi, 1998; Dura n & Hechiche, 2001; Pipes, 2002; Yeor, 2002; Meddeb, 2003; Warraq, 2003) that delib erately uses higher education to advance itself ideologically and strategica lly. Therefore, and arguably, when such a political ideology establishes itself within a higher education institution, few in that institution possess the kind of specialized knowledge or critical judgment that would provide cause for concern, or even the moral resolve to question the propriety of that movement on a university campus. The problem of Islamism in higher educat ion is apparently worldwide, existing not only in universities in the Middle East but also in North American universities, most notably at The University of South Florida (USF), in Tampa, Florida, where between 1986 and 2007 two highly publicized ca ses with apparent connections to each other have come to light. The Al-Arian Case The first case surrounds the 1986 hiring of computer engineering professor Dr. Sami Al-Arian, a Palestinian born in Kuwait and self-described enlightened Islamist (qtd. in Time 2002). Al-Arian was initiated in to the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood 20

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when he was a boy (Waller, 2002). He arrived in the U.S. in 1975 on an Egyptian passport under the auspices of a U.S. F-1 visa for foreign national students. By 1982, as is stated on the website www.FreeS amiAl-Arian.org, Al-Arian co-founded the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), which according to undisputed trial evidence in U.S.A v. Holy Land Foundation (2007) is one of many arms of the Muslim Brotherhood in North America. ISNA evolved out of the Muslim Students Association-National (MSA). Hired at U SF in 1986, the Southwest Florida Muslim Students Association (MSA-USF) was created as a non-profit entity several months before Al-Arians first seme ster of teaching at USF (see www.Sunbiz.org ). Al-Arian became MSA-USFs faculty advisor and remain ed in that position until his indictment in 2003 by the federal government on terrorism and criminal racketeering charges. During his imprisonment, Al -Arian was fired by univers ity president Dr. Judy L. Genshaft. In 2006, Al-Arian plead guilty to a criminal charges of providing services to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) before a nd after the organization had been declared a foreign terrorist organizati on in 1995. He also plead gui lty to lying to the media about, among other things, his knowledge that another visiting pr ofessor he helped instill at USF in the early 1990s, Dr. Rama dan Abdullah Shallah, was a leader in the PIJ. Findings of fact in the trial U.S.A. v. Al-Arian (2006) also rev eal that some of that conspiracy occurred on the USF campus through the establishment of a front organization, World Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE), attached to the university in the form of a legal partnership for the purpose of directing communica tions on behalf of a criminal enterprise, the PIJ. As is detail ed in Chapter 5 findings about the USF case, 21

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one of several Islamic scholars whom Al-Arian arranged to come to the United States and lecture for USF-WISE was Khurshid Ahmad, one of the aforementioned Malwana Maududis earliest disciples in Pakistan. Ahmad is considered one of the Islamist movements leading activist-intellectu als propounding revolutionary jihad (Esposito and Voll, 2002). Of the case against Al-Ari an, terrorism expert Steven Emerson (1998), in consideration of his and other media inve stigations resulting in the governments occasional declassification of in formation to the public, writes: Beyond the issue of how a terrorist front could operate undetected for nearly five years, an interesting question raised was to what degree was The University of South Florida complicit in the creati on of a terrorist cell? According to documents collected by federal authorities and interviews with various university officials, mounting evidence s uggests that university officials closed their eyes to the warnings and indications that a terrorist cell was operating with the university imprimatur. (p.40) Of that alleged terrorist cell operating at USF, Emerson (1998) further states that it succeeded, in large part, in establishing [its] support infrastructure because [it] networked together with other militant Islamic groups in a pan-Islamic militant partnership most readily seen in the first World Trade Center bombing, a collaboration from five diffe rent radical Islamic organi zationsthe Gama Islamiya, Islamic Jihad, al-Fuqra, Sudanese Nati onal Islamic Front, and Hamas (p.41). The Mohamed and Megahed Case The second case involving alleged terro rism connections to USF involves two students, Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohamed (24 or 26 years old) and Youssef Samir Megahed (21 years old), who were arrested in South Carolina in August 2007. Initially, they were pulled over by local law enforcement for speeding. Having 22

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engaged in some activity that law enfor cement found suspicious, suddenly closing a laptop computer upon approach and not providi ng plausible answers for their traveling on remote country roads near a military facility, the students consented to a search of their car. Trunks contents revealed what law enforcement regarded as bomb-making material and a can of gasoline, or what the students and their attorneys regard as homemade fireworks. The bomb-making mate rial, or homemade fireworks, included over twenty feet of detonating cord. By early September 2007, after several weeks of detention in South Carolina, and following ra ids at a storage facility and a private home in a subdivision that includes Al-Arians mosque and some mosque board members, the students were extradited to Tampa, Florida, where Mohamed was charged with teaching and demonstrating how to manufacture and use an explosive device in furtherance of an activity that constitutes a crime of violence under United States terrorism codes (U.S.A. v. Mohamed and Megahed, 2007). In addition, both students were charged with transporting interstate commerce explosive materials without a license. Previously at least one of them had b een arrested in Tampa for shooting at squirrels in a city park. Like Al-Arian, both students arrived lega lly in the United States with Egyptian passports. One of the students, Mohamed, had obtained at least an undergraduate degree in engineering from Cairo Univers ity, a well-known educational haven for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. As Al-Arian was a professor of engineering at USF, Mohamed and Megahed were engi neering students there. Like Al-Arian, they or their relatives possibly had established corporate entities for technol ogy in the state of Florida (e.g., General Trade and Technology and NetSynergy). Like Al-Arian, they 23

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were associated with the MSA at USF. Like Al-Arian, they were associated with a board member, Noor Salhab, of Al-Arians former mosque and school, the Islamic Academy of Florida (IAF). The IAF itself wa s cited in undisputed trial evidence in U.S.A. v. Al-Arian as part of the enterprise Al-Arian created to provide services to the PIJ. For himself and his family, Noor Salhab denies any knowledge of Al-Arians crimes or of those alleged by students Mohamed and Megahed, one of whom had rented a house at 12402 Pampas Place, owned by Salhab. The government has not accused or charged Salhab with a ny crimes. Salhabs house, however, already had been known to government investig ators as a kind of safe-house for PIJ operatives at USF and the nearby Temple Terrace subdivision. Sami Al-Arian reportedly had lied about his having used the residence an off-campus office for WISE after neighbors had complained about the high vo lume of traffic associated with it. At that time in the early 1990s, the house had been occupied or its address had been used, variously, by Dr. Ramadan Shallah (USF visiting professor and second GeneralSecretary of the PIJ), Dr. Hussam Jubara (USF graduate student of engineering, University of Central Florida visiti ng professor, and U.S.-deported HAMAS operative), and Dr. Samir M. Benmakhlouf (engineer and former business partner of Al-Arian in General Trade and Technology). Purpose of the Study Specialization in area studies programs like Middle East and higher education seldom advance conceptual research models that triangulate their and other multiple fields of theoretical expertise and practice fr om across academic disciplines in order to 24

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create new knowledge out of existing knowle dge. Seldom do they enrich that same interdisciplinary content with current case study observation. In this study, the researcher consulted numerous works by the worlds foremost authorities and publishing houses in Middle East and hi gher education studies, concluding that experts in both areas have not explored directly Islamisms interplay with higher education to advance Islamisms agenda for worldwide reformation. Thus, the purpose of this study was to explore that interp lay. Therefore, the researcher situated the case of alleged Is lamist international terrorism and related matters at USF in a global context, comparing and contrasting conditions and characteristics involving Islamism and USF w ith similar problems in other parts of the world. At the same time, however, the study triangulated extant theory and research from social psychology, political science, and history about the co llective behavior and characteristics of mass movements, thei r leaders, and their followers. According to Walker (1979), a university chancellor and sociologist, the collec tive nature of mass social movements is more responsible for the problem of mass movements in higher education than are the charac teristics and conditions of higher education itself in drawing mass movements to it. Walker (1979) does state, however, that the democratic nature of the university offers a loophole of which mass social movements take advantage. Within that overarching cont ext, the case involving Islamism at USF, 1986-2007, became an important example for that comparison-contrast analysis. The interdisciplinary framework of this study and international scope coincide with USFs Strategic Plan, 2007-2012 The plan holds that the university should align with local, state, national, a nd global needs. In turn, th e plan states that alignment 25

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should come, in major part, through integ rated and synergisti c interdisciplinary research across disciplinary, department al, college, and campus boundaries. The researcher, together with the support of her thesis committee hailing from three different departments, two colleges, two di fferent campuses, and three different regions in the world--North America, Europe, and North Africaachieves precisely that. In addition, external validation for the study came from subject matter experts not from the United States but also from Canada, France, and Sweden. Two of the studys external validators, while living in European count ries, are natives of Egypt and Morocco. Research Questions Out of the aforementioned strands of discussion about the problems hypothetical conditions and characteristics, th e researcher established two overarching research questions for the study: 1. What are the conditions and characterist ics of Islamisms interplay in higher education in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Leva nt, Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan? 2. What are the conditions and characteristics of Islamisms interplay with USF and its service area, 1986-2007? In this study, interplay is de fined as the contours of interr elating ideologies, strategies, and legacies of direct and indirect action undertaken by the Islamist movement in the university milieu and its surrounding environm ent. In short, it connotes a decades-old process that Kepel (2002), in his work The Trail of Political Islam calls reIslamization from above and below. That interplay involves a range of temporal developments manifesting as conditions upon which the Islamist movement exacted its influence in host societies, and out of those conditions arise the Islamist 26

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movements characteristics. In this an alysis, we examine those conditions and characteristics as they pertain to matte rs of higher education. In this inquiry conditions signify things that give rise to the occurrence of the Islamist movement in higher education institutions in a particular place and time. Characteristics refers to certain features that are typical of the Islamist movement in higher education institutions in a particular place and time As will be shown, sometimes a condition in one place represents a char acteristic in another. Method This study employs a method of histor iography, New Historicism, involving Foucaults (1969, 1971, 1974) theory of instituti ons to investigate Islamisms interplay with higher education, culminating in a study of the movement and its leadership at USF. The methods philosophi cal base being postmodernist in origin, Foucaults theory of institutions accepts Derridas (1966/ 1967) arguments that language, or signification, is not transcendental, and is, to the contrary, quite arbitrary and sometimes coerced in institu tional settings regarding meaning, which happens through a process of signification, or free play, or interplay. In short, things signify other things but they do not mean other things in a transcendental sense. Writing about the history of sexuality and penal syst ems, Foucault (1969, 1971, 1974) employs Derridas deconstruction of what Derrida calls the transcendental signified and shows how institutions and sub-institutions engage in an interplay of linguistic signification and other practices in or der to consolidate power and knowledge, imposing limitations on discourse through structures of instit utional thought. 27

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The study of intellectual history and id eologies is integral to the New Historical method. In the study of organizati ons, institutional analysis focuses on the multiplicity of factors involved in describing organizational life and events (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998: p. 43). Hence, in their drawing upon Foucaults theory, Said (1978, 1983), White (1974), Leitch (1992), Czarniawska (1997), and Meddeb (2003) variously employ Foucaults theory to culture, academic disciplines, literature, organizations, and Islamism, respectively. T hose institutions are each involved in a signification process with other sub-inst itutions, such that critics of those institutions and sub-institutions may interpret the signification process by analyzing, inter alia ideological habits of mind, ba sic assumptions (and reactions to challenges of those basic assumptions ), actions, archives, pedagogy, taboos, publishing records, religious texts, and judici al texts. In turn, au thors, or people who signify, lose control over the meaning of their institutions and sub-institutions. At the same time, critics can, as White (1974) states, re-familiarize us with events which have been forgotten through either accident neglect, or repressi on by looking at the ways in which events evolved, provi ding more information about them, and showing how their developments conform to or deny other [signifying] story types (pp.399-400). In this analysis, a four-year process of coding for thematic association reveals an interplay of ideologies, strategies, and le gacies of direct and indirect action diffused across geographical space and time, with hi gher education representing organizational territory upon which the Islamist movement and its leaders exacts their plans for ultranationalist conquest. By coding, this inquiry means the s imultaneous collection and 28

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analysis of data that is compared and c ontrasted to the point that interrelated concepts are refined and integrated into the theoretical fram ework of the study (Charmaz, 2000: p. 509). This coding process proved to be well-suited for an inquiry that draws from multiple academic fields of study because it acc ounts for variation and permits modification of established analyses as conditions in the research changed or as further data were gathered (p. 510-511). Coding of the data also involved textual analysis of the Islamist movements discourse on three interrelated levels identified by Johnston in Methods of Social Movement Research (2002): world-historical (e.g., the discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood and its leadership ), organizational (e.g., the e ducational discourse of the International Institute of Islamic Thought), and individual (e.g., th e discourse of Sami al-Arian). As the researcher amassed and an alyzed evidence over the past three years, the aforementioned research que stions were reframed into their current form for the purposes of systematically presenting the fi ndings in later chapters. Eventually, the coding method led to the classification of c onditions and characteristics essential to Islamisms interplay in higher education, th e contours of which are presented in rich detail in Chapters Four and Five. Section II: An Extended Discussion of Major Strands of Ideas for Answering the Research Questions Broadly considered, the discourse of scholars and other experts on Islamic studies and higher education st udies suggests that Islamism maintains an affinity for 29

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higher education, and, conversely, that highe r education maintains an affinity for Islamism. In that respect, the symbiosis between the two institutions echoes similar relationships between external social gr oups and higher education in the 1960s and 1970s. Writing about the relationship, for example, Walker, in a discussion about campus disruption in the work The Effective Administrator (1979) suggests that militant third-sector groups influencing cam pus decision-making owe that ability to their nature more than from the charact er of the university (p.35), excepting that the democratic nature of the university welcomes those groups (p.35). In tacit support of Walkers (1979) organizational observation, Egyptian American newspaper publisher Seif Ashmawi stat es that radical Islami st groups have taken over mainstream Islamic institutions in the United States (qtd. in Emerson, 1998: p. 3637). However, Unfortunately, Americans are a nave people, refusing to believe that foreign extremists would actually lie to them (qtd. in Emerson, 1998: pp. 36-37). By coincidence to this study of a mass social movement in higher education, Walker (1979) refers to campus conflict influenced by militant third-sector groups as holy war (p.78-84). Walker (1979) qualifies the term in his descrip tion of the political model of governance as the process wher eby complex issues of the head are translated into simple issues of the he art for large numbers of people (p.78). By comparison, a similar process took place in 2006 in European and Islamic countries around the world as mass protests, embassy sieges, and boycotts by religious leaders and their followers objected, six mont hs after the fact, to the publication of satirical cartoon portrayals of Muhammad, Is lams final and most revered prophet. In this section, as throughout this entire inquiry, a reader payi ng attention to those current 30

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events will come to a deepened understanding of the pre-modern Islamic traditions that fuel the cartoon riots, in which mili tant Muslims living in liberal-democratic European societies expect that those socie ties not criticize Muslim things, lest they experience mass Muslim uprisings instigated by local religious lead ers and civil rights advocates. Hence, this interdisciplinar y study about a worldwide mass movement attempts to examine what Walker (1979) calls complex matters of the head (p. 35) as opposed to simple matters of the heart (p. 35). The aforementioned affinity between Islamism and higher education also compares to R. Pipes (2001) observation of the role of in tellectuals in the advancement of Communism: Most Europ ean Communists and sympathizers were not oblivious to the odious aspects of Communist rule, bu t they rationalized them in various ways: by blaming extraneous causes, such as the legacy of tsarism and the hostility of the capita list West (p.97). Moreover, R. Pipes (2001) shows that in northern Europe and in the United States where neither socialism nor Communism had much of a following, Moscow won useful allies among liberals and fellow travelers, mostly intellectua ls who, without joining the pa rty, promoted its objectives (p.98). They were of the grea test importance to it, R. Pipes (2001) writes, because, unlike party members, who were suspected of speaking at the partys command, they expressed personal convictions (p.98). Thes e intellectuals are what Bolshevik party stylist and leader Lenin (1902) refers to as useful idiots in the work What is to Be Done? (p. 52). According to R. Pipes (2001), th e role of intellectuals in furthering Communism inside and outside higher education is one th at would be repeated in various other countries such as, inter alia in Germany, Italy, Japan, China, and Cuba. 31

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Ellen Earle Chaffee and Sarah Willia ms Jacobson (1997) suggest that institutional cultures and subcultures, os tensibly including Walkers (1979) militant third-sector groups, may be studied through analysis of their basic assumptions, basic values, norms of behavior, and artifacts (p.234). In this extended background section the research er delineates the terms of that scholarship involving mass social movements and higher education. That scholarship signifies what William Cohen (1997) calls the post-Cold War academ ys recognition of the significance and power of expertise based in institutions in other countries such as area studies programs that have shifted out of their o rientalist [sic] guise of Western values (p.550). In context, the researcher notes that conflicting discourse about Islamism, let alone Islamisms affinity for higher educa tion, is extraordinarily contentious in the manner that Becher (1989/1993/1996) describes as that rare but blazing row, a kind of warfare among academic tribes and territo ries, that academics engage in when trying to protect their scholarl y reputations that imbue their personal identities. On one side of the debate are those who espouse anti-Western resistance theory and postcolonial theory (Qutb, 1953; Sai d, 1978, 2001; Hiltermann, 1991; Esposito, 1991, 2002; Cantori & Lowrie, 1992; Abu Amr, 1994; Chomsky, 2002; Honderich, 2002). Those voices often adhere to the adage that One mans terrorist is another mans freedom fighter.1 On the other side of the deba te are those scholars (Duran, 1978; Lewis, 1993; Pipes, 1996, 1997b, 2002, 2003; Kramer, 2001; Tibi, 2001; Duran & Hechiche, 2002; Dershowitz, 2002; Ches ler, 2003; Meddeb, 2003; Berman, 2003; Sharansky, 2003; Yeor, 1998, 2002) who hold that leading Middle East scholars have 32

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obviated facts about Islamisms socially a nd intellectually totali tarian features in which all aspects of private life and of religion are subsumed by the state (Sabine, 1937/1950/1959). Some of those scho lars argue that Middle East studies, as an area of academic study, has failed in its obligations of research, publication, and education, attributing that failure to theoretical shifts in the discipline that have rarefied knowledge (Lewis, 1993; Kramer, 2001). Section III: Limitations Answering the research questions pr esented above involves the collection, study, and synthesis of a vast range of schol arly and archival s ources, which is why the researcher began the public archives, events, and documents collection of her inquiry six years ago. The rese archer did not locate USF Boar d of Trustees archives in university library Special Collections; how ever, USF presidential archives were studied at length. At that time, the USF-WISE case resurf aced during what the researcher refers to as its second historical phase, Septem ber 2001 to May 2006. The USF cases third historical phase, from 2006 to the present, is in-progress but invol ves Islamism at USF after Al-Arians conviction, which prevents hi s return to the unive rsity and its service area. The on-going developments about the alleged pipe-bomber st udents likely will consume attention in this third phase, whose facts are not entirely clear. As this study is historical in nature, involving interpretive methods detailed in Chapter Three, interviews with stakeholde rs represented a problem for the study given 33

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the polarization of political camps at USF regarding the USF-WISE controversy. When approached, most constituents never responded substantively except to repeat statements previously stated in the media. Therefore, the researcher conducted the study with the supposition that any substa ntive information could not be obtained through interviews. The study compensates for lack of interviews with the collection of un-refuted media statements that extend as far back as 1991 and of original documents that amplify insight about the case. Another reason for not interviewing is th at the USF case has been embroiled in legal battles involving Al-Arians arrest a nd indictment for terro rism, visa fraud, and criminal racketeering and his firing from his professional position at USF. Some people involved with the case have been relu ctant to say anything that might be selfincriminatory or that might implicate others in criminal or professional malfeasance. Some have feared professional reprisals by their colleagues in the academy; some, the nations Attorney General; and others, Islamists. However, constituents statements reported in the media and other collected institutional documents were fruitful in conveying a range of basic assumptions and id eological habits of minds regarding the Al-Arian imbroglio. In addition, all research, no matter howeve r careful, maintains some element of scholarly bias. In this inquir y, the researcher admits her ow n bias in that part of it stems from her role as a participant-observ er of the USF case. Here, the researcher admits to the following: Strong positions on academic freedom doctr ine as applying to all professors, students, and institutions in the world; from her 34

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Strong objections to intellect ual persecution in the world and also from acts of Islamic terrorism, including the singling out, maiming, and murder of intellectuals and students by various Islamist activist-intellectuals in this study; Strong objections to academic freedom denials and censorship practices observed as a study-abroad student in E gypt at The American University at Cairo in 1998. Strong support of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 Such limitations by no means discredi t the value of this study, however. Indeed, they might enrich its value. Destructi on of source material and stakeholders unwillingness to be interviewed may be c onsidered, arguably, as supportive to the observation that Islamism is a totalitarian mass social movement that self-justifies censorship and historical negationism (Yeor, 2002). The volume of scholarly sources, archival data, and other information presen ted in rich descript ion and based on five years of systematic information collecti on and analysis of the topic amply and empirically presents the defining features of Islamism in higher education. The contours of those features have been illustrated in this first chapter and resonate throughout this inquirys forthcoming chap ters about the re-Islamization of higher education and the history of Islamism at USF, re-Islamizations most salient North American higher education case to date. While the inquiry may not be generalizab le to all higher education institutions in the United States or around the globe, its illustration of key concepts and events nonetheless present themselves profoundly and relevantly to higher education 35

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institutions involved administratively or as a matter of curriculum, teaching, and research in issues of intern ational terrorism and Islamic studies. In that sense, each university must decide for itself to what extent, if any, it has become a receptive haven for a subculture of global jihadists bent on destroying the ideals of higher education as we know and love them. Section IV: Definition of Terms academic freedom : the freedom of professors, students, and higher education institutions to create and disseminate knowledge in a manner that is free from politicization or other pressures from organized groups; the concept carries many meanings, therefore, that shift according to different historical circumstances and contexts; thus, the concept maintains a tensi on between its historical re-definitions and its invocation as a universal ideal, which in turn signifies that efforts to resolve tension by insisting on one tru e definition is to engage in dogmatism that can only disarm the concept it purports to defe nd (Scott, 1996: p. 165). (adapted from The Random House College Dictionary 1988, and Scott, 1996); the AAUP 1940 definition further elucidates that freedom in resear ch is fundamental to the advancement of truth (see full AAUP statement in Chapter Two). Algeria : a republic in Northwest Africa that ga ined independence from France in 1962 (from Random House 1988; Kepel, 2002) 36

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ayatollah : a title in the religious hierarchy of Islamic religious scholars of the Shiite sect conferred by their demonstration of hi ghly advanced knowledge of Islamic law. (from Random House 1988; Tibi, 1998) Critical Theory : a neo-Marxist social theory made popular in the 1960s by Herbert Marcuse, in which rigorous explanations of the causes of oppression are attributed exclusively to Western ideology, science, and cap italism. (adapted from The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 1999) dar al-harb : domain of war, or the non-Muslim world where Islamic law does not rule. (from Yeor, 2002) dar al-Islam : domain of Islam, or the Muslim world where Islamic law rules. (from Yeor, 2002) dhimma : originally a protection pact or trea ty granted by the Prophet Muhamad to the Jewish and Christian populations he subjected. (from Yeor, 2002) dhimmi : indigenous Jews, Christians, and Zoro astrians whosubjected to Islamic law after the Arab and Turkish c onquestboth benefited from the dhimma yet were limited by it. (from Yeor, 2002) dhimmitude : a term used to describe the subs ervient condition of a people who live under the Islamic beliefs, customs, and laws of a Muslim minorit y. (from Yeor, 2002) Enlightenment : a late eighteenth-century internat ional movement in thought that had enormous social, political and religious ramificati ons, laying the groundwork for various intellectual foundations involvi ng a scientific worldview and liberaldemocratic society; key intellectual pr opositions involve actions prompted by traditional authority (religious or political) as being not free, universality of human 37

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rationality (requiring only education for the development of that rationality), human beings as having the right to shape their own individua l destinies (as opposed to having traditional authority shape individual destinies), and that with application of reasoning the true forms of things could be answered. (adapted from The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 1995/1999) fatwa : legal opinion issued by a jurisconsult ba sed on the Quran and the Sunna. (from Yeor, 2002) fundamentalism : a mode of belief found in most major world religions that stresses the infallibility of their religious texts in all matters of faith and doctrine, accepting those texts as literal historical record. (adapted from The Random House College Dictionary, 1988, and Fundamentalisms 1993) Gaza: a seaport adjacent to southwest Israel a nd a territory under the administration of the Palestinian Libera tion Organization. (from Random House 1988; Kepel, 2002) higher education : postsecondary school education, provided by colleges, graduate schools, and professional schools (adapted from Random House 1988) historical negationsim : a term used to describe the omission or glossing over of historical events for the purpose of sweetening the histor ical record, especially for political purposes that blur the traditional purpos es of scholarship to create and disseminate knowledge. (from Yeor, 2002) ideological politics : a form of politics that arose in the Twentieth Century which holds that politics should be conducted based on a comprehensive set of ideological, social, or religious considerat ions that override al l other considerations while infusing those considerations into every aspect of huma n life; also called alienative politics 38

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because of the propensity to distrust the cen tral institutional systems of the prevailing society and to engage in extra-cons titutional conduct (from Shils, 1997) ideology : the body of doctrine, myth, and symbol of a social movement, institution, class, or large group with re ference to a cultural or po litical plan along with the devices for putting it into operation, usually vi sionary or impractical in theory. (from Random House 1988; see also, Shils, 1997) imam : the religious and political head of a Muslim community, the equivalent of a mayor; also a spiritual authority. (from Yeor, 2002) Islam : the religious faith of Muslims, as set forth in the Quran, which teaches that Allah is the only God and that Muhammad is his prophet; the whole body of Muslim believers, their civilization, a nd the countries in which theirs is the dominant religion. (from Random House 1988; see also, el Fadl, 2005) Islamism : the religion of Islam as turned into a twentieth-century political ideology. (from Duran & Hechiche, 2001; Ke pel, 2002, Pipes, 2002; Tibi, 1998) Islamization : a self-defined term of Islamists to denote their ideological vision of history in which the dar al-Islam and dar al-harb are subsumed under Islamic law; it is a process achieved primarily through above and below actions in social, educational, political, and religious ins titutions throughout the world. (adapted from Kepel, 2002; Tibi, 1998; Yeor, 2002) jihad : holy war against non-Musl ims; its aims, strategies, and tactics make up a theological-legal doctrine; also applied to a persons inner st ruggle to fulfill the commandments of Allah. (from Yeor, 2002) 39

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martyr: a person who chooses to suffer death rath er than renounce his religion; or who sacrifices himself on behalf of any belief, principle, or cause; a person who seeks sympathy or attention by feigning or ex aggerating pain, deprivation, or suffering. (from Random House 1988; see also, El Fadl, 2005) Middle East : loosely the area from Libya to Af ghanistan, usually including Egypt, Sudan, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turk ey, Iraq, Iran, and the countries of the Arabian Peninsula. (from Random House 1988; Kepel, 2002) militant Islam : a term synonymous with political Islam, Islamic fundamentalism, and Islamism. (adapted from Kepel, 2002; Meddeb, 2003; Pipes, 2002; and Yeor, 2002) mufti : the religious head and legal advi sor of an Islamic community. (from Random House 1988; see also El Fadl, 2005) nihilism : total rejection of established laws and institutions. (from Random House 1988; see also, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 1994/1999) Occidentalism : a term that denotes Islamisms and the academys propensity to minimize the more shameful as pects of Islamic history. (see reference to historical negationism above) Orientalism : the knowledge and study of Orient al, or Eastern, languages and peoples; the term became a pejorative with the publication of Edward Saids Orientalism (1978); (adapted from Random House 1988, Kramer, 2001, and Lewis, 1993) political imam : a term used to distinguish Islamic religious leaders who were educated outside of traditional Islami c religious universities from those who were educated inside those seats of Islamic l earning. (Kepel, 2002; Tibi, 1998) 40

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political Islam : synonymous with militant Islam, Islamic fundamentalism, and Islamism. (see references for militant Islam above) Quran: the primary sacred text of Islam, be lieved to have been dictated to Prophet Muhammad by the angel Gabriel and regarded by Muslims as the foundation of their religion, law, culture, and politics. (from Random House 1988; El Fadl, 2005) re-Islamization : a term used by Meddeb (2003) to show that Islamists seek to purge civilization, through its social, e ducational, political, and relig ious institutions of ideas and people who do not embody the dar al-Islam as that domain is interpreted by Islamists; Meddeb (2003) regards this pro cess as one that i nhibits intellectual enrichment for both Muslims and non-Muslims; Meddeb (2003) refuses the term Islamization because Islam has always existed in global institutions, a fact which refutes the Islamist myth of exclusi on and oppression (adapted from Meddeb, 2003) ressentiment : or resentment; a French term borrowed from Nietzsches The Geneaology of Morals used to describe the psychology of social groups and their members who feel displeasure or indignation over a preceding action or injury; in turn, that mode of thinking leads to cultural nihilism in which groups and their members seek to destroy life and its scientific and cultural achievements (adapted from Meddeb, 2003, and The Geneaology of Morals 1887) sharia : Islamic sacred law, based mainly on the Quran and Sunna. (from Yeor, 2002) sheikh : the head of an Islamic religious community. (from Random House 1988) shura: the Arabic term for consultation, as, for example, by a body of religious leaders who makes decisions for the ummah 41

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Sunna: the received words and deeds attri buted to the Prophet Muhammad. (from Yeor, 2002) terrorism : activities that involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State within, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; those acts appear to be inte nded to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a gove rnment by assassination or kidnapping, and occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend the national bounda ries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear to intim idate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum (from the United States Criminal Code 18, section 2331 (1)) totalitarianism : the practices and principles of a totalitarian ideology or regime characterized by absolute control over all aspects life and social institutions, public and private. (from Random House ,1988; Arendt,1948/1951/1966/1968/ 1976/1979/1994) Tunisia : a French republic in North Africa, on the Mediterranean Sea, that was a French protectorate until 1956 (from Random House 1988; Kepel, 2002) university : a term associated with higher edu cation (see above) that denotes an institution of higher learning, comprising a college of liberal arts, a program of graduate studies, and various professi onal schools, and sanctioned to confer undergraduate and graduate degrees (adapted from Random House 1988) 42

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Wahhabism : a branch of Islamic fundamentalist th eology that is considered the state religion of Saudi Arabia but is practiced throughout the world; scholars consider it a prime motivation for religious terrorism committed by many Islamic groups throughout the world, but Al-Qaeda speci fically. (Bergen, 2002; Kepel, 2002; Meddeb, 2003; Pipes, 2002; Rashid, 2002; Yeor, 2002) West Bank : an area in the Middle East between the west bank of the Jordan River and the east frontier of Israel. (from Random House 1988; Kepel, 2002) Section V: Significance of the Study In 2002, a pro-Palestinian activist was hired as a professor at Columbia University as an endowed Edward Said Ch air of Arab Studies (Kramer, Sept.9, 2003). Martin Kramer, a Middle East historian who ca lls for reform of Middle East studies in the work Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle East Studies in America (2001), has challenged Columbia Universit y, a federaland state-funded private institution, to declare the sources of its fe llowship monies for the post (Kramer, Sept.9, 2003). And on the list that I have seen, writes Kramer, there is a foreign government, which I find positively alar ming (Kramer, para.7, Sept.9, 2003). Amid the dialectic between Kramer and Columbia University rests the background of USF-WISE, whose funds for th e Islamic studies institute on campus were channeled from Saudi Arabia to th e IIIT in Herndon, Virginia, to WISE in Tampa, Florida, and through USF administrative, faculty, and student payrolls. The federal government has indicted many of the professors affiliated with WISE or who 43

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taught at WISE or who knew WISE board members on fifty-two counts of criminal activity related to Islamization from above activities in the Middle East, namely suicide bombings responsibl e for the murders of two U.S.-American study-abroad students in Israel. One of them, Al-Arian, confessed and was convicted for facilitating such acts through services he provided to the PIJ. Thus, one matter of significance involves the question of the politicization of think-tanks and university programs. Think-ta nk criticism is usually directed toward those having a conservative board of dire ctors affiliated with private, for-profit enterprise, or for the contingent use of university programs for non-academic ends. In the USF case, criticism is directed towa rd a think-tank supported by an Islamist ideology that espouses violent and intimi dating action from above and non-violent action from below. The flow of money is not for-profit but rather in not for-profit, through foreign and domestic charities affiliated with terrorism financing. This study therefore raises the bar on questions of accountability related both to moral turpitude and to the rarefaction of knowledge on the part of university employees. At the same time, the inquiry shows how Islamists feel self-justified in using higher education toward their larger objectives, given thei r religious in terpretations and practices of jihad, dhimmitude and adab, which provide Islamists with religious justification for their actions (Yeor, 2002). Therefore, this study transcends the legal terms of the case, repositioning the case in historical and scholastic terms, thereby deepening the academys awareness of its sali ence as a case the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) defines as the most important case of academic freedom in the twenty-first century. 44

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This study is also significant because USF posits itself in its mission as a Research I institution interested in serving a global society, so the question arises whether the creation and dissemination of an ideology like Islamism, which, arguably, is totalitarian in nature and in action, helps USF to adva nce that part of its mission. Another aspect of the univ ersitys mission is to promote cultural tolerance and diversity. Again, the presence of Islamism in a think-tank on campus, in university courses, and in student activities calls t hose two concepts into question because of Islamisms outstanding thought and practice of jihad dhimmitude and adab, which oppose cultural tolerance, divers ity, free inquiry (Yeor, 2002). In addition, this study has significance in terms of academic freedom in matters of making trustworthy faculty appointments, as well as d ecisions about the expansion and philosophical nature of the university cu rriculum and research, and where the line between disseminating knowledge versus pr opaganda is drawn. In turn, this study possesses significance in terms of whether, when, and to what extent external constituents, governing boards, and administrators have a voice in accountability regarding faculty appointments, curriculum decisions, and the potential safety of students in Middle Easter n study abroad programs. Moreover, this study has significance in that it is the first of its kind to investigate whether Islamists use higher education in other parts of the world for the purpose of advancing a political agenda of religious, social, and thought reform. Therein, this study places the USF case in the distinct Islamic contexts of jihad, dhimmitude and adab, scholastic hallmarks of the pr ocess of Islamization from above and below. Incorporating the Is lamist context into the controversy 45

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distinguishes this critical an alysis of the USF case from past critical analyses, which focus exclusively on government-defined te rms of international terrorism and the acceptability of those terms. This study also possesses significance in th at it is the first recorded history of Islamism at USF from 1986-2007 that details the controversy over the partnership agreement between USF-WISE and the various USF-WISE professors who maintained associations with the leaders of Islamist terrorist groups from various countries in the world. Prior to this study, the most extended independent chronicle of the USF case could be found in a chapter enti tled Jihad in the Academy in Steven Emersons investigative work American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us (2001). As for non-independent chronicles abou t the case, the only ot her extant one is Report to Betty Castor: On Matters Concerning WISE (1996), written by a Tampa attorney and former Florida Bar Association president, William Reece Smith, Jr., and commissioned by the then USF president, Betty Castor. Numerous other essays and articles about the USF experience, polemical or not, have appeared in the world media. Finally, this study is significant in that it builds upon extant th eory from social psychology about mass social movements, relig ious fundamentalism, and terrorism, in particular, and in terms of th e thesis that higher education is an integral component of the Islamist movement. As such, this study provides scholars with a synthesis of accounts by Middle East and Islamic scholars who have written about radical Islams Western mind, the prevalence of people with graduate degrees in Islamisms ranks, 46

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the ideological takeover of professional and students un ions, and the use of higher education institutions for above and below purposes. Section VI: Chapter Summary In rich form and content, the researcher has set the stage in this chapter for a study of the mass social movement Isla mism, typing the movement as being totalitarian in kind and laying the groundwork of extant research for that movements presence in higher education in the world a nd at USF. The chapter also contrasts the totalitarian qualification with an opposi ng one that is much more accepted in the academy, which is that Islamism is a lib eration theology with benign, democratic intentions. In keeping with so ciological theory about the co llective behavior of social groups, Islamism is defined as having a progr am entitled Islamization, referred to in this inquiry as re-Is lamization, and as having the ability to spread itself in a manner that sociologists classify as a contagion. Because the movement is one of total social reform, Islamism by nature seeks education institutions as a means to achieve its objectives in the societies where it exists The scholarship studied for this research proposal ranges far afield from social psyc hology to political sc ience to history to higher education in attempt to show how Islamism and higher education might maintain various characteristic s and substantive conditions th at, in turn, allow for their mutual coalescence. The problem identified in this chapter to which the research questions are tailored is simp ly that no previous research in Middle East studies or in higher education has directly explored the points of intersection between Islamism and 47

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48 higher education. This establishes the purpose of this research, namely exploring that intersection by means of the tw o stated research questions In context, the case of alleged terrorism at USF, adjudicated in federal court in May-December 2005, after which a confession by Al-Arian of conspir acy to commit terrorism was negotiated in April 2006, is situated in a comparative gl obal context about wh at is known about Islamism in higher education. In that resp ect, the case at USF is taken out of its narrower context of legal concerns involving criminal law, contract law, and academic freedom customs and usage and placed in a greater one involving cultural, religious, historical, and political ferments taking place in a global setting. 1 Despite current trends in the academy and by Islamists and sympathetic persons, Geneva Conventions for warfare are very clear in drawin g distinctions between the term terrorist and freedom fighter, or terrorism and freedom fighting. Among the major differences, for example, is that freedom fighters wear insignia or uniforms that clearly identify them and their purposes at a distance, so that they cannot be mist aken as innocent civilians. In add ition, their vehicles carry similar, highly visible insignia and they do not quart er their militia and accoutrements among civilian populations or in religious institutions, using them as human shields. For detailed descriptions and case law about those and other distinctions see Franck and Glennon (1993), Foreign Relations and National Security Law: Cases, Ma terials and Simulations.

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Chapter Two Review of the Literature Introduction In this second chapter, the researcher draws upon the works of theorists and practitioners as diverse as Sigmund Freud, Hannah Arendt, and Herbert Blumer who, write, inter alia about the psychological motivati on and behavior of organizations, institutions, mass social groups and whole civilizations th at sometimes are overtaken by social contagion (Blumer, 1939/ 1946/1951/1955: p.175). While Blumers research on types of mass movements represents the theoretical mainstay of the social psychology of this inquiry, the presentation st arts with his Wester n antecedents in the field whose foundations rest within the International Psychoanalytic Movement. However, after a review of Blumer, the chapter backtracks by about 600 years in a discussion of Ibn Khaldun, a fourteenth-century statesman, philosopher, historian and sociologist born in Tunis whose observations of Islamic group feeling both predate and support contemporary social psychology on the same subject matter. This chapter also offers a review of scholarship a bout the social psychology of Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic terrorism, which is necessary toward further understanding of the mass social move ment studied in this inquiry. Toward those purposes, the review considers psychoanalytic and non-psychoanalytic theories about tota litarian mass social movements and civilizations. In context, the review shows how the language of social psychology 49

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supports the observations of Pipes ( 1996, 1997a, 1997b), Duran and Hechiche (2001), Yeor (2002), and Meddeb (2003) when they variously write about the totalitarian characteristics of Islamism. Within this ch apter, therefore, the reader may gain a deepened understanding of Islamism as a transnational reformist mass social movement and what may propel it to a dvance its cause in and through higher education channels. In addition, this review presents an other strand of discourse about higher education administration and or ganizational theory and prac tice, which, in addition to the discourse on the social psychology of Islamism, also may shed light on why Islamists are attracted to highe r education. In that section of the review, the researcher considers a range of works that involve variously organizational models of governance and their implications, social movements in higher education, curriculum theory and practice, and matters of internationalization and globalization. Section I: Psychoanalytic Social Psychology of Civilizations and Totalitarian Mass Social Movements Social Contagion: Prefatory Remarks This first section offers a compleme ntary perspective to the dominant discourses in the human sciences (e.g., sociology and industrial and organizational psychology [I/O]), which may limit our unde rstanding of social phenomena through the customary scientific m odels those disciplines comm only use for defining social life. The perspective in this case is psyc hoanalysis, whose discourse proffers unique 50

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glimpses into the nature of, inter alia group cultures, leadership roles, and followership roles. In contrast to the scientific method es tablishing causality by gathering tangible facts from the external world, psychoanal ysis is largely a hermeneutic discipline about mental phenomena tied to language with all the opportuni ties for expression and imprecision that [mental phenomena] im plies (Eisold, 1995). Lear (1995) argues further that psychoanalysis in ability to validate causal clai ms is a sign of its success as an interpretive science: Psychoanalysis is an extension of our ordinary psychological ways of interpreting people in te rms of their beliefs, desires, hopes, and fears. The extension is important because psycho analysis attributes to people other forms of motivationin particular wish and fantasywhich attempt to account for outbreaks of irrationality and other puzzling human behavior. (qtd. in Gabriel, 2000: p. 50) In turn, some of that research may have bearing on the characteristics of the Islamist movement and the significance of its pr esence in higher education, as those characteristics were introduced in the prev ious chapter. Moreover, a merger of the psychoanalytical and the sociological allows the reader to appreciate more fully those points at which deep-level human emotions may intersect with certain developments in organizational arenas, social institutions, and societies. That is a point made abundantly clear in the discussions below a bout Freud and Jungs contributions to the study of German socialism. Both psychologi sts establish that whole societies may suffer from psychological afflictions, especi ally when their leaders impose limits on human consciousness by imposing repressive laws that merge all aspects of public and private life and by instilling nihilist ic cultural norms on their citizens. 51

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A literature review about the social psychology of institutions, mass social movements, societies, and ci vilization must begi n with the Viennese psychiatrist Sigmund Freud and his school, the Interna tional Psychoanalytic Movement. Freud and one of his disciples, Carl G. Jung, must be considered among the most influential minds from the Twentieth Century, whether one agrees with their assumptions or not. Freuds referential structur es of the human psyche, id ego and superego, of the conscious and unconscious mind, of Eros and Thanatos and of repression permeate human discourse, as do Jungs, who ope ned up a line of ps ychological inquiry through his study of archetypes and the Self which he argued were products of the unconscious mind as signified through dr eams, art, cultural artifacts, social institutions, and other forms of human action. Both Freud and Jung argue that individuals and groups can become mentally ill. Freud utilizes the descriptive term complex to illustrate his observations; however, Jung employs the term archetype, such as when a person or group became overly identified with a single one so as to develop an individual or mass psychosis In this sub-section, the researcher firs t summarizes two of Freuds works, the first, an essay entitled Thoughts for a Ti me on War and Death (1915), and the second, his final work Civilization and its Discontents (1930). After those summaries, the review discusses the influence of Fr eud on American social psychology after World War II, in particular his influence on that generation often referred to as baby boomers whose professional presence has im pacted greatly American politics and higher education. For that part of the re view, the researcher relies on the primary sources of Herbert Marcuse (1960, 1962, 1964, 1969), in addition to Richard Kings 52

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seminal study The Party of Eros: Radical Socia l Thought and the Realm of Freedom (1971). Thereafter, the resear cher concludes this subsect ion with a discussion about Jungs essays on Nazism, Wotan (1936), and the collective guilt of post-World War II Germany, After the Catastrophe (1945), The Fight with the Shadow (1946a), and Epilogue to Essays on Contemporary Events (1946b). Sigmund Freud, Death Instinct, and Society King (1971) writes that common sense and even a slight knowledge of the way ideas are transformed by diffusion through sp ace and time reveals that there are many Freuds and many ways his teachings can be applied to social analysis, an area in which Freud was only tangentially intere sted (p. 1). While Freud was most preoccupied with the psychoanalysis of indi viduals, he did contribute to social psychology through some concepts formulated in two works Thoughts for a Time of War and Death (1915) and Civilization and Its Discontents (1930). Both works were written in Vienna, so Freud positions himsel f in each as a direct observer of German militarism and its rigid, nihilistic, and anti -Semitic design that transformed an entire way of life in Europe. In other words, he writes during a period in which Europe was experiencing another major shift in social consciousness characterized by civil wars raging across the continent. In addition to that general background, Freud had worked with shell-shocked neurotics in the Vienna General Hospital whose dreams led him to modify previous his positions that dreams were mere wish fulfillment, and a product of the id his term for the pleasure principal in the human psyche that seeks selfpreservation only (King, 1972). Instead, he added a new premise to his theory of 53

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dreams as a consequence of studying shell-shocked people: dreams have a selfpunishing component pointing to the opposite of self-preserv ation, the death instinct (Freud, 1930; King, 1972). Freud po sited the death instinct, Thanatos as opposite to the life instinct, Eros and its presence in the human psyche was observable through the dreams of war veterans who in their dreams relived and attempted to master the battles that had created th eir neuroses (Freud, 1930). In Thoughts for a Time of War and Death (1915) Freud expresses an obvious sense of personal alienation resulting from Eu ropes most recent immersion into war. In this essay, he states th at he feels helpless in a wo rld that has grown strange (p. 273) and then proceeds with a lament a bout the many civilized men who have proven themselves to be cu ltural hypocrites (p. 289). Ho wever, in turn, Europes bellicose setting confirms to him that the nature of humanity rested upon humanitys primitive, instinctual impulses (p. 289) which sometimes fail in keeping egoistic (p. 289) ones in check, thereby cr eating uncivilized states of affairs in society. A general sense of agreement among in tellectual historians suggests that this essay represents a turning point in Fre uds thought in that his concerns about instinctual impulses, which in this case are those which drive humanity to commit nihilistic acts, which Freud represents in later papers as, Thanatos which works against the life-affirming aspect of Eros (King, 1972). In light of the earlier essay that led Freud to reconsider his theory of dreams and devote new attention to the form ulation of the concepts of Eros and Thanatos Civilization and Its Discontents (1930) takes up the same themes not in a formal analysis of history but as a means to explain humanitys hunger for power, 54

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aggression, and war. The work is dense but its thesis may be described succinctly as a claim that individual frustra tions and anxieties are institutionalized in civilizations. In this work, Eros and Thanatos do not work independently of each other but are mixed together, as witnessed in individuals through their dreams or actual acts involving sadism and masochism. However, because individuals have developed at later stages of life a superego, or conscience, the sexua l aggression played out between Eros and Thanatos is repressed in individuals but is sometimes diverted outward into society itself in attempts by individuals to release their sense of guilt (Freud, 1930). Freud ends his final work with a gloomy conclusion about why civilization will always be discontent: if Eros is kept strong and unrepressed, then Thanatos can be held in check; however, no work gets done and civilization fails to progress; yet, if Eros is kept weak and work gets done, then Thanatos and guilt from the superego take over and threaten civi lization with destruction instead of the individual himself (Freud, 1930). While Freud concludes that there is little hope for the double-bind of civilization itself, he does believe th at individuals can help themselves through psychoanalysis to master their own Thanatos made manifest through their repression of libido by their superegos and by balancing id ego and superego (Freud, 1930). Freuds Influence on American Social Psychology: Herbert Marcuse The previous understanding of Freuds work is helpful to understand his influence on American social thought afte r World War II because the next social theorist examined herein, Herbert Marcuse, exerted great impact on the intellectual ferment of the post-war generation of childre n born in the 1940s and 1950s and their 55

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attitudes social institutions such as politics and education (King, 1972). Marcuse positions his arguments in Freudian terms. In that respect, Freud did not directly influence the so-called baby boomers inas much as he influenced those who recast his terms to support some of the various so cial visions of what would become the New Left. What Marcuse does with Fre uds canon is take what he wants from it and leaves the rest, and what they take from Freud is libido and Eros positing their relevance above all other matters (e.g., id ego superego) in terms of how and where to find happiness. Moreover, and this repres ents the core of Kings (1972) thesis in The Party of Eros Marcuse then positions libido and Eros within neo-Marxist frameworks. Marcuse is considered in th is section because of the psychoanalytic basis of his assumptions. However, his thought could have been justified in th is chapters section on higher education theory and practice because as shall be explicated in the next paragraphs, his writings have influenced the American academy philosophically and methodologically, in terms of research and teaching and in terms of drafting and interpreting institutional law and policy. For example, the Critical Theory that Marcuse brought with him from Frankfurt af ter his self-exile from Germany to the United States in the 1930s has spawned a br anch of legal study in U.S. law schools called Critical Legal Theory, a sub-field of Critical Race Theory. These theories are cited throughout one of higher education s most widely acclaimed textbooks for qualitative research, The Handbook of Qualitative Research by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (2000). Despite the at tention and support that those theories receive, they are not above scholarly repr oach, as Henry Louis Gates, Jr.s, essay 56

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Critical Race Theory and Freedom of Sp eech (1996) and Alan Charles Kors and Harvey A. Silvergates Marcuses Revenge (1998) suggest. Like all philosophers, Herbert Marcuse asks questions abou t the nature of freedom and how social systems either attain or fail to attain it. What he proposes throughout his writings are tw o-tiered standards of liberty and political violence based on oppressor versus oppressed cu ltural scenarios. In addition, Marcuse resists specifically what he refers to as Western versions of knowledge, science, and technology. To appreciate Ma rcuses two-tiered standards of liberty and violence, the reader must first understand that late in his career Marcus e adopted aspects of Freuds mythically-derived concepts of Eros and Thanatos which, in Eros and Civilization (1962), Marcuse merged with interpretations of Hegel, Marx, and Nietszche to show how mankind could be liberated in a synthesis of sensuality and reason (King, 1972), which he called the l ogos of gratificatio n (Marcuse, 1962: 101). Of interest here is that Marcuse ta kes from Freud only what pleases him. He bypasses the rest, discounting Freuds acknow ledgment that man is as much guided by self-consciousness--because man is, after a ll, a social being--as he is guided by instinct. In addition, in his critique of Marcuse, King (1972) details Erich Fromms attack on Marcuse, Fromm being a former colleague of Marcuse in Europe. Fromm countered that Marcuse had f allen victim to the ideology of consumption, that his advocacy of unlimited sexual satisfaction [was actually] a characteristic trait of twentieth century capitalism, the need fo r mass consumption (qtd. in King, p.135). As King (1972) remarks, in the early sixt ies Marcuses earlier homo laborans had given way to homo ludens (p.136). 57

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For mankind to achieve this state of fr ee play, Marcuse proposes in subsequent works a specific means to that end while blaming mankinds lack of freedom on Western rule of law protec ting individual rights and priv ate enterprise. King calls Marcuses attack on liberalism and capitalism a radically pessimistic critique of the social and ideological struct ures inherent to Western societies (King, 1972:139). In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse calls this problem total administration (1968, p.98) in which Western knowledge and technolo gy exists as a form of social control and domination (p.101) under the guise of scientific objectivity. For Marcuse, nothing short of a revolution from above and below would cure mankind of its repressive ways, which in turn prevent mankind from becoming the homo ludens described in Eros and Civilization King (1972) points out, however that the anti-historici sm of Marcuses thesis does not account for several centuries of liberalism and capitalism which arguably have made mankind freer than it had been under pre-modern authoritarian rule of men. Despite history, however, in One-Dimensional Man and in A Critique of Pure Tolerance (1966) Marcuse advances the following prescription for curing the West of its hegemonic sins. He claims that the positive exercise of civil rights and the negative tolerance of reactionary views a nd actions only serve the interests of the total administration of liberal democratic societies; therefore, selective tolerance should be granted to the counter-hegemoni c actions of oppressed people who maintain a natural right of resistance (1966, p.116). Moreover, Marcuse proffers that the use of undemocratic means [o stensibly by suppressing the speech of majority groups and committing criminalized acts of violence] by a minority in the 58

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maturity of their faculties was justified by rational a nd objective standards (p.117). He called this program progress in th e consciousness of freedom (p.112). While Marcuse (1966) advocates the use of political violence, he states that such violence should be used only as a means of elimina ting cultural repression in the future. If violence is used for ends other than thos e that would lift repression, then he argues that the replacement regime has engaged in illegitimate practice of power (Marcuse, 1966). That latter point, the re searcher adds, is one that revolutionaries and advocates of revolutionaries tend to overlook when they invoke Marcusian prin ciples to justify the actions of so-called resistance moveme nts that justify furt her repression after they have achieved power. King (1972) notes the sense of elitist volunteerism inherent in Marcuses two-tiered standards of liberty and violen ce, which joined with the belief that the masses were locked into a deterministic situation (p.150), having no other options but to commit terrorist acts against percei ved oppressors. To take Marcuses thesis about liberation from Wester n strictures to its logical conclusion, the researcher submits that when an aggrieved group en acts selective tolera nce it rationalizes inciteful speech and terrorism as defenses against perceived oppr ession; yet at the same time it considers societys countermeas ures (e.g., limitations on inciteful speech or declarations of national s ecurity) not as reasonable acts of self-defense but rather as unreasonable discriminatory offenses. Marcuse is also the theoretical precurs or of hate speech codes on university campuses, a matter which Alan Charles Kors and Harvey A. Silvergate take up in Marcuses Revenge (1998). They show how most infringements on free speech in 59

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todays academy come not from right-wi ng conservatives outside higher education but from the left-wing liberal factions inside who enact speech codes designed to protect the self-esteem of minority groups. This is the br anch of legal theory referred to above and in Denzin and Lincoln (2000) as Critical Legal Theory. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., (1996) expresses misgivings about Critical Legal Theory in an essay in The Future of Academic Freedom (1996) by showing though historic al-legal analysis that the purpose of U.S. law is not protect the self-esteem of groups of people who regard themselves as historically marginalized or oppressed by defining mere speech actions as racist or defamatory (pp. 119-157). Decrying the vo cabulary of Critical Race and Legal theorists, Gates, Jr., states, The grip of this vocabulary has tended to foreclose the more sophisticated and multivar iate models of political economy we so desperately need (p. 155). Marcuses impact also resonates in recen t permutations of hidden curriculum theory. For example, various essays in The Hidden Curriculum in Higher Education (2001), edited by Eric Margolis, indicate that a less politicized earlier definition of the hidden curriculum by Benson Snyder (1971) has morphed into a decidedly counterhegemonic acceptance of a curriculum by academics who generalize that Western knowledge and society are responsible for all the problems of the developing world and of oppressed people in the industrialized world. In essence, what these latter-day theori sts practice is Marc uses challenge to educators to enforce . the systematic wi thdrawal of toleran ce toward regressive and repressive opinions and movements th rough propaganda of the deed and word ( A Critique of Pure Tolerance, 1966: 118). For Marcuse, and those in American 60

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higher education influenced by him, higher education reform has always been a key battleground of social reform, a prospect which invites the atte nuation of knowledge inasmuch as it invites expansion. Carl Jung and Twentieth-century Totalitarianism Carl G. Jung, the Swiss psychologist who would for a time serve as president of the International Society for Psychoanalysis, writes in one of his many letters that charges of anti-Semitism could not be laid at his door. You know well enough how very much I take the human being as a pe rsonality and how I continually endeavour to lift him out of his collective condi tion and make him an individual (Letters 1973: 162). Jungs concerns about the relational tensions between individuals and their societies was therefore of great concern to him, and as such he wrote extensively in his letters and in essays a bout the perils of totalitarian social movements that had ravaged Europe and Russia in the first half of the Twentieth Century. Unlike Freud, Jung dealt in metaphysical issu es with his patients and did not rule out soul and spirituality as part of the process of human development he called individuation a personal journey people take th roughout their lives, to grea ter or lesser extents, of which Jung believed involved the making of a unified Self in which people did not become dominated by particular archetypes as signifying a partic ular aspect of their whole psyche. Jung believed, moreover, that when people became dominated by particular archetypes as exemplified by thoughts and act ions in their conscious lives, various forms of psychopat hology would develop, among them psychosis and neurosis 61

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Given that individuals c ould experience those conditi ons, Jung also believed that so could whole societies become entrenched in archetypal collective delusions such that by 1939, he had already diagnosed German militarism as a mass psychosis that had rendered Germa ny pathologically sick ( Letters 1973: 276). By that time Jung had called into question the totalitarian collective mind of the Third Reich, wondering if the German people knew how th ey had lost their national honor: The situation is completely opaque because of the inhuman terror the whole population is kept under (p. 276). Elsewher e in his letters to other colleagues and friends, Jung discusses the devastation of London and France, referring to the German assault as Nietzschean insanity (p. 290). Moreover, J ung writes about the atro cities of Jewish concentration camps for which the world w ould become aware in the mid-1940s, as a sign of Germanys collective guilt to which German people should admit and not foist it on others (p. 372). Jungs Essays about a Nation Overtaken by its Shadow In Why the Nations Rage: Kil ling in the Name of God (2002), Christopher Catherwood advances the term palingenetics to describe religious nationalism, in which a strong, myth-based ultra-nationalism seizes both the leadership and the popular imagination (p. 94). While most r eaders might regard Nazism as a secular ideology, Catherwood (2002) draws upon lesse r-known aspects of Nazi history to illustrate its strong palingenetic nature. If one accepts Catherwoods (2002) thesis, then the discussion in the previous chapte r about diplomatic a nd military alliances between Nazis and Arab spiritual leaders in the 1940s makes sense not only in terms of their common Jewish hatred but also in terms of their common religious 62

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nationalisms. Arguably, anyone familiar with U.S.-American neo-Nazi churches such as The Church of the Creator and Christ ian Identity will appreciate Catherwoods (2003) thesis. Of note, too, in this litera ture review is Catherwoods commentary on Jungs essay Wotan (1936) to describe Na zi palingenetics, a lthough Jungs essay is merely a side-note in a chapter about the Nazi Partys use of powerful symbols such as the swastika, or ever-turning wheel of Christ, to stir up strongly atavistic folk memories (p. 95); the establishment of the German National Church as the result of Heinrich Himmlers interest in Nordic mysticism and pre-Christian Teutonic religions; and Adolf Hitlers messianic caesaropropism (pp. 96-97). The Repression of a Pre-Christian Archetype Jungs thesis in Wotan (1 936) is simply that Christianity divided the barbarian tribes of Germany into two halves in which a dark side was repressed so that a light side could be do mesticated and made fit for ci vilization. Nevertheless, this shadow aspect of the German collective unconscious periodically manifests itself because whenever life proceeds one-side dly in any given di rection, the selfregulation of the organism produces in the unconscious an accumulation of all those factors which play too small a part in th e individuals conscious existence (p. 15). The repression of the Wotan archetype in the German psyche, Jung contends, led to the mass psychosis of a German society that, afte r World War I, instead of taking responsibility for itself, chose to blame a nd repudiate external enemies for its own economic depression in the 1930s. We are always convinced, Jung (1936) writes, that the modern world is a reasonab le world, basing our opinion on economic, political, and psychological fa ctors. But we, . layi ng aside our well-meaning, all63

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too-human reasonableness, may burden God or the gods with the responsibility of contemporary events, we would find Wotan qu ite suitable as a causal hypothesis. . In fact, I venture the heretical suggestion that the unfathomable depths of Wotans character explain more of National Social ism than all three reasonable factors put together (p. 184). So, who or what is Wotan? Using Nietzschean categories, Jung (1936) describes him as a god of storm and frenzy (p. 184), of berserkers, who found their vocation as the Blackshirts of mythical kings (p. 185), of ergriffener or seizure and possession (p. 185), and of the elemental Dionysus breaking into the Apollonian order (p. 187). Among ancient German people, Jung (1936) asserts that those powers were personified as Wotan, who, as happens in individuals when confronted with new situations that they cannot be dealt with in ways familiar to them, nihilistically takes over society when met with repeated political impasses. The Collective Guilt of German Socialism In later essays such as After the Ca tastrophe (1945) and The Fight with the Shadow (1946), Jung used the term collect ive guilt to describe the psychological condition of Germany in the aftermath of having unleashed the fury of Wotan on all of Europe. If Nazi Germays alliance with non-European leaders from the Arab world is of any consequence (Fregosi, 1998), then one could extend the argument about Wotans influence to include the Middle East. Jung (1945, 1946) clarifies that when he speaks of Germanys social pathology, or collective guilt he is not speaking in terms of cold-blooded superi ority (1945, p. 195) or in any legal or moral sense. A medical diagnosis is not an accusation, a nd an illness is not a disgrace but a 64

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misfortune Jung (1947) writes. Moreover, Jung (1945) states that collective guilt is a tragic fate that hits everybody, ju st and unjust alike, everybody who was anywhere near the place wh ere the terrible thing happened (p. 197). Jung (1945) does not mean, however, that collective guilt should be turned into individual guilt without giving the individual a hearing; yet at the same time he asserts that if the German is to get along with th e rest of the world, then he must be conscious that in the eyes of Europeans he is a guilty man (p. 197). Furthermore, Jung (1945) states of the mythical nature of collective guilt : It may be objected that the whole concep t of psychological co llective guilt is a prejudice and a sweepingly unfair condemnation. Of cour se it is, but that is precisely what constitutes the irrational nature of collective guilt: it cares nothing for the just and unjust, it is a da rk cloud that rises up from the scene of an unexpiated crime. It is a psychic phenomenon, and it is therefore no condemnation of the German people to sa y that they are co llectively guilty, but simply a statement of fact. (p. 198) Setting the atrocities of the Nazi co ncentration camps aside, Jung (1947) implicates the establishment of the Germ an totalitarianism as the source of the nations collective guilt in which people lost their instinct for self-preservation and became dependent on their state and their leader, a phenomenon that gave them a false feeling of security (p. 201). Of that road to perdition that happened in the 1930s that eventually led to what Jung ch aracterizes as the Ge rman peoples mass psychosis, Jung (1945) writes th at the steady growth of the Welfare State is no doubt a very fine thing from one point of view, but from another it is a doubtful blessing, as it robs people of their indivi dual responsibility and turns th em into infants and sheep (p. 201). The implication therein is that had the German people not become enamored by German socialism, their individual mora l mechanisms about what was right for 65

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their country and the world might have preven ted the nihilistic fren zy that did occur. The citizens instinct for self-preservation should be safe-guarded at all costs, for, once a man is cut off from the nourishing roots of instinct, he becomes the shuttlecock of every wind that blows, Jung ( 1947) writes. He is then no better than a sick animal, demoralized and degenera te, and nothing short of a catastrophe can bring him back to health (p. 201). In s hort, the palingenetic nature of German socialism had rendered all German people co mpletely uncritical of themselves and they began projecting their own problem s as a people onto other nations, ethnic groups, and religions. The cure for this collective guilt or fight with the shadow, then, rests with helping the collectively guilty to rid themse lves of their complexes manifest by the domination of a collective archetype and he lping those collectively guilty to become aware of the problem such that they will begin the process of collective reform (Jung, 1946). He also advised that collectively gui lty people should beware of aggressive defense (1947, p. 240), or excuse-making fo r past actions. In addition, Jung (1946) held out hope in Western democracies th at encourage internal dissension among individuals, as opposed to t he State which should not be expected to accomplish what individuals should accomplish for themselves, with powerful organizations where the individual dwindl es to a mere cipher ( p. 226). Finally, Jung (1947) claimed that healing would not only be a pol itical enterprise for Germany but also a spiritual one, of which Germany had many gifts, albeit overshadowed by Germanys shadow nature: We should therefore help a nd support this side of her nature by all the means within our power 66

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(p. 242). The same argument could be made, too, for Islam as it tries to preserve itself from the destructive natures of its own shadow, Islamism. Section II: Non-Psychoanalytic Social Psychology of Mass Movements, Islamic Fundamentalism and Islamic Terrorism The Non-Psychoanalytic Frame: Prefatory Remarks This section involves literature about Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic terrorism in non-psychoanalytic frameworks of theory and practice. Most of the works illustrated come from sources in sociology and its subfield of social psychology; however, a few derive from the observations of political scientists familiar with Middle East affairs and culture who nonetheless have drafted essays highly social psychological in intent. From the non-psyc hoanalytic perspective on the psychology of social groups in general, this section starts with some basic principles about collective group behavior by Herb ert Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955). Then the section proceeds to Arendts (1948/1951/1968/1976/1979/1994) seminal insights into the collective behavior of totalitarian move ments. After Arendt, the researcher delves into the intellectual thought of Ibn Khaldun, a fourteenth-century philosopher, Islamic scholastic, historian, social psycho logist, and statesman whose work The Muqaddimah (1377/1969) classifies obs ervations of Islamic culture and society in manner familiar to modern sociology and its sub-field social psychology. Then, the section proceeds with an overview of chapte r essays about Islamic fundamentalism in theory and practice as posited in the multivolume work Fundamentalisms (1993), a recent and seminal work of research co mmissioned through The University of 67

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Chicago. Thereafter, the section reviews literature from books previously noted above, such as Origins of Terrorism (1990/1998), plus several others new to the discussion, all of which have chapters most relevant to the discussion of Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic terrorism a nd how those two isms signify the program defined in Chapter One as the I slamization of society and knowledge from above and below. Blumers General Contributions to th e Study of Collective Groups and Their Institutions Herbert Blumer, first a sociologist at The University of Chicago and later distinguished chairperson of sociology at The University of California at Berkeley, is most responsible in Western scholarship for advancing a th eory of collective behavior developed initially in the 1940s and refine d through the 1960s. The term collective behavior refers to a range of topics fr om crowd behavior to reform movements. Because collective group behavior involves human emotion and cognition, the term obviously deserves classifi cation as an aspect of social psychology. Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) defines collec tive behavior as the way in which a new social order arises [under] the emergence of new forms of collective behavior (p. 169). Blumers (1930/1946/1951/1955) discussions about elementary collective groupings and social movements are of chief interest in terms of this inquiry because they enrich the readers understand ing of Islamism in social psyc hological terms that compliment other ideas advanced previously in this chapter and in Chapter One. Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) employs the term circular reaction to show how collective behavior, in its most elementa ry form, develops when the emotions of one person stimulate the emotions of another, resulting in a process of 68

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interstimulation (p. 170), in which leaders and followers fuel each others behavior to the extent that where the behavior of the mass arises becomes unclear and takes on a life of its own. Circular reaction plays a role in many types of situations Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) catalogues, one of which is reminiscent of Meddebs (2003) description of Islamism as a mania and a si ckness and of psychoanalysis descriptions of conspiracism, scapegoating, and totalita rianism as, variously, collective delusions and mass psychoses. Social contagion, Blumer (1946/1951/1963) defines as an intense, widespread form of excitement characterized further as a nonrational dissemination of a mood, impulse, or form of conduct (pp. 175-176). Another one of its characteristics is the developmen t of rapport in which unreflective responsiveness of individuals . becomes pronounced ( p. 176). Arguably, that trait signifies Meddebs (2003) criticism of Islami sm as anti-intellectual and of the typical Muslim as a person of the no. In addition, people who may start out as mere bystanders become more and more inclined to engage in it as their ability to resist the contagion lessens and as they lose their sense of independent judgment (Blumer, 1946/1951/1963). These aspects of social c ontagion are most profound in the early stages of the condition but always continue to operate, though in a more minimal way, for a long time (p. 177). Another type of collective grouping Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) is the mass, which is represented by people who participate in mass behavior such as a national event (p. 185). Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) ru les out physical proximity as part of mass behavior, w ith the mass group consisting of anonymous 69

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individuals who are loosely organized (p. 186). If a sufficient amount of individual lines of action emerges through mass beha vior, the influence of the mass may become enormous, as is shown by the far-reaching effects on institutions ensuing from shifts in the selective in terest in the mass (p. 187). When mass behavior becomes organized into a social movement its whole nature changes in acquiring a structure, a program, a defining culture, traditions, prescribed rules, an in-group attitude, and a we-consciousness (p. 187). A social movement consists of colle ctive enterprises to establ ish a new order of life (p. 199). Mass social movements also possess other traits vital to their continued development: agitation, an esprit de corps morale-building, ideological formation, and operating tactics (Blu mer, 1039/1946/1951/1955). Specifically, however, Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) would classify Islamism as a religious nationalist movement in which the past of the people is glorified and is intimately associated . with a feeling of inferiority (p. 219). Mass social groups often use propaganda to induce others to support their views and collective action (Blumer, 1939/1946/1951/ 1955). Propaganda has certain traits that distinguish it from other forms of discourse. For example, it purposefully neglects fair consideration of opposing vi ews; its means are subservient to its dominant end; and operates to mold opinions and judgments not on the basis of the merits of an issue, but chiefly upon emoti onal attitudes and feelings (p. 193). Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) states furthe r that propaganda requires an appealing setting such as a university where an ideological program can be cultivated (p. 194). Part of 70

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the dissemination of the ideologi cal program involves, as Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) states, utilizing the emotional attitudes and prejudices which people already have (p. 195). Hannah Arendt and the Collective Behav ior of Totalitarian Movements Several of Arendts observa tions in the seminal study The Origins of Totalitarianism assist in providing a ba sis for understanding Islamisms interplay in higher education, especially in terms of the movements potential to subvert education with monolithic political doctrine and to commit terrorism. The first observation of interest, the creation of criminal and non-criminal front groups, interrelates to Blumers assertion that ma ss movements require an appealing setting toward cultivating a semblance of le gitimacy in a sanctioned forum (e.g., a university). Front groups, th rough the manipulation of the media and education with quasi-scientific propaganda, serve in th e decomposition of the status quo of actively existing institutions (p. 371). S econd, Arendt writes that these front organizations possess an undeniably par amilitary character that must be understood in connection with other professional party orga nizations, such as those for teachers, lawyers, physicians, students, university professors, technicians, and workers. All these were primarily duplicat es of existing nontotalitarian professional societies (p. 371). The second observation of interest to this study is the front organizations maintenance of fellow-travelers in the m ovement, not only as a means to generate membership but also as a decisive force in itself (p. 365). These sub-groupings of sympathizers (e.g., for legal help, financia l help) are essential for a number of 71

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reasons: they enlarge the movement while al so limiting the number of party members, and they form a protective wall of deceit around the party members that shields the members from criticism and acts as a bridge between th e radical world-historical view of the members and the normal outside world. This shield that front groups provide permits a lying fictitiousness about their semblance of normalcy to take hold in the mindset of the movements members (p. 366) The build-up of front organizations, Arendt states, should be c onsidered far more frightening to the societies in which those organizations take hold than the phy sical liquidation of opponents (p. 364). Finally, Arendt writes about the role of education in totalitarian movements. Education, too, becomes a milieu for the subve rsion of that status quo, with terrorism being the other side of the coin. In cont ext, Arendt discusses totalitarianisms penchant for dressing up educational pr opaganda in quasi-scientific terms. Furthermore, she observes the subtext of anti-semitism and scapegotaing in that educational discourse, a charac teristic studied by later so cial psychologists such as Girard (1977), Graumann and Moscovi ci (1987), Billig (1987), Groh (1987), Poliakov (1987), Zukier (1987), Pruitt (1987 ), Post (1990/1998), Reich (1990/1998), an Beck (1999). Arendt states that even in education systems fake departments exist as instruments of destruction as peopl e in the educational environment are intellectually prepared to accept the movements strate gy of consistent lying to deceive the non-initiated external masses (p. 376). Without [the arrangement of fake departments], Arendt writes, the lies of the leader would not work [because he 72

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relies on the feigned objectivity of his educat ional program in the quest for power]. . The gullibility of sympathizers makes lies less credible to the outside world, while at the same time the graduated c ynicism of membership and el ite formations eliminates the danger that the leader will ever be for ced by the weight of his own propaganda to make good his own statements and feigned respectability (p. 384). Finally, Arendt writes, This technique of duplication was as ingenious and irresistible as the deterioration of professional standards [in higher education] was swift and radical (p. 372). Ibn Khalduns Contributions to Social Ps ychology: Group Feeling Predating Blumer by Six Hundred Years As the introduction to The Muqaddimah (1377/1989) states, Ibn Khaldun was born of an aristocratic family in Tunis in 1332 that possessed prominence in the political leadership of Moorish Spai n (Dawood, 1967/1969/1989: p. vii). One can only describe his education as classical, blending Islamic studie s with that of the Greeks. Areas of major application i nvolved the study of Arab mysticism and Moorish Aristotelianism (p. vii). Having read The Muqadimmah the researcher notes the influences Arab mysticism in that the work intermittently refers to Sufism and means of achieving atonement not by the literal study of religious texts but, inter alia by attending to ones intuition and divinati on of dreams. In addition, the Aristotelian influence asserts itself in The Muqadimmah through its highly disciplined method of assigning names for things a nd for classifying things. Khalduns (1377/1989) mysticism and classi cal European influence pits his intellectualism against that of contemporary Islamic fundamentalists who reject cooperation with Western forms of knowledge acquisition. Indeed, Khaldun devotes an 73

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entire chapter to educati on, its purposes and means. His thought differs immensely from that of the works by the Internati onal Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT, 1984) and those endorsed by American Islamic st udies expert Esposito, in addition to Shariati (1986) and Choudhury (1997). Whereas the latter two contemporary Islamist educators seek to merge divine knowledge with other forms of knowledge, Khaldun (1377/1989) claims that in education the two are separate. For exam ple, of medicine and Islam, he asserts: The medicine in religious tr adition is of the Bedouin type It is in no way part of divine revelation. Such medical matters were merely part of Arab custom and happened to be mentioned in connecti on with circumstances of the Prophet, like other things that were customar y in his generation. They were not mentioned in order to imply that that pa rticular way of practicing medicine is stipulated by the religious law. He was not sent to teach us medicine or any other religious matter. (p. 386) In all other areas of fields of study, Khal dun (1377/1989) conveys distinctions between religious knowledge and other forms of knowledge. In addition, he has much to say about the fundamentalists, or orthodox Is lamic scholastics, of his day, who disavow speculative theology and Qu ranic ambiguity (p. 353): Scholars always assumed the correctness of the articles of faith and paraded proofs and arguments in their defense. . [However,] the problems of theology have been confused with those of philo sophy. This has gone so far that the one discipline is no longer distinguish able from the other. (p. 353) Khaldun (1377/1989)s historiography is presciently social psychological in that his manner of historiography examines the nature of civilization, its achievements, gainful occupations, sciences, crafts, education, and its causes and conditions. He also discusses the climate and geographical areas where civilization prospers and their influence on human character; and he di scusses Bedouin civilization, the caliphate, government authority, and economies. The hi storiography culminates in a profoundly 74

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humanistic discussion about mans ability to think, which disti nguishes human beings from animals and which enables them to obtai n their livelihood, to co-operate to this end with their fellow men (p. 333). God thus caused all animals to obey man and to be in the grasp of his power, Khaldun (1377/1989) writes. Through his ability to think, God gave man superiority over many of his creatures (p. 333). That introduction to The Muqadimmahs last chapter bespeaks of mans capacity for reasoning beyond religious know ledge and in a manner that supports creative knowledge in the advancement of civilization. Because, however, Khaldun (1377/1989) was writing during a time when Islamic civilization had begun its slow decline (Dawood, 1967/1969/1989; Enan, 1993) one can appreciate Khalduns (1377/1989) critique of the decay of Islamic world as hinging upon the retrenchment of creative thought on the part of the religious or thodoxy of the Islamic state during his time. Dawood (1967/1969/1989) argues that there is an element of pessimism that runs throughout the work in that respect and it is unfortunate for Islam that Khalduns intellectual contributions fell in to obscurity after his death. One of Khalduns more prescien t terms is group feeling, a major descriptor in The Muqadimmah (1377/1989). It prefigures contemporary terms defined elsewhere in this chapter, groupthink and groupism. In that respect, Khaldun (1377/1989) shares Blumers (1946/1951/1963) concerns for the collective behavior of social groups. Khalduns (1377/1989) observations of group f eeling in Islamic societies are worth looking at because they are tr ans-temporal ones that may inform the reader about the collective behavior Islamist social gr oups. Khaldun (13771989) defines group feeling as follows: 75

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Respect for blood ties is something natural among men, with the rarest exceptions. It leads to affections for ones relations and blood relatives, the feeling that no harm ought to befall them or any destruction come upon them. One feels shame when ones relatives ar e treated unjustly or attacked, and one wishes to intervene between them and wh atever peril or destruction threatens them. This is a natural urge in man, for as long as there have been human beings. (p. 98) Elsewhere in the work, Khaldun (1377/1989) expresses that group feeling forms the basis of leadership and followership among people of common descent, with those people claiming superiority. Once group feelin g has established superiority over the people who share in it, it will, by nature, s eek superiority over people who have other group feelings unrelated to the first (p. 108) Khaldun (1377/1989) further submits. The researcher observes thereunto that this process signifies, ostensibly, re-Islamizations transtemporal cultural influence in which all other groups subsumed under the banner of Islamism. Khaldun (1377/ 1989) notes a problem, however, with the advancement of dynasties through group feeling in that the sharing of wealth among leaders and followers leads to trib al members being concerned only with material acquisition, satisfied only with an easy, restful life in the shadow of the ruling dynasty (p. 109). This custom, he notes is responsible for the demise of the caliphate, whose sedentary culture led to a loss of Muslim identity as more and more groups were subsumed under one name (p. 181). In addition to luxury, political persecu tion also results in the decline of civilization when the people who share in the group feeling of the dynasty are humiliated . because members of the rule rs family . are more humiliated than anyone else (p. 246). What Kh aldun (1377/1989) illustrates next is that a kind of paranoia sets in, with rulers destroying their enemies through propaganda and 76

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violence (pp. 248-249). Without group feeling, however, no religious and political propaganda can be successful (p. 249) when senility befalls a dynasty (p. 292). The result is a vacuum of power in which othe r people, prone to seek superiority and domination (p. 293), form new groups and continue persecuting each other through assassination and exile (p. 250). Interestingly, a reading of The Muqaddimah shows that Khaldun (1377/1969) does not equate holy war, or jihad, with the aforementioned form of political violence and persecution. One recognizes the diffe rence in that Khaldun (1377/1969) does describe holy war in other sections of The Muqadimmah wherein he defines holy war as both an inner spiritual st ruggle and as a form of religious defense. As Khaldun (1377/1969) is extraordinarily diligent in his Aristotelian method of classifying and restating key terms as part of his classification of things, one would expect that if he thought political assassination and persecuti on resulting from Islamic civilizations decline exemplified holy war, he w ould label those actions as such. In context to Khladuns (1377/1969) group feeling, one is reminded of Bions (1959) basic assumptions groups in which ove r-identification of leaders and followers in the group leads to a loss of self-consciousness and individu al identity, which in turn results in a lack of group self-criticism and inability to learn new ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving. Such a process, whether one calls it group feeling or groupthink, the researcher discerns, appears to mirror the Islamist worldview and actions that spring from that worldview in that Islamists refuse personal responsibility for the demise of their civilization by casting blame on other out-groups, while 77

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simultaneously reinterpreting political viol ence rooted in hatred and paranoia as legitimate self-defense incumbent on all Muslims. Fundamentalisms: Socio-re ligious Perspectives on Sacred Terror and Islamism Introduction: A Sacred Cosmos, Sc andalous Code, and Defiant Society Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (1993) examine Islamic fundamentalism as a means to understand the strategies and impact of Islamic fundamentalists in many nations. The authors of this chapter introduction to the multivolume work Fundamentalisms (1993) state that Islamic fundament alists have sought to influence the course of developments in politics, la w, constitutionalism, and economic planning since the 1970s (p. 2), and have attempted to reorder scient ific inquiry, to reclaim the patterns of traditional family life and interp ersonal relations, and to reshape educational and communications systems (p. 2). They conc lude that one of the major implications of the research commissioned through The University of Chicagos Fundamentalism Project is that Islamic fundament alism is of greater concern at the level of society, as opposed to the level of the s tate (p. 2). To greater or lesser extents, Marty and Appleby (1993) show that al l fundamentalist religions exer t those tendencies but that social costs differ among religions. Marty and Appleby (1993) further characterize Islamic fundamentalism, as they do other type s that arose in the Twentieth Century, as a habit of mind, found within religious communities and paradigmatically embodied in certain representative indivi duals and movements (p. 3). In addition, Marty and Appleby (199 3) convey about fundamentalism: It manifests itself as a strategy, or a set of strategies, by which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or group. Feeling this identity to be at risk in the contemporary era, these believers fortify it by a selective retrieval of doctrines, belie fs, and practices from a sacred past. 78

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. Moreover, fundamentalists presen t the retrieved fundamentals alongside unprecedented claims and doctrinal innovations. . Instead religious identity thus renewed becomes the exclusive and absolute basis for a re-created politic al and social order that is oriented toward the future rather the past. (p. 3) Marty and Appleby (1993) further conclude th at the chiliastic visi on of fundamentalists of any stripe, Islamic or otherwise, hinges itself on two commitments among believers: the unfolding eschatological drama thr ough submission to all things divine and self-preservation by neutr alizing the threatening Oth er (p. 3). Impact thus involves proximity of fundamentalists to non-fundamentalists and their reformist relationship to the state or non-fundamenta list social institutions (Marty & Appleby, 1993). Schools, daycare centers, seminaries, and colleges are the local chapters of fundamentalist movements, Marty and Appl eby (1993) assert. but these movements transcend localities by virtue of the regional or universal appeal of the message and through the homogenization and marketing of that message via communications technologies that fundamentalists of every sort have harnessed to their various ends (p. 11). Accounting for Islamic Fundamentalisms James Piscatori (1993) does not deny that contemporary Islam takes on rich and varied forms in every society where Islam exis ts. In this respect, he agrees with the assertions of the so-called leading apologists in academe discussed in Chapter One, Edward Said and John L. Esposito. However, Piscatori (1993) details that whether Sunni, Shiite, Arab, African, or Central Asian, several general patterns arise from the empirical details and shed light on how Islamic fundamentalist movements originate and evolve and what impact th ey possess (p. 361). In addition, Piscatori 79

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(1993) states that the Islamist movement itself does not maintain in its specific localities common catalysts often implicated in the media and as assumed in the dominant discourse of Middl e Eastern studies scholarsh ip. Esposito (2002) quotes Piscatoris (1993) assertions about differences among Islamist groups but he neglects Piscatoris (1993) assertions about over arching commonalities among those groups that cause Piscatori (1993) to ques tion claims about the causes and conditions of Islamist movements commonly advanced by Esposito (2002). For example, social and economic disequilibrium, opposition to state authority, colonialism, and capitalism are not always th e likely factors implicated in the rise of Islamic fundamentalism (Piscatori, 1993). For example, Piscatori (1993) writes that the leaders both religious and political fail to deal effectively with modernization in their societies (Piscatori, 1993). In addition, Piscatori (1993) states that religious aut hority has become fragmented in modern Muslim societies, a circumstance leading to the proliferation of Islamist leaders and groups who compete with traditional leaders for authority. Of interest to Piscatori (1993) here is that religious l eaders like Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, in exile from Egypt can exercise considerable influence over adherents of radical groups [like Islamic Jihad] in Egypt (p. 362), mean ing that Islamist groups are more ultra-national than they are local, a point which Espos ito (2002) disputes when he discusses the possible threat of Isla mic fundamentalism to peace among nations. Piscatori (1993) observes that the percep tion of a decline in the legitimacy of established political and religious institutions conveys a strong association with the rise of Islamist movements, whose highly educated intellectuals claim the right to interpret 80

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the proverbial true Islam. In addition to Sheikh Rahman, who presently is in U.S. federal prison for conspiracy to blow up various New York City landmarks, as someone who maintains influence across national borders, Pis catori (1993) cites Rashid Al-Ghannushi of Tunisias Islamic Te ndency Movement and Abassi Madani of Algerias Islamic Salvation Front, both of whom hold PhDs in education and exert a mixture of traditional and modern educational practices (p. 363). At the heart of those intellectuals Islamist doctrines is the idea that Islam must be defended against assault from within and without, preservi ng the religion from pluralism, mainly--and quite ironically--by borrowing totalitarian ideas and methods from Baath and Communist parties in Middl e Eastern and African societies (Piscatori, 1993). Elsewhere, Piscatori ( 1993) clarifies that in some Islamist movements the tendency is to re-Islamize society and knowle dge from above in direct revolutionary action against a state, the Islamic Jihad in the West Bank and Gaza being the example Piscatori (1993) uses; or from below, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as another example (Piscatori, 1993). However, most movements involve a blend of above and below type activity (Piscatori, 1993). Piscatori (1993) devotes the remainde r of his essay to the Islamic Jihad, especially its Palestinian faction, which adopt ed above type tactics when some of the groups founding members, mostly Palestinian and Egyptian students and professors in Cairo in the 1970s, became disillusioned by the lack of progress by the Muslim Brotherhood, which did not enga ge in so-called direct ac tion against its perceived oppressors in traditional religion or in the government itself. Prior to that time, the Muslim Brotherhood maintained factions who operated from below not only in 81

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Egypt but also in the Palestinian territorie s, which Israel had seized along with the Sinai peninsula in 1967. As a group, th e Islamic Jihad became the Muslim Brotherhoods militant offshoot, although it did not reject below activities associated with social, educational, and charitable gr oups (Piscatori, 1993). In fact, the Islamic Jihad relied on charismatic religious leader s to infiltrate, first and foremost, the majority of mosques in the West Bank and Gaza; and second, to gain control of the Islamic Universitys administrative and student bodies (Piscatori, 1993). Piscatori (1993) compares the succes ses of middle and upper class Islamist student elections to that of Islamists in non-educational forums in the Palestinian territories, showing how the hi gher percentages in collegiate forums belies the idea that Islamic radicalism is a barometer of the ec onomic and social frustration of the most disadvantaged people in soci ety (p. 416). Piscatori (1993 ) thus characterizes the Islamic Jihad as a movement founded by elites, armed Islam and political legitimacy without the masses (p. 416) th at is not a mass movement but a nebulous circle of small groups organized loosely around and by guides and a common ideology (p. 416). Conceived by Palestinians in Egypt, it migrated to Gaza and the West Bank through the actions of two people, Fathi Sh iqaqi, a medical doctor, and Abd Al-Aziz Al-Awda, a professor at the Islamic Univer sity, whose proselytizing nearby the Islamic University in 1987 touched off the first Palestinian intifada or uprising (Piscatori, 1993). Interestingly, too, is that although the Islamic Jihad stems from Sunni Islam the terror group receives ideol ogical and intellectual suppor t from the shia Iranian government and Iranian intellectuals, includ ing a writer cited in Chapter One, Ali Shariati. 82

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Religious Fundamentalism and the Sciences Everett Mendelsohn (1993) discusses in his chap ter essay on religious fundamentalism and society the sense of competition that religious fundamentalism engages in with modern science and tec hnology. This essay deals primarily with Christian and Islamic fundamentalist groups who adopt similar habits of mind when pitting themselves against modern scien ce and technology. In read ing this essay, one finds it easy to appreciate why the Islamist movement itself has gained sympathy from left-wing social groups who adopt Marcusian, anti-Weste rn scientific doctrines. Contrary to popular thinking, fundamentalists are not anti-science or anti-technology; rather they possess outright admiration of the products of modern science and technology, especially those deemed useful fo r the program of recasting modernity into an anti-secularist mode (Mendelsoh n, 1993: p. 25). Mendelsohn (1993) notes in particular how some fundamentalist intellect uals make broad claims about their own special qualifications to serve as arbiters of scientific re search and the application of technologies (p. 24). In support, these fundamentalists will claim that modern science has its roots in their particular religions golden age; thus, their current agenda to take back something they once owned but had lost due to no fault of their own (Mendelsohn, 1993). Typically, blame for that theft is laid upon the Enlightenment, which divided the sacred and the secular, resulting in a schism between religion and science (Mendelsohn, 1993). Another product of the Enlig htenment that fundamentalists disavow is the change in the definitions of freedom and progress into non-religious forms (Mendelsohn, 1993). In public statements, for example, fundamentalists will assert that 83

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they value human freedom and progress; and if they are not questioned further about what they mean by those terms, one is tempted to assume that their definitions match the terms of modern, mass society. However, fundamentalists regard themselves as defenders of authentic freedom and progr ess, which means that those terms are posited in terms of fundamentalists knowledge of Gods will, which is divine, perfect, and not open to multiple interpreta tion (Mendelsohn, 1993). Thus, when fundamentalists talk of liberty, they mean the liberty of all people who accept their version of faith and knowledge of Gods will. Liberty is not the pluralist liberty for all people espoused in documents like the U.S. Constitution; it is the distinctly pre-modern kind of Christian liberty of 1620 Massachusetts Bay or of the Islamic liberty that Yeor (2002) speaks of in Islam and Dhimmitude Mendelsohn (1993) concludes by discussing the myriad subculture of re search institutes, publishing houses, and professional affiliations that fundamental ists establish and the challenges that fundamentalists make in challenging courts and legislatures to grant them their religious rights. Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalists Bassam Tibi (1993) focuses specifically on the worldview of Sunni Arab fundamentalist intellectuals who publish a bout the de-Westernization of knowledge (p. 74). Using postmodernist terms, Sunni Arab fundamentalists protest Western cultural hegemony but regard Western scie nce and technology fa vorably. Tibi (1993) points out in particular that Sunni Arab fundamentalists disavow the Cartesian principle of doubt and conj ecture as being essential to well-founded epistemology. Therefore, these Islamic fundamentalists reason that the only true knowledge is 84

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knowledge based upon the revelations of the Quran, which is not subject to revision (Tibi, 1993). Islamic fundame ntalists also deny conflict between their religion and science, so long as hierarchies of knowle dge are employed in the reasoning process with Islam being the pinnacle of reasoning (T ibi, 1993). In that se nse, understanding God and the problems of the Muslim commun ity are essential to learning; but the pursuit of these things is subservient to Quranic valu es and ethics (Tibi, 1993, p. 75). Tibi (1993) continues that the Enlightenment view that transrational revelation is an impediment to the acquisition of knowledge by Muslim fundamentalists because they hold that the progress of scie nce in Islamic society is not how far can that society liberate itself from the clutches of its religion, but how more truly Islamic can it make its educational program (p. 77). Hence, Tibi (1993) refers to Islamic methodology as part of an overall medievalmodern worldview that causes Sunni fundamentalist ideologues to restrict their focus on education rather than on research or on methods of scientific inquiry in the pr ocess of techno-scientific development (p. 84). Hence, students are relegated to memoriz ing scientific findings but not learning how to collect data or conduct experiments (p. 84). Therefore, Tibi (1993) concludes that Islamic fundamentalisms most major im pact on education rests in its ability to stifle human creativity because, after all, in the Sunni Arab worldview, only God can create. Furthermore, Tibi (1993) notes that th is conflict is at the heart of most intellectual censorship, intimidation, and charge s of blasphemy in the Middle East that gained momentum after 1969, when Islamism gained ascendancy throughout the region. Prior to 1969, Tibi (1993) laments, it was possible for free-minded secular 85

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intellectuals to protest the oppression of their colleague s (p. 78). Those free-minded types argued that censure lent credence to a stereotype of Arabs as people who reject intellectual freedom and who despise human reason (p. 78). The imprint of Islamic fundamentalism has become the salient featur e of public life in the Middle East, Tibi (1993) observes. Islamic fundamenta list thoughts, based on the foundational principles [noted above], has become a wide spread intellectual approach to all major issues, including the question of the appropr iation of modern sc ience and technology (p. 78), such that Islamic fundament alists do not argue that Islam is compatible with science and technology but is the ultimate source of science and technology (p. 78). Fundamentalist Impact on E ducation and the Media Majid Tehranian (1993a) illu strates that religious f undamentalism of any kind is characterized by anti-secula rism, anti-intellectualism, and anti-modernism. The first trait is a revolt against Enlightenment assumptions about secular humanism; the second, against upper middle and upper cla ss populations by marginalized or suppressed people; and the third, against the results of modernity and secular rationality. Tehranian (1993a) stat es that the first and third tr aits are most prevalent in Third World societies or among indigenous cu ltures in which the native religion (e.g., Islam) is associated with a past history of glory and independence. In such cases, national liberation movements tied to religion become translated in to reactions against foreign influences (Tehranian, 1993a). As reactionary movements fundamentalist eventually rely on education and media to reform society: To restore spirituality and decency, funda mentalist movements all seem to turn to education and media for a new sociali zation, recruitment, and organization of their members. In fact, both traditiona l and modern networks of communication in the religious institutions schools, and media have served as indispensable 86

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tools in the formation and dissemination of fundamentalist messages. . In the Islamic world, the fundamentalist moveme nts have availed themselves of the traditional educational, cultural, and communication channels in conjunction with the micromedia (telephones, casse tte recorders, copying machines, and mimeographs to launch effective campaigns for the dissemination of their ideologies and theologies). (pp. 316-317). Tehranian (1993a) observes that phenome non in Israel, Egypt, and Iran, where micromedia use through mosques and school networks transmits fundamentalist education and propaganda toward re-Islamization programs (p. 317). Writes Tehranian (1993a), the same methods have been used by others such as planned uprisings among the West Bank Palestinians, the Jewish fundamenta lists in Israel, and the Sunni fundamentalist groups in Israel (p. 317). In Islamic radicalism, this strategy toward social and political reform is partly a means toward administering a cure for modernity in which a vanguard of true believ ers organized as a counter-society call for the total control of education and media through revolutionary militancy (p. 317). In addition, whenever and wher ever the fundamentalist groups have some measure of political power and access, they use the regular commercial and government media and school systems, (Tehranian, 1993a, p. 317). Tehranian (1993a) asserts that fundamentalist groups of all stripes various employ different strategies to achieve their objectives, depending on the types of societies and governments with in which they operate: Wa hhabi fundamentalists in Saudi Arabia align with the state in state schools, state media, and state religious networks as a means to conserve traditio n; separatist Sunni Egyptian types focus on underground activities, altern ative schooling, and underground micromedia as a means to avoid contamination; reformist types as in other Egyptian groups rely on alternative curricula and media networks to engage in accommodationi st approaches to reform; 87

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and revolutionary militant groups like those in Lebanon, West Bank, and Iran utilize propaganda, agitation, terror, and violence to ward educational and media overhaul. Tehranians (1993a) analysis of the uses of media omits mentioning of the use of the Internet by Islamist groups for their transn ational machinations as a mass movement of social reform. This is an area that, ten year s after the publication of this essay, requires some attention, especially given the totalita rian nature of Islamism, replete with its hegemonic aspirations. Reshaping Personal Relations in Egypt Andrea B. Rugh (1993) draws upon answers by relig ious authorities in Egyptian newspapers and their statements on television to show how personal relations in Egypt have changed as the result of th e re-Islamization proce ss that began in the 1970s. Therein, she notes that members of the militant groups in Egypt tend to be young people from the lower middle classes, often studentsespecially those who temporarily or permanently reside away from their families and study in the elite faculties of medicine and engineering (p. 153). Rughs (1993) observations of Egyptian culture indicate that those youth measure themselves in terms of Western lifestyle and values, rejecting modernity by seeking indigenous solutions to local social ills (p. 153). A major problem that Rugh (1993) notes in terms of the education of those youth is that their high school preparation and their desired fields of undergraduate study, science and math, do not afford them much opportunity for criticism and evaluation (p. 153). Those sa me students, moreover, are taught by rote, a method which prepares students to accept without question the literal messages of religion (p. 153). Such general problems, in turn, predicate the success of radical 88

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Islam in its re-Islamization of Egyptian soci ety in their ability to use underground and mainstream educational modes and media to indoctrinate young Egyptians and, hence, to gradually change culture from w ithin and by non-violent means (Rugh, 1993). Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups Abdel Azim Ramadan (1993) divides fundamentalism in Egypt into two types, the radical Islamic trend and the traditional Islamic trend. Takfir groups represent the former; and the Muslim Brotherhood, the la tter. Both groups adopt the concepts of jahilyya (pre-Islamic idolatrous society), al-hakimiyya (Gods sovereignty), and altakfir (branding with atheism) and dedicate themselves to Islamic law in Egypt. However, they maintain different st rategies to achieve that goal. Ramadan (1993) provides some historical context for the manner in which these two groups have transformed Egyptian societ y through educational channels. He notes that during Egypts modernization period th at began in the Nine teenth Century, the country had adopted Western models wh erein traditional mosque schools were transformed into schools for the study of sciences and languages (Ramadan, 1993). Intellectuals in during that ea rly period of modernization ar gued that the caliphate was not a legitimate form of government and ha d no basis in the Qura n or other religious texts. Through education, Egyp tian intellectuals of the day taught about the decline of the conditions of Muslims and called for the adoption of new beliefs alien to Islams first principles which had paralyzed Mus lims, preventing them catching up with the modern age (p. 153). By the 1920s, Egyptian women had stopped wearing the veil and practices such as Islamic law a nd polygamy were being criticized. 89

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However, the Muslim Brotherhood was created in 1927 by an elementary school teacher, Hassan Al-Banna, who challe nged modernization by defending Islam (p. 154). Al-Bannas new movement represente d the earliest phase of the current reIslamization movement in Egypt, focusing mainly on obscenity and apostasy. By May 1933, the Muslim Brotherhood had become so successful in reaching masses of Egyptians through schools and mosques a nd other outreach programs that it could sustain its own newspaper (Ramadan, 1993) As a religious society, it had a missionary element that stretched into the Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and the Maghreb. The establishment of an Islamic government was its ultimate goal. Al-Banna preached through mosques and educational ne tworks that lack of involvement in politics was Islamic crime and brought that message to secular universities and the educated classes influenced by Western culture (p. 156). The rise of communism in Egypt vexed the Muslim Brotherhood, whose members were convinced that Egypt was regressing (Ramadan, 1993). Egyptian governments in the 1950s and 1960s suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood, imprisoning many, including Sayyid Qutb, who would be executed in 1965 but whose writings would inspire the radical Takfir organizations that emerged in the 1970s. These were secret organizations whose co re members comprised, surprisingly, not only native Egyptians but also Palestinians, all of whom were associated with student organizations on Egyptian university campus es. These students in the early 1970s were dedicated to the use of force to achie ve the earlier stated goals of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ramadan, 1993). Some of the mo re prominent organizations included the Military Technical College Organization, th e Society of the Muslims, and the Jihad 90

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Group. Members of these groups over a peri od of years spoke in mosques, clubs, schools, and universities and by establishing themselves in those places began the reIslamization process from above by fo rcing conformity on others through intimidation practices and violent clashes with local political orders At the same time, however, other members of the Takfir groups and the Muslim Brotherhood initiated a process of infiltrating traditional educational, social, and political institutions in which they demanded application of Islamic law a nd conformity of mind and practice among believers (Ramadan, 1993). Hizbullah: The Calculus of Jihad Martin Kramer (1993) states that Hizbullah, or the Party of God maintains an annual budget of slightly less than half of the University of Chicago and owes its reputation almost solely to its mastery of vi olencea violence legitimated in the name of Islam (p. 539). In addition, Kramer (1993) states that another factor to the groups remarkable hold in Lebanon invokes the fact th at Syria allows the Republic of Iran to run without question a line of infrastructural, human, and financial support to Lebanons terrorist group through Syrian borders. Within this discussion rests the obvious point that governments pl ay a key role in furthering the objectives of terrorist groups. In addition, as with ot her Islamist groups, Hizbullahs leadership is comprised of a disgruntled mass of students first educ ated in the theological schools of Iran in the early 1970s who pioneered the concept of martyrdom or suicide bombings (Kramer, 1993: p. 543). Despite the media atte ntion given to Hizbullah and its later imitators in the Palestinia n territories, Kramer (1993) disputes these groups achievement through suicide attacks, stati ng that as of 1991, none of these groups had 91

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anything to show for their violence and would have to adjust to new phases and tactics if they hoped to succeed (p. 552). Terrorism in Democracies: It s Social and Political Bases Ted Robert Gurr (1990/1998) establishes a thesis that likely would not sit well with some people who are not terrorists but who maintain philosophical and legal sympathies with accused terrorists or with pol itical and humanitarian causes. His thesis rests on three main points of argument: 1) po litical terrorist campaigns emerge out of larger political conflicts, albe it in distorted form; 2) relationships between violent activists and their community of support ai d understanding the onset, persistence, and decline of terrorist movements; 3) id eologies, psychologies, and social dynamics of terror groups cannot be understood well without looking at terror groups affiliation with other institutions and the larger public (p. 86). Gurr (1990/1998) states that one of two conditions must be met in democratic societies for terrorist groups to develop: radicalization or reaction. The former term refers to a process by which a moderate group, when it fails to make enough progress toward satisfaction of its goals, becomes discouraged and turns to violent activism. The latter term refers to a term that from the outset turns to violent act ivism in response to a social change or a government policy that th reatens their group identity or values. Gurr (1990/1998) states that most elements of society in American and European democracies do not support violent activism; however, he notes that pockets of support for such militancy can be found in and near universities. Studies in German universities, for example, show that while only five percent of West Germanys 92

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population sympathizes with violent actions, th e figure is much higher in the milieu of universities (Gurr, 1990/1998). The remainder of the essay involves th e association of young intellectuals and violent activism, whose activities can be er oded in a combination of backlash, reform, and deterrence but not by just one of those measures. For example, reforming a government policy will not satisfy ideologi cally motivated people because they tendentially disavow political compromise a nd only accept compromise for short-term and not long-term reasons. In addition, deterr ence may be necessary but also may give violent activists more justif ication to commit violence and stir up support from groups who are non-violent. Backlash, Gurr (1990/1998 ) contends, is the most crucial of the three measures undertaken by democracies to reduce terrorism: illconceived acts of terrorism can and do extend and solidify public antipathy for the terrorists and, by extension, their objectives because those acts do not correspond to majority community norms (p. 102). The Moral Logic of Hizballah Hizballah, like many Islamist groups in the Middle East, is backed financially by the Republic of Iran (Kramer, 1990/1998). Its name literally m eans the Party of God, and, like many Islamist groups, inserts itself into a place in a seesaw struggle for ungoverned land, in this case, Le banon (Kramer, 1990/1998). Martin Kramer (1990/1998) discusses the ideology of Hizballa h and how that ideo logy helps the group suspend its moral logic. In addition, Kram er also describes other Islamist groups aligned with Hizballah in Lebanon, such as the Islamic Jihad, who took on a special interest in ridding Lebanon of foreign influen ces at The American University at Beruit. 93

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Kramer (1990/1998) asserts that intelligence so urces regard Islamic Jihad as a group of clandestine cells run by several of Hizballahs military commanders, in most instances in collaboration with Iran but the Islamic Jihad is more shadowy than Hizballah, so a precise reconstruction of th e groups methods or affiliations is not possible (p. 136). Nevertheless, Islami c Jihad, working with Hizballah or independently, took credit for suicide bombings against U.S. Americans and a wave of kidnapping against foreign nationals in Leba non, including university presidents and professors (Kramer, 1990/1998). The basis of Hizballahs party platform is like that of all other Islamist groups throughout the world, to reform society thr ough the establishment of a pure Islamic state based on the interpretation of Isla mic law through an elite group of people who consult with each about conflict resoluti on and social propriety (Kramer, 1990/1998). The rationale for this purpose is also like that of all other Islamist groups, Islam has been corrupted by Muslim capitulation to Western culture and government (Kramer, 1990/1998). If all individual states can reform as pure Islamic states, then in the future all nations can unite as part of a worldw ide Islamic hegemony, in full restoration of Islams lost pride and its divine right to succeed other world religions and secular governments (Kramer 1990/1998). Like other Islamist partie s Hizballah has a structured organizational model with leadership in various factions in Le banon who designate ambassadors to Iran, but despite that the group tries to be as secret as possible about its machinations (Kramer, 1990/1998). In addition to its internal government and established militia ranks, the party maintains tight connections with non-me mbers in Lebanese villages who are part 94

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of intraclan alliances, rep licating loyalty through their common respect for their common religious leaders. Of special note is that before returning to Iran and eventually overthrowing the Shah of Iran in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini lived among his Shiite Lebanese brothers in Lebanon (Kramer, 1990/1998). Thus, the level of indoctrination in this Islamist group extends back genera tions before Hizballah became prominent in the late 1970s (Kramer, 1990/1998 ). Like all Islamist groups, Hizballah did not spring up overnight. Like the Islamic Jihad, Hizballah leader s are very intelligent and most have college educations through graduate school; many are bona fide academics or founders of Islamic academies (Kramer, 1990/1998). The leaders of these groups defend each other when they are accused of terrorist acts. Kramer (1990/1998) observes specifically of their moral logic in this respect that the leaders ma intain an oppressed versus oppressor mentality about political conflict and regularly employ those exact terms in media statements, media being a favorite fo rm of propagandizing about self defense by both groups. However, those terms are not tied to the secular Marxist rhetoric for which they are customarily associated with ; instead the terms are tied to religious doctrine that allow leaders and followers, th rough the media, to transform apparent crimes into sacred deeds (p. 137) as military operations against imperialist enemies (p. 137) committed by restless youth depende nt on and indoctrinated by religious leaders. When questioned about the propriety of political violence through acts of martyrdom, for example, one Hizballah religi ous leader states that these initiatives must be placed in their context, such that if the aim is relig ious war by making a 95

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political impact on an enemy, then huma n sacrifice is acceptable jihad (p. 145). Kramer (1990/1998) further notes that through Hizballah statements tied to the rhetoric of religious justification by the imams in Lebanese villages, the Islamic Jihad need give little or no account for itself, and it ha s generally preferred not to do so (p. 137). Kramer (1990/1998) thus shows in his explicat ion of Hizballahs arguments in support of Islamic Jihads kidnappings and suicide at tacks how Islamist groups distort morality and law as they take advantage of a society mired in collective distress (p. 137). Hizballah and Islamic Jihads presence also extended over into Lebanese university systems, where when kidnappings and assass inations were not sufficient to purge universities of foreign influence, slower measures of re-Islami zation were taken, the mainstay being the preaching of the Islamist version of Islams message to university students (Kramer, 1990/1998: p. 153). The Western Mind of Radical Islam Daniel Pipes (1997) conten ds most directly one of the great paradoxes of Islamism, that, as the movement rejects the West, its leadership is nonetheless highly Westernized and highly credentia led. This is a cultural trait shared by virtually all Islamist leaders. In context, Pipes (1997) cites the most notable to have emerged on the Islamist scene in the past two decades: Fathi Al-Shiqaqi, assassinated leader of the PIJ and MD who admitted to having wept bitterly over Oedipus Rex ; Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, a PhD in economics who taught poli tical science at USF and successor to Shiqaqi in the PIJ; Hasan Al-Turabi, PhD a nd ruler of the Sudan; Abbasi Madani, PhD in education and leader of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front; Rashid AlGhannoushi, PhD who was convicted in absentia of seditious conspiracy in Tunisia; 96

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Musa Muhamammad Abu Marzuk, PhD in e ngineering and head of HAMAS in Virginia; and Layth Shubaylat, PhD and president of the Jord anian Engineers Association. These are Islami sts who live and operate in the West, Pipes (1997) notes, but the same pattern unfolds in other part s of the world, too. So much knowledge of the West, Pipes (1997) asserts, demonstrat es that fundamentalists are not peasants living in the unchanging countryside but modern, thoroughly urba nized individuals, many of them university graduates (p. 110). Among the other aspects of the Westernization of Isla mists that Pipes (1997) observes is that they are distant from their own culture and have no working knowledge of traditional Islam (p. 112). Inst ead, the Islamist version of Islam flows from the political discourse of ideological founding fathers like Qutb, whose thought is described more fully in Chapter One, and the so-called political imams (Tibi, 1998) throughout the world who are not trained in Islams seats of religious learning. This represents one aspect of the anti-intell ectualism that Meddeb (2003) describes in The Malady of Islam Instead of knowing Islami c traditions, Islamists take what they want from it piecemeal in order to serve their militant agenda and simultaneously blame the West when their plans for industria lization fall short (Pipes, 1997). In addition, Islamists have adopted for their religious leadership an organizational structure like the Christia n church; whereas in traditional Islam decisions were reached in an unstructured and consensual way as opposed to through a top-down manner of control (p. 114). More over, Islamists have adopted what they refer to as their own brand of feminism, in which wearing the veil facilitates a career and allows women to be looked at as a human and not as an object of pleasure (Pipes, 97

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1997). Furthermore, Islamists are Westernized in their success in turning their religion into a political ideology in wh ich the religion represents, first and foremost, a means to achieving political and economic power with state interests taking priority over all other aspects of life and fait h. Pipes (1997) writes to that effect, Hitler, Stalin, and Mao subordinated religion to the state, so why not Khomeini? His edict subordinated Islam to the state. Khomeini may have looke d medieval but he was a man of his times, deeply affected by totalitarian ideas emanating from the West (p. 118). While one might consider Pipes observations that Islamist have no working knowledge of their own culture a sweepi ng generalization because it would be impossible to interview all Islamists, one must accept his observations as typical of Islamists, because Pipes has been studying Is lamists and Islamism for over thirty years and his analysis is supported by other leadi ng scholars such as Tibi (1998), Duran & Hechiche (2001), Kepel ( 2002), and Meddeb (2003). In this section, the researcher pres ented an array of literature about scapegoating, conspiracy, terrorism, and Islamic militancy that might enable a deeper appreciation for what Walker (1979) calls militant third-sector groups in higher education. The section ranged wide ly from psychoanalytic to non-psychoanalytic perspectives, covering scholarship from Europe, the Middle East and the United States. 98

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Section III: Organizational and Administrative Theo ry and Practice in Higher Education The Role of Higher Education in At tracting Islamism: Prefatory Remarks As has been suggested in the preceding pages, while Islamism, as a totalitarian mass social movement, requires higher e ducation to achieve its objective of reIslamizing society and knowledge from above and below, higher education possesses certain characteristics stemming from its or ganizational and administrative functioning and purposes that ostensibly render it availa ble to Islamisms influence. In addition, changes in the intellectual character of higher education since the mid-1960s, as discussed above in terms of the New Left s recasting of Freuds concepts of Eros and Thanatos may also play a role in that attracti on. This final section of the literature review examines more deeply organizationa l and administrative theory and practice in higher education that may enable Islami sms interplay with higher education. This section is arranged according to two major divisions. The first involves works about organizational and administrative theory and practice in higher education (Walker, 1979; Birnbaum, 1988; Becher 1989/1993/1996; and Shils, 1997), with additional emphasis on the American Asso ciation of University Professors 1940 Statement on Academic Freedom. The section also examines epistemological conflict in Middle East studies related to Shils (1997) observations. The second showcases works about contemporary issues in curri culum planning and change (Chaffee and Jacobsen, 1997; Cohen, 1997; El-Khawas, 1997; Gaff and Ratcliff, 1997; Hurtado and Dey, 1997; Johnston and Spalding, 1997; Mu sil, 1997; Stark and Lattuca, 1997; Margolis, 2001). Many of the authors cited in the second part of this section are far 99

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more accepting of the changes in the univers ity after World War II, perhaps because they are of a younger generation that does not maintain a living memory of the war itself or perhaps because they support the id ealism of inclusion in the curriculum, cherishing that most noble value above all others. Organizational and Administrative Theory and Practice in Higher Education An early but seminal work about higher educa tion organization and administration is Donald E. Walkers The Effective Administrator (1979). Arguably one of the most pragmatic and practical works in the field of higher education organization and administration, the book is penned by a sociologist who is at one and the same time a former university president and university system chancellor, and who also happens to be the son of an academic administrator. Two chapters by Walker (1979), Understanding the Peculiar Natu re of Colleges and Universities and Exerting Leadership in an Active-React ive Environment seem of particular importance to this inquiry about Islamisms influence on higher education and on how higher education may attract Islamism. In the first chapter in que stion, Walker (1979) candidl y discusses the classic tensions between faculty and administrators, outlining certain principl es of the political model of governance valued by faculty and sometimes infringed by administrators in their managerial roles. In anot her essay entitled The Presid ent as the Ethical Leader of the Campus (1982), Walker refers to those tensions as being between the sacerdotal and secular points-of-view, or th e professional and managerial. The political model holds th at universities function as pluralistic democracies (Walker, 1979). Given that perspective of governance, Walker (1979) writes that if 100

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there is an issue at hand that the facu lty cares deeply about and you cant persuade them, you certainly cant bulldoze them (p.10). This principle is sometimes raised to the level of conscious ideology but more frequently it simply functions as an unconscious set of assumptions like those held by the muscle-view subscribers, Walker (1979, p.10) further allows. Quoting a university system chancellor, Walker (1979) lauds the nobility of a university functi oning as a political st ate but suggests that its existence as carrying out the will of a constituent population [by consent of the governed and not a representative form] simply does not provide for accountability (pp.10-13). Finally, Walker (1979) asserts that deviations in a faculty and student bodys willingness to support presidentia l authority on some issues hinges upon whether or not previous trust among administrators is high. In that same chapter on un iversity governance, Walker (1979) also discusses the moral quality of decision making that stems from the idea that a university is a political democracy. In that respect, Walker observes several assumptions such as the individual being more important than proce dures, decisions being re ached at the lowest possible level having the most validity, a nd the concept of the moral veto which sometimes transcends majority rule. Of the latter, Walker (1979) asserts that if a person can argue with real f eeling and conviction that what is being done is wrong in principle, its the rare academic community that will not stop and listen (p.25). The struggle for interpretation a nd credibility is th en on, Walker (1979, p.25) asserts, and the problem will be negotiated as a polit ical-moral issue rather than as an administrative or a statistic al one (p.25). Walker give s the following hypothetical example to support his point: 101

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Let us say that a proposal comes before the university community to train the military officers of a nation suspected of totalitarianism. In defense of the proposal, someone argues that at least we as a democratic society will have some influence on the future lives of the citizens of this nation if we offer such a program. A clear but not overwhelming majority of the faculty and student senate vote approval. But a group of st rongly convinced members of the student body and the faculty oppose the acti on on moral grounds: How can this university lend its support to the maintenance of a tota litarian regime? (p.25). In such a case, the moral veto has been exercised and thus the stage for holy war has been set (p.25.). Nonetheless, de spite the timeless possibility of the moral veto, it is an action always running against the tide a nd unless a campus is very disorganized, it cannot be effectiv e on every occasion (pp.25-26). Finally, Walker describes the role of third-sector groups (e.g., womens rights groups, ethnic groups) that influence campus organizational and administrative decision making. Their presence Walker (1979) avers, is paradoxical in that on one hand, they laudably provide stimulation from the periphery, which can be immensely helpful to a university in maintaining a tender growing e dge responsive to the needs of a changing society; yet, on the other ha nd, they may result in a cannibalism of leadership, characteristic of militant third-sector groups [which] derives from their nature more than from the character of the university (p.35). Wa lker (1979) observes that while such groups may cause trouble fo r a campus, the democratic nature of the university welcomes those groups, so ther efore some administrators and other constituents may perceive them as using the university as kind of Trojan horse that causes disruption to the smooth functioning of the institution. In the next chapter entitled Mastering the Political Realities of the Campus, Walker (1979) has a suggestion for the so-called holy war that usually is engendered by coalitions of third-sector groups: the threat of po litical convulsion on troubled campuses should 102

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focus attention administratively on the perpetua l need to deal with low-grade infections that keep elevated the temperature of the campus (p.84). Of course, it need be mentioned here that Walkers use of the term holy war is used in a sociological sense to imply how complex matters of the head become translated into simple matters of the heart for campus constituents. In other words, it is not a political or theological reference to Islamism. Robert Birnbaum in How Colleges Work (1988) discusses the higher education as a kind of cybernetic organization for the purpose of understanding the problematic nature of university governance. Birnbaum ( 1988), the director of the National Center for Postsecondary Education and Finance and former college administrator, regards the university as an organization comprised of institutions and sub-institutions, external and internal to the campus, which interact with each other, whic h gives the university an anarchic character as opposed to that of a smooth-functioning bureaucracy. As does Walker (1979), Birnbaum takes note of the classic tensions between professional and managerial roles on campus, but extends the discussion to include conflict with trustees who have fiduciary respons ibility to the campus. The tensions, however, spill over into the ideological and political, Birnbaum (1988) asserts: In terms of political party affiliation and ideology, and attitudes about higher education, the trustees are more conser vative than the faculty (p.6). However, because of the vastness of the university as an anarchic system, replete with institutions and sub-institutions in the uni versitys external and intern al environment, university executives and faculty form separated and isol ated conclaves in which they are likely to communicate only with people similar to themselves (p.7). Elsewhere, Birnbaum 103

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(1988) states that a large institution m ay become like an academic holding company, presiding over a federation of quasi-aut onomous subunits. Unable to influence the larger institution, faculty retr eat into the small subunit for wh ich they feel affinity and from which they can defend their influence and status (p.17). One significant result of this phenomenon, Birnbaum (1988) suggests, is that faculty and administrators become embroiled in disruptive conflict and mut ual scapegoating which, in turn, leads to increased pressure by outside agencies to di minish university authority and to demand accountability (p.16). Finally, Birnbaum (1988) describes a salient characteristic of university decision making, the so-called garbage-can styl e, typical of an anarchic organization. Essentially, the garbage-can approach work s as follows: someone or group with an agenda creates a committee, then other people or groups who have their own agendas believe that their agendas maintain an affi nity with the former committee and so they take measures to coalesce with that form er committee, resulti ng in what Birnbaum (1988) calls a tight-coupling among di fferent campus groups. Furthermore, Birnbaum (1988) notes three possible conse quences of the garbage-can approach to achieving ones agenda in an anarchic organi zation: resolution, flight, or oversight. Of the first consequences, re solution of a problem is the least likely, whereas flight from a severance of the origin al tight coupling or oversight from people in other areas being so unaware of problems elsewhere in the organization represent more likely possibilities (Birnbaum, 1988). Tony Becher (1989/1993/1996) in Academic Tribes and Territories contends that the organization of a uni versity cannot be fully apprec iated unless one explores the 104

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relationship between particula r groups of academics organize their professional lives and the intellectual tasks on which they are engaged (p.1). As such, Becher (1989/1993/1996) studies academic cultures and the nature of knowledge, so in essence, the author describes the aca demys tendency toward disciplinary specialization and how peopl e in those areas of specialization perceive their professional roles and the rules that govern their behavior (p.1-2). Faculty, Becher (1989/1993/1996) notes, beco me engrossed with their fields of specialization because specialization represents a rap id and effective way to enhancing their reputations and so they guard their territories zealously when confronted with reaction to their new ideas (pp.70-71). In fields of the so-called softsciences that lack strong paradigms, Becher (1989/1993/1996 ) observes another phenomenon, a wish to keep the institu tion decentralized and thus relatively egalitarian (p.73). Along with that matter, Becher (1989/ 1993/1996) observes that in terms of the external environment and its overarching ideological assumptions, the fields of specialization in the academy e xhibit marked tendencies to resist those assumptions because of their ideal to remain untouched by outside influences (p.134). In fact, Becher (1989/1993/1996) states that about the only external actors or groups that an area of specia lization on a campus will not resi st are those that are like them, in the form of other departments in other universities or who are part of professional associations that maintain similar ideological assumptions and common causes. Becher (1989/1993/1996) also de votes a major section in his work to the nature of controversy in the tribal atmosphere of the university. Because, as he contends, a 105

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faculty members personal identity strongly hinges upon the ideology of his or her discipline, whenever that person perceives a th reat to his or her di scipline, the threat tacitly doubles as a threat to the persons personal identity (Becher 1989/1993/1996). Good blazing rows, the writer asserts, ar e especially pronounced with passions running deep when peoples id eological identities are at stake (p.98). Nevertheless, Becher (1989/1993/1996) notes that in mo st academic writing the opposite occurs, suggesting a tendency for deliberate a voidance or damping down of critical comment in academic writing, as most academics tend to withdraw from controversial situations and ideological disagreements in their fields (p.99). Herein, Becher (1989/1993/1996) states that a consequence is that when conflict does erupt among members of the academy, they will often resort to fiddly disagreements rather than major issues (p.100). Finally, Becher (1989/1993/1996) states that the irony to this phenomenon in the academy is that the reluctance to say what one thinks, the refusal to join in or contest the debate, is the direct antithesis of the view with which this discussion began: that free communication is the essence of intellectual progress (p.101). The Calling of Education (1997) is a collection of essays written by the late Edward Shils, a professor of history who taught variously at The University of Chicago and Cambridge. As the books forward by Joseph Epstein (1997) states, Shils perspective on the academic calling was formed by a wide historical reading and common sense, which later in his career caused him to become concerned about the erosion of the academic ethics tradition resu lting from what Shils (1997) refers to throughout his essays as i ntellectual antinomianism traced directly to the 106

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politicization of the higher educations faculty and students who saw the university more as a means to achieve social object ives as opposed to the advancement of the intellectual character. Sh ils (1997) does not directly define intellectual antinomianism. However, his discussion taci tly indicts the anti-West/Critical Theory ferment on campuses after World War II (s ee aforementioned chapter notes on the hidden curriculum of Herber t Marcuse), which gave rise to a revision of academic freedom doctrine. With some distant recall to general education in colonial American history and theology taught by the late Professor Emeritus, George H. Mayer, University of South Florida, one may define intellectual antinomianism as a belief and trend among academics characterized by a prevailing supposition that they are not bound by the moral or institutional laws of the university or society, and that having received an academic appointment places ac ademics in a state of unconditional grace that frees them from the need to observe mo ral or institutional laws of the university or society. Those academics thus practice an intellectual version of what is known in Lutheran doctrine as justification by faith alone that negates the practice good works. The educational development Shils (1997) re fers to so often in his essays is commonly known as social reconstructionism a philosophy of education which holds that the purpose of education is to address social questions in order to help humans resist oppression as students de velop what is known in rec onstructionist parlance as critical consciousness (see, for example, Curriculum for Utopia by Stanley, 2002, an outgrowth of Marcuses Critical Theory). Ho wever, because Edward Shils loved the university so ardently, he greatly disliked [reconstructionist] inroads, not to say 107

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onslaughts, against those whose ultimate affect could only be to diminish it, Epstein (1997, p.vii) avers. Indeed, Shils concerns led him to serve as chief advisor to The University of Chicagos President Edward Levi (Epstein, 1997) and, reportedly by those who observed the univers itys student upheavals of the late 1960s, Chicagos great institution of higher lear ning came away with its integrity less battered from those events than did Berkeley, Columbia, Harvard, Michigan, and nearly every other major American center of higher learning (p.vii). For this reason, Shils historical insights regarding higher education or ganization and administration are worth pondering in this review. His views serve theref ore as a bridge between this section and the next, which more directly involves di scussion about current issues regarding curriculum planning and change. One of the salient themes in Shils (1997) collected essays involves the history of espionage and subversion in higher edu cation, the matter for him being a subtext to other concerns about the rela tionship between the university and its external social world. His insights are most va ried and rich in that resp ect. Shils (1997) notes that changes after World War II that culminated in the expansion of the numbers and different kinds of people in the univers ity brought with them the brushing of universities by Soviet espionage (p.38). The implicat ion of a small number of university teachers in espionage and the rumors and accusations of the connections of larger numbers in such activities as well as the conviction that universities held the keys to a happier, more prosperous future made newspapers begin to attend more seriously to the activities of universities, states Shils (1997, p.38). Furthermore, he states that the student disturbances of the 1960s and 1970s exacerbated the 108

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universitys newfound role as a source of dramatic news (p.38), the most profound consequence of that being that publicity ex tended the student disturbances nationally and internationally (p.38). However, Shils (1997) does not limit discussion of that desire for either activism or publicity to just students. Ad ministrators, for fiduciary reasons, and professors, for their personal causes and th eir work, also court publicity (Shils, 1997). In addition, Shils (1997) notes that aggrieved members of th e universities turn to the press . to remedy the wrongs which th ey think they have suffered (p.39). Elsewhere, Shils (1997) laments int ellectual antinomianism because it signifies a failure on behalf of professors and students to appreciate the significance of their fields of study. He obser ves thereunto that that cha nge rests mostly with newer generations to higher education who are increasingly led to think that their subjects as generally practiced over the past several generations ar e just ideologies supporting the ruling classes and serving as instru ments of imperialism and colonialism (p.46). Such professors, Shils (1997) observe s, have sought the admiration of their more antinomian students by denouncing their subjects and disciplines in class (p.46). Because the university has been pulled into the increased political interest and activity of academics, the pressure of so cial movements brings renewed obligations on behalf of those academics with respect to their distinguish ing between knowledge and ideological doctrine, Shils (1997, p.103) writes. In contex t, Shils (1997) has much to write about what professors owe and do not owe their societies. He is clear, for example, in stating that professors ar e not above the law of a nation, even though academic freedom buffers professors from being fired for exercising first amendment 109

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rights. Therein, he laments that so many post-world War II academics have forgotten that distinction. For example, Shils (1997) states that in the United States, where professors are not employed as civil servants, per se : No oaths of loyalty are exacted in such circumstances. [However,] this does not mean that the university teacher is exem pted from the obligation of a minimal loyalty. The obligation is however that of any citizen and not that of a university teacher in particular. The obligation to abstain from subversive activities is the obligation of the citizen, ju st as is the obligation to abstain from criminal activities. Neither the right to academic freedom not the autonomy of the university implies any privilege of academics to engage in subversive activities. . Academic freedom in th e sense of the freedom to perform the academic activities of teach ing and research does not confer the freedom of subversion or terrorist activ ities any more than bei ng a citizen confers such rights in the civil sphere. The autonomy of universities does not confer on individual university teachers immuniti es which no one else in society legally enjoys. . [Therefore] if an academic is active politically, he should not use his office or other university premises fo r that activity, nor should he use his university address for any corresponden ce which is part of that activity. (p.117) Later, Shils (1997) reiterates: There is another set of activities which are to be protected from sanctions by the guarantee of the freedom of academics. Th is is the right of academics to the performance of legal political actions, to be members of or otherwise associated with legal political parties or societies; to participate in the activities of these bodies as freely as any other citizen in a liberal democratic society. Political activities such as the pr actice of terrorism, kidnappi ng, or assassination are not to be protected by the invocation of the principle of academic freedom, any more than they are assured by the right of political freedom of any citizen, academic or nonacademic (p.157) In addition, Shils (1997) suggests that academic s civil freedom does not extend to the conduct of political propaganda in teaching, which is eas y to distinguish in hard sciences but less easy in political scie nce, anthropology, economics, and sociology, whose subject matters overlaps with the objects of political activity (p.157-158). Of that kind of antinomianism that Shils (1997) suggests has found its way into higher education, he stat es, too, that it has objectives very different from those 110

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which the American Association of Univer sity Professors once sought to protect (p.177). In The Calling if Education Shils (1997) characterizes this problem as paradoxical because it arose with the growth of social sc iences after World War II, which was a gift of sorts to the academy, but in return for that gift, the academy came to view the government and its society with mistrust: The rise in social sciences in the universities coincided with a period of increasingly disapproving judgment of contemporary American society by journalists, artists, and writers. They were joined by a number of social scientists who were a small sector of the academic profession, but they received a disproportionate amount of attention. . Populistic radicals were few in American universities before the Gr eat Depression of 1929. Marxists radicals were practically nonexistent. . To summarize the contradiction: there was growing up a belief [after World War II] in the rightfulness of government ubiquity and omniprovidence, alongside the other halfheartedness about the legitimacy of the political realm. Thus, unlike the ancient Jews facing an utterly alien Caesar from whom they expect ed nothing, from whom they received nothing, to whom they owed only tribute and subm ission, and whose representatives were scar ce and not usually visible among them, the American academic lives in a society permeated by Caesar. . The American academic lives in a society with a powerful cent er from which he cannot and would not detach himself. But he is distrustful of it. (p.199-200) In terms of mass movements in higher e ducation that exhibit this dilemma, Shils (1997) is most critical of those w hose present efforts to penetrate into the universities are made in the name of egal itarian ideals and of social justice (p.206). Subverting the ideal to pursue truth and l earning to those other ends for Shils (1997) represents a politicization of universities that is worse th an McCarthyism, and he uses the example of the professoriate in 1930s Germany to make his case: In National Socialist Germany, many prof essors welcomed the new regime in 1933, which aside from its other monstrositi es, did enduring damage to the still then great German universities. The Of fice of Civil Rights and related bodies are not to be compared in wickedness with the National Socialists, but the movement of the professors who went out of their way to welcome them was 111

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similar in its implications for universities to that of our professors, some of themlike the much worse German professorsvery eminent (p.206). Shils (1997) then laments the results of defining faculty appointments and determining the nature of curriculum al ong the lines of social engi neering from within the university, which he believes cause gr eat acrimony among colleagues and other constituents: The fact remains that misappointment s, whether out of sloth, friendship, political partisanship, pol itical ideals, or intimidati on, do harm to universities. They do harm which lasts for a long time longer than the villainous harassment of Joseph McCarthy, his predece ssors or accomplices. (p.208) Thereafter, Shils (1997) again faults the dist urbances of the 1960s and 1970s for that trend, stating that while the disturbances were usually bl amed on student activists, the most active were encouraged by some of their teachers and once the agitation became very audible and the disruption b ecame tangible, university staffs were distracted by acrimonious conflicts resulting in further cleavage s between faculty and administrators in which matters of social engineering exacerbates the us versus them mentality and is used as a pretext for starting a furor against the administration (p.209). In later pages, Shils (1997) regret s such anarchistic (p.282) developments, which coincide with the erosion of trust and accusation against Wes tern civilization as sexist, racist, and imperialist (p.282). Given Shils (1997) asse rtions that 1960s intellectual antinomianism contradicts the AAUPs original definition of what the organization saw as the purpose of the academic ethic coinciding with higher educations role in society, that AAUP definition is worth repeating here: Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good and not to further the interest of either the individua l teacher or the institution as a whole. 112

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The common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition. Academic freedom is essentia l to these purposes and applies to both teaching and research. ( www.higher-ed.org/resources/AAUP_1940stat.htm ) In contemporary polemical pa rlance, intellectual anti nomianism is referred to polemically as political correctness or political correctitude, terms the researcher prefers not to use when understanding the larger epistemological ferment in the academy that Shils (1997) critiques. That ferment has resulted in criticism of the evolution of Middle East studies by Bernar d Lewis (1993)), Bat Yeor (1998), Bassam Tibi (1998), Martin Kramer (2001), and Phyllis Chesler (20 04). Each scholar discusses problems associated with the advent of postcolonial and anti-Western resistance theories as those theories pertain to the st udy of Middle Eastern and Islamic societies in which the feelings of aggrieved groups are placed willfully above academic freedom doctrine, to the extent that histor y is distorted or even negated. The British Middle East historian Bernard Lewis (1993) discusses higher educations concerns for not wanting to stereotype Muslim s. Lewis (1993) states that those concerns correlate to a form of mediaeval Islamic etiquette called adab, in which non-Muslims must not speak or write in a manner that might offend Muslims or defame their religion. Lewi s (1993) suggests that the st udy of Islam and Muslims in the past thirty years has caused the negati on of certain aspects of Islamic history because of the trend to avoid stereotyping or making utterances that might fan the flames of prejudice. Lewis (1993) states furt her that theorists in Middle East studies who are concerned about appear ances of Angloor Eurocentric bias sometimes shirk the difficult issues and subjects that some people would place under some sort of taboo (pp. 78-79). Another ar ea of concern to Lewis ( 1993) is that traditional 113

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academic criteria for making professiona l appointments are replaced by a single criterion that a persons personal herita ge qualifies him or her for a position. Yeor (1998) amplifies Lewis (1993) concerns about ne gating history based on the academys polite tradition of writing a bout non-European cultures in purely favorable terms. She writes that much-used arguments of Wester n culpability and the victimization of Muslim popul ations are generously deve loped in explaining Muslim hostility toward the West (p. 315). This in tellectual output in the publishing record she calls apologetic literatu re (p. 315) which maintains a thematic structure of representing jihad as peaceful conquest gener ally welcomed by vanquished populations, omitting Muslim methods of conquest such as pillage, enslavement, deportation, massacres, masking the proces ses which transformed majorities into minorities, constantly at the risk of extinc tion, obligatory self-incrimination for the Crusades, the Inquisition, imperialism, colonia lism, Israel, and other intrusions into the dar al-Islam , and servile criticism of the rati onal tools of historical knowledge, created by earlier European histor ians and historians (pp. 315-316). In addition to Lewis (1993) and Yeor (1998), Tibi (1998) compares the academys apologetics for Islamism to those of the Mandarins in Europe. He, too, situates the problem in higher education s trend to de-Westernizing society and knowledge. Of that trend, Tibi (1998) fi nds the postmodernisms support of the Islamist movement paradoxical because postmodernism denies transcendental meaning, whereas Islamism does not. Kramers (2001) seminal work on the failures of Middle East studies in American education went to press prior to the September 11 attacks but achieved 114

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commendation for its insights into the quest ion everyone had asked in the months afterward: What went wrong? Not only had Americas intelligence community failed to predict, but also so had Americas Mi ddle East studies asso ciation. The discipline had come under attack, as its freshest body e xperts disguised the vice of politicization as the virtue of commitment, and replaced proficiency with ideology (p. 22). The locus of the problem, Kramer (2001) traces back to the publication of Edward Saids 1978 work Orientalism which came during a time of economic retrenchment in Middle East studies (p. 31). Said, Kramer (2001) write s, was perfectly positioned [sic] to legitimize at least some of the cont entions of critical sc holarship of the Left (p. 32). In addition: Said--like the practitioners of critical scholarshiphad not hing to say about Islam [in his critique of the West]: his academic generation drew upon the experiences of the 1960s and 1970s. Th ey were products of late-Cold War third worldism, which they had worked into an epistemology and which could be summarized in three words: resistance, revolution, and liberation. (p. 44). In essence, Kramer (2001) had recognized that the social psychology of Herbert Marcuse, explicated in the earliest section of this literature review, had become the bedrock theory for Middle East studies and the difficult job for accounting for Islamist deeds . became another opportunity for th e repetitive and ritu al denunciation of Western prejudice against Islam (p. 45). Finally, Chesler (2004), a womens st udies professor and UN activist for womens rights, states that postcolonial theory has morphe d into a shrewd cover for what she calls the Twenty-first Centurys new anti-Semitism. To qualify, she writes, Because the charges of Apartheid Zionism are being leveled by those who champion 115

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the uprising of the oppressed, what they say, by definition, presumably cannot be racist (p. 88). Contemporary Issues Regarding Curriculum Planning and Change Ellen Earle Chaffee and Sarah Williams Jacobson write in an essay entitled Creating and Changing Institutional Cultures (1997) that organizational culture is the dominant pattern of basic assumptions and shared meaning that shapes what participants see and do (p.231). Within that dominant pattern, however, are subcultures that variously complement and contradict each other (p.231). Typical of most higher education institutions rest cultural values such as faculty autonomy, intellectual integrity, and respect for th e scientific method of inquiry (p.231); however, those values of a shared vision are sometimes contravened by diverse subcultures within instituti ons (p.233). Chaffee and Jacobson (1997) suggest that one may study institutional cultures and subcultu res on at least four levels: by their patterns of basic assumptions; basic valu es; norms of behavi or; and artifacts (p.234). Mindsets, they contend are not uni versally shared rega rding what and how to teach and learn (p.234). As is the case in society outside higher education, campus groups that have a common history and have been relatively stable over a period of time tend to have strong cultures, in th at the underlying assumptions, values, and reinforcing artifacts are widely shared by most participants and therefore when challenged, groups tend to defend their cultural convictions mightily (p.235). Furthermore, Chaffee and Jacobson (1997) state the following: Under threat, [sic] these patterns of behavior may be triggered and accentuated, leading participants in a given cultural group to act in seemingly irrational or pathological ways characte rized by defensiveness, anger, emotional outbursts, and psychological withdrawal. (p.235) 116

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In prestigious universit ies, the writers state, too, that collegial cultures run strong and remain intransigent to those who would change it; however, even less prestigious universities, where faculty ar e in the process of trying t o prove their worth in the disciplinary community perceived threats m ay lead to defensiveness, overreaction, and heightened devotion to protecting the discipline (p.237). Often, that defensiveness is directed toward administrators, Chaff ee and Jacobson (1997) aver, and in support, they cite a study that shows as many as 64 percent of presidents and chancellors lack the professional confidence and support of their faculties (p.239). Chafee and Jacobson (19970 conclude, in their discussion of culture, subcultures, and conflict that the only means to bridging divides and achieving positive change is to solicit widespread involvement and ownership in shaping the institutions future (p.244). Elaine El-Khawas writes in The Role of Intermediary Organizations (1997) writes that little attention has been devoted to the dynamics of intermediary organizations, whether in their internal conf licts and challenges or in the way they affect other actors (p.67). Her contribution is thus to provide a model for examining intermediary organizations and their relati onship to higher education institutions. By intermediary organizations, El-Khawas (1997) refers to local groups like the chamber of commerce or national organizati ons like the AFL-CIO or religious groups like the Bnai Brith. Also, the term refers to accrediting bodies a nd other institutions that carryout inspection roles, as well as professional membership organizations (ElKhawas, 1997). While each kind of organization is unique in its mission, they all have in common a collective desire to address the common needs or interests informed by their group (p.67). In terms of thei r differences, El-Khawas (1997) places 117

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intermediary organizations on a continuum of source of authority. In her model, some are aligned closely with government and ot hers with academe (El-Khawas, 1997). The model El-Khawas describes is very helpful for appreciating the in tersection of roles between domestic external and internal constituencies on campus but does not extend to the role of international intermediary groups that may also influence the curriculum. In Social Forces Shaping the Curriculum, Mildred Gaff and James L. Ratcliff (1997) describe the tensions between higher educations cons ervative nature, as lauded in particular by Walker (1979) and Shils (1997) in the previous section, and higher educations more recent call for orienting the curriculum toward social change and its impact. Their concern, generally, is what stude nts need to know in a global society (p.119) and how certain influences i mpinge on the curriculum (p.119). Among those influences, Gaff and Ratcliff (1997) cite demographic changes, political influences, economic influences, and t echnology. As examples of impact on the curriculum, Gaff and Ratcliff (1997) provide various examples such as the expansion of race, ethnic, culture, and gender studies programs that are challenging the root of the established system that shapes undergra duate curricula (p. 120). Hence, the writers predict that multiculturalism and diversity i ssues will continue to impact and cause conflict in higher education not only because of domestic concerns that grew out of the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s but also because increased globalization of our society in interdependence among countries has renewed in terest in the study of nonWestern cultures and foreign languages ( p.120). In context, political influences follow, with Gaff and Ratcliff claiming narrowly that the politics of the Reagan era 118

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and by the Republican revolution . called for the return to the traditional curriculum (p.121). This aspect of globalization is also ta ken up in other discou rse about curriculum planning and change. For example, Joan S. St ark and Lisa R. Latucca (1997) state that the recent development of multicultural programs has helped to emphasize the importance of contemplating religion, history, philosophy, sociology, psychology, and political science as understood in non-Weste rn nations (p. 349), a point which has bearing on how universities plan for intern ationalizing their curri cula, as discussed below. In addition, Sylvia Hurtado and Eric L. Dey (1997), in their discussion about institutional responsiveness to major social movements influencing higher education meant to accommodate diverse students and fa culty (p. 405), state that the inclusion of new groups often focus on dualistic noti ons of diversity with groups claiming grievances of discrimination and lack of inclusion seeking and receiving support as part of the campuss expanding definition of multiculturalism (p.406). Not only are there more groups to consider, but [sic] we must also understand the nature of external pressures that support their in clusion and consider the gr oups as part of the campus community when determining how to im plement diversity goals (p. 406). Joseph S. Johnston and Jane R. Spalding discuss in Internationalizing the Curriculum (1997) how international educ ation has emerged as a leading imperative of curriculum reform for the 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century (p. 416). However, the push for internationaliza tion is not without its problems for the process is a disorderly development, lacking clear defi nitions, boundaries or framework (qtd. in Johnston & Spaldi ng, 1997: 416). The arguments in favor of 119

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internationalization are varie d, the writers state, from econo mic advantages to cultural appreciation and involve foreign students and scholars exchange programs and also study abroad programs (Johnston & Spalding, 1997). Because reforming a curriculum for internationalization involves unique challenges such as tensions that may erupt when faculty members in traditional fields regard these explicitly international or globa l fields as lacking in rigor or prone to ideological bias (Johnston & Spalding, 1997: 422), the writers adjure institutions to not internationalize their programs in an ad hoc manner (Johnston & Spalding, 1997). David William Cohen (1997) in another es say about globalization and scholarship isolates three changes in the nature of such scholarship coinciding with the end of the Cold War: a reconfiguration of academic disciplines given the disappearance of socialist states and socialist ideology; recogniti on of the significance and power of expertise based in institutions in other c ountries such as area studies programs that have shifted out of their o rientalist guise of Wester n values; and a reluctant acknowledgment of the power of expertise lying outside th e university whether in the United States or abroad (p. 550). Caryn McTighe Musil, in Diversity and Educationa l Integrity (1997) also discusses the interplay between multicultu ralism and higher education, rejecting the melting pot metaphor of the American nation: History suggests, however, that the reputed neutral identity, is not neutral at all. It is, in prac tice, a gendered and racialized idenitity, deeply layered with religious, ethnic, and cultural values. Quoting passages from Blooms The Closing of the American Mind (1987), Musil (1997 ) suggests that his resistance to diversity is cannibalistic (p.191), making Blooms arguments appear 120

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racist, when in fact he objects to racial separatism and states, rather, that human beings are all pretty much alike, and that friendship is another aspect of equal opportunity (Bloom, 1987: p. 91). Blooms overall context aside, however, Musil (1997) argues that curriculum change for multiculturalism after the 1960s has brought dazzling intellectual innovations, innovative experiments in making higher education more democratic, and a new vision of co mmunity grounded not onl y in recognition of differences but also in commitment s to shared obligations (p. 120). For Musil (1997) diversity is not divisi ve, as Shils (1997) suggests, but is potentially unifying (Mus il, 1997: 192). Like Shils (1997 ), Musil does state that it was not the so-called culture wars that br ought about the change in higher education but rather World War II did. Unlike Shils ( 1997), however, Musil (1997) is far more laudatory toward what Shils calls antinom ianism, speaking of this new wave of campus activism in positive terms: Instead of trusting the au thorities quietly and without hesitation, generation after generation of students grew increas ingly wary of what the authorities presented as facts. Generating knowledge themselves, students began to participate in teach-ins, start alternat ive student papers, and become chief inquisitors themselves of historical cl aims, foreign policy decisions, and reports from the battlefield. . They learned a bout military ties to research funding in universities, which had long existed but had been hidden or glossed over. . Like many of the black students, the anti-war students were often militant, insisting that they be heard and demanding new political power within the institu tion (p.195). Accepting of the militancy of the 1960s and 1970s, Musil (1997) supports the overturning of assumptions about the value of Western knowledge stating that the new scholarship on diversity, coupled with other intellectual movements in the last quarter century, has made it all but impossible to hold such views and still have intellectual integrity (p. 199). 121

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The anti-Western flavor of antinomianism that Shils ( 1997) states represents a threat to the academic ethic is lauded in th e self-styled resistance education described in various chapters in the work The Hidden Curriculum in Higher Education (2001), which the authors state hides in plain sight (p. 1). Relying upon a curious amalgam of medieval and neo-Marxist te rms, the works first chapter states that one may critique the college curriculum by examining it for evidence of wrongdoing, which for authors Eric Margolis, Michael Soldantenko, Sandra Acker, and Marina Gair (2001) means conducting fruitful work in the s ecret garden of th e curriculum where sexuality, power, and knowledge lie coiled liked serpents (p. 3). Moreover, they state, at least in the West knowledge is guilty knowledge (p. 3). Thus, the university curriculum requires educationa l resistance and reform in the curricula of class consciousness, whiteness, patriarchy, hete rosexuality, and of the West (p. 3). Another chapter in the same work suggests that the only problem for resistance curriculum that hides in plain sight is the management of disruptive elements (Soldantenko, 2001: p. 193). In context, So ldantenko (2001) provides an enlightening analysis of the purpose of the antinomian violation of the traditional mission of higher education that Shils (1997 ) characterizes in his essays: Students of color transformed the university curriculum by institutionalizing ethnic studies in the late 1960s. . Students assumed that these courses could subvert the intellectual colonial apparatu s. In these classes, students of color would learn who they were; recapture th eir culture and history; learn about oppressive colonial, class, or national sy stems of control; and, most importantly, develop a political ideology and organization to fight these systems of oppression. (p. 193) In context, Soldantenko (2001) analyzes the rise and fall of a Chicano studies program that was demanded by students at The University of Califor nia at Berkeley. It 122

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was the product of a political manifesto based on the demand for self-determination (p. 204). In other words, Chicano power could be achieved through the political application of university resources channeled through Chicano studies and other campus programs (p. 204). The Chicano activ ists outside the university, in concert with activists inside th e university, proposed [in El Plan] that Chicano(as) build institutions within the acad emy under Chicano control in order to wage the wider struggle for self-determinati on (p. 204). In addition: Through institutions Chicano power w ould be realized on campus and university services could be directed to the Chicano(a) community (Chicano Coordinating Council on Higher Educati on, 1970, 13). To secure the autonomy of these institutions, El Plan proposed to integrate students, staff, and community with faculty to govern these programs. This balance, it was assumed, could mitigate the rise of Chicano(a) facultys self-interest or interference from administration. Simulta neously, collective leadership could assure that courses, while fulfilling an academic role, would prepare students for political and social responsibilities. (p. 206) One of the products of the Chicano studies program was the culmination of a strike at the university that probl ematized academic knowledge (p. 205) by non-Chicano social scientists as de -valuing Chicano self-consciousness (p. 206). The Chicano studies program and its coalition of other institutions was established at Berkeley but later dissolved. To that exte nt, Soldantenko (2001) regrets that the university programs larger goal of community liberation was lost (p. 206) because, as Soldantenko (2001) writes, it fe ll into the hands of faculty who had little choice but to follow academic procedures ( p. 206) because the eventual compromise for an ethnic studies department necessarily deemphasized the activist agenda that had been part of the Third World strikes ( p. 206). In addition, Soldantenko (2001) claims that the program also failed because at th at time, the early 1970s, theoretical 123

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alternatives such as colonial theory and Marxism has not yet achieved legitimacy in the hidden curriculum of higher educati on, which demanded assimilation and not separatism into the greater curric ulum at Berkeley (pp. 210-211). Section V: Chapter Summary The discourse of social ps ychology supports referentially Duran and Hechiche (2001), Yeor (2002), and Meddeb (2003) when th ey write about the inimical nature of the mass social movement of Islamism, whic h possesses traits remarkably similar to twentieth-century totalitarian moveme nts like Nazism and Communism. Arguably, both psychoanalytic and non-psychoanalytic varieties of social psychology provide valuable insight into the causes, conditions and impact of totalitarian mass social movements (Freud, 1915, 1930; Jung, 1936, 1945, 1946a, 1946b; Tibi, 1993; Pipes, 1997; Hoveyda, 1998). Indeed, one needs to look no further than Sabine (1937/1950/1959) to discern the structural similarities, echoed by so many writers in this chapter: According to the theory of totalitarian ism, therefore, government was not only absolute in its exercise but unlimited in its application. Noth ing lay outside its province. . Education became its tool and in principle religion was also, though neither fascism nor national socialism succeeded in getting more than unwilling acquiescence from the churches. (p. 898) Islamism, of course, differs from Sabine s (1937/1950/1959) comment ary in that it has successfully subordinated religi on to the state in many parts of the world, rather than allowing religion to be a private matter for which the state does not attempt to force conformity among believers. 124

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On the other hand, the discourse of Wa lker (1979), Birnbaum (1988), Becher (1989/1993/1996), and Shils (1997) in the stra nd of literature about higher education organization and administration theory and pr actice also suggests that while Islamism may seek higher education to achieve its various objectives as a mass social movement, higher education maintains various objectives and characteristics that Islamists find attractive. Indeed, multiculturalism, diversity, and internationalization goals may render higher education vulnerable as contem porary higher educati on experts (Chaffee & Jacobson, 1997; Cohen, 1997; El-Khawas, 1997; Gaff & Ratcliff, 1997; Hurtado & Dey, 1997; Johnston & Spalding, 1997; Musil, 1997; Stark & Latuca, 1997; Margolis, 2001) consider the positive and most noble aspects of those institutional goals, but not their potential to foment espionage and intellectual antinomianism that is of concern to Shils (1997). Moreover, the descri ption of the intentions and actions of the Chicano social movement and its academic program established at The University of California at Berkeley in the 1970s, as de scribed by Soldantenko ( 2001), indicates that the USF-WISE curriculum, as part of the Islamist mass social movements objectives for self-determination against Western civiliza tion, may have an hist orical corollary in higher education. Ostensibly, such knowledge should give pa use to higher education constituents because totalitarian social movements perenn ially have proven themselves hostile to the purposes and values of higher education: the creation and dissemination of knowledge, intellectual freedom, multiculturalism, and civil rights. That is a point underscored by Gurr (1990/1998), Kramer (1990/1998), Keddie and Monian (1993), Kramer (1993), Mendelsohn (1993), Rama dan (1993), Rugh (1993), Teheranian 125

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(1993a, 1993b), Tibi (1993), Laqueur (1997), and Hoveyda (1998). Illustration of findings related to the global and local re-Islamization of higher education also may deepen awareness of that problem. In addition, many of the motifs found in the discourse of social psychology re-assert themselves as salient themes and issues in the USF case: organizational conflict, group culture and identity, groupthink and group f eeling, ideology, leadership and followership (Khaldun, 1377/1969;; Blumer, 1946/1951/1963; Arendt (1948/1951/1966/1968/1976/1979/1994), Grauma nn & Miscovici, 1987; Groh, 1987; Pruitt, 1987; Wulff, 1987; Zukier, 1987; Obholzer & Roberts, 1994; Lear, 1995; Beck, 1999; Anderson, 2000). Moreover, social psycho logy allows the read er to appreciate the ideological prism and purposes of the Islamist movement and its adherents. In terms of the influence of some social psychology on American thought, the writings of Marcuse (1962, 1966, 1968) resona te highly with some higher education faculty in their defense of political violence and intellectual repression by resistance movements against the West and its instit utions. Lewis (1993), Yeor (1998), Tibi (1998), Kramer (2001), and Chesler (2004) ea ch challenge Marcusian de-Westernizing theory in Middle East studies teaching and research. Marcuses thought also has made an impact on higher education in the areas of law and policy in the form of Critical Race and Legal Theory (Gates, Jr., 1996; Ko rs & Silvergate, 1998; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000) and in the area of curriculum and inst ruction in the form of hidden curriculum theory (Margolis, 2001; Soldantenko, 2001). Hendershott (2002) illustrates in The Politics of Deviance that postmodernist rejections of hierarchies has resulted in a general unwillingness in the academy to 126

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define a society or a cult ure or institutions therein as deviant. Citing common discourse in the academy about so-called Islamic culture, which might be better described as Islamist if one considers those adjectives distinguishing nuances, Hendershott (2000) states, us ing the collective we: Our unwillingness to make judgments about the behavior of othersno matter how reprehensiblecoupled with th e requirement to honor claims of multiculturalism and diversityhowever divisive and morally questionable had weakened our resistance and lowe red our defenses. We knew about the treatment of women in Afghanistan, for instance, who under Taliban rule were prohibited from working, attending school, or leaving their ho mes without their husbands or a male relative escort. We knew that these women could be beaten on the street by male strangers for so me supposed infraction of a medieval behavioral code. Yet we said, this was simply their way, which, by postmodern principles, could be no wors e than our way. The cruelest and most repressive practices of Islamic funda mentalists were viewed as matters of culture and tradition, not for us in the West to judge. (p. 154-155) With Hendershotts (2002) observations in mind, the researcher has presented in this literature review an extended discussion about the social psychology of institutions, organizations, mass movement s, and whole societies by drawing upon both psychoanalytic and non-psy choanalytic discourse. As Jung (1946) reminds us in his description of collective guilt however, social contagion is not a moral asserti on of one person or groups superiority over another; it is merely a statement of fact arrived at using the referential knowledge passed on to us through various fields of st udy. Contradicting the claims of so-called apologists for militant Islam, this literature review arguably presents further evidence that institutions, groups, culture s, societies, and nations where Islamism finds itself may become victims of that totalitar ian contagion that Meddeb (2003) so evocatively describes in The Malady of Islam 127

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128 As investigated in the next chapters detailing the researchers findings about Islamisms global (e.g., the Middle East, Tuni sia, and Algeria) a nd local (i.e., USF) referents, the Islamist worldview, its leade r-follower characteristics, and its motives and actions maintain remarkable transnationa l consistency, indicating that a vast global network of Islamist leaders and followe rs has been operating since the 1970s, employing both above and below type met hods to achieve their utopian goal to bring the world under the banner of one Isla m. Specifically, this literature review shows that higher education is a key social institution for Islamist activity in nations where Islamism exists (Rapoport, 1 990/1999; Marty & Appleby, 1993; Keddie & Monian, 1993; Kramer, 1993; Mendelsohn, 1993; Merari, 1990/1998; Ramadan, 1993; Rugh, 1993; Piscatori, 1993; Tehrania n, 1993a, 1993b; Tibi, 1993; Pipes, 1997; Hoveyda, 1998; Laqueur, 1999).

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Chapter Three Methodology Section I: Introduction This chapter reiterates the purpose of the study Re-Islamization in Higher Education from Above and Below: The Un iversity of South Florida and Its Global Contexts in which the case involving Islamist international terrorism at USF and its service area is examined in te rms of similar problems of uni versity infiltration in other parts of the world, namely Egypt, Saudi Arab ia, the Levant, Tunisia, Algeria, and the Sudan. The body of this chapter (Section II: Purpose of the St udy) starts with a reiteration of the research questions and definition of their terms. Within this qualitative study, the chapters main section al so describes the inqui rys wide range of population samples, or texts. From there, the section turns to a se ries of sub-sections and sub-subsections detailing the studys methods of analysis: ca se study and historical textual analysis resulting in data coding. Therein, the chapte r contextualizes the findings in terms of three levels of textual analysis identified by Johnston (2002) in Methods of Social Movement Research which are conveyed by the Islamist movement, spanning 129

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approximately eighty years of discourse by the movements highly educated leaders, followers, and uninitiated sympathetic masses. Moreover, the study accepted and utilized a constructivist historical framework for viewing Islamisms stated interplay with higher education called a theory of institutions authored by the French philosopher Michel Foucault (1969, 1971, 1974) and described herein. Combined w ith case study and hi storical textual analysis resulting in data coding, this th eory sometimes called New Historicism proves useful in that it de scribes and analyzes the Islamist movements process of finding avenues within the highe r education milieu to impose restrictions, or taboos, on what its leaders and followers believe ar e unacceptable discou rse. In turn, the movement arrives at its own educational pr ogram called Islamization of society and knowledge, precisely aimed at the subversion of Western-style research universities and the minds of those university constituents. While the Foucauldian method is often called New Historicism, it is not new. Scholars perennially have employed the study of intellectual history embedded in Fouc aults theory of institutions to the study of texts. In the early part of the Twentieth Century, for ex ample, I.A. Richards (1923) in Britain had codified a reminiscent theory of context to the st udy of literary texts. Using case study and historical methods to analyze texts and code data, matrix charts (Tables 1 and 2) and extended explica tions of each of those charts are included in the thesis, each of which illuminates th e researchers coding structure and method. In addition, the chapter explai ns the studys methods of da ta collection for archival documents, historical research (both global and local), and observation of institutional events, also in relationship to the coding structure and method. 130

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Section II then enjoins an ex tended section on the process of external validation of the studys findings to which this study was s ubjected. The findings were received positively by a majority of constituents, including international scholars from France, Switzerland, and Canada, outside the doctoral thesis committee. These constituents over a long period of time and through their read ings of different dr afts or listening to presentations based on those drafts, allowed fo r generous critique and further coding of the studys findings. Following those sub-sections is a di scussion of the studys reliability and validity, contextualized with the aforementioned material on method, data collection, and external validation. Section II: Purpose of the Study Specialization in area studies progra ms such as Middle East and higher education seldom advance conceptual resear ch models that triangulate their multiple fields of theoretical expertise and practice fr om across academic disciplines in order to create new knowledge out of preexisting knowledge, and then enrich that same discourse with current case study observation. In this study, the researcher consulted hundreds of works by the foremost authori ties and publishing hous es in Middle East and higher education studies, concluding that experts in Middle East studies and in higher education studies have not explored how Islamism intersects with higher education to advance Islamisms agenda for worldwide reformation. 131

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Thus, the purpose of this study was to examine the interplay between the Islamist mass movement and higher education. Therein, the researcher situated the case of alleged Islamist international terrorism and related matters at USF in a global context, comparing and cont rasting higher educations ch aracteristics and conditions involving Islamism and USF with similar probl ems in other parts of the world. At the same time, however, the study investigated ex tant theory and research from social psychology, political science, and histor y about the collect ive behavior and characteristics of mass movements, their l eaders, and their followers. According to Walker (1979), a university chancellor and sociologist, the collective nature of mass social movements is more responsible fo r problems associated with mass movements in higher education than are the characteristics a nd conditions of higher education itself in drawing mass movements to it. Walker (1979) does state, however, that the democratic nature of the university o ffers a loophole into which mass social movements take advantage. Within that overarching context, the case involving Islamism at USF, 1986-2007, became an important example for that comparisoncontrast analysis. The interdisciplinary framework of this study and international scope coincide with the mission, objectives, and goals of USFs Strategic Plan, 2007-2012 The plan holds that the university should align with local, state, national, and global needs. In turn, the plan states that alignment should come, in major part, through integrated and synergistic interdisciplinary research acr oss disciplinary, departmental, college, and campus boundaries. The researcher, together with the support of her thesis committee hailing from three different departments, two colleges, two different campuses, and 132

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three different regions in the world--Nor th America, Europe, and North Africa achieves precisely that. In addition, external validation for the study came from subject matter experts not from the United States bu t also from Canada, France, and Sweden. Two of the studys external validators, while living in European countries, are natives of Egypt and Morocco. Types of Scholarship Represented in This Inquiry Because this is an unusual study involving interdisciplinary scholarship with an internationalist scope, one would be remiss if one were to proceed without some reflection on how we view scholarship a nd on types of scholarship in America. The American academy always has been and always should be a place where many different kinds of scholarship have exis ted and should exist. Universities in any nation are, in part, products of their nati onal ethos. So, as is the national ethos of America one of rough-and-tumble political c onflict, so should be the tensions among the American academys different kinds of scholarship. Conflicting points-of-view about the nature of scholarship, or questi ons about what is s cholarly, produce ambiguity and even anxiety among scholars. In the past thirty years, a scholarship that avows the politics of self-representation, which holds that researchers much politely refrain from criticizing members of self-d escribed oppressed groups, has prevailed in the area of qualitative analysis in the social sciences. When confronted with scholarship apparently opposed to their Marc usian trinity of race, class, and gender doctrine, those researchers may accuse their competitors as being unscholarly or even racist, for by default competing intellectual views cause uncertainty in the academic enterprise. However, a sense of uncertainty sometimes is no hindrance and 133

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can be a great motivator. For example, some of the greatest works of literary criticism, such as Northrop Fryes Anatomy of Criticism (1952), were born during a period of time when the study of English and literary te xts was not yet recognized as a bone fide academic discipline because its methods of analysis did not seem scientific. Frye was among the first theorists in th e Twentieth Century to offer typologies of literary things, calling the approach anat omical, which provided the appearance of scientific rigor, despite that when all wa s stripped away it was still the reader as researcher who was producing the outcome of the research, as earlier the Heisenberg Principle in modern physics had proven. The researcher also notes from her days as a masters student of English, requiring two courses in the history of criticism--which proved to be the study of philosophy and inte llectual history--that the period which saw the professionalization of the academic di scipline of English also saw rapid development of critical theories now accepta ble throughout the social sciences. English departments never have had reservati ons about borrowing from other academic disciplines, and those of us having spent our formative academic years in English departments see no reason that methods common to literary criticism cannot be applied across academic disciplines. Ernest L. Boyer (1990) offers a typology of the kinds of scholarship in the American academy. One type he calls the sc holarship of discovery which holds that no tenets in the academy are held in highe r regard than the commitment to knowledge for its own sake, to freedom of inquiry and to following, in a disciplined fashion, an investigation wherever it may lead (p.17). While this inquiry is non-conformist when compared to other forms of qualitative research at USF, such as those rooted in 134

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anthropological methods and the politics of self-representation, this study did follow the logic of its own inquiry-that of a less fashionable examination of a mass social movement--where it did lead. Another type Boyer calls the schola rship of application, which applies discovery to specific problems for individuals and institutions. In other words, the quest for knowledge is the quest for a dvancing the public good. Again, this study involved applied scholarship in the sense th at it illustrated how a local problem at a doctoral research university in Tampa, Fl orida, could be part of a broader global phenomenon in other universities. The final se ction of this chapter suggests ways to ameliorate that same problem. Yet another type Boyer calls the scho larship of teaching which holds in Aristotelian fashion that teaching is the hi ghest form of understanding (p.23). In part as a means of external valid ation, the researcher presente d her findings to a range of onand off-campus constituents. The boundaries between teaching and research therein were held to be very fluid, therefore, with oral presenta tion of data about the subject matter leading to the refinement of the final research manuscript. Finally, the last type of scholarship Boyer calls the scholarship of integration. Integrative scholarship, the researcher now s uggests is that which is particular toward the attainment of a degree in interdisciplinary studies; for with integration researchers give meaning to isolated facts, putting th em in perspective, making connections across the disciplines, illuminating data in a revealing way, and often educating nonspecialists, too (p.18). The na ture of integrative scholar ship also involves doing research at the boundaries where the di sciplines converge and fitting ones own 135

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research or others research into larger intellectual patterns (p.18). Integrative scholarship necessitates high application of the research ers own powers of critical interpretation, leading from th e provision of simple data to knowledge and sometimes, as Boyer suggests, even wisdom (p.21). Integrative scholarship is th at which this inquiry most represents, for the inquiry triangulated academic theory and research fr om ancient, modernist, and postmodernist scholarship and across the academic discip lines of Middle East studies, sociology, psychology, and education. The spir it of integration in this inquiry also extended to the inclusion of American, European, and Islamic sources. In fact, even the external validation process involved many scholars from private and public colleges and universities in the United States Canada, France, and Sweden. Research Questions Out of the aforementioned strands of discussion about the problems hypothetical characteristics and conditions, th e researcher established two overarching research questions for the study: 1. What are the conditions and characterist ics of Islamisms interplay in higher education in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Le vant, Algeria, Tunisia, and Sudan? 2. What are the conditions and characterist ics of Islamisms interplay with USF and its service area, 1986-2007? In this study, interplay is defined as the contours of interrelating ideologies, strategies, and legacies of direct and indirect action undertaken by the Islamist movement in the university milieu and its surrounding environment. In short, it connotes a decades-old process that Kepel (2002), in his work The Trail of Political 136

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Islam calls re-Islamization from above and below. That interplay involves a range of temporal developments manifesti ng as conditions upon which the Islamist movement exacted its influence in host societies, and out of thos e conditions arise the Islamist movements characteristics. In this analysis, we examine those conditions and characteristics as they pertain to ma tters of higher education. In this inquiry conditions signify things that give rise to the occurren ce of the Islamist movement in higher education institutions in a partic ular place and time. Characteristics refers to certain features that are typical of the Islamist movement in higher education institutions in a particular place and time As will be shown, sometimes a condition in one place represents a char acteristic in another. Population Samples As defined further belo w, Islamism and higher education represent an institution and sub-institution, respectiv ely, which interact with each other to collect and allocate power. Unto that purpose, the one interacting institution relies on educational accoutrements such as think-tanks, academic journals, charitable organizations, books about Islamization, manifestos of HAMAS and Islamic Jihad, the writings of leaders and followers, leaf lets passed out by religious student groups, Palestinian universities, websites, onand off-campus demonstrations, lectures sponsored by student groups, statements made by administrators and professors, statements made by other stakeholders, govern ment affidavits, and the tran-shistorical actions of Islamist groups. This list--identified here as a population sample-expanded to include approximately ten year s worth of media stories in Tampa Bay 137

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newspapers, which were worthwhile in reve aling the basic assumptions of internal and external constituents through thei r interrelating levels of discourse. Methods of Analysis Textual Analysis: Three Interrelated Levels of Social Movement Discourse Coding of the data (defined below) involved textual analysis of the Islamist movements discourse on three interrel ated levels identified by Johnston in Methods of Social Movement Research (2002): World-historical discourse that is definitive of a mass social movement (e.g., the discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood) Organizational discourse that is produced by specific leaders for a social movement organization but that draws upon the aforementioned broader discourse (e.g., the educationa l discourse of th e International Institute of Islamic Thought) Individual discourse that is produced by participants and activists (e.g., the discourse of Sami al-Arian, other activist intellectuals and others who are not members, per se, but who are sympathetic to the movement). Johnston (2002) states that the three levels are nested one within the other because the more general levels of mass social m ovement texts are produced by individuals; therefore, detailed information, or micro-data about the individuals who produce those texts becomes an important feature of the study. In this study, for example, the educational theory of the Internati onal Institute of Islamic Thought (i.e., organizational discourse) was written by one of Is lamisms earliest leaders in North 138

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America, the late Ismail Al-Faruqi (i.e., a producer of individual discourse that was transformed into texts for his social move ment organization). Al-Faruqi was a former professor at Temple University who founde d the institute in the early 1970s (i.e., micro-data ). That data maintains referential c onnections to The University of South Florida which in 1992 established a partne rship with another Islamic organization, World Islamic Studies Enterprise, that received funding and direction from the organization founded by Al-Faruqi, the Inte rnational Institute of Islamic Thought. By textual analysis, which is synonymous with discourse analysis, the researcher refers to the study of spoken and written records a nd events that are stored, produced, shared, or used in vari ous socially organized ways (Patton 2002). Selection of those texts hinges upon their bei ng representative of the three levels of discourse described above, world-historical organizational and individual (Johnston, 2002). The most salient finding in terms of that aspect of the analytic process was the strategic goal of the Is lamist movement, no matter which locale studied, to assume total cont rol of society, in robust pa rt, through the subversion of higher education systems through intimidation, overt and covert forms of censorship, and a codified program called Islamiza tion of society and knowledge by sponsoring endowments and partnerships with secular, Western-style research universities. This study discerned that goal of the Islamist movement by examining most notably the interrelated discourse of th e Muslim Brotherhood, the In ternational Institute of Islamic Thought, and Sami Al-Arian and hi s associates throughout the world and across time and space. 139

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Examples of World-Historical Di scourse in the Studys Findings An important example of the Muslim Brotherhoods world-historical discourse is the international mass social move ments famous credo The Koran is my Constitution, which dates back to th e founding of the organization in the mid1920s as part of the groups reaction to a modernizing influence in the Islamic world called de-Islamization. Other examples of world-historical discourse included in this study were found in the anti-Semitic ut terances of the Muslim Brotherhood after the organization had aligned itself with the Nazis during World War II, with the hope that strategic support from the Axis pow ers would enable the overthrow of the Egyptian government under King Farouk. At th at time, the Salafist doctrine of the Muslim Brotherhood had adopted tropes associated with Fascist ideology. Later, as Fascism fell out of favor in the world, th e Muslim Brotherhood changed altered its lexicon with Marxist tropes found in the writings of the groups leading theoretician, Sayyid Qutb. Examples of Organizational Discour se in the Studys Findings The International Institute of Is lamic Thought (IIIT), a known Muslim Brotherhood front (see Katz 2002), was the primary funding source of a partnership that developed between the University of South Florida (USF) and a think-tank, World Islamic Studies Enterprise (WISE), whose chief executive officer was also USF engineering professor Sami Al-Ari an. Texts found in university archives illustrate that the organizational discourse of the IIIT, at minimum, had the potential to become part of USFs social sciences h idden curriculum as the result of the USFWISE partnership agreement. Those texts we re a thirty-two page brochure given to 140

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faculty and administrators ad judicating the potential merits of the partnership and also a textbook, Islamization of the Disciplines accepted into USF library general collections in 1992. Each delineates the strategic purposes of the IIIT to subvert secular research institutions in the West through a process called Islamization of society and knowledge. While they may not have known about the IIIT textbook found in the USF Tampa library, USF faculty and administrato rs were presented with the brochure by WISE associates Dr. Bashir Nafi and Dr. Khalil Shikaki. The brochure details higher educational purposes such as the need to control dissension with in the ranks and to reconstruct Muslim thought. Such was the organizational discourse that had found its way onto the USF campus at or about the same time that key USF faculty and WISE leaders were lobbying for the partne rship agreementand at a time when the university was restructuring to become a top-tier doctoral res earch institution under Carnegie classification. Examples of Individual Discou rse in the Studys Findings Numerous media reports about former USF professor Sami Al-Arians Islamic fundraising events indicate th at he, too, incorporated the world-historical and organizational discourse of the Muslim Brotherh ood into impassioned off-campus speeches, alongside leaders from many of th e Islamist movements other terrorist organizations (see Emerson, 1994, 2002). Therein, his and others individual discourse interrelates to the othe r two types. In this study, that individual discourse was found in a publication called Inquiry, which advertised in each issue that it was an intellectual view of the Muslim and a Muslim view to the intellect. The 141

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magazine always contained a full-page IIIT a dvertisement next to its table of contents page, which featured intervie ws with and articles about some of the same Muslim activist intellectuals who were invited to USF-WISE roundtable meetings. Those texts further elucidated the mindset of the Islamist movement and its hostile attitude toward Western higher education. Perhaps th e most telling example came from an article about Muslim Brother and Islami c Tendency movement leader Rashid AlGhannoushi whose individual discourse denounced some three hundred years of world history, or the Reformation, because it resulted in scientific invention and granted tolerance toward Jews. Later, after WISE was exposed as a front for another Muslim Brotherhood militant offshoot, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), its CEO, Al-Arian, would defend repeatedly in the local press that Al-Ghannoushi and other Islamist colleagues invited to USF were respected intell ectuals who sought c ivilizational dialogue with the West. As this study pointed out in its second findings chapter about the USF case, civilizational dialogue is a trope, according to the co rpus of research of Bat Yeor (2004), more commonly found in Europe an diplomatic and cultural contexts, as part of a European-Middle Eastern agreement with roots traceable to the influence of Tarik Ramadan, the grandson of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan Al-Banna. To the researchers knowledge, no one who has reported previously on AlArians individual use of the Muslim Brotherhoods world-historical or organizational discourse has remarked upon the underlying significance tied to additional micro-data : Sami Al-Arian had been indoctrinated into the Muslim Brotherhood when he was a boy in Kuwait (see Waller, 2004); thus, the former 142

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engineering professors lowe st common denominator of or ganizational allegiance is not to the Palestinian Isla mic Jihad (PIJ) but to the Muslim Brotherhood. As is commonly known among those who study Is lamism, the majority of those organizations represented at Al-Arians Islamic Committee for Palestine (ICP) conferences were, like the PIJ, offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood, which stated on its website that it graduates me mbers to other organizations (see www.ikwhanweb.org). Therefore, at ICP, Al-Ari an was not speaking to mere members of regional Islamist terrorist organizations; he was speaking to highly esteemed initiates in a very elite and secretive organizati on that, as the totalitarian movement theorist Hannah Arendt might concur, hides in plain sight (p. 366). The significance of all these facts, if c onsidered on the basis of what they have in common, implies therefore that it was not merely the PIJ that sought infiltration of USF for the purpose of using the university as a front to commit re-Islamization from above in the form of direct, immediat e, violent action in Israel. Indeed, for both government and non-government constituents in USFs service area to remain focused on the PIJ is to obviat e a far more intriguing point of analysis: According to the logic of the nested levels of world-historical organizational and individual discourse revealed in the narratives of th is studys two findings chapters, it was the Muslim Brotherhood that sought infiltrati on of USF, but for the purposes of reIslamization from below. 143

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The Studys Historiography: Textual Analysis Based on th e Assumptions of Foucault, Richards, and Derrida Coding of collected and studied informati on (described further below) in this study also employed a method of historiography involving Foucaults (1969, 1974) theory of institutions to investigate Is lamisms interplay with higher education, culminating in a study of the movement and it s leadership at USF. The research notes here that Foucault (1969, 1971, 1974) never articulated a sp ecific historiographical method. In addition, he did not espouse a particular political point-of-view, although most scholars who adopt his concepts have b een of Marcusian, or what is more often defined as neo-Marxist, or progressive political persuasion. As is apparent in research anthologies such as The Handbook of Qualitative Research (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000), scholars have employed post-modernist theories like Critical Legal Theory, an offshoot of Critical Theory, which Marcuse brought to the American Academy from Germany in the 1930s, to put forward a construc tive conception of a new legal and social order (p.264) that ch allenges the legitimacy of Western legal systems and liberal values such as academic freedom. Foucaults arrival on the American methodological scene in the 1970s overturned decades of modernist practice known as New Criticism in the study of literature, which advocated close readings of texts. While articulated in decidedly postmodernist terms identified further below, Foucaults emphasis on intellectual, political, and social history was not wit hout its modernist antecedents. Among those was I.A. Richards, who in the early Twen tieth Century had developed a theory of context in The Meaning of Meaning (1923, with C.K. Ogden) and Practical 144

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Criticism (1929). Richards argued that in order to understand a single text, a critic had to understand that texts relationship to ot her things. In other words, a critic had to know how a particular text alludes to other texts, sources, and ideas. Foucauldian scholars have corresponding terms for Richards earlier theory of context. They articulate th at texts are refer ential and intertextual (Cuddon, 1991; Preminger and Brogan, 1993). These terms are detailed further below. In all likelihood, Foucault would have regarded a codified method and particular political theory as anathema to his decidedly c onstructivist social theory in which textual meaning is not fixed but, ra ther, is located in specific organizational contexts and hinges upon the shared meanings uttered among indivi duals in specific contexts. Hence, a term like civilizational dialogue, if we do not ask the person who utters this term to qualify it further, may imply superf icially a meaning congruent with our own organizational values. However, if we probe a terms meaning further, we may realize that the term is rooted in that persons possible contempt for and potential to undermine our organizational values In practice, therefore, the researcher who accepts Foucaults theory of institutions is left to intuit the French philosophers conceptual framework within a situational cont ext. In this thesis that context is the interplay between Islamism and higher education, the former being the institution for this organizational analysis that exacts its will to power on the latter subinstitution. Perhaps what Foucault had imp lied by the term sub-institution was that it had the potential to become subordinate to the in stitution seeking what Foucault called throughout his works as a collective will to truth. 145

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Particularly in North American sc holarship (e.g., Said, 1978; Leitch, 1992) and as mentioned above, Foucaults theory of institutions is grafted to Marcusian suppositions about so-called dominant, culturally hegemonic, imperialist, or even racist institutions identified as capitalism, individualism, the West, Western government, Western society, the state, the military-industrial complex, the establishment, and so on. This inquiry deviates, however, showing that Foucaults theory of institutions can apply equally to non-dominant, communitarian, anti-Western, non-state actors who also aspire to Foucaults will to power. Reminiscent of the late nine teenth-century philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, that will to power re-identified in Foucaults works signifies the driving force behind Nazi Germanys seizure of total control over the vanquished German population that was mired in cultural ressentiment following the Treaty of Versailles. That consolidation of power, as is commonly accepted among intellectual historians, began inside Germanys revered universi ties which were purged of taboo discourse that might contradict the pan-Aryan aspira tions of an elite Nazi establishment. Its philosophical base being postmodernist in origin, Foucaults theory of institutions accepts Derridas (1966/1967) ar guments that language, or signification, is not transcendental, and is, to the contra ry, quite arbitrary and sometimes coerced in institutional settings. The process holds that things signify other things but they do not mean other things in a transcendental sense because no transcendental corollary to the language we produce exists. Institutions, institutional discourse, and other types of texts, according to Derridian argum entation are not isolated phenomena; they are referential systems of signs in which the mea nings of one kind of discourse are 146

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overlaid with meanings from another kind (Cuddon, 1991: p. 192). While we may use words to describe our research, we may acknowledge the absence of Words or what Derrida called throughout his written corpus, the t ranscendental signified. That layering of signs challenges an assumption in the Western rational tradition, mimesis which dates back to Plato. Mime sis holds that a text (or any kind of utterance, symbol, or si gn) reflects a given reality (p.923). The postmodernist model suggests that no Platonic mirror of reality exists. Meaning has no central origin, no author. It is de-centered (Derrida, 19 66, p. 101) possessing boundless references without an absolute referent (p.101). In turn, the intertextuality of meaning denies assumptions that authors ha ve any kind of contro l, or authority, over the meaning of the texts they produce. The significance of textual production thus expands as researchers are free to open up infinite and random connections between texts (Preminger and Brogan, 1993: p. 606). Derridas arguments in 1966 caused F oucault to ask later What is an author? in a 1969 paper of the same name. In that paper, Foucault diminishes authorial significance: an au thor is a variable that accompanies only certain texts to the exclusion of others (p. 142). His pur pose is to circulate discourse within a society (p. 142) and to lay claim to certain property ri ghts (p. 143). An author is not a transcendental entity (p. 143) or an index of truthfulness (p.143). As authors may represent anyone involved in a s poken or written utterance, Foucaults argument extends to research subjects involved in similar acts. By default, that same argumentation calls into question the valid ity of case study methods that try to recreate an event as it really happened by holistically reclaiming the voices of people 147

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involved in that case. Must we accept what th eir voices as indexes of truthfulness and not probe any deeper, lest we risk offending them? Or do we question their authorial claims and seek instead the para doxes and contradictions in their discourse? Within Foucaults framework, who is speaking matters less than what is spoken. To study texts, Foucault reco mmends genealogy which holds that researchers chart between the unauthorized relationships between authors and texts (Preminger and Brogan, 1993: p. 606; it alics added). Within that framework researchers may expose the ideologi cal pedigree among authors and among institutions that produce discourse across space and time. As F oucault recapitulates from his earlier work The Order of Things (1969), more important to research are the ideological relationships that inform the c oncepts in their various works, the web of institutions in either the de nial or validation of their works, and the interdependent relationships among primary and secondary texts ( The Discourse on Language, 1969). The interplay among such things pro duce a rarefaction of knowledge among authoritative communities vested in main taining their positions of power by imposing a certain number of rules upon those individuals [within their communities], thus denying access to everyone else (p. 155). These institutions thus have a totalizing effect through their appr opriation of rituals and fellowship of discourse (p. 156). Foucaults arguments question this will toward truth (p. 153) in which discourse communities lose their capacity to create new knowledge. Seeking to maintain power through their monopo lies of knowledge, th ese institutions impose their institutional will on sub-institutions (p. 160). Instead of producing new 148

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knowledge, they replicate mere doctrine. Fo r others wishing to belong in those communities, The sole requisite is adhere nce to the same truths and the acceptance of a certain rule of conformity w ith validated discourse (p. 156). Will to Truth and Power Located in the Research Study Foucaults (1969, 1974) emphasis on how institutions and sub-institutions engage in interplay of li nguistic signification and ot her practices in order to consolidate power and knowledge is, of course, constructivist in nature. The institutional practices he de scribes also signify the very essence of the USF-WISE partnership, for which a brochure given to ke y university faculty and administrators stated that the partnerships funding source, The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), stated that it sought the reconstructi on of Muslim thought through partnership with Western, s ecular research universities Inasmuch as universities provide values loopholes in the form of their democratic spir it for Islamists to exploit, the source of that exploitation is Islami sm and not higher education; and so it is Islamism as an overarching Foucauldian institution that acts upon and tries to subvert higher educatio n, a sub-institution. In the study of organizations, institutiona l analysis remedies will to truth (Foucault, 1971: p. 161) by focusing on th e multiplicity of factors involved in describing organizational life and events (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998: p. 43). The role of research changes dramatically in Foucaults genealogical framework. He suggests that research shoul d investigate taboo systems (p. 160) of thought, which are not always to be found where we imag ine them to be (p. 160) but are held 149

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responsible for the attenuation of know ledge through a kind of institutionalized censorship. In their drawing upon Foucaults id eas, Said (1978, 1983), White (1974), Leitch (1992), Czarniawska (1997), and Me ddeb (2003) variously employ Foucaults ideas to culture, academic disciplines, literature, organizations, and Islamism, respectively. Those institutions are each i nvolved in a signification process with other sub-institutions, such that critics of those institutions and sub-institutions may interpret the signification process by analyzing, inter alia ideological habits of mind, basic assumptions (and reactions to ch allenges of those basic assumptions), actions, archives, pedagogy, taboos, publishing records, religious te xts, and judicial texts. In turn, authors, or people who signify, lose cont rol over the meaning of their institutions and sub-institutions. At th e same time, critics can, as White (1974) states, re-familiarize us with events which have been forgotten through either accident, neglect, or repression by looking at the ways in which events evolved, providing more information about them, and showing how their developments conform to or deny other [signify ing] story types (pp.399-400). In this inquiry--and in a Foucauldian se nse--the political ideology of Islamism represents an institution and is proven through the analysis of a wide range of information collected to exact demands on a sub-institution, higher education, for the purpose of consolidating power and knowledge, or, in other words, to further the advancement of Islamism in higher educati on. As an ideology, Islamism is comprised of a set of beliefs that are used to justify a group or society or challenge a given socio-political order and are used to interpret th e political world (McAdam, 150

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McCarthy, and Zald, 2006; p. 262). As such, it is a more logically codified system of beliefs than it is a system of cultural frames (McAda m, McCarthy, and Zald, 2006; p. 262). One may therefore view the process of re-Islamization--signifying Islamisms program to impose its ideological model on hi gher education--as a kind of intellectual coup-making in which the Islamist movement exacts its own will to truth on an institution it regards as territory for conquest, the dar al-harb or domain of war. Examples of that process were found in the original documents analysis of the educational theory of IIIT. In additio n, other examples were found in original documents analysis of IIIT educational practice found in the Tampa-based magazine, Inquiry whose editor-in-chief, Sami Al-Aria n, published articles drafted by himself and other Islamists seeking control of governments in various world locales, including North America, by infiltrating education systems with the stated goal of reforming those systems for the purpose of Islamizing society and knowledge. That activity signifies what the inquiry defines in the initi al section above as reIslamization from below. It is not to be confused with re-Islamization from above, or political violence that Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and its various international offshoot s like the Palestinian Islami c Jihad (PIJ), Algerian Islamic Front (AIG), Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI), and the Sudanese Liberation Front (SLF) reserve for later use, after they have determined that society has been won over and a Qutb-inspi red phase of power can begin. The inquiry does illustrate, however, that terrorism, or polit ical violence, is also waged against and through higher educ ation systems--and by the same Islamist groups or people responsible for educationa l subversion. As the findings convey, that 151

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two-fold strategy of re-Islamization in hi gher education found in higher education systems supports other empirical observations by scholars like Yeor (1998), Pipes (2002), Duran and Hechiche (2002), and Tibi (2002) who argue that Islamism is a totalitarian movement. As the late Hannah Arendts seminal work on The Origins of Totalitarianism shows about Nazism and Communism, this inquiry illustrates, too, that for Islamism terror and propaganda-including educational propaganda--signify two sides of the same coin. Because Islamism is categorically a to talitarian movement that knows no geographical divisions and whos e highest aspiration is total control of humanity itself, that movement, by its very nature, shuns dissent, intellectually intimidates, maims and murders, and repres ses information that portrays its darker realities. To survive past its first generation, the moveme nt requires the co-opting of sympathetic intellectuals, Muslims a nd non-Muslims, who are not movement members but who provide the movement with a semblance of legitimacy. Other Findings on the Inquirys Excursion into Taboo Discourse Taboos on acceptable and unacceptable discourse run strong within the Islamist movement, which couches its objectio ns in terms that hold special appeal to libertarian-leaning academics, neo-Marxists, progressives, civil libertarians and religious rights advocates from other faiths. This inquiry parses out the nuances of that aspect of Islamisms agenda by studying the history of the movement in overseas locales in the first findings chapter (Re-Is lamization in Higher Education in Selected Middle Eastern and African Countries) and then by illustrating a similar history in the second findings chapter about USF (Toward Local Confirmation of a Global Narrative: Islamism Comes to US F and Its Service Community). 152

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Texts analyzed in this inquiry are cited elsewhere in this chapter as types of population samples. In addition, the anal ysis of texts in th is inquiry involves interpretive understanding, or hermeneutical skill, vital to placing texts in historical and cultural contexts (Patton, 2002). Moreover, textual analysis carries with it an assumption that the researcher himself or herself acts as a research instrument involved in constructing the reality of the inquirys fi ndings (Patton, 2002: p. 115), a constructivist viewpoint. Thus, research ers possess different backgrounds, they use different methods, and they have d ifferent purposes that underscore how they develop different types of reactions, focus on different aspects of the setting, and develop somewhat different scenarios ( p. 115). In other words, interpretation involves selection or choice, or, as Patton (2002) s uggests, the conveyance of meaning from some perspective, a certai n standpoint, a praxis or a situational context (p. 115). In this inquiry, the researcher drew from multiple fields of inquiry (e.g., sociology, political science, Middle East studies, higher education studies) to contextualize the problem of Islamism in higher educat ion as an ultra-nationalist totalitarian movement with probable, milita nt from above and below objectives. The approach was undertaken and approved in the research pr oposal ratified by the thesis committee in 2003. Given that cont extualization, the inqui ry ruled out major discussion of other problems associated w ith the Islamist movement (e.g., the ArabIsraeli war, Islamisms relationship with the Nation of Islam and its offshoot groups in North America, and questions of iden tity among Muslims living in non-Muslim societies) that are outside the bounds of the research questions. Moreover, the 153

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approach ratified in 2003 was one that would challenge orthodox assumptions about Islamism in Middle East studies, whos e most major voices disavow the terms terrorism and totalitaria nism, claiming that Islamism is a highly misunderstood movement inappropriately maligned variously by racist U.S., Is raeli, and Western governments and their ignorant populaces (see, for example, the late Edward Saids Covering Islam 1981/1997) The distinguished Islamic historian Bern ard Lewis in the essay In Defense of History discusses problems that confront re searchers as they define their topics and contextualize their analyses. Any starti ng point is necessarily in some degree artificial, Lewis (2004, p. 389) writes. In addition, he states that analytic results are to some extent predetermined by the accessibility of evidence (p. 390). Generally, Lewis accepts that precondition for research in the social sciences; however, he identifies a problem in the study of the Middle East and Islamic history: amnesia sustained by concealment (p. 390). Synonymous with this problem, is the phenomenon Lewis (2004) calls the unconscious forgetting of disagreeable episodes and the deliberate suppressi on of shameful memories (p. 390). As a distinguished scholar now in hi s late eighties who has witnessed the changes in how the Middle East and Isla m are studied, Lewis notes that no matter which epistemological point-of-view scholars assume, there have been certain topics that have been off limits to graduate students and other rese archers in the field. Among them are the topics of slavery a nd the subjugation of religious and ethnic minorities in lands governed under sharia or Islamic law. For example, Lewis observes that there are societies in which sl avery has been a fact of life, in some of 154

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them very recently, in some even to the present day. But the subject is taboo. Not long ago a graduate student who wanted to work on slavery in the medieval middle East was strongly advised, not by any Middl e Eastern authority but by a grant-giving body in [the United States], to choose so me less provocative subject (p. 390). Lewis regrets such discouragement of research, not because he is hostile toward Middle Eastern people or Islam, but because to study the history of the Middle East without slavery would be as meaningful as to study the history of the American South or the Roman Empire without slavery (p. 390). However, Lewis (2004) further states that most Middle Ea stern history books avoid or gloss over (p. 390) topics like slavery or the subjugation of religious minorities under Islamic law. Furthermore, the amnesia described in Lewiss essay is sometimes supported through acts of coercion, intimidation, and pressure by colleagues, neighbors and friends, which make it difficult or even painful to express opinions that go against what is currently acceptable or fashionable in academic study (p. 391). Lewis (2004) is not the first academic to note this problem, which Patton (2002), in his analysis of Thomas Kuhns The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970), suggests is endemic to the so cial sciences. Pa tton (2002) writes: Before Kuhn, most people thought that science progressed through heroic individual discoveries that contribute d to an accumulating body of knowledge that got closer and closer to the way the world really worked. In contrast, Kuhn argued that tightly or ganized communities of specialists were the central forces in scientific development. Ideas that seemed to derive from brilliant individual scientific minds were ac tually shaped by and dependent on paradigms of knowledge that were socially construc ted through group consensus. Rather than seeing scien tific inquiry as progressing steadily toward truth about nature, he suggested that science is best seen as a series of power struggles between adherents of diffe rent scientific worldviews. (p. 99) 155

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And so we return full circle to Derrida (1966/1967) who, in his famous work Of Grammatology proved that all language is arbi trary, referential, and that the transcendental signified does not exist. In other words, there may exist a thing we call a horse, which possesses certain physio logical characteristics, but there is no such thing as horseytude. Or, in other words, that thing we identify as horse is not called horse on the basis of some transcen dent condition giving ri se to horse. Of course, Derrida and his postmodernis t counterpart in France, Foucault, have been accused of nihilism and their ideas have been used to undermine traditional notions of academic freedom, leading to th e politicization of th e soft sciences in particular. Any serious study of their work s, however, should dispel such accusations. Neither Derrida nor Foucault advocated a sp ecific political model in their works. Only later did other scholars rely on Derridas and Foucaults de-centering of truth in their competition for intellectual legitimacy in the academy. Derrida himself was an Algerian Jew who protested his 1942 ex clusion from his high school by French administrators in the Vichy government (N orris, Beardsworth, Dillon, and Zehfuss, 2007). He chose to skip school for an entire year rather than attend a Jewish school (Norris, Bearsworth, Dillon, and Zehfuss, 2007). While teaching at the University of Tunis, Foucault himself maintained tenuous political relationships with Marxists who later would co-opt his theori es for their own political pu rposes (Didier, 1991). In France, prior to his service in Tunis, he had broken with other academics who insisted on supporting Soviet Communism, despite reports emanating from Russia that Stalins experiment was not an agent of democratic reform (Didier, 1991). 156

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Derridas logic is thus the essence of construc tivist thought: Language is arbitrary, but communities of scholars or organizations usually accept agreed upon terms to classify their observations. However, sometimes conflict arises within those same collective groups when individuals in those groups knoc k the usual way of knowing certain things out of alignment. So at best, in the social sciences, there are linguistic communities that Kuhn compares to ideological revolutionary communities. According to Kuhnian theory, Communitie s of scientists, like ideological and religious communities, were organized by certain traditions that periodically came under strain when new problems arose that couldnt be explained by old beliefs (Patton, 2002: p. 99). Derrida (1966/1967) would in turn influe nce the epistemological position of Michel Foucault (1969, 1971, 1974) and other theorists noted throughout this chapter who write about the nature of institutions and social movements to control language and, by default, human beings for the purpose of consolidating power. Hence, the problem also realizes itself in the academic world of research and teaching. Patton (2002) states that, according to Kuhn, new explanations and ideas compete until old ideas are discarded or revised, sometimes sweepingly. But the competition is not just intellectual. Power is involved. The leader s of scientific communities wield power in support of their positions just as political leaders do (p. 99). And so it appears that researchers can be as driven by their philo sophical and scientific worldviews as can be and are their research subjects. In his critique of the current prevai ling epistemological orthodoxy in the Middle East Studies Associ ation (MESA), Martin Kramer (2001) describes the 157

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Kuhnian revolution that took place in th e field of study in the late 1970s as an intellectual insurgency ( p. 122) of self-incriminating, d rigueur theoretical commitments (e.g., neo-Marxist theory) th at paradoxically emanate out of the Western tradition and later subsumed in the lexicon of pro-Islamist faculties. That particular ideological ferment in the st udy of the Middle East and Islam prevailed over the empiricism of trad itional Orientalist scholarship following the publication of Edward Saids book Orientalism in 1978. The new scholarship, occasionally referred to as Occidentalism in the book of the same name (Buruma & Margalit, 2004), is presupposed by an epistemological point-of-view that researches the world as some scholars want the world to be a nd not how it is. Lewis (2004) characterizes the ferment as a mood of disillusionment and hostility in which academics have grown accustomed to accusing the West of sexism, racism, and imperialism, institutionalized in patriarchy and slavery, tyranny and exploitation (p. 324). To these charges, Lewis (2004) writes, we have no option but to plead guiltynot as Americans, nor yet as Westerners, but simp ly as human beings, as members of the human race (p. 324). Lewis also asks his reader the following: Is racism, then, the main grieva nce? Certainly th e word figures prominently in publicity addressed to Western, Eastern European, and some Third World audiences. [It] has become a generalized and meaningless term of abuse. (p. 325). In his analysis of MESA and other foundations for the study of the Middle East and Islam, Kramer (2001) suggests that those scholars who have retreated ever more deeply into their own secluded world, w ith its rigid etiquette of theory and its peculiar mannerisms of polit ical posturing . [should] initiate a co llective soul searching (p. 124). Furthermore, Kramer (2001) claims that the orthodox scholars 158

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who presently control MESA and most of the nations federally funded National Resource Centers have become over-identified with their research subjects. Yet, in the end, Kramer (2001) doubts that future breakthroughs in the field will come from MESA and Middle East studies foundations. Instead, he suggests, the breakthroughs will come from individual scholars laboring in the margins (p. 124). In terms of this inquiry, which defines the topic of study as an Islamist mass movement that interacts with higher education institutions as part of an overall strategic agenda for worldwide reform, the researcher notes that it, too, is circumscribe d as taboo subject matter typically considered off limits to both graduate students and their professors. Coding of Collected and Studied Information into a Finished Work In this analysis, a three-year proce ss of coding collect ed information for thematic association reveals an interplay of ideologies, strategies, and legacies of direct and indirect action diffused acro ss geographical space and time, with higher education representing organizational terri tory upon which the Islamist movement and its leaders exact their plans for ultr a-nationalist conquest. By coding, this inquiry means the simultaneou s collection and analysis of data that is compared and contrasted to the point that interrelated c oncepts are refined and integrated into the theoretical framework of th e study (Charmaz, 2000: p. 509). This coding process proved to be well -suited for an inquiry that draws from multiple academic fields of study because it accounts for variation and permits modification of established an alyses as conditions in th e research changed or as further data were gathered (p. 510-511). Furthermore, the coding process involves what Patton (2002) calls inducti ve analysis and creative sy nthesis oriented toward 159

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exploration and discovery that begin with specific observations and build toward general patterns (p. 55). Categories or dimensions of analysis emerge from openended observations, Patton (2002) writes, as the inquirer comes to understand patterns that exist in the phenomen on being investigated (p. 56). Coding and the Studys Thematic Findings of Characteristics and Conditions of Islamisms Interplay in Higher Education The inquirys thematic patterns--ideologi es, strategies, and le gacies of direct and indirect action--involved their further categorization in Chapters 4 and 5 as the conditions and characteristics typical of the Islamist m ovements interplay in higher education systems in the va rious locales studied. Some of those thematic patterns manifest as ideologies (e.g., Salafisms syncretic merger with Fascism and Marxism); others, as strategies (e.g., codified educa tional theory); and others, as legacies (e.g., Campus Holy War). As detailed furthe r below, external validation by a range of scholars but especially by Dr. Michae l Buonanno and Dr. Mohamed Ibn Guadi assisted the researcher in parsing out thos e patterns and further categorizing them as conditions and characteristics vital toward the ability Islamism to advance its overarching objective of world-wide reformation. The results are presented in narrative form in sub-sections in each of those chapters; however, they are also included in the thesis in the form of matrix charts (Tables 1 and 2) to illustrate the results of the coding process. Each chart is explained in the paragraphs that follow. Some of the indicators signify the move ments ideologies; some, the movements strategies; and others, th e movements legacies. 160

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Explication of Coded Findings: T able 1, Conditions of Islamisms Interplay in Higher Education in Selected locales and at USF and Its Service Area Titled Conditions for Islamisms Inte rplay in Higher Education in Selected Locales and at USF and Its Service Area, Table 1 on page 162 depicts six major conditions that were revealed across time a nd space as Islamism spread in mass universities starting in Egypt and then to Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, West Bank, Gaza, Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan (see Chapter 4 na rratives). The same chart also depicts conditions vital to Islamisms advancem ent in the Tampa Bay region in the southeastern United States, again with a ma ss university acting as a kind of territory for Islamist conquest (see Chapter 5 narrativ es). In that sense, one may view the Islamic term dar al-harb, or the domain of war, not only as a country to be infiltrated and conquered but al so as a concept that that could apply more broadly to infrastructure (e.g., a university) and the accout rements associated with that infrastructure (e.g, personnel, students, academic departments, student groups, curriculum). Whereas the studys selected locales (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, West Bank, Gaza, Tunisia, Algeria, and Sudan) are presented vertically to the left of the matrix chart in Table 1, its six coded categories ( A-F ) appear horizontall y at the top of the chart. A matrix indicator log appears below the chart, with coded items paralleling the sub-sections in Chapters 4 and 5. Wherever an X appears on the chart, there existed strong evidence of a particular condition from the range of 161

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population samples identified in the study as texts or discourse, two terms which are further defined below. As the note below the chart states, absence of an X signifies that not enough information wa s found during the data collection and study for the researcher to convey confidently the presence of a condition Conditions identified in the analysis a nd in Table 1 are as follows: A : Fall of Ottoman Caliphate Engend ers Rise of Muslim Brotherhood Seeking to Revive Islams Political Dimension B : Salafist Doctrine of Muslim Brotherhood Exposed to Fascism and/or Other De-Westerniz ing Intellectual Trends C : Government Attempts at Appeasement and Repression Embolden Further the Islamist Movement D : Transnational Influence of Musl im Brother Professors and Students to Other Locales Broadens Range of Influence E : Expansion of University Missi on and/or Educational Policy Changes Contributing to Islamist Advance F : Epistemological Development of Civilizational Dialogue Concept Reaches Intellectual Mind of In ternationalizing USF Community Because the study involved tracing the deve lopment of the Islamist movement as it developed across time and space, beginni ng in the 1920s as Hassan Al-Banna and early members of the Muslim Brotherhood re acted to Kemal Ataturks dissolution of the Ottoman caliphate after World War I, conditions A-C were by and large limited to Egypt, as that countrys edu cated elite formed the early vanguard of the movement during its first few decades. Attempts at appeasement by King Farouk and President 163

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Nasser allowed the group to organize quickly and to move into bold phases of civil service infiltration, followed soon thereafte r by bold displays of propagandizing and terrorism designed to destabilize the state, paving the way for militant overthrow of the Egyptian government. While many Mus lim Brothers, including the groups leaders, were jailed and executed during a series of attempts by Farouk and Nasser to crush the movement, other leaders and init iates fled to neighboring countries to escape repression. Being highly educated, many Muslim Brothers went on to pursue academic careers in neighboring locales, which welcomed the talent of these Egyptian foreign nationals into their university systems (see matrix indicator D ). Indicator D proved to be the indicator most associated with the Islamist movements advance in higher education in the selected locales, with all four of five locales exhibiting the trend, w hose causality is traceable to A-C The researcher notes that it remains to be seen whether the deportation of Tampa Bays Unindicted CoConspirator Mazen Al-Najjar, who comple ted his engineering PhD at USF, and the eventual deportation of confessed and convicted conspirator Sami Al-Arian, who was an engineering faculty member at USF, will allow for a continuation of the trend of Muslim Brotherhood leaders migrating fr om one locality to another, finding employment in universities, and influenci ng initiated and uninitiated masses within those universities, their nearby mosques, and external organizational networks interacting with them a nd their campuses. Al-Arians wife and youngest children relocated to Cairo, Egypt, from Tampa, in 2007. Al-Arian, when and if he is deportedhe could still face charges regard ing another case in Herndon, Virginia would likely return to Egypt to be with them. 164

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Other individuals who were at one time employed at USF or were on the staff of the World Islam Studies Enterprise (WIS E) think-tank at the time it had partnered with USF vacated Tampa Bay soon after the USF-WISE partnership was exposed as a terrorist financing front. One of the two, Ba shir Nafi, an indicted but un-prosecuted conspirator in the Tampa trial, is presently an educator in a mass university in the United Kingdom. In addition, one of the pe ople he and his cohorts at USF-WISE had invited to lecture at USF, Rashid Al -Ghannoushi, has escaped prosecution for seditious conspiracy in Tuni sia by self-exiling in the Un ited Kingdom. He, too, is an academic in the UKs higher education system. Explication of Coded Findings: Table 2, Characteristics of Islamisms Interplay in Higher Education in Selected Locales and at USF and Its Service Area Titled Characteristics of Islamisms Advancement in Higher Education in Selected Locales and at USF and Its Servi ce Area, Table 2 on page 167 depicts five major characteristics that were revealed across time and space in the same locales identified in Table 1 and narrated in Chapters 4 and 5. The matrix charts axes are the same, with locales situated on the vertical axis to the left of the chart; and matrix indicators, on the horizontal axis to the top. Likewise, the tables matrix indicator log appears below the chart, with coded items paralleling the sub-sect ions in Chapters 4 and 5. For an X to appear on the ch art, strong evidence of a particular characteristic had to exist in the texts or discourse studied. Characteristics identified in the analysis and in Table 2 on its horizontal axis are as follows: 165

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A : External & Internal Organiza tional Networks run by Educated Elites Interacting w/Universities to Re-Islamize Society and Knowledge B : Codified Education Theory to Promote Monolithic Worldview of Islam to Subvert Universities and Surrounding Society C : Campus Holy War & Other Related Problems Associated w/Universities and Interactive Organizations As Part of Re-Islamization Program D : Transnational Influence of Islamism and Its Esprit d Corps to Other Locales Broadens Influence of the Movement E : Intended Islamist Hidden Curri culum at USF w/Strong Linkages to Codified Education Theory of Muslim Brotherhood Think-Tank A few blank areas are found on the Table 2 matrix chart, their absences expressed in coded indicators D and E on the horizontal axis. The rese archer predicts that further study would reveal their presence, give n the presence of coded indicators A-C for all five locales. Indicator D is also curious because it doubles as a condition in the narrative findings (see Table 1). The r eason for the indicator appearing as both a condition and as a characteristic results from the migration of professors and students to and from more than one locale. Therefor e, they appear in bot h chapter findings of the study and in several different sub-secti ons of those same findings. For example, the PIJ was founded in Egypt, and not in the Palestinian territories of West Bank and Gaza. Like most other Sunni Arab mass movements, it is an offshoot of the 166

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Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood with l eaders like Sami Al-Arian having received initiation into th e parent organization when they were young men. During the 1970s and early 1980s, those leaders (i.e, Sami Al-Arian, Mazen Al-Najjar, Ramadan Shallah, Bashir Nafi, and Fath i-Al-Shikaki) while pursuing academic studies in engineering, medici ne, and economics, left Egypt during periods of Islamist repression during Al-Sadats presidency a nd just after his assa ssination. At various points in time during the repression, they migrated to North America, West Bank, Gaza, and the United Kingdom on student or academic work-related visas and commenced the same or similar activity with in other universities on behalf of their movements cause. Thus, what was a condition for Islamism to advance in a university in one locale sometimes b ecomes a characteristic in another. Methods of Data Collection: Historical-Case Study Research, Archival Documents and Sources, and Observation of Institutional Events This inquiry included the following methods of data collection to answer the research questions about the characteristics and conditions that make higher education an attractive environment for Islami sm: historical-case study research, archival/document collection and analysis, and observation of institutional events. Embedded within that collected data was evidence of the world-historical organizational and individual discourse of the Islamist movement in higher education defined above. The researcher submitted the proposal document to the Institutional Board of Research (IRB) under expedited status because the study 168

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involved primarily documents analysis, extant historical researc h, and observation of institutional events that ar e within the public domain. Historical-Case Study Research Historical-case study res earch is a salient means for gathering data for a complex study such as this inquiry, which involves Foucaults (1969, 1974) theory of institutions and their relationships with s ub-institutions and tr iangulating Faoucaults methodological with textual analysis of Islamisms world-historical organizational and individual discourse. As Adler (1996) not es, case study is a process which begins with description, develops understand ing, and results in an explanation of a specific event or phenomenon as it unfolds ove r a period of time (p.20). In this case study, the researcher undertook that appr oach regarding a phenomenon--Islamism-that began as part of a student movement in Egypt in the early 1970s (see, inter alia Abdalla, 1985 and Hatina, 2001) and then spr ead into other countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and North America by the 1990s (see Tibi, 1998, Kepel, 2001, and Emerson, 2001, inter alia ). The historical aspect of this case study involved methodological characteristics such as the study of complex social phenomena, relevant behaviors that cannot be manipulated by the re searcher, unclear boundaries between the phenomenon and its context, and multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 1989: p. 14-23). Therein, the findings reveal an unexpect ed but significant pattern across time and space of a mass social movement and its leaders co-opting universities in their service areas for purposes extending well beyond matters of teaching and research. Subordinated to the goals of Islamists, uni versities become over-politicized havens 169

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for re-Islamization from above and below in the form of front activity, or what Muslim Brothers and university militants in West Bank and Gaza call parallel hierarchies. In this way, these religious ultra-nationalists groups hope to expand their range of influence in the community at large, with the quixotic goal of reestablishing an Islamic Caliphate, having re-engineered the purpose of higher education toward Islamizati on of society and knowledge. Of course, the researcher does not believe that Islamists in higher e ducation will ever succeed with the greater, totalitarian objective of bringing the wo rld under the banner of their puritanical interpretation of Islam. However, histor y of the mass movement in higher education at USF and abroad suggests that Islamists have and will continue to challenge the mission and values of higher education, wh ether in Western universities or in Western-style universities. Within that fo recast, the commission of terrorism and the use of universities as part of the ma terial support for te rrorism is certain. Moreover, historical analysis of the case provided a context fo r the case at USF as it manifested as a local referent to its global predecessors, which Janesick (2000) suggests is a salient component of the case study method as the rese archer stretches her range of knowledge and insight to discern a res earch topics historical antecedents (p. 387) and to present findings based on patterns of association that reveal themselves in the information colle cted (p. 389). Therein, the researcher looks for relationships regarding the structure, occurrence, and distribution of events over time (p. 387). In addition, Janesick (2000) also testifies to the role of the researcher in interpreting the historical data as an imaginative activity in which the researcher uses her own mind and body in anal ysis and interpretation (p. 390). 170

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In addition to the relevant literature on the social psychology of mass social movements, Islamic fundamentalism, and Is lamic terrorism delineated in Chapters One and Two, the researcher drew upon social and political histor y texts from major university presses and major publishing houses, national and international, to describe how Islamism intersects with higher educat ion as a means to fulfill the objectives of the re-Islamization program. The role of higher education is not the overarching thesis of any of those texts; however, in all cases the writers of those texts tacitly indicate that higher educati on is a mainstay of the Islamist movement, with the movement originating in hi gher education and then permeating outward into the societies where Islamism flourishes. Am ong the many social and political history texts cited for the fourth chapter of this inquiry we re Abdalla (1985), Alexander (2002), Bender and Leone (1995), Bergen (2001), Carey (2001), Chomsky (1999), Dershowitz (2002), Duran and Hechiche (2001), Emerson (2002), Haddad (2002), Harub (2000), Hatina (2001), Hilterma nn (1991), Hoveyda (1998), Kepel (2002), Kramer (1997), Kramer (2001), Meddeb (2003) Pipes (1996), Pipes (1997), Pipes (2002), Pipes (2003), Saad-Ghorayeb (2002), Sagiv (1995), Schwartz (2002), Shadid (2001), Sullivan and Abed-Kotob (1999), Ti bi (2001), and Zwicker-Kerr (1994). The aforementioned texts represented a broad range of insight about Islamism itself, with writers conveying the mass social moveme nts history in both sympathetic/nonsympathetic and critical/noncritical points-of-view. The Global Referent as Over arching History and Case Della Porta (2002) states that cross-count ry historical research for mass social movements analysis allows assessment of trends, processes, and dynamics (p.301). 171

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By employing that kind of research, a rese archer may examine the conditions that gave rise to that movement and its most salient characteristics in order to understand its ebb and flow of collective mobilizatio n (p. 301). In this study, cross-country historical research was undertaken to understand the general ebb and flow of Islamisms interplay in higher education in Egypt, where the movement began in the 1920s, and in other selected locales wher e the movement later spread precisely through the migration and infl uence of Egyptian university professors who were also Muslim Brothers (see coded indicators D Tables 1 and 2). Fresh insight into the history of Isla mism in higher education in the world was gleaned from the analysis of archival documents and sources such as investigative journalism, websites, and an array of Islamist publications. Those archival documents and sources contain evidence of Islamisms world-historical organizational and individual discourse vital to our understandi ng of the mass social movements program of world reformation through the stud ys title term re-Islamization. Here, the researcher drew from documents and sources about Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic terrorism in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, the West Bank, Gaza, the Sudan, Algeria, and Tunisia. Those countries were selected above all others because more information has been written about them than about most other countries. It became apparent during the analysis phase of the research that the Muslim Brotherhood was a prime force of influence in each of the eight global locales. In addition, some of the leaders of Islamist movements in those plac es re-appeared as part of the USF case, which means that their histories illumina ted the transnational significance of reIslamization at USF (see items D Tables 1 and 2). Chapter Fours analysis of the 172

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phenomena in each country showed how Islamism in those countries served as a global referent to the North American ca se at USF, which, in turn, allowed the researcher to compare and contrast the imp act and purposes of Islamism at USF to the mass social movements inte rnational antecedents. The Local Referent as Part of the Ebb and Flow of Its Global Antecedents Like the analysis of document and sour ces for the global referent involving re-Islamization in higher education, the analysis of the local USF case drew upon similar archival documents and source texts in order to arrive at an understanding of Islamisms nested levels of world-historical organizational and individual discourse. In addition, this part of the anal ysis also examined collected media sources in the form of documentaries, investigativ e journalism, the researchers field notes (discussed further in the next section on Observation of Institutional Events), government affidavits, court cases, congressional testimony, Islamic Jihad and HAMAS manifestos, government indictments, institutional memos and letters, media reports, emails from stakeholders, Islami st websites and publications, think-tank memorabilia, video-recorded public debates and speeches, university websites, student group websites and constitutiona l charters, community group websites and charters, and student group leaflets and vide otapes. In addition, the special collections section of the USF library in Tampa provi ded a wealth of information from the archives of three USF administrations relate d to the Al-Arian affair at USF. Those same archives provided the researcher with a detailed glimpse into the history of USF and its changing academic ethos. 173

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Archival Documents and Sources A key element of historical-case stud y research involves the collection and analysis of archival documents toward further engagement with the world-historical organizational and individual discourse of the Islamist movement in higher education. According to (Hodder, 2000), arch ival documents can be formal (e.g., a written contract, a drivers license) or informal (e.g., field notes, memos, letters). Such texts are of importance for qualitative research because, in general terms, access can be easy and low cost, because th e information provided may differ from and may not be available in spoken form, and because texts endure and thus give historical insight (p. 704). Insofar as th is inquiry proposed a historical-case study involving the intertextuality of the institution of Islamism and its various subinstitutions--along the lines of instituti onal theory put forth by Foucault (1969, 1971, 1974)--archival documents collection and analysis was salient, too, because the items collected can be linked to strategies of centralization and codification and, hence, the secular and religious processes of the legitimiza tion of power (Hodder, 2000: p. 704). In this study the resear cher collected and analyzed a plethora of archival documents and sources, for which the collection process alone started in September 2001 and is presently stored in three, large, full file bi ns. Among the kinds of items collected for analysis included but were not limited to those same texts located in the section above labeled Population Samples. Observation of Institutional Events Another major element of this historical-case study was the observation of institutional events. Those events, too, ar e studied for their potential to provide 174

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insight into the world-historical organizational and individual discourse of Islamism in higher education. Angrosino and Perez ( 2000) state that observation, in and of itself, represents the fundamental base of all research methods in the social and behavioral sciences (p. 673) As part of case study method, Angrosino and Perez (2000) further state that obs ervation is the mainstay of fieldwork in which the researcher takes field notes (p. 673). Trad itional observation in the field usually concentrates on well-defined types of group activity (e.g., religious rituals, classroom instruction, and political elections) (Angrosino & Perez, 2000: 677-678). As part of this inquiry, th e researcher took and analyzed field notes for the following onand off-campus events: student-sponsored guest lectures, university-sponsored guest lectures, Wednesday Bull Ma rket activities, on-campus student group meetings and demonstrations, Tampa community activist demonstrations, and off-campus lectures. Notes for these events were kept in the aforementioned file collection and are preser ved there for future inquiry. Again, all of the institutional events in ques tion were from the public domain. Validity and Reliability: Triangulatio n of Vision, Purpose, and Methods This chapter would be remiss without soundi ng a few notes about measures taken to increase its validity and reliability the nuances of which are embedded in the paragraphs above and are arti culated directly in the fo llowing paragraphs. One should note that there is debate among scholars about whether the two term s are applicable to qualitative research, with one community of scholars who maintain that qualitative research should employ instead the terms trustworthiness and credibility A reading of Denzin and Lincolns Handbook of Qualitative Research (2000) suggests that 175

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anthropological schools of thought that base their methodologies in what is commonly known as the politics of self-repr esentation, prefer the later terms. A study is said in that context that if re search subjects deny how the study portrays them, then it is therefore not trustworthy nor credible. This inquiry is not an anthropological study and theref ore maintains a preference for the former terms. As it also sheds light on the taboo discourse of a worldwide social movement, which is disposed toward the denial of disclosure of its more unpleasant manifestations (e.g., the killing of apostates, intellectual censorsh ip, and totalitarian intellectual pedigree), one doubts that any Islamist w ould validate the study as such. Validity as is commonly defined among rese archers, signifies a study that measures what it is supposed to measure, with results being tr ansferable to other situations with similar parameters, research subjects, and characteristics (Janesick, 2000). Validity signifies that the results of the study are probable in light of the information presented (Janesick, 2000). This study carries with it that assumption of validity in that it was purposefully designed to be a cross-cultural study with what are called above a global referent and a local referent Tables 1 and 2 clarify the similarity of coded findings for both. Reliability signifies the ability of a method for research findings to perform consistently over a long period of time (J anesick, 2000). In that respect, this study again carries that assumption in that it examined the history of a mass social movement that began in the mid-1920s and has developed its ideological thought and has made strategic advances in higher edu cation in every decade since that time. Validity and reliability also refer to the factual accu racy of the research, which is 176

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free from fabrication, fraudulent material omissions, and contrivances and to the soundness of its theoretical foundations a nd methodological approaches (Christians 2000: p. 140). Generally, scholars want to s ee a multi-faceted synthe sis of theoretical perspectives and methods fused with deta iled, accurate data for a study of a mass social movement to be judged valid and reli able (Christians, 2000). They also expect an admission of bias and potential limitations especially in empirical research with a qualitative orientation (Christians, 2000). Fr om start to finish, this study is as multifaceted as most come in terms of its synthesis of vision, purpose, and methods. It also acknowledges bias and potential limitations. Vision The title of the study, in and of itself, characterizes the visi on of this study: Re-Islamization in Higher Education from Above and Below: The University of South Florida and Its Global Contexts first word, re-Islamization, identifies a process that occurs within a particular setting, higher education, while the modifying phrases from Above and Below, whose prepositiona l descriptors are capitalized, thereby imply a subversive process. Imp lied therein is that the study triangulates research data about three referential things found in the title: re-Islamization, subversion, and higher education. Starting in Chapter One, the researcher then qualified those title terms, in addition to the purpose of the study, its res earch questions, and methods to show how the triangulation would occur. According to Blee and Taylor (2002) in Methods of Social Movement Research, triangulation is the term used to refer to 177

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the combination of different kinds of data, a process that both increases the amount of detail about a topic and counteracts threat s to reliability and validity (p. 111). Purpose As stated in Chapter One and identifi ed by the French scholar Gilles Kepel in The Trail of Political Islam (2002) and by the Syrian scho lar scholar Bassam Tibi in The Challenge of Fundamentalism (1998) the above and below process is contextualized further as part of an overal l agenda qualified as a totalitarian, religious mass movement. The purpose of the study wa s aimed at answering research question about Islamisms interplay in higher education in other parts of the world and at USF. The first chapter and the literature revi ew (Chapter Two) suggested that the subversion of higher education is hallma rks activity of the worlds two other totalitarian movements, Communism and N azism, which have been studied as mass movements by various theorists detailed in the literature review, chief among them Herbert Blumer and Hannah Arendt. In addition, the observations of Donald E. Walker, in The Effective Administrator (1979) has prescient insight about the influence of subversive mass movements in higher education. Other scholars of higher education organization analysis were also considered, as were scholars of sociology and religious fundamentalism. The movements discussed by Walker owe their genesis to the inspiration of a neo-Ma rxist social psychologist, Herbert Marcuse, who was part of a Leftist inte llectual movement in Germany that would be used in the United States in the 1960s and after to de-Westernize higher education. Another scholar, the Tunisian diplomat-historian Ibn Khaldun, from ancient Islam also was highlighted as a theoretical antecedent for his discussion of The School of Ancient 178

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Scholars, Islams first wave of Islamic f undamentalists who merged matters of faith with those of reason, precipitating the decl ine of the Islamic mind, for which Islamic civilization, arguably, ha s not recovered. Again, the complex theoretical bases of this study also account for its reliability and validity. Snow and Strom (2002) discuss the underlying logic of triangulating multiple theoretical perspectives. They state that trustworthy research must contend the complexity of social r eality and the limitations of all research methodologies. . Rather than debate the merits of one theory vis--vis another, one does better to combine the multiple theori es so that they complement and supplement one anothers weakness (p. 150, italics added). Methods Snow and Strom (2002) also regard the triangulation of analytic methods and data collection across multiple domains of knowledge as essential to achieving reliability and validity in mass movements research as is attention to multiple theoretical bases. Commensurate with that strategy, this study also triangulated multiple methods of analysis and data co llection. As delineated above, the main method was textual analysis of three interrelated levels of discourse ( world-historical organizational and individual ), supplemented with relevant micro-data written or spoken by the purveyors of such discourse. Textual analysis enjoined a form of historiography predicated upon the French phi losopher Michel Foucaults theory of institutions. In this analysis highe r education signified a sub-institution subordinate to the mass movement of Islami sm, an institution bent on consolidating its power and influence in higher educa tion through a program, Islamization of 179

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society and knowledge. Moreover, textual analysis triangulation of rich, multiple data sources from historical-case stu dy information, archival documents, and observation of institutional events. In fact, the researcher challenged the limits of contemporary research into Islamism by undertaking analysis and writing about micro-data in the form of taboo subject matter (e.g., terrorism, censorship, fr ont groups, totalitariansim), or what Islamic historian Bernard Lewis calls disag reeable episodes in history. In choosing research methods contrary to the so-called emic approach of the politics of selfrepresentation that politely show only those details that the research subjects themselves want to be knownhence, it is hagiography not historiography they wantthe researcher then coded the data parsed out its major themes, and then collapsed those themes into two set of conditions and characteristics of Islamism in higher education (Tables 1 and 2). Further, those same conditions and characteristics were presented in narrative form in Chapters Four and Five. Patton (2002) further states that the process of extern al validation of data and findings represents the last and possibly mo st important element of achieving validity and reliability. While no inquiry is values-f ree, Patton (2002) claims that leaving an audit trail in which others assist in vouching for the c onsistency and dependability of the data results in quality research. On e might consider external validation as a form of quality control, therefore. Thereunto, the researcher extends her gr atitude to the largesse of numerous external validators identified below either as individuals or en masse, who have availed themselves to the researcher, upon th e researchers request or not, over the 180

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past few years. Their generosity came in the form of reacting during question and answer sessions in peer-reviewed paper pres entations in national conferences, in the form of on-line discussions, and in the form of individual readings of various findings drafts during the 2005-2006 academic year. Bias and Limitations On a final note, Blee and Taylor (2002) also acknowledge the importance of admitting biases and limitations that mi ght influence the outcome of the study. In Chapter One, the researcher disc ussed her legal posi tion about terrorism, one of the studys many sub-topics. To reiter ate, the researcher accepts the Geneva Conventions defining terrorism, and she accepts the corpus of United States laws and policies used to prosecute terrorism. As for limitations, the researcher regrets that her committee, during proposal defense, directed her to not conduct interv iews because it was held by a previous member that interviews with USF c onstituents probably would not yield any significant information about the topic. No interviews were conducted, therefore. Board of Trustees statements about the case also were not examined. External Validation of the Findings As the researcher amassed and analyzed evidence over the past three years, the aforementioned research questions were re framed into their current form for the purposes of systematically presenting the fi ndings in later chapters. Eventually, the coding method led to the classification of conditions and characteristics essential to understanding Islamisms interplay in hi gher education, the c ontours of which are presented in rich, narrative form in Chapters Four and Five, Given the subjective 181

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nature of all research (see Bohm, 1985, on how the observer, or researcher, controls whether light acts wave-like or particle-l ike in quantum physics experiments) and given that qualitative research itself r equires personal rath er than detached engagement in context, Meloy (2002) advocates talking into a tape recorder or to a friend or colleague as a means to bring into consciousness the findings of ones analysis. In effect, Meloys (2002) r ecommendation allowed the researcher a pragmatic means of contending what Czar niawska (1997) calls the paradox of applied pragmatism for which the resear cher must interpret information through textual analysis by mediating between two le vels of reading, first-level semantic and second-level semiotic, or reader-response. In these cases, analysis of data involves the appointment of an external validator, whic h this study has utilized in its process of arriving at the coded findings pr esented in Tables 1 and 2 above. External Validators This study has had more than one external validator. To that extent, this study may well be unique in the history of the College of Education at USF because its findings have been presented to or read by and critiqued by a range of individuals at USF and in the international academic comm unity. First, as the research proposal mandated, an official external validat or, Dr. Michael Buonanno, Professor of Anthropology at Manatee Community College, critiqued an early draft of the manuscript in summer 2005. He made suggestio ns for improving the richness of the text by inclusions of more detail and mu ltiple voices from the USF community. Second, at the suggestion of a comm ittee member in October 2005, another person, Dr. Stuart Silverman, Dean of the USF Honors College, read a version of the 182

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manuscript submitted to the thesis committee in July 2005. The concern at that point involved the thesis taboo subject matter and questions of anti-Arab bias. Dr. Silverman did not raise concerns about anti -Arab bias, as neither did previously the Middle East specialist on the committee. Dr. Silverman did highlight areas which he felt needed clarification, especially becau se in November 2005, Sami Al-Arian had not yet confessed to conspiring to commit terrorism. The research er followed through with Dr. Silvermans suggestions and re-subm itted another draft of the thesis to the committee in February 2006. Third, Dr. Mohammed Ibn Guadi, Professor of Islamology, The University of Strasbourg, France, reviewed the findings of the post-Dr. Silverman draft of February 2006. Dr. Guadi posed no objections to the treatment of Islam or Islamism in the thesis, noting that its interest in Islamic re ligious matters, per se, was negligible when compared to the overarching interest in Islamism, a political ideology. Dr. Guadi suggested that previously-conc eived material about viewp oints in the academy from the research proposal in Chapter One be dele ted because it distracted from the earlier stated major theoretical positions involving mass social movements and higher education. Aside from readings by the aforementioned external persons, some findings from this thesis involving Islamist education theory were presented at two Education Law Association conferences in 2003 and 2004. Thos e presentations and the response they engendered were also helpful in the codi ng process of the thesis as it underwent numerous draft revisions. In addition, over the past three years the researcher has received insight from Dr. Ray Hundley, a Pr ofessor of Religion at Manatee Community 183

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College who specializes in liberation theol ogy movements. Dr. Hundley agrees with the researchers point made in Chapter One that Islamism is a kind of liberation theology comparable to that of the Leftist social movements in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s. Moreover, and also over the past thr ee years, the researcher has presented her findings as they were conceptualized and re -conceptualized before groups of students in international affairs courses at USF, allowi ng for further redress of concerns and free academic exchange within the USF community. Furthermore, some findings in this inquiry have been presented to interdisciplinary groups of academics with the following institutions: The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies at The George Washington University, the Hudson Institute, The Center for Advanced Defense Studies, Mercyhurst College, Th e American Military University, and RAND Corporation. Those e xperts come from diverse professional, religious, and national backgrounds. Reception by those academics also has been favorable. One such scholar, Dr. Marc Tyrell, of The Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada, regards the scholarship contained with in this study of Islamisms interplay in higher education as among the best availabl e on what he calls jihadist symbolic warfare (Personal communication by Marc Ty rell, September 2006, in the Small Wars Council/Journal). Symbolic warfare refers to the studys focus on the university as territory for conquest in the Isla mist movements battlespace. Another scholar, Dr. Bat Yeor, from Ge neva, Switzerland, received a copy of the findings in August 2006. Her response was as follows: I want to thank you and congratulate you for your courageous and excellent research on such a difficult and complex s ubject as the takeover and control of Western knowledge and universities by Isla mists. Your analysis is extremely 184

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well researched and supported by an extensive knowledge, good arguments, and investigation on a wide sphere of interrelated domains. I think your work is extremely important since [sic] it exposes and analyzes the diverse and numerous processes converging to the Islamization of knowledge and thought in academia, and a conditioning to mental and academic dhimmitude. (August 2006, personal communication) Moreover, the findings of this study have come to the attention of Professor William Gawthrope, who researches and teaches Islamic sacred law at The Joint Military Intelligence College. He believes that the findings about Islamist subversion of universities in this study i ndependently support his researc h, which suggests that it is impolitic and impolite in Islamic sacred law to criticize Islamic things. Gawthrope understands how imposition of th is tradition in secular univ ersities has hindered free inquiry in civil society around the world. It signifies that, tacitly, university research may have become arrogated by Islamic law. If that is the case, then for Gawthrope this study has major implications for intellig ence analysts who may have become intellectually conditioned in their universi ties toward censorship prior to their government service. Section III: Chapter Summary This chapter reiterates the purpose of the study which was to explore Islamisms interplay with higher education. In addition, it restates the studys research questions and delineates the studys method of analysis, along with the rationale for those methods, as a highly creative process called coding, in which key patterns and themes are parsed out from collected data over a period of time. In this study, coded 185

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186 data emanated from textual analysis of thr ee types of interrelated discourse identified by Johnston (2002): world-historical organizational and individual Therein the chapter discusses the possible characteristics and conditions of Islamism in higher education that make it conducive for bei ng studied through a poststructural method involving Foucaults (1969, 1971, 1974) theory of institutions, which accepts Derridas (1966/1967) arguments that language, or si gnification, is not transcendental and therefore that meaning is not stable. With that in mind, this study ultimately proposed that the researcher engage in an inquiry of how Islamism signifies in other higher education institutions in the world and at USF from 1986-2007. The method is also represented as conforming to commonly accepte d modes of social movements analysis. Those modes of analysis involve a range of subject matter involving inquiry into, inter alia ideologies, basic assumptions, patterns of behavior, religious paradigms, media documents, and judicial texts. Finally, th e chapter weighs in on the studys validity and reliability, through its diligent use of triangulation of theories, methods, and detailed findings. The analytic method applied in this inquiry situat es it into an overall cultural fight in the world today between Islamism and intellectual freedom.

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Chapter Four Re-Islamization in Higher Education in Selected Middle Eastern and African Countries: A Prelude to the USF Case Section I: Introduction In consideration of the case against Al-Arian alleging that he used USF as a platform for terrorism-related activities, the researcher noted that constituents often framed the debate over whether Al-Arian s hould be fired from his tenured teaching position at USF contextually with four major geopolitical problems: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the wars in Iraq, Islamic resurgence, and international Islamic terrorism. For over a decade, opposi ng points-of-view fought for control over the meaning of the conflict in the public milieu. As of August 2007, with the arrests of two students, Ahmed Mohamed and Yousse f Megahed, newer concerns about the earlier case have arisen, incl uding those questioning how mu ch, if any, of Al-Arians activity at USF and in its se rvice area is directly re lated to the new government charges. In other words, are these incidents is olated or are they part of a larger pattern of infiltration at USF? As will be shown in this findings chapter and in context to the next, each about Islamisms interplay in higher education, the answ er to those latest public questions may very well be yes. 187

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Here, the reader may reca ll that Al-Arian, who refers to himself as an enlightened Islamist (qtd. in Time 2002), had been accused of using USF infrastructure and his academic appointment not for purposes of teaching and research, but rather as a front for directing and fi nancing terrorism on behalf of the Islamic Jihads Palestinian faction, the PIJ (see Emerson, 1994, 2002; U.S.A. v. Sami Amin AlArian) The PIJ is a militant splinter group of the Muslim Brotherhood, and, according to Waller (2003), Al-Arian was inducted in to the Muslim Brotherhood when he was a teenager in Kuwait, where he was born. The plea agreement of April 2006 between Al-Arian and the U.S. government attests the veracity of th e accusation, although the former professors supporters now contend that he was pressured into making a false admission (Plea Agreement, 2006; Blac kburn, 2006; Laughlin, 2006; Silvestrini, 2006). Given the terms of the c onflict at USF, the resear cher intuited that a full understanding of the USF conflict necessitated study of the cases historical antecedents, and so the researcher began st udying social and political history texts, written by individuals both sympathetic a nd unsympathetic to Is lamism, wondering if those texts might offer information that mi ght exonerate Al-Arian from the charges against him or, conversely, that might support those charges. What the researcher has discovered fr om pre-existing scholarship and other sources about conflict in the Middle East and Islamism in th e Middle East and Africa is that Islamists in their native countries pe rennially have relied on the accoutrements of higher education (e.g., sympathe tic intellectuals, professiona l associations, students, student groups, curricula, academic freedom doctrine) as means toward achieving their objectives to establish pure Islamic states In the locales studi ed, those objectives 188

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involve the commission of terrori st acts and also lesser acts such as harassment of nonsympathetic colleagues and fellow students in the university milieu. Those actions signify re-Islamization from above. Fro m above is a term employed in political and military science to denote dramatic, direct action aimed at preparing a society for the ultimate objective of whol esale governance change. However, the institution (to use the Foucauldian term), or mass social movement, known as Islamism also appr opriates higher education and other sub-institutions associated with higher education (e.g., professional groups, journals, student groups, external youth groups) in order to enlist movement members, influence public opinion, gain sympathy, control discourse, and expand its base of power in countries and regions where its leaders exist. Those methods signify reIslamization from below. From below is a term employed in political and military science to denote indirect action, especi ally through covert propaganda campaigns and institutional subversion, aimed at prep aring a society for wholesale governance change. As Arendt (1948/1951/1966 /1968/1976/1979/1994), Kepel (2002), and Meddeb (2004) convey in their works about ultra-nationalist mass movements, where there is the above type of strategy, th ere exists the below kind, as well. Therefore, this chapter presents in rich-text style the conditions and characteristics of Islamisms interplay w ith higher education as the re-Islamization program developed across space and time in key Middle Eastern and African countries. Understanding that interplay--replete with its intellectual history embedded in world-historical discourse, organizatio nal discourse, and indi vidual discourse--may help in deepening understanding of the USF case beyond legal issues and in assisting 189

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the USF community in appreciating its role in either mitigating or exacerbating what is arguably this centurys most salient gl obal problem, Islamism. The chapter also attempts to show that Islamists, believing th ey are an elite group of social reformists performing the will of Allah, seek to en act their program in higher education irrespective of government and instituti onal policies. Given Islamic terms of scholasticism defined in Chapter One, combined with extant research on the social psychology of mass movements, terrorists, a nd Islamists in Chapter Two, the findings presented below engender scholarly consider ation that higher education signifies to Islamists a kind of fresh territory for conquest, the dar al-harb, or the domain of war, as part of the overall reformist agenda of re-Islamization from above and below. Research Question The research question for findings in th is chapter is What are the conditions and characteristics of Islamisms interp lay in higher education in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Levant, Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan? Population Samples Population samples for this chapter in clude think-tanks, academic journals, charitable organizations, books about Islamization, manifestos of HAMAS and Islamic Jihad, the writings of leaders and followers, websites, leaflets passed out by religious student groups, academic scholarship, media documents, government affidavits, political history, learned societies, organizati onal networks, and the transhistorical actions of Islamist groups and individuals. Another locale, Iran, also was studied for its sense of inte rplay with higher education bu t was not included in these chapter findings. Iranian Islamism is known widely for its Western-educated leaders 190

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and student movement that t ook over fifty U.S. American hostages on sovereign U.S. territory, the U.S. embassy in Teheran. Furthermore, the Iranian movement whose leaders would form the worlds first Islami c republic in the wa ke of the Iranian hostage crisis is known widely for having become a state sponsor of international terrorism after it assumed totalitarian control of the country in 1979. Nevertheless, when compared to the other locales presented in this chapter, Iran is a unique case in that its student movement is Shia-inspir ed, unlike the more prevalent Sunni forms that exist in the world today. That stated, Irans educational stra tegies and sense of unlimited aims toward re-Islamization from above and below appear remarkably similar to those which are illustrated in the following pages. Section II: Egypts Muslim Brotherhood, The Mother of Re-Islamization in Higher Education: Conditions and Characteristics Conditions of Islamisms Interplay in Higher Education Condition One: The Fall of the Ottom an Caliphate Engenders Ikwhan Ideologies, Strategies, and Legacies Of the wide range of texts about Islami sm studied, the res earcher notes that while higher educations role in fostering th e re-Islamization program is not the thesis of those texts, those texts nonetheless implicate higher educations role without exceptions. In Egypt, the road map of re -Islamization in higher education, and sometimes of it, leads to and from the Muslim Brotherhood, which formed in the aftermath of the fall of the Ottoman caliphate. Later sections below indicate that the 191

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Brotherhood, sometimes referred to as the Ikwhan movement, exerts influence in other higher education systems in the other locales studied. In turn, one might surmise that the case at USF, given the immigration history of Islamist leaders and their operatives from native to foreign countries over the past forty years, might be a more recent chapter to a problem that has persisted in other parts of the world since 1927. That was th e year when Hassan Al-Banna (1906-1949), an elementary school teacher in Egypt, created the Muslim Brotherhood, a group that soon began exerting ideological influence in Egypt, the Palestinia n territories, and other adjacent countries larg ely through the intellectual t hought and teaching of Sayyid Qutb (Bergen, 2001; Schwartz, 2002) a nd other early leaders in the Muslim Brotherhood who were steeped in the id eology of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Al-Wahhab (b.1703) (Gold, 2004). Indeed, Al-Banna seems to have been destined for the task. A sheikhs son educated at Cairos Al-Azhar University, Al-Banna, by the age of twelve, had become the leader of the Society for Moral Behavior and later, the Society for the Prevention of the Forbidden (Mitchell ( 1969/1993). Al-Banna and other members of those groups reached deep into town life by imposi ng increasingly burdensome fines on Muslims who cursed their fellows and thei r families, or cursed in the name of religion and by drafting and circulating secr et and often threaten ing letters to those they regarded as living violation of the t eachings of Islam (Mitchell, 1969/1993: p. 2). Kepel (2002) writes of the overall conditi on of the Muslim world at the time Al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood: Ataturk abolished the Ottoman caliphate in Istanbul in 1924, which for so long had symbolized the unity of the faithful and replaced it with a secular Turkish 192

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nationalist republic. The land of Islam wa s divided up by the Christian powers at the same time that it was being eaten away from the inside. The Muslim Brothers formed their society in Egypt in order to reclaim Islams political dimension, which had formerly resided in the person of the now-fallen caliph. Confronted by the Egyptian nationalists of the time--who demanded independence, the departure of the British, and a democratic constitution--the Brothers responded with a slogan that is still current in the Islamist movement: The Koran is our constitution. Islam, for the Brothers, was a complete and total system, and there was no need to go looking for European values as a basis for social order. Everything was made clear in the Koran, whose moral principles, the Brothers claimed, were uni versal. This doctrine was shared by the entire Islamist movement whatever their other views. (p. 27-28, italics added) What the Muslim Brotherhood called for instead was an Islamic modernity that contrasts European modernity, which Ke pel (2002) describes as the dividing of society, politics, religion, and cultures into separate fields or discourses (p. 28). This divided condition also was referred to in ma ny parts of the Middle East as a period of de-Islamization, a process discussed previ ously in Chapter One as oppositional to the re-Islamization of contemporary Islamic resurgence. Condition Two: Exposure of Salafist Doctrine to Radical Western Ideologies and De-Westernizing Ferment in Western-style Universities From which strands of soci al theory expounded in Egypts modern educational systems did that aforementioned Islamic modernity develop? A glimpse into the ideological background of the Muslim Brothe rhood during its first two decades of formation suggests interplay of Salafism, Marxism, and Nazism. The first two of these ideologies, each discussed in this section, appear to have shaped Ikwhan thought and strategies during the movements first seve ral decades of development, as more and more leaders and followers enrolled in E gyptian and American mass university systems (Mitchell, 1969/1993). The th ird ideology, Nazism, was im ported to Egypt like its Marxist counterpart, but it is discussed separately in the next section because its 193

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influence on Ikwhan students and leaders in Egyp t stems more from their nontraditional learning from Rommels troops in Libya than from traditional classroom learning. Qutb and the early founders of the Muslim Brotherhood owe a salient strand of their intellectual pedigree to the text s and teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Al-Wahhab, who was born in the early 1700s in east-central Arabia (Gold, 2004). While the Tunisian scholar Meddeb (2003) critiques Al-Wahhabs works as being devoid of creativity and independent thought Al-Wahhab was well-traveled in the Islamic worlds major centers of intellect ual thought and teachi ng during the Ottoman Empire. Al-Wahhab concluded th at while Islam had vanquished many earlier civilizations it had nonetheless been corrupted by foreign influences and therefore Islam had lost its sense of unity, or tawhid (Gold, 2004: p. 18). As shall be illustrated later in this chapter, unity is a characteristic term for Islamist higher education theory and practice, especially as conceived by two of the worlds most major countries, Saudi Arabia and Iran, responsible for advoca ting and spreading re-Islamization through government educational channels. In addition, Muslim Brotherhood educa tion also employs similar terms of reference. For example, the idea of unity in Muslim education at all levels is a concept Qutb treats extensiv ely in his most popular work Social Justice in Islam first published in 1953, in which the Muslim Brot herhoods leading theo rist advocates a new means of Islamic education designed to return the Community of the Faithful, the ummah to an original state of purity by de-Westernizing education. Generally, the 194

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task involves being careful when we describe Islam not to relate it to other principles and theories (p. 117), pragmatism being a common philosophical target for Qutb. Drawing theoretically from Al-Wahhabs doctrine of unity, the overarching raison detre in Social Justice in Islam is that Islam is a comprehensive philosophy and a homogenous unity, and to introduce into it a ny foreign element would mean ruining it (p. 117). Furthermore, Qutb compares Islam to a delicate an d perfect piece of machinery that may be completely ruined by the presence of an alien component (p. 117). Thus, later in his work, Qutb argue s that education should not be entrusted to human logic alone; and so, the ente rprise of educati on relies also upon revelation (p. 292). Regarding education as vital to disarming Western systems of capitalism and Communism, Qutb views the growth of the Islamic bloc in Indonesia and Pakistan as positive developments for the awakening of the Arab world, both in the East and West, a process that he hopes will allow the world itself to accept our social system (p. 319). Algar (2002) writes in the work Wahhabism: A Critical Essay that believers in Wahhabism themselves prefer the nominal terms al-Muwahhidun or Ahl al-Tauhid the asserters of divine unity (p. 1) to describe their sect. Nevertheless, Algar (2002) remains critic al of this term, of fering the following argument: But precisely this self-awarded title spri ngs from a desire to lay exclusive claim to the principle of tauhid that is the foundation of Islam itself; it implies a dismissal of all other Muslims as tainted by shirk There is no reason to acquiesce in this assumption of a mo nopoly, and because the movement in question was ultimately the work of one man, . it is reasonable as well as conventional to speak of Wahhabism and Wahhabis. (p. 2) 195

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Algar (2002) agrees with Meddeb (2003) in that in the extremely lengthy and rich history of Islamic thought, Wahhabism does not occupy a particularly important place (p. 2), lacking substantial precedent in Islamic history (p. 10 ), excepting that the intellectually marginal sectarian movement in Islam had the good fortune to emerge in the Arabian Peninsula . and thus in the proximity of the Haramayn, a major geographical focus of the Muslim world; a nd its Saudi patrons had the good fortune, in the twentieth century, to acquire massive oi l wealth, a portion of which has been used in attempts to propagate Wahhabism in the Muslim world and beyond (p. 2). From Wahhabs teachings, the term S alafist came into being, defining Al-Wahhabs followers more by what they opposed than what they advocated, which was to restore what Al-Wahhab contende d was a pure form of Islam practiced by Muhammad and the early caliphs, the al-salaf al-salihin (Gold, 2004: p. 19). As a point of doctrine, Salafism is a critical el ement of Islamist thought and practice, such that after a long period of dormancy outside the Saudi Arabian peninsula--held in check largely through British im perialist rule--the doctrine would become ascendant in the Twentieth Century with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo, whose cofounder Rashid Rida and his mentor M uhammad Abduh had studied Wahhabism and had embraced its Salafist tenets (Algar, 2002; Gold, 2004). Appeal for Salafism grew during the 1930s as Rida published articles about the doctrine in the journal Al-Manar, or The Beacon (p. 54), which upheld the Muslim Brotherhoods manifesto: God is our objec tive; the Quran is our constitution; the Prophet is our leader; struggle is our way; and death for the sake of God is the highest of our aspirations. God is great. God is gr eat (qtd. in Gold, 2004: p. 55); or in its 196

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rhythmic Arabic incantation: Allah ghayatuna./Al-rasul zaimuna./Al-Quran dusturuna./Al-Jihad sabiluna./Al-mawt fi sa bil Allah asma amamina./Allah akbar. Allah akbar (qtd. in Murawiec, 2005: pp. 34-35). That credo, according to Mitchell (1969/1993), was equally useful as a unique mark of the Brother (p. 193, italics added). As Algar (2002) remarks, however the relationship between Wahhabism and the Salafist tenets of the Muslim Brotherhood, so commonly propounded in Middle Eastern university education, rests solely upon intellectual affiliations common to adherents of both doctrines, with no geneti c connection (p. 4) involving two similar intellectual phenomena in Islamic intellectual history. Qutbs intellectual thought and education theory, an outgrowth of the Wahhabi religious doctrine Salafism, arguably repres ents the epitome of interplay of thought translated into action through higher education and other sub-institutions affiliated with higher education in various Middle Eastern and African co untries studied in this chapter. Recall, for example, from Chapter One that Qutbs ideological views turned increasingly militant while he was earning a graduate degree in education in the United States during the 1940s. Kepel (1984/2003) in his seminal work Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh illustrates that Egypts reasoning for sending Qutb to the United States for extended academic study had less to do with the civil servants professional qualifications than it did with the governm ents perception that Qutb, through his publications and scholaractivism, was becoming a nuisance in his dissemination of what Shils (1997) calls i deological politics, in which those who practice it shun the central inst itutional system of the prev ailing society and practice in them for purposes very different from t hose who have preceded them in the conduct 197

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of those institutions, with extra-constitutionality . inherent in their conceptions and aspirations (pp. 26-7). In short, Qutb had become a threat to the state. With no exaggeration his pamphlets can be compared, in terms of spread and influence, with the Communist Manifesto in the period of the early workers movement in Europe and later under communism (Tibi, 1998: p. 56). Similarly, Tibi (1998) refers to Qutbs basic missionary messa ge that world peace could be achieved only under Islam within the framework of jihad as an expression of world revolution (p. 56), based on religious legitimacy and th e use of force in the form of irregular war (p. 58). By international legal standa rds (see footnote for Chapter One), Tibi (1998) writes, this kind of vi olence qualifies unequivocally as terrorism (p. 58). No little irony exists here in that the Mus lim Brotherhood sought to reject Western influences, not assimilate them; yet the orga nization did absorb characteristics of the Wests other totalitarian ideologies despite its wish to divest itself from Western ideologies. The Egyptian government had hoped that an American education in the United States would temper Qutbs radicalism; however, time in the United States in the 1940s seems to have emboldened further his radical mind. In a wholesale break with Enlightenment values that distinguish betw een church and state spheres of influence over peoples private and public liv es (see Kepels introduction to The Trail of Political Islam 2002), Qutb conceived a new doctrine of violent jihad to enforce the Muslim Brotherhoods Salafist tenets. His t hought crystallized while he was earning a masters degree in education in the United States. Then, after returning to Egypt, Qutb refined the doctrine further after learning th at Egypts President Nasser had no plans to 198

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implement Islamic law in the new government created after the 1952 Free Officers coup detat of which Qutb was apparently a key supporter and player. Finding common ground in the communitari an precepts of Marxist thought, Qutb reformulated Islamist ideo logy in his most famous work, Social Justice in Islam (1952), whose title borrows directly from Marx ist rhetoric studied while Qutb lived in the United States (Berman, 2003). Perhaps, given the timing of the two intellectuals teaching and studying in the United States, Qu tb found appeal in the post-World War II Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse, who found in Freud and Marx revolutionary ways to justify two-tiered st andards of liberty and violen ce for aggrieved non-Western social groups. Moreover, as the researcher remarked in Chapter One, the substance of Social Justice in Islam is likewise immersed in totalita rian precepts that outline how a religion conceivably could form the governi ng basis of all aspects of human activity, both public and private. In addition, the work also posse sses another feature common to other twentieth-century totalitarian mass movements (i.e., Fascism and Communism): a belief in the theory of the Jewish cabal. Condition Three: Exposure to European Fascism through Strategic Alliance with the Nazis Another condition that further allowed for the Islamist movement to gain ascendancy in Egypt was its exposure to Eu ropean Fascism, whose own doctrines and strategies were cultivated in German unive rsities (Walker, 1995). That exposure further solidified the totalitarian presuppositions and strategies found in Islamist thought, which, the researcher notes, germinated in the Middle East at the same time that Marxist and Fascist thought germinated in Europe. 199

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In the 1930s Hassan Al-Bannas Muslim Brotherhood established a covert alliance with the Third Reich. By that time, as Fregosi (1998) documents in Jihad in the West, the movement had branched out into the British-occupied Levant. The Ikwhan movement held intentions of using it s alliance with the Nazis to drive the British out of the Middle East. At the same time, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, also a Muslim Brother, in his position of exile in Yugoslavia for a brief time led a division of SS troops comprised entirely of Muslims. Formation of the troops, Fregosi (1998) documents, was short-lived. The Nazis rega rded the undisciplined conduct of the muftis troops with contempt and soon disbanded them. European-Middle East World War II history reveals other, more startling facts about the Ikwhan-Nazi alliance in Egypt. That al liance led to the deployment of Muslim Brothers who were students in Cairo s universities in covert missions into the Libyan desert during Rommels invasion of North Africa (Mitchell, 1969/1993). The purpose was to serve as part of the Nazis disinformation campaign in Egypt and to prepare the country for a Nazi invasion by disseminating anti-British propaganda in Egyptian cities, starting with university campuses. That is a point which underscores the influence of an anti-Semitic work of propaganda and forgery, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, that was translated into Arabic and disseminated through educational and other cultural channels throughout the Arab world be ginning in the 1930s and continuing to the present day (Pipes, 1997). According to World War II documents, Nazi success in North Africa, for which Muslim Brothers worki ng and studying in the universiti es had acted as covert 200

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agents, was supposed to have resulted in a s econd phase of the Final Solution in that region ( The Forgotten Refugees 2005). As the Egyptian counterparts leadership in Yugoslavia had stated upon touring European concentration camps, There were considerable similarities between Islamic principles and National Socialism (qtd. in Fregosi, 1998: p. 221). Yeor (2005), in The Euro-Arab Axis extends discussion of the ideological and strategic influence of the Nazis on the Islamist movement in Egypt with a review of declassified French documents and schol arship about the French governments role in allowing Nazi war criminals living in France to escape conviction by emigrating to Cairo. Having received cover in Egypt in th e early 1960s, they converted to Islam, joined the ranks of the Muslim Brothe rs, and plied their academic knowledge in Egypts educational system. By the late 1950s, however, Fascism, as exemplified in the Nazi movement that had raged across Europe, had fallen out of favor in the West; and so, while the Muslim Brotherhood in several countries in the Middle East had formed alliances with the Nazis during the 1930s and 1940s, the ideology of the group, through Qutbs publications and professorship, underwent a linguistic shift over a period of several decades (Passmore, 2002; Paxton, 2004; Sc hoenfeld, 2004), with the more traditional terms of opprobrium used by Fascists a nd the early Muslim Brotherhood (e.g., Jew, international bankers) replaced with softer Marxist labels (e.g., Zionist, imperialist, military-industrial complex) as a means to make Islamist thought appear more respectable to broad clas ses of constituents. 201

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Condition Four: Alternating Attempts to Appease or Repress the Mass Movement Another condition vital to ward Islamisms interplay in Egyptian higher education involves attempts by the Egyptia n government to appease or repress the movement. Initially, Egypts King Farouk c ourted the Muslim Brotherhood precisely because the mutual aid wing of the group se rved as a means to appease the lower middle classes in the cities, leaving Farouk with fewer groups among the newly literate classes to oppose his author ity (Kepel, 2002). Therefore, during Farouks rule the Muslim Brotherhood was given license to organize in Egyptian univers ities. That is not to suggest, however, that Farouk supported full Islamic law in Egypt in a manner that would appeal to the Muslim Brotherhood; for, during the time of Farouks rule, Egypt had undergone the de-Islamization process, which had led to the unveiling of women and, by the end of Farouks rule, the country had lifted repressive social standards to such an extent that one woman, Doria Sh afik, would become the publisher of four womens magazines simultaneously, a rema rkable accomplishment for any woman in the world in the 1940s (see Nelsons Doria Shafik, Egyptian Feminist: A Woman Apart 1996). Kepel (2002) asserts that as long as the lower middle classes were receiving social and educational assistance from the Muslim Brotherhood--which in the first few years of its formation had transformed itsel f into a mass social movement that soon moved north into the region known as the We st Bank and Gaza and also into Syria, various North African countries, and th e Sudan--Farouks government willingly accommodated the group. Farouks accommodationist policy allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to accumulate more recruits through its 202

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socio-educational outlets; in turn, the gr owth of the movement would coincide eventually in the dissolution of the Egyptian monarchy (Kepel, 2002). The Egyptian monarchys accommodationist policy of non-repression of the Muslim Brotherhood did not end in an absence of political violence and peaceful compromise. To the contrary, and as shown below, the monarchial government of Egypt between the world wars would be the first of many governments around the world that would later regret its initial policies of Isla mist accommodation, inside and outside educational channels In Farouks case, the Mus lim Brotherhood would align itself with a group of Egyptian socialists who would in 1952 overthrow the Egyptian monarchy in a classic military coup. This example is among many in the Middle East and Africa indicating that Islamists are as likely to sow insurrection for the purpose of establishing totalitarian systems of government when existi ng socio-political institutions accept their presence inasmuch as they sow insurrection when sociopolitical institutions reject them. Algar (2000) states that an attempt to assassinate President Nasser on October 23, 1954, led to the governments arrest of nearly one thousand members of the Muslim Brotherhood, which led to the convic tion of seven people, six of whom were hung and one of whom was sentenced to life in prison, and another, Qutb, who was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. The Nasser government also abolished the Muslim Brotherhood as a group with legal rights to operate in Egypt in any kind of institution, including Egypts unive rsities (Kepel, 2002). While Algar (2000) doubts the legitim acy of the convictions, courting the notion that the assassination attempt was a plot conceived by Nasser himself as a 203

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means to justify the Muslim Brotherhoods pol itical repression, Ke pel (2002) views the assassination attempt as the logical outcom e of an Islamist group that already had adopted political violence through its para military wing well in advance of Nassers assumption of power. Kepel ( 2002) discusses in context th at the Muslim Brotherhood had objected to Nassers secular nationa lism, which quickly collided with the Islamism of the Brothers ( pp. 29-30). The conflict led to bloodshed . and their organization was dissolved, their members were jailed or exiled, and several of their leaders were hanged. [The Muslim Brother hood] no longer had a place in a society that was aggressively modernizing under the ba nner of authoritarian nationalism, while moving decisively toward socialism and an alliance with the Sovi et Union (p. 30). When weighed against other evidence besides that which Kepel (2002) presents, Algars (2002) arguments rega rding Nassers complicity in his own assassination attempt seem specious at best with Algar (2002) never mentioning in his introduction to Social Justice in Islam the Muslim Brotherhoods terrorist actions prior to Nassers assumption of power. One not es here, too, that Nasser had no trouble imprisoning non-Islamist people for extended periods of time on le sser charges than seditious conspiracies and a ssassination plots, so he cannot be accused of merely singling out the Muslim Brotherhood and Islam. Indeed, one example of non-Islamist persecution by the Nasser government involves that of the aforementioned Dori a Shafik, whose publications were banned during Nassers rule (Nels on, 1996). During Nassers leader ship, Shafik was arrested and jailed. And later, after a period of in carceration had broken her psychologically, Nassers government commuted her sentence and placed her under house arrest in the 204

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mid-1960s (Nelson, 1996). Unlike the leader s of the Muslim Brotherhood, however, Shafiks repression and confinement did not result in her refining her feminism in a more militant manner. Instead, Shafik committed suicide by jumping from a secondfloor window in her apartment in Zamalek, a swanky international district on Jazeerah (aka Gezirah), an island s ituated between the banks of Cairo and Giza (Nelson, 1996). Nassers repression of the Muslim Brotherhood allowed for yet another transformation of Islamism in which the problem with Islams weakening in the twentieth century was not overt foreign rule or the absence of soci al justice (Algar, 2000: p. 7); but rather, the problem was, accord ing to the next generation of Islamists who followed Qutbs re-formulation of Isla mist doctrine in th e 1960s, the total usurpation of power intensely hostile to Islam, with the result that entire life of society was fixed in the non-Islamic patterns into whic h it had gradually fallen as a result of decay and neglect (p. 8). This is a condition known as jahiliyah which in turn serves as an epistemological device for rejecting all allegiances other than Islam (p. 8). Now, moderate Muslims who might favor de-Islamization could be singled out, in addition to Jews and their alleged conspirators, for expulsion and extermination. Kepel (1984/2004) refers to the new phase of the Muslim Brotherhood during the late Nasser years as the neo-Muslim Brotherhood, a te rm that will be invoked throughout the remainder of this chapter when referring to the Islamist group in its lateand postNasser manifestations. That education of the Muslim Brotherhood occurred in large part through the family and branch sub-units of the Muslim Brotherhoods organizational and administrative structure (Mitchell, 1969/1993). 205

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In a collection of writings Qutb drafte d while in prison--later published as Signposts --the remedy for jahiliyah was jihad by a so-called v anguard of true believing Muslims who would find its way by knowing when to withdraw from and when to seek contact with the jahiliyah that surround it ( Signposts qtd. in Kepel, 1984/2003: p. 45). The strategy of knowing when to withdraw and when to integrate, mirrored the movements of Islams prophe t, Muhammad, who emigrated from Mecca to Medina when he found himself in weak position (p. 46). Therefore, this doctrine also gave rise to a re-formulation of the term hijra which became inseparable from the term jihad and meant going underground and co mmunicating in symbolic language (Tibi, 1998). Kepel (1984/2003) writes that Qutbs works would fill the ideological vacuum (p. 37) that persisted after the deat h of Al-Banna and th e destruction of the Muslim Brotherhoods library at the groups General Headquarters. Although conceived on the basis of Qutbs observati on of the Nasser regime, Kepel (1984/2003) states, the basic analysis of Signposts would retain its validity under Nassers successor as well (p. 37). Qutb thus adju red, These signposts will likewise tell it what role it will have to play to attain its goal, to inform it of its real function. . These signposts will likewi se tell it what position mu st be taken towards the jahiliyah that reigns over the earth (p. 45). How and in what terms should it speak the language of Islam to them? (p. 45), Qutb asks. Interestingly, the Muslim Brotherhoods Society of Muslim Ladies, or the Muslim Sisterhood, which prior to the Nasser governments purges held no significant power in directing the cour se of the movement (Mitchell, 1969/1993), would adopt a significant educational purpose while their husbands and other family members were 206

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imprisoned. Representing a committee on th e Muslim Brotherhoods organizational chart, their actions arguably represented an early manifest ation of concealed advance that enabled the imprisoned Muslim Brothe rs to reconstitute their organization. Formally abolished by the Nasser government in 1954, the Muslim Ladies, led by the wife, Zaynab Al-Ghazali, of one of the imprisoned leaders, assumed the charitable task of providing for the rel eased prisoners (Kepel, 1984/2003: p. 29) who had never been brought to trial. Al-Ghazali s network of relations among Brotherhood sympathizers enabled her to act as a link in the secret reconstitution of the organization (p. 29). Al-Ghazalis role was no less that that of an ambassador in that among her many actions was a pilgrimage in 1957 to Saudi Arabia, where she met with Egyptian exiles, a move that was approve d by the Saudi leaders who opposed Nasser. One of the exiled leaders in the Muslim Brot herhood and she pooled their efforts (p. 28) and planned the groups reorganization. The groups from along the N ile River who met period ically in Al-Ghazalis home were purportedly there for Muslim e ducation (p. 29). However, they soon began coordinating with othe r groups from Alexandria, Damietta, Buhayra, and Cairo who were holding collective discussions about the ordeal of 1954 (p. 30). Kepel (1984/2003) writes of these young ac tivists that they and othe rs attending seminars in Al-Ghazalis home: All became acquainted with the latest literary productions of Sayyid Qutb--in other words, the initial drafts of Signposts Mrs. Al-Ghazali visited Sayyid Qutbs si sters regularly, and th rough this link Qutb received reports about th e work of the seminar, sending his own writings in return. (p. 30) 207

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By 1964, Al-Ghazalis para-educational activities had resulted in a new operational directorate, albeit one th at was in conflict over ho w to seize power. The younger activists wanted to violently overthrow Nassers government, while Al-Ghazali held that the organization could do no more than establish educational programmes lasting thirteen years at a time; th ese would have to be repeat ed until 75 percent of the population were won over (p. 31). Initially taught by Al-Ghazali, the martyrology of the Nasser period is of the utmost importanc e for the subsequent Islamicist movement. The halo of persecution suffered in defence of a faith and a social ideal confers a status of absolute truth upon Islamicist discourse (p. 35). Beginning in the 1960s and into the 1970 s, the neo-Muslim Brotherhood, as illustrated below, made significant transnat ional achievements outside its country of origin, Egypt, and especially with the assi stance of Saudi Arabian wealth and doctrinal support by the Al-Sheikh family who gained control over the kingdoms restructured educational ministry. Nevertheless, insi de Egypt Nassers re pression of the group seems not to have diminished the groups resolve. According to Abdallah (1985), the takfir movement found its way into the student movement of Egypt in the 1970s when Anwar Al-Sadat became president of Egypt after Nassers death. What is known about the student moveme nt in Egypt in the early 1970s allows us to examine more closely a feature of highe r education that is vi tal to the growth of Islamism: students. Egypts student moveme nt in the 1970s exhibited the lines of intellectual conflict discusse d by Kepel (2002) involving diff ering interpretations of Qutbs new doctrine, from the extreme to less extreme: the first, that takfir was a condition all over the world, excepting for a ha ndful of true believers, the vanguard; 208

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the second, that takfir was limited to state leadership; and the third, that takfir was allegorical and therefore that the pure among Muslims should preach and not judge. Whereas the jailed or exiled leaders of the neo-Muslim Brotherhood tended to interpret Qutbs new doctrine in its less extreme form, young radicals in Egyptian and other Middle Eastern universiti es in the early 1970s wishe d to break off all contact with the state and punish society for its pa ssive acceptance of an impious government (p. 32). Therefore, the takfir groups in Egypts universities were inclined toward the most radical interpretation of Qutbs t hought, a condition likely the result of Zaynab Al-Ghazalis assistance in re-educating younger members of the group during their older members imprisonment in the 1950s and 1960s. Kepel (2002) types this new class of student Islamists as adherents to what is commonly known as popular Islam, or an unscholarly strain of Islam in which its imams do not receive training in religious schools or universities, the result of which is the complete reduction of Islam to a political ideology, as opposed to partial in the organizations ma nifestations prior to the 1960s. Tibi (1998) refers to the imams of popular Islam as political imams or underground imams; and Meddeb (2003) accuses them of, inter alia a crude form of anti-intellectualism that on one hand causes th em to desire knowledge but only for the paradoxical purpose of destroying the founda tions of that same knowledge upon which early Islamic civilization ha d made great achievements. As shall be shown below, the Islamist ferment on Egyptian campuses in the 1970s not only conveys re-Islamization in higher education but also provides us with clear evidence of re-Islamization of higher education, as students in Egypts 209

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Western-style mass education systems s ought to impose their ideology on whole campuses. Thus, Qutbs doctrine of zalzalah, or shaking, would take on new meaning in Egyptian society, throug h Egypts mass educational outlets. Thereunto, whereas Nasser had eliminat ed what Birnbaum (1988) would call organized anarchy in Egypts Westernstyle higher education milieu, Egypts new president, Anwar Al-Sadat, would ease campus repression and create new anarchic conditions that sought an Islamist form of social justice through the use of external advocacy groups working in concert student organizations, a trait of higher education discussed in favorable terms by curriculu m experts El-Khawas (1997), Hurtado and Dey (1997), and Soldantenko ( 2001) and also in skeptical terms by Cohen and March (2000). The interplay of extern al groups and internal ones in Egypts universities, of course, was by Al-Sadats assumption of the Egyptian presidency a mainstay of Muslim Brotherhood activity discussed above now reconstituted as the neo-Muslim Brotherhood. This section also demonstrates a persis tent relationship between Muslim student organizations and the commission of terrorist acts, a pattern of activity that would be repeated around the world for the next three decades. As discussed in the cases of Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan below, th e radical student groups that arose in the 1960s and early 1970s were at their most m ilitant in the Nile Valley (Kepel, 2002: p. 81), a condition likely the resu lt of the success of the Mu slim Brotherhood in having established parallel institutions of cultural and political reform in Egypts civil service (Mitchell, 1969/1993). 210

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Kepel (2002) paints a tell ing picture of the Islamist ferment on Egyptian campuses after the reconstitution of the Mu slim Brotherhood into the neo-Muslim Brotherhood, a process that eventually re ceived political support from Nassers successor, Al-Sadat, who lif ted the sanctions against the Muslim Brothers who remained in Egypt as a means to counter Egypts Marxist influences: During the summer preceding the October war of 1973, the Gamaat Islamiya (Islamic Associations) suddenly came to lif e in student circles, on the occasion of the first summer camps organized for their members. Militants and sympathizers attending these camps were in itiated into the pure Islamic life-which involved regular daily prayers, id eological training, an apprenticeship in the skills of the preacher and the tactics of prosyletis m, socializing within the group, and more. A skeleton network of cadres was planned that would eventually make the associations the dominant voice in the universities of the Arab world. (p.81) The Gamaat Islamiyah offere d an Islamic solution to the failure of the Marxism that had come before it. Confounding any ideological matters, too, was Egypts inability to ameliora te the poor condition of its higher education system. Kepel (1984/2003; 2002) describes that system as having learning conditions [that had] degenerated alarmingly and a chasm [t hat had] opened between the cultural aspirations of the students--many of whom were the first in their families to attend university--and their ability to find jobs (p. 82). True to th e educational doctrines of Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood, the solu tion offered by Egypts Islamist students involved questioning modern secular values of instruction (p. 82), which the Gamaat Islamiyah indicted as Orientalist lies ( p. 82). Instead, Egypts students were offered a vision of Islam that was complete and total and could bot h interpret and transform the world (p. 82). In other words, if Marxism was a secular form of a pre211

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modern Christian religion, then Islamism had succeeded in turning itself into a sacerdotal form of a modern secular ideology. Off-campus, in the places wh ere Islamist students lived, the new associations also acted in ways that resembled the earlier Muslim Brotherhood, combining practical services with the in culcation of moral standards (p. 82). Kepel (2002) offers the following example of how campus es were eventually re-Islamized: When the students were confronted with hideously overcrowded transportation systems, the Islamists used generous donations to purchase minibuses for women students. When this service became overwhelmingly popular, they restricted it to those women who wore the veil. Thus, th e privatization of transport became a way of responding Islam ically to a social problem. (p. 82) Kepel writes that initially Al -Sadat and the Islamist st udents enjoyed significant mutual support of each other. The Belie ving President who sought to establish the reign of knowledge and faith saw the Islamist student intelligentsia both as a tool for containing a younger generation that was quick to protest and as a source of cultural and moral values (p. 83). In addition, Al-Sadat made another significant move. He allowed the return of the Muslim Br others-in-exile in Saudi Arabia. Al-Sadat saw these Muslim Brothers, who had become w ealthy during their time abroad, as a means to re-privatize E gypt. With these moderate Islamists, Al-Sadat had hoped to hold the line against more radical groups [i.e., Marxist] whose goal was to subvert society (p. 83). Along with the retu rn of the exiled Muslim Brothers from their professorial posts in Saudi Arabia came a massive distribution of radical texts, so beloved of Wahhabite clerics, made accessible to young people with education (p. 87). These youth had duly absorbed the moral and conservative 212

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message the Saudis intended them to abso rb; the trouble was, Kepel (2002) writes, they had also paid attention to its destabilizing subtext (p. 87). Characteristics of Islamisms Interplay in Higher Education Characteristic One: External and Internal Organizational Networ ks Run by Highly Educated Elites Interacting w ith Universities and their Serv ice Areas for Purpose of Re-Islamization from Above and Below Arendt (1948/1951/1966/1968/1976/1979/1994) in The Origins of Totalitarianism writes that one of the more striking features of totalitarian movements is their creation of non-criminal and crimin al front groups comprised of members and non-member constituents. Arendt calls that technique of duplication (p. 283) a hallmark of totalitarian mass movements. The purpose of those groups is to mimic existing social institutions for the purposes of gaining more membership and support from fellow travelers, establishing a sembla nce of legitimacy, and subverting societies from below. Also, by shielding leaders in the movement from criticism, the front organizations use uninitiated masses to pe rpetuate the leaderships deception and interest in what Arendt calls the decomposition of the stat us quo [of societys existing organizations for teachers, lawyers, students, university professors, etc.] (p. 371). In agreement with Arendts observations Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) writes that education provides any mass movement, incl uding religious ultra-nationalist types, with a setting that appeals to their reformist na tures. In that respect, both scholars agree tacitly with Walker (1979) who, in The Effective Administrator states that pressures on universities from what he calls militant th ird-sector groups (p.21) arise more from their nature than from the na ture of the university itself. However, as Birnbaum (1988) 213

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suggests, universities--and this observation certainly extends to Egyptian ones modeled after Western ones--provide anarchic organi zational cultures that may contribute to their subversion. Viewed in its totality, this section in vestigates how Islamism, as a reformist ideology that relies on above and belo w strategies, organizationally and administratively engages in interplay of sha dow activity with higher education in order to accumulate power. As Mitchell (1969/1993) s uggests, this feature equates to fifth column activity conceived by an organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, which has sought throughout its history the overthrow of existing governments by military coup with the intention to repl ace them with a Western corporate model of governance lacking any separation of powers and lead ership among its plethora of councils and sub-units. The Muslim Brotherhoods sh adowing of higher education during its formative years was consistent with its act ions within Egypts other civil service sectors. The Muslim Brotherhoods highly infl uential version of re-Islamization assumed totalitarian features; or, as Kepe l (2002) writes: Their Islamic version of modernity entailed a complete and total ble nd of society, state, cu lture, and religion, a blend with which everything began and e nded. The social order they envisioned contained no internal contradictions. Polit ical parties were scorned because their quarrels disturbed the unity of the Community of the Faithful [the ummah ], thus weakening it in its struggle with the enemie s of Islam (p. 28). At the same time the organization sought unity through its vision of an Islamic Order, however, the success of the Society of the Muslim Brothe rs derived from its capacity to muster 214

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widely different groups in support of its program, while recruiting members through charitable activities such as dispensa ries, workshops, and schools near mosques (p. 30, italics added). As shall be illustrated thro ughout this chapter and the next, such behavior signifies a characteristic pattern of operation for Islami st groups all over the world. It is a behavior th at is no less paradoxical in that, on one hand, it calls for unity and clarity yet, on the other hand, relies on sociopolitical ambiguity toward its amassing of power. Within that context of operating thr ough schools near mosques (p. 30) and other external groups such as professional associations and presses that would invariably interact with schools near mo sques rests the foundation of the interplay between Islamism and higher education, in which twentieth-century Islamism, through its founding group, the Muslim Brotherhood, exacted higher educations role in furthering the totalitarian goals of the m ovement inasmuch as the movement exacted demands on all social institutions in E gypt and the surrounding region, no matter how antior pro-democratic those institu tions and their governments might be. In the earliest decades of the mass social movement, what began as Egypts accommodation of the Muslim Brotherhood ended in the organizations first period of state repression after student members in the organizations paramilitary wing began agitating in and around university campuses Scholarship on the history of the movement suggests that given the unyi elding posture of the organization for Nizam Islami or the Islamic Order, the organization gradually re structured itself toward militancy and subversion. Some of that rest ructuring appears to have been guided by Qutbs social theory, yet some of it also appears to have been Al-Bannas concern for 215

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controlling conflict w ithin the group and his interest in advancing a direct confrontation with the state, and in concert with a foreign government. Al-Banna was an autocrat, Miller (1996/1997) writes. H is authoritarian ins tincts were also the source of the groups autocratic tendencies, its intolerance of dissent, and the political violence that ultimately gave governments th e pretext to crush it three times, in 1948, 1952, and 1954 (p. 58). Al-Banna was in some ways a prototype of todays modern militant Muslimsly, ambitious, action oriented and willing to embrace violence if it served his ends (p. 58). During that time, the Mu slim Brotherhood began recruiting rovers through its various para-educational s ubsystems first introduced to ensure success of student members enrolled in Egypts e ducational systems. Rovers, or jawwalla were trained in a legally operating organization modeled af ter the Boy Scouts of America. However, the rover system soon assumed a seco ndary purpose. The para-educational indoctrination those students received in the organizat ions summer camps provided them with the requisite intellectual, spirit ual, and physical traini ng to allow for their recruitment into the Muslim Brotherhoods Secret Apparatus (Mitchell, 1969/1993), a far more subversive underground organizati on than the Boy Scouts of America. What would be a totalitarian ideology without violence committed on behalf of a loyal youth movement indoctrinated by a hi ghly educated leadersh ip? Eventually, as Kepel (2002) demonstrates, the ambiguity of the Muslim Brotherhood movement to appeal to the two opposing strands of populis t intellectuals, Marxis t and Fascist, in Egypts socio-educational milieu culminated in the movements first wave of political violence associated with the demise of the Egyptian monarchy. As with the Twentieth 216

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Centurys other totalitarian mass movements, Communism and Nazism, the Muslim Brotherhoods appeal to the la rger societys hatreds and pr ejudices against Jews also figured into the intellectual equation. In a ddition, at that time terrorism had become ascendant within the Muslim Brotherhoods ranks. While one gr oup of intellectuals unabashedly championed the practice as a laudatory feature of the Muslim Brotherhood, another group attempted to disavow terrorism by claiming that the groups humanitarian wing bore no responsibility for the actions of th e groups terrorist wing: The Secret Apparatus, which was the paramilit ary arm of the Brothers, went so far as to practice systematic terrorism. The proponents of a fascist interpretation of the Brot hers ideology saw in this violence a corroboration of their analysis, while those who viewed th e Brothers as progressives imputed the violence to an extreme wing of the movement. (p. 29) Mitchells (1969/1993) account of the Secret Apparatus (al-jihaz al-sirri ) in the seminal work The Society of Muslim Brothers indicates that its development in the organization coincided with Al-Bannas se nse of threat to the existence of the organization. As evidence, Mitchell (1969/1993) shows how a 1942 speech by Al-Banna to his followers immediately pr eceded a 1942 or 1943 creation of the special section, as it was known inside th e society, and the secret apparatus, outside: When asked what is for which you call, re ply that it is Islam, the message of Muhammad, the religion that contains w ithin it the government, and has one of its obligations freedom. If you are told that you are politi cal, answer that Islam admits no distinction. If you are accused of being revolutionaries, say, We are voices for right and for peace in which we dearly believe, and of which we are proud. If you rise against us or stand in the path of our message, then we are permitted by God to defend ourselves against your injustice. (qtd. in Mitchell, 1969/1993: p. 30) 217

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The Secret Apparatus, like all elements of the Muslim Brotherhoods organizational administrative structure maintained sp ecific membership ranks: assistant ( musaid ), related (muntasib ), active ( amil ), and struggler ( mujahid ). In addition, the Secret Apparatus developed as an offshoot of the specified rovers ( jawwala ) and battalions ( kataib ), subgroups of Bodily Training who developed in the late 1930s in response to the Muslim Brothe rhoods concerns for British activity in Palestinian territory, the inspiration for activism within the Society (Mitchell, 1969/1993: p. 30). By the 1940s, subversion on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood had begun. While the Muslim Brotherhood formally clai med to support the British in colonial Egypt when the Nazis invaded Egypts Western, or Libyan, desert in the 1940s, the organization continued in informal capaci ty to agitate by spreading pro-Axis propaganda, largely by member students w ho demonstrated in favor of Erwin Rommels advance toward Egypt (Mitchell, 1969/1993). These students were part of the Muslim Brotherhoods rove rs and battalions, thus esta blishing a tradition in the organization in which militancy and education coexisted. The result of the Muslim Brotherhoods support of Nazi aggression in North Africa was that in 1941 the Egyptian government would accuse Al-Banna of neglecting his work as a civil servantteacher, would suppress some of the Muslim Brotherhoods journals, and would detain and later releas e certain members susp ected of subversive activity. Al-Banna, in turn, adopted a pub lic relations campaign, entreating the subunits in his organization to propagate the idea that the Muslim Brotherhood was experiencing its first mihna (persecution). At the same time, Al-Banna would 218

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establish rapport with An war Al-Sadat, who was among the members of the Free Officers group whose revolutionary ideas had taken root in the Egyptian army in the late 1930s. The record indicat es that Al-Sadat had been overjoyed to see that [AlBanna] had already started collecting arms ( p. 26), which flowed to Al-Banna through Muslim Brotherhood agent-followers in army ranks (p. 26). In addition to the wartime activity agai nst the British, in their paramilitary capacity, the rovers more importantly pres erved order within the Society and its defense against enemies from outside ( p. 202). Also called the rover troops ( firaq al-jawwala ), the rovers were the Muslim Brot herhoods prime source of power, the machine by which the alleged revolution wa s to be effected (p. 203). With close associations and task overlap by the Secret Apparatus with the close-knit families of the Muslim Brotherhoods Field Apparatuse s, the organizations spiritual-military training program was a prime inspiration to violence (p. 203). As the result of the destabilizing terrorist actions attributed to the Secret Apparatus in the late 1940s, a socialist order eventually assumed powe r in 1952, which the Muslim Brotherhood welcomed because the new government dissolv ed all political parties in Egypt and because of the Free Officers social rese mblance to the Muslim Brotherhoods welleducated leadership (Kepel, 2002). Another element of the Brotherhoods organizational and administrative structure that involves interplay between Is lamism and higher education is what is called in British terms, the academic branch of the movement. By the late 1940s academic branches shadowed nearly all academic departments in Egypts higher education system (Mitchell, 1969/1993). Academ ic Branches were also sub-units in the 219

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organizations overarching Field Apparatus, in turn shadowed by the aforementioned Secret Apparatus. Furthermore, their ranks overlapped with social groups outside the universities that the Ikwhan called families. The Muslim Brotherhoods Field Apparatuses were the administrative channels through which the voice of high command passed to the operating membership groups and through which the membership was welded to the highly disciplined instrument it was ( pp. 175-176). The administrative unit ( al-maktab al-idari ) represented the largest unit in th e field and typically coincided with the provincial divisions used by th e Egyptian government (p. 176). That office, in turn, was partitioned into districts ( manatiq ), also imitating the organization of the Egyptian government. Mitchell (1969/1993) st ates that the purpose of the Field Apparatuses following provincial divisions and districts in Eg ypts government was that they had the obvious value of bene fiting from the communication lanes between and among the various divisions and sub-divisi ons already in official use by Muslim Brothers who were in Eg ypts civil service. Of course, re-Islamizing Egyptian soci ety through the Muslim Brotherhoods network of para-educational out lets that networked with Egypts formal educational institutions could not occur without the infusion of funds For that reason, Mitchell (1969/1993) claims that the most important of all the sub-units of the Field Apparatuses was the branch ( shuba ); for it possessed powerful administrative roles in the form of a chairman, two deputies, secretary, and treas urer for each branch. From the very bottom levels, then, of the Mus lim Brotherhood the revenues of the society were collected from the various Field A pparatuses and Technical Operations, whose 220

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books were kept by their treasurers, and then circulated upward to th e highest offices of the organization. Revenues came from a range of sources: membership fees [collected by the family in each branch), contributions, legacies, and the profits from its economic enterprises, publications, and sales of embl ems, pins, seals, and the like (p. 180-181). Designated fixed shares were dispersed up the organizational r ungs. Additional funds came from non-member contributions usually in the form of endowments, gifts, land grants, buildings, and other material s ponsorship. As such, Mitchell (1969/1993) writes, The General Headquarters was, in effect, at the mercy of a strangely decentralized fiscal structure (p. 181). Usually the branches were named accordi ng to their geographical locations, but not always, in the case of academic branches, discussed below. Accordingly, officers and administrators of the Muslim Brothe rhood were responsible to their respective offices and districts; but for most members allegiance was to a branch, which consisted of a council of administration el ected by a general assembly composed of registered and paid-up members of the br anch (p. 177). Regular branches Mitchell (1969/1993) describes as a miniature headquart ers (p. 179). In re ading about regular branches in Mitchells book, one finds that within the branches exist sections and committees that mirror other ones called Tec hnical Operations. In other words, there were sections for, inter alia propagation, bodily training a nd rovers (which were part of the Secret Apparatus), prayers, and stude nts. And there were committees for law and policy issues, statistical information, servic es, and financial matters. In addition, each branch maintained a reading room, imita ting the General Headquarters. Also, each branch cooperated in local educational pr ograms and initiatives. Finally, through the 221

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branches, family activities could take shap e, with each family consisting of five to ten members, overlapping membership w ith the branch, and being collectively responsible for the actions of its member s. Among the activities of families were therefore disciplinary actions by branch l eaders taken against members who were in violation of the Muslim Brotherhoods principles. The term family, represented the Mu slim Brotherhoods most fundamental educational enterprise for creating co hesion among the organizations ranks. Originating in 1949, the purpose of the family was to correct what, in their opinion, is the erroneous image of the system identifyi ng it with the more notorious cell, an image fostered by the extensive press cam paign launched by the government (p. 195196). One member was elected chief ( naqib ) and represented his fa mily to the branch; four families equaled a clan ( ashira ); five clans constituted a group ( raht ); five groups signified a battalion (katiba). The family system served, moreover, as means to reinforce the loyalty oath, especially as the Muslim Brotherhood became concerned about infiltration of its ranks from outside sources. In addition, as the Muslim Brotherh ood acquired new members from the universities, families increased in their impor tance as a means to counter the bigness of mass education: There took the idea of unit breakdowns for the purposes of instruction in the aims and meaning of th e movement (p. 196). Often family systems overlapped in membership with the Mu slim Brotherhoods Battalions of the Supporters of God ( kataib ansar Allah ), numbering forty each, consisting of workers, students, civil servants, and me rchants (p. 196). The high command of the family system was located in the general head quarters of the family section (p. 198). 222

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Mitchell (1969/1993) writes that acad emic branches were organized differently from the ordinary geogra phic branches (p.180) that mirrored the organizational and administrative structur e of Egypts other social and political institutions. Instead, academic branches were arranged in accordance with university needs and organization (p. 180) Illustrating the significance of higher education to the Muslim Brotherhood, in general, Mitc hell (1969/1993) states of the academic branches: The head of the university branch was the recognized leader of the university Brothers; his was a powerful voice in the leadership echelon of the Society in general, among the student Brothers, and among other students. Control of the position was once of the most certain assurances of mobility to the highest ranks in the Society. (p. 180) In fact, in Cairo in the 1 940s and 1950s some leaders of the university branches became so powerful that they incurred th e animus of other Muslim Brotherhood leaders who held high positions in the organizations ranks. They also became enemies of the state itself as they mobilized st udents and the communities adjacent to their universities to challenge Egypts va rious governments (M itchell, 1969/1993). About the academic branch es, Mitchell (1969/1993) also discusses a distinct organizational pattern that mirrored the organization of Egypts higher education institutions. Typically, the para-organizational pattern was as follows: Directly responsible to th e university leader were the leaders of each of the various faculties; the faculties were in turn divided into groups representing each of the four years of schooling. The heads of each year-group were responsible to the faculty heads for th e performance of the members of their group. This breakdown permitted an efficient organization of the university Brothers into units small enough to be rapidly assembled and large enough to be effective in their respective facultie s. Liaison between faculties was in the hands of the leader of the university. Pe rhaps no other facet of the activity of the Brothers in the university so astounded (and infuriated) their opponents there as the ability of the leaders to communicate direc tions and decisions 223

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throughout the ranks of the Brothers with such speed and to have them perfectly obeyed. (p. 180) There was overlap between these faculties and the families, for the training of faculties translated into para-educati onal training for the Muslim Brotherhoods family system, with a more clearly defined body of lear ning and a more efficient system of teaching and teachers (p. 200). Characteristic Two: Codified Education Theo ry for Purposes of Promoting Monolithic View of Islam and Subverting Universities and Surrounding Society from Above and Below The development of the organizational structure and administration of the Muslim Brotherhood discussed above co incided, according to Mitchell (1969/1993) with the recodification of the Muslim Brot herhoods educational theory as being scientific and stated in more sophisticated terms that would appeal to Egypts civil servant professors and their students in th e countrys universitie s. In essence, the Brotherhood thus set out to establish a hidden curriculum in higher education that over the course of several decades would evolve into a codified educational theory. That sense of scientism embedded in a proscribed educational doctrine is a characteristic of totalitarian movements, accord ing to Arendt (1941/1948/1949/1951/1966/ 1968/1976/1979/1994). Originally, Al-Banna framed the Mu slim Brotherhoods ideal educational curriculum for primary, secondar y, and tertiary leve ls in terms of theological matters and also Islamic and Egyptian history (Mit chell, 1969/1993). However, the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood led to a noticeabl e change in tone and emphasis (p. 189). The education of Muslim Brothers shifted from basic religious and propagandistic 224

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messages toward a more sophisticated tack: This meant a more consciously scientific approach to the problem of Islam. The section for the propagation of the message now began to make use of the ta lent available to it among its professional members in the fields of law, economics, society, education, chemistry, engineering, and zoology (p. 189). In addi tion, Al-Bannas death compe lled the society to look to its hitherto untapped intelli gentsia to find answers to the ever-increasingly complex challenges to its premises coming from out side its ranks. Substance, not slogans, became a priority (p. 189). Underpinning the movements interest in turning the quest for Nizam Islami -the delicate, perfect pi ece of machinery that Qutb wrote about in Social Justice in Islam --into a problem of scientific research and teaching were Technical Operations sections in the Muslim Brotherhood. These were responsible for the creation, maintenance, and dissemination of knowledge conceived within Egypts universities among the academic branches and their student s. One of these operations sections was the movements library in the Brother hoods General Headquarters. Tellingly, the Muslim Brotherhoods library was a gift of Egypts former ruling family before Farouk, and thus signified th e defunct Ottoman caliphate the Muslim Brotherhoods had hoped to revive (Mitchell, 1969/1993). The library housed all pub lications penned by Muslim Brotherhood members. Of historical note, King Farouks government burned the literature written by the Muslim Brotherhood in 1948, when the groups Secret Apparatus began instigating ci vil disturbances that challe nged the legitimacy of the government (Mitchell, 1969/1993). The remai nder of Prince Muhamm ad Alis original collection was donated to another group, the Society for Islamic Education (SIE), 225

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which had interests in the Al-Azhar Univ ersity, where some of the early Muslim Brotherhoods leaders had been trained in Islamic studies (M itchell, 1969/1993). In 1951, when the Muslim Brotherhood became legal again, the SIE sold the Ali collection back to the Muslim Brother hood. Then in October 1954 the library was destroyed by fire in a riot in Cairo. The suppression, sale, resale, and burning of the library at the General Headquarters further si gnifies the importance of the creation and dissemination of knowledge to an educated elite interested in re-Islamizing the society and culture in which they lived. Ideological transmission of a re-codified scientif ic doctrine also involved the Brotherhoods nashr al-dawa section for propagating th e organizations religious message. That section maintained close relati ons with other sections such as labor and peasants, students, liaison with the Islamic world, profe ssions, press and translation, policy, legal issues and opinions, and serv ices. In 1951, press and translation was relocated in the organizational structure as a committee. Sections and committees possessed both advisory and investigative roles, leaders for each group were named by the General Guide or Guidance Council, a ssistants were appointed by the Guidance Council, and locations were usually at the general headquarters (Mitchell, 1969/1993). Of special note is that the press and translation committee was responsible for publishing the Muslim Brotherhoods newspaper and magazines; and collecting, filing, and translating the materials into different languages (Mitchell, 1969/1993). These particular sections a nd committees therefore bore a major responsibility in the spiritual and intellectual training of the member s of the Muslim Brotherhood, including members in countries were Arabic was not the primary language. Mitchell (1969/1993) 226

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states that more important than the committees in the actual operation of the Society were the sections, because they were so intimately and directly involved in the orientation and training of the members ( p. 171). In addition, ch airmanships of most of the sections were prizes which carried with them the possibility of real power within the structure (p. 171). The most salient of the sections was nashr al-dawa if only because the Muslim Brotherhoods primary interest wa s disseminating ideology compatible with the spirit of Islam (p. 171), as the Muslim Brotherhood referred to it. The educational aspects of the groups propa ganda were disseminated through missionaries ( duat ) for speeches and lectures, who were particularly well-trained for public meetings outside th e society; publications of a scientific, cultural, and athletic nature, none of which might be issued by any individual Brother without authorization of the section; guida nce--spiritual, mental, and physical--of each brother towards an Islamic preparation by means of lectures, publications, and organized athletic activit y (p. 172). In addition, nashr al-dawa was responsible for supplying the branches with speakers and lect urers and provided all Field Apparatuses with a unified schedule of study for the mi ssionary school which each of them was to maintain, the successful graduates of which would be elevated to the level of organizational missionaries (p. 172). Kepel (1984/2003) devotes significant text to the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhoods press and translation section to the students section. In his analysis of the organizations history, Ke pel illustrates how throughout Egypts history the press and translation section, through its magazine Al-Dawa motivated the ranks of 227

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the more radicalized student member s on Egyptian campuses. Buoyed up by the magazines staple content, tales of what Kepel calls the Al-Dawa editorial boards Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse (in rank of abomination Jewry, the Crusade, communism, and secularism) served as a ki nd of predictor of incitement to violent action that would start on unive rsity campuses and then spr ead as a social contagion into nearby communities. As a manifestati on of the students ideological outlook, the magazine offered long and heavily documented articles . aimed at a readership of a higher intellectual leve l than its other competitors (p. 104). Aside from the magazines journalists p ublishing exposes such as the one involving the forgery known as the Richard Document and printing instructi onal columns for children on the need to annihilate Jews, Kepel (1984/2003) concludes in his analysis of sixty-four months of issues: It need hardly be emphasized that Al-Dawa . offered readers a vast fresco depicting the triumph of Islam . id entifying the innumerable enemies, overt or covert, whom the magazines jo urnalists tracked down and denounced relentlessly in their zeal to expose the equally innu merable plots against Islam. (p. 110) Many of the editors targets for blacklisting were professors, Muslim and non-Muslim, accused of contributing through th eir orientalist scholarship to the alleged condition of aposta sy in Egyptian society. The Ikwhan movements publishing history ex tends to the support of members in Egypt who were not Egyptians but Palestinians studying and teaching in Egypt who would become the founding members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). The result was that the Ikwhan publishing record, replete with a subtext of violence and call to arms, assumed a decidedly international character. 228

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In 1979 a publishing house of the neo-Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Mukhtar Al-Islami published a pamphlet written by Al-Shiqaqi, Khomeini, the Islamic Solution and the Alternative Mayer (1990) documents that this work was dedicated to Muslim Brotherhood founder, Al-Banna, and Irans Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Mayers analysis of the pam phlet indicates no deviation from any aforementioned discussion of Muslim Brothe rhood ideology on Al-S hiqaqis part: he indicted Western and Eastern imperialism as a means to dominate Muslims by confusing ideologies and reminded his reader that the Jews were enemies of Islam and agents of imperialism likely in league with both the United States and the Soviet Union (p. 144). Al-Shiqaqi further posited that the Muslim Brotherhood movement was the sole group that enjoyed genuine popular support in or der to resist imperialism (p. 145). The alliance of a Sunni fundamenta list group in Egypt and a Shia one in Iran belies commonly held notions on the part of Western observe rs that sectarian beliefs among Islamist groups in different locales pr eclude there being a monolithic Islam that overlooks such differences. According to Zamel (1991), in masters thesis approved by an interdisciplinary committee of USF professors prior to the creation of USF-WISE in 1991, Nafi published and edited a journal, al-Taliah al-Islamiah ( The Islamic Vanguard ) specifically for the [Palestinian Islamic Ji had], which was sent to the occupied territories for reproduction, in the same sh ape and form, and dist ribution (p. 192; see also Emerson, 2002). As noted above, the term vanguard derives from Qutbs Signposts the collection of writings that further radicalized the 229

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neo-Muslim Brotherhood in E gypt. Nafis experience with The Islamic Vanguard also appears to have been part of a close pub lishing relationship that Al-Shiqaqi and Nafi held with one another in the service of their objectiv es for the PIJ (Emerson, 2001b). For example, Al-Shiqaqis colleague, Na fi, served on the editorial board of Al-Mukhtar Al-Islami (Emerson, 2001), which Kepel (2002) stat es is a part of the neo-Muslim Brotherhoods trinity of publications a nd in which Al-Shiqaqi had published the article noted above. Chapter Five findings show that former USF-WISE professor, Ramadan Shallah, cited himself as an editor of the same publication on his vita given to the university as a former editor of the same magazine. Kepel (1984/2003) states that the Arabic title of the magazine means Islamic Selection and was conceived as a kind of Muslim version of the Arabic-language edition of Readers Digest whose typography and layout it copied (p. 104). It was printed monthly starting in 1979 and endi ng in September 1981, when Egypt banned the publication because of its pr opaganda supporting Sheikh Ahmad Al-Mahallawi, a graduate of Al-Azhar University who had renounced teaching for preaching, where he officiated in the gr eat mosque Qaid Ibrahim, not far from university campus (Kepel, 1984/2003: p. 252). Of his relationship with the campus, Kepel further writes: His influence on the students who came to listen to his sermons and lectures was great, and he did all he could to facili tate their reviews for exams. He even installed microscopes in the annexe s of the mosque to help those enrolled in scientific disciplines, ther eby implying that Islam and science were compatible. (p. 252) In 1985, Al-Mukhtar Al-Islami re-appeared in Cair o (Kepel, 1984/2003). 230

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Another Palestinian academic, Abd Al-Sat tar Qasim, also wrote favorably of the Iranian revolution and attempted to have his work published in Egypt and in Jordan. Both countries refused to publish it in its unabridged form, but the work was published in full in 1981 in the West Bank (Mayer, 1990). Qasim and Al-Shiqaqi garnered support mainly from the Islamic Student Movement for the Islamic Jihad through their other publications like Al-Bayan in the early 1980s. Those publications, too, revered the teachings of Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb (p. 153) and were disseminated on Palestinian campuses. Eventually, these new militant leaders who had spent their student days as part of Egypts neo-Mus lim Brotherhood student cadres were arrested and released by Israeli author ities for having been charged with membership in an illegal organization and with agitation (p. 154). For a period of time after that AlShiqaqi and the other leaders in the new militant movement stopped public statements about committing jihad against Israel until 1987, when the intifada erupted (Mayer, 1990). Mayer (1990), like Kepel (2002), illustra tes that Al-Shiqaqi was not alone in Egypt in demonstrating a pr o-Iranian fundamentalism, ev en though he was a Sunni and not a Shia Muslim. Muslim students at the universities in Egypt were in the habit of distributing a samizdat publication called The Voice of Islam which applauded Irans revolution and its leadership and other suppor t came directly from the leaders of the neo-Muslim Brotherhood itself. For his view s, Al-Shiqaqi and others came under close scrutiny by the Egyptian government, whose president Al-Sadat was personal friends with the Shah of Iran. Al-Shiqaqi was jailed for three months until the government was satisfied that he was not receiving support from Iran for his publication. However, his 231

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file remained open. Mayer (1990) writes that following Al-Sadats assassination, AlShiqaqi was among the many agitators in E gypt on the governments list for detention and interrogation; however, by that time Al-Shiqaqi had left Egypt and had returned home to the Gaza Strip. Nafi, who interacted closely with Al-Shi qaqi while they were students in Egypt (Hatina, 2001), also could not remain in Egypt after the assassination of Al-Sadat. According to court records Ma yer (1990) procured from the Egyptian government, Nafi was arrested and interrogated by the Egyptian government because he had given refuge to a suspect in Sada ts assassination (p. 148) After his release, in 1982 Nafi left Egypt and went to London where he became active in the publication of a Muslim Students Federation journal, which was funded by an Iranian-run group called the Islamic Center for Studies and P ublishing. Nafi maintained his relationship with Al-Shiqaqi during this time and provided copies of the publica tions to Al-Shiqaqi, who distributed them in Gaza Strip mos ques via Muslim students (p. 149). These clandestine publications dissemi nated freely on campuses in the Palestinian territories, but especially at the Islamic University; th ey leaned heavily on the writings of Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb; and they lauded actions such as Sada ts assassination (p. 149). The people Al-Shiqaqi used to dist ribute the publications also included employees at the Islamic University and an imam from a local mosque who doubled as a professor at the Islamic University (Mayer, 1990). By 1984, the Sunni-Shia alli ances forged in Egypt, Lebanon, and Gaza, largely through the leadership of Islamic Jihad or ganizations in those places, had become a major concern of Egyptian and Jordanian govern ments. In fact, at some point Nafi had 232

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been convicted of seditious conspiracy by the Jordanian government after hearings revealed the Islamic Jihads role in instig ating civil disorder. Indeed, Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Ubaydat told Jo rdans parliament that the tr ansfer of explosives into Jordan from Egypt, Lebanon, and Gaza was occurring on almost a weekly basis. He further testified that those explosives were connected to groups, both inside and outside Jordans borders, with ties to Iran (May er 1990), which included the Islamic Jihad. One of the organizations was the Jihad organi zation, active in Egypt, which recruited both civilian and military Jordanians to fo rm a branch in Jordan (p. 151). Of course, one must study a profession before one can become a professional; and, in the Muslim Brotherhood, members in th e professions, too, we re to color their work with Islamic atmosphere. Professions sections had committee subdivisions representing also the different classes of workers in Egyptian society: doctors, engineers, lawyers, teachers, merchants, agri culturalists, social workers, journalists, and civil servants. All held membership in the larger society but remained active in professional associations involved with the universities or they worked in Egypts universities (Mitchell, 1969/1993). Mitchell (1969/1993) argues that the most important in Egypt were the teachers and civil servants committees because these were the largest professions, and because of their potential role as molders of opinion and instruments of a new generation of Muslims in Egypts universities and other educational outlets (p. 172). Another section of vital significance to the Muslim Brotherhood was the liaison with the Islamic world. This section posse ssed the task of spreading the message about Islam and the Brothe rs throughout the Muslim world through the existing 233

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nation and Islamic organizat ions in the various Muslim countries; studying the problems of the Islamic world i n light of the various internat ional political currents in cooperation with the policy committee of th e general headquarters; and organizing an annual meeting to be attended by leaders and representatives of the Islamic movement throughout the Muslim world--wheth er of the Society of the Brothers, or from any Islamic or reform organization--t o discuss matters relevant to the Muslim world and the potential unification of the rules and regulations by which the various groups governed themselves (pp. 172-173). This section collected dossiers on each country and its demographic data and major socio-political issues. Also, it collected information of the growth of the Islami c movement therein (p. 173). Furthermore, it studied problems in each country through organized research, le ctures, publications, and study groups (p. 173). Finally, the liais on section engaged in exchange of missionaries (p. 172). Combined with the power of the organi zation to make effective use of its professional talent in reinfo rcing the movements ideology and its objective to establish a pure Islamic state, the missionaries in the propagandizing sections also remained vital to the organizations re-Islamization program And throughout its history the Society, in the traditional Islamic fashion, never mi nimized the effect of a good speaker (p. 190). The missionaries, many w ho were trained in Egypts teachers colleges and received an Islamist spin on their ed ucation through the Muslim Brotherhoods educational circles, were required to be good speakers, though they were also expected to bring into what had been al most a purely theological operations more secular currents of learning (p. 190). 234

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In accord with re-Islamiza tion in higher education, sy mpathetic intellectuals of various and even oppositional stripes in Egypts universities supported the Muslim Brotherhood in its fledgling days. In that re spect, the utility of sy mpathetic intellectuals who are not necessarily party members in E gypt resembles those same features that Blumer (1946/1951/1963) writes of mass social movements, generally, and that Sabine (1937/1950/1959) and R. Pipes (2001) write of Nazism and Communi sm, particularly. By the 1930s, Kepel (2002) writes, two major classes of intellectuals had found appeal in the Muslim Brotherhood, owing to the ambiguous nature of the movements stated ideology: L eft-leaning Arab inte llectuals . regarded the Brothers as a populist movement whose aim was to en list the masses and dilute their class awareness with a vague religious sentiment, a tactic that, ironically, played into the hands of the established order (p. 28). Ye t again, Kepel (2002) illustrates that this populist view also pointed out similarities to the workings of European fascism during the same period, the 1930s (p. 28), when th e Nazis had begun their period of social preparation for the Holocaust, in part, by pol iticizing social theory and research in Germanys universities. Perhaps what Kepel (2002) alludes to in that respect--he never states why, specifically--involves either the in fluence of the Russian forgery The Protocols of the Elders of Zion on the Muslim Brotherhood (see disc ussion about the influence of the Jewish cabal theory on Muslims and totalitar ian social movements in Chapter One). However, Schoenfeld (2004) offers an alternative explanation, which implies that Qutb actually had conceived of an Islamist scienc e and education that w ould counter what he perceived as anti-Islamic forces that, in tu rn, were by-products of the Jewish cabal the 235

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Egyptian scholar wrote about in an academic journal he had founded when he was a civil servant-professor in Egypt. In addition, Al-Bannas Muslim Brotherhood eventually acquired a scientific educational theory based on Qutbs own articulations (Mitchell, 1969/1993). As will be shown later in this chapter, Saudi Arabian educational influence would lead to more systematically rendered versions of Islamist science and education. In that respect, Qutb again seems to have drafted the earliest of charts for such educational routes of re-Islamization vis a vis research, teaching, and publishing. A sub-section below shows that the educatio nal theory, practice, and mission of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) closely resembles Qutbs. Moreover, some of the IIITs leaders and associates we re and may still be members of the Muslim Brotherhood (see Emerson, 2002; Waller, 2003; Katz, 2004; Mi ntz & Farah, 2004). The prevalence of a belief in the Jewish cabal presents itself as a major theme in the Muslim Brotherhoods teachings th rough both its para-educational and civil service education outlets. For example, in an essay from the early 1950s in Al-Manar Our Struggle with the Jews, Qutb conte nds that the de-Islamizationist intellectual power in the Arab world manifested from a secret alliance with the Jews who maintained a massive army of agents in th e form of professors, philosophers, doctors and researchers--sometimes also writers, poets, scientists an d journalists (Qutb, 1952/1970; qtd. in Schoenfeld, 2004: p. 42). In addition to the implication that these so-called Jews might be actual spies, anot her implication is that in his famous essay Qutb had conceived of a Jewish science not unlike the Jewish science conceived by Nazi Germany in the late twenties that saw the demise of Germanys once great 236

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institutions of higher learning wherein hard and soft sciences became subservient to the directives of a monolithic state doctrine (see Walker, 1995 ) Qutbs antidote for that aforementioned suffering from Jewish doubledealing, wickedness, deception, plotti ng, and evil-doing was not subjugation-for that would only drive Jews to commit further conspiracy against Muslims--but wholesale offensive through expulsion from Arab lands and through killing. Qutbs strategy must have had some effect on Egyptian policy because between 1944 and 2004, the population of Arab Jews in E gypt dwindled from 80,000 to 40, as postcolonial Muslim-Arab governments sequestered lynched, and expelled their ethnic coreligionists throughout the Central Arab states and North Africa ( The Forgotten Refugees 2006). In addition, Social Justice in Islam repeatedly underscores the need to purge education at all levels from so-called alien and foreign influences, including Jews, because policies in this world cannot be divorced from such philosophies like the intellectual background pragmatism which Qutb holds responsible for the U.S. and U.N. position on the Palestine qu estion (pp. 292-293). Furthermore, Our Struggle with the Jews--a work that was re -published in Saudi Arabia for the first time in 1970 (Schoenfeld, 2004)-even goes so far as to justify Nazi Germanys actions as precedent for further struggle: Allah br ought Hitler to rule over them and so present-day Muslims must follow in Hitlers path, letting Allah bring down upon the Jews people who will mete out to them th e worst kind of punishment, as confirmation of his unequivocal promise (qtd in Schoenfeld, 2002: p. 43). 237

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The repetition of the term struggle to de fine the task also echoes, of course, another publication associated with the Nazi movement, Mein Kampf translated as My Struggle, which was Hitlers re-formulation of his own particular radical thought written while the future leader of Germa ny was in prison. Anyone who has ever read Hitlers vision of a pan-German society in Mein Kampf will note immediately the ideological similarity to Qutbs work in th at both overtly blame Je ws for the decline of civilization and loss of tran snational unity of a group of people--Aryans for Nazism, Arabs for Islamism. Even their remedy is si milar: societys return to a pre-modern condition in which sacred and profane spheres of life, the privat e and the public, are rendered indivisible, religi on being subsumed under the banner of the state. Characteristic Three: Campus Holy Wa r and Other Problems Associated with Universities and Interactive Organizations to ward Advancement of Re-Islamization from Above and Below The appeal for an Islamic Order ( Nizam Islami ) advanced by Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood is not a term originati ng in classical Islam (Tibi, 1998). In other words, For fundamentalists, whatever they may claim, are not traditionalists: the much touted nizam Islami is something new that resembles more a religiously legitimated dictatorship or an otherwise totalitarian rule th an it does a traditional caliphate (pp. 141-142). Toward achieving the Nizam Islami Ikwhan strategy necessitates destabiliza tion of higher education and society itself from above following a longer period of destabilization from below as identified in the previous two subsections of characteristics. Presented in the next paragraphs, then is a decidedly Egyptian version of Walkers (1979) concept campus holy war, orig inally applied to 238

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the de-Westernizing professor-led student revolts of the 1960s and 1970s, but representing in Egypt a battle for the hear ts and minds of Muslim students, most of which centers on the intimidation of liberal intellectuals, the revision of educational curricula, and the commission of violence. The dictatorial aspect of Islamisms t eachings, Tibi (1998) states, is precisely what leads to the blacklisting of liberal Muslim scholars in E gypt, blacklisting being another feature that Islamism shares with Fascism and Communism. Among those whom Tibi (1998) cites is Muhammad Said Al-Ashmawi, whose area of intellectual interest is the Islamic caliphate. Al-Ashmawi bluntly states that neither in the Quran, as the Islamic revelation, nor in the sayings of the Prophet ( hadith ) does there exist religious justification fo r the political order of the caliphate (pp. 156-157). For asserting his intellectual freedom a nd hence the conclusion he draws about contemporary Islamic fundamentalism, therefore, Ashmawi is among the Muslim intellectuals in Cairo hunted for his rational arguments by fundamentalists (sic) (p. 157). Other liberal Muslim scholars targ eted for attacks include Farog Foda, assassinated in 1992 for being a so-ca lled enemy of Islam, and Ahmed Subhy Mansour, an Al-Azhar University gradua te whose books have been banned and who himself has been jailed in Egypt, a country often considered among the most liberal in the Islamic world ( http://www.freemuslims.org ). Of interest, too, is that Mansour, through Cairos Ibn Khaldun Ce nter, published a book called Suggestions to Revise Muslim Religion Courses in Egyptian E ducation to Make Egyptians More Tolerant (1999). This book, aimed at relieving Egypt of its terrorist culture, was among those banned by the censor at Al-Azhar University, who exercised an Islamic version of what 239

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is known in American law as prior restra int doctrine (Hall, 2002: p. 550). In Egypt, the Al-Azhar doubles as the countrys judicial seat. The equivalent to such banning in the United States would be the Chief Ju stice of the U.S. Supreme Court being permitted to call any bookstore in the count ry for the purpose of ordering certain books to not be sold until the court had render ed further decisions about those books. Other scholars, too, in Egypt have been the recipients of free speech and academic freedom violations. Abu Zaid, a professor of Arabic language at Cairo University, fled to Holland with his wi fe, also a professor, after Egypts re-Islamized judiciary at the Al-Azhar University issued a fatwa against Zaid, declaring him an apostate for allegedly having defamed Islam in a book the professor had written about Muhammad, Islams prophet. The order demanded that Zaid be divorced from his wife, against both their wishes, because under Islamic law in Egypt an apostate cannot be married to a Muslim woman ( Middle East Times 2000). Another scholar to have e xperienced affronts to his sense of intellectual freedom is Saad Eddin Ibrahim, an Egyp tian-American sociology professor and human rights advocate. In July 2000 he and twenty-seven others were arrested and jailed after announcing that their Ibn Khaldun Center would monitor parliamentary elections. Accused of being an American spy by Egyptia n Islamists, Ibrahim was released from prison after nearly two years in prison follo wing pressure by the U.S. State Department (MacFarquhar, Dec. 7, 2002). Kepel (2002) augments Algars analysis of Qutbs re-formulation of Islamist doctrine by stating that this path diverged greatly from the original way of the Muslim Brothers for it meant that the members of society as whole were no longer viewed as 240

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Muslims, which in Islamic doctrine is a very serious accusation, called takfir (p. 31; see also Ramadan, 1993, in Chapter Two). The term takfir derives from another, kufr which applies to Muslims who are considered impure. For those who interpret Islamic law literally and rigorously, one who is impi ous to this extent can no longer benefit from the protection of law. According to the consecrated expression, His blood is forfeit, and he is condemned to death (p. 31). Kepel (1984/2002) apparently regards this change in philosophy that occurred during a period in which many of the Muslim Brotherhood had been imprisoned as so signi ficant that the Fren ch scholar invokes a new term to distinguish it: the neo-Muslim Brotherhood. That accusation of takfir the researcher notes, is pr ecisely that which leads to the blacklisting and charges of apostasy ag ainst moderate Muslims who have spoken or published views oppositional to Islamism (see discussion about Khalid Durans blacklisting and fatwa in Chapter One). No longer would it be just Jews who were at fault for Islams predicament but also Mus lims with the exception of a self-anointed few. In addition, Qutbs re-formulation of Islamist doctrine also may be the driving ideological force behind the intellec tual counter-hegemony, kidnappings, and assassination of Middle East scholars at The American University at Beruit (AUB), a Western university run by so-called Orienta list scholars (see Sa id, 1978) ostensibly responsible for the takfir of Lebanese society, during the Lebanese civil war (see discussion about the kidnapping of interim president David Dodge and assassination of Malcolm Kerr in Chapter One). The rise of the vanguard in the neo-Muslim Brot herhood would, according to Qutb, occur in two stages discussed in Kepel (1984/2003). The first for a member of 241

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this vanguard was spiritual maturatio n to deliver the believer from jahiliyah ; the second, battle against jahiliyah society. The battle, or jihad encompasses this flux in totality, from the personal effort to contem plate the Book to combat arms-in-hand (p. 54). Thereunto, Kepel (1983/2002) discusses othe r terms relevant to Qutbs teachings while in prison in the 1950s and 1960s. One of these is bayan, or discourse, a kind of jihad that in Qutbs own words opposes [erroneous] doctrines and concepts (p. 55). Another salient strategy of the vanguard is al-haraka or movement to remove material obstacles in the pa th of the vanguard (p. 55). Because Qutbs writings were vague in how these terms translated into action, members of the neo-Muslim Brotherhood made their own decisions, with action usually taking the form of coups detat resocialization, or ag itation on the university campuses (p. 57). In addition, when the ne o-Muslim Brotherhood members concluded they were in a period of weakness ( istidaf ) relative to the enemy society in which they lived, they practiced concealment ( kitman ), a doctrine that had numerous manifestations such as worshipping in mosques led by takfir imams. After a period of time, however, those worshippers might decide to make a concealed advance ( alharaka bil-mafhum ), with the groups objectives be ing revealed little by little to initiates alone, depending on their degree of initiation (p. 75). Eventually, the advance might take on the characteristics of a direct challenge to society during a phase of power (marhalat al-tamakkun ), which in a mosque might mean a leadership coup, or in a society, a student demonstration or a coup detat If advancement resulted in objections or repression by the jahiliyah society, then the so-called vanguard might retreat into another concealment phase. 242

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Kepels analysis of the social history of a document published in an official magazine, Al-Dawa, by the neo-Muslim Brotherhoods pr ess and translation section in the early 1980s implies how the neo-Musl im Brotherhood employs the doctrine of concealed advance through the use of special language (signposts) to the vanguard. In magazine publication, part of that special communication involves the use of blacklisting perceived enemies of Islam, an action that perhaps owes its origins to AlBanna when he was blacklisting Muslims in the countryside in the Society for the Prevention of the Forbidden. The document in question was composed anonymously for Al-Dawa during a time when President Al-Sadat had made peace with Israel and had established a rapp rochement with the Bishop of E gypts Christian Coptic Church. It is described in Kepel (1984/2003) by the name given to it by the neo-Muslim Brotherhood members afte r its publication: the R ichard Document. Actions signifying cooperation and comp romise among religions such as the so-called shameful peace with the Jews taken by Al-Sadat contradicted the neoMuslim Brotherhoods objectives to purge Muslim lands of foreign groups and religions. Perennially, too, Muslim Brothe rhood members drew a conspiratorial line between the alleged Jewish cab al (that allegedly created the Crusader conspiracy) and orientalist voices in the academy, whom the publishing organ of the neo-Muslim Brotherhood claimed were spies working fo r a cadre of enemy ag ents: We must be aware from the start that the enemies of Islam are the gang of liars represented by todays colonialist trinity ( thaluth ): Jewry, communism, and capitalism. For fourteen centuries, Our Koran has warned that the Community of infidels ( millat al-kufr ) was one (Al-Dawa qtd. in Kepel, 1984/2003: p. 117). 243

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In effect, the researcher notes, the initial appearance of the Richard Document in printed form, followed by later reference to it after its contents had captured the popular imagination of neo-Muslim Brot herhood members and their community enclaves along the Nile River, shows how veiled language and hints of enemy conspiracy culminate in a concealed adva nce by the vanguard. It also supports the observations of so many of the social psychologists in Chapter Two (Grauman, 1987; Groh, 1987; Zukier, 1987; Wulff, 1987; Pr uitt, 1987; Post, 1990/1998; Beck, 1999) who discuss how the language of conspiracism helps members of militant social groups to suspend their traditional forms of mora l logic that would otherwise hold their potential to commit violence in abeyance. Concealed advance in the case of the Rich ard Document took the initial form of a family vendetta and then became associated with a larger conspiracy to re-Islamize Egypt from above. Kepels (1984/2003) descri ption is worth examining at length. The Richard Document has its origins in the st udent demonstrations of the neo-Muslim Brotherhood in Minya in 1980, which are discussed below in a section about the birth of the Islamic Jihad. Kepel (1984/2003) writes: The work of orientalists constitutes on e component of the Crusade conspiracy, as is indicated by a mysterious Richard document supposedly passing instructions to Christians which featured prominently in the confessional incidents that occurred in Minya in 1 980. The Richard in question is Richard P. Mitchell, an American orientalist a nd author of a major work on the Muslim Brethren, The Society of Muslim Brothers (1969). At the origin of this affair we find the hand of [editor] Talmasanis friends, who in 1979 confected what might be called the Mitchell case. Be fore that date, the neo-Brethren harboured no particular hostility to th e American historian, and were even somewhat proud that a work of this qua lity had been devoted to the society founded by Hasan al-Banna. At first the work was noted in al-Dawa and even recommended to readers. (p. 118) 244

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The date in which the change of sympathy for Mitchell and his writing is of great interest, given the event touched upon in Chapter One about the assassination of American University at Beruit president Malcolm Kerr. As Kramer (2001) documents in the work Ivory Towers on Sand in 1978 the work Orientalism by the late Edward Said, a pro-Palestinian Christian, appeared in print and, according to Muslim scholars at AUB who were assessing local events, Said s book provided anothe r justific ation for Islamists in Lebanon to cause harm to Mu slim and non-Muslim scholars critical of Islamic militancy. As stated in Chapter One, those scholars predictions proved accurate. Might Saids book have served the editors of Al-Dawa in 1979 in a similar capacity? Be that as it may, in 1979 when Mitchell was in Cairo for a year-long sabbatical, Al-Dawa published a document written in Arabic and addressed by the writer to the head of the secret services of the American Central Intelligence Agency; it called for the urgent destruction of the Islamicist movement by the Egyptian state (p. 118). Kepels next observat ions arguably illustrate how one signpost (the Richard Document) drew members of the vanguard out of their concealment, in turn allowing them to extrapolate out a larger meaning encoded in the document, which was that orientalist Crusaders from the United St ates were conspiring to destroy Islam: It was far from clear why the American pr ofessor, even if he had been a CIA agent, would correspond with an American official in Arabic. Al-Dawa was unable to answer the denials issued by both Mitchell and the American embassy in Cairo. But the point had been made, and a year and a half later, in Minya, the Richard document was said to be the ultimate cause of persecution of Muslims organized by the Crusaders. Young readers of Al-Dawa in Minya felt there could be no truth to the denials: Mitchell was a CIA agent and the Christians were his fi fth column. (pp. 118-119) 245

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Kepel (1984/2003) then analyzes three more articles that appeared in the magazine just before student-initiated riots erupted in a few cities along the Nile River, including Minya and Cairo. According to the magazine: It seems that the Copts of Egypt are the happiest minority in the world; all their material and moral rights are not only protected, but extended. They lived in perfect harmony with the Muslims a nd enjoyed the enviable status of dhimmi : Everything was for the best until Shenouda became patriarch of the Copts of Egypt. Then phenomena appeared the like of which had never before been seen: we heard it said that Egyp t was Coptic and that there was no place for Muslims, and so on. (p.119) Kepel (1984/2003) further allows from hi s analysis that the articles in Al-Dawa denounced foreign powers, in particular Copts living in Am erica, for having incited the worlds happiest minority to arrogance and defiance. The traditional distinction between good Christians who submit to Islam and evil Crusaders was obliterated in the heat of the moment: one article went so far as to suggest an indiscriminant boycott of all shops belonging to Copts (p. 119). In the same breadth, however, the magazines editor wrote, Love is the symbol of the Society of Muslim Brethren (qtd. on p. 124). Setting apparent rhetorical contradictions aside, Kepel (1984/2003) concludes that the violence-oriented ne o-Muslim Brotherhood students initially could not strike out at the state that their organization sought to undermine through its organizational and administrative system of ideological propa gation; so they instea d set their sights on minority Christians, scapegoating Egypts minority Copts in various actions that came on the heels of artic les published in Al-Dawa, giving them tacit clearance. Although Kepel does not state so directly, the implicati ons of his description of social history are strong: to radicalized students supporting the tenets of the neo-Muslim Brotherhood, 246

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those articles were signposts that articu lated in coded message what kind of action the elect vanguard Muslims in Egypt must take based on about the condition of the ummah Approaching the so-calle d phase of power, the students could challenge certain parts of society through orientalist blacklisting and Christian lynching; but if more signposts appeared in print media that tacitly assume d the conditions were right for state challenges, then the vanguard students could take direct action ag ainst lesser state apparatuses like the Minya police station in 1980. Kepel (1984/2003) dramatizes how another signpost in the form of a leaflet published by the jamaat al-islamiyyah (discussed in greater detail below) proffered incentive to proceed further in a direct att ack against the state. This leaflet was more than a signpost to take a concealed advance; it showed in coded language that a direct attack on Egypt itself was imminent: The leaflet concludes by suggesting, in the form of a purely rhetorical question, that Sadat, having received his orders from the White House, is now applying the instructions of the Richard Document and that a top-level functionary, the Christian governor of Southern Sinai, is providing his coreligionist with their automatic weapons (p. 161). This leaflet appeared about one year before Al-Sadats assassination, an action itself committed by another vanguard of student neo-Muslim Brotherhood members and their associates in the Egyptian army who felt that they could be su ccessful in waging a wholesale coup d etat In Minya, if interpreted as a signpost that the phase of power was nigh, the leaflet tacitly signified that the students should destabilize their own locality in advance of possible future attacks against the countrys highest seats of government. Apparently, as Kepel (1984/2003) concludes, the students in Minya had access to 247

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arms depots and were able to turn the tr aditional violence into political violence against the state, in this case the siege of a police station in a large city (p. 161). The same kind of violence would be committed by similar student groups in Asyut during four days of armed rebellion af ter Al-Sadats assassination. Other violent splinter groups of the Muslim Brotherhood formed in response to Al-Sadats rapprochement with the Islami st movement in Egypt. Among their actions, especially after 1977 when The Believing President traveled to Israel to make peace, were the kidnapping and murder of an Is lamic cleric by a radical group called the Society of Muslims and sometimes the Al Takfir wa-l Hijra (Excommunication and Hegira). This group sent shock waves through the Muslim world far beyond Egypt, and the term takfiri (one who excommunicates other Muslims) passed into colloquial Arabic as a description of the more sect arian elements of the movement, which had been hatched in Nassers penal colonies by students arrested during the 1965 police raids (Kepel, 2002: p. 84). The leader of this movement was Shukri Mustafa, an agricultural engineer who believed that nobody except his own followers was a true Muslim. Buoyed up by the incendiary publications that blacklisted Egyptian and foreign orientalist professors in alleged collabor ation with the Jewish -Crusader conspiracy (see sub-section on the Richard Document above) and by the denunciation of the AlAzhar University by Egypts own military pr osecutor in Shukris trial, dissatisfied students would foment civil conflict in most major cities along th e Nile. In turn, AlSadat dissolved the Egyptian Students Union, confiscated their prop erty, closed their summer camps, and censored Al-Dawa the Muslim Brothers magazine (Kepel, 2002). 248

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After Sadats visit to Jerusalem and the si gning of peace with Israel, the foreign policy of the Egyptian government came head to head with the fundamental tenet of Islamists, including those of its moderate wing : namely, hostility to Jews in general and to the Jewish state in particular (p. 88). Not to be stopped, however, the students resorted to more secretive actions in Egypts major cities with the more politica lly inclined militants coalescing under the aegis of a shadowy group called Jihad (p. 86). This group appears to be the reconfiguration of the Muslim Brotherhoods Secret Apparatus, a terrorist version of the organizations Field Apparatuses, whic h also were led by student members and their campus advisors. The major theorist fo r this group was a Qutb-inspired electrical engineer, Abdessalam Al-Faraq, who penned the work The Neglected Duty which posited that the ulama were required to declare jihad against any ruler who had failed to implement Islamic law. Thus, Al-Faraq deem ed Al-Sadat an apostate for he fed at the tables of imperialism and Zionism (qtd. in Kepel, 2002: p. 86). Moreover, Al-Faraq condemned moderate Muslims fo r their alleged capitulation with Egypts political process that the radicals we re trying to weaken and overthrow. The Neglected Duty the Richard Document, and other forgeries published in Al-Dawa spurred a conspiracy to assassinate Al -Sadat and foment mass uprisin gs in Egyptian cities. Those uprisings were crushed by Al-Sadats su ccessor, Vice President Hosni Mubarak, whose government immediately sent army paratroope rs into Egypts major cities to hunt down Egypts Islamist students and their mentors. 249

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In the months after Al-Sadats murder, the ulama at Al-Azhar University sought through their scholarship and teaching to prove Al-Faraqs treatise a deviant form of Islam: The ulemas pushed their claim that they alone were competent to interpret the great texts of Islamic tradition, which were beyond the grasp of ordinary ignorant people led by graduates in electrical engi neering. (p. 87) Nevertheless, damage to Egyptian society ha d been done and divisive Islamism would remain in Egypt, with the most significant terro rist attack after Al-S adats assassination there occurring in November 1997 with the massacre of Western tourists and Egyptian security guards at the Temple of Hats heput in Luxor. Egypts economy has not recovered since that attack and slid into further decline follo wing the September 11 attacks in the United States (2002, pe rsonal communication with Abdelwahab Hechiche). Some scholars describe the Islamic Jihad and its aff iliated organizations as cultural groups who perform good works for di spossessed people. They also describe those groups acts of violence as spectacu lar operations perpetrated by freedom fighters (see, for example, Hiltermann, 1991; Abu-Amr, 1994). Or, in other words, those scholars dodge the term terrorist acts even though the political violence committed by takfir groups bear no conformity to Geneva warfare conventions that would designate them in a legal sense as freedom fighters (see footnote, Chapter One). Public record dating back to the mid-1970s suggests bona fide terrorist activity for re-Islamizing Egypt from above, starti ng with the countrys higher education institutions. This section shows that the ra dicalism of Egypts inte lligentsia not only involved native Egyptians but also foreign nationals, a str ong number of whom were of 250

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Palestinian heritage. Sivan (1990) states that scholars have devoted scant attention to the role of Palestinian students in the takfir groups attempts to re-Islamize Egypt, its university system notwithstanding. While Kepel (2002) suggests that the violence of the student takfir groups erupted in 1977, Egypt saw ear lier incidents involving th is revolutionary group of Islamist cells. One example was the atte mpted takeover of the Military Technical Academy at Heliopolis, a suburb of Greater Cairo. While the attempted takeover was against the state of Egypt, it was perpetra ted by Palestinian stude nts residing in Egypt whose goal was to liberate Egypt from its condition of jahiliyah This is a point of history often missed by observers sympathetic to the objectives of Palestinian militant Islamic groups who object to the existence of the state of Israel. Palestinian students objectives stretched far beyond their sense of injustice toward the establishment of the Jewish state and into the arena of forcing conformity of a monolithic religious doctrine that all Muslims in all societies should practi ce. In other words, their view of Islam as a total way of life was immersed in the Islamist discourse of Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood. Sullivan and Abed-Kotob (1999) show that the attempted takeover of Heliopolis military academy was supposed to lead to a general coup against the AlSadat government, making the terrorist act th e first of its kind during the Al-Sadat years. Sagiv (1995) supports the account by Sullivan and Abed-Kotob (1999). The failed assault was against a military institution by a group calling itself the Islamic Liberation Party (ILP), resulting in the ex ecution of its leader, Salih Al-Siriyyah, a Palestinian student from Jordan who studied at the Al-Azhar Univ ersity. Other students 251

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involved in the attack were forced underg round, recreating their cause in other Islamic Jihad groups along the Nile River and direc tly through the use of religious student associations in Egypts universities. Am ong those students were other Palestinians, Salim Al-Rahhal, Kamal Al-Said Habib, and Muhammad Abd Al-Salam Faraq. According to Sullivan and Abed-Kotob ( 1999), most were engineering students with advanced degrees in their fields; th eir concerns about Egyptian society were ethical and moral (p. 82), an understateme nt that hints at the re-formulation of Islamist thought by Qutb and his adherent s noted above. As part of the Gamaat Islamiyah, they sought university policy changes regarding womens dress codes, curriculum, and segregation of the sexes. In an interview, one leader, Talat Al-Qasim, recollects that in the mid-1970s: The group worked to change the munkar (that which is forbidden) and after some destruction of property they got a law passed banning alcohol. It was after that these activists formed a real orga nization. In Minya Un iversity in 1977-78, they took over the student uni on. (qtd.in Mubarak, 1996: p. 56) In Egypt, according to Hoveyda (1998), indi viduals who wished not to conform to the demands of Islamist students often were harassed into conformity and silence. The student uprisings bega n in 1972 when the growing current of political activism was beginning to develop into a fully-fledged movement (Abdallah, 1985: p.176). In tacit reference to neo-Muslim Br otherhood activities, A bdallah (1985) writes that the formation of a variety of societies helped to provide students with a platform for collective activitie s and discussions (p. 176). Th ese collective meetings were called Families (Abdallah, 1985: 176). While Abdallah (1985) does not draw the connection, the Families he describes signify the lower rungs of the academic branches of the Muslim Brot herhoods Field Apparatus: 252

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While some were primarily social and cultural gatherings, usually called Families and supervised by a member of the teaching staff, others were overtly political. The most prominent po litical group was the Society of the Supporters of the Palestinian Revolution (SSPR), established in Cairos Faculty of Engineering by a group of activists, some of whom had previously visited Palestinian camps and guerilla groups in Jordan. (pp. 176-177) That activism was the direct result of di ssatisfaction of the Egyptian-Israeli War of 1967, in which students were demanding th at Egypt recover lost territories now occupied by Israeli forces. Abu-Amr (1994) doc uments that this type of professorand student-led paramilitary support for the Pale stinian cause dates back to the 1930s, when Al-Banna authorized tactical support and supply lines through the Sinai desert into the Levant. Even as the Al-Sad at government was openly supporting those students to check Marxists in fluences, however, Islamist student uprisings in 1972 led to the creation of a commission in Egyptian Parliament regarding their activities and to the arrest of the Youth of Islams facu lty leader Issam Al-Ghazali. The final parliamentary report condemned the moveme nt, for it consisted of a small minority whose illegitimate activities were ignored by th e vast majority of students (report qtd. in Abdallah, 1985: 202). Moreover, the parlia ment alluded to wall-magazine articles that included articles violating moral and religious values . articles calling for violence and agitation . and articles exceed ingly frivolous with many of the articles prepared outside and not inside the uni versity (pp. 202-203). Finally, the report stated that the university campuses have become accessible to strangers who do harm to university traditions and to students (p. 203). As the years passed, the Gamaat Isla miyah would amass greater political presence on Egypts campuses, such that by 1976 they had become one of the three principal groupings of the student movement opposing the regime on clear ideological 253

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grounds, and between 1977 and 1981 they beca me the dominant force, managing to win increasing numbers of seats in Student Union elections, which they swept in a landslide in the academic year 1978/1979 (p. 227-227). Abdallah (1985) concludes that despite the Muslim students succe sses in gaining wide support for their reIslamization program: The central obstacle to their creation of a coherent student movement was not so much their views, which many see as extreme, but their tactics against those who held different views or did not behave as good Muslims. Acts like forcing the separation of the sexes in l ecture halls, breaking up the meetings of their opponents, tearing down their post ers, and so on served to display fundamentalist muscle but alienated ri sing numbers of students, leaving the student movement as a source of disturba nce rather than as real source of influence in national politics. The fact that some fundam entalists realized this and acted more democratically does not al ter the general picture or exonerate the fundamentalist current as a whole from responsibility for making a shambles of the universities and for causi ng the energies of the activists to be wasted in internal squabbling. (pp. 227-228, italics added) Minimizing the more disruptive elements of the Gammat Islamiyah involved myriad and sometimes conflicting policies and act ions, especially by the time the 1979 revolution in Iran further exacerbated the students resolve in Egypt (Abdallah, 1985): checking identity cards on campuses, appeal to university professors and Islamic scholars, wholesale government repression, pol itical reform, and accommodation of the neo-Muslim Brotherhood. Qutbs radical ideology al so held enormous influence on a core group of young men who would become the founding me mbers of the Islamic Jihad and its factional offshoots in the early to mid-1970s, but that would clai m official formation much later in the 1980s. The United States a nd all other European nations consider the Islamic Jihad an international terrorist group (see www.statedepartment.us). The men Hatina (2001) cites are Dr. Fathi Abd Al-Azi z Al-Shiqaqi (first Secretary General of 254

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the Islamic Jihad); brother of Khalil Shiqaqi, a political science professor and pollster inside the Palestinian territories); Dr. Bash ir Nafi (aka, Shamim A. Siddiqi and Ahmed Sadiq, in exile in London; convicted of sed itious conspiracy in Jordan); Dr. Ramadan Abdullah Shallah (an economis t; current Secretary General of the Islamic Jihad); and Dr. Sami Al-Arian (computer science prof essor; chief of North American Islamic Jihad). Given Hatinas (2001) accounts one may deduce that the Islamic Jihad started as a student movement led orig inally by this core circle of men, with the elder Fathi AlShiqaqi, a medical student who lived among them in Cairos Ayn Shayms district, acting as their mentor: The historic roots of the Islamic Ji had go back to a group of students [see above] from the Gaza Strip, many of them members of the Brothers, who were enrolled in universities in Egypt in the 1970s. They were influenced by the activity of militant Islamic groups such as Al-Jihad and Shabab Muhammad (Muhammads Youth), and the Islamic A ssociations (Al-Jamaat Al-Islamiyya) based in the campuses. . In Egypt, [A l-Shiqaqi] came into contact with a group of Palestinian students [cited above] who had no cohesive ideological outlook or political experience and were studying in various fields. (p. 24) Fathi Al-Shiqaqi was born in Gaza but moved to Egypt where in 1974 he entered medical school at the University of Zaqqazi q. His decision to become a medical doctor stems from his father having died of cancer in the mid-1960s (Sivan, 1990). AlShiqaqi studied in Egypt for seven years, from 1974-1981, and became a part of the neo-Muslim Brotherhoods students circle s (Mayer, 1990). Following the Arab defeat in the wars with Israel, the advent of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1978, and the worried reaction of the West, seems to ha ve greatly impressed young Al-Shiqaqi, as well as many other Muslim students (p. 144). 255

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Characteristic Four: Transnational Influen ce of Islamism and its Esprit de Corps through the Migration of Professo rs and Students to Other Locales Kepel (2002) states in a few sentences in The Trail of Political Islam that starting in the 1970s, Muslim Brothers from Egypt re-located to locales like Algeria and Tunisia, where societies were in the proc ess of restructuring during their periods of post-colonialism. Given Mitchells (1969/ 1993) seminal account of the movements organizational development, the precedent fo r that activity likely emanates from the Muslim Brotherhoods sending of academic mi ssionaries from its liaison section to study and report on the needs of Muslims in other world regions, and to encourage Muslims from other regions to connect with the movements Cairo headquarters. The liaison section provided a kind of haven for those of the many hundreds of foreign Muslim students who found themselves in sy mpathy with the ideals of the movement (p. 173). Mitchell (1969/1993) writes, too, that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood regarded these foreign students as potential missionaries who were urged to join the organizations other factions in other countries. Finally, th e liaison section managed the General Headquarters librar y, functioning as a clearinghouse for the literatures of the various Islamic movements throughout the Mu slim world (p. 174). In effect, that migration of professors and students equa tes to the Brotherhoods amassing of an esprit de corps of fellow travelers contributing to the growth of the movement on transnational levels. In addition to the customs of the liaison section, other factors for the movements transnational influe nce of its ideo logy and esprit de corp s arose later in the movements development in the 1970s. In the wake of group repression by Nasser and 256

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later Al-Sadat, some members in the Brothe rhoods ranks fled to other countries to escape prosecution (Kepel, 2002). Other nations welcomed them as political refugees in exchange for academic talent (Berman, 2002). However, another factor engendering Islamisms transnational influence involve s Egypts high unemployment rates which caused young men, with college degrees a nd other advanced training to turn to militant Islam when their hopes of marriage, a decent home, and fulfilling work were dashed (Miller, 1996/1997: p. 55). Those young men, in turn, became the so-called Afghan Arabs of Al-Qaeda, who after the Cold War, then either returned to their home countries or traveled ye t again to other places like Bo snia or the United States with the requisite commitment and training to re-Islamize th ose locales, too (Berman, 2003). This Qutb-inspired hijra of educated leaders and followers became part of the Islamist lecture circuit in No rth America in the late 1980s and early 1990s that Steven Emerson would expose in 1994 as having ties to academics at The University of South Florida (see Emerson, 1994; Emerson, 2002). Most of those individuals, including Sami Al-Arian, had been indoctrinated into the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood in their native countries before creating newer militant offshoots of the parent organization (Waller, 2003). In a lecture at USF in 2002, Edward Walk er, former U.S. am bassador to Egypt, spoke of the connection between Egyptian hi gher education and Al-Qaeda in a manner that illustrates the process of transnati onal migration among Egypts highly-educated militants. When asked How does Middle Eastern higher education exacerbate conflict in the Middle East? Walker explained that in Egypt the most sought-after graduate programs are medicine first; engineering, second; and education, third. However, only 257

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undergraduates from wealthy families can afford to pay for private tutoring that would help them pass entrance exams to those programs, so less privileged students seeking admission to graduate programs are compelled to seek tutoring in nearby mosques, and those mosques that offer tutoring services for university exams typically maintain a radical fundamentalist character. Walker, during his 2002 lecture, also claimed that those tutorial services do not come without a price: students gradually come to accept the non-accommodationist doctrines of the political imams who l ead those mosques. As the popular Egyptian saying suggests: In Egypt, if you want something, you must give something. Therefore, the price exacted by political im ams on students needing tutoring for college entrance exams is, as Hatina (2001) also notes, the taking of loyalty oaths both to their political imam and to a politically-charged religious doctrine that effectually makes offensive jihad a sixth pillar of Islam unmenti oned in either the Koran or other traditional Islamic sources of exegesis like the Hadith. Walker stated further that this scenario exacerbates conflict in the Middle East because many of the students who joined Egypts radical mosques in the 1970s and 1980s became the so-called Afghan Arabs of Al-Qaeda who are now dispersed all over the world in both Islamic and non-Islamic societies. If one accepts that sometimes cultural groups who emigrate to other countries replicate in some manner the beliefs and traditions of their native cultures, then why not those students acculturated to the beliefs and traditions of the neo-Muslim Br otherhood? Bergen (2002) notes that these highly educated but militant Afghan Arabs have returned to their native countries since the end of the Afghan-Soviet War, or to other countri es if their native countries 258

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refused them, with intentions to commit terro rist actions designed to establish Islamic rule through the process that Islamists commonly call Isl amization of knowledge and society from above and below. In addition, the associations of the ma jority of well-known Islamists and their terrorist counterparts not only involve educati onal attainment in certain fields of study, with the assistance of nearby radical mosques, but also i nvolve activity in student-led organizations. For example, Mohammad Atta, the leader of the Al-Qaeda cell responsible for the 9/11 atta cks, born in 1968, was of a middle-class Cairo family who could afford to send him to study in Germany, where the technology student took seven years to graduate with a four-year de gree at the Hamburg Technical Institute, where Atta founded an Islamic student group. Bergen (2001) also adds that another two of the student groups fifty member s also joined Attas conspiracy to level the World Trade Center and other U.S. landmarks in 2001. Section II: Saudi Arabias Higher Educational Interplay of Corporate Wealth and Mus lim Brothers in Exile: Conditions and Characteristics Conditions of Islamisms Interplay in Higher Education Condition One: Transnational Influence of Is lamist Thought and its Esprit de Corps through the Migration of Ikwhan Pr ofessors and Students to Saudi Arabia The transnational influence of Islamist thought and its esprit de corps through the migration of Ikwhan professors and students, a ch aracteristic of Islamisms interplay with higher educa tion in Egypt, hence becomes a condition of that same 259

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interplay in Saudi Arabia and other locales studied. Qutbs re-formulation of Islamist ideology led to new lines of intellectual bat tles that started in the prison cells of the Nasser government and then spread to the Muslim Brotherhoods countries of exile, where the outcast leaders of the group to other countries would become the teachers and university professors of future Isla mists (Algar, 2000; Kepel, 2002; Gold, 2003). Evidently, exiled leaders of the Muslim Br otherhood fared better than those such as Qutb, who remained in Egypt and would ev entually face torture and public execution. Those leaders, qualified to teach in colle ges and universities, would take Qutbs ideology to other countries starting in the late 1950s, thereby exacting greater influence and garnering more power throughout the Middle East and, later, the world. Outside Lebanon, Syria, West Bank, Gaza, Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan perhaps the most important country or territory to which members of the Muslim Brotherhood were exiled was Saudi Arabia, if only because that country had adopted another similar version of political Isla m commonly known as Wahhabism that Saudi Arabia in turn could afford to export to ot her countries, literally and eventually on a global scale, because of the oil-rich natio ns accumulation of wealth in the Twentieth Century (for extended discussions about Wahhabism, see Bergen, 2001; Algar, 2002; Rashid, 2002; Schwartz, 2002; Trifkovic, 2002). However, as Gold (2004) traces through ex amination of historical record, Saudi Arabia could not have exported its own radi calized version of Islam had it not imported a class of highly educated professors who were, first and foremost, members of the Muslim Brotherhood exiled from Nassers E gypt and also other countries like Syria and the Sudan; and, second, fully immersed in a cross-pollination of Al-Wahhabs and 260

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Qutbs intellectual thought and teaching through socio-educational channels such as mosques, universities, student organizations professional organizations, and academic journals. This reformist educational proce ss may represent one of the most dramatic but unstudied aspects of globalization. In effect, Golds analysis points to a second transcultural merger of Wahhabi and Muslim Brotherhood doctrines that re newed itself in the 1960s and 1970s, leading to new developments in the re -Islamization program especially through educational channels, international student s associations, and youth movements. As Moussalli (1992) supports, the use of education is vital to what Qutb calls zalzalah, or shaking, or revolution, considered essent ial to the rebuilding of civilization under a puritanical Islamic interpretation. While zalzalah is strong, it is not violent but comes directly through the process of education, or by teachi ng the true Islam and by refuting Western ideologies (Qutb qtd. in Moussalli, 1992: p. 203). The researcher notes that zalzalah, if viewed as an aspect of re-I slamization from below, maintains important implications for education theory promulgated by theori sts associated with the Saudi-funded International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) and also by various theorists from Iran. Saudi Arabias and Irans most significant texts of education theory are deconstructed in other sections and subsect ions in this chapter. Examples of that educational theory put into practice, in the form of an original documents analysis of Sami Al-Arians magazine Inquiry, which specifically targets an intellectual audience, are cited in Chapter Five. The aforementioned next phase of re-Isl amization as conceived by Qutb also corresponds to Blumers (1946/1951/1963) theory of mass social movements in terms 261

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of the kinds of sub-institutiona l apparatuses needed to enlist new recruits and to widen a social movements base of support, the esprit de corps. Furthermore, the next phase also supports Blumers (1946/1951/1963) posit ion that intellectua ls therefore are critical to the formulatio n of thought in advancing mass social movements. Certainly among the fashionable postm odernists and multiculturalists in the West, I fail to see a commitment to Western civilization. . In this framework, owing to the spread of cultural rela tivism, it seems no longer possible, for instance, to defend human rights as universal rights, (Tibi, 1998: p. 46) asserts. It was once considered progress when sociologists-along the lines of the sociology of knowledge developed by Karl Mannheim--determined knowledge to be embedded in the social conditions from which it grew. But it is a setback to the so ciology of knowledge to apply this very approach to cultures, as some an thropologists do in speaking of an anthropology of knowledge (p. 47). Such anthropological clai ms, Tibi (1998) contends, encourage the de-Westernizationist drive of the Islami c fundamentalists (p. 47), a point to which the researcher will return in an analysis of higher education theory and practice, the Islamization of knowledge, published in seventy languages by a Saudi Arabian publishing group in Riyadh. In an interview with Abdul Wahab Al-Anesi in Yemen, December 2000, Bergen (2001) briefly notes that Islamist l eaders come from two classes of educational attainment: the older generation usually st udied at Cairos Al-Azhar University, Egypts seat of Islamic learning; the younger, at other universities in Egypt where they studied technical subjects like medicine, engineering, and business--as opposed to traditional Islamic scholasticism and textual ex egesis. Thus, Bergen (2001) states that 262

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one should not be surprised that Osama bin Ladens top aide, Ayma n Al-Zawahiri, is a medical doctor from upper-class Egyptian stock; that his military advisor in the United States also graduated from an Egyptian university with a psychology degree before becoming a computer network analyst in California; and that another Al-Qaeda official studied electrical e ngineering in Iraq. One of those leaders who came to Saudi Arabia was Sayyid Qutbs brother, Muhammad Qutb, who became a professor of Islamic studies at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah (Gold, 2004). In fact, Osama bin Laden himself was one of Muhammad Qutbs students (Gold, 2004). In addition to Muhammad Qutb, the infamous Blind Sheikh of Egypt, Omar Abdul Al-Rahman, later convicted for conspiracy to blow up various New York C ity landmarks in the 1990s, lived in Saudi Arabia between 1977 and 1980 and taught at a girls college in Riyadh after having been imprisoned in Egypt several times under both Nassers and Sadats governments (Gold, 2004). Noted above, Al-Zawahiri was a profe ssor of medicine whom the Saudis accepted on a work visa even though he had served a jail sentence in Egypt for his involvement in the assassination of Anwar Al-Sadat (Gold, 2004). He was among many Ikwhan members who sought refuge in Sa udi Arabia following periods of violence committed on the part of terrorist cells they aided and abetted. An appendix in Marc Sagemans Understanding Terror Networks (1995) indicates that twenty out of thirty-two of Al-Qaedas central staff are Egyptians from the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), another offshoot of the Muslim Brot herhood. These men represent the highlyeducated theoretical base of Al-Qaeda, the most talked about but cer tainly not the only 263

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terrorist element of the Islamist mass m ovement. While the world focuses on places like Afghanistan and Iraq as terrorist-spons oring states, it might well consider that Egypt, considered the inte llectual center of the Islamic world, has produced the majority of todays leading theoreticians and strategic leaders in the global salafi jihad network. Archival evidence shows that Muhammad Qutb, in ad dition to teaching, edited and published his brother Sayyids writings wh ile working as a professor of Islamic studies in Saudi Arabia (G old, 2004). Thus, Sayyid Qutbs call for Muslim expansion throughout the world through militant jihad was re-invigorated in Saudi Arabian Islamic studies: He who understands the natu re of this religion [Islam] will understand the need for the activist push of Islam as a jihad of the sword alongside a jihad of education (Qutb qtd. in Sagiv, 2000, Fundamentalism and Intellectuals in Egypt, 1973-1993). In addition to the Muslim Brothers from Egypt who migrated to Saudi Arabia in the mid-1960s, however, were those members who had earlier established the Palestinian faction of the same group (Gold, 2004). Those members included Abu Jihad (aka Khalil Al-Wazir), who founded the Palestinian Fatah movement. In addition, Yasser Arafat, who in 1948 fought with Muslim Brotherhood paramilitary units in Egyptian-controlled Gaza, applied for a Saudi work visa. Arafat holds a PhD in engineering from Cairo University, but then moved to Kuwait before returning to the Palestinian territories to lead the PLO in the late 1960s (Gold, 2004). Moreover, neoMuslim Brotherhood members from the groups Syrian faction came to teach in Saudi Arabia during the Saudi governments edu cational restructuring toward Wahhabism; 264

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and so did neo-Muslim Brotherhood member s of the Sudanese faction, including, at various points in time, Hassan Al-Tur abi from 1975-1977 (Gold, 2004). Turabi, as commonly reported in the media, is regard ed as the person most responsible for engineering the coup to overthr ow the government of the Suda n in 1989, with logistical and financial assistance from Iran. In the early 1990s, Al-Turab i guest-lectured for USF-WISE. Condition Two: Changes in Saudi Arabian Educational Policy Resulting from Accumulation of Oil Wealth In order to understand further the Saudi contribution to re-Islamization in higher edu cation it is instrumental to know about the policy changes in Saudi Arabian higher education in th e early 1960s. Argua bly, those changes provided a welcome structure (Wulff, 1987) for exiled Muslim Brothers to import the ideology of re-Islamiza tion to a country that, through its accumulation of oil wealth, could in turn export re-Islamizati on, literally, throughout the world, including the United States and, as one shall see in the next chapter, WISE, the USF think-tank that received most of its funding by the Saudi Arabian government though the IIIT general headquarters in Herndon, Virginia. In that respect, Golds (2004) analysis of Saudi Arabias educational policy changes appears to be highly informa tive: Until 1951, the Saudi government--a monarchy that perennially had courted the Wahha bi clerical elite in order to maintain power, a circumstance not unlike King Far ouks courtship of appeasement of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during the same period of time--only had three ministries. However, from 1951 to 1975 a total of twenty new ministries were added as 265

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the monarchy amassed more wealth. As a result, the mechanisms to run society necessitated more bureaucratic oversight. As such, Gold (2004) writes, [King] Faisal needed to find a formula to give the ulama a role in governance that would appease them but not undermine the role of the Saudi royal family (p. 77). Thus, two ministries became the excl usive province (p. 77) of the Wahhabi religious leaders, who under those ministri es created the Committee for Commanding Good and Forbidding Evil, a kind of religious police that has the pow er to make arrests in its enforcement of public morality. Anothe r organization that was created during this period of reform in Saudi Arabia was a supranational group calle d the Muslim World League (MWL) that served as a kind of clearinghouse that would further bind the ties between Saudi Arabian Wahhabism and Mus lim Brotherhood Salafism (Algar, 2002). Established in 1962, this body consisted of the chief mufti of Saudi Arabia, a descendant of Al-Wahhab, and eight ot her men from the Muslim Brotherhood, including a grandson of Al-Banna (Alg ar, 2002). Sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood, as implied in his diminuti on of Qutbs contribution to terrorism illustrated in Chapter One, Algar (2002) ta kes an apologetic route about the merger between the two reform movements given the persecution to which [the Muslim Brothers] were subjected in their homelands (p. 49). At the same time, Algar (2002) asserts that there was, in any event, a po litical price to be pa id: support, explicit or implicit, for the policies of the Saudi government, for article four of the Muslim World Leagues covenant committed it to work for the establishment of Islamic solidarity as articulated by the Saudi regime (pp. 49-50). 266

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Two of the ministries alluded to abov e were Pilgrimage and Awqaf (religious endowments) and Justice. A third, the Mini stry of Education, underwent a significant leadership change in 1963 by having its director, Prince Fahd, replaced by a Wahhabi cleric of the Al-Sheikh family, direct des cendants of Al-Wahhab. Algar (2002) reserves a portion of his essay on Wahhabism for crit icism of what he obviously regards as a most pernicious aspect of Islamic educati on reform that began in Saudi Arabia but would egress into other higher education systems throughout the world, leaving a deep mark of intellectual impoverishment: The d ead hand of Wahhabism has left nothing in its place. With the exception of small, semi-c landestine teaching circle s, all that is now to be found in Mecca and Medina are institutes for the propagation of Wahhabism, grotesquely mislabled as universities (p. 44). That decision to give control of Saudi Arabias educational ministry to the AlSheikh family permitted the Wahhabi religious establishment to maintain total control over all Saudi higher education institu tions. Gold (2004) therefore deduces: The entire generation that was born dur ing the 1960s and came of age during the 1980s grew up on Wahhabi doctrines. . The Education Ministry as a whole became a stronghold of religiously conservative bureaucrats. The Saudi government also installed backers of the Muslim Brotherhood at all levels of education. The curriculum used in schools focused on Islamic and Arabic studies, helping to preserve the grip of Wahhabism on Saudi society. (p. 78) Thus, in that respect, one may conclude that the Saudi Arabian monarchy, which maintains a tight coupling with its ministries purposefully opened up an organizational institutional vacuum--albeit not very anar chic in kind like Birnbaums (1988), given the absence of democratic pluralism and academic freedom in Saudi Arabian institutions--into which the Wahhabi education minister s and leaders would permit professors from Egypts exiled Muslim Br otherhood to work. Were the Muslim 267

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Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia not of like-mi nded, radical reformist ideology, the merger would not have occurred. Enrollment statistics provide further suppor t for the influence of the puritanical strain of Wahhabi Islam which cross-pollinat ed with Qutbs in Saudi Arabia: During the quarter century from the mid-1960s th rough the end of the 1980s, the number of students in Saudi universities exploded (pp. 78-79) writes Gold (2004). Furthermore, In 1965 there were 3,625 university st udents throughout the kingdom; by 1986, the number had reached 113,529. Yet relatively fe w Saudis went off to study at Western universities. In the mid-1980s, the number of foreign Saudi students reached a peak of 12,500; the figure would taper off to 3,554 by 1990 a nd stay at that level for the rest of the decade (p. 79). The researcher has found no data, however, on how many of those foreign students in Western institutions returned to Saudi Arabia after their non-immigrant visa statuses had expired. Moreover, Thirty percent of Saudi st udents in Saudi universities majored in Islamic studies, while the other 70 percent devoted an av erage of a third of their coursework to religious study (p. 79). Eventually, the Saudi higher education system would open itself to foreign students from all over the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, such that by the 1990s 85 percent of the student body in Saudi Arabia would be non-Saudi (Gold, 2004). In that milieu, Gold (20 04) claims that the Islamic University of Medina and the King Abdul Aziz University became hothouses for Islamic militancy (p. 90). 268

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Characteristics of Islamisms Interplay in Higher Education Characteristic One: External and Internal Organizational Networks Run by Highly Educated Elites Intera ct with Universities for Purposes of Re-Islamization from Above and Below Gold (2004) writes that among the most important organizations financially underwritten through Saudi Arabias burgeoni ng system of ministries is the World Association of Muslim Yout h (WAMY), whose North American headquarters has been raided twice by the U.S. federal government since the September 11 attacks. Moreover, Emerson (1994, 2002), Pipes (2002), Katz (2004 ), and Gold (2004) show variously how WAMY and many of the organizations it supports financially and logistically have leaders who are associated with, have b een accused of, have been indicted for, or convicted of terrorism. The purpose of WAMY and its affili ate groups, however, is to spread their message of Islam throughout the world through the support of Muslims and through the conversion of non-Muslims. Study of the WAMY network reveals th at education is integral to its overarching purposes, which give rise to an objective of Islamizing education throughout the world. That objective gives rise, in turn, to other affiliated groups that interact with universities, para-professional groups, publis hing organs, students, and sympathetic intellectuals. For example, Gold (2004) states that WAMY supports the Muslim Students Association (MSA) and its offshoot, the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA). The ISNAs website ( www.isna.net ) shows that it, in turn, acts as a parent group of its academic association, the Association of Muslim Scientists and Engineers (AMSE), which refers to the same academic journal as the Association of 269

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Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS), the American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences (AJISS), published through the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), as stated on the IIITs website, www.iiit.org. A nother group belonging to this network of front organizations is the Muslim American Society (MAS). In addition, Gold (2004) devotes considerable editorial space to the In stitute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America (IIASA) for its role in adva ncing re-Islamizati on in education. World Association of Muslim Youth Gold (2004) shows that WAMY was estab lished as a charitable organization in 1972 by Saudi Arabias education ministry in order to disseminate Wahhabi doctrine. The organization operates like a semigovernmental arm, protected by Saudi embassies and consulates abroad (p. 79) Through WAMY and other organizations like those cited below, Saudi Arabia em barked on a massive campaign to bring Wahhabi Islam to the world such th at between 1982 and 2002, 1,500 mosques, 210 Islamic Centers, and 2,000 schools to educat e Muslim children were established in non-Muslim countries alone (p. 126). On its website, WAMY states that its objective is to serve the ideology of Islam through the tawhid [or the oneness of Islam]. As discussed in Section I, the doctrine of tawhid or unity, is a core belief of the Muslim Brotherhood. Undisputed eviden ce brought forth in the trial U.S.A. v. Holy Land Foundation (2007) reveals that WAMY and the other organizations cited in this chapter section are indeed North Amer ican arms of the Muslim Brotherhood. Underscoring that ideological missio n, WAMY also publishes and distributes texts about Islam ranging from basic religious texts to the writings of Qutb. One such work, The Difference Between the Shiites and the Majority of Muslim Scholars sets 270

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forward the thesis that Shiism was the pr oduct of a Jewish conspiracy (p. 152). The use of the term ideology by an organizati on like WAMY, the researcher suggests, is also crucial to understanding the significan ce of the Islamist vision as it operates through religious and secular educational channels. Indeed, the terms use supports previous observations by Pipes (2002) about the importance of ideologies in the service of the totalitarian mass social movement; and it supports Durans (1978) thesis about Saudi involvement in spreading a divisive form of militant Islamic fundamentalism throughout the world through the funding of Islamic institutions. And, as Blumer (1946/1951/1963) observes, it is often inside higher education institutions where ideologies are created, discussed, and even promoted, which explains in part why Islamists find higher education an attr active medium for carrying out the reIslamization agenda. Another work, further underscoring the prevalence of Jewish conspiracy theories in the Saudi educational establis hments publishing venues for students at the University of Medina, is The Methods of the Id eological Invasion of the Islamic World which states that secularism in educati on and the mass media are aggression against Islamic legitimacy (qtd. in Gold, 2004: p. 101). That work bears the seal of Saudi Arabia on its cover because it is sponsored by the kingdoms Directorate for Religious Research, Islamic Legal Rulings, Islamic Propagation and Guidance. The Methods of Ideological Invasion of the Islamic World claims that the Crusades are still in continuance and that the so-called Crusa derism of modern Christianity was an invention planned by the in ternational Jewry albeit under the new American umbrella (qtd. in Gold, 2004: p. 102). Perry and Schweitzer (2002) support Golds 271

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analysis of the prevalence of anti-Semitic literature in Saudi Arabian educational institutions and publishing houses that publ ish classic anti-Semitic works such as The Protocols of the Elders of Zion (see Chapter Ones discussion of this forgerys influence on Islamic thought and higher education) and Talmudic Jew each of which are Western inventions thereby supporti ng Pipes (1997a, 1997b, 1998) observations of Jewish conspiracism forming the basis of government policy in the Middle East and of the Western mind of radical Islam. The concept of ideologic al invasion, which Tibi (1998) calls paranoid sc holarship (p. 193), resembles the concept of intellectual incursion described by the scholars for the IIIT (see below). As discussed in the subsections above about Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood, beliefs in Jewish conspiracism and the use of orientalist scho lars is also a hallmark of their educational theory and practice, thus denoting a tran smission of educational thought across time and space, and from Egypt to other parts of the world. Of course, WAMY and its publications are free to exist, a po int that Salah S. Al-Wohaibi, the American-educated secret ary general of WAMY makes when asked about changes Saudi Arabia might make in its teaching and publication practices. Invoking the mediaeval Islami c standard of etiquette, adab, in which non-Muslims must not criticize Muslims, Al -Wohaibi states, Saying that the Jews and the Christians are infidels is part of our religious dogma such that any changes should be decided by Saudis and not others. It doesnt mean we tr y to incite hatred against others, but my religion has its own principles that should not be violated or changed (qtd. in MacFarquhar, 2004: p. A3). 272

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In addition, through apparatuses like WAMY, which work in concert with educational institutions of all levels and kind, Gold (2004) documents that academic chairs for Islamic studies were donated to Harvard Law School and the University of California at Santa Barbara. Moreover, the Sa udis funded Islamic res earch institutes at the American University, Howard University, Duke University, and Johns Hopkins University (Gold, 2002). In turn, charitie s like WAMY became pivotal conduits for funding the most extreme Palestinian orga nizations, including HAMAS which was a natural Saudi ally, having grown out of th e Gaza branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (pp.126-127, p.224). Echoing Yeors (1998) discussion about m odern reformulations of dhimmitude in the academy, Gold (2004) makes an asse rtion showing how Saudi Arabian financial support of Islamic studies programs overseas directly challenges the concept of academic freedom in which faculty and admi nistrators in higher education shield themselves from the excesses of a governments influence: The Saudis, in short, were donating enormous sums [through charitable educational outle ts], and contributions on such a massive scale can crea te certain expectations: the recipient might well adapt his positions toward the donors to assure continuing assistance (p. 127). Muslim Students Association Another result of the aforementioned ch anges in Saudi Arabias education system involves the countrys relationship with the MSA National and its student field groups in the United States, a relationship characterized by a specific emphasis on reIslamization by dissemination of published mate rial and of financial support. By most accounts the MSA, founded in 1963 at the Univ ersity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 273

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(see www.msa-national.org/about/history.html ), would not have become such a formidable student religious organization in the world were it not for two factors: (1) the financial assistance in the late 1950s and early 1960s of Saudi Arabia to Muslim followers of the teacher Mawlana Abu Al-Ala Mawdudi in India; and (2) Arab students who supported the Muslim Brotherhood under the radicalized philosophy of Qutb (Gold, 2004). That financial trend has con tinued until the present day, according to Professor Sulayman Nyang, a Sufi Muslim who studies the social and intellectual pedigree of the MSA and other Muslim organi zations that started in the 1960s (Gold, 2004). Dowd-Gailey (2004) also documents th e flow of money from Saudi Arabia to the MSA and its affiliate groups, and so does Alex Alexiev of the Center for Security Policy (www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/inde x.jsp?section=static &page=alexiev). Another Sufi Muslim, Stephen Schwartz, who is a convert to the religion, testified in 2003 to U.S. Congress the following: Shia and other non-Wahhabi Muslim community leaders estimate that 80 percent of American mosques out of a to tal ranging between an official estimate of 1,200 and an unofficial figure of 4-6,000 are under Wahhabi control. . Wahhabi control over mosques means control of property, buildings, appointment of imams, training of imams, content of preaching including faxing of Friday sermons from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and of literature distributed in mosques and mosque books tores, notices on bulletin boards, and organizational and charitable solicitation. . The main organizations that have carried out this campaign are the [ISNA] which originated in the [MSA], and the Council on American-Islamic Relati ons. (qtd. in Dowd-Gailey, 2004). Mintz & Farah (2004), in a work of investigative jour nalism published in The Washington Post write that the founding members of the MSA were indeed members of the Muslim Brotherhood. In addition, they write that the leadership of many of the other organizations that maintain interest in higher education, secula r or not, in the U.S. cited in other sub-sections below are or were members of the Muslim Brotherhood. 274

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On its website, the MSA claims that it is the parent group to a variety of other groups such as, inter alia the ISNA (discussed below), the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), the Muslim Arab Youth A ssociation (MAYA), and the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS). Th e MSA began collaborating with similar organizations in other parts of the world wh en Saudi Arabia created in 1966 the Islamic Federation of Student Organi zations (IIFSO), headquarter ed in Riyadh, which also partners with the MWL and WAMY, whose headquarters are also in Riyadh (Algar, 2002). The MSA and those groups shared ea rly leadership among seventy members who studied and taught mostly in mid-We stern states. Those members, among them Ahmad Sakr, Mahdi Bhadori, Ahmad Toton ji, and Illyas Ba-Yunus, were foreign graduate students bent on returning home after their studies; yet while many did a significant portion realized th at they would still have th e responsibility of spreading Islam as students in North America. Anot her one of the MSAs early intellectual mentors was Ismail Al-Faruqi, a Palestinian professor at Temple University criticized by Algar (2002) for his heroic efforts to el evate the intellectual status of Muhammad Al-Wahhab (p.51) and lauded by Esposito for hi s pioneering efforts in the field of Islamic studies in North Ameri ca (qtd. in Pipes, 2002: p. 117). According to the website www.MSAnational.org The main goal, those foreign students who founded the MSA cont ended, was always Dawah, or the spread of the MSAs version of Islam in its host society. In addition to those accomplishments, the MSA states that it was the first Muslim organization to publish a newsletter and magazine, Islamic Horizons and Al-Ittihad 275

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(aka Al-Itjihad ). While positioning itself as a religious student organization, the organizations Starters Guide cited on the MSA website advocates Islamization of campus politics: It should be the long-term goal of every MSA to Islamicize the politics of their respective uni versity. . The politicization of the MSA means to make the MSA more of a force on internal campus politics. The MSA needs to be a more Inyour-face association. According to Dowd-Gailey (2004), 150 MSA chapters exist on college and university campuses in North America, while a national office in Washington, D.C. assists in the establishmen t of constituent chapters and overseas fundraising and conferences while steering a pl ethora of special committees and political task forces ( www.meforum.org/article/603 ). The politicization of th e MSA extends to its having created alliances with mostly left-wing student political and cultural groups on university campuses throughout the countr y, including International ANSWER (Act Now to Stop War and End Racism), a group that was formed by International Action Center, a communist organiza tion in New York City that acts as an umbrella organization to a host of radical social and political groups (Dowd-Gailey, 2004). In January 2004, the Senate Finance Committee pu blicized a list of organizations whose members have been linked to internationa l terrorism and has requested that those organizations, the MSA notwithstanding, di sclose their financ ial records (DowdGailey, 2004). The MSA not only is criticized for its me mbers involvement in and affiliation with international terrorism but also is cri ticized for its narrow interpretation of Islam, the religion, and its Arab-only cultural orientation. For example, Nyang is critical of 276

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the MSA because he contends that the group, like its offshoots and affiliated organizations, promotes Islam through the lens of Arab culture at the expense of other cultures that also practice the religion (Gold, 2004). Sufi c onvert Schwartz (2002) also supports arguments like Nyangs. Dowd-Gaile y (2004) contends further that such a narrow interpretation of the religion on th e part of the MSA represents a prime characteristic of militant Islamic groups: a refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of secular society and personal spirituality. Al gar (2002), in turn, traces this rarefaction of intellect and of spirituality to the Muslim World League, discussed above, and elaborates on the close relationship that th e MSA has maintained over the decades with the Muslim World League, to the extent that criticism of Saudi Arabia at the MSAs annual conventions is consider ed taboo. In addition, Algar (2 002) illustrate s that local MSA chapters often distribute at their Frid ay prayer functions on college campuses Muslim world League publications aime d at preventing what the Muslim World League refers to as inimical trends and dogmas (p. 51) such as Sufism, a mystical and highly individualistic variety of Islam. Islamic Society of North America The most comprehensive information about the ISNA that is not published by the ISNA comes from Emerson (2002) in an ap pendix entitled The Terrorists Support Network found in the book American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us ; and, second to Emersons work, Gold (2004), in Hatreds Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism In addition, the undisputed findings of fact in the trial U.S.A v. Holy Land Foundation (2007) reveal archival documents indicating that the ISNA and over twenty other organizations act as arms of the Muslim Brotherhood 277

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in North America. The ISNA is an offshoot of the MSA and has been cited as an unindicted co-conspirator in that same tria l. Sami Al-Arian, according to the website www.freesamial-arian.org is a co-founder of ISNA. While it may seem out of place to discuss an organizati on based in Plainfield, Indiana, in a section about Saudi Arabias role in re-Islamizati on in higher education, the researcher derives justification from so me important facts also related to Saudi Arabias restructuring of its education mini stries to include the funding and printing of educational literature that apparently flow s through the ISNAs home offices, and then to various Islamic Society chapters and mosques in cities throughout North America (Gold, 2004). Evidently, the literature then flows in reprinted form to MSA chapters who distribute such literatur e on university campuses (see, for example, the publishing information on literature distributed at USFs MSA booth: Hijab: Unveiling the Mystery, Status of Women in Islam, Disc over Islam: The Reader, and Islam at a Glance). In addition, it is instrumental to the study to know where and when some of the ISNA leaders received their university educ ation and what they teach to students in college classrooms. This section reitera tes Emersons (2002) and Golds (2004) discussions about the ISNAs interplay with higher education, and also analyzes ISNA documents culled from the ISNAs own website and other Islamic websites that post articles about the ISNA and its involvement in higher education. Emerson (2002) finds that th e ISNA is the largest Mus lim organization in the United States and is an umbrella organi zation for hundreds of other North American Islamic organizations. Founded in 1981, as th e logical outgrowth of the MSA, whose earliest members had graduated from colle ge, the ISNA rejected Sufism as an 278

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acceptable form of Islamic faith (Gold, 2004). Emerson (2002) claims that some of those organizations under the ISNAs wing openly promote the Islamic fundamentalist doctrines of the Muslim Br otherhood, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (p. 216). Emerson (2002) states that the ISNA convenes annual conferences where Islamist militants have been given a platform to incite violence and promote hatred (p. 216). For example, the ISNA estimates that about 10,000 people participated in its 1997 Chicago conferen ce in which the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), and the Marzook Legal Defense Fund--all of [whom] have ties to Hamas (p. 220)--have actively participated. Accord ing to HAMAS, as documented in its own organizational charter, the group is part of the Muslim Brotherhood (Alexander, 2002; Hroub, 2000). The current secretary-general of th e ISNA is Sayyid Muhammad Syeed, who was a board member of another or ganization that raised money for mujahideen or jihad fighters, in Afghanistan, Africa, Le banon, and Palestinians in Jordan (Emerson 2002). According to the ISNA website, Syeed holds a doctorate in sociolinguistics from Indiana University at Bloomington and co-founded the American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Syeed also serves on the board of directors for th e Institute of Islamic Sciences, Technology and Development (IISTD), a group whose chief mission, according to its website, is the Islamizat ion of knowledge and higher education in the U.S.A. or Islamizing higher secular and pseudo-Islamic education systems ( www.islamicscience.org ). Syeed was born in Kashmir in the 1940s and considers himself during childhood as a prisoner of conscience but will not disclose the details of his detention during childhood during th e conflict between India and breakaway 279

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Pakistan in 1947 (Whittle, 2003). Syeed move d to the United States in 1974 and became a U.S. citizen. In a 2003 interview with the Christian Science Monitor John L. Esposito, a renowned Islamic studies specialist and director of the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University, credits Syeed in a public speech for his advancement in the areas of human right s and positive interfaith relations among Muslims and Christians (Whittle, 2003). He also gives Syeed and other ISNA members present specific advice on what kinds of new terminology they should use to express their grievances in a post-September 11 m ilieu of government scrutiny, advocating that the ISNA avoid strident terms of blame like imperialism and colonialism (Rashed, 2003). The esteem that Esposito holds for Syeed is apparently mutual, for in an August 2003 feature article on IslamOnline.net, Syeed calls Esposito the Abu Taleb of Islam, Taleb being the uncle of Muhammad who gave unconditional support to the Muslim community at a time when it was weak and oppressed (Rashed, 2003). IslamOnline.net is an ISNA affiliate group. The 1996-2000 president of the ISNA Board of Directors is Muzammil H. Siddiqui, who also acts as president of th e Islamic Societys Orange County chapter. He acquired a B.A. in Islamic and Arabic studies from the Islamic University of Medina in 1965 (Gold, 2004), after the rest ructuring of Saudi Arabias education ministry so that it would be directed by descendants of Al-W ahhab. Like most ISNA leaders he had served on the MSA National Board of Directors and was a leader in his universitys MSA (Gold, 2004). Emerson (2002) quotes him as saying, Islam will not 280

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allow a Muslim to be drafted by non-Muslims to defend concepts, ideologies and values other than those of Islam (p. 217). Under the leadership of all these men and one woman cited above, the ISNA has opposed all peace agreements between Israel and the PLO, as has its parent group, the MSA (Gold, 2004). In addition, through its widely-read publication Islamic Horizons the ISNA has voiced support for Islamic militancy in the Sudan, Turkey, and Algeria (Emerson, 2002). A 1998 program for the ISNAs annual c onvention in Chicago, Illinois, demonstrates the organizations interest in fostering relationships with higher education in various ways, as part of its purpose in advancing re-Islamization from below through legitimate channels, as opposed to the above ways alleged by Emerson (1998), the U.S. Department of Justice, and numerous congressional and senate committees since the mid-1990s (see the 9/11 Committee Report released in July 2004). For example, Session 6C features five panelists on the topic Guilty Until Proven Innocent: Prisoners of Conscience in the U.S. moderated by Abduraham AlAmoudi. Two of those panelists are or were university professors, David Cole (Georgetown, law) and Sami Al-Arian (USF, co mputer engineering). Sami Al-Arian is one of the ISNAs founding father (see www.FreeSamiAlArian.org ). Furthermore, another session, 11B, is enti tled Building Muslim Institutio ns for Higher Education: Why and How? which illustrates the concer ns of the ISNA about the transition from high school to college for the Muslim youth it claims to represent. Of interest here, too, is that Al-Amo udi himself was convicted in August 2004 on terrorism-related charges involving his invo lvement in a plot to assassinate a Saudi 281

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Arabian prince. A known member of the Mu slim Brotherhood, Al-Amoudi became the leader of a political lobby headquartered in Washington, D.C., the American Muslim Council (AMC) (Waller, 2003). Al-Amoudi b ecame a naturalized citizen in 1996 when in so doing he swore to defend the Constitu tion against all enemies, foreign and domestic; yet, after his taking of the ci tizenship oath, in a videotaped rally in Washington, D.C., told an audience that I th ink if we are outside this country, we can say oh, Allah, destroy America, but once we ar e here, our mission in this country is to change it (qtd. in Waller, 2003: http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony ). Moreover, after becoming a naturalized citizen, Al-Amoudi called upon President Clinton to release someone the Muslim lobbyist considered a political prisoner, Sheikh Al-Rahman, mentioned above regarding his conspiracy to blow up New York City landmarks (Waller, 2003). Al-Amoudi is also the president of a committee called Muslims for a Better America (Waller, 2003). According to Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. (2003), Al-Amoudi was also affiliated with the IIIT, another Saudi-funded thinktank discussed below in terms of its influence on higher educ ation. Al-Amoudi, along with Sami Al-Arian and a Republican lobbyist Grover Norquist, gained access to the White House in order to spread Islamist influence to the American military and the prison system and the universities and the political arena with untold consequences for the nation (Gaffney, 2003, italics added). Islam prof essor Khalid Duran states that the ISNA speakers would never be able to c onvene such conferences in their native countries. They would not be able to hold this conference in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco or Pakistan. Many of the speak ers are barred from those states (qtd. in Gossett, 2004: p. 16). 282

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Two other groups under the ISNA banner are the Muslim American Society (MAS) and the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), which recently merged. Those groups maintain an organizational stru cture close to that of their parent group, the ISNA, with an Ameer (President), Sec retary General, three Vice Presidents, and an Executive Council, Zonal and Regional Presidents, General Assembly members, and a Majilis Ash-Shura. Li ke the ISNA, the leaders of the major governing bodies of the group serve on each body. The MAS website, www.masnet.org cites its affiliation with ISNA groups, including the MSA, and claims that it developed out of an I slamic revival movement which evolved at the turn of the twentieth century that later brought the call and the spirit of the movement to the shores of North America with arrival of Muslim students and immigrants in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Context clues in ot her parts of the MAS website indicate that the revival movement in question is none other than the Muslim Brotherhood (see DepartmentsTarbiyya ). The MAS posts an obituary of IIIT founder Al-Faruqi (discussed further below). In the obituary, al-Faruqi is laude d as a pioneer in Muslim-Christian relations, for his founding leadership in the MSA, AMSS, and for his chairmanship of the NAIT and the Islamic Studies Steering Committee of the American Academy of Religion. Furthermore, the MAS writes that Al-Faruqi was among the vanguard of Muslim intellectuals who settled in Ameri ca, and his vision, ideas, and impact . were transmitted through his writings, hi s Muslim students (as well as non-Muslim students) who returned to teach and work in government ministries throughout the 283

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Muslim world, and the organization and inst itutions he funded a nd led (p. 2, italics added). Given the various positions this Mu slim academic held within the ISNA subgroups, Al-Faruqi obviously had achieved significant power in the ISNA ranks prior to his and his wifes murder in the 1980s. As a founder of the IIIT and other organizations also, according to the MAS, he provided an im portant intellectual foundation for both the scholar-activists of the 1970s and 1980s and the emerging intellectual generation at the beginning of the twenty-first century during his academic appointment at Temple University. Al-Faruqis impact shall enjoy more detailed analytical commentary below. As was typi cal of Muslim Brothers who were also professors in Egypts university system, Al -Faruqi achieved signifi cant prestige within the ISNA ranks, resulting in the accumulation of power through his academic status at Temple University and his f ounding leadership in the IIIT. The MAS website continues on by disc ussing the foundation of the MSA and the ISNA. It boasts an on-line journal, The American Muslim Online, which publishes informative reports about current events, su ch one by Omer bin Abdullah, whose lead sentence is Terrorism enables the weak to confront the strong, and thus has an enduring appeal to those who are dissatisfied with the status quo (July 2003, p. 1). Located in Virginia, the president of the MAS is Dr. Souheil Ghannouchi. Ghannouchis bio published by the August 2002 MAS Youth and MSA Boston Tarbya and ilm Camp indicates that he ha s a PhD in chemical engineering from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Prior to becoming MAS president, he was president and imam of the Islamic Center of Madison. He was also the president of the Madison 284

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MSA, and he is a veteran of the Tunisian Student Movement. According to Kepel (2002) the Tunisian movement owes its inspiration to the Muslim Brotherhood members who emigrated there from Egypt and taught in Tunisian universities. In all likelihood, the MAs leader is related, therefore, to Ra shid Al-Ghannoushi, discussed below. The MAS Youth, on its website, endorses the MSA program, and posts on its website, www.ymusa.org, a weblog that makes libera l reference to the Muslim Brotherhood. For example, the weblog states: The history of the Islamic movement in this century dates back to the 1920s when Imam Hasan al-Banna and Mawl aana Mawdudi began their work. Their inheritors have continued their wo rk through the decades and we have witnessed many trials and periods of hardship. . So wh at is our role here and now in North America? Khilaafah? Jih aad? Tazyiyyah? The Islamic Movement today is not just you and me. The Is lamic movement today means many organizations and many millions of people. We have a global agenda that is to revive the Muslims, and this includes a ll that Islam requires of us. So is the movement working for the Khiliaafah and the application of Shareeyah? Of course it is. Is the movement working for jihad? It is the du ty of the movement by way of example, to defend Muslims wherev er they have been attacked. . It is our responsibility that Islam should now be introduced to the people of this land [North America] . as the cure to its many diseases. Following another quotation by Al-Banna, the weblog posts another article dated November 14, 2002, which mourns the death of the Muslim Brotherhoods Guide-General, Mustafa Mashour, whic h states that in 1981, he founded the International Muslim Brotherhood in Germany, after leaving Egypt during Al-Sadats arrest of Muslim Brother hood leaders. Here, the MAS Youth, led by Ghannouchi, a member of the Muslim Brot herhood-inspired Tunisian student movement, directly reveals its sympathy to the Muslim Brothe rhood. A directory of North American mosques, published by the ISNA and available on-line shows that 285

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another International Muslim Brotherhood bran ch was introduced in North America in the 1949 the same year that Sayyid Qutb arri ves in the United States for graduate study. The Quba Institute in Philadelphia attributes its development of educational programs to its partnerships with the Muslim Student Associations of local universities (www .qubainstitute.com). The MAS, invokes a term called tarbiyyah on its website to refer to not only the intellectual and spiritual but also the physical training of its young members. Citing the terms origins in the behavior of Muha mmad, the MAS states, Also, Islamic history proves the effectiveness and relevance of this methodology. Imam Hassan Al-Banna, the founder and leader of a great Islami c movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, said, When ever you find the good Muslim, you find w ith him all means for great success. (Sic) message of Islam, but also left a gr eat generation that carried the message and spread it all over the land and moved human ity from darkness into light. Furthermore, the MAS defines its mission as follows: MAS delivers a rigorous educational curri culum to its current and potential members that focuses on the systematic development of the Muslim individual, the Muslim family and the Muslim comm unity. The focus of Tarbiyah is to groom members who are distinguished, stri ve for excellence, have a sense of mission, self-motivated, conduct a balanced life, live in peace with themselves and their environment, be equipped with the necessary knowledge, understanding, and skills to make a difference in the society by taking an active role, both individually and collectively in the reform process that seeks to make the betterment of our community, our country, and the whole world (sic, italics added to illustrate the totalizing nature of the MAS reformist program). Moreover, the MAS writes that the Tarbi yah process also aims to put members and potential members on the path of consta nt self-purification and self-development, and instill in them the passion for trut h, righteousness, and justice/fairness. 286

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Association of Muslim Sc ientists and Engineers One of the ISNAs academic professiona l associations is the AMSE. A link from the ISNA to the AMSE reveals a we bsite layout with t opical placement and symbolism close to that of the ISNA, the AMSS, the AMJISS, and the IIIT. For example, like the AMSS (discussed below as a sub-affiliate of the IIIT), the AMSE uses the same font and names to describe its departments and customary activities to advance what it calls Islamic science: research papers, sp eakers bureau, career centre, discoveries, and voyages. Many of the scholars in the AMSE, as cited in the associations research department, hol d positions in North Americas major universities (e.g., Dr. Zarjon Baha, Buildi ng Construction, Purdue University; Dr. Mohammad Karim, Dean of College of Engi neering, City University of New York). Others are affiliated directly with the IIIT: Dr. Iqbal Unus, Dr. Seyyid Hossein Nasr, Dr. Usma Hassan, Dr. Ziauddin Sardar, Dr. Mahbub Ghani, and Dr. Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman, all of whom write about topics th at merge matters of science with faith, as indicated in the titles of their works (e.g., The Concept of Ilm and Knowledge, Science in Islamic Philosophy, Tauheed and Knowledge, and Islamization, Science, and Technology.) Institute of Islamic and Ar abic Sciences in America Located in Fairfax, Virginia, the IIASA is actually an overseas branch of Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University and is part of the ISNA umbrella in North America. According to the IIASAs we bsite, the IIASA was founded in 1988. Among other purposes, it trains over four hundred students for religious leadership in U.S. mosques. Its major higher educational texts are printed by the Saudi Arabian Ministry 287

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of Islamic Affairs and Endowments and ar e written by scholars in Saudi Arabian universities (Gold, 2004). Two of those books, The True Religion and A Muslims Relations with Non-Muslims, Enmity or Friendship? assert that Judaism and Christianity are deviant relig ions (qtd. in Gold, 2004: p. 152) and that people who call for brotherhood and equality among religions are parasites ( p. 152). The IIASA is affiliated with the International Curricula Or ganization (ICO) whose task is to develop Islamic and Arabic studies curricula for us e by Islamic schools in Western countries in English-speaking schools. Apparently echoing the philosophy of the Muslim Brotherhood, the ICOs goals maintain a dis tinct reformist agenda with an emphasis on helping Muslim youth avoid assimilating cultu ral practices that ar e contradictory to Islamic values (see http://www.manahijj.com/icoCurricula.htm ). Characteristic Two: Codified Educati on Theory for Purposes of Promoting Monolithic View of Islam and Subverting Universities and Su rrounding Societies from Below The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) is another organization that directly receives its di rection of mission and funding from Saudi Arabia. The organization therefore exemplifies how Sa udi Arabia, according to Duran (1978), has spread a divisive form of Islam around th e world that, according to Algar (2002), has rarefied Islamic scholarship under the banne r of a monolithic voice that purports to represent true Islam. Algars (2002) discussion of the IIIT centers precisely on its conception as an organ of Saudi Arabia de signed to promote Wahhabism. In turn, that version of Islam, which has been explicated above as a blend of both Wahhabi and neoMuslim Brotherhood doctrines, further illustra tes the characteristics of Islamisms re288

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Islamization program from below as it se eks what the IIIT calls integration ( Islamization of Knowledge 1982/1989/1995) with the dom ain of modern knowledge in higher education instituti ons in the United States and other countries throughout the world. Given such an understanding, one mi ght consider that on a conceptual level Islamists consider modern in stitutions of higher education in the same manner that they, by nature of their doctrine expounded in Chapter One, regard higher education institutions as they regard any territory that Muslims have not yet conquered: the dar al-harb or the domain of war. On its websites and in its plethora of white papers and books about higher education theory the IIIT calls its program Islamization of knowledge, thus supporting the objectives of the larger mass social movement encapsulating the IIITs mission, Islamism, and its totalitarian object ive of bringing all lands where Muslims reside under Islamic rule. Chapter Threes overview of the case at USF, which involves the North American chapter of the IIIT, notes that founder of the IIIT in North America was Ismail Al-Faruqi, who for a time taught at Temple University. He was a Palestinian immigrant who once wrote, Nothi ng could be greater than this youthful, vigorous, and rich continent [of North America] turning away from its past evil and marching forward under the banner of Allhu Akbar [God is great] (qtd. in Pipes, 2002: p. 113). Perhaps the premier Islamic studies schol ar in the United States, Georgetown Universitys John L. Esposito lauds Al-Faruqi as a pioneer in the development of Islamic studies in America (qtd. in Pipes, 2002: p. 113). While Esposito never 289

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provided a full critique of Al-Faruqis scholarship at the IIIT, his counterpart in the field of Islamic studies, Algar (2002 ) does offer the following summation: Al-Faruqi, in his day one of the princi pal promoters of Wahhabism in North America, had it almost right when, in the introduction to his translation to Kitab al-Tauhid he described the books as havi ng the appearance of students notes. It would have been closer to th e mark to say that this and many other writings of [Al-Wahhab] were the notes of a student. In a flight of fancy that would have done honor to a medieval cour t panegyrist, al-Faruqi attempted to account for the general modesty of his hero s literary output by asserting that he applied himself [to rectifying the alleged misunderstanding of tauhid by virtually all Muslims] with a mental vigor too great for his pen. (p. 14) Algar (2002) further enjoins that the l ack of completeness and breadth of Al-Wahhabs scholarship caused Al-Faruqi, a custodian of Wahhabism (p. 15) who translated Al-Wahhabs works into Englis h and then published them between 1968 and 1988 in publishing houses in Delhi and Riyadh, to not indicate where his amendments to Al-Wahhabs text began and ended. Alga r (2002) expresses a certain sense of mystification as to why another professor of Islamic studies would even bother to regard the expansion of Al-Wahhabs scho larship as a necessity (p. 17). Because Al-Wahhab regarded the authorial act as one more unauthorized i nnovation that for centuries had clouded the Muslim mind (p. 17), Algar (2002) questions why a twentieth-century proponent of Al-Wahhabs teachings, Al-Faruqi, would engage in further acts of innovation, which for Al-W ahhab was an act of spiritual abomination that defied the true interests of Islam. Another element of Algars ( 2002) criticism of Al-Faruqis elaborations of AlWahhabs scholarship involves th e MSAs publication in 1980 of Sources of Islamic Thought Appreciating that it might appear at first sight puzzling that students pursuing a higher education should be attracte d to a Wahhabi reading of Islam (p. 51), 290

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Algar (2002) explains the affinity: Attuned to a rationalistic worldview fostered by their studies of engineering and natural sciences, they found in Wahhabism a rationalized Islam, one already stripped of niceties and ambiguities of juristic reasoning, the complexities of theology, and the subtleties of Sufism, all of those having been decried as a ccretions (pp. 51-52). In kind, Algars (2002) obs ervations support Durans in an interview with Emerson (1998) on the attraction of engineers an d other students in the hard sciences to the Muslim Brotherhood (see Chapter One) In addition, Wahhabisms inability to appreciate paradox in the domain of West ern educations charge to create and disseminate knowledge is further illustra ted in the education theory published by various scholars from Al-Faruqis IIIT itself, despite the underlined paradoxical statements in the Overview of the IIITs mission on the website www.iiit.org : The International Institute of Islamic Thought is a private, non-profit, academic, and cultural institution, concerned with general issues of Islamic thought The Institute was established in the Unit ed States of America in 1981 (1401 AH). It is independent of local politics, party orientations and ideological biases (italics added) Aside from the Wahhabist underpinnings of the IIITs stated program to Islamize society and knowledge, the claim of independence from ideological bias is rendered all the more contradictory in the next st atement, with underlining again added to emphasize the ideological bias embedded in the IIIT mission: The Institute is an intellectual forum working from an Islamic perspective to promote and support research projects organize intellectual and cultural meetings and publish scholarly works. It has established a distinct intellectual trend in Islamic thought which relate s to the vivid legacy of the Ummah (Muslim nation), and its c ontinuous efforts of inte llectual and methodological reform. This involves a large number of researchers and scholars from various parts of the world. 291

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Moreover, the IIIT further shows that the ide ological bias that it claims not to have is conceived not solely for the Muslim nation or ummah ; rather, it is conceived for humanity: The International Institute of Islamic Thought is dedicated to the revival and reform of Islamic thought and its methodol ogy in order to enable the Ummah to deal effectively with present challenges, and contribute to the progress of human civilization in ways that will gi ve it a meaning and a direction derived from divine guidance (italics added to show the Islamist ideology embedded in the IIITs mission) Of course, according to the logic of the IIIT Islamic thought as a foundation for all of humanity is not a bias because its vi sion of Islamization transcends the boundaries of nation-states and surpasses other religi ons. Again, that Islamic thought represents classic Muslim Brotherhood doctrine. Ther efore, the monolithic worldview of the IIITs Islamization of society and knowle dge program coherently resonates in the organizations Objectives a nd Means to formulate a comprehensive Islamic vision and methodology that will help Muslim scholars in their critical analysis of contemporary knowledge; develop an appropriate methodology for dealing with Islamic legacy and contemporary knowledge, in order to draw on the experiences of both past and present, to build a better future for the Ummah and humanity at large (italics added to show the Islamist id eology embedded in the IIITs objectives and means). As will be amplified in an analysis of original documents of the IIIT below, contradiction of thought identified by Algar ( 2002) is not the only ki nd that lends itself to textual scrutiny. Also of major relevance to this inquiry is that the IIIT was the primary funding source of USF-WISE (see Chapters One and Five), a fact which establishes a strong ideological association between Islamists at USF and those in Herndon, Virginia, 292

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headquarters for the IIIT in the United States. The relationship also reveals an ideological connection among USF-WISE and the Saudi-funded WAMY network described above. Ideological association, of course, alone cannot be used to convict a person of a crime; however, examination of ideological association is an acceptable line of academic inquiry and discourse, as th e writings of the many scholars cited in Chapter Twos literature revi ew suggest. When one studies the social psychology of a mass social movement, in part, one studies the ideology of that movement as a characteristic feature for analysis. As with previous organizations, this sections explication of the IIITs website and books stems from the groups practice in No rth America, but places it in a chapter about the global context of Islamiza tion because it receives its funding for administration, research, and developmen t from Saudi Arabia through the North Atlantic Islamic Trust (NAIT, see Emerson, 2002); maintains similarly named chapters in other countries; and partners with traditional higher education institutions and academic professional associations throughout the world. In addition, the IIITs texts of educational theory and practice are transl ated into scores of foreign languages by publishers in Riyadh and dissemi nated in all continents. Here, one finds it helpful to note that th e scholars involved with the IIIT do not refer to their educational ag enda of re-Islamization as Islamist but rather as Islamic, a point discussed by Duran and Hechiche (2001) in non-educational contexts. So the only means to understand where the IIIT fits into th e Islamist aspect of contemporary Islamic fundamentalisms mi nd is to examine the content of the IIITs texts and statements made by scholars associ ated with the organi zation. Therein, clues 293

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include patterns of thought such as bl aming the decline on Islamic civilizations decline on jahiliyah, takfir and kufr ; by establishing the condition of dhimmitude on other religions, cultures, a nd institutions; and restoring th e Islamic caliphate, dissolved in the early Twentieth Century in favor of the Westphalian system of nation-states. A critical review of a work by Zahra Al-Zeera, Wholeness and Holiness in Islamic Education published by the IIIT, offers furthe r insight into the nature of the methodology that the IIIT has developed in the course of several decades of consideration by a group of IIIT-affiliated scholars throughout the world. This review by Jeremy Henzell-Thomas, available on the IIIT website, defines the IIIT methodology by using common postmodern discourse supportive of de-Westernizing the production and dissemi nation of knowledge in higher education. Henzell-Thomas represents the Book Founda tion in the United Kingdom, a group that offers Islamic education and raises money for it. In his book review, Henzell-Thomas praises Al-Zeeras work for its ability to overcome passive acceptance in the human and social sciences which by their very natu re can never be as n eutral or value-free as the pure, hard, natural sciences. Mo reover, the reviewer objects to the Western rationalist tradition for its unremittingly re ductionist mode of blinkered scientism which claims to operate under the most ri gorous conditions of objectivity but which are nonetheless founded upon a priori assumptions germane to the Western secular world-view of positivism which radically restricts the nature of reality only to that which is observable by quantitative means. The invocation of de-Westernizing postm odernist principles by the IIIT and its class of international scholars is not without its paradoxes. While postmodernism 294

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disavows the idea that a transcendental signified is behind all logos, the IIIT nevertheless affirms the existence of that very thing in the service of its call to restore the Islamic caliphate in lands where Muslims live: From an Islamic perspective, the denial of God does not elevate man, for it is of course the underlying unity and interconnectedness of everything in existence which makes the microcosm of man a mirror of the macrocosm and which alone endows man with the possibility of becoming fully human by virtue of his divinely appointed role as khalifah, or viceregent. . Authentic Islamizat ion of knowledge cannot be a parochial concern but must be an inclusive activity which avoids the limitation and fixity of a non-perspective by acknowledging a nd valuing different levels of description, by synthesizi ng and integrating tradi tional and contemporary knowledge, or perennial and acqui red knowledge, by going beyond facile dichotomies representing competing models of reality, and by reconciling opposites and resolving contra dictions within an overa rching Islamic paradigm. This unity, after all, is by definition what the doctrine of tawhid implies in the domain of knowledge. As such, constructivist methods serve to ju stify, in decidedly paradoxical terms, an Islamist educational program, Islamizati on of society and knowledge, that denies messy contradictions in knowledge by stating, a priori that multiplicity is only the manifestation of a single reality, the ultimate tr uth, which itself is an assertion that no constructivist in the Western tradition would agree. The review of the Al-Zeera b ook of education theory ends with an invocation of a mediaeval Muslim scholar considered im portant to the neo-Mu slim Brotherhood in Egypt, Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) (Kepel, 1984/2003). Al-Ghazalis influence on the takfir student groups supported by professors w ho were neo-Muslim Brothers rests in Al-Ghazalis descriptions of the ulema or jurisconsults who issue legal opinions, or fatawa on certain matters concerning Muslims. Al-Ghazali stated that the jurisconsult serves as master and director of conscience for political authority in administering and disciplining men that order and justice may reign in this world (qtd. in Kepel, 295

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1984/2003: p. 229), a position that gives sancti on to ruling classes as rulers and imposing recognition of the legitimacy of domination of the ruled (p. 230). In essence, what the IIIT does is transl ate Al-Ghazalis idea of right Islamic government by an elite jurisconsults interpre tation of early Islamic texts such as the Koran and the Sunnah into a means of mana ging Islamic education, covering all fields of knowledge, not just the law. Henzell-T homas praises Al-Zeeras book about Islamic education theory by stating that only a curr iculum in harmony with the teachings of the Holy Quran and intended to integrat e mans understanding of God, the universe and his own nature can be spacious enough to accommodate and reconcile competing paradigms. In addition to the IIITs theo ry being presented as encompassing Gods will, the same theory is presented as scientific, although some Western observers and other early Islamic scholars like Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), a Tunisian mediaeval Islamic scholar favored by Sufis, might conc lude that matters of faith and science are separate. Despite the possible contradictions in so mething that is a matter of faith being also a matter of science, a 1988 IIIT essay posted on the organizations website by Taha Jabir Al-Alwani affirms the merger. Also a leader in the ISNA according to a 1998 ISNA convention program (see ISNA sect ion above), Al-Alwani--following the essays presentation in Islamabad, Pakistan, in 1982 on Islamization of Knowledge at the Second International Conferen ce on Islamic Thought--explains thus: When the League of Muslim Youth expr essed their desire to hold a course on Usul al Fiqh Source Methodology in Islamic Juri sprudence, the material for this study formed one of the six subjects covered in the course. . The science of Usul al Fiqh is rightly considered to be the most important method of research ever devised by Muslim T hought. Indeed, as the solid foundation upon which all the Islamic disciplines are based, Usul al Fiqh not only benefited 296

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Islamic civilization but contributed to the intellectual enrichment of world civilization as a whole. It will not be out of place to note here that the methods of analogical developed within the framework of Islamic jurisprudence constituted the methodical starting-point for the establishment and construction of empiricism, which in turn is c onsidered the basis of contemporary civilization. Al-Alwani further allows: We present this brief work to all who ar e interested in gaining some knowledge of this science, and we ask Allah Taala to help us benefit from what we learn, and to learn that which will not benef it us, and to protect us from knowledge that is not beneficial, and from d eeds that are not acceptable to Him. The IIIT characterization of its educationa l theory and practice being a science or scientific resemble Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhoods earlier formulations of Islamist educational theory practice. The pa rallel is apparent not only in terms of employment of the terms science and scien tific but also in terms of the plan to merge matters of reason with revelation by applying a persons interpretation of Islamic law to all things studied. The aforementioned works introduce the reader in general fashion to the IIITs mission and educational th eory; however, the book Islamization of Knowledge: General Principals and Work Plan (1982/1989/1995), offers specifics in chapters beginning with a problem statement and then proceeding to other chapters on the following topics: explaining the institutes t ask of applying its educational theory, refuting traditional methodology, counteri ng that methodology with an Islamic version, explaining further the agenda of the IIIT, stating indispensable clarifications about the I slamization program and the Islamization of knowledge program, and ending with a needs statement about financial requirements. The one hundred thirteen-page work is a translation of Islamiyat Al-Marifah and holds its 297

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origins in the Saudi Arabian educational systems publishing orga n, the International Islamic Publishing House (IIPH), headquarter ed in Riyadh and distributing Islamic books and tapes in seventy languages. Islamization of Knowledges introduction and individual chapters enable understanding of an influential inte rnational educational theory for graduate studies, in particular and why the IIIT recognizes the importance of interacting with secular higher education institutions in the West. The author or authors of the text in question is or are unknow n. References to the work in the sections below are therefore cited in -text as the IIIT and vari ous referential common nouns such as the author or authors, t he text, the work, the book. The introduction to Islamization of Knowledge in the course of seven pages, gives the reader an historical overview of the condition of the Muslim community from the inception of Islam to the present, as pe rceived by the IIIT, and in turn give reasons for the work plan described in the book, wh ich supports the establishment in 1972 of an associate group, the Association for Musl im Social Scientists (AMSS, discussed further below). The introduction never documen ts specific examples to explain the IIITs version of Islamic history; however, it does describe in the most general of terms centuries of plots, assaults, and dominati on by foreign groups and persons whose sole objective is to keep Islam in a state of weakness, an oft-repeated term in the book. Khaldun (1377/1967/1989) writes of Al-Ghazal i and his coreligionists that they were very intent upon meddling with philoso phical works. The s ubjects of the two disciplines (theology and philosophy) were thus confused by them. This has gone so far that the one discipline is no longer dis tinguishable from the other (p.353). Therefore, Khaldun (1377/1967/1989) in part traces the decline of Islam to the 298

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intellectual impoverishment of his own civi lization caused by his own Muslim people. Khalduns argument is that, early on, Islam disc overed Aristotelian logic, a mainstay of the Western intellectual tradition, and th ereby made great achievements in the advancement of knowledge that the West w ould adopt; but then Islam proceeded to equate logic with matters of faith, soul, and heart and slid into centuries of malaise. To the IIIT, its founder, and notable scholars, however, problems with the Muslim community have not cha nged since the dawn of Islam. Islamization of Knowledge thus thematically conveys the sense of conspiracism discussed above and in previous chapters and exhib its a conceptual interplay with Qutbs concepts of takfir kufr and jahiliyah To the IIIT, Islam has been beset with challenges and conspiracies and unrelenting psychological and economic warfare, covertly and deviously waged (p. ix). With repeat ed attacks over the centuries, Islam never entirely lost its will to power, and so it s enemies set out . more devious methods (p. ix) such as intellectua l incursion--a pro cess that introduced (under the guise of logic, common sense, and pragmatism) certain metaphysical concepts that led to much controversy and endless sophistry (p. ix). The result, accordingly to the introduction, was intellectual incursion (p. ix) giving rise to sectarianism (e.g., Sufism) that impaired Islams unity and distracted its scholars from the original sources and unsullied fountainheads of Islam: the Quran, the Word of Allah (SWT), and the Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad (SAAS) (p. x). Again without providing any specific em pirical evidence to support the books introductory claims, the IIIT further states that even during the Ottoman Empire intellectual deviancy (p. x) remained a threat because in the age of the European 299

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Renaissance, the intellectual incursion be gan to assume new dimensions by becoming more systematic, all-embracing, and sophisticat ed (p. x). Apparently, it was during the Renaissance--although scant evidence of actual dates and specific ev ents are provided to know for certain in this paragraph--tha t Islam was further weakened by Western imperialism, its religious functionaries [n ever directly identified as Jews and Christians], and orientalists machinations who together turned their campaign into a total and exhaustive ons laught (p. x). Islam, itself, the IIIT text implies, was raped, the prime target to be penetrated (p. x). On an educational level, Orientalism was the aggressor laying the groundwork for this new intellectual offensive against Islam and the Ummah and was aided and abette d, materially and morally, by numerous organizations and supporters, and succeeded eventually in ensnaring the hearts and minds of many Muslims, reshaping its thinking and clouding their Islamic vision (p. x). Furthermore, the IIITs locus of resp onsibility for Islams decline not only involves, inter alia plots by Orientalist in tellectuals, Crusaders, and deviant religions but also the time when the West created an a lien entity inside Muslim lands to act as a convenient springboard for its plans and ambitions (p.xi). Presumably, because the introduction never states the year nor name s the entity in ques tion, the alien entity is the state of Israel, or what the IIIT te xt calls the most cruel and inhumane act of imperialism in the world. . Shaken by such calamitous events, the Muslim mind was unable to distinguish between right and wrong or good or evil (p. xi). In The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder, Syrian sociologist, Tibi (1998) refutes such fundamentalist historical 300

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claims and calls them forms of paranoid sc holarship. Tibi (1998) writes, for example, that the decline of the Ottoman Empire was not the result of a Western conspiracy against Islam, but part of unfolding global history; it marked the end of the long historical epoch of divine orders that had reigned virt ually throughout the world (p. 144). Yet the IIIT remains wedded to its vision of history that accordingly culminated in the creation of Israel. And despite the odds stacked against Nizam Islami the author or authors of the IIIT textbook asserts th at several groups (p. xii)--who are never identified specifically--within the Ummah have remained faithful to the truth and have adhered to their beliefs (p. xii) set ou t to rescue Islam from its weakness. Unwavering in their faith and regardless of prevailing suppr ession, corruption, and pessimism, the people in this Islamic vanguard provide a map of the way to deliverance and salvation (p. x). Thus, in 1972 the IIIT and the AMSS were created jointly to address the inte llectual problems facing Islamic thought (p. xii). Never identifying them by name, Islamization of Knowledge first published in 1982 and then reprinted in 1989 and 1995, holds also that members of one group were young men who had attained a clear understanding of th e nature of the problem and its cure while still studying at various We stern universities (p. xii): intellectual deviation, stagnation, loss of vision, confusion, disintegration, and weakness leading to aimlessness and impotence (p. xii). These ar e the same accusations that appear in Qutbs and the Muslim Brotherhoods writi ngs, meant as educational tools for Muslims living jahiliyah society. 301

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Referring to Muslims as a nation, Malai se of the Ummah signifies the basis of the IIITs definition of the problem of Islamic civilizations loss of power in the Twentieth Century. In this century, no other nation has been subjected to comparable defeats or humiliation. Muslims were def eated, massacred, double-crossed, colonized, and exploited, proselytized, forced or bribed into conversion to other faiths (p. 1). Moreover, they were secularized, Westernized, and de-Islamized by internal and external agents of their enemies (p. 1). To the unknown author or authors of this work of educational theory and practice, such act ions aggravate because Islam is, in fact, an integral, beneficial, wo rld-affirming, and realistic religion in which practical solutions for contemporary problems of huma nity can be sought and found (p. 1). Moreover, the malaise affects the political economic, and cultural character of the Muslim nation; and there can be no doubt that the intellectual and methodological decline of the Ummah is the core of it s malaise (p. 5). In addition, and without providing any empirical evidence the author or authors state: As far as Islamization is concerned, neve r before have both the traditional and the secularist schools, colleges, and univ ersities been more daring in advocating their un-Islamic themes and never before have they had the captive ear of the overwhelming majority of Mu slim youth as they do today. . The secularist educational system has assumed tremendous proportions, elbowing out the Islamic syst em from the field. Islamic education, for the most part, remains a private affair that has limited access to public funds. . The forces of Westernizati on and secularization, and resultant deIslamization of teachers and students, continue to gather momentum in colleges and universities; and nothing has been done to stop that degeneration. . No Muslim government, university administra tion, or private organization is doing anything about the sinking morale of co llege youth or about their continuing de-Islamization through education. (p. 6) 302

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In addition to matters of de-Islamization, the author or authors condemn Muslim university professors for their own lack of a clear vision (p. 6), which tacitly accuses Muslim university professors of takfir and jahiliyah : Look at the highest model of the Muslim university teacherthe professor with a doctorate from a Western university, es pecially in the social sciences and humanities. . In most cases, he wa s not Islamically motivated beforehand, i.e., he had not embarked upon his expedi tion to seek knowledge for the sake of Allah (SWT), but rather for materialistic, egoist, or at best, nationalistic goal. . that teachers in Muslim uni versities do not possess the vision of Islam and, therefore, are not driven by its caus e is certainly the gr eatest calamity of Muslim education. (pp. 7-8) Also, the author or aut hors condemn the Wests s ubjects and methodologies which the Muslim cannot digest as well as the non-Muslim because those things have been de-Islamized: Unconsciously, these dispirited material s and methodologies continue to exert a sinister de-Islamizing influence upon stude nts by posing as alternatives to the Islamic disciplines. . Without a cause, th e Muslim is not driven to master the totality of knowledge in the discipline; and without that mastery no transcendence of that disciplines stateof-the-art is possible. For the Muslim, the only cause that can really be a cause is Islam. (p. 8) And, in a comparative statement that perhap s more than a few educators in the West would deny, simply because postmodernism has given rise to de-Westernization in the Western curriculum (see, for example, Tibi 1998): Nowhere in the Muslim world is the Islamic vision taught to all students as th e Western tradition is taught to high school students in the West with consistency, universality, utmost seriousness and commitment on the part of all (p. 9). Late in the book, however, the author or authors contradict this early statement about th e consistency and commitment of the Western curriculum in a critique of its flaws and defects (p. 59), disjointed 303

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approach, (p. 68), unimaginative me thodology, (p. 68) and misguidance and deception (p. 83). The next two chapters re iterate the aforementioned content and themes of Islamization of Knowledge again without offering any evidence for their raison detre, but then propose a solution, identified as T he Task, which is to merge the Western tradition of education with th at of revelation, just as Qutb had suggested in 1953 in Social Justice in Islam : The two systems must be united and integrated, and the emergent system must be infused with th e spirit of Islam and must function as an integral part of its ideological program. . The edu cational system must be endowed with a mission, and that mission must be none other than that of imparting Islamic vision and cultivating the will to realize it on the largest scale (p. 13). In essence, for the IIIT, this merger equates to an educa tional system in a kind of Golden Age during Islams formative years before some Muslims tried to overcome the difficulties they faced in a changing world by adopting tasawwuf (Sufism) (p. 23), which purportedly divided the realms of revelation and r eason and separated thought from action. Wahhabisms and the neo-Muslim Brotherhoods concern for unity becomes the leitmotif for the Islamic principles articulated in Chapte r IV. In a series of major sections, the author or authors claim that the New Islamic Man envisioned in their exposition of zalzalah in Western education--a process implied in the previous chapters as an Islamic version of Marxs thes is (Western education) and antithesis (the spirit of Islam) leading to synthesis: the Islamization of knowledge--must have infused in his education the unity of Allah, Creation, Trut h, Knowledge, Life, and Humanity. As the chapter unfolds, one fi nds that those educational objectives will 304

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bring Muslims out of their jahiliyah ; whereas, failure to perform these duties will keep them immersed in their de-Islamized condition (p. 45). Ther eafter, a series of condemnations follow. Among those things co ndemned is chauvinism, which is to assume the advantage of the ethnic entity as the ultimate criterion of good and evil (p. 48). Chauvinism thus signi fies a form of ethnocentris im, for which the author or authors state the Muslim is the exact opposite of this conception of reality (p. 49). In contrast, committed chauvinists are the Jew, German, French, or Russian who assumes the Jewish people, Germany, France, or Russia to be ultimate realities (p. 48). Chapter Five of Islamization of Knowledge offers further insight into how the IIIT intends to guide scholarly study and gra duate research as a means to advance a particular political dogma or monolithic vis ion, Islamism, whose explicit purpose is to force conformity and reform thought, contrary to textual assertions of independence, thereby keeping foreign in fluences found in Western knowledge in check. Presumably, this agenda is not considered by the author or authors of the book to be chauvinistic or ethnocentric: First, we must enlist the cooperation of Muslim scholars working in Western universities and elsewhere to supervise these youths to guide them in their academic activities, and to lend them all possible he lp to complete their essential Islamic knowledge and to adopt a right and independent approach to their studies Help from Muslim scholars is also needed to inspire topics that tackle issues which really concern the Ummah and are helpful in elucidating its vision. . These theses should be a means of tackling the issue of Islamization of knowledge instead of allo wing these theses and studies to be used as a means of molding the Muslim mind into a co mpletely alien Western pattern. Such theses should not be used for exploiting Muslim intellect to further the interests and objectives of alien powers nor as a means of collecting v ital information to be manipulated by alien teachers and organizations (p. 79, italics added to underscore themes of intellectual conform ity and thought reform inherent to the IIITs stated educational theory and practice) 305

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The IIIT enjoins, too, that the desirable rese arch studies should be original, analytical, critical studies and not descriptive and emotional (p. 126). Furthermore: Second, is offering material support to pr omising scholars of outstanding merit. . Its goals include ideological reformation, the Islamization of knowledge. . This material support will offer fields of study that are essential to providing special skills required by a Muslim community or country where the absence of such skills may cause serious setbacks and problems. (p. 79, italics added to illustrate explicit statements of thought reform along monolithic ideological lines) And, as the very first clause in the aforementioned passages states, such educational theory and practice is expected to occur with the assistance of Muslim scholars working within Western universities, where tradi tional notions of academic freedom to pursue independent research are not circumscribed by educational theory and practice that imposes ideological limits on what is studied and written about. Thus, one may argue that an organization like th e IIIT operating on a university campus might, as Marty and Appleby (1993) state a bout any kind of Islamic fundamentalism, poses a direct challenge to existing institutions given Islamisms characteristic reformist will to power. However, the IIITs repeated claims that Islamization of knowledge is a science refute Marty and Applebys (1993) other assumptions that Islamic fundamentalism differs from other types of religious fundamentalism because its adherents do not hold their religious educat ion is scientific. Adoption of the agenda advances in seven conceived stages: creation of understanding and awareness by engaging the problem of knowledge and thought with a wide cross-section of people, including scholar s, thinkers, the educated elements of the Ummah, and their le aders alike . through their diverse organizations, groups, clubs, and forums of Islamic media (p. 59). Such engagement 306

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is explicitly stated a serving the purp ose of the ideological cause and the Islamization of knowledge (p. 59). In that respect, cooperation with all international centers of knowle dge in general and in those of the Islamic world the IIIT regards as indispensable, and is c ooperation with all academic institutions and the mass media (pp. 59-60). In addition to establishing relations and official partnerships with those i nternational centers and academic institutions through conferences, seminars, studi es, and publications, the Islamization of Knowledge boasts an existing special program for uni versity teachers, scholars, and thinkers where they can spend their sabbatical leaves at the Institute in order to devote their time exclusively to research to produce pioneer academic works that will guide and help others who are working in various fi elds toward the Islamization of knowledge (p. 60). Invoking a military term, the IIIT desc ribes this special class of Muslim-only intellectuals working in and with higher education inst itutions as a cadre that instills a stable Islamic ideological basis (p. 74). The IIIT also proffers information about money and banking toward the advancement of zalzalah in higher education. For exam ple, the final chapter of Islamization of Knowledge laments in its opening sentence the restricting of support for charitable work and public service to governments and official contributions subject to numerous political administrative, and routine limitations that deprive the Ummah of one of th e most important sources of support for enterprise and creative activity for the general welfare and reformation (p. 97). Waqf or what the IIIT descries as the in stitution of endowment, held a sacrosanct position in Islam, and so the author or aut hors clarify that it was not permissible for 307

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anyone to misuse the waqf or to divert its funds from their lofty purposes (p. 97). However, as was stated earlier in this an alysis about the IIITs version of history, imperialism had hegemony over the Islamic world and the floodgates of Western ideas and philosophies that we re hostile and inimical to the norms and legacy of the Ummah were thrown open, and Islamic char itable institutions were violently and viciously attacked (p. 98). Recognizing th at it must assimilate somewhat with Western money and banking laws and policies in host countries, the IIIT advocates that Muslims take advantage of opportunities in its own immediate milieu, such as U.S. laws and its system of private ente rprise aimed at encouraging people to participate in public works of charity (p. 98). Moreover, the IIIT advocates donations to a range of Islamic charitabl e organizations, such as the Institute, mosques, schools, Islamic centers and othe r important Muslim orga nizations active in the United States (pp. 98-99). Presumabl y, those organizations are the same ones housed under the ISNA umbrella, given that the IIIT is a sub-group of the ISNA. The USF library holds another book of hi gher education theory and practice published by the IIIT, Toward Islamization of Disciplines (1984), which was placed in general collections in 1990, according to library records, two years prior to the creation of USF-WISE. The book is an affi rmation of what its unknown editor calls Pax Islamica (p. 448), a term reminiscent of th e ancient Roman concept of empire building in which a foreign minority gr oup rules over a native majority group. In addition, the Islamist borrowing of the term Pax Romana also signifies Pipes (1997a) observations of what he calls the Wester n mind of radical Islam, arguably another feature of the mass social movement in hi gher education responsible for Islamists 308

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study of the West through Western educati on for the purpose of conquering the West. The researcher suggests that creating Pax Islamica by Islamizing the various disciplines of Western thought represents but another manifestation of Qutbs doctrine of zalzalah, or the shaking of a societ ys institutional foundations from below through educat ional channels. Under Pax Islamica native religious communities will be permitted their religious identities but will serve under a wo rld-wide Islamic empire, thus consigning non-Muslims to the pre-modern status of dhimmitude, which Yeoor (1998) defines as a condition in which non-Muslims make a pact with a ruling Muslim group in exchange for various rights known in the West as life, liberty, and property but with the understanding that non-Muslims, while permitted certain rights, are second-class citizens. The book Islamization of Disciplines equates Pax Islamica to the United Nations, only superior . because . its constitution is divine law, valid for all, and may be invoked by anyone in any Muslim court (p. 449). Like the other IIIT texts presented above, Islamization of Disciplines also illustrates the intention to reform West ern education through the application of Allahs will by utilizing the so -called scientific methods of Islamic jurisprudence. For example, the chapter Research in Psychology: Toward an Ummatic Paradigm criticizes Western knowledges habit of cr eating new knowledge in the discipline of psychology, or organizing a new psychological community around a new psychological paradigm (p. 124) in order to resolve conflicting claims among the different fields of psychological study. Th at kind of Ummatic paradigm is carried across all chapters for all disciplines in the book, tacitly supporting Meddebs (2003) 309

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critique of contemporary Islamic fundament alisms anti-intellectualism paradoxically wrought by highly educated men. Instead of creating new knowledge to come to terms with intellectual conflict, the Ummatic paradigm negates the need to create new knowledge by applying an elite scholars in terpretation of divine will to settle intellectual dispute: Fortunately, Muslims have their own trad ition of resolving such disputes from the history of the development of jurisprudence ( fiqh ), as we have mentioned earlier. . This tradition should be c ontinued if psychology is to develop an Islamic spirit. (p. 126) Tibi (1998) finds the concept of I slamization of Knowledge a troubling pursuit of behalf of political Islam because in reviewing the writings of Islamic fundamentalism, the religious underpinning of Islamist politi cal ideology, we no longer encounter this notion of plurality of humanity (each has his own religion) (p. 152). Specifically, Tibi (1998) obse rves how the spread of such thought engenders disorder in the form of re ligious persecution, inte llectual persecution, and civil war. Political Is lam is an entirely different caliber, Tibi (1998) writes. Those Muslims who regard their religion more as an ethical than a political context, as a source of conduct and not as a sy stem of government, are considered by fundamentalists to be misguided Mus lims, or even apostates. Thus, the fundamentalists draw the conclusion that th ey are justified in slaying these Muslims they arbitrarily declare apostates (p. 152). Referring to a work described by Sc hoenfield (2004) above for its anti-Semitic content, Methods of the Intellectual Invasion of the Muslim World, Tibi (1998) states that the authors, both educa tion professors in Medina, Saudi Arabia, indict various Muslim scholars dating as far back as the early 1800s as having 310

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capitulated to the intellectual incursion described in the IIITs Islamization of Knowledge According to those professors, Tibi (1998) asserts, there has been a colonial muamarah /conspiracy directed against Islam, a conspiracy that resulted in the destruction of the caliphate (p. 153). Neither they, nor the IIIT, for that matter, consider the fact that the concept of a caliphate cannot be found in the Quran (p. 153). Some bright liberal Muslim thinke rs do not contest the political character of Islam. They do, however, refuse any dogmatic solution to the crisis of the nationstate in Islamic civilization, be it purely s ecular or fundamentalist. It is unfortunate that these Islamic thinkers are such a sma ll minority and that they are already exposed to the threat of being slain as murtad/apostates (p. 157). Tibi (1998) thus enjoins that an unbiase d reading of the political writings of current fundamentalists leads one to concl ude that we are dealing with a brand of political propaganda. The style, language and method of argumentation of these works all reveal propagandist ic tactics, not a theology or an intellectual discourse. Reasoning for these zealots is heresy (p. 156). The same observation could be made about the IIITs theory and practice of higher education, in addition to the scholarship of the AMSS and the AMSE, the IIITs associated academic groups. The IIITs mission of re-Islamization in higher education garners support from an academic association called the Associati on of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS). Founded in 1972, its objectives are close to those of the IIIT. The AMSS also publishes in concert with the IIIT a quarterl y journal, the American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences (AJISS). Its mission, according to the journals website, is to serve as a bridge between Muslim intellectuals and scholars all over the world to effect the 311

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development of scholarly approach in the fi eld of Islamic social sciences and human studies. In addition, the jour nal presents its mission in co ntrast to what it calls the face of apparently unstoppable secularism and modernization/Westernization which continues to spread around the globe. Th e AJISSs Editor-in-Chief is Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman; Editor, Katherine Bullock ; Assistant Editor, Layla Sein. The AJISS jointly sponsors conferences and seminars along with the AMSS, IIIT, and the Islamic, Educational, Scient ific, and Cultural Organization (IESCO). The IIIT, the ISNA, the AMSS, the AJISS, and their associated scholars and groups will be revisited in the next chapter on re-Islamizations interplay at USF. Characteristic Three: Campus Holy War Advocated and Exported to Other Locales for Purposes of Re-Islamization from Above and Below Islamists in Saudi Arabian higher edu cation appear to have used their universities as platforms fo r re-Islamization from above and below, advocating and exporting the practice to othe r regions around the world. An archetypal example is that of Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, noted earlier in Chapter One as having conceived of the idea of an elite group of martyred sc holars who would sacrifice their souls in the effort to unite the world ummah Azzam taught Islamic studies in the 1970s at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah (G old, 2004) before becoming a key figure in the fundraising and recruitment network of violent jihad that would eventually establish itself in the United States (Emerson, 1994, 2002). Azzams teachings were action-oriented. He advocated everything fr om heresy allegations against Muslims who did not accept violent jihad, to Jewish c onspiracy charges, to terrorism, and to total war against apostates and infidels. 312

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Gold (2004) offers the following information about Azzams history and ideological influences: Azzam was born in a Palestinian vi llage near Jenin in 1941. In 1959, he traveled to Syria to study at Damasc us University; he lived there through 1966, and during that time he joined the Mu slim Brotherhood. In 1973, he completed his doctorate in Islamic ju risprudence at Al-Azhar in Cairo, where he met the family of Sayyid Qutb. Subsequently, he taught Islamic law at the University of Jordan in Ammam, where he again became active in the Muslim Brotherhood. Because of his involvement with the Brotherhood, he was dismissed from his university position. So, like other Muslim Brothers, he moved to Saudi Arabia. There he joined Muhammad Qutb on the faculty of King Abdul Aziz University. At the university, Qutb a nd Azzam shared a young Saudi student named Osama bin Laden. (pp. 94-95) At the time he taught as a professor of Islamic studies in Saudi Arabia, Azzam became known in the Muslim world as the E mir of Jihad because he followed in Qutbs steps to restore the centrality of jihad: Anybody who looks into the state of Muslims today will find that their great misfortune is their abandonment of Jihad (qtd. in Gold, 2004: p. 95; a fatwa from Defending the Land of the Muslims is Each Mans Most Important Duty ). Azzams legal ruling continues as follows, and supporting the idea that jihad is the sixth pillar of Islam: Verily, the repelling of the disbelieving enemy is the most impor tant obligation after Iman [faith] because there may arise such a situation in which it is obligatory upon each and every one to march forward, when Jihad is obligatory on all Muslims if the enemy invades one of our countries or he surrounds one of our territories. Then it is obligatory upon the whole of creation to march out for jihad. If they fail to re spond they are in sin (pp. 95-96). Thus, Azzams teaching de-centered blame on the problems with the Muslim world away from the establishment of Israel and instead looked at a broader attack on the Islamic world (Gold, 2004: p. 96) to in clude all countries where Muslims live, 313

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including those like the United States, wh ere Muslims did not originate but did emigrate. The problems with those countries therefore involved the Wests alleged capitulation with Zionists (aka, Jews, i nternational bankers, military-industrial complex, capitalists) who had ruined Is lamic civilization (Gold, 2004). Gold (2004) surmises in his conclusion about Azzams ideological influence through teaching and publishing in the Saudi Arabian university sy stem and through his earlier interests in the Muslim Brotherhood in other countries that while the sheikhs ideology played a key role in the defeat of a world superpow er [the Soviets in Afghanistan], it also would have an even more significant impact on world affairs, for his writings ultimately justified the indiscriminate terrorism that Al-Qaeda would come to practice: Many Muslims know about the Hadith in which the Prophet ordered his companions not to kill any women or children, etc., but very few know that there are exceptions to this case. In summary, if nonfighting women and children are present, Muslim s do not have to stop an attack (qtd. in Gold, 2004: p. 99) Furthermore, Those who believe that Isla m can flourish and be victorious without Jihad (fighting) and blood are deluded and have no understanding of the nature of this religion, Azzam teaches (p. 99). As Western professors with expertise in government and international affairs might advise their national leadership, Go ld (2004) writes that Azzam consulted with the Saudi Arabian government on matters of warfare in the Balkans, where many Muslim veterans of the Afgha n conflict against the former Soviet Union would later fight. While the atrocities committed by the non-Muslim Serbians were inexcusable under international standards of warfare, ac ts committed by Bosnian Muslims, justified 314

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by extreme interpretations of Islamic law, were no less violative. The Arab force, having received legal guidance by Sheikh Azza m and other Islamic scholars in Saudi Arabia, acquired a reputation as fierce fight ers, known to have severed the heads of the Christian Serbs and mutilated their enemies bodies (pp. 143-144). Azzams radicalized Ikwhan worldview also maintains adherents in North America who apparently enjoin him in the wo rld-historical discourse of the Islmaist movement. For example, many of the Islami c Centers and Societies under the umbrella of the Islamic Society of North America (IS NA, discussed above) are led by spiritual leaders who were trained in Saudi Arabian uni versities and whose salaries are paid at least partially by the Saudi Arabian gove rnment (Modany & Weyrich, 2004). A major contingency of those leaders have connec tions to the Muslim Brotherhood. Sheikh Jamal Said of the Mosque Foundation of Illinoi s, which classifies as a Center, is one of those leaders. Born in 1957, Said is of Palestinian heritage, was born in the West Bank, and claims to have received his earli est religious inspira tion from the Muslim Brotherhood in that region. In 1967, he move d with his family to Amman, Jordan, to an upscale neighborhood (Modany & Weyric h, 2004: p. 1), and then later studied Islam in Saudi Arabia. In 1985, Said moved to the United States and became the prayer leader at the Mosque Foundation in Illinois, where he dev eloped a national reputation and easily attracted prominent Muslim activists to Bridgeview (p. 2). His arrival there was not viewed favorably by some members of th e mosque, who prefer to practice faith without politics. The moderates at the Bri dgeview mosque attrib ute the radicalization of the mosque to the fact that most of th e leaders of the mosque are members of the 315

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Muslim Brotherhood (Modany & Weyrich, 2004). In an interview in Cairo, Brotherhood leader Mohammed Mahdi Akef said he and other Brotherhood members helped create the society [in Bridgeview, Illinois] and that it follows Brotherhood philosophy. The society [in Bridgeview] said it is independent but is influenced by the Brotherhood and other groups (p. 3). Said declines to be interviewed but reportedly tells worshippers that those who critic ize mosque leaders are hypocrites--a condemnation that in Islam could cause someone to be shunned (p. 3). Section III: Parallel Hierarchies in Le vantine Higher Education: Conditions and Characteristics Conditions of Islamisms Interplay in Higher Education Condition One: Transnational In fluence of Islamism and its Esprit de Corps from Non-Indigenous Organizational Netw orks toward Advancement of Re-Islamization from Above and Below Islamism would not have become a formid able force in the Levant were it not for the organizational support emanating fr om two major sources cited in this chapters previous sections, the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia. Research implies that each attempts to influence hi gher education and its accoutrements in the Levant for purpose of a common objective in defiance of U.N. charter, the destruction of the state of Israel. By the 1980s, chapters of the Muslim Br otherhood had existed already in the West Bank and Gaza, and in other areas of the Levant (Mitchell, 1969/1993; AbuAmr, 1994). In fact, the Palestinian chapter of the group extended as far back as the 316

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1930s. Established Muslim Brotherhood infr astructure thus provided the Islamic Jihad with an institutional network th at would assist th e Islamic Jihads organizational development in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. The Islamic Jihad would continue to advance itself by relying on the existence of Muslim Brotherhood institutions even after the Muslim Brotherhood had divested itself of its direct organizational affiliation with the terrorist group in 1982 (Zamel, 1991). Zamel (1991) states that after 1982 the Is lamic Jihad operated from the Muslim Brotherhoods two major sources of infrastructure, the Islamic University (est. 1971) and its adjacent Islamic Center, or the Mujama a type of mosque which Zamel (1991) refers to as the public front for th e Brother-hood (sic) (p. 154). In the Akram Document revealed in undisputed evidence in U.S.A. v. Holy Land Foundation (2007), Islamic Centers are referred to as bases of operations toward the settlement of North America through civi lizational-jihadist process with all the word means. In addition, the purposes of the Islamic Center in the West Bank and Gaza are similar to those of other so-named Islamic Centers throughout the world: it is a multipurpose sub-organization of a pare nt organization that accepts guidance and aid from outside governments, Saudi Arabia in particular, and cont rols a majority of mosques within its metropolitan area. Similarly in the Palestinian territories, the Islamic Center in Gaza was primarily esta blished as a mosque, but attached to it were a medical clinic, a youth sports club, a nursing school, an Islamic festival hall, a zakat [charity] committee, and a center for womens activities and for training young girls (p. 16). 317

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In addition, another terrorist group, HAM AS, founded in 1983 out of two other secret networks (p. 154)--one the intellectual arm of the Brotherhood; the other, its paramilitary organization (p. 154)--also operated out of those same two institutions of the Muslim Brotherhood. While Abu-Amr (1994) states that HAMAS operates as both a group that performs non-vi olent cultural actions and as one that performs spectacular actions or daring attacks (see, inter alia pp. 107, 112), the Islamic Jihad exists only to carry out spectacular or daring attacks. Characteristics of Islamisms Interplay in Higher Education Characteristic One: External and Internal Organizational Networks Run by Highly Educated Elites Interacting with Universities for Purpos es of Re-Islamization from Above and Below This sub-section shows that the experience of re-Is lamization in the Levant bears little difference than in its place of origin, Egypt. In the Levant, the introduction of Muslim Brotherhood chapters and activitie s gave rise to terrorist sub-groups, or what the Muslim Brotherhood termed in the late 1930s Secret Apparatuses or Zamel (1991), secret networks (p. 154). And, as was true of the parent society in Egypt, the accoutrements of higher educat ion in concert with nearby mosques and their related associations have been paramount to the a dvance of the mass social movement in its quest for power and ideological reform of its host societies. HAMAS notwithstanding, the Islamic Jihad also emulat es the leading intellects and founders of the Muslim Brotherhood who worked as civil servants in Egypts education system. For example, a major chapter on the Islamic Jihad in Abu-Amrs book Islamic Fundamentalism in the 318

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West Bank and Gaza (1994) demonstrates that the Islamic Jihad considers Qtubs Signposts as sources of education and indoctrination (p. 97). In addition, the group considers Al-Ba nnas focus on revival, organization, and upbringing and his personality and var ious roles he played as vital to the Islamic movement against the Zionist ent ity and Israeli occupation of Muslim land (p. 97). Furthermore, another source reve als that a combination of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Ji had at least one Palestinian university, Bir Zeit, follows the Muslim Brotherhoods campus organiza tional and administrative structure that works in concert with nearby mosques, as th at structure describe d in Section I. For example, one Bir Zeit student, himself a leader in the minority Communist bloc, comments: The Islamists were very good at orga nizing. This we could see during the elections campaigns, when they w ould hold large marches which were organized and directed by Islamic suppor ters outside the campus. Also, the Islamic bloc used the mosque in Birzeit village as its headquarters and people from all over the region would meet up th ere. The leaders on the campus were called emirs and in each faculty there was an emir from the Islamic bloc who led the students. This meant that power was very centralized and the emir must be obeyed unquestioningly. (qtd. in Milton-Edwards, 1999: 137) Lastly, throughout the Levant Islamist students through the influenc e of faculty learned the ways of the localized political ar ena and the university became an important training ground for the movement (p. 137). As noted above, kinship between the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Palestinians dates back to the 1930s a nd 1940s. The foundation of that kinship explicitly involves higher e ducation as a domain of war for Palestinian societal reform and the denial of the state of Israel. For example, in the 1930s and 1940s, according to Abu-Amr (1994), the Muslim Brotherhood had Palestinian rovers and 319

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branches under the Egyptian organizations gui dance. Those rovers and branches were in the practice of making incursions into th e Sinai peninsula during times of official banishment under the guise of what the Muslim Brotherhood called scientific missions: During the Palestinian revolt of 1936, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood carried out propaganda activities on behalf of the Palestinians, whose Grand Mufti, also a Muslim Brother (Abu-Amr, 1994: p. 3), had formed an alliance with the Nazis (Fregosi, 1998). On behalf of the Palestin ians, the Muslim Brotherhood also formed a committee (the General Committee to Aid Palestine), headed by Hasan Al-Banna . . The society established a st udents committee to explain the Palestinian cause to Egyptian students (pp. 1-2). Soon thereafter, the students committee adopted another organizational purpose, which was to assist in the training of Palestinian scouts in West Bank, Gaza, Syria, and Jordan (p. 2). That kind of be havior was contested by Egypts government and other neighboring governments in the Levant, such that the fear of paramilitary assistance and training would lead to polit ical destabilization, overthrow, and soured relations among neighboring countries. Abu-Amr (1994) documents throughout his book that many of the leaders of the Fatah movement, HAMAS, and Islamic Jihad had been members of the Muslim Brotherhood branch es in the Levant, a fact that explains why so much of the terrorist organizations purposes, strategies, and tactics resemble the Muslim Brotherhoods, even when t hose groups claim no relationship to AlBannas group. Nevertheless, Abu-Amr (1994) writes, the Muslim Brotherhood continued to smuggle in [to the Palestinian territories] volunteers on a smaller scale. 320

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The society disguised this e ndeavor by forming scientific missions whose declared task was to conduct explorations in the Sinai desert (p. 3). By 1954, Abu-Amr (1994) states, eleven branches of the Muslim Brotherhood existed in Gaza alone, a condition that prov ided the group with enough infrastructure to accept aid from foreign agencies and governme nts. To begin, members were mostly students in the refugee camps because the Muslim Brotherhood was active in the schools for Palestinian refugees operate d by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) (p. 8). In addition, Students who were studying in Egyptian universities also joined as part of foreign exchange programs (p. 8). Moreover, even as the society itself declined as a formidable force in the Levant in the 1960s after decades of intermittent repression, the lead ers of the Muslim Brotherhoods radical offshoot groups would continue to enjoy good relations with the Saudi royal family who gave material support to the society in Egypt and Gaza (p. 8), such that by the 1980s Saudi Arabias education ministry was giving ideological, endowments, and student financial aid to Islamic universitie s in the West Bank and Gaza (p. 14). While one could contest the use of the term mode rate to describe the Muslim Brotherhood, Zamel (1991) writes that Saudi Arabia has long been favorably disposed to moderate groups like the Brotherhood (p. 131). The universities, combined with their re lationships with nearby mosques away from the eyes or interference of the Israeli authorities (p. 15), became the most important of all venues to r ecruit followers dedicated to the cause of Islamism in the ideologys most militant forms that arose out of the Muslim Brotherhood movement (Abu-Amr, 1994). The Muslim Brotherhoods do mination of universities in West Bank 321

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and Gaza Islamic universities was evidently extensive, to the extent that all, including the Islamic university, were s ubject to the authority of the [Muslim Brotherhoods] Islamic Center [ al-Mujamma al-Islami ] and its leadership (p. 16). Zamel (1991) further allows that the Islamic University and the Islamic Center served as a power base to advan ce the political agenda of the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoot groups like Islamic Jihad and HAMAS (pp. 128-9). Moreover, he states that the university and the center were legal fronts for the Brothers from which they administrated their increasingly sprawli ng empire (pp. 128-9) and were tools to indoctrinate and recruit the youth and as a powerful political leverage through apportioning and distributi ng patronage (pp. 128-9). According to Eqbal Ahmad in Hiltermann (1991), the socio-educational front activity of the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Jihad, and HAMAS is a planned process that Islamist activist-scholars call outadministering the enemy (p. 13). Islamist groups achieve such seditious goals through organizational networks that do not exist simply to inflict military losses on the enemy but to destroy the legitimacy of its government and to establish a rival regime through the creation of parallel hierarchies (qtd. in Hiltermann, 1991: p. 13; italic s added). The researcher adds that such awareness by those organizational ne tworks that aided and abetted the 1987 intifada represents a strategy that the mass so cial movement Islamism has known since its inception in 1927. Indeed, the entire organizational and administrative structure of the Muslim Brotherhood, and possibly the or ganizational and administrative structure of the ISNA, resembles an el aborate parallel hierarchy. 322

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Characteristic Two: Codified Educati onal Theory for Purposes of Promoting Monolithic View of Islam and Sub verting Universiti es and Surrounding Societies from Above and Below Zamel (1991) characterizes the purpose of higher education in West Bank and Gaza after 1971 as social, economic, cultura l, and educational infrastructure and organizing . that helped in the emergence of a new cadre of activity, replacing the old often uneducated and apol itical Koranic teachers a nd preachers (p. 132, italics added). The term cadre is revealing in that the term possesses a militaristic connotation in which education reform is achieved through hiring a new class of activist professors beholden to a single ideo logy to replace an apol itical type, a fact that signifies not a broadening of the Pales tinian mind but rather its displacement. In that sense, higher education in the West Ba nk and Gaza were reduced to the status of parallel hierarchies. Zamels (1991) charact erization of the Islamic University, Bir Zeit University, and Al-Najah University indicates that their purpose is culturally subversive, emphasizing re-Islamizations drive toward turning a religion into a political ideology. Within those universities, education is therefore not a means to advance knowledge, but rather is a means to indoctr inate Palestinians under the banner of a single political ideology. Zamel (1991) conveys that that purpose became the mainstay of both religious and secular universities in West Bank and Gaza: The creation of Islamic colleges . where Islamic politic al activity permeated the structure of the school from the administration to the facu lty to the student-body (sic), gave a momentous push to the diffusion of Islamist politics (p. 132); however, the Muslim 323

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Brotherhood also targeted secular institutions for prosteylization (s ic) and recruitment. Preachers and activist students established clubs on university campuses and held lectures and sermons calling on the youth to return to Islam for salvation (p. 133). Abu-Amr (1994) offers other revealing de scriptions of the condition of higher education in Palestinian universities, whose administration, faculty, students, and staff seem dominated by the ideology of Islamism and fully entrenched in re-Islamization, which in turn affects those universities su rrounding society, in te rms of religious and ideological politics. That description is worth quoting at length, despite Abu-Amrs contradictory assertion in another section of his history of Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza that Palestinian universities are relatively autonomous (p. 30): The Palestinian universities in the West Bank and Gaza have been an important field for Muslim Brotherhood activity a nd a platform for the dissemination of ideas and for gaining influence. . The Muslim Brotherhood enjoys strong support in the universitie s of the West Bank and Gaza. The votes of the societys supporters fluctuate between 30 and 50 percent. Even in Birzeit University, which has been known for its strong nationalist, le ftist, and liberal tendencies, the Islamists muster cons iderable support in the student body. Muslim students have always controlle d the student counc il in the Islamic University in Gaza. Currently, they al so control the student council in the University of Hebron. (pp. 16-17) In addition: The Islamic University in Gaza, founded in 1978, is considered the principal Muslim Brotherhood stronghold. The universitys administration, most of the employees who work there, and the majority of students are Brotherhood supporters. Current student enrollment in the university is estimated at five thousand. This university, together with other Palestinian universities, supplies the mosques in the West Bank and Gaza with young preachers. More importantly, these universities gradua te a new breed of educated Muslim leaders who can occupy key pos itions in society. (p.17) 324

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And: In the student council elections of 1987, the Islamic Bl oc received nearly 800 votes while the Fatah supporters won 650. The Islamic Jihad movement won 200 votes, while supporters of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) won 150 votes. In a previous year, the Islamic Jihad was able to wi n 400 votes. Islamic student groups control student councils in seve ral high schools and community colleges across the West Bank and Gaza. (p. 18) Moreover, Islamist student groups are involv ed in the publishing of several magazines, evidently meant to instill a so-called Islamic spirit that is reminiscent of the educational theories teachings, concerns of the Muslim Brotherhood and educational groups like the IIIT: The content of these publications co ncentrate on indivi dual behavior and suggest that the Islamic culture has be en distorted by Western influence. AntiIsraeli rhetoric was tolerated becaus e of the religious nature of these publications. Since the eruption of the intifada these publications have contained strong political messages. In addi tion to a constant call for a return to Islam, strong criticism is directed at local nationalism and secularism. Israeli occupation is described as a curse or punishment from God because the Palestinians have left the true path of Islam. Israel the United States, the West and Arab governments are also targets for attacks. Together with published material, the Muslim Brotherhood circulat es recorded sermons and speeches of famous Islamic leaders and preachers. . The ultimate message being disseminated in Islamic literature, tapes, and other media is that the reso lution of the Palestinian problem can only be attained through Islam. (p. 18-19) And finally, the Islamic spirit extend s to university professionals and their associations, especially by the Mus lim Brotherhoods terrorist offshoots: Another intervening factor mitigating the Muslim Brotherhoods influence has been the emergence of the Islamic Jihad movement in the early 1980s which came to challenge the moderate nonmilitant line of the Muslim Brotherhood. A decline of the Muslim Brotherhoods influence in Gaza Strip was reflected in the elections of the Arab Medica l Association. In 1985, the Muslim Brotherhood won three seats, Fatah four, and the leftist fac tions won the other four seats. In the associations elections of 1987, the PLO groups won nine seats, while the Muslim Brotherhood won only two. In the Engineers Association the Muslim Br otherhood won only one seat in the 1987 elections, 325

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after having won the majority of seats in 1981. But in the elections of 1989, the Brotherhood (Hamas) won five out of th e nine seats in the association, which reflected a decline in the PLOs presence. (p. 19) Hroub (2000) further supports observations about the effects of Islamism in Palestinian higher education: Hamas combin ed Islamic socio-instructional discourse with the discourse of nationalis t resistance, placing each at the service of each other (p. 239), a condition which fuses the boundari es between knowledge and political indoctrination. In the Palestinian universities, that same condition is one that permits little deviation, as students, faculty, and admi nistrators are effectually trained to force conformity on others who might stray fr om that single-minded path. Indeed, an interview with the late HAMAS leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, whom Israeli defense forces assassinated in 2004, shows that HAM AS enlistment of stude nt rovers helped expose and commit to death on the basic of a composite Isla mic-instructionalnationalistic-resistance code suspected Muslim collaborators with Israeli agents (p. 239). Perhaps the most extreme ex ample of Islamist contro l of Palestinian higher education is the campus atmosphere of Nablus Al-Najah University, sometimes described as a breeding ground for suicide bombers ( http://www.ict.org ). At Al-Najah University, every student party such as the Muslim Palestine Party, the Shuhada/Martyrs Party, and the Al-Quds Pa rty maintains direct affiliation with a terrorist group such as HAMAS/Islamic Ji had, Fatah Military Wing, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The Muslim Palestine Party, which takes orders from HAMAS/Islamic Jihad, two terrorist groups that merged in the late 1990s, 326

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captured 48 out of 68 General Council seats in the universitys 2001 student elections ( http://www.ict.org ). The Student Assembly of Al-Najah holds regular marches in memory of suicide bombers in which students dressed as the next seven bombers wear white shrouds and explosive belts, the obj ective being the promotion of the message of Jihad throughout the broader Palestinian population ( http://www.ict.org ). The rallies and conventions held by the student council typically feature a telephone address by a Hamas or Islamic Jihad leader ( http://www.ict.org ). For example, in November 2001 Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, General Secretary of Islamic Jihad, stated in his address to the students: Youth of Pales tine. .Yesterdays student council elections were a vote in favor of the Intifada, a vote in favor of th e Jihad and the struggle, a vote in favor of the blood of the fallen heroes, . a vote in favor of the heroic su icide bombers of the Iz Adin al-Qassam battalions and the Jerusa lem squads. This is the righteous choice; this if the true referendum. . a test of the students of Al-Najah passed with flying colors ( http://www.ict.org ). In addition, on-campus ral lies covered and photographed by the media feature what might be considered a militant Palestinian version of the ROTC, with operatives armed with various types of weapons, including anti-tank missile launchers, plays that demonstrate to the students how to murder Israelis and blow up Israeli passenger buses, and plays the re-create suicide attacks such as the one on the Sbarro restaurant in Jerusalem ( http://www.ict.org ). Incentives for joining HAMAS/Islamic Jihad involve non-militant benefits for students in the form of a support system fo r students that involves academic guidance and financial aid. Combined with regular student meetings, this strengthens the 327

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students link and commitment to Hamas/Islamic Jihad and creates a natural transition to their becoming active members in the terrorist wing ( http://www.ict.org ). In fact, many of Hamas leaders in Nablus including leaders of the Iz Adin al-Qassam terrorist wing, began their involvement in th e movement while students or professors at the university ( http://www.ict.org ). The infrastructural connection of indoctrination and recruitment of students and professors at Al-Najah University is so tight that Hamas itself refers to university as a greenhouse for martyrs ( http://www.ict.org ). Nevertheless, and despite its wholesale suppor t of activities that violate humanitarian law and Geneva warfare conventions, Al-N ajah University signed a partnership agreement with the United Nations Popula tion Fund (UNFPA) and is a full member of the International University Union. Under the auspices of these relationships, Al-Najah sends lecturers to other countries and receives them from abroad. Characteristic Three: Campus Holy Wa r and Other Problems in Universities Associated with Intera ctive Organizations Advancement of Re-Islamization from Above and Below Islamism in Levantine higher educati on also is characterized by a continuum of religious intimidation and violence sim ilar to that which has been noted in the previous sections. Perhaps adopted through Muslim Brotherhood influence was educational immersion in The Protocols of the Elders of Zion a Western import and forgery explicated in previous sections a nd chapters. As has been amply cited in the press since HAMASs assumption of political power in the Palestinian territories in 2006, HAMAS cites The Protocols as justification for the de struction of Israel. MiltonEdwards (1999) observes, for instance, that Islamist Palestinian education expresses a 328

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hatred for Jews that is almost blind, extending well beyond th e realm of religion, theology or ecumenical conflic t (p. 188). HAMAS, for example, even by its terms of religious reference, stretch th e limits of credibility and are clearly a symptom of racism rather than religious difference (p. 188). If the Muslim Brotherhood and its terrorist offshoots in the Levant were dissatisfied with their efforts at re-Isla mization from below by re-directing academic work and life toward the advancement of a monolithic political ideology that Islamizes modernity, then those groups could always resort to re-Islamization from above. Despite their re peated failures to achieve their objectives through the use of terrorist a ttacks and other forms of politic al violence, the radical are resourceful in finding new locales in which to operate (e.g., Afghanistan, Bosnia, Africa, Western Europe, North America, Pa kistan) (Sivan, 1998: p. 3). Driven from one country to the next, what Qutb called in Signposts a new form of hijra obligatory of the so-called Islamic vanguard has incr eased coordination between (sic) Islamist movements of various countries (p. 3). In th is chapter, that coordination apparently begins through what has been describe d above as academic missionary activity inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, the mo ther of re-Islamization, and receives added impetus when radicals come under the close sc rutiny of their native or host societies. Alluded to in aforementioned sectio ns and chapters, the earliest known instances in the Levant of terrorist activit y committed by the Islamic Jihad happened in Lebanon. Those instances direc tly involved the American Un iversity of Beruit (AUB), a university in the Levant that had been established after the fall of the Ottoman caliphate. By the late 1970s, Lebanon had become engulfed in civil war, a condition 329

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from which AUB faculty and administrato rs sought to shield the campus and themselves. Zwicker-Kerr (1994), the wife of AUB president Malcolm Kerr, who himself was born in Lebanon and was the son of an AUB chemistry professor, writes that, in the last years of her husbands lif e, Kerr had worked diligently to appease rivalry among campus groups, disavowing a military presence on campus by any government--Israeli, Syrian, or otherwise--despite the possible security against terrorism a military presence might bring the campus. Malcolm gained local popularity by fo rbidding Israeli military from visiting the campus in a shouting match where he remained adamant that no foreign forces would enter the campus (p. 208), Zwicke r-Kerr states. In an October 1983 convocation that preceded his official inaugur ation in early 1984, Kerr defined his role to AUB, having become the first graduate of the university to become its president and following in the path of his fa ther and grandfather as AUB pr ofessors: I therefore feel a natural identity not only with the faculty but also with the students (p. 209). Kerr further spoke of the university s liberal arts tr adition, its internati onal quality, and its concern for the individual (p. 209). Sensitive to religious issues at AUB and in its surrounding milieu, Kerr staved off condemn ation by his Christian colleagues after appointing a Muslim vice presid ent, Dr. Abdul Hamid Hallab. Yet Kerrs overtures could not appease the external Islamist forces that had begun interacting with AUB faculty and st udents. One month after his inauguration, Kerr was assassinated by members of the Isla mic Jihad, a terrorist group that few in the world knew about at that time. The New York Times report for January 19, 1984 read as follows: 330

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The president of the Americ an university of Beruit, Ma lcom Kerr, was killed here today when unidentified gunmen fire d two bullets into his head while he was walking toward his office. Soon af ter a male caller telephoned the Agence France Presse and said the slaying was the work of Islamic Holy War supposedly a pro-Iranian underground gr oup. A Beruit born American citizen, the 52-year-old Dr. Kerr was trained as a Middle East spec ialist at Princeton, Johns Hopkins, and Harvard University a nd pioneered in the study of political relationships among the Arab countries. Fluent in Arabic, Dr. Kerr also took a masters degree at the American Universi ty of Beruit, where his father was a professor of chemistry and his mother was the advisor to women students. There he met his wife, the former Ann C. Zwicker, when she was studying as a junior abroad student from Occidental College in Ca lifornia. (qtd. in ZwickerKerr, 1994: 3). Kerr had reluctantly accepted the appointment at AUB after interim president David Dodge and fellow colleagues had been kidnapped by the Islamic Jihad, who along with Hezbollah and other terrorist groups had found the war-torn country a perfect medium for re-Islamization from above (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). While Kramer (2001) documents how a ttacks on orientalist professors figured into the militant justification to hold Dodge and his other colleagues hostage, giving them copies of Saids (1978) Orientalism to read during their captivity, Saad-Ghorayeb (2002) illustrates that their reformist efforts of terrorist groups at AUB enjoyed major success and professes appreciati on for Western education. For example, even though the West is accused of using its schools and universities as mediums through which Arab and Muslim culture can be infiltrated and Western values and norms propagated, [Hezbollah] views the Wester n educational system as superior to all other educational systems in the contem porary Arab and Muslim world (p. 107). Thus, Islamists saw that the only matter requiring attending at AUB was its reIslamization. As in the Palestinian univer sities, Islamic blocs of students therefore 331

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came to dominate student governments afte r 1984 and their faculty advisors now dominate the professions and their associate unions (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). On-campus violence by the Islamic Jiha d also permeated the universities in West Bank and Gaza, demonstrating once again how re-Islamization from above occurs not only in but of higher education in Egypt and the Levant. In some cases the violence was between competing Islamic groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Jihad, or the violence was betw een Israeli soldiers and the Islamic Jihad. Such activity, Hatina (2001) and Abu-Amr (1994) document, coincided with a surge of pamphleteering distributed on campuses by students who re-printed pamphlets distributed by nearby mosques such as th e Izz Al-din Al-Qassam Mosque and the Islamic Center. At the Islamic University, fo r example, local press reported a consistent pattern of conflict as the Islamist students, encouraged by their faculty emirs and the spiritual leaders of adjacent mosques, stormed the campus, damaged property, and attacked fellow students (Milton-Edwards, 1999: p. 136). Those actions, coupled with persistent threats to administrators, caused repeated closures of the university, as Islamist students refused to compromise with non-Islamist campus interests (MiltonEdwards, 1999). Elsewhere, at Hebron University, the 1980s and early 1990s also saw similar eruptions signifying campus re-Islamization. While at Hebron University, a greater spirit of cooperation existed between Is lamists and Communists among the student body and faculties, campus election, decisions, and actions strongly reflected the spirit of an Islamist corps. Some students doubled as preachers in nearby mosques, while the professors themselves championed the Islamist movement (Milton-Edwards, 1999). 332

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Evidently, one of the clearest indication of th e spirit if Islamism at Hebron University, however, was the building of a shrine on the campus to honor a local hero, Sheikh Abdullah Azzam (Milton-Edwards, 1999), the so -called emir of jihad discussed in previous sections and chapters, who made viol ent jihad a sixth pillar of Islam, taught in Saudi Arabia, then became a favorite Islamic scholar on the ISNA lecture circuit in North America, and then was killed in a car-bomb attack in Pakistan. Not always about Israeli occupation , most of the on-campus violence involved disputes about control over the un iversity, and other pe ripheral issues (p. 43) as groups competing for power accused each other of being the willing tool of Christian Phalangist hatred in or der to achieve their aims and their capitulationist and liquidationist plots (qt d. in Abu-Amr, 1994: 44). In other cases, administrators were accused of being in co llusion with nationalists (p. 44) or with Arab or American imperialist intelligence agencies (p. 45). Indeed, an administrator at Al-Najah University in Nablus who symp athized with Palestinian nationalists was thrown from the third floor of a university building by Islamist student demonstrators in 1983, an event that was followed by sim ilar events at the other Palestinian universities in later years. Milton-Edwards (1999) offers a more de tailed account of the same incident than does Abu-Amr (1994), however, offeri ng information that disavows alleged imperialist conspiracies: [Islamist] grie vances stemmed from claims that the university authorities were supporting the rights of lecturers to express leftist political views. In the previous year the university administration had reinstated four lecturers dismissed on account of holding such views. . The [Islamists] openly challenged 333

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arguments in favour of the right to political expression, either by le cturers or students (p. 132). Such comments illustrate much more than Islamists merely seeking control over higher education; indeed, they reveal the Islamist challenge to academic freedom. While Abu-Amr (1994) does not state the person who was thrown from the window was killed in the attack, Milton-Edwards ( 1999) does. His death caused such a furor at Al-Najah University that in the coming years, Islamist students evidently regained their composure, ceasing re-Islamization from a bove actions on campus, and limiting their actions to peaceful protest and politi cal organizing (Milton-Edwards, 1999). Violent demonstrations by Islamist student s in the early 1980s set the stage for the Palestinian intifada against Israel that began in October 1987 (Abu-Amr, 1994; Milton-Edwards, 1999). Abu-Amr (1994) does not document it but Hatina (2001) states that the intifada began when students from the Is lamic University attacked and killed a Yeshiva student, following yet anot her flurry of pamphleteering sponsored by leaders at the Al-Qassam mos que, which was the spiritual headquarters of the Islamic Jihad in Gaza. The mosque was named afte r Izz Al-din Al-Qassam, the father of Palestinian armed resistance who has been el evated to almost a saintly status (AbuAmr, 1994: p. 98). Alexander (2002) documents several other killings of Jewish students by the PIJ between 1983 and 2002, incl uding the murder of Alisa Flatow, a U.S. American study abroad student. The circ umstances of her death will be examined more fully in the next chapter. By 1989, two years after the intifada s inception, the uprising had not achieved its purpose in producing the desired result of driving the state of Is rael into the sea. Nevertheless, the leaders of the Mus lim Brotherhood, HAMAS, and Islamic Jihad 334

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continued to romanticize the event: The number of detainees, wounded, and martyred from among the student members of Islami c blocs, the studen ts, the faculty, and employees of the Islamic university, the mosque-going faithful--young and old, the imams, and the young heroes are absolute proof that the launching of the intifada was the result of that preparation and deve lopment (Sheikh Yassin, qtd. in Hroub, 2000: p. 239). The preparation and developm ent to which Yassin refers is the establishment of parallel hierarchies in the Palestinian higher education system, a feature that we have now witnessed in hi gher education systems in three different locales: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the co mbined Levantine areas of Lebanon, West Bank, and Gaza. Section IV: The University as Ladder to Power in Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan: Ikwhan Interplay with Post-colonial Vacuums of Intellectual Thought and Social Policy Conditions of Interplay in Higher Education Condition One: Transnational Influence of Islamism and its Esprit de Corps through the Migration of Professors and Students from other Locales The author or authors of Islamization of Knowledge occasionally refer to the group of unnamed Muslim students in the 1960s who left their native countries because of alleged political persecution as a diaspora, a term customarily used to refer to the scattering of Jews to countr ies outside Palestine after their Babylonian captivity. Besides Saudi Arabia and, as the IIIT educational discourse in Section II suggests, North America, that group of students also emigrated to Algeria, Tunisia, and 335

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the Sudan. In those countries, processes of re-Islamization in higher education are similar to that witnessed in the previous sections. In Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan, re-Islamization would occur with the advent of radical student movements led by professor-/political-imams. In turn, re-I slamization would take on above and below characteristics that would challenge Alge rian, Tunisian, and Sudanese families and societies, destabilizing post-colonial governments seeking to be brought into modernitys fold. Nevertheless, during the firs t phase of Algerian coloni al independence, Islamists remained quiet and did not challenge Alge rias independent government to reform along lines of the Nizam Islami (Kepel, 2002). Perhaps, given the Muslim Brotherhoods failure in Egypt under the Na sser government, Muslim Brothers-in-exile in other locales had learned patience, putting Qutbs doctrine of concealed advance to the test. Not until 1985, after the Algerian government had created institutional vacuums (p. 49) under its agrarian reform program would the Algerian Islamist movement move into Qutbs so-called phase of power. Characteristic One: External and Internal Organizational Networks Run by Highly Educated Elites Interacting with Uni versities for Purposes of Re-Islamization From Above and Below In his historical analysis, Kepel (2002) implies that socialism weakened the power of traditional Islam throughout the Muslim world, therefore providing what Wulff (1987) would call a welcome structure for the untrained political imams of the Islamist movement to enact their program. Initi ally, re-Islamization came in the form of below type strategies enacted through the Ikwhan movements usual means of 336

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creating front organizations interacting with uni versities. This feature is thus witnessed in Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan. The relative ease for Islamists to fill the institutional vacuums created in Algerian society can, in part, be attributed to the countrys lack of Islamic religious universities to train the ulama (Kepel, 2002). Thus, the religious field was quickly taken over by intellectuals of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) (p. 56). These intellectuals, of course, came from the same class of professors a nd other professionals associated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhoods politi cal or underground imams. Esposito and Voll (2001), however, cite as cause the ulama themselves for their propensity to remain aloof (p. 16) from Islami st social activism. In that sense, they take the same position as Islamists themselves, who perennially indict traditional religious leadership, scholars hip, and jurisprudence just as they would any societal institution that does not a ffirm their standards of a Nizam Islami (Kepel, 2002). The accusation against the traditional scholars of Islams ancient universities is, at its simplest, an accusation that they live in ivory minarets. In Algeria in the 1960s, Among the Egyp tians who were recruited at this time to Arabize and de-Frenchify the school sy stem was a substantial number of Muslim Brothers on the run from Nassers repre ssion (p. 163), Kepel (2002) writes. The Egyptian contingent trained a whole genera tion of strictly Arabophone teachers who agreed with their ideas and later formed the basis for the FIS (p. 163). Second in command of the FIS was Ali Benhadj, a teacher. Evidently, Muslim Brotherhood influence in higher education would last we ll into the 1980s in Algerian society. For example, Benhadj himself would find cons iderable guidance by two Egyptian Muslim 337

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Brothers that the Algerian government hi red to teach in its newly founded Islamic studies program founded in 1985, Muhammad Al-Ghazali (husband of Zaynab AlGhazali, see Section III) and Yusuf Al-Qarad awi (also noted for his guidance in AlQaeda, a group that received its earliest military training from the Islamic Jihad, see Section II). By the late 1970s, the failure of Marxis m in Algeria and other socialist locales caused the young Islamist intellectuals, as th ey took stock of their failure to impress the masses, to convert to Islamism because it seemed a more genuine discourse (p. 64). Taking advantage of conflicts between a middle class populace and authoritarian government, the role of the FIS on Algerian campuses was like that which the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt had adopted over the decades: the FIS focused on the moral and cultural aspects of the Islam that would ha ve broad appeal to the middle class and urban youth (Kepel, 2002), with adherents bei ng able to interpret Islamist ideology as they chose, because of Qutbs delibera te ambiguity of terms articulated in Signposts and other theoretical trac ts being disseminated throughout the Arab world. As also in the case of Egypt, professo r-led university students were among Algerias most militant Islamists. In general, these Islamist students who initiated Algerias first riots in 1988, we re first-generation college students, most of whom were of provincial mindsets, having migrated to the cities from the agrarian countryside (Kepel, 2002) and perhaps susceptible to the si mplicities of the Islamist intelligentsias propaganda in ways that s econd-generation students might not be. By the mid-1980s, the degrees these young students had attain ed had become worthless on the job 338

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market when Algerian oil prices collaps ed, reducing Algerias Soviet model budget by half (p. 160). In light of Kepels (2002) obse rvations about Arab national interest in blurring distinctions between Islam and Marxism in Algeria and, indeed, many other countries, it becomes transparently logical that me mbers of the reconstituted neo-Muslim Brotherhood exiled from Egypt--and inspired by theorist-educator Qutbs Marxist version of Islam--would find an ideological niche in Algeria, now in international alignment with Moscow. Given that th e Muslim Brotherhood had been studying Islamic societies and Islamist movements in other parts of the world since the 1930s when the Cairo headquarters divided the world into major geographical divisions and began maintaining records of those places in it s library, it is also likely that an unstable Algeria, during its final push toward independence whereupon it would need to rebuild socio-educational institutions, had been fl agged by the neo-Muslim Brotherhood as a locale where a highly educated class of Islamist professors and other professionals might gain access and influence. The same argument could also be applied, of course, to Tunisia and the Sudan. Esposito and Volls (2001) attenuated discus sion about the bene ficial purpose of Muslim Brotherhood activity in the Islamic world in Makers of Contemporary Islam supports such reasoning. In addition, Kepel (2002) states that in 1963 a society of religious intellectuals did exist in Algeria, calling themselves Al-Qiyam al-Islamiya (Islamic Values). They were anti-Weste rn, sought the existen ce of an Algerian Islamic state, and in 1966 sent a letter to Egypts President Nasser requesting the pardon of their revered educator-the oretician, Sayyid Qutb (Kepel, 2002). 339

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Like Algeria, Egyptian Muslim Brothers -in-exile played a major hand in the development of the MTI, with professor-led students leading th e Islamist assault against Tunisian society (K epel, 2002). The MTI modeled itself after the Muslim Brotherhood in that it cultivated a strong relationship be tween university campuses--replete with activist professors and student advisees--and nearby mosques led by underground imams. Even so, the information provided by Esposito and Voll (2001) employs softer terms to describe th e relationship and never mentions academic freedom denials, other violations of individual rights, and violence sponsored by MTI followers. Like the Muslim Brotherhood, the MTI achieved broad appeal across professional classes that in cluded middle-class professionals, professors, teachers, engineers, lawyers, scientists, and doctors (p. 101). In addition, and also following the Muslim Brotherhoods model, the MTI published its own magazines and journals that addressed the particular circumstances and conditions of Tunisia by developing an ideology, program, and solutions more specific ally suited to the Tunisian experience (p. 102). 1984, according to Esposito and Voll (2001), would see a new period of vitality and growth (p. 102) as the first generation of the MTI would work side-byside with the second generation. The leader of the MT I was Sheikh Rashid Al-Ghannoushi, actually a philosophy major who, under the Bourguiba government, was charged with and convicted of seditious conspi racy in 1987 with financial assistance from Iran (Jones, 1988), thus making the MTI the second but not th e last terrorist group discussed in this study to have garnered Khomeinis support. Making no apologies for his politicized view of religion, Al-Ghannoushi is credited wi th the parallelism, I slam is ancient but 340

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the Islamist movement is recent (qtd. in Pipes, 1997: p. 44). While he could have received a death sentence for his actions, the courts sentenced the philosophy professor to a life sentence of hard labor so that, unlike his theoretical antecedent, Sayyid Qutb, Al-Ghannoushi would be deprived the Islamist honorific Martyr of the Mosques (p. 19). Al-Ghannoushi is one of several activistintellectuals cited in Esposito and Volls (2001) book to have been invited to USF-WI SE in the early 1990s, where they would convene at roundtable conferences. Exactly how did that vit ality and growth of Al-Ghannoushis MTI affect Tunisias university system and then radiate broadly into Tunisian society? An autobiographical essay by Sa mia Labidi in Ibn Warraqs Leaving Islam: Apostates Speak Out (2003) suggests that the result came in th e form of rejection of Islamism, as opposed to its acceptance, given the heavyhanded manner in which the MTI attempted to force conformity on Tunisian society starting in the 1970s. The process began on university campuses and then found their way into the most fundamental part of any society, the family unit. Labidi writes of th e manner in which Islamism infiltrated her family through the husband of one of her older sisters: The sister who had succeeded in going up to university, the first to save the honor of women, flirted with the beginning of the movement of radical Islam in the mid-1970s in Tunis. No one at the time gauged the impact that this encounter would have on the stability of my family. It was a mini Islamic revolution that was taking place in the heart of our home, from one day to the next a change of regime was in place; we went from one extreme to another. The intrusion of this son-in-law provoke d a radical change in all of us; my father, my mother, my four sist ers, my four brothers, and myself. . The husband of my sister turned out to be one of the founding members of the Islamist organization [MTI], known under the name El Nahda (Renaissance). He represented the hard line of this movement, those who advocated military action. His strategy was to take control of his family-in-law to consolidate his power of oppression. (p. 320) 341

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After a lengthy description of her family s indoctrination in to the MTI and its politicized version of Islam, Labidi (2003) th en states that her situation was typical for thousands of other families in North Af rica and the Arabo-Muslim world (p. 324). Islamism provoked the breakup of families, one after another (p. 324). Crediting the strength of her mother to ask her father a convert to Al-Ghannoushis cause, for divorce, Labidi at eighteen years abandone d the veil and went to Paris in 1983, where her mother had fled previously. In 1989, Islamism saw its second creation of a totally Islamic regime. To achieve their revolution and support its co ntinuation, Sudanese Islamists also took direction and financial assist ance from Iran. The person most credited for engineering the overthrow of the Sudanese government is Hassan Al-Turabi, whose success resulted from a military coup detat and had no popular dynamic whatsoever (Kepel, 2002: p. 176). Instead, it was the consequen ce of a long process of infiltration by the Islamist intelligentsia of the Sudans state apparatus, army, and financial system, with the cooperation of an emerging de vout bourgeoisie (p. 177). In addition, the Sudan, an East Africa n country just south of Egypt, had maintained since 1944 a well-es tablished system of mutual aid groups run by Sudanese members of the Muslim Brothe rhood who took their earliest direction from Hassan AlBanna (Kepel, 2002). As in other countries of Black Africa, in the Sudan the Muslim religion was tightly controlled by mystical br otherhoods, which gave short shrift to the rigorous, city-oriented approach of Bannas di sciples and their plans to Islamize a state and social structure from which they felt excluded (Kepel, 2002: p. 177). In addition to traditional opposition by Black Muslims, the decades-long intention by Al-Turabi 342

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and his colleagues to Arabize Africa acco rding to a non-indigenous plan conceived by Al-Bannas followers was also opposed by Christians and animists in the south. Those Christians rejected any national project associated with Arabism--meaning, with an Islamic ulterior motive--because it feared that its Black African identity would be swiftly annihilated by any such development (p. 177). As has been the case regarding the growth of Islamism in other selected locales, the mass movement in the Sudan therefore arose in the countrys university system, and it was in that system that Al-Turabi used his Western training to build an original Islamist political movement named the Is lamic Charter Front (ICF) (p. 178). By 1965, the ICF, through its proselytism and planning, achieved 40 percent of the vote in student council elections. Meanwhile, in national elections, the Ummah Party dominated in 1965 with sixty-six seats, and it s leader, Sadiq Al-Mahdi enjoined in an alliance with Al-Turabis ICF (Kepel, 2002) Eventually, Al-Turabi would marry a sister of Al-Mahdi and, by the 1990s, other political marriages would take place, including the betrothal of one of Al-T urabis nieces to Osama bin Laden. Characteristic Two: Codified Educati on Theory for Purposes of Promoting Monolithic View of Islam and Subverting Universities and Su rrounding Society from Above and Below Islamist education propounded in Algerian, Tunisia, and the Sudan, owing to their influence by Muslim Brotherhood profe ssors who were not indigenous to those places would take on similar characteristics to those seen in other countries in previous sections of this chapter, thus supporting Blumer (1946/1951/1963), Sabine (1937/1950/1959), and R. Pipes (2001) about the nature of totalitarian mass 343

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movements. The propaganda of the move ment came to be disseminated through educational channels in an intellectualized form seen as scie ntific and worthy of respect, couched in the terms of typi cal of the Islamist intelligentsia. According to Esposito a nd Voll (2001), most of th e so-called makers of contemporary Islam in their book of the same name took early direction in their pledge to Islamism from the Muslim Brotherhood explicated in Section I. Two of those makers, Rashid Al-Ghannoushi and Hassan Al-Turabi, are from Tunisia and the Sudan. Another in Esposito and Voll (2001), Ismail Al-Faruqi, founder of the IIIT, has been discussed previously in Section II. Gi ven that Sunni-inspired Muslim Brotherhood activity is a direct feature in all selected countries except one, Iran, we can deduce that Islamism, as it extended itself across time a nd space, has maintained great consistency in the ways it exacts re-Islamization from above and below. Indeed, as a strategy employed in the higher education milieu, propaganda and terror present two sides of the same coin (Arendt, 1948/1951/1966/ 1968/1979/1994: p. 341) for mass movements with totalita rianism on their minds. Through various means, the Algerian and Tunisian gove rnments have prevented Islamists from assuming complete power; hence, in those societies Islamists have not been fully able to turn propaganda dissemination into fu ll-fledged indoctrination. However, in the Sudan--as in Iran and Saudi Ar abia--totalitarianism possesse s absolute control and it replaces propaganda with indoctrination (p.341). As is the case with Islamist education elsewhere in the world, consistency also has come in the form of the mass movements emphasis on its modern scientific nature, Islamic modernity, in which the move ment reduces science to a surrogate 344

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for [achieving] power (p. 345). So in this final section, by following what Qutb calls in Signposts the Islamist hijra to Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan, we can better grasp the meaning of what some international a ffairs scholars refer to as an Islamist internationale (Fuller, 1 997: p.153) as witnessed in th is case through the lens of professor-led student movements that arose in those countries dur ing the last three decades. In the 1960s Algeria became one of many countries acro ss in North Africa to have achieved independence from coloni al occupation. Under the consecutive presidencies of Ahmed Ben Bella a nd Houari Boumedienne, Algeria became ideologically aligned with Communism emanating from Moscow. The newly formed post-colonial government of Algeria view ed traditional Islamic institutions as thoroughly reactionary (Kepel, 2002: p. 46). And so, Algerias independent government restricted Islamic social functi ons, subjecting them to rigorous controls with a view toward using them as conduits for their own socialist ideology (p. 46). In Marxist-styled countries like Algeria, schoolbooks of the 1960s went out of their way to impress upon children that socialis m was simply Islam properly understood. Pamphlets demonstrating the inherently social ist nature of Islam were to be found all over the Muslim world. Yet even this socia list version of Islam was kept under close surveillance (p. 47). The religious legitim acy of regimes, Kepel (2002) writes, was carefully fostered, but religious issues we re kept out of the public eye, which was supposed to be trained instead on the battle against imperialism and Zionism (p. 47). In this respect, one may find a similarity to Nassers Egypt, where that presidents 345

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marginalization of traditional religion and Is lamism paved the way for an even fiercer militancy that would later rise to challeng e the Al-Sadat and Mubarak presidencies. A similar process of delegitimization of traditional Islamic scholarship happened in Tunisia. Kepel (2002) shows th at Tunisias model of government, unlike Algeria, after achieving independence from colonial rule was founded upon a predominantly secular but non-Marxist model under the leadership of Habib Bourguiba. Unlike Algeria, Tunisia did ha ve an ancient university for religious training, Zitouna, founded in Tunis in 734. B ourguiba himself had experienced a purely secular education during the French Third Re public and had enjoyed the full support of the urban middle class for his struggle ag ainst French rule (Kepel, 2002). Hence, appeasement of Islamists or even of the ulama at Zitouna University was not a major factor in the earliest period of Tunisian independence. And so, like Algeria, a kind of religious vacuum did occur in post-colonial Tunisia. With strong support behind him, Kepel (2002) writes, Bourguiba rejected th e clerics out of hand and emptied Zitouna of its substance by directly abolishing th e ulemas as an organized body (p. 54). As with Algeria, the institutional vacuum that opened in the absence of the ulama resulted in a kind of blowback during the 19 70s when the underground imams of the Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI, Islamic Tendency Movement) appropriated religion in T unisia for its own political gain (Kepel, 2002). Characteristic Three: Campus Holy Wa r and Other Problems Associated with Interactive Organizations for Purposes of Re-Islamization from Above and Below At the same time, Algerian students gained inspiration from the first Palestinian intifada which they witnessed on televisi on and read about through Islamist 346

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publications. Indeed, during the October 1988 ri ots, students ritua listically taunted Algerian police as Jews (p. 161) during police counterattacks. Inside the universities, which were part of the countrys civil service, Islamist student demands traversed a range of issues from establishing an Algerian Islamist state to segregating the sexes in the countrys educational system. When the Algerian government denied those demands, those same students revolted in armed conflict. Similar events ranging from religious persecution to acts of terrorism also arose in Tunisia following the build-up of front or ganizations with the help of exiled Muslim Brothers from Egypt. During the mid-1980s Islamists capitalized on a disaffected public and engaged in a series of terror cam paigns throughout the small, North African country (Versi, 2001). As part of the esprit de corps that had also consumed their Algerian counterparts, the MTI (later Al-Nahda) of Ra shid Al-Ghannoushi, himself a Muslim Brother, targeted everything from political institutions, mosques, and people, both native and from abroad. As part of the Islamist movement s re-veiling program, terrorists from this movement that star ted as but another pr ofessor-led student movement hurled acid into womens faces. Versi (2001) writes, too, that They tried to silence opposition by claiming that attacks on them were tantamount to attacks on Islam (http://www.africa.co.uk/archive/tunisia ). The argument would be heard repeatedly by the Islamist movement, and on a global scale. In a country about to be consumed by anarchy, President Ben Ali mounted a successful two-part campaign against terrorism that involved police work and distinguishing Islamism from Islam (Versi, 2001). Under the new po licy, the state oversaw religious affairs. This came as a huge relief to minority communities such as Jews and Christians who, after enjoying 347

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Islams traditional tolerance for other faiths for centuries, had begun to fear for their futures during the height of fundamental ist terror (Versi, 2001: para. 14). The Sudan would not be as fortunate as Tunisia. Islamist leader Hasan Al-Turabi, who in his thirties was head of the University of Khartoums law faculty, used his field of knowledge to gradually Isla mize the Sudans legal system from below, leading up to the 1989 military coup. Esposito and Voll (2001) discuss in context that among the kinds of Islamic law that Al-Tur abi agreed to codify into the Sudans constitution were hudud punishments such as amputation, flogging, and stoning. Moreover, Esposito and Voll (2001) quot e Al-Turabi who once stated that hudud and other Islamic judgments are in reality, the historic precondition for the perfection of society (p. 133). In apparent defense of Al-Turabis consignment of legal practices that violate international human rights standards, Esposito and Voll (2001) state of the unpopular dictatorship that sl owly arose under Al-Turabis aeg is that the benefit to be gained was that issues of implementa tion of Islamic law became more central to Sudanese politics than ever be fore, a form of Islamic law, however flawed it might be in scholarly terms, was in place as the la w of the land (p. 133). By the mid-1990s, that same legal system had led to the w holesale persecution of Black Christians and animists in the southern part of th e country. Allegations of genocide and UN investigation resulting from challenges to the UN raised by President Bushs Secretary of State, Colin Powell, have been met w ith resistance, including the expulsion of the head of the UNs investigatory team in the Sudan. In summation of Al-Turab is legacy, Esposito and Voll (2001) call the activist-intellectuals full program of soci al and political reform . extremely 348

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controversial (p. 134). Of Al-Turabi hims elf, those same Islamic studies scholars write without attention to the human rights viol ations ascribed to this Islamist facultyleader role model: Hasan Turabi has throughout his life been a person of id eas, an intellectual. He has also been, since the completion of his graduate studies in 1964, an active and visible political leader in Sudan. In many ways, he is the prototype, almost stereotype, of the Muslim activist intellectual. The significant difference between him and most other Muslim activist intellectuals is that he had a decade in which he had the political power to put his ideas into practice. (p. 149) Shadid (2001) comments on Al-Turabis a ppeal to Western academics that the NIF leader has received lenient treatment by West erners attracted to his dexterity with languages and his ability to converse on their level and in their cu ltural context, with references to American presidential scanda ls, racial tension in the United States, and even Louis Farrakhans Na tion of Islam (p. 177). Tacitly accusing Al-Turabi of intelle ctual doublespeak, Hannah Wettig, in a Cairo Times article More Equal than Others (1 999) describes an interview with the Sudanese leader: A colleague in the National Islamic Fr ont (NIF), Hassan Makki, claims that Turabi makes 80 percent of the decisions and just leaves twenty percent for shura. Foolish, Turabi says when confronted with this opinion. Im a Muslim. Which is probably supposed to m ean that Islam is so inherently antiauthoritarian that true Muslims just ca nt help but decide everything through consensus. But even in consensus, a fe w voices may be more equal than others. Some people are the mouthpiece of pub lic opinion, Turabi says. Do you think that socialism was invented by Ma rx and Engels? I sense currents of public opinion, and then I can express them. (p. 2). Furthermore, the anti-democratic nature of Al-Turabis prototypical leadership style manifests in his assessment of Western de mocracy, which he compares to his own version of it: 349

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The only significant difference between a Western republic and an Islamic republic is that the Western electorat e doesnt believe in God. Without acknowledgement that men and women are created by God, public life can become very corrupt. (p. 3) Given that Al-Turabi claims that his democratic government does believe in God, Wettig (1999) wonders, therefore, why afte r spending two weeks in Khartoum, this correspondent was unable to find a single ordinary citizen with a good thing to say about the man (p. 3). Both Kepel (2002) and Esposito and Voll (2001) discuss how Al-Turabi claimed spiritual and political legitimacy in the Sudan. In essence, the Ph.D. from the University of Khartoum was of a Sudanese religious aristocracy that included dual pedigree, Mahdi and Sufi. It also seems apparent from reading Esposito and Voll (2001) that Al-Turabi used that dual pedi gree to enamor the Sudans university students, with whom he had maintained direct access through his position on the University of Khartoums law faculty. In addition, the charismatic leader aroused considerable antipathy from traditional Islamists by recruiting female students into the ICF ranks, countering the monopoly of leftist student groups in the Sudan who advocated womens emancipation. Those early overtures that so easily seduced Khartoums students, however, would lead to the setting up of a military dictatorship that involved several years of savage repression against th e secular middle class (K epel, 2002: p. 182). In the aftermath of the 1989 coup, Purges and execu tions were immediately carried out in the upper ranks of the army, while civil and military officials were subjected to reeducation to make them adopt the Islami st view of the world. People were routinely 350

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interrogated and tortured in ghost hous es--anonymous villas used by security services (p. 183). Conditions that Al-Turabis dictatorship fostered in the Sudans university system, which had previously enjoyed a relatively high degree of academic freedom, were just as appalling to human rights advocates. Resistance in the academic professions and student unions were systematically crushed, shut down as the reIslamization from above program went into full swing in 1991 (Shadid, 2001: p.155). The coup in the university system by NIF suppor ters involved tactic s that included the detention of rival leaders, dirty tricks, and violence (p. 163). In fact, Khartoum University, Al-Turabis alma mater that had given him the Western knowledge that would allow him to formulate how he would re-Islamize the Sudan from below, first, and from above, second, was another victim of Islamists who, in the words of one former professor, sought to break the my stique of the university (p. 163). The university was a ladder to power, another fo rmer professor states Now that theyve arrived theyve thrown it on the ground so th at no one else can climb it (p. 163). In total, Twenty thousand judges, professors, so ldiers and civil servants were fired and replaced with the [NIFs] supporters (p. 161). The toll on students and the curriculum after Al-Turabis revolution is predictably tragic. Shadid (2001) writ es of those educational conditions: Arabization had forced professors to read aloud from English-language books and translate into Arabic because there were not enough texts in translation to distribute. Lecture halls had no chal k and photocopying paper was in short supply. One administration official speculated that the univer sity had lost twofifths of its professors. Those remaining were paid the equivalent of $30 to $60 a month and the money increasingly did not arrive on time, a testament to Sudans crumbling economy as much to do with government neglect. There were signs of faith and zeal the regime was supposed to inspire. [Some signs] 351

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urged young women to wear the veil. Outside the campus main walls were amateurish portraits erected by government spaced every ten yards or so of students killed in the civil war. Under the picture was their name with the appellation shahid (martyr), his school of study a nd date of death. On more than a few, there were scratch marks as though disgruntled students had scraped keys across what the Islamic government ha d celebrated as religious sacrifice. . In 1997, the government shut the doors of the univers ity, exhorting 20,000 students to the front. A million martyrs for a new era was the slogan. In the end, students and professors told me, only about 250 heeded the call. (p. 164) Kepel (2002) further states that international organizations denounced the Sudanese human rights abuses, but Turabi dismissed those abuses as minimal, attributing them to extreme sensitivity (p. 183). By the early 1990s, Al-Turabi may not have won the hearts and minds of hu man rights advocates or Western liberal governments, but he had won the hearts and mi nds of other radical Islamist leaders and groups, including Tunisias MTI and Pa lestines HAMAS (Kepel, 2002). His revolution of the intelligentsia had thus become as unpopular as Khomeinis student revolution, and led to the Sudan being classe d as a rogue state th at actively supported terrorism (p. 184). As with the Algerian a nd Tunisian faculty-led student movements, Sudanese experiment may have moved mountains in select quarte rs of the countrys elite intelligentsia, but it did not have the love of the people--let alone the University of Khartoums students and professors. Characteristic Four: Transnational Influen ce of Islamism and its Esprit de Corps through the Migration of Professors and Students Because the MTI maintained internati onal networks in France, which also happened to be where Samia Labidis brothe r-in-law would flee from the close watch of Tunisian investigators. In France, as in Tunisia, Labidi would be hunted by Islamists, where she started a career as a journalist and wrote a book about her own 352

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brother entitled Karim, My Brother, Ex-Fundamentalist and Terrorist (1997). Labidi writes of her French experience that we must reveal and admit that Islamism in the West is an imported product, not a local one. Many Islamists, fleeing their own country of origin, were freely accorded political ref ugee status, and they were able to continue their activities in their host country as well as their own from a distance (p. 328). Now, the private domains of the Islamists a nd the home base of their activities are to be found in Europe and in the United Stat es. They know how to manipulate those who knew nothing of Islam, and to make dupes of those who agree with them (p. 328), Labidi (2003) states. And finally, she concludes of Islamism in the West: The attack is progressing on two parallel fronts, on one hand they are sponsoring from a distance the establ ishment of Islamist states in Arabo-Muslim countries, and on the othe r they are undermining the West from the inside. Thus, it would be enough for the fi rst half to invade the other half of the planet to establish international Isla m. You would have to be a fanatic of God to imagine such a scenario (p. 328). That hijra of Islamists moving from one country to the next to avoid prosecution during a phase of weakness is not unlike the one envisioned by Qutb from his prison cell and transcribed in the co llection of writings called Signposts For believers in the Nizam Islami the movement is a reformulated manifestation of jihad incumbent on believers everywhere, whether in the dar al-Islam or the dar al-harb (Kepel, 1983/2002). As exiling oneself from a country divi ded by Islamic fundamentalism failed for victims of political Islam like Labidi, Tuni sias internal appeasement policy failed, too, as it typically fails when a government contends communitarian militancy that ultimately rejects compromise. By the late 1980s, Al-Ghannoushi was forced to flee Tunisia to Great Britain, where he would be convicted a second time of seditious 353

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conspiracy, this time in absentia The conviction came in 1988, after President Bourguiba was forced into retirement, allowing a former director of Tunisian military intelligence, Zain Al-Abidine Ben Ali to a ssume the presidency. Under Alis direction, Tunisias state Security Court was abolished, a policy decision that would be regretted. Ali released all political prisoners, including Al-Ghannoushi, who was given amnesty in 1988 (Jones, 1988). Like his theoretic al hero, Qutb, Al-Ghannoushis prison sentence served as a means to help his movement reorganize, and not to repent. Noting the problems inherent to communita rian ideologies that deny the rights of individuals that formulate rule of law in Western democracies, the Moroccan philosopher Abdou Filali Ansari observes, F or Ghannoushi, the principal question is always how free to the community [the ummah] from backwardness and the other. However significant his concessions in favor of democracy . the community--not the individual--remains . the ultimate objective (qtd. in Brumberg, 1997: p. 221). Furthermore, in noting Al-Ghannoushis denial of the rights of the individual, Ansari states that Al-Ghannoushis vision of Islam is not a vision one might equate with the Christian Reformation. Instead, he equates it to the Counter Reformation (Brumberg, 1997), an analogy that by default compares Al-Ghannoushi to Englands Oliver Cromwell. From his base in the West, in London, Al-Ghannoushi has often stated that he and other Islamists prefer Western democracies but that, of course, is not because Islamists are democratic people. The preference involves instead Islamists appreciation for the benefits of democracies, whose liberal social institutions provide Islamists cover and legitimacy for committing terrorism and other human rights violations in their native and host countries. As Emerson (2002) suggests in the 354

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introduction of Jihad in America Islamists propagate their message by word and deed in societies that care about rights of indi vidual association and due process with much greater ease than in socie ties whose leaders know not the meaning of enacting law and policy by least restrictive alternatives yet according to the needs of the day. Al-Ghannoushis academic credentials seem typical of the Islamist movements early leaders, except that according to Espos ito and Voll (2001) his highest degree is an M.A. in philosophy. Born into a provincial, ru ral family suspicious of Wester n culture, he received a partial undergraduate education in Tunisias religious institution, Zitouna University. However, he withdrew from th e university during his fourth year, then became a primary school teacher, and consid ered becoming a jour nalist (Esposito & Voll, 2001). In 1964, a year the researcher notes represented the apex of Nassers police raids on Egyptian students, Al-Ghannoushi went to Egypt and enrolled at Cairo University to study agriculture. After f our months of study in Egypt, however, President Bouguiba, concerned about the in fluence of Nasserism on Tunisian study abroad students, withdrew Al-Ghannoushi, who then enrolled at The University of Damascus, where he received a B.A. in ph ilosophy (Esposito & Voll, 2001). The irony was that while in Syria Al-Ghannoushi join ed the Syrian Nationalist Socialist Party. Hence, his removal from Egypt failed to prevent his immersion in to Marxist politics. Al-Ghannoushis thought would not rema in purely Marxist for long, however, for Esposito & Voll (2001) compare his travel s in Europe to Qutbs travels in the United States, where European culture would serve as a form of revulsion leading to Islamist enlightenment. Al-Ghannoushis t hought further congealed when, back in 355

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Damascus, the 1967 Six Day War would erupt and the Israelis bo mbed the Syrian capitol. After completion of his degree, the futu re leader of the Tunisian student movement moved to Paris and earned a mast ers degree at the Sorbonne. And it was in Paris, among the French-speaking North African students, that Al-Ghannoushi would join a Muslim stude nt-activist group, Pakistani in origin (Esposito & Voll, 2001). An M.A. in philos ophy being his highest earned degree, the better educated Al-Ghannoushi served as an imam in a storefront mosque to fellow North African students (Esposito & Voll, 2001). His immersion into Muslim student life and activism was not un like that of the underground imams of Egypt and Algeria, in that Paris, too, held no seats of traditional Islamic learning for the ulama whose sensitivity to a less politicized form of religion might not prevent Islamisms total development but at least could mitigate it s more pathological manifestations in societies where organized Islamic religious universities either di d not exist (i.e., AlGhannoushis Paris) or had been marginali zed under Marxist influences (i.e., Nassers Egypt, Bellas and Boumediennes Algeria) or under ultra-secular influences (i.e., Bourguibas Tunisia). The Sudans role in the transna tional influence of Islamism in the years after its professor-led movement had succeeded in making the country the worlds second Islamic republic remains forever marked by its connections with Al-Qaeda. In 1998, many of the highly educated l eaders of the worlds most major Islamist terror groups discussed in the aforementioned pages a ssembled in the Sudan to announce the formation of the World Islamic Front (WIF) ( 9/11 Commission Report 2003). By that 356

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time, the established leader of this group, Osama bin Laden, had married one of AlTurabis nieces during his period of refuge in the Sudan. There these leaders signed the Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Ji had against the Jews and the Crusaders. The document, published originally in London on concluded as follows: By gods leave we call on every Muslim who belie ves in God and hopes for reward to obey Gods command to kill the Americans and plunder their possessions wherever he finds them and wherever he can. Likewise we call on the Muslim ulema and leaders and youth and solidiers to launch attacks against the armies of the American devils and against those who are allied with them from the helpers of Satan (qtd. in Lewis, 2000/2001: p. 320). After signing this document, th e signatories returned to their native countries or to other countries, where they would heed the call, finding higher education an appealing se tting for re-Islamization. Section V: Chapter Summary This chapter undertakes stud y in an uncharted area of higher education inquiry of critical importance to international education and gove rnment policy in a world environment beset with problems related to Is lamism and its self-styled program of reIslamization from above and below. By synt hesizing what is known about Islamism in social and political history texts, whos e purposes of inquiry do not focus on higher education, with other texts such as Islamist websites and educational discourse, and then tracing the intellectual pedigree and t eachings of leading Islamists, the chapter presents a genealogy of re-Islamization as it developed across sp ace and time in key 357

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Middle Eastern and African loca les. The texts in this ch apter range greatly, and the majority of them are written by individuals sympathetic to the Islamist movement. The result is that the chapter pr ovides a foundation for understanding the significance of Islamism and the totalita rian movements leaders, who would eventually take their Qutb-inspired hijra to North America and, as the chapter hints, USF, thus establishing the university as a place where leaders in an Islamist international would coalesce. In addition, th is chapter shows in rich discussion USFs historical antecedents in Egypt, Saudi Arabia the Levant, Iran, Al geria, Tunisia, and the Sudan that higher ed ucation apparently represents a kind of dar al-harb, the domain of war, or fresh territor y in the quest to create a worldwide Nizam Islami Therein, Islamists and sympathetic colleagues reduce research, publication, and teaching to a form of propaganda, or what Tibi (1998) calls paranoid scholarship that often involves the s capegoating of Muslim and non-Muslim professors as part of an alleged Jewish-C rusader conspiracy aimed at keeping Islam in a state of wea kness and oppression. Finally, the chapter shows how the soci o-political networks of the Muslim Brotherhood--not always under the classi c names of the Egyptian organization-provide direct and indirect material s upport Islamist terrorist movements like the Islamic Jihad, HAMAS, Al-Qaeda, FIS, MT I, and NIF. In those cases, higher education institutions that cooperate with onand off-campus organizations become fronts for destabilizing activity against i ndividuals and societies resistant to reIslamization. Problems manifest in the form of violations to indi vidual rights to life, liberty, and property, and also espionage committed by students and their faculty 358

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359 advisors. In that sense, Islamists cha llenge academic freedom through violating the teaching and research choices of dissenting faculty and the coercion of administrators, most dramatically witnessed in the form of blacklisting, libel, physical violence, institutional disruption, kidnappings, and murder. In the process, students also become targets of coercion when on-campus pressure is placed upon them to conform to the Islamist worldview or when Islamist student blocs assume political control of student government.

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Chapter Five Toward Local Confirmation of a Global Narrative: Islamism Comes to USF a nd Its Service Community Section I: Introduction In the previous chapter, the researcher presented the historical antecedents of the University of South Florida case by documenting Islamisms conditions and characteristics, illustrating how the to talitarian movement appropriates higher education in Middle Easter n and African locales to achieve its objectives. The relationship between one institution, Islami sm, and a sub-institution, higher education, the researcher refers to as interplay, representing in this study a signification of interrelated ideologies, strategies, and legaci es of direct and indirect action diffused across geographical space and time. More su ccinctly, that interp lay may be called re-Islamization from above and below. By studying that interplay through the range of texts (e.g., historical records, cour t documents, para-professional associations, publishing organs, media archives) that link the Islamist movement with the milieu of higher education, we ca n better understand the gravitas of the Islamist movements interest in an appealing se tting (e.g., higher education) as a means to advance an ultra-nationalist strategic ag enda of global conquest. In the locales cited, the Muslim Brot herhood, a group indigenous only to Egypt, provides an ideological and st rategic base for the re-Islamization programs progress in other locales. Chapter Four findi ngs appear to show that exiled Muslim Brothers from 360

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Egypt became university professors in the locales studied and began exerting influence in higher education institutions. Eventual ly, that influence spread to surrounding communities. Apparently, that Qutb-inspire d hijra proved itself highly adroit at filling vacuums in post-colonial societies a ligned with the Soviet Union and socialist policies, which marginalized traditional forms of Islamic faith. However, the movement was just as likely to establish it self firmly in other types of authoritarian states that alternately tried to appeas e and suppress the movement. Supported by the World Muslim Youth Association (WAMY) a Saudi Arabian organization founded during the kingdoms ministeria l restructuring several decades ago, the Qutb-inspired hijra of students also came to North Amer ica in the 1960s. In North America, they founded the Muslim Students Association Na tional (MSA), whose graduates later formed the Islamic Society of North Amer ica (ISNA). Sami Al-Arian, a former USF professor and leader in the Islamist move ment, claims to have helped found the ISNA (see www.FreeSamiAl-Arian.org ). The Muslim Brotherhoods vanguard stude nt initiates became the leaders of Islamist movements in Saudi Arabia, the Levant, North Africa, and the Sudan. In those cases, the people who rose to power the fastest were the movements intellectuals. By the 1990s Islamist subversion in higher education, emanating into communities outside university milieu, had become particul arly severe in Algeria, a country that had no ancient Islamic university to counter the vacuum filled by the Armed Islamic Group (AIG). The Islamist movement was no less pr one to using universi ties as ladders to power in the other locales studied, eventually leading to government overthrow and the establishment of highly repressive I slamic states like the Sudan. There, the 361

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concept of social preparation from below fo r a long period of time in advance of direct action from above proved successful the Ikwhan re-Islamization strategy. In the Sudan, in Stalinist fashion, professors who had helped their Islamist academic counterparts achieve power were among the firs t to be removed from their professional appointments. Many were jailed, tortured, and killed. While the Islamist movement sought a broad base of support in the lo cales studied, that same movement was conceived and led by an intelligentsia fi nancially supported through its professional sections and committees, many of which were financed by charities abroad. Research Question The research question for this chapte r about re-Islamization from above and below in higher education is What are the conditions and characteristics of Islamism at USF and its service area, Tampa Bay, 19862007? An answer to that question demonstrates whether and to what extent th e highly publicized case at USF confirms or denies the global narrative of re-Islamization in higher education from above and below. It is a case that involves media, constituent, and government accusations that a group of terrorist leaders us ed the university as a front for the Islamic Jihads Palestinian faction, the PIJ. The chorus of voices representing the media, external and internal constituents, and government is richly detailed in this chap ter in narrative form that specifies relationships among events, texts, and concepts. The chapter also conveys relevant informati on about re-Islamization at US F, replete with apparent pressures on the curriculum that may ha ve been forgotten by chance or acts of repression. The details of Islamisms conditions and characteristics at USF and its service community emanate from a multi-laye red approach to data collection known as 362

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coding through which information has been collected and analyzed repeatedly over a four-year time period, as, inter alia key themes, ideas, problems, processes, and incidents have been categorized, compared, and contrasted. At the advice of her committee during proposal stage, no interv iews were conducted for this inquiry. Several strands of research explicated in Chapter Two find relevance in this chapters findings. Those strands of research provided initial theoretical bases for analysis of the material collected. The eviden ce cited in this chapter supports the social psychology of Blumer (1949/1946/1951/1955), w ho conveys how religious nationalist movements find in higher education an appe aling setting in the service of their objectives. In addition, the blurring of propaganda and education and the growth of non-criminal front groups cited in this chap ters evidence also s upport the observations of Blumers colleague at The University of Chicago, Arendt (1948/1949/1951/1966/1968/1976/1979/1994), in her studies of totalitarian mass movements. Arendt observes that in tota litarian movements educational propaganda and terror represent two sides of the same coin, with front organizations maintaining strong interest in uni versities. Where educational propaga nda exists in a totalitarian mass movement, levels of terror also exist. Those levels of terror range from low-level intimidation of dissenting individuals to coups d etat The research also supports Walker (1979), who observes in The Effective Administrator that pressures on universities from militant external groups stem more from the reformist nature of those groups than the open, democratic nature of universities themselves. Finally, that sa me evidence in this chapter supports, respectively, Birnbaum (1988) and Margolis (2001) on their respec tive studies about 363

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organizational anarchy in universities and hi dden curricula in multic ultural education. Other evidence lends credence to Becher ( 1998) on the tribal nature of university faculties who may violate their most cheris hed democratic ideals when they are challenged. Evidence also supports Chafee and Jacobson (1997) on the defensive nature of academics when their conclusions are challenged. Shils (1997) notions about the perils of ideological polit ics in the curriculum also re ceive support in this chapter. Population Samples In the spirit of this i nquirys methodology, the findings depicting the Islamist movements interplay with USF and its se rvice community draw from analysis of institutional documents, institutional mee tings, presidential archives, publications, websites, professional associations, intellect ual pedigree, media ex change, and an array of other texts. As in the previous chapters this chapter consider s sources of the socalled Orientalist and Occide ntalist intellectual pedigree. The researcher also has endeavored to present the array of c onflicting points-of-vi ew regarding the characteristics of re-Islamization at USF as the mass reform program became part of a vitriolic exchange, aired largely in the local press, about academic freedom rights. These population samples offer further insi ght into the linkages among the Islamist movements world-historical discourse, organizational discourse, and individual discourse expressed at USF and in its service community. At the time of writing, former professo r Sami Al-Arian has plead guilty to conspiracy to commit terrorism, for which a reading of the plea agreement involves a range of activity articulated in the 2003 indictment and in 2003-2006 court testimony. Some of that activity involves the use of USF infrastructur e and personnel, so therefore 364

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the university was assigned unwittingly as a platform for the material support of terrorism, or re-Islamization from above. On May 1, 2006, Al-Arian read a statement to the judge prior to lear ning the Honorable James Moodys decision about the former professors sentencing. Followi ng that statement in which Al-Arian professed respect for the U.S. legal system and the generosity of a nation that would allow his children to attain their fullest potential in highe r education, Moody castigated the defendant, calling him a master manipulator who in public forums praises the U.S. but in private ones condemns it and who sends his children to the finest universities but raises money to blow up children elsewhere. Of that May 1 sentencing, the Tampa Tribune further wrote, In a statement he read, Al-Arian had the gall to say he harbors no bitterness or resentment. It is perhaps the ultimate display of Al-Arian's arrogance to make himself a victim on the day he is being sentenced as a criminal. It is also tell ing that in Al-Arian's separate statement to his supporters he never acknowledges or apol ogizes for the crime of providing support to members of the Palestinian Islamic Ji had, an organization responsible for hundreds of deaths and maimings in Is rael. Instead, he writes, I'll co ntinue to call and work for the peaceful engagement and dialogue betw een civilizations, in particular between Muslim and Western intellectuals and academics, as if that were what he has been doing all along (Judge Gets to th e Heart of Al-Arian Case, 2006). To date, no indication has been found th at other internal or external USF constituents were involved in the criminal ac tivity at USF. However, there is indication that supporters of Al-Arian at USF and in Ta mpa Bay appear to be part of a wider mass social movement that involves what Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) calls an esprit d 365

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corps of sympathizers and fellow travelers who add to the semblance of legitimacy the movement requires. Al-Arian is considered a leader in that movement which, since his arrival in Tampa in 1986, has amassed the sy mpathy of broad classes of academics at USF and throughout the world. As he told his supporters after his sentencing, Ill continue to call and work for the peaceful engagement and dialogue between Muslim and Western intellectuals and academics. In addition, the findings in this chapter suggest this broad, influential base of academic constituents share in a common intellectual ferment, a well-defined Islamist epistemology that enjoins a d rigueur anti-Western epistemology that gained as cendancy in higher e ducation after the post-World War II generation achieved profe ssional appointments in their academic disciplines (from Chapter Two, see King, 1972, for discussion about Marcusian social psychologys influence on post-World War II American intellectual thought; and see Kramer, 2001, for a discussion about that same influence in Middle East area studies programs). Be that as it ma y, sympathy for Al-Arian or his cause does not equal criminality of fellow travelers and colleagues. 366

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Section II: Re-Islamization at USF and its Service Area Community: Conditions and Characteristics Conditions of Islamism at USF and its Service Area Community Condition One: Temporal Developments Related to Expansion of the Universitys Mission with Eventual Formation of a Partnership with Sami Al-Arians Think-tank, World Islam Studies Enterprise Participant observation of institutional events and documents analysis of USFs history found in the universitys Tamp a library Special Collections department reveals a range of temporal developments involving major changes in USFs mission over the span of several decades. As shown below, the changes in mission were marked on one hand with USFs need to ear n public trust while on the other hand to maintain independence from potential political pressures. Those developments led to the internationalization of the university and to pressures on the university through other socio-political forces (e.g., forei gn policy crises, the Johns Commission, the diversity movement, the accountability m ovement). By the early 1990s, those developments also had contributed to the rationale for the USF partnership with AlArians think-tank, World Islam and Studies Enterprise (WISE). Arguably and paradoxically, university expansion laid th e foundations for USF and its service community to become fresh territory fo r intended conquest, a problem which caused an enormous diminishing of public trust in the university after 1994 when terrorism investigator Steven Emerson exposed USFs links to international terrorism in a PBS documentary. 367

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Founded in 1956 on the site of a World War II airstrip, He nderson Airfield, with its motto being Truth, Wisdom, USF boasts a student population of 41,571 students and 2,202 full-time professors. USF wa s also Floridas first coeducational university and the first in Florida to integrate during the Civil Rights period. The original mission for the newly le gislated USF in 1956 was that its curriculum be organized along interdiscip linary lines represen ted by cutting edge faculty, as opposed the compartmentalized organization the university represents today with most faculty representing narro w areas of specialization in their fields. Had USF realized that goal, the university s political culture might have become analogous to a nation-state. Instead, the in stitution appears to ha ve evolved into a mass university governed by the tribal inte rests of faculties more devoted to the ideologies of their fields of study, as Becher (1998) describes, than to, inter alia the mission of their universities or even the values of their societies, which may on occasion conflict with their own. In addition to the early interdisciplinary mission, original emphasis at USF was on teaching as opposed to research. Over tim e, that aspect of USFs organizational identity would change, too, lest the univers ity stagnate and lose its competitive edge for faculty, students, and funds. In that respect, the universitys academic tribes became ever mindful of the bottom line and th e basic needs of their groups, who must hunt, gather, and fiercely guard scarce resources in the proverbial changing environment. Those circumstances, as Becher (1998) avers, may threaten a facultys professional identity and existence, causing that faculty to react when challenged, and 368

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in a manner that contradicts the ethic of strict scrutiny prior to rendering judgment about research, teaching, and curriculum development. The youngest of Floridas three major publ ic universities--the other two being The University of Florida (UF) and Fl orida State University (FSU)--USF achieved considerable growth during a short period of time under the aegis of six appointed presidents (John Allen, 1957-1970; C ecil Mackey, 1971-1976; John Lott Brown, 1978-1988; Frances T. Borkowski, 19881993; Betty Castor, 1994-1999; Judy L. Genshaft, 2000-present), five interim presidents (Harris Dean, 1970-1971; William Reece-Smith, Jr., 1976-1977; Carl Riggs 1977-1978; Robert Bryan, 1993-1994; Richard Peck, 1999-2000), and one acting president (Thomas Tighe, Fall 1999). The administrations of each of USFs presidents were marked by significant national and world events in which social a nd geopolitical issues of the day affected how each president might have reshaped the universitys mission for teaching and research: Allen and Mackey, the Cold War, Civil Rights, Vietnam, and the ArabIsraeli Conflict; Brown and Borkowski, The Iran Hostage Crisis, the end of the Cold War, the Persian Gulf War; Castor, th e Republican Revolution, Globalization, the Balkans Conflict, the Palest inian-Israeli Peace Accords; Genshaft, the September 11 Attacks and the U.S.-Iraq War. To greater or lesser extents, therefore, Middle East affairs have punctuated the entire hist ory of USFs administrative calls--and community, faculty, and student resp onses--to reshape curriculum. During Borkowskis presidency, the unive rsity was elevated to Research II Carnegie status and under Castor, Research I. In addition, USF s presidential history appears relatively consistent with a recu rrent area of concern in higher education 369

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administration, shortened spans of presiden tial tenure, sometimes perceived as a problem whose causes range from the so-ca lled corporatization of higher education, to the us versus them scenario between f aculty and administration, and to matters of sunshine law disclosure in the sele ction of presidential candidates. USFs founding also came on the eve of the formation of the Florida Legislative Investigatory Committee (FLIC), or the Johns Commission, named after Senator Charley E. Johns. The FLIC conducted covert investigations of students, faculty, and curricula in Floridas state uni versities. Eventually, according to USFs website, the FLIC would accuse USFs facu lty of corrupting students with trashy and pornographic novels like The Grapes of Wrath and with the study of evolutionary theory. FLIC representatives would take students to a motel on Dale Mabry at night and question them, and so, when President Allen became aware of this development, he insisted that the co mmission come to the campus and question students and faculty in the open ( http://isis.fastmail.usf.edu/history ). While eventually Allen would be forced out of office in th e late 1960s during the rise of Marcusian educational doctrines at USF, resonating in the national trend of faculty-led student rebellion, Allens position regarding the FLIC investiga tions and also his stance against having a campus ROTC positioned him as a distinctly liberal-leaning first president. USFs knowledge of the intrusion of th e FLIC into the soul of the newly founded university, matters of teaching and research, has been kept alive largely through the stewardship of Dr Sherman Dorn, a faculty union leader and historian who holds an appointment in the College of Education. Through Dorns efforts, the 370

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FLIC legacy would be cite d repeatedly on campus, on the faculty union website, and in the local press during the restructuring of the governance system of Floridas K-20 system under House Bill 2263, the Florida E ducation Governance Reorganization Act of 2000. The matter would come to light again during Genshafts decision to fire AlArian when these matters collectively were illustrated in a spirited manner on the USF faculty unions website, using the metaphors of a chess match and a hammer descending on a nail. Dorns long sense of history was compatible with that of U.S. Senator Bob Grahams. That long, collective memory of campus history resonates with Bechers (1998) concept of academic tribalism, expressed by ressentiment over ancient affronts resurrected in the rhetoric of current battle s. Graham, in a speech given at USF to the state task force charged with overseeing the restructuring, claimed that the abolition of the Board of Regents would signal the death of academic freedom at USF and other institutions. He used the metaphor execu tioner to describe the political nature of those leading the restructuring and deliver ed stern warnings about haste executing the executioner. The history of the earlier Board of C ontrol, which governed until the mid-1960s and evidently had political ties to the FLIC, was cited as cause for concern on behalf of faculty leadership and the U.S. senator. By contrast, the Board of Regents was perceived as a buffer between the excesses of unwelcome conservative political intrusion at USF and other institutions; some thirty-five years later, that abolition of the Board of Regents surely signified the opposite to the most vocal of faculty and the senator himself. Many USF students and faculty participated 371

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in giving Graham an extended standing ovation after the senator condemned the actions of the task force. Faculty leadership and some university presidents speaking on campus in January 2000 charged that the Board of Regents abolition placed USF and other institutions in an unwelcome position of major instability. Such concerns implied that policy vacuums in USFs organized anarchy wi dened in the late 1990s, with the fate of the facultys collective bargaining contract beco ming the critical issue of uncertainty. The demise of the unitary c ontract held through the suddenly defunct Board of Regents heightened concerns about academic freedom and free speech. For Florida public education, H.B. 2263 also signified the most dramatic development in the history of the accountab ility movement, a shrewd gubernatorial interpretation of a ballot init iative to amend the state c onstitution for public education governance. Public became a word that the newly elected Governor Jeb Bush and his legislative allies liberally construed as reference to all of public education, K-20, as opposed to K-12 only. In a meeting th at took place in the Marshall Center Ballroom in early 2000, Florida faculty objected to Senator Jim Hornes repeated assertions that higher education should be run like a business, and that local boards of trustees comprised of, mostly, non -academic CEOs could hold universities accountable to their constituents. Hornes st atements were met with the unforgettable logic of USFs faculty union president, Dr. Roy Weatherford, a philosophy professor: U.S. corporations would not want an execu tive board consisting of distinguished Latin professors from around the country telling corporations how to govern 372

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themselves. Ergo, what good could the CEOs of multinational restaurant chains do for Floridas universities? At the same time as the governance changes, however, other issues were rippling throughout the state and at USF in the form of affronts to the respect for cultural diversity on Florida campuses. In disc losures that made headlines in Floridas major newspapers, the president of The University of Florida (UF), Dr. John Lombardi, outraged some constituents for his having called Board of Regents Chancellor Dr. Adam Herbert an oreo at a private cocktail pa rty. Faculty, students, other colleagues, and the public exercised Walkers (1979) moral veto and forced the UF president to resign. The statement was considered unbecoming of a university president, even if it had been uttered in private. Thereafter, UF and the regents began the arduous task of replacing th e ousted president, a process that in turn reinvigorated the sunshine law debate over presidential appointments. And of course, following Governor Bush s election in Florida, his brother, George Walker Bush, would become Pr esident of the United States, in a post-election battle that made its way all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, whose verdict, according to Alan M. Dershowitz (2001) in his book of the same name, was a supreme injustice. The election stirre d up strong emotions about civil rights pertaining to minorities who were former convicted felons and, in more general terms, about the Republican ascendancy in Florida, which for the most strident of opponents signified a majority tyranny of Christian fundamenta lists and capitalist conservatives. Those matters, along with Gove rnor Bushs changes in education and state contract bidding signifying the demise of affirmative action policies, also would 373

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cause faculty at USF and elsewhere in th e state to move into an increasingly defensive posture. After President Genshafts banishment of Al-Arian from campus in September 2001, her informing him of her intent to fire him, in December 2001 and her firing of him in February 2003, the basic assumptions of the facultys defensive posture about governance changes, unwarranted political intrusion, academic freedom, and tenure coalesced with the basic assumptions of th e Islamist movement in Tampa Bay, which advocated its own interpreta tions of peace, liberty, and justice. From that point forward, the concern about political intrus ion into the soul of the university was virtually indistinguishable fr om Al-Arians cause, although other constituents argued that Genshafts decision to terminate Al-A rians employment had merit and had little to do with academic freedom: The process was very undemocratic. It resu lted in a very bad decision. This is the kind of governance that has been in place since the BOT was established (Susan Greenbaum, Professor of Applied Anthr opology at USF and Anthropology Graduate Program Advisor, qtd. in No Support, The Oracle Jan. 10, 2002). This is a unique case of how one pers ons activities outside the scope of his employment have resulted in harm to the legitimate interests of the university (Judy L. Genshaft, USF President, CNNfyi.com Jan. 14, 2002). I certainly agree with Tom Auxt er, president of the Nutty Professors Union. No one who has attained the holy grail of tenur e should be fired, including Sami Al-Arian. In an effort to preserve intellectual freedom, a new position should be created for which Al-Arian is eminently qualified: Professor of Anti-Semitism 101, with special focus on damning America (Daniel Holmer, Editorial, The Tampa Tribune Jan.15, 2002). In fact what is going on is, in my opini on, the culmination of a series of actions, beginning with the decision to reorganize th e state university syst em, that amount to a coup of the right, designed to force the uni versity to become a docile and compliant servant of the politically connected and economic ally privileged (Silvio Gaggi, Professor of Humanities, Editorial, President, BOT Endanger Academic Freedom, The Oracle Jan. 15, 2002). 374

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We will not sell our principles for an endowment (Roy Weatherford, Philosophy Professor and USF Faculty Union Pres ident, qtd. in Al-Arian Responds, The Oracle Jan. 15, 2002). [What has happened to Al-Arian is] a bigot ry and prejudice being perpetrated on the entire Muslim community. [Genshaft] doesnt have the moral courage or moral certainty to stand for whats right (Eric Vickers, Executive Director for the American Muslim Council, a group advertised in Inquiry, qtd. in Al-Arian Responds). What we are seeing is vi gilantism. A media circus (Roy Busch, Director of government Affairs at the American Muslim Council, qtd. in Al-Arian Responds). A lot of people are talking about this in te rms of issues that have nothing to do with this case. Terms like racism . I dont k now that people ought to be throwing a word like racism (Tom Gonzalez, USF Attorne y, qtd. in Al-Arian Responds). On Monday a press conference was held for Dr. Sami Al-Arian at the Islamic Academy of Florida. Many people spoke on behalf of Dr. Sami Al-Arian, such as an American civil liberty leader, a professor, a Berkeley graduate and many more. They all came to show support and to se nd President Gens haft a positive message. . .Firing Dr. Al-Arian would be labeled as discrimina tion. Dr. Al-Arian is an innocent man who has no links to any terrori st acts or organization. He has been teaching me for the past seven years and has be en one of my biggest role models. I dont think anyone would be able to fi ll the shoes of such a great person (Diana Mitwalli, USF Student, Editorial, The Oracle Jan. 16, 2002). There was more disruption, and he violat ed the collective bargaining agreement [which states that an employees activities which fall outside the scope of employment shall constitute misconduct only if such activi ties adversely affect the legitimate interests of the university or board] (Judy Genshaft, qtd. in SG Senate Supports Genshaft, The Oracle Jan. 16, 2002). Im more concerned with possibly having a future faculty position and what you can and cannot say (Gigi Brathwaite, Applied An thropology Graduate Student who voted not to fire Al-Arian for career r easons, qtd. in A Reputation to Uphold, The Oracle Jan. 31, 2002). [ Genshafts intent to fire Al-Arian] sugge sts controversy is not wanted at the University of South Florida. . The Board of Trustees has said they will stand by President Genshafts decision. I will only believe that if the presidents decision goes against them (Susan Greenbaum, qtd. in A Reputation to Uphold). 375

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I care about my own reputation, and I have to make my own decisions. There arent any gains for me in this. Im not a rubber stamp for the board (Judy L. Genshaft, qtd. in A Reputation to Uphold). Al-Arian used his office to do ICP bus iness on at least one occasion. . Fortunately, Steven Emerson is there to provide documentation and explanation. More than any other source, his Amer ican Jihad accurately and courageously informs the government and people of the Unites States in detail t hat their enemy in the war on terror resides not just in the caves of Afghanistan but also in their very midst, even at their leading universities (Daniel Pipes, Fe b. 4, 2002, The Terror Aiding Prof, New York Post ). Time magazine questioned whether, after Al-A rians firing, any professor would feel safe to speak his or her mind. An article in The Chronicle of Higher Education is titled Blaming the Victim? Al-Arian obvi ously has been successful in making himself seem the victim. But the fi ring is not about censoring unpopular views. . .The image of Al-Arian as an i nnocent academic reluctantly thrust into the spotlight is simply false. This is a man who pursued his cause with a single-minded zealotry that endangered and discredited USF. For years nothing was done. Now, thanks to Genshaft, Al-A rian is finally facing consequences (Editorial, The Tampa Tribune, Feb. 7, 2002). Fourth, America was founded on dissent and when all of sudden you justify the elimination of dissent by fir ing a professor because of his political opinions, then have we compromised our freedoms? Tenure was established for that very purpose: the maintenance and perpetuation of freedom, not for its dissolution (Publicus Americanus Anonimus, University, qtd. in Colloquy, The Chronicle of Higher Education 11:40am EST, Feb. 8, 2002). We all sign contracts that prohibit us from committing acts detrimental to the college. I submit that any academician who espouses a belief summarized by so volatile a statement as Death to_________( fill in the blank with ANYTHING)! has breached that agreement. Those extremis t, anti-intellectual statements can only reflect badly on the institution. . Academi c freedom was established to allow for dissent between intellectuals, not fo r the propagation of hatred by people temperamentally estranged from the civility and decorum of the dispassionate search for the truth, meaning and value promoted in higher education (Alan Punches, ADS Director, Virginia Intermont Co llege, qtd. in Colloquy, 1:10pm). I just have to question the appropriateness of the very discussi on of this topic including the live colloq uy. This is a personnel matter that is best settled in a private forum between the university and the indivi dual involved. Im not sure what purpose is served by trying this matter in the c ourt of public opinion. I dont see any benefit for either the people involved or high er education as a whole in doing this (Karl Bridges, Associate Professor, University of Vermont, qtd. in Colloquy, 1:45pm). 376

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Professor Al-Arian is simply abusing the te nets of academic freedom to justify his use of a college campus to support a radical and despicable middle-east [sic] group. It only serves to demean the importance of academic freedom when someone uses it for personal gain (Molly Mefume, Scholar-in-Residence, Evergreen State College, 3:08pm). As mentioned in the article, I resigned as a faculty administrator at USF because of the letter of intent sent to Dr. Al-Arian. . .This issue has nothing to do with whether one supports or detests Al-Ari ans political views, as I think my commentary explains. Unfortunately, other faculty and USF employees feel the same as the faculty member who was afraid to be named in this forum, as many have told me privately. And their fears are justified (Elizabeth Bird, Professor of Anthropology, qtd. in Colloquy, 4:00pm). This has major national ramifications. Im a little disgusted that this could happen. Ive been here 26 years, and we have made this a highly respected university. We recently became a level-one research universityone of only three publics in Florida. In that environment, do you want to deny academic freedom, deny tenure? (Harry Vanden, Professor of Political Science, qtd. in Blaming the Victim? The Chronicle of Higher Education Feb. 8, 2002). Absolutely not [is Al-Arian a terrorist]. Ive heard Sami speak in my church. He talked about how [September 11] is wrong and an evil act (Harry Vanden, qtd. in Blaming the Victim?). I dont believe this is a case of academic freedom. A person has academic freedom to go into his classroom and discuss issues that may be difficultfreedom to teach unpopular things. But after 9/11, hate speech of the kind he set forth is like screaming Fire! in a theater. . .I assume that most of the threats are from kooks or crazies. But if a crazy kills you, youre still dead (Sara Mandell, Professor of Religious Studies and former President of the USF Faculty Union, qtd. in Blaming the Victim?). The reasons muddy the line between what is and isnt acceptable conduct. If were going to fire someone for disruption, then any faculty member who is a primary cause of disruption must be fired, or youre being arbitrary and capricious. . .Mr. al-Arian has not made statements like this in a number of years. To the best of my knowledge, hes what I would consider slightly cons ervative. He believes the Palestinians are oppressed. Guess what? So do I (Gregory Paveza, Professor of Social Work and current Faculty Senate President, qtd. in Blaming the Victim?) There was never any explanation of why it was an emergency. They wanted to do it when there as few people around as possible. I think they very underestimated the reaction of the students and faculty to such a move (Nancy Jane Tyson, Professor of English and former Faculty Senate Pres ident, qtd. in Blaming the Victim?). 377

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Its not about what he says. Its about what hes doing to this university. And he doesnt seem to care (Dick Beard, Chairman of the USF Board of Trustees, qtd. in Blaming the Victim?). I was there and saw the process. The board treated the faculty with contempt (Elizabeth Bird, qtd. in Blaming the Victim?). The charges are a trumped-up pretext, bec ause the real charges are illegal. The fundamental lesson is that local boards of trustees are more susceptible to local political pressure (Roy Weatherford, qtd. in Blaming the Victim?). Does Roy Weatherford really mean to suggest that the City of Intellection will be leveled unless he and his colleagues can s it down in the cafete ria with a man who raises money for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad? Is the de sirability of murdering Jewish people the sort of idea university tenure is designed to protect? (David Tell, Editorial, The Weekly Standard Feb. 11, 2002). The argument of tenure is fat uous; it is clear that Dr. Al-Arian has used USF for his own means without deference to the cost of his actions upon the university, students, faculty or community (Carol A. Roth, Member of Community Resource Counsel of the Tampa JCC Federation, Editorial, The Oracle Feb. 21, 2002). There is no evidence. There was no evi dence before 9-11, and there isnt any evidence now. I assure you, if they had evidence to indict Al-Arian as a terrorist, it would have been done. . Its a propaganda campaign. Some facts are right; some are in error. For Judy Genshaft to basically bend to the winds of hysteria is wrong. Im not defending Al-Arian. Im defending a principle (Vincent Cannistraro, Former Counterterrorism Officer in Afghanistan, Reagan Administration, qtd. in The AlArian Argument, The St. Petersburg Times Mar.3, 2002). This is a unique caseU-N-I-Q-U-Ean extraordinary case. . [He should have been fired years ago because] he has been known to have ties with terrorists. Its been willful, organized, repeated (Judy Genshaft, qtd. in The Al-Arian Argument). Politics is far too involved in the governance of higher education in Florida. The governor has failed to take seriously the will of the electorate, and our individual institutions are being increa singly managed by boards that reflect political ideologies rather than educational missions (Merle F. Allshouse, Di rector of Academy of Senior Professionals at Eckerd College, 1994-2003, Mar.18-25, 2003). Everything thats going on he re right now has to do with politics, power, control, money, and ego. There is nothing that has anything to do with a humanitarian interest (Reverend Nina Burwell, Member of Gulf Coast Coalition for Peace and Justice, Mar.18-25, 2003). 378

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People are afraid to speak out today. . .W e knew the arrest would affect us for years (Sarah Mitwalli, USF Student, qtd. in USF After Al-Arian, The St. Petersburg Times April 17, 2005). We dont talk about [Al-Arians indictment] much. Its sad that so few people are sticking up for a guy whos innocent until proven guilty (Naveed Kamal, USF Student, qtd. in USF After Al-Arian). Weve never been a hotbed of anything (Roy Weatherford, USF Philosophy Professor and Union President, qtd. in USF After Al-Arian). The Committee only did a few things in join t sessions with WISE. . We were under attack by Jewish groups, Zionist groups, fo r giving Islamic scholars a platform. They felt by giving them a platform, we were being supportive. But arent academics supposed to delve into the issues? (Arthur Lowrie, USF Adjunct Professor, qtd. in USF After Al-Arian). Samis lies damaged the university and dest royed the good work being done by the committee (Arthur Lowrie, qtd. in USF After Al-Arian). Relations between the board of trustees the faculty and the administration hit bottom with the Star Chamber trial in whic h they fired Al-Arian without even hearing from him (Roy Weatherford, qtd. in USF After Al-Arian). Its getting harder to get a serious debat e going on the Iraq war, or Iran, or any Middle East topic (Michael Gibbons, USF Prof essor of Government and International Affairs, qtd. in USF After Al-Arian). There is a national environment of appreh ension and it is present on campus here, too. People are more reserved in expressing thei r views, especially if it is an Islamic point-of-view. . I am not a Muslim but if you were a Muslim and you had good sense, you would want to be careful being misinterpreted. And t hat does mean there is a loss in the quality of discussion on the campus (Jamil Jreisat, Professor of Public Administration, qtd. in USF After Al-Arian). Aside from governance change and tenure concerns, the presidential files of Borkowski and Castor show in their tota lity other areas of tension at USF as administrators, faculty, students, and exte rnal groups sought to shape university policy for accountability during the late 1980 s and early 1990s. In that respect, H.B. 2263 was but the most recent chapter in a mu ch longer history. Prior to H.B. 2263, for example, the files of Borkowski show th at all of Floridas pub lic universities had 379

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been directed by the Florida legislature and approved by Governor Lawton Chiles in 1991 to implement nine accountability measures New legislation led to the redress of USFs strategic plan under the aegis of five USF internal constituent bodies: the Accountability Task Force, the Undergra duate Council, the Graduate Council, the Research Council, and the Inst ructional Service Council. The strategic plan ratified by t hose councils implies that its raison d etre rested with the demands of mostly external constituents (legislators, parents, and students) who believed that colleges and universities do not know what they are doing, meaning that funding for higher e ducation had increased but no evidence existed that resources were used wisely. In their document, those councils quoted Peter Ewell, an expert in higher educati on who advocates that universities focus on specific areas of institutional importan ce and avoid, therefore, cosmic game playing. The latter term might best be restated as a call for humility in curriculum development, by examining what is and improving on that, as opposed to entertaining grandiose visions of a curriculum that should be At the time of USFs drafting of th e strategic plan in 1991, the nations twenty-third largest university held that its strength and qual ity were exemplified by several specific programs. Those program s were the University Honors Program, fine and performing arts, marine scien ce, psychology, Floridas only College of Public Health, and the Florid a Mental Health Institute. Despite decades of international matters related to Middle East affairs and previous calls to reshape curriculum acco rdingly (e.g., Browns answer to the 380

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Iran-Hostage Crisis, Global Awareness), programs in religion, government and Middle East studies were not lauded in the new plan. The f act is that in the early 1990s there was no Middle East studies program at USF. What did exist were a few courses about the Middle East taught in th e Government and International Affairs (GIA) department and also the Department of History. Reece-Smiths 1996 findings discuss some Committee on Middle East Studi es (COMES) members as stating that the only course on the Middle East taught at USF was a jointly conceived course by full-time professor Dr. Abdelwahab Hechic he and part-time professor Mr. Arthur Lowrie. However, USF did offer other courses a bout the Middle East. For example, the course evaluations of Dr. George H. Mayer, a former New College provost who became a USF history professor in 1979, show that he had taught a highly popular one on the Sarasota campus lauded by both young, progressive students and Sarasotas conservative, Jewish communit y. In addition, USFs then honors college, New College, would ask Hechiche from GIA to coordinate special lectures. In fact, an early event involved Hechiches invitati on of two renowned colleagues of cited elsewhere in this inquiry: the late Dr. Ed ward Said, Professor of Literature and proPalestinian activist from Columbia University, and the late Dr. Malcolm Kerr, Professor of Middle Eastern History and Politics from th e American University in Beruit, Lebanon, where he was assassinat ed by Islamic Jihad gunmen for having expressed Orientalist views (see Chapter Fours discussion on higher education in the Levant). Hechiche, a native of Tunisia with French-U.S citizenship was hired at 381

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USF in 1970 and is the only professor on cam pus with a doctorate in Middle East studies. The strategic plan under Presiden t Borkowski also provided impetus for the universitys continued interest in the USF-WISE partnership established in 1992, even though, according to Reece-Smith (1996) and various newspaper reports found in USFs media files, onand off-cam pus constituents already had begun voicing concerns that WISE might be a front gr oup for HAMAS. That was a concern stated by Dr. Ailon Shiloh, an original member of USFs Committee on Middle East Studies (COMES) from the Department of Anthr opology. Shiloh had speculated as much to another COMES member, Arthur Lowrie, a long-standing USF ad junct professor in Government and International Affairs (Fech ter, USF Professor Questioned Ties with Think Tank, 1996). As mentioned above, at the time of the partnership formation USF had no Middle East Studies program, per se although in the media constituents often referred to USFs teaching of Middle East affairs as a program or that the university maintained a Middle East Center. Factually, COMES members acknowledged the absence of such a program in their jus tification to pursue th e development of a Middle East studies program, and that the university held few courses on the subject (Reece-Smith, 1996). While COMES acknowledged what was (i.e., the absence of a program), the leading backers of the WISE partnership and relevant administrators interested in the bottom line (i.e., from where would the money come) were also hopeful about what could be (i.e., Peter Ewells cosmic vision), as media statements excerpted below suggest: 382

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The University of South Florida was going to become one of the countrys best 25 public colleges by the end of th is century. . To help reach that lofty status, the faculty members aligned themselves with a local think-tank in 1992. Now, that thinktank headed by a USF engineering professor, is being linked to Middle Eastern terrorist groups (Mark Kenyon, Reporter for The Tampa Tribune, Thinking Through Academic Freedom, 1995). Its money and glory (A.C. Higgins, Professor of So ciology at State University of New York, Albany, Specialist in universit y research ethics, qtd. in Kenyon, 1995). Universities are always hunting for show pieces. They are constantly searching for ways to say, Look at us. Look at how good we are (A.C. Higgins, qtd. in Kenyon, 1995). Schools are on the lookout for big names, pe ople with connections. They just buy these faculty members (A.C. Higgins, qtd. in Kenyon, 1995). At all colleges there is a drive for pr estige. Some schools do it better than others (Peter Smith, Spokesman for the Associat ion of American Universities, qtd. in Kenyon, 1995). Its extremely healthy. If you compete, youre going to find that strong programs survive. If a program is not attractive to students and employees, it will wither away and die (James Appleberry, President of the Association of American Colleges and Universities, qtd. in Kenyon, 1995). By aligning themselves with a university, think-tanks can legitimize themselves. The fact that they have university affiliation allows themselves to pass themselves off as being objective when they really are not [and] pass of shopworn rhetoric as research (Lawrence Soley, Marquette Univer sity Professor, Higher Education Professor who studies thi nk-tanks, qtd. in Kenyon, 1995). And so the strategic plans development of the Task Force on Future Academic Frontiers composed of senior, distingui shed faculty may have aided COMES grand expectation that its WISE partnership would evolve from th ink-tank status to the Southeastern United States only Middle East st udies program. The professors serving on COMES di d not or may not have known that virtually all of the board members of WISE were known in the intelligence 383

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community and in international academic pub lications to be founding members of the PIJ. Key faculty and administrators did know, however, that WISE was Saudi-funded through the IIIT (Reece-Smith, 1996). Saudi funding also happened to be part of a national trend. In the earl y 1990s, Saudi Arabian diplomats and their relations had begun funding othe r Middle East research cen ters within the U.S. (Baer, 2002). Among the more notable contribut ions were those made to the Middle East Studies program at The University of Arkansas, which received gifts from Saudi Prince Bandar to the tune of tens of millions of dollars in two lump sums after the election and inauguration of an Arkansas governor to the U.S. presidency (Baer, 2002). After Clintons election in 1993, the na tional competition to fund Middle East studies programs had become fiercer than ever. First perpetuated in Europe, Saudi gift -giving in higher ed ucation signified a growing trend in funding Middle East programs in the United States under the trend of reversing what the late Edward Said called Orientalist dogma(Kramer, 2001). In particular, funding by Jewish, Israeli, or U.S. American government interests were identified in unproven conspira torial terms (Kramer, 2001). In his history of changes in U.S. educations fast-rising area studies discipline, Kramer (2001) writes: Many failings could be laid at the door of Middle Eastern studies, but the most damning was their failure to expos e the weaknesses of Orientalism A lone and now forgotten rebuttal came from Malcolm Kerr, a polit ical scientist born to two American educators in the hospital of the American University at Beruit, trained at Princeton, and tenured at UCLA (p. 36). Kerr wrote that Saids book, which inspired a counterhegemony of gift-giving by an Arab foreign government, charged the entire tradition 384

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of European and American Oriental studi es with the sins of reductionism and caricature but in the process committed precisely the same error (qtd, in Kramer, 2001: p. 36). USFs change in mission from a university whose major focus was on teaching to one in which research and internationalization became its raison d etre apparently resulted in the institutions realignment of academic freedom and related policy. The change seemed necessary because an absence of policy had resulted in what some considered an unequal balance of power between administration and faculty. The record of policy changes rela ted to investigations of f aculty corruption in the 1980s adequately illustrates the tensions generated by USFs policy vacuums which apparently led to ambiguous formulations of the universitys academic ethic, creating tensions between faculty and administration. During the period in which USF had redressed its strategic plan for accountability, university memos revealed th at the relatively young institution was in the throes of another kind of conflict that led to the drafting of hitherto unwritten policy for procedures to investigate faculty for non-criminal malfeasance, misfeasance, or other misconduct. Ostensibly, those terms include investigations covering charges that faculty have abused the responsibil ities of their professional appointments. This new policy directiv e was led by the Faculty Senate Executive Committee (FSEC) and is instrumental, like the 1991 strategic plan, in gauging what kinds of issues the faculty consider important as part of their pr ofessional ethics and affairs. Hence, the first paragraph of the FSCEs 1991 policy statement reads as follows: 385

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The fundamental character of the academic enterprise should set the context of administrative decision making. Thus, the values of the academic environmentvalues that encourage fr ee speech, self dire ction, independence of thought and action, indi vidual responsibility, colle giality, and the highest standards of ethical behaviorshould gui de the determination of methods of investigation and documentation that wi ll be employed in the resolution of situations involving non-criminal ma lfeasance, misfeasance, or other misconduct of employees in the performance of their duties. Moreover, the policy statement further iterates: Every effort is made to investigate a nd document the situatio n in a reasonable, straightforward, collegial, and ethical ma nner consonant with the values of the academic community. It is the policy of the University that the methods of investigation utilized in non-criminal s ituations will not include investigative surveillance. The latter point was written in response to an investigation of a USF faculty member that had begun in 1988. Tacitly noting the anarchy of Birnbaums (1978) organizational anarchy, the FSCE observed th at the surveillance of a faculty member was a product of that sort of institu tional dissonance. Softly chastising the administration for past actions, the Faculty Senate allowed nonetheless in an eloquent letter written by then Senate Speaker Phil Smith that we would like to be very clear that we have no tolerance for faculty or staff members who engage in malfeasance or misfeasance in the perfor mance of their duties. In light of aforementioned policy cha nges enacted under Borkowski and at the behest of the USF Faculty Senate, Castors widely publicized in action to investigate Al-Arian may have been a response to those changes. However, if that assumption is accurate, then Castor never cited specific USF policy in her statements, or was never quoted as having known about specific polic y. There is also no evidence in her archives that she was aware or not aware of policy for investigating faculty. What she 386

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did express was that the unive rsity should not be the arbi ter of good and evil. Therefore, although Al-Arian had been accu sed of misappropriating his professional appointment to teach and research, the unive rsity would leave the matter to the U.S. government to decide. When the problem wa s investigated by the university, similar conclusions were drawn about not investigating faculty involved in criminal wrongdoing: the allegations were a criminal matte r outside the scope of the university and not as an administrative matter within the universitys range of concern (ReeceSmith, 1996). Condition Two: Epistemological Devel opments in Higher Education Giving Rise to De-Westernizing Intellectual Tr ends Affecting an Internationalizing USF Community A Middle Eastern outgrowth of the multiculturalism movement in education, a trend toward dialogue originated in European universi ties in the 1960s, thus laying the intellectual foundations for the two-tie red rights standards, justification of terrorism and self-incriminatory anti-W estern discourse among Western academics (Yeor, 1998, 2004, 2005). A similar trend appear s to have emerged in the wake of USFs mission change, also contributing to th e rationale for the partnership with AlArians think-tank WISE, supported by the In ternational Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT). Such epistemological changes in hi gher education co ntribute to the view that USFs curriculum could be manipulated for purposes of re-Islamization from below. Recall that Blumer (1946/1951/1963) refers to these developments as shift[s] in mood or impulse by mass social movements. 387

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The process of subverting European culture through educati on with dialogue signifies a form of re-Islamization of so ciety and knowledge from below, as AlFaruqi advocated through the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT (see IIIT educational theory and strategy explicated in Chapter Four). The theory bears close approximation to that which was codified by the reformulated Muslim Brotherhood beginning in the late 1960s, when Sayid Qu tbs collection of writings were smuggled from prison and disseminated in Zaynab Al-Ghazalis teach-ins for Egypts newest generation of university stude nts. The new vanguard Muslim s in Egypts universities came to support the doctrine of concealed advance, part of Qutbs call for zalzalah a kind of revolution or shaking of a society that occurs specifically through education (Kepel, 1984/2004). Original documents like the Muslim Brotherhood Project (1982) and the Akram Document (1992) reveal the transnational organizational organizations strategic plans to mollify the North American mind through informational warfare waged in the continents universities. These documents support the IIIT educatio nal theory. The consistency in su ch social preparation is not surprising, given that the IIIT is one of sc ores of undisputed front organizations for the Muslim Brotherhood currently operating in North America. Yeor (2004) writes of the drama tic diplomatic codification of zalzalahs corollary, the Euro-Arab Dialogue, that this deliberate, comprehensive process has taken place through several means: the contro l of Middle Eastern Studies departments at European universities, and the re-writi ng of historical textbooks; allowing EuroArab bodies to screen cultural exchanges and publications relating to Islam and the Arab world for unwelcome content; taboos imposed on issues related to immigration 388

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and Islam; disinformation campaigns de monizing Israel (and America), while fostering a comprehensive and brotherly alliance between EU and Arab League countries on the political, cultural, and social levels; and the servile obedience of the EUs mainstream media to al l these initiatives (p. 2). Dialogue enjoins the soft, referentia l terms of Islamic resurgence and revivalism in d rigueur Middle East studies di scourse. As a matter of epistemological coincidence, those same te rms also find their way into the Sami AlArians magazine Inquiry and its disclosure of conference proceedings by the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS), an IIIT affiliate discussed in the previous chapter, and the Islamic Committee for Palestine (ICP), which was part of the chain of front groups that Al-Arian us ed in his confessed conspiracy to commit terrorism. Moreover, what Yeor (2005) calls the dialogue industry also coincided with Saudi Arabian funding of Middle East programs. As has been reported ad infinitum in the press after the September 11 attacks on U.S. institutions, the Saudis were also responsible for funding a significant majority of mosques in the U.S., largely through the ISNAs financial holding company, the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT). According to Hillsborough County quitclaim deed records for property ownership, the mosque Sami Al-Arian founded, The Islamic Community of Tampa Bay, also called the Al-Qassam Mosque, was deeded to the NAIT in the late 1980s. During the partnership negotiations with WISE, USF would be inform ed that the organization primarily responsible for funding the USF-WISE partnership was Al-Faruqis brainchild, the Intern ational Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), which received most 389

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of its funding from Saudi Arabian sources (Reece-Smith, 1996). And so it appears that subsidizing Middle East programs in U.S. universities represented Saudi Arabias other major endeavor in the re-Islami zation of America, which always has represented the Shining City on the Hill for all religious people to reinvent according to their own cosmic visions. The specifics of the IIITs role in fostering the dialogue movement in North America and at USF warrant further explic ation for the purpose of appreciating why USF became the object of so much public animus in the months after Emersons 1994 exposure of Al-Arians fundraising activities for violent action in the Middle East. This is a salient aspect of the USF case that no one until now has investigated. As shown below, the matter evolved into an atte mpt to foster a hidden curriculum at USF as it held high hopes to create a majo r Middle East studies program in the southeastern United States. Along with funding for re-Islamization of American education came intellectual pedigree resting primarily with Al-Faruqi s scholarship and later his influence on American Middle East studies scholarship. Al -Faruqi is considered to be the founding father of North Americas dialogue move ment (Yeor, 2005). Murdered in his own home, along with his wife, in 1986, Al-Faruqi was the Temple University professor lauded by his former student, Esposito, who in the early 1990s was hired to teach at USF until faculty objected to the salary he was offered. Al-Faruqi anchors Christianity in an explicitly anti-Jewish context that denies Jesus Jewish heritage, replacing that he ritage with an Arab one in which Islam becomes the primal religion of humanity (Yeor, 2005: p. 221). Such ahistorical 390

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revision opposes traditional Western exeg esis of Jesus lineage from the Old Testament, which Al-Faruqi calls Jewish ethnocentrism (qtd. in Yeor, 2005: 221). That revision explains how North Ameri ca, where Muslims are neither indigenous people nor a majority people, can entertain a goal to re-Islamize as opposed to simply Islamize. Al-Faruqis ideas find partial basis in the Koran, which teaches that all people are born as true Muslims. From a traditio nal academic view or from Ibn Khalduns view, that belief is a matter of Islamic faith and not a fact of history. Historically, there is no evidence of Islam or Muslims prior to about 650 A.D., when Muhammads revelations were thought to have been colle cted in the Koran (Trifkovic, 2002). Not all Muslims, however, subscribe to the view that all people are born Muslims. For example, Sufis practice a more flexible doctrine which holds that Jews can be Muslims and Muslims can be Jews. Many Sunni Arab Muslims, however, accept a more literal reading of the Koran. Given that the United States is experien cing similar problems in its educational institutions and in its civil serv ice sectors, Yeor (2004) states: Americans should know that this self-des tructive calamity di d not just happen, rather it was the result of deliberate policies, executed and monitored by ostensibly responsible people. Fina lly, Americans should understand that Eurabias contemporary anti-Zionism and anti-Americanism are the spiritual heirs of 1930s Nazism and anti-Semitism, triumphally resurgent. (p. 3). According to this revisionist theolo gy expressed through dialogue, Islam always existed, even before Muhammad, but it had been obscured by the Judeo-Christian tradition. Jews and Chri stians are therefore Muslims who have strayed from the primordial Islamic faith. Hence, even in the United States, whose 391

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tradition is rooted in Judeo-Christian hist ory and where Muslim immigration is for the most part a recent development, education curricula require re-Islamization, not Islamization. Thus the program denies history. In turn, the university transforms into a pr ime territory for conquest in the Islamic battlespace, the dar al-harb In that respect, the new scholarship that became popular in European and American centers for so-called Muslim-C hristian Relations, Understanding, or Dialogue has become a theological avenue in which to deny Jews their traditional Israelite heritage. That denial of history, rooted in Palestinia n replacement theology, is a point which underscores the overall epistemological conflict noted by Kramer (2001) and other critics (e.g., Pi pes, Lewis, Tibi) of the c ondition of Middle East and Islamic studies in the international academy. Saad-Ghorayeb (2002) draws similar conclusions about the replacement theology of Hizbullah, a Lebanese terrori st group which, like Islamic Jihad, holds innumerable ties to Iran. Hizbullah, like its radical Palestinian counterparts, HAMAS and PIJ, embraces a theological concept th at the alleged Jewish cabal began when rabbis allegedly deviated from Moses reve lations. Anchoring its theology of Jewish conspiracy in Koranic text, Hizbullah claims that Jews, who are inherently depraved and full of conspiratorial predilection (p. 182), corrupted their adherents by failing to adhere to the Torah, which foretold the coming of Jesus and Mohammad (p. 183). Logically flowing out of this argument, then, is that Jews who do not convert to Islam are Muslim apostates, for the true in terpretation of the Tora h is to be found in the Koran, which shows that Moses was a Muslim prophet, and not a Jewish one. 392

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From that, therefore, logically flows further theological justif ication for condemning to death those Jews who do not submit to Islam. In the pages of Al-Arians Inquiry explicated further below, the distinction is posited in terms of Zionist Jews and non-Zionist Jews. With the exception of Yeor (2005), critics have seldom looked to Al-Faruqis early influence in epistemol ogical changes in Middle East and Islamic studies. The usual focus, as articulated in Chapter One, is instead on the intellectual influence of Said and also Esposito, both of whom make mention of their Christian backgrounds in their perennial championing of the Islamist movement. Said and Esposito are also in a class of scholars whose views dominate Middle East studies (Kramer, 2001). They, too, in the interest of promoting dialogue, employ softer terms like Islamic Revivalism or Isl amic Resurgence in their discussion of Islamist movements or societies. Ot her scholars such as Walid Phares (2004, 2007), who teaches at Florida Atlantic Univ ersity, claim that the scholarship of dialogue is really an academic jihad. In The War of Ideas (2007), Phares states, I have observed with amazement American stude nts stripped of their basic rights to be educated accurately about the main geopol itical and ideological threats to their homeland. Instead of using classroom time to profoundly analyze the rise of what would become Al-Qaeda or the Khomeini regi mes long-term strategies, we professors had to clean up the diseducating pro cess that blurred the whole vision of a generation (p.161). Revivalism and resurgence notwithst anding, other tropes in the Islamist educational lexicon are dialogue and unde rstanding. Yeor (2004) refers to this 393

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lexicon, having found a semblance of scholarly respectability in academia, as the dialogue industry (p. 2). Co mmensurate with that indus try is an assumption that those who were best qualified to teach about the Middle East and Islamic things were devout Muslims (Lewis, 1993). In one se nse, that assumption signifies a contemporary manifestation of a pre-modern trad ition in Islam, adab which holds that only Muslims may study Muslims and Mu slim things (Duran & Hechiche, 2002). In their media commentary about the USF-WI SE case, some professors at USF stated that they had supported WISE because WISE scholars were devout Muslims, such that their high degree of faith may have been major criterion for claiming scholarly legitimacy (Lowrie, 1995). The meanings of the tropes of re-Islami zation are rarely defined by their users. Taken at face value, the terms convey a semblance of neutrality. In addition, the terms are so ambiguous that they arouse no objection, for who in a Western university in a civilized society would object to the n eed to have dialogue or understanding with a religious or cultural group he or she knew little about? Why wouldnt a major university in the Southeast want to broade n its international horizons for the purpose of civilizational dialogue? Surely objectives like these were consistent with USFs new strategic plan. Local press excerpts show that several leading participants in the defense of the USF-WISE partnership were prone to using those tropes of reIslamization to defend the reputabil ity of the USF-WISE mission: WISE is a research institution. We believe in dialogue and understanding between Muslim and Western scholars (Sami Al-Arian, qtd. in Jih ad Link Stuns University, 1994). 394

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I am a seriously religious person, never extreme. My concern for understanding is one of my top priorities. We s ought to initiate real dialogue (Sami Al-Arian, qtd. in Al-Arian Rebuffs Allegations, 1995). Hasan Turabi is one of the worlds leadi ng authorities on Islamic law, a graduate of Oxford and the Sorbonne and a former attorney general and foreign minister of the Sudan. . Rashid Ghannoushi is one of the most prominent intellectuals of the modern Islamic movements and the leade r of the banned An-Nahda (Renaissance) Party in Tunisia. . We believe American scholars should have the opportunity to debate with Ghannoushi, no matter what his views. . Consistent with that ethos, the Royal Institute of International Affiairs of London invited Ghannoushi to deliver a lecture on May 9, 1995. . Therefore, well con tinue to foster dial ogue at USF that will facilitate the elimination of violence toward political ends (Mark T. Orr, Jamil Jreisat, James Strange, Tamara Sonn, Arthur Lowrie, Sam Fustukjian, Robert Brinkman, Guest Column of some COMES professors at USF, The Tampa Tribune, Academic Inquiry Justifies Invi ting Controversial Speakers, 1995). Our joint objective in these activities was to enhance community understanding of Islam and to counter the stereotype of the Muslim as a f anatic, violent, anti-democratic and anti-Western (Arthur Lowrie, Guest Column, 1995, Finding the Hidden Agenda). WISE, with a well-stated commitment to erad icate Americans ignorance of Islam, is one of the few links USF has with Tam pa Bays large Moslem community. It has facilitated greater Western understanding of Moslems and Islam, and appreciation of values and interests by Moslems. . That should be easy in this global village in which the United States is the sole economic and military superpower (Mark August, Editorial in The Tampa Tribune, Keep Islam Debate Alive on Campus, 1995). [COMES] chair Mark Orr recalls that Shil oh was interested mainly in where WISE got its moneyan interest th e committee shared. After WISE officials said most of their support came from an establishe d Islamic organization in Washington, the committee was satisfied, and Sh iloh participated in WISE events, Orr and Lowrie said (James Harper, Mideast Intr igues Play Out at USF, 1996). The decision by USF to suspend its agreem ent with WISE has been made in haste. WISE, which may have needed financial aid and moral support from the local Muslim community in Tampa, must be faulted, noneth eless, for its close coordination with [ICP] for one single reason: ICP has a socio-political agenda. WISE has none. . It was certainly inappropriate for WISE to rely heavily, if this has been the case, on many people with similar socio-political agendas (Khalil Shikaki, Al-Najah University Professor and former USF-WISE Professor and University of Wisconsin Professor, Editorial, The Tampa Tribune 1995). 395

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It is striking that three of those eight are academic specialists on Middle East and Islamic subjects. Their arrests reveal to what extent Middle East studies is a field that serves as an extension of the regions r adicalism. Other defendants teach computer engineering, manage a medica l clinic, own a small busine ss, and serve as imam in a mosque. . All three alleged terrorists succ eeded in talking the academic talk, fooling nearly everyone. Shallah wrote in 1993, in hi s capacity as director of WISE, that the organizations long-term goal is to cont ribute to the understa nding of the regions Islamist trends, misleadingly labeled fundamentalist in Western and American academic circles. Almost any North American acade mic specialist on Islam could have written those same sneering and duplicitous words. Many do (Daniel Pipes, Terrorist Profs, Feb. 24, 2003, New York Post ). If the users of terms like dialogu e and understanding are not probed rigorously about their meani ng, there is a tendency to a ssume that dialogue and understanding equates to mutual respect and equality among people, religions, and nations. In light of other evidence presented in this inquiry, one finds it reasonable to assume that some users of those terms might have the IIITs Pax Islamica in mind, which enjoins a theology like th at of that of militant Islamist groups like Hezbollah, HAMAS, and the PIJ. Recall from Chapter Four that Pax Islamica in the book Islamization of the Disciplines placed on library shelve s near the time of the USF-WISE partnership formation, is a soci al condition in which a minority of devout Muslims imposes its version of Islamic law and customs on a majority people. According to the IIIT educational strategic plan depicted in Chapter Four, Pax Islamica starts in secular Western-style uni versities, where the minority group imposes its traditions on the universities a cademic disciplines, re-Islamizing society and knowledge from below. USFs strategic planning under Borkow ski coincided with the dialogue movement in that the plan called for USF to revitalize its traditional liberal arts courses toward multicultural dimensions such as values and ethics, international 396

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and environmental perspectives, race, ethnic ity, and gender. In addition, the plan called for initiatives to maintain sensitive concern for the educational, personal and social well-being of all students to enhance our sense of community. Moreover, internationalization and h ealth and human welfare were cited as among the most promising areas for renewed develo pment in the USF curriculum. Despite the support for dialogue in the early 1990s, critical appraisals of Islamist epistemology--the dialogue industry--were raised in the academy and at USF. For example, USFs presidential file s from the early to mid-1990s suggest that the administration had been apprised of de velopments regarding the epistemological tensions between traditional Judaic a nd non-traditional Islamist points-of-view brewing in the international academy, of which USF had reshaped its mission to become by achieving Research I status. A file labeled Jewish Affairs signifies attempts made by distinguished professor Dr. Jacob Neusner of USFs religious studies program to educate Presidents Bo rkowski and Castor about the condition of his discipline, Judaic studies. By the ear ly 1990s, experts in Judaic studies had recognized that their field of study had unde rgone an epistemological assault from within and out, some of it involving Islamist epistemologys tendency toward minimizing or denying the Holocaust and toward claiming that Jews were not true Israelites. On its face, this theological arguments closest comparison is that of Christian Identity theology, which also denies Jewish claims of Israelite heritage. In short, traditionalist experts in Judaic studies had take n notice of what Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) would call a s hift in mood or impulse in their professional 397

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field. It is precisely the sa me kind of shift noted by Kramer (2001) and Yeor (2005) in other area studies programs in American and European higher education. In their totality, Neusners corres pondence details on-going concerns of international scholars in the field, especi ally those in Europe who by the 1990s had experienced the intellectual backlash of th e EADs pro-Islamist pol icies. Those policies codified Euro-Arab diplomatic agreements fo r the revision of university curricula that would asymmetrically incorporate Islamist theology like Al-Faruqis into European religious and Middle East studies programs (Yeor, 2005). Here, it may be helpful to note that Neusner was the most published pr ofessor at USF before he returned to Brown University in 2006. His erudition and professional wisdom might have been the kind that no university admini stration would have wanted to ignore during a period of internationalization within the institution. According to correspondence in Borkowskis and Castors presidential files, the nations most formidable center for Judaic studies is at Brown University, a program that Neusne r himself shaped into before taking an appointment at USF. In September 1993, one year after the U SF-WISE partnership had formed and complaints of anti-Semitism at USF had surfaced, President Borkowskis office received from Neusner correspondence from a university rector in Sweden to Neusner in regard to a libel case i nvolving Radio Islam, a broadcasting station in Sweden. The libel case involved Radio Islams use of another one of Neusners colleagues statements about the Holocaust. Apparent ly, Dr. Jan Bergmans testimony was used and manipulated in court in order to suppor t the legally-held libelous views of Radio Islams broadcasting agent, Mr. Ahmed Rami. Radio Islam was another by-product of 398

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EAD broadcasting policy (Yeor, 2005). Bergma ns statements as they were aired in the court and in the media were evidently so offensive that Neusner condemned them, declaring that Bergmans statements maligne d Judaism as well as the State of Israel and the Jewish people through time and in our own day. However, the letter submitted to the U SF presidents office shows, in the end, that Neusner accepted Bergmans eventual apologies to Holocaust survivors who heard selections of [Bergmans] testimony a nd were injured by them. There is no indication in either Borkowsk is or in Castors presiden tial files on Jewish affairs whether either chief administrator called upon their inst itution to ask academic questions related to allegations of anti-S emitism at USF, and how they might compare to those addressed in Neusners correspondence. There is also no evidence in the files to confirm or deny whether Neusners submi ssion of these letters signified an attempt by the distinguished professor to educate either president about similar matters of Islamist epistemology as they might manifest in USFs curriculum. The correspondence Neusner submitted to the presidents office also reveals the values of an internationalized academic community that condemns racism in all forms. Written by the Rector of Uppsala University, Dr. Stig Stroholm, the letter is an exercise in how an administrator mi ght try to mediate conflict among faculty and within a particular discipline. Walker (1981), in an essay The President as the Ethical Leader of the Campus, states that the kind of mediation demonstrated by Stromholm is a university presidents most important function. The rect ors letter states that Professor Neusners own public involvement along with that of many others, in Europe, the State of Israel, and North America, is aimed at denying academic 399

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legitimacy to the racism that takes the form of anti-Semitism, anti-Judaism, Holocaust Revisionism, and the delegitmization of the right of the Jewish People to build and sustain the Jewish State, the State of Israel. In his final anal ysis, Stromholm praises Neusner for his efforts in reestablishing peace within his field of study--a peace signified by Neusners acceptance of an apology by Bergman--wherein there had been prior conflict. Stromholms letter would not be the only one that Neusner would submit to the presidents office. Another letter, penned by the presiden t of Wellesley College, Dr. Diana Chapman Walsh, is a work of censure against a Wellesley professor, Dr. Tony Martin, who published a book in 1993 entitled The Jewish Onslaught: Dispatches from the Wellesley Battlefront While Walsh defends the rights of faculty to self-express freely and without reprisal, she exercises he r own rights to academic freedom as an expression of independent conscience in th e letter by condemning Martins book for its application of racial and religious stereo type. We must speak out against the content of this particular book. It violates the basic principl es that nourish and sustain this college community and that enable us to achieve our educa tional goals: norms of civil discourse, standards of scholarly integrity, and aspirations for freedom and justice, Walsh states. Standards of reas on and logic demanded in academic discourse cannot be met through stereotyping and group ad hominem argument. Rhetoric of this kind undermines the force a nd critical exchange of ideas on which teaching and scholarship rest, she further asserts. Wals h had taken a decisive stand in defining the legitimate interests of the prestigious Wellesley College, the alma mater of U.S. Senator Hilary Rodham-Clinton. 400

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In addition to the letter from the pres ident of Wellesley College and the one from the rector from Uppsala Universit y, non-academic matters concerning Jewish affairs manifest themselves in USFs presidential files. Chief among those matters is the Jewish National Funds (JNF) interest in USF, which itself sponsored study abroad students in Israel and at a time when thei r safety in that country could not be guaranteed. The JNF, during the early 1990s, was urging USF to support Solidarity Missions to Israel in order to relocate Russian Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union on reclaimed land, a point of contention among the academys more vocal supporters of Palestinian rights and also on behalf of the first Intifada (Uprising) instigated almost exclusivel y by HAMAS and Islamic Jihad in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The concerns expressed in USFs Jewish Affairs and other presidential files bring us back to the topic of this inquir y, re-Islamization in hi gher education. As has been amply demonstrated in previous chapters and reiterated in this chapter, a critical subtext of that program is the romanticizi ng of Islamist discours e within the academy, often noted for its anti-Semitic biases, sense of conspiricism, and blurring of internationally recognized legal distinc tions between terrorism and freedom fighting. The Occidentalist view supplants a traditional Orien talist understanding of the Middle East. Scholarly judgments in the accused Orientalism also are couched in positivist terms and condemned for thei r alleged Western biases. Orientalisms alleged anti-Islamic biases also are presuppos ed in the educational theory and views of Al-Faruqi, his associated th ink-tanks, and among his intell ectual pedigree who teach the replacement theology of Palestinia nization, a sub-topic of re-Islamization, 401

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described in Yeors diplomatic-intellect ual-cultural history of the EAD in her historical analysis The Euro-Arab Axis (2005). In addition, efforts to de-Westerni ze knowledge and society take their justification under precepts of Critica l Theory, a neo-Freudian/neo-Marxist philosophical position supportive of the Occidentalist view. These d rigueur intellectual ferments in the academy are preci sely those that give rise to Yeors neologism academic dhimmitude defined in Chapter One. This epistemological rift in the academic disciplines circumscribes the conflicts noted in Neusners correspondence submissions to USFs administration, although there is no record of COMES ever having considered a possible need to delve into epistemological questions that circumscribe the USF-WISE curriculum. Reece-Smith, a former Interim USF Pres ident but himself not an academic, inquired about many important matters re garding USF-WISE but not about the partnerships epistemological undercurrents that by the early 1990s had caused major tensions in various fields like Middle East and religious studies. At best, Reece-Smith noted that there were some complaints a bout a lack of balance in the USF-WISE program to his 1996 report commissioned by President Betty Castor. He also mentioned that there had been unsubstantiated charges of anti-Semitism in the USFWISE curriculum which existed in the form of faculty bias about recognition of the state of Israel. Additionally, but less apparently, that same non-traditional epistemological view for civilizational dialogue and understanding that is, in part, the source of Neusners academic concerns, coincided w ith USFs strategic plans to revamp its 402

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traditional liberal arts curriculum al ong race, ethnicity, and gender lines. Confounding all those developments, too, re sts the overall condition of the university replete with ongoing efforts to fill policy vacuums that wax and wane in a rapid, expansionist, anarchic political culture of academic tribes and territories. Condition Three: Transnational Influ ence of Islamist Thought and its Esprit de Corps through Migration of Ikwhan Professors and Students to USF and its Service Area Community Documents found in USFs library in uni versity presidents files in Special Collections, along with Middle East scholarship about the history of the PIJ, show that Al-Arian and his associates in those organizations had international connections and experience with re-Islamization in highe r education before se tting their sights on USF. Some of that prior history was presented in th e previous chapter and is reiterated here. A salient s ubtext of their prior intern ational connections involves activity related to the Ikwhan movement, or Muslim Brotherhood. Also, as noted in the previous chapter, two USF-WISE visi ting scholars from the Sudan and Tunisia, Hassan Al-Turabi and Rashid Al-Ghannoushi, are lauded on the Muslim Brotherhood website as being Ikwhan graduates before establishing the Sudanese Liberation Front and the Islamic Tendency Movement. Formed after the Brotherhood had for a number of years re-Islamized Sudanese a nd Tunisian societies from below, those organizations fomented extreme forms of violence and terrorism in both countries, committed in the name of defending true Isla m. As widely reported in the media, Al-Turabi presently resides in the Sudan under house arrest a nd Al-Ghannoushi lives 403

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in exile in London, unable to return to T unisia having been convicted of seditious conspiracy in absentia Sami Al-Arian is the son of Palestinian refugees who first lived in Kuwait and then later left Kuwait for Egypt. While in Ku wait, Al-Arian was indoctrinated into the Muslim Brotherhood (Waller, 2003). Also, one media report indicates that Al-Arians father was a garment-maker in Cairo, affl uent enough to be able to give the young AlArian $10,000 to travel in the mid-1970s to the United States for graduate studies (Renford, 2002). With his fathers generous gift, Al-Arian arrived in the United States in 1975 with an Egyptian passport. Al-Arian first attended undergraduate sc hool in Illinois at Southern Illinois University and then moved to North Carolina before moving to Florida after being conferred a PhD in 1985 in computer engine ering. While in Raleigh, North Carolina, in the early 1980s, Al-Arian started a student prayer group, participated in demonstrations against the Israeli invasi on of Lebanon, and became active in several related Muslim-Arab organiza tions. All but one of thos e organizations he later advertised in his ICP journal, Inquiry Those organizations are the Muslim-Arab Youth Association (MAYA,), the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Islamic Association for Pale stine (IAP), and the Muslim Students Association (MSA) (Renford, 2002). Despite the aforementioned denials in the media, Al-Arians educational involvement with a transnational network of non-criminal and criminal networks run by highly educated elites in the Islamist move ment is too robust to be coincidental, a point Reece-Smith (1996) noted in his i nvestigative report to Betty Castor. For 404

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example, at USF Al-Arian became associated with other university professors in Florida who would find themselves under considerable public scrutiny after the September 11 attacks: Dr. Imam Mahgoub, Dr Khalid Hamza, Dr. Bassem Alhalabi, and Dr. Mustafa Abu Sway at Florida Atlant ic University (FAU). These professors all belong to the ISNA and some of its subgroups like the American Muslim Council (AMC) ( Central Florida Future 2003). The AMC is another group that is cited as undisputed fact in U.S.A. v. Holy Land Foundation (2007) as a political organ of the transnational Muslim Brothe rhood. At least one of the pr ofessors noted, Abu Sway was known to have ties to HAMAS, the terro rist organization w ith which Al-Arian had negotiated an organizational merger in order to keep the PIJ financially solvent (see U.S.A. v. Al-Arian, 2003). HAMAS is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, as is Al-Arians PIJ. Abu Sway was deported from the U.S. in 2005. Another Florida engineering professor, Hussam Jubara, a University of Central Florida (UCF) visiting professor, was mentored by Al-Arian at USF and served on the boards some of Al-Arians Tampa-based organizations, including WISE ( Central Florida Future 2003). Following Al-Arians arrest, Jubara was arrested during UCFs 2003 spring break for alleged falsificati on of immigration documents and participating in terrorist groups He also turned up in the international record as being a known HAMAS operat ive. While in Tampa studying for his engineering doctorate and working with Al-Arian at WISE, Jubara and Ramadan Shallah lived at the Pampas Place addr ess recently implicated in the 2007 USF student arrests. 405

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As stated in the previous chapter, Ha tina (2001) shows that while in Egypt Al-Arian had been part of Cairos st udent circles who received education and indoctrination during the Muslim Brother hoods reformulation in to the neo-Muslim Brotherhood. This was during a period of tim e when students were apt to translate the terms of Qutbs signposts into their most radicalized form replete with subtexts of terrorism (Kepel, 1983/2004). By the 1980s the PIJ would become one of several offshoots of the neo-Muslim Brother hood. Its Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) counterpart would absorb in the 1990s into the ranks of Al-Qaeda (Venzke & Ibrahim, 2003). Both major factions of the Islamic Ji had, PIJ and EIJ, became involved with Al-Qaeda. The connections between Al-Q aeda and the Islamic Jihad make the allegations against Al-Arian and USF-WISE even more compelling today than in 1994 when they first surfaced: Emerson (1994) had shown in a national PBS documentary that Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, Bin Ladens mentor and a known Muslim Brotherhood member, had lectured on Jih ad by the sword as a spiritual value incumbent on all true Muslims to kill Jews wherever they may be at Al-Arians ICP. According to Emerson (1994, 2002) and 2005 court testimony in Tampa, ICP used the same address as WISE, the think-tank that came to USF in 1992. The primary purpose of many of these Muslim scholars was to raise money for global jihad (Emerson, 1994, 2002). Indeed, Emerson referred to those appearing on Al-Arians ICP lecture circuit as an al l-star cast (1994). The researcher also learned by studying issues of Al-Arians magazine published in Tampa in the early 1990s during the USF-WISE partnership that the magazine featured full-page ads for 406

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charities shut down after the September 11 attacks. Two of those charities, Benevolence International and Mercy Founda tion were directly tied to Al-Qaeda fundraising toward the September 11 atta cks. Another one, the Somali Relief Fund, was advertised in Inquiry at a time when Al-Qaeda wa s in Somalia disrupting the U.S.-led humanitarian intervention. The ads for charities tied to Al-Qaeda in Al-Arians Tampa-based magazine would not be the former professors only connections to the Islamist movements most notorious militant group, Al-Qaeda, which partly consists of Ikwhan initiates. Another connection involves Mazen Al-Najjiar, Al-Arians brot her-in-law. Another more recent media report by an investigative journalist in North Carolina reveals that Al-Najjar had attended NCSA&T at th e same time as the captured Al-Qaeda operative, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad (Sperry, 2005), known as KSM in the 9/11 Commission Report (2004). Like Al-Arian, KSM was indoctrinated into the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait. According to that report, KSM masterminded the September 11 attacks. According to the me dia report from North Carolina, Al-Najjar and Muhammad were in a Muslim stude nts group together and were commonly referred to on campus as the mullahs (Sperry, 2005: p. 268). Al-Najjar was a teaching associate in mechanical engineer ing at NCSA&T in 1984 at the same time KSM was enrolled in the same program. However, Al-Najjars on-campus friends hip with KSM would not be the only historical connection between members of the WISE think-tank at USF and Al-Qaeda. Another member of the board of directors of WISE was Tarik Hamdi (aka, Tariq Abdulmelik Ismael Azami), who earned a masters degree in Islamic studies at 407

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the Hartford Seminarys Center for Islam a nd Muslim-Christian Relations in the early 1990s. The Hartford Seminary is also c ited on the thirty-two page IIIT brochure given to COMES prior to the partners hip formation between USF and WISE. Declassified government documents from 1998 show that Hamdi provided an AlQaeda operative in the Sudan with a satelli te phone, an action that violates AEDPA (1995) provisions for providing material s upport for terrorism (H orowitz, 2005). That phone allowed Osama Bin Laden to communicate with his followers for preparation of the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania ( 9/11 Commission Report 2004). At one time, Hamdi was also employed at IIIT. Hamdi also was a board member for Al-Arians mosque (Katz, 2003). In turn, the IIIT c onnections establishes another Muslim Brotherhood connection to Tampa Bay, for Katz (2003) illustrates in her book that the IIIT is an Ikwhan front. Questioned vigorously after the Sept ember 11 attacks by Bill OReilly, Al-Arian defended his relationship with Hamd i, who is reportedly on a terrorist watch list. Al-Arian states, He is not on any lis t. In fact, he has received security clearance by the FBI, and he is helping the authorities with their investigation (Al-Arian, 2001: para. 16, Freedom of Speech Still Important). So during Al-Sadats postappeasement period when the newly formed, professor/student-led Gamaat Islamiyyah (Islamic Groups) had formed along the Nile, Al-Arian moved to the United States. However, as stated in Chapter Four, his student counterparts, Al-Shiqa qi, Shallah, and Nafi remained in Egypt at least until finding themselves under government scru tiny after Al-Sadats assassination. According to Egyptian court documents cite d in Sivan (1992), Al -Shiqaqi and Nafi 408

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were briefly detained and questioned for thei r harboring of suspects in the conspiracy to assassinate the Egyptian president. Of interest here is that Ramadan Sha llahs curriculum vita found in Special Collections archives also places him in Ca iro at the time of Al-Sadats assassination, where Shallah served on the review board of an Ikwhan publication. The Cairo magazine Shallah was editing at the tim e of Al-Sadats a ssassination was soon banned by Mubaraks new government, who viewed it as a direct source of sedition (Kepel, 1984/2003). At that tim e Shallah was studying at The University of Zaqaziq, where the elder Al-Shiqaqi had acquired his medical degree. After Al-Sadats assassination, Al-Shiqa qi, Nafi, and Shalla h appear to have left Egypt for the Palestinian territories and the United Kingdom (Hatina, 2001). In those locales, Nafi and Al-Shiqaqi would commence transnational publishing activities on behalf of the PI J and the first Intifada of 1987. Shallahs vita indicates that he was working on a doctorate in econom ics at The University of Durham at the same time Nafi and Al-Shiqaqi were working on their tran snational publishing activities. These observations are suppor ted by Alexander (2002) who writes that most of the PIJ founding members were students who had been expelled from Egypt (p. 30). In a recent interview Sha llah discussed talks among the leaders of the various Palestinian terrorist groups. He stated in vague te rms that he could not attend the talks in Cairo because circumstances would not permit him (Shallah interview, 2003). 409

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Characteristics of Islamism at USF and its Service Area Community Characteristic One: External and Internal Organizational Networks Run by Highly Educated Elites Interacti ng with USF and its Service Area Community for Purposes of Re-Islamization from Above and Below A leader in the Islamist movement prior to his arrival in Tampa Bay, Al-Arian was hired at USF 1986 for a tenur e-track faculty position in computer science, during the universitys expansion toward internatio nalization. As this section demonstrates, Al-Arians hiring at USF co incided with a build-up in USFs service area of non-criminal and criminal organiza tions that would, over the course of a decade, interact more and more with the university as a means to protect Al-Arian and others from outside investigations as well as provide a semblance of legitimacy for the criminal enterprises established by Al-Arian and fellow Islamists at USF. The movement in Tampa Bay also consiste d of an effective propaganda campaign, excelling at controlling media discourse in order to shield the movements vanguard from internal dissension, as advocacy groups also interacting with internal constituents at the university coal esced in the Tampa Bay area. This advance also represents the below activity of an overall two-pronged strategy of the Islamist movement, re-Islamization from above and below. The Akram Document put forth as undisputed evidence in the Texas Holy Land Foundation trial refers to this kind of grassroots organizational activity as the wo rk of beehives to advance the goals of the mass movement. Analysis of thos e organizations, their highly educated leadership and their inte raction with USF through, inter alia para-professional associations and publishing organs enables understanding of the s ubstantial influence 410

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of Islamism at USF and its service co mmunityand how the university could be regarded as territory fo r Islamist conquest. The developmental course of the buildup of criminal and non-criminal front organizations at USF and in Tampa Bay is one familiar to Blumer (1946/1951/1963), Arendt (1948/1951/1966/1968/1976/1979/1994), and Walker (1979), both of whom have studied the appeal of higher edu cation to mass movements. The higher education milieu serves as cover, maki ng illegitimate causes appear legitimate. Arendt further states that these fronts or secret societies hiding in plain sight in which the leadership replicates itself on multip le boards of directors for a plethora of causes (e.g., legal, political, religious, educational, charit able) seek erosion of public confidence in existing institutions. This technique of duplication, perfected by the Nazis, Arendt writes, proved extremely fr uitful in the work of undermining actively existing institutions and in the decomposition of the status quo (p. 371). It appears to be a hallmark of Islamist political warfare. Yet, at the same time, the leaders of those societies adopt a st rategy of consistent lying to deceive the non-initiated external masses (p. 376). For Al-Arian, the lying that was disc losed in court testimony and confirmed by the Honorable James Moody in federal court centered on whether Al-Arian was an advocate of Muslim-Arab civil rights and peace or a purveyor of out-group hatred and terrorism. The belief that front organiza tions were advancing an ignoble cause at USF did not go unnoticed by USFs external and internal constituents. Indeed, that was the thesis of Emersons 1994 PBS doc umentary on the subject. For over a decade, local and national media elicited insights from Al-Arian and those who 411

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sought to shield him from threats to hi s cause and from expert academics and terrorism investigators know ledgeable about the role of front organizations in university settings. Commentary from those constituents is stated here: It is a false and totally f abricated charge that wer e talking about Muslims in general. These charges were made about terrorists, not about Islam (Steven Emerson, investigative journali st and terrorism expert, qt d. in Fechter, Tampa Group Sympathizes with Terrorists, 1995). I certainly would have offered them [USF in ternal constituents] a copy of the film. I would think that if they we re doing an investigation they w ould at least look at the allegations instead of just asking Sami (Steven Emerson, qtd. in Fechter, Tampa Group Sympathizes with Terrorists, 1995). He felt the [Emerson documentary] was a setup . taken out of context (Michael Kovac, qtd. in Fechter, Tampa Groups Sympathizes with Terrorists, 1995). WISE, with a well-stated commitment to erad icate Americans ignorance of Islam, is one of the few links USF has with Tam pa Bays large Moslem community. It has facilitated greater Western understanding of Moslems and Islam, and appreciation of values and interests by Moslems. . That should be easy in this global village in which the United States is the sole economic and military superpower (Mark August, Editorial in The Tampa Tribune, Keep Islam Debate Alive on Campus, 1995). What we have been witnessing is journalis tic terrorism. It is journalism without consciencean attempt to crea te a story through accusations of guilt by association. It is guerilla warfare journalism, where th e purpose is not to report the news but to create it. . The best Fechter can do is quote Israeli reporters and academics or U.S. Anti-Defamation League officials who have fears and suspicions (Darrell J. Fasching, Chairperson of USFs Religious St udies Department, Editorial Column in The St. Petersburg Times 1995). I was manipulated, exploited. Now I am more vigilant (Abdelwahab Hechciche, COMES member and Professor of Governme nt and International Affairs, qtd. in Fechter, I Was Manipulated, USF Profe ssor Says: He Resigns from Middle East Group, 1995). [Hechiche] said he was assured the comm ittee investigated the think-tanks backers before USF signed a contract to share resources and train students (Michael Fechter, I Was Manipulated, USF Professor Says, 1995). 412

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This affair concerns the parents of the st udents, the community and the state. It is an affair that concerns me as a member of the university I feel like Im guilty by association (Abdelwahab Hechiche, qtd. in Fechter, 1995). I have done nothing, nothing, zero, to endanger the national security of the United States or to endanger the life or rights of any of its citizens (Sami Al-Arian, qtd. in Professors Home, Office Searched, 1995). The only thing I have done is speak my mind . about an issue involving my homeland because I thought this is a count ry that values freedom of speech and different points of view (Sami Al-Arian, qtd. in Professors Home, Office Searched, 1995). Eventually, well know. Its not a great secret. Thats one of the reasons this is a great country. Things will be known. The truth will come out (Sami Al-Arian, qtd. in Professors Home, Office Searched, 1995). The United States provides civil libertie s, freedom, democracy, and within the United States is the best arena for these or ganizations to act in the academic world (Walid Phares, Professor and Middle East Terrorism Expert at Florida Atlantic University, qtd. in Bomb Scare, Terrori st Probe Jolt Florida University, 1996). The issue is not about academic freedom. Th e issue is about truth in advertising and academic honesty, and whether in fact WISE was appended to USF as a means of legitimizing radical fundamenta list extremists and their entry into the United States (Steven Emerson, qtd. in Tribune Seri es Debated at USF Forum, 1996). I checked with some of my sources. Th ey say [Ramadan Abdullah] is absolutely not the same person [as Ramadan Shallah] (unidentified part-tim e USF professor, qtd. in Dvir, 1995, The Disappearan ce of Professor Shallah). I would be very surprised if this was the same man (Louis Cantori, Professor of Islamic Studies at University of Mary land and Former Attendee of USF-WISE roundtable conferences, qtd. in E x-USf Prof Leads Jihad, 1995). I dont see any possibility that there are two Dr. Ramadan Abdullah Shallahs from Gaza, affiliated with the Is lamic Jihad, educated in Durham, England, and affiliated with a university in Fl orida. I know its him (Yigal Carmon, Former CounterTerrorism Advisor to Israel, qtd. in Ex-USF Prof Leads Jihad, 1995). Youre making an assumption that because so meone was elevated to the head of an organization that has a te rrorist element that he has terrorism on his mind (Harry Battson, USF Vice President of Public Re lations, qtd. in The Disappearance of Professor Shallah 1995). 413

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Under Dr. Shikakis leadership, the Islamic Jihad took responsibility for the attacks on the Marine barracks in Beruit, Lebanon, as we ll as many other attacks. This attack killed 242 U.S. Marines and 58 French paratroop ers. . Are we so stupidly nave that we think a man would be given leade rship of an organization and not reflect the organizations views? I hope the university administration looks ver y carefully at its Middle East studies depart ment in an effort to make sure its philosophy is educational and not political (Marlin Ginsburg, Huds on resident, Editorial, The St. Petersburg Times 1995). I had to bring photos to campus and show them to USF officials. Academic freedom had nothing to do with it (Michael Fechter, Tampa Tribune reporter, qtd. in Dvir, 1995). This was never a debate about academic freedom. It was, and remains, a sorry commentary on USFs sloppy commitment to due diligence with organizations attempting to do business with the school (Daniel Ruth, Editorial, The Tampa Tribune 1995). Everywhere in America, people who work hard can be in touch with the whole world. See, many people visit here from Europe and the Middle East. At the same time, Tampa is not Washingt on, D.C.; it is not New York. This is an atmosphere of anonymity (Abdelwahab Hechiche, qtd. in Niebuhr, 1995). The university messed up, and weve got to have procedures in place so that if its WISE or the Charlie Reed Foundation, y ou cant subvert the internal public processes that have to be in place to ensure accountability (Charles Reed, Florida State University System Chancellor, Boar d of Regents, qtd. in Fechter, Reed: Islamic Group Dealings in Error, 1995). I have no information that leads me to be lieve [that WISE] is staffed by anyone sympathetic to terrorism or an advocate of terrorism or a participant of terrorism. I think quite to the contrary. Theyre serious scholars who are concerned with peace in the area (Mark T. Orr, qtd. in ONeil, The Oracle Report Ignores Terrorism, 1995). The university is not in an investigative role in all spheres of society. We have a role to play in making sure our mission is carried out (Michael Kovac, qtd. in ONeil, Report Ignores Terrorism, 1995). [The university should address th e terrorism ties question] if in fact theres any link thats authoritative between USF and some terrorist activity. (Alan Stonecipher, Board of Regents Spokesperson, qtd. in ONeil, Report Ignores Terrorism). There is really nothing to worry about I havent done anything wrong. I havent done anything illegal (Sami Al-Arian, qtd. in Federal Agents Search Professors Home, Offices, 1995). 414

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Agents searched not only Al-Arians USF office but also his Tampa home and the office of [WISE]the think-tank wh ere Al-Arian and Shallah workedat5620 E. Fowler Avenue (Deborah ONeil, USF Oracle writer, Federal Agents Search Professors Home Offices, 1995). Computer science professor Peter Maurer said most faculty in the department dismissed earlier reports about Al-Arian as media exaggeration. (Deborah ONeill, Federal Agents Search Professors Home, Offices, 1995). Its a shock. Its a big difference betw een reading things in the newspaperwhich you may or may not believeand having them he re searching his office. Its a little harder to ignore (Peter Maurer, USF Computer Scie nce Professor, qtd. in Federal Agents Search Professors Home, Offices, 1995). The problem is that Shallah didnt come out of a vacuum. There are still two or three people working at the university who are still connected with the Islamic Jihad. We are asking the university for an investigation (Dan Berman, qtd. in Dvir, 1995). [Not only do they like universities for propaganda purposes, but campuses are a good] place where they can bl end in and recruit supporters (Stephen Sloan, Terrorism Expert at University of Oklahom a, qtd. in Foreign Scholars with Agenda Can Easily Seduce Colleges, 1995). Terrorist groups, Sloan said, exploit demo cratic societies, because they understand the rights granted by them. They get unwitting support from well-meaning defenders of free speech, assembly, and other forms of expression (Tim Collie, Foreign Scholars with Agenda Can Easily Seduce Colleges, 1995). In fact, history has been that the more extreme groups, even within the PLO, have drawn from the intellectuals, the sons and daughters of the intel ligentsia, the most prominent Palestinian families (Shibley Telhami, Director of Cornell Universitys Middle East Studies program, qtd. in Foreign Scholars with Agenda Can Easily Seduce Colleges, 1995). I was concerned that in this country we are not allowing some of the dissenting voices of Islam to be heard [so I lent my name to a journal Shallah edited] (Richard Bulliet, Director of Columbia Universitys Middle East Studies program, qtd. in Foreign Scholars with Agenda Ca n Easily Seduce Colleges, 1995). Bulliet visited Tampa in 1992 for a WISE conference featuring Sudanese extremist Hassan Turabi. He acknowledged that Isla mic Jihad has claimed credit for violent acts, but calling them a terrorist organi zation merely provides grist for snap judgments about very comp lex movements and politics (Tim Collie, Foreign Scholars with Agendas Can Easily Seduce Colleges, 1995). 415

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Abdullahs connections dont ma tter, Wilson said. Its danger ous to threaten the free speech of a professor or group just because their group or cause may be unpopular (Tim Collie, quoting John K. Wilson, of Teachers for a Democratic Culture, Foreign Scholars with Agenda Can Easily Seduce Colleges, 1995). Others contend that the issue is not free sp eech at all, but a universitys conception of its values and mission. Did USF have any business dabbling in Middle Eastern politics or affiliating itself with WISE, a group that shared leadership with a charity raising money for Islamic Jihad? (Tim Collie, Foreign Scholars with Agenda Can Easily Seduce Colleges, 1995). I dont want to criticize some of the individuals there. But if theyre regional experts on the Middle East, they may want to brush up on the subject of Islamic and international terrorism (Steven Emerson, qtd. in F oreign Scholars with Agenda Can Easily Seduce Colleges, 1995). I have worked closely with WISE for the past five years [1990-1995]and, in my opinion, there is no substance whatever to the Tribune allegations (Arthur Lowrie, June 5, 1995 letter to General J.H. Binford Peay III, Head of Central Command, MacDill, A.F.B., copied to Sami Al-Arian and Ramadan Abdullah, qtd. in Terrorist Leaders Email Revealing, 1995). Sami told me yesterday that a ll of his outside activities with ICP, conferences, travel, etc., was documented each year in his evalu ation folder and was in his tenure folder as well (Arthur Lowrie, June 2 letter to USFs Middle East committee, qtd. in Terrorist Leaders Email Revealing, 1995). Also among the computer articles was an attack on journalist Steven Emersons testimony before the U.S. Senate Judici ary Committee on May 27, in which Emerson outlined a network of terrorist support groups in America. . Lowrie forwarded the article written by the American Islamic Group, which describes itself as a non-profit organization aiming to expose threats against Islam (Cathy Cummins, Terrorist Leaders Email Revealing, 1995). What some of the WISE people were doi ng on their own, or may have been doing on their own, I have no idea (Arthur Lowrie, qtd. in T errorist Leaders Email Revealing, 1995). Lowrie sent Shallah a copy of a memo he had written to other members of USFs Committee for Middle East Studies. The committee was discussing how it might rebut the Tribune articles (James Harper, Email Tells Little of Ex-Professor, 1995). But the testimony is bracketed by co mments from the American Islamic Group, which says Emerson is among the vicious and vile dogs dressed in suits spreading lies against Islam so that Muslim s will give up their true religion (James Harper, Email Tells Little of Ex-Professor, 1995). 416

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Books on the U.S. Central Command [MacDill A.F.B.] mailed to Abdullah (Item cited on unsealed inventor y records of 1995 Tampa sear ch and seizure, qtd. in The Orlando Sun-Sentinel, Records: Terrorist Cell Operated at USF, 1996). We believe the Central Command books in Abdullahs home are not a coincidence. Ramadan Abdullah Shallah is an agent for Mi ddle East terrorist groups, and they have links to Iran (Anonymous federal agent for the USF case, qtd. in The Orlando Sun-Sentinel 1996). It sounds like a distortion of the facts (Robert Cannella, Attorney for Sami AlArian, qtd. in The Orlando Sun-Sentinel 1996). [The Tampa Tribune ] is acting like a pit-bull conspirator with the FBI against the Muslim minority and its constitutional rights (Pilar Saad, Editorial Column in The Oracle 1996). [William West and Barry Carmody of the INS found records] reflecting numerous calls between Al-Arians residence . and . phone numbers with known alien terrorist suspects . identified in the World Trade Center bombing investigation and who associates of the individuals who we re indicted and convicted in that case (William Wests affidavit for search warra nt for Al-Arians onand off-campus offices, qtd. in The Miami Herald 1996). These people represent a network of more than a half-dozen of the top terrorist organizations in the Middle East. They are pe ople who are at or near the top of the network. There are links here to Tunisia, to Egypt, to Iran, and to Syria (Walid Phares, Professor of International Affairs at Florida Atlantic University, qtd. in The Orlando Sun-Sentinel, 1996). Records seized in the inves tigation show frequent tele phone calls between Al-Arian and associates of several men convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. AlArian set up visas for Ramadan Abdullah Shal lah and Basheer Nafi, two Palestinians whom U.S. intelligence agencies regard as terrorists. They were hired as research associates at the think tank (E.A. Torrierro & Edna Negron, The Orlando SunSentinel 1996). Right now, this is the number one terroris m investigation in the world. This was a cell of international te rrorism operating under the nose of a university. (Steven Emerson, Independent Terrorism Inve stigator and Jour nalist, qtd. in The Orlando SunSentinel 1996). [Messages sent by Khalil Shiqaqi to hi s brother Fathi al-Shiqaqi by Ramadan Shallah] show Shallah was known to have a ccess to the Jihad leade r. At least two letters seized in the documents ask him to contact Shiqaqi (Michael Fechter, Records Reveal Terrorist Message, 1996). 417

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[Shiqaqi asks Shallah] to send messages to his brother Fathi without mentioning [Fathis] name: Is it po ssible to prepare that? (FBI Translater, qtd. in Fechter, 1996). [The voter registration was an] unfortunate, regretful incident [despite Al-Najjars advanced education] (Luis Coton, Al-Najjars immigrati on attorney, qtd. in Fechter, 1996, Researchers Visa Violations May Lead to Deportation). Mazen and I never lived together and never consummated the marriage (Jan Fairbetter, Al-Najjars first wife in No rth Carolina, qtd. in Fechter, 1996, Sham Marriage Used to Seek U.S. Residency). The documents released after Al-Najjars July hearing indicate WISE officials communicated with and collected information about terrorist leaders. In their search of WISE offices in November, federal officials found jihad communiqus and biographies of radicals such as Sudans Hasan Turabi, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, and Islamic Jihad spiritual leader Sheikh Abdel Aziz-Odeh (Michael Fechter, Records Reveal Terrorist Message, 1996). If you look at the secret evidence cases across the country theyre all against Arabs and Muslims (David Cole, Law Professor at Geor getown University and Consultant for Mazen Al-Najjars detention case, qtd. in The Politics of Immigration, 1997). They come in as students and then they don t leave. They go to one employer. They violate the rules of this country (Russ Bergeron, INS S pokesperson, qtd. in The Politics of Immigration, 1997). Its no doubt its political persecution (Sami Al-Arian, qtd. in The Politics of Immigration, 1997). They cant give up. This case is the clearest challenge to the Anti-Terrorism Act. I think it will end up in the Supreme Court (Kit Gage, National Lawyers Guild Representative and LA8 Attorney challe nging the McCarran-W alters Act during Communist immigration, qtd. in The Politics of Immigration, 1997). [The courts are no place to decide] who we are. Immigration should be subject to the political process, not the judicial pro cess. We should not ha ve courts taking away the power of the Legislature to say who can come in and who cant stay (David Stein, Head of Federation for American Immi gration Reform, qtd. in The Politics of Immigration, 1997). The only reasons he is in jail are his fa ith, Islam, and his nationality, they say. Theres just one problem. Thats not what happened. Omitted in this public sympathy campaign is documentation that Al-Najjar is not a random victim of overzealous investigators. He was ordered deported by a U.S. immigration judge based on 418

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standard immigration rules. In fact, Al-Na jjar could be freed quickly if he dropped an appeal of that order and agreed to leave the United States. It is American due process that grants him the right to appeal. While he does, federal officials continue a separate criminal investigati on that they think sh ows Al-Najjar is part of a terrorist front (Michael Fechter, Unidentified Tampa Tribune article, 1997). Everyone must be aware of whats going on. When Mazen gets out of prison, youll be the next to go in. There is an underlying bias in this country generated from (the United States) foreign policy and the media. I defy anyone here to find anything said about the Middle East where it is used with the word democracy. In this country the Middle East and democracy are natural enemies (Muhammad Al-Asi, Imam from Washington, D.C., previously featured in Emersons PBS documentary Jihad in America qtd. in Hundreds Support Pr isoners Release, 1997). What if (Ramadan Abdullah) Shallah worked for The Tampa Tribune ? Would every person who knew him be investigated? Would they be detained on secret evidence? (Arthur Lowrie, qtd. in Hundreds Support Prisoners Release, 1997). There are Christians, Native Americans, and African Americans here. I dont care who you are, everyone is entitled to basic rights. I could have kept my mouth shut and gone to a barbeque. But if I did that I w ould be forgetting the true meaning behind this holiday [July 4] (Ruben Max Griffin-Maya, Hillsborough Interfaith Clergy Association and USF Religious Studies Adj unct Professor, qtd. in Hundreds Support Prisoners Release, 1997). How sad, on Independence Day, that some are under tyranny (John Cooke, United Church of Christ member, qtd. in Rally for Ex-Teachers Release, 1997). How did we get here? A member of my spir itual family sits alone. Mazen, today my heart is imprisoned with you (Max Maya, qtd. in Hundred Rally for ExTeachers Release, 1997). Its sickening. He is one of the most decent people I know (Richard Preto-Rodas, USF Professor, qtd. in 00 Rally for Ex-Teachers Release, 1997). The university was manipulated by so me very devious groups and individuals (Norman Gross, President of Promoting Re sponsibility in Middl e East Reporting and former Desegregation Leader for Rochester Public Schools, qtd. in Rally for ExTeachers Release, 1997). This is a form of torture (Fedaa Al-Najjar, Mazen Al-N ajjars wife, qtd. in Critics Say Rights Lost in Terror Fight, 1997). Do you believe the Palestinian Is lamic Jihad is a terrorist group? (Jorge Perez, U.S. Justice Department Attorney to Loui s Cantori, Middle East Studies Professor 419

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from U.S. Naval Academy, AJISS Review Board Member, and Former USF-WISE Roundtable Attendee, qtd. in Critics Sa y Rights Lost in Terror Fight, 1997). One persons terrorist one day is the sa me persons prime minister the next day (Louis Cantori to U.S. Attorney Jorge Perez, qtd. in Critics Say Rights Lost in Terror Fight, 1997). Cantori says he was shocked when another WISE member, Shallah, turned up as a Jihad leader. So, how, Perez pres ses, could Cantori know that Mazen Al-Najjar is not a terrorist as well? (Susan Aschoff, St. Petersburg Times Critics Say Rights Lost in Terror Fight, 1997). You dont want to create law out of knee-je rk reactions, fearful reactions. But I dont think youre entitled to all the rights of a U.S. citizen because youve penetrated our borders (Harvey Kushner, Chairman of the Criminal Justice Department at Long Island University and Terrorism Expert, qt d. in Critics Say Ri ghts Lost in Terror Fight, 1997). People are always looking for someone to blame. . .When it comes to taking someones freedom, we have a Constitution and we have rules, and this is way over the line (David Pugh, Representative of the Center for Constitutional Rights, qtd. in Critics Says Rights Lost in Terror Fight, 1997). I would rather err on the side of safety. The abuses by the other sidethe Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, even the IRAhave been so great, we had to act (Harvey Kushner, qtd. in Critics Say Rights Lost in Terror Fight, 1997). Immigration and civil rights lawyers say the government already wielded a heavy club. For more than twenty years, INS has had the right to use clas sified evidence to imprison, to deny residency and to grant asylum (Susan Aschoff, St. Petersburg Times writer, Critics Say Rights Lo st in Terror Fight, 1997). He doesnt hurt a fly. Hes a community leader. It makes you paranoid that such a man could be arrested and jailed as a terrorist (Pilar Saad, former USF student and organizer for the Tampa Bay Coalition for Justice and Peace, formed to free AlNajjar, qtd. in Critics Say Right s Lost in Terror Fight, 1997). The problem is that (the current rules) . mean you have to wait until there is blood on the street before the bureau can act (Oliver Buck Revell, Retired Senior FBI official, qtd. in Critics Say Ri ghts Lost in Terror Fight, 1997). By September 1995, the crackdown on terrorism had become a campaign to make Islam the new Red Threat in America. We we re suffering anti-Islamic hysteria. The terror threat is real. We must not forget that. But while law enforcement agencies must have our support, they do not have carte blanche (Arthur Lowrie, qtd. in Critics Say Rights Lost in Terror Fight, 1997). 420

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Its un-American. Its like wer e in a Third World country that uses these despotic tactics [such as use of secret evidence to detain a non-immigrant with allegiance to a mother country] (Luis Coton, Al-Najji ars immigration atto rney, qtd. in Merzer, INS Holds Palestinian on Secret Evidence, 1998). The bottom line is, under our regula tions, were permitted to do this (Lemar Wooley, INS spokesman, qtd. in Merzer, 1998). It has been 487 days since Dr. Al-Najjar has not been charged with a crime and the classified evidence doesnt poi nt to any criminal activity (Statement of the Tampa Bay Coalition for Justice and Peace, qtd. in Fechter, Attorney to Oppose Use of Secret Evidence, 1998). As a native-born American, proud of Americ a, I am ashamed by the way we permit our immigrants to be treated (Richard Condon, Hillsborough Organization for Progress and Equality, qtd. in Fechter, 1998). Theres a key to open the door to Al-Najjar s release from federal custody, and its in its own pocket. . Theres a mountain of public material tying Al-Najjar to Islamic Jihad and some very nasty people. . Al-Najjar could get out of jail any time if he simply dropped his de portation appeal. . The U.S. government deports people all the time for reasons more mundane than be ing associated with fronts for violence and terrorism (Daniel Ruth, Editorial, The Tampa Tribune, 1998). Its the destruction of a career (Al-Arian, qtd. in Aschoff, USF Wants to Get AlArian Out of Limbo, in Class, March 14, 1998). After one and a half years, th ere appears to be insufficient information for federal authorities to take any action (Betty Castor, qtd. in Aschoff, 1998). What about the likelihood that Al-Arian may be, first and foremost, an international thug who has successfully infiltrated ma instream America via an extremely openminded and blindly accepting USF community? . how many more totally illintended individuals have already infiltrat ed the U.S. mainstream particularly through the open and accepting atmosphere on colleges and universities? Will they be forever protected from being exposed because of our asinine penchant for putting political correctness above all else? (Tom Berlinger, Tallah asse, Editorial, Feb. 25, 2003, The St. Petersburg Times ). The arrest of professor Sami Al-Arian conveniently comes a few days after nearly a million people inside this country and more than 11-million worldwide marched against the U.S. governments pl anned war against the Iraqi people. . Dr. Al-Arian is a political prisoner. He stood up for the truth (Penny Hess, Florida Alliance for Peace and Justice, St. Petersburg, Editorial, Feb. 25. 2003, The St. Petersburg Times ). 421

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Considering the vast sums of money that is purported to have passed through his hands, he shouldnt have any trouble paying for the best defense that money can buy (Shirley M. Day, Editorial, Feb. 25, 2003, The St. Petersburg Times ). The scariest thing in all of this may be those voices among us who admit to the possibility of the mans guilt but seek somehow to excuse it terms of some just cause that fueled his actions. . I have read the indictment, something I fear that far too few of us have done. It is thorough and it is damning, and if even a fraction of it is true, Al-Arian has been lying to us for years. Al-Arians supporters appear far more concerned with damage control than getting to the bottom of things. In Tampa Bay, as elsewhere, the Arab Muslim community appears to be in denial about the whole thing, casting blame everywhere but w ithin and lapping up Al-Arians absurd comparisons of himself to Jesus and Patrick Henry (Lance Goldberg, Weekly Planet film critic, Mar.19-25, 2003, qtd.in Deconstructing Sami). I work for the folks in international affair s at USF. I really respected the group of academics and students who wanted to study the Mid Eastbefore it blew up in our face. I want this scholarly study to continue. I never felt frightened by Sami AlArians presence on this campus I think that was created drama or fiction. There was no fear factor because of its presence here. Ive been more outraged and perplexed by the universitys behavior (Maura Barrios, Weekly Planet Best of the Bay Community Activist, 2000, Mar.18-25, 2003). I think that Ashcroft sort of co-opted this idea and praised the Patriot Act for letting (evidence) be collected and this case crea ted when, actually, most of the case against Al-Arian was done with the RICO Act. I see this as a marketing campaign for the Patriot Act: Scare people about Muslims and create consent to let peoples civil liberties be dissipated through the Patriot Act (Wayne Genthner, Citizen Activist, Congressional Candidate, and Sarasota Charterboa t Captain, Mar.18-25, 2003). The controversy affected the political communi ty before it really came to a head as a legal issue. You saw a lot of politicians gathering around Judy Genshaft, supporting her. Florida university boards of trustees are more political, on a local level, than they used to be. If politicians spoke out at all, they spoke in favor of suspension. I didnt see anybody in the mainstream political process, of any power, standing next to Al-Arian. . [The indictment vindic ated Judy Genshaft and the USF board. . Im sure some of his defense will be that hes a political prisoner. . One reading all of that would get the fu ll spectrum of beliefs: the Tribune hates Sam;, the Planet loves him; the Times hates USF. No one paper did it all (Wayne Garcia, Political Consultant, Tampa, Mar.18-25, 2003). I think hes guilty of being a Palestini an, of supporting his people, and maybe of saying at times things that were dangerous to say. If anything, I think hes guilty of that. I dont think hes a te rrorist. I had a professor at USF who was a Palestinian from Jordan. He was pretty angry. It doesn t mean he wants to blow something up (Linda F. Beekman, Sarajevo Project Founder, Clearwater, Mar.18-25. 2003). 422

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The indictment and arrest of Al-Arian had a serious impact on the political community that Im associated with. It addresses the questi on of self-determination of African people and other oppressed peoples around the world. I think Al-Arian has been indicted and arrested because of his alleged affilia tion with Palestinian selfdetermination. It has a chill ing effect. . In genera l I thought that the media conceded to the U.S. and Ashcroft the right to criminalize behavior in the struggle for national liberation (Omali Yeshitela, African Peoples Socialist Party, St. Petersburg, Mar.18-25, 2003). Many people have pleaded with me to remain silent. This is exactly what my critics want. Some think that there are powerfu l groups who are out to get me. My answer is simple. I believe in freedom of speech now more than ever (Sami AlArian, Guest Column, Oct. 8, 2001, The Oracle ). I dont recall ever using my office as a return address [for the ICP] (Sami Al-Arian, qtd. in Another Forum for Speech, The Oracle Jan. 7, 2002). With the commentary above in mind, we may now turn to more soberly stated evidence about who Al-Arian is and how th e Islamist mass movement of which he was a leader inspired him to build an extraordinary network of criminal and non-criminal front organizations in teracting with the university. As stated above, an important feature vita l to the build-up of front organizations in Tampa Bay and at USF was the courtship of the local media. Throughout the same time period as the USF-WISE partnership formation, Al-Arian had established a positive relationship with reporters from local newspapers. That relationship is evidenced in several 1991 newspaper reports contained in USFs Media Files. Those major feature stories published in The St. Petersburg Times and The Tampa Tribune quote Al-Arian on current events involving Muslims. His chief concern in those articles centers on Islamic defamation and st ereotyping in light of the Persian Gulf War and the Iranian fatwa against novelist Salman Rushdie, the latter being an event condemned by academics around the globe. 423

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Of course, Al-Arian would not be th e only Muslim professor at USF to be interviewed by the local press in these U SF media files, altho ugh content analysis shows that Al-Arians voice and image dominat es these early articles. In the articles, he has the first word and the last. A January 17, 1991, article in The Tampa Tribune found in USFs Media Files describes, for example, how Al-Arian, identified then as an assistant professor at USF, was questioned by FBI agents duri ng the mobilization period prior to the Persian Gulf War. The article was publishe d six months before a June 1991 meeting with Nafi, Shikaki, Al-Arian, and COMES me mbers. The article, entitled Questions Anger Arab Americans, states that two FB I agents visited Al-Arian at his home as part of the governments campaign to question Arab Americans about potential terrorist activities because Al-Arian was bor n in Kuwait. The reports states that AlArian was asked if he knew anyone who might pose a security threat to the United States. The report, publishe d three years prior to the 1994 Emerson documentary, further states, Al-Arian said he thinks the FBI singled him out because he has lectured around the country about the Pa lestinian issue. In 2004, local media reported that Al-Arian had been an informan t for the FBI, a point which if true may be related to his 1991 questioning before the Persian Gulf War. Another undated article about the Persian Gulf War but that appears to have been written soon after the month-long ev ents conclusion features Al-Arians commentary on the event. The two-column le ngth article begins with the editorial plea, But doesnt anyone care, they [Tam pa Bay Arabs] wonder, that thousands of Arabs were killed in the desert and the cities of Kuwait and Iraq? Identifying 424

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Al-Arian on four different occasions as a USF professor, the article quotes Al-Arian as saying, It would be difficult for me to understand why anyone would be proud of killing three hundred thousand peopl e. The article then continues on to quote Al-Arian and others as claiming Israel has the same expansi onist intentions as Iraq, but that no one applies the same standard for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the Jews whom he argues invaded Palestine. While Al-Arians statements indicate his desire that Israel not exis t, others quoted in the article state they would be satisfied with a two-state solution. Fi nally, the discussion returns to Iraq, with Al-Arian having the last word on whether returning Ameri can troops should receive a heros welcome for having liberating Kuwait: I dont want to hurt anyones feelings, but I recall a saying by an American governor. He was asked, Could fascism come to America? He said, Yes, but it would be called patrio tism. Evidently, Al-Arians answer is that U.S. troops do not deserve a heros welcome, given his assumption that Fascism and patriotism are moral equivalents. The final 1991 report in USFs Media Files is a majo r feature work entitled What Muslims Believe. Comprising an entire sections front page in The St. Petersburg Times one half of the page consists of two photographs taken at AlArians mosque in Temple Terrace. The largest picture is a profile shot of Al-Arian with his head bowed, looking pen sive at the recent service at Al-Qassam Mosque. In the caption he is identified as a USF professor, a point mentioned several more times throughout the article. Al-A rian again appears in the smaller of the two pictures, this time kneeling while lead ing a prayer service with eight other men kneeling behind him. 425

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The article itself is about peoples per ceptions about Islam, and most Muslim individuals quoted in the arti cle claim that most non-Muslim s see Islam as a barbaric and repressive creed. The one Jewish re ligious leader, Rabbi Jan Bresky of Tarpon Springs, quoted in the article disagrees, however. He states, Islam has been twisted for political ends, and it real ly is a noble religion, just as Judaism and Christianity have been used at times in history be perver se individuals for their own greedy ends. After a long discussion about the major tene ts of the faith, the article then turns toward matters of human rights, free speech, and the Iranian fatwa against Salman Rushdie and his editors for defaming Alla h and Islam itself. At the time of the Rushdie affair, the academic community, we ighing in on matters of right versus wrong, morally condemned Irans fatwa that called for the forfeit of Rushdies blood. The fatwa drove Rushdie into hiding, ruined his marriage, and led to the assassinations of some of his overseas editors. First, the article quotes another USF pr ofessor of international studies, Dr. Abdelwahab Hechiche, on the cruel forms of hudud punishment exacted without rule of law in many Muslim countries. While some Muslims say that such punishment is effective, fast, and fair, other Muslims do not agree. Speaking for himself only and not for other Muslims, Hechiche states of killing for the purpose of keeping a religion and its people pure, It seems to be eff ective, but there is a debate about it. Compassion, understanding, the need to pacify the world, to not use force--this is what Islam is for me at least. 426

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However, Al-Arian expresses a different view about the use of violence as interpreted through Islamic law, especia lly when Muslim writers like Rushdie allegedly defame Islam. Having the last word regarding the Rushdie affair, Al-Arian states: Basically, what [Rushdie] did was to slap every Muslim in the face. It has nothing to do with free speech. You can criticize ideas, even Islam. But you cannot disrespectfully abuse them. Jihad is therefore not a quiet inner spiritual struggle in Al-Arians religious worldview It also signifies violent struggle. For some Muslims, the Iranian fatwa to forfeit Rushdies blood was just cause for Rushdies presentation of Muhammad in an unsavory light. So Al-Arian, speaking in his capacity as a spiritual lead er for Tampas Muslim community, states, So he wont ever think of repeating this offe nse, the best way is to threaten him with the fear of punishment. The reporter then asks Al-Arian if Ru shdie deserves to die, to which Al-Arian replies, I wouldnt weep if he dies, but I wouldn t do it myself. It is clear by the content of these early media documents in USF files that Al-Arian, at least in the early 1990s, expressed two-tiered standards about violence. These statements further show that Al-Arian believed that some people were not entitled to free speech, even if the majority of the academic commun ity of which he was a part held different ethical views leading to academias censure of an Iranian cleric who had incited violence against Rushdie and his edit ors. Military violence committed under multilateral U.N. sanction against a state (i .e, Iraq) that had transgressed its own internationally recognized boundaries was un acceptable to him; however, violence 427

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committed in response to a fatwa by Irans most supreme l eader who objected to the publication of a work of fiction he had never read was acceptable. As he became in part through his cour tship of the local media one of Tampa Bays most celebrated Muslim leaders in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Al-Arian founded a magazine for the Islami c Committee for Palestine (ICP), a charity that was implicated as part of his confe ssed conspiracy to commit to terrorism (see Emerson, 1994; Emerson, 2002; Katz, 2003; U.S.A. v. Al-Arian 2004). Inquiry, having the same address as ICP, was clos ely related to another organization, the International Institute of Islamic Thought (I IIT), which Katz (2003) states is a front organization for the Muslim Brotherhood. A think-tank in Herndon, Virginia, the IIIT was disclosed to USF faculty and administ rators during the negotiation of the USFWISE partnership as being WISEs pr imary funding source (Reece-Smith, 1996). According to an early press report about USF-WISE, Al-Arian told Government and International Affairs ad junct professor Arthur Lowrie that Al-Arian had included his work with the ICP in his annual review file with the university (Terrorist Leaders Email Re vealing, 1995). Part of Al-Arians ICP activities included editing, publishi ng, and writing articles for Inquiry The researcher does not know whether Al-Arians colleagues ever reviewed Inquiry or studied the ICP toward evaluating his intellectual pur suits or community service endeavors toward tenure. Reece-Smith did review some issues of the ICP magazine. From his review of Inquiry Reece-Smith (1996) determined that editor Al-Arian held pro-Palestinia n views, although the pages of Inquiry reveal an overall editorial concern for a global jihad movement of which the Palestinians represent an 428

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important but small regional part. A review of The Project, a document ratified by the Ikwhan movement in 1982 reveals a similar ra tionale: to adopt the Palestinian cause as part of a worldwide Islamic po licy, with the policy plan and by means of jihad . [by conducting] studies on the Je ws, enemies of Muslims, and on the oppression inflicted by these enemies on our brothers in occupied Palestine, in addition to preaching and publications (p. 10). In comparing Inquiry s contents to the global jihad policy stated in The Project, keeping in mind Inquiry s close association with the Ikwhan front, the IIIT, featured in a full-page advertisement next to each issues table of contents, one is left with the impression that Inquiry s tacit purpose is to enact The Projects suggested missions (p. 10). A significant amount of Inquiry s content is directed toward re-educating Muslims toward an Islamist view of the world, in keeping with the analysis of Islamisms intellectual history explicated in the previous chapter. The magazine takes a monolithic position in that it claims to represent all of the Muslim community, making no acknowledgment that perhaps some Muslims and even some ulema trained in Islams ancient religious universitie s might differ with the conclusions of Inquirys editor-in-chief and his contributors. To that end, discourse within the pages of Inquiry denotes a striking consistency in point-of-view as if an article or statement written by one author or person could have been made by any of the magazines contributors and interviewees. As Blumer (1946/1951/1963) and other so cial psychologists might argue, the contributions in Inquiry display little independent judgment and reflective responsiveness. In other words, the magazine actually defies the task of its stated 429

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target audience--intellectua ls charged with the task of independent judgment and reflective responsiveness--in the service of a strident in-group attitude and ideological program. In its totality, the magazine signifies the same kind of monolithic doctrine of the Islamist international described in the previous chapter. Also, most of the content supports strident Islamic f undamentalist views supporting the use of assymetrical warfare (i.e., terrorism) to defend Islam and all Muslims, including those who believe their rights have been affronted by the existence of Israel. In addition and as will be shown in the following content analysis, the magazines advertisements and its feature articles are aimed at not just Muslim re-education but toward the enlightenment of all intellectual people in Muslim and Western universities toward the same kind of Islamist epistemology described above and in the previous chapter. Many of Inquiry s contributors hold doctorates, work in Western universities, and are known leader s in Islamist terrorist movements like Algerias Armed Islamic Group (AIG) and Tunisias Islamic Tendency Movement (ITM). In fact, even before 1994, when the case at USF erupted for the first time, academics, journalists, and governments ar ound the world were aware of the problem and had written about the various academics featured in Inquiry from the standpoint that they were the leaders of terrorist movements. Of course, Inquirys featured professors who may not be the leaders of terrorist movements are no less controversial, even if two of them are considered part of the mainstream view in the field of Middle East studies. One c ontributor, in fact, Professor Hamid Mawlana, writing about the greatness of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, is identified as a professor at The American University in Washington, 430

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D.C.; and another, Noam Chomsky, writi ng about the Palestinian-Israeli peace accords in wholly unfavorable terms, is iden tified as a distinguished professor and a prominent American Jew. Chomsky r eceives recognition by the magazine, ostensibly, because he is what the magazine occasionally refers to as a non-Zionist Jew which the pages of Inquiry define as a Jew who can live happily and in peacefully under an Islamic govern ment in which Jews and other dhimmi people agree to a two-tiered legal system with di fferent standards of rights for Muslims and non-Muslims. Not just about glorification of the fi rst Intifada or providing theological justification for the destructi on of Israel and Jews, each issue of the magazine is about the Islamist mass social movements progress in various countries, including some of those locales studied in the previous chap ter. Again, the magazine maintains other international corollaries noted in the pr evious chapter, Nafi and Shiqaqis PIJ publication produced in London and distributed in the Palestinian territories, and the Muslim Brotherhoods, Islamic Selection for which Shallah was once an editor. These connections of time and place in Tampa Bay and USF in the early 1990s, necessitate further explication of Inquiry for the purpose of showing the characteristics of the Islamist movement in Tampa Bay and at USF, especially given that some of the magazines issues featur e photographs of other USF professors and students (e.g. Ramadan Shallah and Sami Hammoudeh at ICP conferences) and a photograph of Sudans Hasan Al-Turabi, wh ich was taken at USF during one of USFWISEs roundtable discussions. In addition, one issue contains an article by Bashir Nafi under his alias, Bashir Musa, publishe d when Nafi was researching at WISE and 431

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involved with partnership negotiations with USF. Such an explication might therefore underscore the impact of the Islamist move ment on USFs intellectual climate, which could be taken positively if one favors Espositos (1995, 1998) apologetic view of Islamism, or negatively if one accepts Lewis (1998), Yeors (1998, 2005) and Kramers (2001) assessments of the conditi on of Middle East st udies in the West, which they contend has rendered itself subservient to Islamist perspectives in teaching and research. Studied in their totality, Inquiry also well may represent part of the collection of Steven Emersons evidence that he deliberately omitted from his 1994 documentary Jihad in America because he believed the prima facie evidence too inflammatory for a PBS audience. Within its pages, Editor-in-Chief Al-Arian advertised Inquiry as a magazine with a Muslim view to the in tellect and an intellectual vi ew to the Muslim. A range of Muslim activist-intellectuals associat ed with the USF-WISE partnership also appeared as contributors or as the subjects of interviews and articles at or around the same time that they had visited or we re expected to visit USF for scheduled roundtable discussions, either as visiting lecturers or as attendees of the discussions. One of those intellectuals was Hasan Al-Turabi. Al-Turabi is the law professor from the University of Khartoum who was di scussed in the previ ous chapter as being a leader in the Sudanese Muslim Brother hood who used his university as means to overthrow the Sudanese government in a military coup in 1989. The Muslim Brotherhood Movement Homepage states that Al-Turabi was one of the movements most laudable graduates ( www.ummah.org.uk ). 432

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The August 1992 issue of Inquiry features the Sudans Hassan Al-Turabi on its cover. Of relevance is the timing of the articles appearance soon after Al-Turabis visit to USF during late spring, in addition to many other cities in the United States, where he lectured in va rious mosques, Islamic Centers, and conferences that are part of the ISNA network. As a means of defending the appropriateness of the USF visit, facu lty championing Al-Turabis appearance reminded the media and Reece-Smith (1996) that Al-Turabi had also met with U.S. government officials during his U.S. tour. In addition, Dr. Robert Bulliet, an faculty attendee at some USF-WISE conferences, would say of the Al-Turabi visit, which came on the heels of the partnership form ation, that progress toward developing a Middle East program at USF had been notably fast (Reece-Smith, 1996). An editorial without a by -line entitled Sudan: A New Model for the World underscores Al-Turabis previously stated comments about Arabizing Africa. The article claims that the pur pose of the Sudans 1989 coup was to allow the Sudan to become Arabs gateway to black Africa, a process purportedly prevented by the countrys previous non-Islamic governments. To the new leadership established in 1989, therefore, Islam meant a civilizational movement that not only could provide a framework for progress and development, but also a uniting force encompassing all the people of Sudan. The article further allows that the new leaders redefined the role of Sudan by insisting on its Arab and Islamic heritage. The editorial on the Sudan is then followed by an interview with Al-Turabi himself, in which Al-Turabi uses soft er tropes such as those employed by 433

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non-Muslim Middle East sc holars romanticizing th e Islamist movement: revivalism, awakening and resurgence. Identified as the SecretaryGeneral of the Popular Arab and Islamic Congress which is a mass move ment representing Is lamic and nationalist trends and parties throughout the Muslim world, Al-Turabi informs his interviewer that the Islamic Revivalism Movement in Sudan is in the process of formulating a whole new life plan for Sudan based on Islamic laws and regulations. Thereafter, Al-Turabi demonstrates the extent of his knowledge about Western society, in particular his pe rception of the role of reli gion in Western democracies. For example, when asked about the potenti al for a debate between the West and Islam, the Sudanese intellectual asserts, It is not likely a debate based on the Wests belief system since the West has lost its religious thoughts and beliefs. Al-Turabi then continues in a statement suggesting th at the new leaders of the Sudan know the will of God such that they are convinced they can shape the New Islamic Man throughout the countrys acknowledged multi-ethnic and non-Muslim religious groups: Sudan has advanced not just economically but also menta lly to a level that might be the beginning of a total Islamic revival with the wi ll of Allah. Toward that end of creating the Nizam Islami in the Sudan, Al-Turabi then states that he is now formulating a compre hensive plan to encompass all branches of life and religion. The verb encompass is an important descri ptive term for the Islamist movement, signifying its intenti ons to re-Islamize so ciety and knowledge according to the principles articulated by the movements international leadership. Excluding non-Muslim nations and Muslim majority nations that do not support Islamist doctrine, Al-Turabi contends that his new Islamic order is also subject to 434

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negotiation with any Muslim supporting nation. Acknowledging post-1989 reforms on the countrys higher education system but without providing specific details, Al-Turabi lauds his governments new policies, the results of which were described in the previous chapter: In the field of education, especially higher education, remarkable progress has been made. Given those aforementioned statements about the potential to form alliances with other states, only one state is compatible with Al-Turabis diplomatic policy: Iran. Of the Sudans new alliance with Iran, Al-Turabi states that bot h countries are integral to the present Islamic Awakening Movement, a matter that exposes them to the pressures of public opinion and a campai gn of deception on worldly and religious levels. Nevertheless, and specifically id entifying Algeria in context, the two countries possess a common purpose to spread the message of Islam that they have started in Asia and Africa. In addition, the so-called Question of Palestine also represents a problem to be overcome by the application of the Iranian and Sudanese models because the existence of Israel prevents the unifi cation of Muslims. The interview also suggests a working knowledge of the Islamist movements characteristic tendency to find and fill vacuums of power in unstable Third World locales. Without qualification, for example, Al-Turabi states that only Muslims are best able to protect independence and in terests of all weak third world nations. Moreover, he states that the Palestinian In tifada and the U.S. victory in the Persian Gulf War remind Muslims of this. And so, any attempts by the U.S. and other Western nations to broker peace and securi ty in the Middle East are far from equality and justice because such attempts invariably recognize Is rael as a legitimate 435

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state, which according to the terms of Islamist epistemology constitutes Muslim oppression. The last article about the Sudan and Al -Turabi is one penned by Aminah Hajara (possibly a relative of Hussam Jubara), A Roundtable Discussion with Dr. Hasan AlTurabi. This work is Inquirys recapitulation of the May 10, 1992, roundtable meeting at USF. As mentioned above, that particular roundtable meeting came on the heels of the formation of the USF-WISE partnership ear lier in the spring term. It features a large photograph taken at the mee ting in which the subject of the meeting, Al-Turabi, is positioned in the lower left -hand corner of the frame. In the photo, Al-Turabi is not facing the camera. He app ears not to be the primary subject of the photo although the caption belo w the photo suggests he is. Instead, another person who is not mentioned in the article, Al -Arian, the CEO of ICP and WISE, is positioned in the center of the frame stari ng directly into the cameras lens. In the article about the USF-WISE roundt able meeting, Hajara summarizes the discussions themes and omits any attempts during the discussion to challenge Al-Turabis political views: parties are not essential to popular democracy; there was a time when the West did not have politic al parties; and Islam has a history of tolerance and liberalism towards minoritie s through the Ahl al-Dimma tradition. The Reece-Smith report of 1996 suggests that in actuality little to no attempts were made to challenge Al-Turabi. Another article in the March/April 1 993 issue is penned by none other than convicted terrorist, Rashid Al-Ghannoushi, fr om Tunisia, who lives in exile in the United Kingdom. Al-Ghannoushi was slated to be a visiting Islamic scholar at USF436

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WISE before the U.S. State Department sh elved his visa appli cation. Currently, AlGhannoushi is a professor in the United Ki ngdom, as is Bashir Nafi, who was also a director of WISE and an employee at th e IIIT, until the governme nt found out that Nafis visa had expired. The Muslim Brothe rhood Movement Homepage states that AlGhannoushi is another graduate among th e movements many thinkers, scholars, and activists ( www.ummah.org.uk ). Reece-Smith (1996) reports that Al-Ghannoushis intended lecture did not become the subject of criticism until after Emersons and Fechters investigations of Islamists at USF. The Al-Ghannoushi article further unders cores the clash of civilizations in which Islamists see themselves as willing participants locked in a cosmic battle over who defines the nature of global justice. In fact, the overall c ontext of Islamist philosophy indicates that it is the Islamist movement itse lf, and not the West, that perpetuates the clash because it cannot reconc ile with several centuries of historical processes emanating from the European En lightenment. As such, all problems with Islamic civilization are the result of a cons piracy in which nothing happens by chance. The Al-Ghannoushi article, Islam and th e West: Realities and Politics clearly undermines the view among apologetic Wester n academics who believe that it is the United States government, either being a puppet of Israel or the opposite, using Israel as its puppet, that is responsible for the erro neous belief that Isla mism is a political ideology underscored by totalitarian strate gies similar to Nazism or Communism. For example, Al-Ghannoushi laments the t ransfer of selective and secular values to the primitive nations. He views Islamisms reaction to the Enlightenment as a kind of Counter-Reformation. Indeed, Al -Ghannoushi calls the Reformation the 437

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movement of religious reform, scientific discoveries, liberal ization, and finally industrialization that swept through the Western world and eventually comprising the virtual domination of the world. He regard s the historical proce ss as part of some grand conspiracy to undermine Islam. Theref ore, for this intellectual slated for an appearance at USF only the creation of the Nizam Islami will deliver the world from its jahilaya condition. Al-Ghannoushi, at the end of this historical analysis of the development of democracy and scientific invention during the Enlightenment leading to further oppression of Islamic civilization, is stated as having delivered this speech at the Center for Democratic Studies, the Un iversity of Westminister, United Kingdom. The Spring 1994 issue of Inquiry is an overall res ponse to the Oslo Peace Accords represented by Israel and Yasser Araf ats PLO, which over thirty years prior had achieved observer status in the U.N. for the Palestinian people. The issue features the famous photograph of Yitzak Rabin and Yass er Arafat in front of the White House, about to shake hands, with C linton in between, his arms out stretched toward the Israeli and Palestinian leaders in a classic gesture of Americas largesse of spirit in mediating Middle East peace agreements. This issue was published during a time when U.S. federal law had been enacted to make financial and material efforts to obstruct the peace process a criminal offense. Above this picture is the caption T he Handquake: Peace or Surrender? which happens to be the lead article by Inquiry s Editor-in-Chief, Al-Arian, who, after Emersons November 1994 exposure of his activiti es related to the PIJ and associations with PIJ leaders, would insist in the media that he favored a twostate solution and that his recorded statements Death to Israel did not mean that he advocated the 438

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destruction of the state but merely that it meant Death to Occupation (Tiger Bay video, 2002). The issue also features other criti ques of the Oslo Accords by notable intellectuals in American universities. One is entitled The Morning After by Edward Said, identified as a Christian Arab intellectual from Columbia University, and another is an article by Noam Choms ky, identified as an American Jew and distinguished professor at MIT. Chomsky s article The Israel-Arafat Agreement: A Just and Lasting Peace or Reductionism? laments anti-terror laws to suppress the Intifada through meaningless and diplomatic maneuvers. The Said and Chomsky articles augment an interview with anot her person who taught at USF as a visiting professor in the early 1990s, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, who came to USF from The University of Wisconsin, and, prior to that, Al-Najah University, West Bank. Al-Najah University, as evidenced in the previous chapter, is an academic institution where the Islamic Jihad represents the universitys de facto ROTC; where professors and students are lauded on campus for practicing human s acrifice in the form of suicide bombings; and where leaders of the Islamic Jihad give regular addresses to faculty, administrators, and students. Khalil Shikaki himself is the brother of Fathi Al-Shiqaqi, the PIJs first Secretary General. The younger Shikaki deni es any operational i nvolvement with the PIJ, and USF faculty hired him because of his genuine academic qualifications as a political scientist specializi ng in Palestinian politics, a lthough they were aware of his relationship to the elder Al-Shiqaqi (Reece-Smith, 1996). Al-Arians article, The Ha ndquake, inside the magazine recreates the cover caption in red bold type. It begins with a condemnation of the Camp David Accords in 439

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1978, which he claims weakened Egypt and he r neighbors. At that time Egypt became a pariah state to the Arab League, which expelled Egypt from its ch arter because of AlSadats so-called shameful peace with the Jews. Without qualification, Al-Arian accuses Israel of Nazi-l ike tactics while hailing the su ccess of the Islamist movement elsewhere but saying that the movement in Palestine signifies a feeling of total failure. In other words, he denies peace with Israel, such that compromise with Israel equates to total failure. He further addresses the Wests, or t he Norths, concern about Islamism being The New Cold War that defines Isl am [as] representing the ideological threat in the South. Islam was seen as a threat, Al-Arian writes, simply because of its real and potential ability to resist adaptation of secular-humanist values which in many respects deny or ignore Gods revelations. He does not consider the possibility that Westerners might draw a distinction between Islam the faith and Islamism the political ideology because, under the tenets of his Counter-Reformationist view, faith and political ideology are inseparable things. According to Kramer, in Ivory Towers in Sand: The Failure of Middle East Studies in America (2001), Al-Arians views about th e myth of an Islamic threat became dominant in the field of study with the publication of Saids epistemological attack Orientalism in 1978. Reece-Smith (1996) also notes in his report to Castor that Al-Arians views were fashionable am ong some members of COMES, including Lowrie, whose article The Campaign Agains t Islam and American Foreign Policy is appended in the report. Lowrie identifi es numerous scholars (e.g., Duran, Pipes, Kramer) and journalists (e.g., Emerson, Jud ith Miller) who--he be lieveserroneously 440

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view Islam and Muslim as a threat. Lowrie (1995) neglects mentioning that those same individuals draw explicit differe nces between the faith, Islam, and its adjectival form, Islamic, and the politic al ideology, Islamism, and its adjectival form, Islamist. In The Handquake, Al-Arian eventually turns to the subject of Yasser Arafat himself. In a rejection of the Oslo Peace A ccords and in an apparent denial of Jewish rights to live in security or for the right of Israel to exist at all, Al-Arian states that Arafat recognized the Zionist entity to live with within secure borders and consequently the right of any Jew in the wo rld to live in Palestine. Arafat further denounced the right to fight occupation by any means available and to to stop the Intifada. The Intifada was spurred by Sheikh Awda from his mosque nearby the Islamic University in 1987. Stirring civi l unrest by enlisting students to pass out leaflets on campus, Al-Awda called for marty rdom actions, or spectacular actions, or suicide bombings, or as Meddeb (2003) w ould call it, human sacrifice. Al-Awda is also among the indicted in U.S.A. v. Al-Arian. He somehow was able to enter the United States and visit Al-Arians mosque, which holds the same name as Al-Awdas mosque nearby the Islamic University. In an apparent invocation of Mus lim-Christian replacement theology, Al-Arian demonstrates his antipathy toward Jewish-Israeli identity rooted traditional Judeo-Christian history. First, he objects to Israels absorption of two million Russian Jews and Mariconite settlers and fu rther denies that Jews have any right to worship in Jersualem this sacred city to Mu slims and Christians. He claims thereunto that Europe created the Jewish problem and that the Islamic world never 441

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experienced the Jewish problem and that in fact, Islam is the reason that Jews exist today. Invoking a romantic view of Jewish dhimmi status--under which Jews paid special taxes and lived under the threat of extinction if they did not (Yeor, 1998)--AlArian writes of a Jewish philosophy a nd science that thrived only under the protection provided by Islam. By contrast, he states that the pain and suffering of Jews today is the result of two conflicti ng doctrines: the inclusiveness of Islam, into which he believes all other religions must be subsumed, and the culture of the regime of Israel and the exclusiveness of Zionism. Therefore, using Islamist theological grounds, Al-Arian claims that Jews are not Israelites; and those who say they are usurp the ri ghts of non-Zionist Jews who supposedly prefer a two-tiered system of rights under Islamic law. Thus Al-Arians contention, as logic follows, Jews have no claim to Israel either theologically or under internati onal legal charter. Hence, Al-A rian prefers the return to a pre-1948 condition before the advent of what he and other Islamists refer to as the Zionist entity. The return to a pre-1948 condition Al-Arian calls a just and comprehensive peace, when a Jewish stat e did not exist and Islam encompasses everything in a total denial of thousands of years of religious history that unfolded prior to the advent of Islam. Through this strange, almost Gnostic de nial of history, Al-Arian threatens a bloody civil war against the PLO and Fatah leaders in his article The Handquake. The Handquake logically signifies anothe r shameful peace with Jews similar to Egyptian-Israeli peace settlements that cau sed Islamists to justify on radicalized theological grounds the assassinatio n of Al-Sadat. In effect, 442

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Al-Arians article denying the legitimacy of the Arab-Israeli peace process and Jewish rights, even to the point of justifying th e human sacrifice of Palestinian martyrs, clearly contradicts a decade of statements he made in the media after having been identified as a PIJ leader. Al-Arians case against Is rael in The Handquake gleans support from another article under the caption Historical Documents in the form of a Legal Opinion (fatwa) of Al-Azhar on th e Zionist Entity, circa 1956. This fatwa from Cairos ancient religi ous university condemns the Arab worlds co-operation with the imperialist powers which backed Israel as thi s sinful aggression . so as to establish a Jewish state in this Islami c country and amidst Islamic states. Therefore, peace with Israel--or as it is sought by those are advocating it--is lawfully forbidden. The ulema at Al-Azhar therefore call upon all Mu slims to not make peace and those who advocate peace are considered apostates, which, according to the Islamist doctrine explicated in the previous chapter, is a condition punishab le by death. Even a passive attitude or neglect of this duty against these awful conspiraci es constitutes the most heinous sin the article states. Finally, all articles in th e Spring 1994 issue enjoin substantive support from another penned by the Inquiry Research Unit entitled Labors Strategy: Improvisation to the Peace Process. This work of political analysis features another picture of the Rabin-Arafat handshake with Clinton standing between them. Like AlArians own assessment of Middle East pea ce negotiations, the Inquiry Research Unit denies Zionist, Arab, and internati onal endorsements of peace with Jews or 443

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Israel. Furthermore, it denounces peace agreem ents as Zionist-imperialist conspiracy to cobble together a Zioni st entity in 1948. Other Islamist intellectuals hoste d by USF-WISE were not featured in Inquiry but they nevertheless exemplify a tendency by the Islamist movement at USF and its service area to court non-Muslim academics as pa rt of their appeal to broad classes of constituents, a trait typical of religiou s-nationalist movements (Post, 1990/1999). Several of them are noted below. An expert on Islamic militant groups and the Muslim Brotherhood in the Palestinian territories, Dr. Ziad Abu Am r was another scholar affiliated with USF-WISE. In his writing, he romanticizes attacks on non-combatants in Israel as, inter alia spectacular actions and military operations. Cross referencing many of the events in his work Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza (1994), shows that some of those military operations were in fact suicide bombings against non-combatant passengers on Israeli buses. Othe r events included the Islamic Jihads hostage-taking and murders such as that which took place on the cruise ship Achille Lauro, with the highly publicized film footage of a handicapped Jewish passenger being executed and dumped into the sea. As was shown in the previous chapters discussion on re-Islamization in Pales tinian universities, Abu Amr excels in documenting how the Muslim Brotherhood, HAMAS, and Islamic Jihad have succeeded in using Abu Amrs own Birzeit Un iversity and the Islamic University and Al-Najah University as fronts for re-I slamization from above and below. Abu Amr is cited in the indictment U.S.A. v. Al-Arian : On or about August 10, 2000, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with Ziyad Abu Amr and requested that reluctant Ziad Abu Amr 444

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travel to the United States to testify at the INS hearing for Unindicted CoConspirator Twelve that the PIJ was i nvolved in non-violent activities. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said he could testif y to the non-viol ent activities of HAMAS but could not find someone to so testify regarding the other Islamic movements. (p. 75) If this part of the indictment is true, then it apparently means that Al-Arian had asked Abu Amr to misrepresent the published findi ngs of his own academic inquiries into Islamist movements in the Palestinian territories. Dr. Naseer Aruri is anothe r scholar who lectured und er USF-WISE auspices. Also of Palestinian heritage, Aruri is a political scientist and chancellor emeritus from The University of Massachusetts. He freque ntly publishes Middle East commentary in the on-line magazines like CounterPunch and MSANews One of his more recent works, Remapping the Middle East: Demons and Threats throughout History (2002), firmly identifies him as what Esposit o and Voll (2001) would call an activistintellectual. In that article, he lament s the outcome of World Wars I and II, the creation of a Jewish colonial state, the def eat of Nasserism, the labeling of Libyas Mohamar Qaddafi as a terrorist, and the Oslo charade in Palestine. He also supports Harry Belafontes remarks that Colin Powell is a slave whose privilege of living in the masters house is dependent on good behavior. In addition to being a political scient ist who lectures in national university forums like USF-WISE, Aruri is a three-term board member of Amnesty International (1988-1994) and Human Rights Watch (1992-1994). Amnesty Inte rnational is a member of the National Coalition to Prot ect Political Freedom (NCPPF), founded by Al-Arian in 1996. Amnesty issued a statement claiming that Al -Arian after his arrest in 2003 was a political prisoner. Aruri is also a former president of the Arab American 445

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University Graduates (AAUG). In addition to these high appointments, he has been a guest speaker with a New York-based or ganization called Al-Awda.Org, a coalition that advocates Palestinian right of return. Aruris most recent speech for Al-Awda.Org was in April 2001 at the No Return = No Peace Rally. He spoke alongside other prominent activist-intellectuals, editors, and publishers like Sami Al-Arian of USF, ICP, and NCPPF; Anthony Arnove, editor of South End Press (Aruris book publisher), contributor to The Progressive, Z Magazine (whose article by Noam Chomsky is reprinted in Al-Arians Inquiry), International Socialist Review and member of the International Socialist Orga nization; and Sara Flounders co-director of Ramsey Clarks International Acti on Center and occasional speaker for the ISNA annual conferences. Aruri and this mix of Al-Awda.org speaker s signify a trend in political alliances in North America between a dherents of Islamism and ra dical left-wing ideology and causes. The North American a lliances continue to grow, cu riously, at a time when in countries like Iran and the Sudan left-wing intellectuals have ceased being enamored with Islamism (Nafisi, 2005). Another scholar not previously ment ioned in the public debate about USF-WISE is Dr. Ibrahim Abu Rabi. Abu Rabi is co-director of the MacDonald Center for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations at the Hartford Seminary. The MacDonald Center states on its website that among its tasks is to train imams for U.S. military chaplaincy. The MacDonald Center for the Study of Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations boasts a famous graduate Tarik Hamdi, noted elsewhere in this 446

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chapter for allegedly having given a satell ite phone to an Al-Qaeda operative in 1998. Hamdi was also a board member of WISE in Tampa Bay before leaving for the MacDonald Centers M.A. program. He also worked at the IIIT. Along with Dr. Ingrid Mattson, herself one of the ISNAs two Vice Presidents, Abu Rabi is a professor of Islamic studies at the same center. Abu Rabi earned his M.A. and Ph.D. in 1983 and 1987 at Temple University, where Esposito studied under Al-Faruqi. Like the other USF-WISE guests, Abu Amr and Aruri, Abu Rabi is of Palestinian heritage. Abu Rabis B.A. is fr om Birzeit University, another university in the Palestinian territories known for its high levels of Islamist influence on academic culture. According to his on-line curriculum vita, in spring 1995/1996, Abu Rabi was also awarded a research fellowship at th e IIIT. The AJISS website cites him as a member of the journals advisory council, along with six other USF-WISE lecturers and guest faculty. He traveled throughout th e Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia between 1984 and 1998 to a total of nineteen different countries. His travels and lectures reveal someone who very much fits the descripti on of an academic missionary, as would other Islamist intellect uals who came to Tampa Bay in the late 1980s and 1990s. The titles of A bu Rabis lectures and papers in those countries and in the United States may illustrate Abu Rabis role in the ISNA/IIIT networks overall strategic goal to Islami ze society and knowledge. For example, in the United States, Abu Rabi delivered a paper to the AMSS in East Lansing entitled The Islamist-Secula rist Dialogue in the Contemporary Arab World (October 1992). In February 1992, A bu Rabi reprinted an article entitled 447

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Intellectual Roots of Islamic Revivalis m in the Modern Arab World in the Ittihad quarterly published by the Islamic Center of Tampa, Florida. Previously the article had been published in New Yorks The Message International. His April 1992 lecture at USF is entitled Intellectual and Social F oundations of Modern Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World. He was also a discussa nt on a panel called the Islamization of Knowledge at the American Council for th e Study of Islamic Societies, Villanova University. In addition, while not cited on his curriculum vita Abu Rabi is the editor of a book published by WISE in 1994 that details the proceedings of a roundtable conference with Dr. Kurshid Ahmad, a visiti ng lecturer to USF-WISE from Pakistan. Ahmad is the Islamist scholar noted in chapte r One as having been a direct disciple of one of the Islmaist movements most renowned theoreticians, Mawlana Maududi. Finally, Abu Rabi has visited other secular universities and centers in the United States, including Espositos center at Georgetown, delivering similarly entitled lectures and papers that employ the classic tropes of the re-Islamization program. Given that the 1996 Reece-Smith report di scusses the Khurshid Ahmad lecture and its faculty attendants, th e details of that lecture and its outcome, Abu Rabis edited book, Resurgence: Challenges, Direct ions, and Future Perspectives: A Roundtable with Professor Khurshid Ahmad is worth attending at length. Ahmad is an economist from Pakistan and is a know n leader in the Jamaat-E-Islami, which maintains strong linkages to the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda and is on the State Departments Foreign Terrorist Organization list (Ronc zynkowski, 2004). The roundtable discussion in question occurred on May 15, 1993. As with every source cited in this inquiry, the researcher has read the work in its entirety. With few 448

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exceptions, the contents of this book suggest on their face that USF-WISEs commitment to civilizational dialogue am ounted to a romantic gloss on illustrating the progress of the Islamist program fo r re-Islamizing society and knowledge. Chapter titles alone are sufficient for understanding the contours of re-Islamization in the Ahmad roundtable. The work contains seven chapters: 1. Khurshid Ahmad: Muslim Activist-Econom ist by John L. Esposito and John O. Voll; 2. Opening Remarks by Jamil Jreisat and Ramadan Abdallah; 3. Islamic Resurgence: Challenges, Directions, and Fu ture Perspectives, Khurshid Ahmad; 4. Islamic Conception of Economic Deve lopment and Modernization: General Discussion; 5. Islamic Movements: Genera l Discussion; 6. Muslim Minorities: in the Western World: General Discussion; 7. Concluding Remarks, by John O. Voll. The Abu Rabi edition of the Ahmad l ecture contains three appendices: the roundtable participants; Ahma ds bibliography; and Abu Ra bis Select Bibliography of Islamic Resurgence. These appendices, coupled with a readi ng of the contents, suggest that the Islamist insurgence, which in the book is repeatedly called resurgence, was not challenged by the pa rticipants as a repr essive, destabilizing force by an Islamist international agai nst liberal Muslims and non-Muslims living under its economic theories and practices. As Reece-Smith (1996) notes in his report to Castor, challenges to other roundtable conferences came months after they had transpired. 449

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Characteristic Two: Signs of Islamist Hidden Curriculum at USF, with Strong Linkages to the Theory, Strategy, Practic e, and Practitioners Associated with the International In stitute of Islamic Thought In delineating the array of non-criminal and criminal external organizations run by highly educated elites interacting with USF, this study already has progressed far in understanding Islamisms interplay with USF and its service community. But this study of a reformist mass movement in higher education would be remiss were it not to delve more deeply into how the edu cation theory, practice, and practitioners of the movements aforementioned network of organizations presented USF faculty and administrators clear indications of an intention to establish at USF a hidden curriculum based on the IIITs ideological re form program for Western secular higher education. On one hand, that advancement of a hidden curriculum signifies the process of re-Islamizatio n in higher education from below It has its roots in a concept already noted, dialogue. On the other hand, that same advancement of a hidden curriculum at USF assisted in the use of the university and the people in it in the Islamist movements from above strategy in higher education, using USF infrastructure and personnel in the commission of violence. In a statement echoing Arendts observ ation of front organizations (i.e., secret societies hiding in plain sight) in totalitarian mass movements who use education to decompose the status quo, Margolis (2001) writes that hidden curricula hide in plain sight (p.26). Mo reover, Margolis counterpart Soldantenko (2001) laments that the hidden curricula of off-campus third-sector groups attempting to legitimize themselves with area studies programs (e.g., Chicano studies in 450

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California) often are doomed because their values clash with the values of Western democratic education. In the end, USF woul d dissolve the partnership agreement with WISE but not because of a values clash, per se, but because of so-called administrative irregularities (Reece-Smith, 1996: p. 21) involved with the partnership that viol ated USF policies. The hidden curriculum of re-Islamiza tion of society and knowledge was conveyed by Sami Al-Arian at a Minare t Freedom Dinner in late 2002 (Minaret Dinner Transcript, 2002). At that dinner, he acknowledged the presence of a former WISE roundtable guest, Dr. Charles Butterw orth, and then explained the importance of think-tanks to the advancement of the ISNA political and social agenda in the United States. Identifying organizations that a decade earlier he ha d advertised in fullpage color gloss in his defunct magazine, Al -Arian said that those organizations could not attain their objectives without the backing of thinktanks. In context, he then reiterated USF-WISEs agenda for prom oting civilizational dialogue. The ISNA organizations connected to the WISE think-ta nk are cited in this section and received fuller discussion in the previ ous chapter as part of Saudi Arabian involvement in the international movement to re-Islamize so ciety and knowledge from below. In the course of ten years of published press stat ements, Sami Al-Arian and his supporters would repeat an immigration judges statem ent that USF-WISE was respectable and scholarly. In the May 28, 1995, article in The Tampa Tribune that reiterated elements of the November 1994 PBS documentary by Emerson, investigative journalist Michael Fechter reprinted a written statement ma de by Ramadan Shallah, the director of 451

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WISE, about the purpose of the think-tank. Shallahs statement, part of a 1993 introduction to the Hassan Al-Turabi lecture, was, Our long-term goal is to contribute to the understanding of the revivalist Islamist trends misleadingly labeled fundamentalism (USF Media Files, p. 44; italics added to s how tropes of the Islamist dialogue). Shallahs statement underscores the noti on presented througho ut this inquiry that the Islamist movement in higher educat ion is a reformist movement hostile to the Western tradition, signifying the de-Western izing trend in edu cation that gained momentum in the 1960s. By its own de finition advanced in the pages of Inquiry the publishing organ of Al-Arians ICP, Islam ist revivalism is anti-Western. Proof of that anti-Western view is presented belo w, but for now let us accept the premise and then ask, as a matter of academic ethical consideration, whether an epistemological approach hostile to the We stern rational tradition contributes to civilizational dialogue. Also, let us as k whether civilizational dial ogue might be a one-sided affair contemptuous of Western concepts like academic freedom and responsibility. Prior to the USF-WISE partnership form ation, an IIIT brochure was given to key faculty and administrators involved in the negotiations. This is an interesting point that has never been investigated in terms of the significance of the USF-WISE partnerships potential to establish a curricu lum hostile to what Shils (1997) calls the academic ethic of preventing the intrusion of ideological politics in the curriculum. That brochure became an appendix in the 1996 William Reece-Smith Report to Betty Castor. Another important item of note is that in giving the broc hure to USF faculty and administrators pushing for the partne rship, Sami Al-Arian, WISEs CEO, and 452

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Bashir Nafi, WISEs Director of Research, also gave them ample indication of what they intended the USF Middle East studies curriculum to be and do. The language in the brochure is similar to that expressed in the full-page ad that always appears in the same place in each issue of Al-Arians Inquiry to the left of the magazines table of contents and editorial board page. The ad/brochure states that one of the purposes of the IIIT is to regain the intellectual, cultural, and civilizational identity of the Ummah through the Isla mization of the humanities and social sciences. Another stated purpose is t o rectify the methodology of Islamic thought, in order to enable it to resume its cont ribution to the progress of human civilization and give it meaning and direc tion in line with the values and objectives of Islam. In addition, and in keeping with the education theory discussed in the previous chapter, The Institute seeks to achieve its obj ectives by holding specialized academic conferences and seminars, supporting and publishing selected works of scholars and researchers in universities and academic res earch centers in the Muslim world and in the West, and directing university students toward undertaking research on issues of Islamic thought and the Islamization of know ledge. Also, the ad/brochure states, The Institute has a number of overseas and academic advisors for the purpose of coordinating and promoting its various activ ities and had also entered into joint academic agreements with several universities and research centers. Over thirty pages, the brochure given to USF is a longer version of the one featured in each Inquiry issue. Its content, too, supports Al-Faruqis IIIT educational theory published in Riyadh (s ee extended analysis in Chapter Four). Received by the backers of COMES and given to USF administ rators for review in the early to mid453

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1990s, the brochure reads, The consensu s among leading thinkers within the Muslim Ummah is that we are facing an intellectual crisis reflected by a deficient performance at all levels, a collapse of institutions, and a disequilibrium of relations within the Ummah (p. 1). The brochure also states that its mi ssion is to organize expert working groups in every discipline to prepare projects in line with the action plan for the Islamization of knowledge and the reconstruction of Muslim thought while freeing [Muslim thought] of that wh ich contravenes the Quran and the Sunnah (the Prophets tradition), and as a whole, the general objectives of Islam (p. 2, italics added). The brochure also states that the mission of the IIIT, and its sub-group WISE by default, seeks to safe guard unity [oneness of the Ummah] and to avoid dissension among the ranks (p. 31, italics added). Th is sincere and humble effort is made, according to the brochure, to advance Islamization of knowledge, which is but one of the aspect s of Islamization, which is a comprehensive moral framework for the individual and society, for thought and action, for theory and application, and for this life and the Hereafter (p. 31, italics added). A major tactic in achieving those strategi c objectives involves IIIT partnerships with Western secular research universities so that, as the brochure stat es, its educational networks may put the Muslim intellectual in command of Western culture and knowledge (p. 29, italics added). Those statements in the brochure indicate that USF, having received this brochur e by WISE prior to the partne rship formation with WISE, had knowledge of the educational goals of the IIIT and its subgroup WISE. The Syrian social scientist Bassam Tibi (1998) who lives in Germany calls the IIITs codified educational vision of Pax Islamica paranoid scholarship (p. 197). 454

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The missions of the two ICPs, AJISS, AMSS, and IIIT, underscore the distinct Islamist philosophical-theological position of the think-tank, WISE, that partnered with USF in the early 1990s and that some COMES professors and other professors at USF and around the country hoped would form the basis of the Southeastern United States first Middle Ea st studies institute. That ba sic position of the AJISS, AMSS, and IIIT is one aimed specifically toward merging matters of faith and reason in scholarship, toward the achievement of re ligious superiority ( not equality) in the world, and the establishment Islamic law in all states where Muslims reside whether as minorities or majorities. As explicated in the previous chapte r, the educational theory and practice emanating from Riyadh publishing houses for those groups in the U.S. signifies nothing less than wholesale a ttack on Western educational theory and practice. Not meant as peaceful intellectual coexistence, the ultimate objective is total reform of Western education in which Islamist epistemo logy arbitrates all scholarly judgment in all fields of research and teaching, in both soft and hard sciences. The AJISS, AMSS, and IIIT hope to achieve those goals by de monizing the West, the United States, and the State of Israel, which IIIT discourse re fuses to acknowledge by its official name, and referring to Israel instead as the Zionist entity or as the state Islamists working at USF hoped the land would become, Palestin e. In Palestine, according to the legal logic of the Islamist movement, Jews and other non-Muslims would live in peace and security, but only so l ong as they accept two-tiered, dhimmi standards of social and political status. These features further define the trope civilizational dialogue. It is that last aspect of the terms of d ialogue--which became part of an 455

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intended hidden curriculum at USFthat led to accusations of anti-Semitism in USFs Middle East course taught by WISE lecturer Ramadan Shallah, who invoked the term Palestine when referring to Israel (Reece-Smith, 1996). Representing another means to those re formist ends, in which higher education signifies the dar al harb, or domain of war, educa tion signifies a battleground of intellectual jihad or Qutbs doctrine in Signposts : zalzalah, or shaking. So by context, Al-Arians Inquiry signifies much more than an expression of pro-Palestinian political views. The magazine and its a ffiliated ISNA sub-groups attend more broadly to the re-Islamization of the United States, which according to the overall epistemology of Inquiry is an outgrowth of the Reformation, a movement in the West that de-Islamized Western knowledge and granted tolerance to Jews. So the underlying purpose is thus to re-Isla mize Western knowledge in the West. For example, in one issue of Inquiry the representatives of these Islamist academic organizations are featured in a December 1993 ICP post-conference writeup called Islam and the New World Order: A Call for National Agenda in America. Written by Ahmed Fellaj, the article describe s the on-going Islamist rejection of U.S. involvement the Persian Gulf, following th e Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War. It also features phot ographs of conference attendant s, one of Sami Al-Arian standing at a lectern under th e ICP/PIJ logo, and another of Taha Al-Alwani, of the IIIT, which channeled Saudi Arabian funds to USF-WISE. The 1992 conference was about current assessment and future plans for Muslims in the United States by distinguished speakers such as Samih Ha mouda [a USF graduate student enrolled 456

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in three different programs during hi s time at USF] and Ramadan Abdullah (Palestine). Both Hammoudeh and Shallah were among the indicted in the trial U.S.A. v. Sami Al-Arian Hammoudeh was acquitted of all charges on December 9, 2006, while Shallah never stood trial because he liv es in Damascus, where the PIJ is headquartered. Hammoudeh is also the student who was a graduate assistant at USFWISE, received money for that purpose th rough university channels, but was never assigned any work at USF (Reece-Smith, 1996). As Inquiry shows, however, Hammoudeh was doing work for Al-Arians other off-campus organizations eventually implicated in th e fund-raising scheme for conducting terrorist attacks in Israel. Another person present at the IC P conference is Abdul-Rahman Al-Moudi. Also known as Abdulraham Al amoudi, this person plea bargained in 2004 for his involvement in a Libyan assassin ation plot against a Saudi Arabian royal by laundering money through a charity a dvertised in a full-apge ad in Al-Arians Inquiry. Alamoudi, Hammoudeh, Shallah, and other speakers also discussed how to deal w ith characteristics of the We stern model because the concept of democracy is being used by th e West to push for a new state of cultural and political imperialism. With the aforementioned delineation of intent to create an Islamist hidden curriculum at USF, at this juncture, on e considers it prudent to offer a major explication of the contents of Inquiry s articles. The explicat ion provides us with a means of viewing what the hidden curriculu m of Islamist educational theory looks 457

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like when practiced in the di scipline of re-Islamized politic al science. In totality, political science as conceived in the pa ges of Al-Arians magazine, itself being published at the same time as the USF-WI SE partnership, resembles educational propaganda along the lines of that which Arendt (1948/1951/1966/1968/1976/1979/1994) observes in totalitarian mass movements. We can start with an article written by WISE research director at USF, Bashir Nafi. In Inquiry, Nafis uses his alias, Bashir Musa, as identified in the indictment U.S.A. v. Sami Al-Al-Arian for which Nafi is among the indicted and alleged terrorism racketeers. The indictment does not discuss another one of Nafis aliases, Ahmed Sadiq, a nom de plume he uses when writing for Islamist websites ( www.ict.org). A Ph.D. in biology, Nafi/Musa disc usses in a two-page article how tolerance towards Jews, a condition which he claims emanates from the Reformation, has been the source of all Modern and now Post-Modern conflict that weakened the ummah This article appear s in the layout between Inquiry s full-page ad stating that the magazine is informative, insigh tful, and objective and another for the ISNA/IIITs academic journal, the AJISS. Nafi/Musas article Israel: A Zionist Dream through Western Colonial Ambitions bl ames all historical conflict on the Jews. For centuries the Jews were s cattered in various pa rts of the world, a condition which Nafi/Musa evidently prefer s and hopes will be re-created in the future. At that time, Nafi/Musa contends that the Jews were a happy, thriving people who existed under the banner of the Islamic states, in Muslim Spain and later in the Ottoman Sultanate, where they had their years of peace and prosperity. Then, in a statement reminiscent of the kind of st ereotypical thinking held by people who 458

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believe in the Great Jewish-Z ionist Conspiracy, Nafi/M usa states that it was the Jews typical insularity and dealing in us ury which fueled Christian hatred against them in the social environment. In othe r words, Nafi/Musa faults only Jews and not those Christians who persecuted them as th e source of hatred against Jews. He also omits the possibility raised by Yeor (1998) that Jews dhimmi status in some Islamic countries might have been a form of extortion in the form of jihza taxes, which allowed Jews and other protected people to live as second-cla ss citizens, but under constant threat of extinction. In addition, Nafi/Musa expresses satisfaction with that pre-Reformation historical condition, for next he turns to the Reformation, that time when Protestants, to reinforce their argument, pragmatically felt it was necessary for Martin Luther and his followers to bring the Old Testamen t--the Torah, the Jewish Holy Book--into light after centuries of neglect by Roman Catholics. This was the beginning of tolerance towards the Jews. Nafi/Musa st ates that afterward came all the problems identified by the Islamist educators and groups identified in th e previous chapters findings: nationalism, the rise of the nation-st ate, Marxism, and the international trade movement. Usury, biologist Nafi/Musa cl aims, which had been the cause of the Jews, was given a more respectable name, the banking interest. This unusual assessment of Reformation history blaming all of modernitys ills on tolerance toward Jews was written by the research director of WISE at the time when WISE was in partnership with USF. The January 1993 issue of Inquiry looks specifically to the condition of Muslims in the U.S. One title in it, in particular, conveys the unwillingness of its 459

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writer to accept the U.S. system of laws and policies that uphold civil rights. Indeed, Muslims and the American Democracy: A Muslim Senate? signifies a certain hostility toward most of that systems participants. Writer Ma sood Rab states, for example, that the political process of elections is ludi crous. Accusing the system of being overrun by non-Muslims and a jahiliyah condition, he questions how we Muslims can participate when we must ha ve hospitality suites in the political party conventions next to gays, lesbians, AIDS activists, Zionist organizations, proabortion, pro-life and other spec ial interest groups. The answer Rab offers is, quite simpl y, that Muslims cannot; therefore, they first should create a Muslim-only extra-constitutional system. We need to understand and develop the concept of a Mu slim community system while living in non-Muslim societies, he writes, and collectively i mplement divine rules in our lives. Why? Rab believes that the political system in this land [America] leads to obedience of a man-made system and, therefor e, to shirk, with Allahs system. By invoking the Arabic term shirk, Rab means that Muslims who assimilate with the U.S. political system have rendered themselves impure and have fallen out of favor with what Rab and other Islamists believe is Gods will. This condition is tantamount to the same condition that Islamists in Egypt and other parts of the world accuse fellow Muslims (e.g., Al-Sadat) of having, takfir a condition of apostasy wrought by accepting non-Islamic forms of government a nd other non-Islamic cultural mores. Rab offers a solution to that problem, i rrespective of the view s of many Muslims in the U.S. who might prefer the U.S. legal system: Therefore, becoming part of this political system will be prohibited. Finally, in a statement that signifies the Islamist 460

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will to make Islamic law the supreme law of the land, Rab illustrates the second part of his strategy for re-Islamizi ng Americas electoral system: A Muslim Senate will present an alternative to the present d ecadent system in this country for the nonMuslims as well. In other words, Rabs statement alludes to the Islamist epistemological principle that Islam encompa sses everything, as a total way of life for all people in all societies and of all religions. The Inquiry issue also features an article written by Sami Amin, who may or may not be the magazines Editor-in-Chief, whose full name is Sami Amin Al-Arian. As is conveyed in U.S.A. v. Al-Arian, Inquiry, and many other media documents, Tampa Bays Islamist movement scrutinizes political developments and then provides its own distinct interpretati on to its own laity. Amin s article, Inquiry Exposes a New Scandal in Congress: C ongressional Committee Sanctions Genocide in Bosnia is another example thereunto. A large reprint of an executive summary entitled Irans European Springboard to U.S. Congress about some Muslim groups in Bosnia accompanies the article, along with another list of prominent U.S. leader s and elected officials who are a part of the alleged scandal. The ex ecutive summary states, The history of the Muslim community in Yugoslavia was larg ely one of oppression; however, during the Tito years, policies were adopted that enhanced the position of Bosnia-Herzegovinas Islamic community. Amin considers this statement reprehensible, adding that the editor of the executive summary is an Isra eli-American. Amin then denounces the report and the congressional counterterrori sm task force whose names the article identifies because they endorse the view that violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina is 461

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being used as a springboard for the launc hing of JIHAD in Europe. Amin then concludes that the report is c lear-cut proof that the U.S. has picked Muslims for their new enemy. The January 1993 issue also features a report on the most recent AMSS conference proceedings called Islam and De mocracy. The report features pictures of IIIT leader Taha Al-Alwani and many other AMSS leaders. Present at the conference were Dr. Ibrahim Ahmad Omar, th e Minister of Higher Education in the Sudan, and Dr. Abdelwahab Al-Messiri, from Egypt. Al-Messiri is not identified as an Egyptian official. Al-Messiri was the AMSSs annual Al-Faruqi memorial speaker who spoke about the secularization of the social scienc es and the Islamization of knowledge. Omar, on the other hand, lectured on Sudans Educational Renaissance, the same one whose resu lts were discussed in Chapter Four. Inquiry s AMSS reporter also states with certain sa tisfaction that even non-Muslims were present at AMSS. They, too, evidently endorse the Islamist epistemological view that Western thinkers have concepts of histor y that are shallow, narrow, arrogant, and greatly misrepresentative of the grave problems in our world. The article implies, therefore, that Islamist education in the Sudan and through the ISNA, the IIIT, the AMSS, and the AJISS is deep, wide, humble and greatly representative of the grave problems in our world. Editor-in-Chief Al-Arians March/April 1993 issue features t itles on its cover page such as Islam and the West: Realitie s and Prospects, Racist Implications of the Jewish View, and Congressional Re port: Islam is the Global Enemy. The issue also contains interviews such as one by Ibrahim Abdullah, from his post in 462

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Lebanon, with Sheikh Abdullah Al-Shami, identified as a representative of the Islamic Jihad Movement. The name of the interview is Our Return is Not Negotiable: No One Can Stop the Intifada, and it glorifies the Islamic Jihads continuous clash with Israel i citizens, drawing no distinctions between combatants (Israeli Defense Forces, primarily) and non-combatants, and firmly denying the relevance of peaceful compromise between the Palestinian leadership under Yasser Arafat and the state of Israel. Another article by Ibrahim Abdullah, I sam Bramah: A Lesson in Commitment and Martyrdom extols the alleged virtue of human sacrifice by writing about a PIJ terrorist who motivated others and became a martyred hero himself who recited the Koran as Israeli Defense Forces (IDF ) closed in on him in a safe house in a middle-class neighborhood. The hero of the story was twenty-eight years old from a middle class family and college educated. Complementing this article is another one by Omar Maxwell about U.S. American pres idential politics, C linton Sleeping with the Zionists, which laments the statements of a Jewish leader about Clinton, He has got something in his heart for the Jews. Also in the March/April 1993 issue is a wo rk entitled Racist Implication of the Jewish View of the Other by Zaid Shakir. At the time this article was written, Shakir was a student at Yale University and also served as the univeristys Muslim chaplain. This article exemplifies the sense of Islamist superiority described by Yeor (1998, 2005) in her analysis of dhimmitude as a precondition of terrorism and asymmetrical policy standards between Muslims and non-Mus lims. In bold green type, the color of the Islamist movement, Shakir states, The purpose here is to argue that, Western 463

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racism is largely due to the inability of the West to overcome the inherently racist roots of the Judeo-Christian tradition. By contrast, Shakir aver s that it is worth noting that the Islamic view of the othe r is neither exclusive nor dehumanizing. The tacit assumption here is one in wh ich Islam encompasses everything, being a primordial religion preceding Judaism and Christianity, in opposition the traditional historical view that Judaism and Christianity are parent religions to Islam. As logic follows further, Muslim converts are not converts, per se but reverts. In apparent contradiction to the issues other articles Islamisms glorification of human sacrifice and the killi ngs of innocent civilians, and especially Jews, Shakir also states, Islam is based on a deeply humanistic impulse which sees mankind as a unified whole. Islam excludes no one from e qual membership in the family of man. In another article in the same issue, Isl am as a Way to Human Liberation, Shakir compares present-day experiences of Muslims in America to the early days of Islam, and specifically of Muhammads religious, political, and milita ry conquests in Arabia. Al-Arians case against Israel in The Handquake (see previous section) gleans support from another article under the caption Historical Documents in the form of a Legal Opinion (fatwa) of Al -Azhar on the Zionist Entity, circa 1956. This fatwa from Cairos ancient re ligious university condemn s the Arab worlds cooperation with the imperialist powers whic h backed Israel as this sinful aggression . so as to establish a Jewish state in this Islamic country and amidst Islamic states. Therefore, peace with Israel--or as it is sought by those are advocating it--is lawfully forbidden. The ulema at Al-Azhar therefore call upon all 464

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Muslims to not make peace and those who advocate peace are considered apostates, which, according to the Islamist doctrine explicated in the previous chapter, is a condition punishable by death. Even a passive attitude or neglect of this duty against these awful conspiracies constitute s the most heinous sin the article states. They made articulate, sympathetic, rational spokespersons. Used to seeing radicals with checkered headdresses rai ling against Israel, Westerners were now seeing highly educated people in Western dress providing coherent, clam, rational arguments for the Palestinia n position (p. 104-105). Ho wever, behind the rational messages for a sophisticated international academic milieu about the Palestinians merely wanting peace and dignity, a sec ond message was transmitted within the Islamist movement: As long as Israel existed, there would be no peace and the terrorism would continue (Hammes, 2005). Those conflicting me ssages that occurred abroad and in the USF milieu exemplify Ar endts exposition of a campaign of lying to deceive the uninitiated masses. At USF and in its service community, similar conflicting messages about the hidden curriculum of USF-WISE were cast about in the local media, for which the university was reluctant to investigate as a matter of curriculum, teaching, and research. Given that Sami Al-Arian has now confessed to conspiracy to commit terrorism though his array of front organizations, the deception of the dual messages Hammes (2005) notes is evid ent the statements below: In April, the Tampa Tribune interviewed Castor and other USF officials about the Tribunes investigation, which showed IC P and WISE were virtually identical. They shared leadership, a post office box and, for a time, office space. . .ICP publications and records of its annual conf erences included direct fund raising appeals for Islamic 465

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Jihad and Hamas. In response Castor asked for a review of all spending between the university and WISE. But no questions were asked about the think-tanks background, its purpose in Tampa or its financial base (Michael Fechter, U SF Knew of Inquiry by FBI, 1995). This is a very gray area when an institution begins to investigate its members. You cant cross that boundary line (Betty Castor, qtd. in USF Knew of Inquiry by FBI, 1995). By aligning themselves with a university, think-tanks can legitimize themselves. The fact that they have university affiliation allows themselves to pass themselves off as being objective when they really are not [and] pass of shopworn rhetoric as research (Lawrence Soley, Marquette Univer sity Professor, Higher Education Professor who studies thi nk-tanks, qtd. in Kenyon, 1995). Were not in the business of being a shill for propagandists (Jacob Neusner, Distinguished Professor of Religion at USF, qtd. in Cummins, USF Ignored Issue, Jewish Leaders Say,). I have no information that leads me to be lieve [that WISE] is staffed by anyone sympathetic to terrorism or an advocate of terrorism or a participant of terrorism. I think quite to the contrary. Theyre serious scholars who are concerned with peace in the area (Mark T. Orr, qtd. in ONeil, The Oracle Report Ignores Terrorism, 1995). [WISE] was a godsend. [Its scholars were devout Muslim s who] offered the kind of expertise rare to find among American academics (Arthur Lowrie, Part-time USF Professor and former Political Advisor to U.S. Central Command at MacDill A.F.B., qtd. in Niebuhr, 1995, Professor Talked of Understanding but Now Reveals Ties to Terrorists). One of the problems that remain at the uni versity is a lack of balance in the Middle East Studies program. Other professors [besides Shallah] in the universitys Middle East Studies program, which is part of th e International Studies Department, also present one-sided views that offend Jews. Its a very slanted program (Dan Berman, Hillel Foundation Director, qtd. in Dvir, 1995). Suicide bombing is not an irrational action. Islam provides them with a powerful ideology that grants peace to them and a good life in the hereafter because they were defending the land against the enemy (Sami Al-Arian, qtd. in Fechter, Ties to Terrorists, 1995). I heard time and time again in the conferences, The Zionist entity is the dagger in the heart of the Muslim world and must be eradicated. . In most meetings, 466

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al-Arian served as the moderator and host. I dont think theres any question he sets the agenda (Anonymous Researcher at The Wies enthal Center, qtd. in Ties to Terrorists, 1995). In an interview, Al-Arian dissociated hi mself from the Islamic Jihad and Hamas, but questioned whether it is fair to call group members terrorists. Their attacks are justified when they target soldiers, he said (Michael Fechter, Ties to Terrorists, 1995). American student Alisa Flatow killed in the April 9, suicide bombing of an Israeli bus in the Gaza Strip, was an accidental victim, Al-Arian said (Michael Fechter, Ties to Terrorists, 1995). ICP is a charity that cont ributes to humanitarian causes such as hospitals and orphanages (Aslam Abdullah, Editor of the L.A.-based Minaret, qtd. in Fechter, Terror Law Cuts Rights, Arabs Say, 1995). The charge of [ICP] being a fund-raiser for the two groups [Hamas and PIJ] is comical. They are rivals. The Tribune quotes a highly biased sour ce. . It is part of a campaign to distort the Mus lim image and history. . Neither I nor ICP can issue visas. ICP invited over 70 speakers, representing Palestine, Algeria, England, France, Kuwait, Jordan, Syria . What [Fechters article Ties to Terrorists] failed to tell the reader is that our conferences were public and open. We provided . complete translations (Sami Al-Arian, speakin g to an unidentified international terrorism class at USF, qtd. in Buel, The Oracle 1995). Al-Arian said that ICP raised money for African relief, Bosnian refugees, a Somali relief fund and many others (Doug Buel, Oracle Staff Writer, Al-Arian Rebuffs Allegations, 1995). Only Tunisia charges [Rashid Al-Ghannoushi] with being a terrorist (Sami AlArian, qtd. in Al-Arian Re buffs Allegations, 1995). [I was] dismayed to lear n that anyone who once had an association with USF--no matter how brief or smallnow heads an organization that includes violence, antiSemitism, and anti-American ideology among its objectives (Betty Castor, qtd. in Cummins, 1995). The university has not been candid. It wa s more concerned with public relations than honesty. It allowed itself to be decei ved and then, when confronted, it defended that deception (Jacob Neusner, qtd. in Cummins, 1995). [USFs future agreements with outsid e groups will be reviewed thoroughly to prevent the school] from being used in any way by individuals who do not share USFs principles (Betty Castor, qtd. in Cummins, 1995). 467

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The guy opened up his course and said, We re going to talk about the Middle East, and were going to talk about Palestine. I raised my hand and said, Dont you mean Israel? Its an insult to every Jewish stude nt on campus to call Israel Palestine (David Burns, USF graduate, qtd. in ONe il, 1995, Students Say Shallah was Never Obvious). Anyone who is the head of a major terro rist organization is a fanatic. He was teaching on our campus and presenting his views to students, and thats one of the most dangerous things in the world to have access to. Youre presenting your influence to people who are look ing to you for information (Dan Bergman, Hillel Foundation Director, qt d. in ONeil, 1995). He made our job of promoting mutual understanding a hundred times harder and he reinforced the stereotypes which American Mu slims are going to continue to suffer from. I wish we had not been taken in by him, but his academic credentials were good (Darrel Fasching, 1995, Press Release, USF Office of Public Affairs). We couldnt be more surprised. There was never any indication that he had any sympathy with acts of terror for anyones cause (Mark T. Orr, Chairman of COMES and Professor of Government and Inte rnational Affairs, qtd. in Niebuhr, 1995, Professor Talked of Understanding but Now Reveals Ties to Terrorists). He was one of the best things you can ever imagine, someone who wants to give his time and volunteer. Its unbelievable to me (Sami Al-Arian, qtd. in Niebuhr, 1995). In an interview, Al-Arian dissociated hi mself from the Islamic Jihad and Hamas, but questioned whether it is fair to call group members terrorists. Their attacks are justified when they target soldiers, he said (Michael Fechter, Ties to Terrorists, 1995). [COMES] chair Mark Orr recalls that Shil oh was interested mainly in where Wise got its moneyan interest the committee shared. After WISE o fficials said most of the support came from an established Isla mic organizations in Washington, the committee was satisfied, and Shil oh participated in Wise events, Orr and Lowries said (James Harper, Mideast Intrigues Play out at USF, 1996). As the IIIT education theory illustrate d in the previous chapter suggests, elimination of the Zionist enemy would be central to the ideological mass reform program at a deliberately chosen, s ecular, Western research university in which its status quo would be, as Arendt suggests, decomposed. Moreover, aforementioned attempts to defend th e USF-WISE partnership after its 468

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exposure as a PIJ front underscore a tactic illustrated in the II IT brochure itself, to avoid dissension in the ranks, in this case led by Al-Arian and his constituents. Characteristic Three: Campus Holy War and Other Problems at USF and its Milieu Associated with Use of the Un iversity and Intera cting Organizations Historians of higher education in Amer ica would be hard-pressed to find a single case that had mired a university and its external community in a public conflict that would last well over a decade and th at would assume such rich and often surprising contours for analysis. While the Islamist movement itself and Sami AlArian himself were not entirely responsibl e for keeping the wheels of this conflict turning, they are partly re sponsible especially as more and more external organizations established themselves in Tampa Bay in an effort to sway public opinion about the allegations. USF would rema in in the local limelight most of the time and in the national and international limelight some of the time, whether the university sought such publicity or not. Th is sub-section thus details the various problems cited among intraand extramural constituents in USFs curriculum and campus milieu as the case regarding the conspiracy to commit terrorism at USF unfolded in the public domain. In general, that legacy of conflic t underscores Birnbaum (1988), who describes the political culture of higher education institutions as organizational anarchies full of loosely and sometimes tigh tly coupled interest groups competing for recognition and scarce resources. Those gr oups profess devotion to the academic enterprise and academic freedom, a value that group members speak rationally about 469

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when circumstances dictate (Becher, 1998). However, those same groups are nonetheless cognizant of the pow er of Walkers (1979) moral veto and are thus prone occasionally to suspend rational judgment, opting instead for campus holy war in which complex issues of the head are translated into simple matters of the heart. Some of those campus warriors are whom Walker (19 79) refers to as militant third-sector groups who provide stimulus from the periphery but may threaten the university with convulsion if circumstances fa il to favor their cause. During periods of holy war in higher educa tion, the rhetoric of all constituents inflates as warring parties engage in verb al sparring matches during campus meetings and in the media. As the conflict escalate s, various constituents build coalitions designed to expiate the campus of problems that concerns them. Replete with an us versus them habit of mind, a strong se nse of group-think among an aggrieved coalition of onand off-campus constituents permeates the academic milieu. When challenged, Chaffee and Jacobson (1997) assert, groups tend to defend their convictions mightily (p. 235). By comparis on, in young institutions like USF, where faculty are in the process of trying t o prove their worth in the disciplinary community (p. 237), the problem can become acute as leading participants act in seemingly irrational or pat hological ways (p. 193). Already, in media statements cited in this chapters afor ementioned sections, we have witnessed the rhetoric of that campus holy war. For example, the section about conditions leading the to the rationale for the USF-WISE pa rtnership indicates that USF appears to have experienced campus holy war three times in its fifty-year history. The first period happe ned during the 1960s when professors at USF were 470

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investigated by the Johns Commission. After that, there was a long period of relative peace until the early 1990s when two problem s coalesced at or around the same time, the 1994 exposure of Sami Al -Arians fund-raising activ ities for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the 1999 governance restructuring of K-20 education in Florida, an outgrowth of the national acc ountability movement. However, the concept of campus holy war is also a characterist ic of Islamism at USF and its service community, as various groups sought to a void dissension among their ranks. Perhaps the upshot of this media war in which various external and internal USF constituents relied on the media as a primary outlet for voicing their grievances exemplifies Shils (1997) objec tion to higher educations co urtship of publicity. Shils (1997) writes that a universit ys involvement of the media in its affairs encourages a campus ethos in which aggrieved members of th e universities [to] turn to the press . to remedy the wrongs they have suffered (p. 39). Shils (1997) writes that this practice is part and parcel of the intellectual antinom ianism of post-World War II academics whose fields of study have become outlets for the propaganda of whatever social movement of the day is d rigueur For Shils (1997), airing grievances in superficial form in the media, as opposed to thoughtfully debating them in the proper academic forums, serves no purpose in re solving the conflicts embedded in the academys epistemological conflicts. Instead, he states that the trend is anarchistic (p. 192) and further erodes trust in the re levance of an academic institution and in civil society itself. Immediately after Steven Emer son exposed Al-Arian in the Jihad in America documentary in November 1994, followed by Mi chael Fechters investigations in the 471

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following year, Al-Arian undertook intramural and extramural measures to deny the allegations that he was using his profe ssional appointment at the university in a conspiracy to commit terrorism abroad and to spread Islamist propaganda in the university curriculum. For example, Al-Arian wrote letters to campus constituents maintaining that allegations brought against hi m and others were the result of intense pressure on the university by some who are misinformed; are heavily biased; may have hidden agendas, or have totally one sided views when it comes to Islam and the Middle East (Al-Arian, Lette r to Betty Castor, 1995). For over a decade, he repeatedly informed the press that an immigration judge, Kevin McHugh, a nonacademic who presided over Al-Arians brot her-in-laws detention case, regarded WISE as a reputable, sc holarly think-tank (see, inter alia Al-Arian, 2001; Renford, 2002). That being noted, it is also common k nowledge that Al-Ari an testified in immigration court during his brother-in-laws detention in a pen itentiary in Manatee County. In his testimony, Al-Arian plead th e Fifth Amendment in administrative immigration court to over ni nety questions asked of hi m about Mazen Al-Najjar and terrorism allegations that surfaced at USF and in Tampa Bay in late 1994 (see, inter alia Genshafts rebuttal to USFs censure by the AAUP). While pleading the Fifth Amendment in criminal court is not mean ingful in an adjudicative sense, in administrative court it is (Hall, Oxford Companion to the Law 2002). In their understanding of that legal difference, in September 2002, USF, the Genshaft administration and a newly formed local boar d of trustees, attempted to sue Al-Arian under the tenets of administrative contract law, so that the university could ask Al472

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Arian questions about those same allegations Years earlier, Al-Arian had informed President Castor he would refute the allega tions against him, if the university asked. The courts dismissed the USF suit of 2002. Thus one aspect of campus holy war involved exacerbating conflict between USF faculty and administration. Al-Arians offer to Castor is a detail missed by most observe rs. Al-Arian wrote a letter dated June 1, 1995, to Castor, receiv ed on June 2, 1995, in which he informed her that he would refute allegations that he was involved in raising funds for the PIJ-and using USF infrastructure for that cause --that had led to the deaths of U.S. Americans overseas, in violation of federa l foreign relations and national security laws enacted during the Reagan admini stration (Franck & Glennon, 1993). Al-Arian sent copies of the letter to Dr. Michael Kovac, USFs Interim Provost and Dean of Engineering, and Dr. Mark T. Orr, Professo r of Government and International Affairs (GIA), Asia specialist, and then Chai rperson of the Committee on Middle East Studies (COMES). The letter states: Id like to assure you that the slanderous and defamatory reporting concerning me will not go unchallenged. They will be challenged in the appropriate forum. Howeve r, if you or any of your assistants care about a point by point refutati ons [sic] of the Tribunes allegations, Ill be happy to provide them to you face to f ace with full documentation. The researcher has found no evidence in th e universitys records that the Castor administration accepted Al-Arians offer or th at Al-Arian later volunteered the full documentation he claimed to have ha d. Indeed, by the time that Castor commissioned former USF interim president William Reece Smith, Jr., a Tampa attorney, former Florida Bar Associati on president, and former Interim USF 473

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President, to investigate the USF-WISE case, Al-Arian was not available for interviews. Apparently, his lawyers had advi sed him against speaking directly to the relevant university personnel (Reece-Smith, 1996). So it appears that the only venue Al -Arian apparently provided for the university to decide whether he had vi olated the USF academic ethic to teach, conduct research, and even fulfill the U SF mission for community service was the media itself, especially through WUSF-TV, The Oracle student groups, and various off-campus newspapers or on-line media out lets. In other words, except for joining the union during the period that Genshaft announ ced that she intended to fire him, AlArian chose to work outside USFs grieva nce system to plead his case against the university. In those extra-systemic venues, refutation came in the form of generalized statements that Al-Arian had been disc riminated, slandered, defamed, and libeled because of his religion, Palestinian heritage, and political activism. So at the same time Al-Arian was using the media to garner sympathy from USFs and Tampa Bays esprit d corps he leveled charges ag ainst that same media whenever it reported evidence and cr iticism portraying him adversely (Al-Arian, 2001, Freedom of Speech Still Important). Comparing himself variously to Patrick Henry a nd the unpopularity of Jesus and Paul in their time, he wrote, I believe in the American political system and in the Constitution. If I have a problem with a policy, I believe in working with in the system to affect it. . As for my security, I will be cautious (para.10; para. 16). At the time of his arrest, in fact, his wife, Nahla Al-Arian, sister of Mazen Al-Najjar, would compare him to other prophets during courthouse protests (L ush & Brink, 2003; Silvestrini, 2003). 474

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During a decade of media courtship, Al-Arian apparently had re-invented himself as a champion of civil liberty and human freedom and as an American hero, a martyred prophet, and a saint. As campus holy war progressed, more than a few observers regarded the media campaign as a brilliant but cynical effort of Islamist dissembling. While Al-Arians press statements appeared satisfactor y to many external and internal USF constituents--and were sufficient to maintain support and even admiration by colleagues and students on campus--counterterrorism and intelligence experts would disagree, noting that aggressive courtship of the media is t ypical of accused terrorists eventually convicted of their crimes (s ee Dysons The Terrori st in Court in Terrorism, An Investigators Handbook 2001/2005). Supportive of that observation is the media campaign Al-Arian launched af ter the terrorism alle gations surfaced in late 1994 and in the spring semester of 1995. That campaign of alleged character defamation was one that Al-Arian allege dly discussed via te lephone with other known or unknown members of the PIJ, incl uding the first and second Secretary Generals of the designated terrorist gr oup, Fathi Al-Shiqaqi and Ramadan Abdullah Shallah (see FISA wiretap transcripts in U.S.A. v. Sami Amin Al-Arian, et. al 2003). Al-Arians persistent maintenance of media involvement, being one he purposefully may have adopted while continui ng to act allegedly as the PIJs North American leader but started before his exposure in Steven Emersons PBS documentary Jihad in America (1994) and Michael Fechters Tampa Tribune series Ties to Terrorists (1995), apparently kept the university and its service area 475

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community in a divided condition of profe ssional, social, and political conflict for over ten years. The university became the object of public scrutiny and distrust in other ways, too. For example, within a y ear after Al-Arians hiring, ot her developments related to his move to Tampa Bay would take place on and off campus in the Temple Terrace area where he resided. After USF hired Al-Arian, the engineering department accepted his brother-in-law, Mazen Al-Najjar, into its doctoral program at a time, when Al-Najjar was in violation of his non-immigrants student visa. The INS had regarded him as having overstayed the visa (Merzer, 1998). According to federal law, such a violation may result in the suspen sion of a universitys license to host any foreign student or scholar, thereby je opardizing an institutions mission to internationalize its curriculum. While in Tampa, Al-Najjar would be placed in immigration detention twice for the violati on, which federal authorities likely used as a means to force him to turn evidence against his brother-in-law before being deported in 2003 and becoming unindicted co -conspirator number thirteen in U.S.A. v. Al-Arian (2004). According to media reports that surfaced in the mid-1990s, the first time Al-Najjar was arrested and jailed was in April 1985 in North Carolina. In North Carolina, Al-Najjar, having real ized apparently that he wa s at risk of deportation for being in violation of his students visa, en tered into a sham marriage agreement with a woman who testified to that effect in immigration court (Merzer, 1998). The woman who married Al-Najjar for pr ofit stated under oath that she and Al-Na jjar never had lived together and never had consummate d the marriage altho ugh they had been 476

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married for sixteen months. Al-Najjar maintains, however, that the marriage was a love affair that turned sour (Merzer, 1998). USF Media Files suggest that as these details were disclosed in the press, within successive days Al-Arian, various campus constituents, Al-Arians external sup port groups, and his external detractors consistently aired their views in campus, local, national, and international media. In ten years the university would hardly draw a breath as new evidence implicating him in the conspiracy came to light. In response to Al-Najjars detention, Al-Arian formed a new organization called the National Coalition to Protect Political Freedom (NCPPF), which held rallies and press conferences at the Al-Qa ssam mosque and in other venues in Tampa Bay. The NCPPF would become another group that would interact with USF, USF students, and sympathetic in tellectuals as means to pe rsuade the public that the government was targeting Al-Najjar because of his politics, religion, and Palestinian heritage. Two USF professors were drawn into th is battle in the campus holy war. In Tampa Bay, Al-Najjar would be jailed again on the same charges of student visa overstay in 1996. USF professors Dr. Jamil Jrei sat and Mr. Arthur Lowrie testified for Al-Najjars defense in immigra tion court, stating that Al-N ajjar and his family would experience significant social and economic ha rdship were the INS to deport them to the Middle East (USF Media Files, p.2). Al-Najjars wife, a Palestinian who was raised in Saudi Arabia had come, like her husband, to the United States in 1988 and also had overstayed her visitors visa (Merzer, 1998). They were both ordered deported in 1998, but both had a ppealed their deportation orders. Because Al-Najjar 477

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was also deemed a national security risk, he was placed in a federa l prison in Manatee County in 1998; whereas his wife, Fedaa, was not considered a threat and was not jailed (Merzer, 1998). Another major event involving the univers ity that happened during the first year of Al-Arians and Al-Najjiars arrival in Tampa Bay and at USF went unnoticed until revealed in a newspaper report in 1995. That event was a mosque leadership coup in nearby Temple Terrace. According to pr ess reports (Fechter, 1995) and sworn testimony in U.S. Congress (Emerson, 1998), Al-Arian and his brother-in-law began attending an unnamed mosque in Temple Terrace, and on May 8, 1987, they orchestrated a leadership coup at the mosque. The coup was so violent that it warranted a call and eventual repor t by the Hillsborough County Sheriffs Department. Apparently, the commission of violence during the coup resulted in the miscarriage of a pregnant woman involved in the fighting who was struck with a large purse. She also happened to be the imams wife. While this early incident did not occur on the USF campus, the imam of the unnamed mosque was an associate professor of mathematics, Ibrahim Ahmad, employed at the nearby USF. In government testimony he is described as a traditional imam (Emerson, 1998) as opposed to the political kind described by Tibi (1998). Emersons description may or may not be accurate. However, given the context of the violence--Ibrahim Ahmads name exists on several jointly held property deeds with Al-Arian relative to the mosque location and Ahmads name app ears in 1987 as the registering agent and first corporate officer for the mosque--quite clearly some kind of betrayal between two men had occurred, leading one to deny the spiritual authority of the other. 478

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After the leadership coup, Al-Arian became the Temple Terrace mosques new imam, and he named the mosque after Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam, who was a legendary Palestinian leader, activist, and militant from the 1930s who garnered financial and material support through the Muslim Brotherhood in the Pa lestinian terri tories during the time of purchase of Arab lands in the Levant by Jews who were sold those lands by Arab landowners (Fromkin, 1989). To fi nd a mosque similarly memorialized you would have to go the Gaza Strip, Emers on (2002) writes. There the al-Qassam Mosque is a recognized hangout for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a terrorist organization that has established as its trademark the decapitating and dismembering of both Jews and Palestinia n collaborators (p. 110) Actually, Emerson is wrong about only finding another in the Gaza strip. A third exists in Bridgeview, Illinois, and was the location of another mosque leadership coup, a non-violent one. In 2004, its imam raised funds for Sami Al-Arians defense. After the leadership coup in Temple Terrace, the mathematics professor and his wife initiated a civil suit against Al-A rian but later dropped it (Fechter, 1995). The couple had filed an injunction to prevent Al -Arian and others named in the suit from approaching them and their homes (Fechte r, 1995). The Hillsborough police charged someone identified as Hala Al-Najjar with aggravated battery. However, prosecutors in Hillsborough County did not try the case because they believed they did not have enough evidence for conviction (Fechter 1995). The mathematics professors contract with USF was about to expire at the time of the coup, and after the incident he and his family moved out of town (Fechter, 1995). 479

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According to Internet searches and hi s on-line vita, Ahmad has taught at The University of Maryland between 19821983; USF, 1983-1987; NIU, 1987-1999; UCF, 1999-2005. Currently, Ahmad is at Colgate Un iversity. His underg raduate degree is from Cairo University, 1965, making him somewhat older than his rival imamprofessor, Al-Arian, who also came to the U.S. from Egypt. Ahmad acquired his doctorate from Florida Stat e University in 1975. Of interest to this aspect of the study, too, is that the leadership coup in Temple Terrace resembles the kind that occurred in non-radical mosques in Egypt in the 1970s following the re-organizati on of the Muslim Brotherhood into the neo-Muslim Brotherhood as advocated in the doctrines expressed in Qutbs Signposts (Kepel, 1984/1993/2003). In Egypt, the mosque overt hrows were violent and initiated by Muslim Brothers who were part of Egypts intelligentsia. Ofte n, the coups involved mosques nearby universities in an Egyptian version of campus holy war. And so it seems by actions that occu rred at, to, or near USF in 1987, re-Islamization from above and below--through zalzalah concealed advances, and phases of power--may have begun at USF and in the universitys service community, when a full-time USF mathematics professor was compelled to vacate Tampa Bay. Perhaps, therefore, these mosque leadersh ip coups, often violent in nature and involving people in nearby univers ities, are early indicators of terrorism in a local community connected to a university. The ove rthrow of a traditional imam by Al-Arian and his brother-in-law also may signify anot her turn of the screw for the new impulse toward re-Islamization at USF and its service community. If one applies the strategic logic of the Islamist movement, Temple Terrace had become the dar al-harb. 480

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Another battle in campus holy war involved a clause in the USF-WISE partnership acted upon in 1992 at the time that the USF-WISE partnership had formed. USFs College of Arts and Sciences was pla nning a university to university partnership with an institution in the Middle East. This partnership never came to fruition because the U.S. State Department declined USFs proposal after the partnerships exposure as being part of a PIJ front. Evidence of the proposal is detailed at length in the 1996 Reece-Smith report to President Castor, although Reece-Smith (1996 ) does not recognize the significance of the intended partnership as a nother potential means to provi de financial and material support for international terrorism resulting in the deaths of U.S. Americans, students, and other innocent civilians. Nor did ReeceSmith (1996) illustrate how the State Departments decline of the proposal signifi ed a failure in the advancement of USF interests toward internationalizing the curriculum. No t that anyone could have, however, for in the mid-1990s, it was probable that most academics in the United States and at USF were unaware of Al-Najah University being cont rolled vertically and horizontally by Palestinian terrorist organi zations (see discussion of universities in West Bank and Gaza in previous chapter). At that time, it is likely that only government interests in Israel and the U.S. would have known such details. The overseas university in question was Al-Najah University, whose significance in the re-Islami zation from above and below program was articulated in Chapter Four. WISE member Khalil Shik aki, brother of PIJ leader Fathi Al-Shiqaqi, was a professor at Al-Najah before coming to the United States under the auspices of the University of Wisconsin. Sh ikaki presently teaches at Al-Najah today. 481

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The major document Reece-Smith (1996) provides is a proposal to University Affiliations Program of the United States Information Agency, which is a part of the U.S. State Department that has the power to issue or revoke an Am erican universitys license to host foreign nati onal students and scholars. Submitted by Dr. Mark Amen, of USFs International Studies program and COMES member, and Dr. Adib Khatib, Al-Najahs Vice President for Cultural Affa irs and University Relations, the proposal sought involvement from social sciences English language, library sciences, and public health. The document requests funding for $97,947. The faculty exchange program was slated to involve si ngle-semester and short visits. When campus holy war over WISE erupt ed, however, and arguably tarnished the reputation of COMES, GIA, Arts a nd Sciences, and USF as a whole, all hopes evaporated for internationa lizing the curriculum through a university to university partnership, or even to creat e a Middle East studies program But the fact that these plans were in progress at the time the USFWISE partnership was formed may help in understanding why so many USF professors wh o were involved in these projects for shaping the curriculum became so defensiv e when the controversy erupted. In all likelihood, they thought they were doing ge nuine good for their professions and the university. Some, however, arguing for Walkers m oral veto, like Emerson (1998) and Tampa Bays Jewish constituents, would say that some of USFs Middle East professors denied factual evidence that a terrorist cell was using university infrastructure for purposes w holly unrelated to advancing academic freedom at USF. Some pushing for the moral veto even poi nted to other scholar ly evidence (Sivan, 482

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1992; Zamel, 1991; Hatina, 1998; all three disc ussed in Chapter Four) advancing their position that something was amiss--and th at it did not involve the creation and dissemination of knowledge. And one profe ssor, Neusner, would argue that the partnership signified the opposite. Neusner s assessment was that USF had become a shil for propaganda (Editorial, 1996). Other press statements and internal do cuments drafted by faculty reveal the intensity and nature of the interpersonal campus holy war that had spread across the campus. For example, on-going tensions am ong USF faculty serving on the Committee on Middle East Studies (COMES) came to light in the mid-1990s. According to Reece-Smith (1996) and various newspaper re ports found in USFs media files, in 1991, prior to the signing of the partners hip agreement with WISE, one committee member had voiced concerns that WISE mi ght be a front group for HAMAS. That was a concern stated by Dr. Ailon Shiloh, an original member of USFs Committee on Middle East Studies (COMES) from the Department of Anthropology. Shiloh had speculated as much to another COMES me mber, Arthur Lowrie, a long-standing USF adjunct professor in Government and Intern ational Affairs (Fechte r, USF Professor Questioned Ties with Think Tank, 1996). Lo wrie, along with Jreisat, had led USFs push to create the USF-WISE partnership (Reece-Smith, 1996). Shiloh stated that he began asking questions in 1991, wanting to know more about the think tanks source of funding (Fechter, 1996). Shiloh also questioned the th ink-tanks motives, which he argued were for spreading propaganda--not furthering academic debate (Fechter, 1996). 483

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Lowrie, according to Shiloh in another Tribune article, dismissed Shilohs observations about WISE being a front or ganization for terrorism because Shiloh happened to be the only Jew serving on th e seven-member committee (Fechter, 1996). The WISE think-tank had so much money and they were distributing it with such largess. They were paying for everything. . I thought they were setting up a base [for HAMAS]. What better place than Tampa, Fl orida? Completely out of the way (Fechter, 1996). In the same article, Fechter also quot ed another USF professor, Dr. Nathan Katz, as stating therefore that money may have been an overlooked motivation behind [COMESs] relationship with WISE (Fechter, 1996). During the period of partnership formation, the director of COMES, Dr. Mark T. Orr, an Asian spec ialist with GIA, was the addressee on a letter wr itten by Ramadan Abdallah Shallah, who in the letter identified the Saudi-funded IIIT as the largest contributor to WISE. In turn, Lowrie denied Shilohs assertions (Fechter, 1996) Fechter quoted him as saying, It wasnt clear what his con cerns were. Because they were Muslim? Because they were Muslim fundamentalist? Because they were Palestinian? (Fechter, 1996). According to other press reports, an other COMES member, Hechiche, had asked the major COMES backers of WISE about the reputability of WISE. He was given their assurance that the think-tank was above-board in its professional intentions and faculty credentials (Fech ter, 1995, I Was Manipulated , Professor Says). Shiloh, from the anthropology department, and Hechiche, from the government and international affairs department, appear in th e public record about the case as the only 484

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two COMES professors to have asked eith er academic or administrative questions about WISE prior to the signing of the agreement with USF. Campus holy war also was fought over other mysteries involving who knew whom and when and what regarding the USF-WISE partnership formation. Seven months after the USF-WISE agreement, Editor-in-Chief Al-A rian,the founder of WISE, published an article wri tten by WISEs research director, Bashir Nafi, in the October/November 1992 issue. According to the Reece-Smith Report (1996), Nafi was present during a meeting in whic h COMES faculty and WISE members discussed how to present their partnership proposal to the USF ad ministration. At that same meeting, for the first time some COMES members were surprised by the presence of another Palestinian collea gue from across campus, Al-Arian, who was identified as a member of the Musl im community (Reece-Smith, 1996: 43). ReeceSmith (1996) neglects mentioning that the introduction omitted two important details: the Al-Arian was the imam of the nearby Al-Qassam Mosque and the CEO of WISE. In July 1996, Nafi was deported to th e United Kingdom, where he became a citizen years earlier having married an Irish woman. Like Al-Najjar, Nafi had been determined by the INS as having violated the pr ovisions of his visa. In Nafis case, he had come to the United States to work at WISE, but he had left the Tampa area for Herndon, Virginia, where he took up work at the IIIT, the think-tank that funded WISE. Nafis academic credentials were not in Islamic or Middle East studies. In fact, Nafi was a biologist. A nother WISE associate, board member Tarik Hamdi, also worked at the IIIT, twice raided by the FBI (Katz, 2003; Sperry, 2005). 485

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Nafis involvement in the USF-WISE case also received media attention in 1995 and after when press reports had reve aled that he had been cited in a 1991 masters thesis by a Saudi Arabian student, Abdul Aziz Zamel. The media reported and Reece-Smith later investigated that Zamel had quoted another scholar Sivan (1991) that Nafi was a founde r and current leader of th e PIJ, operating out of London. According to Reece-Smith (1996), seve ral USF professors who were COMES members, including Hechiche, Orr, and Jrei sat, signed the thesis but admit to not making the connection between the person cited in the masters thesis and the person who would appear at USF as the research director of WISE. As was noted in the previous chapter, another relevant but pr eviously not reported element of the Zamel thesis is that it, too, boldly states that Palestinian terro rist movements use universities in West Bank and Gaza as fronts for indoctrination, recruitment, and the commission of violence (i.e., re-Islamizat ion from above and below). Statements from Chapter Two of Ab u Rabis edited book on the USF-WISE roundtable discussion with Ahmad are discus sed at length in the Reece-Smith report because COMES and WISE formed at approximately the same time: I would like to say a couple of wo rds about the connection between the University of South Florida and the World and Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE). This is a very happy marriage indeed. . Then comes WISE into the picturean institution devot ed to the research and study of Islamic thought and life. The institution approached us several years ago, and suggested that WISE and the university co-sponsor events on Islam and the Middle East. We, naturally, welcomed this opportunity, and we created the Committee on Middle Eastern Studies in order to facilitate future work with WISE and other similar institutes and scholars in the United States. (Reece-Smith, 1996: 7-8; italics added) Reece-Smith (1996) never references those st atements as having been published in Abu Rabis edited work. Instead, Reece-Smith calls those statements a written 486

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transcript of the proceedings of that conference (p. 7). Therefore, a reader of the report never would know that they had b een published by WISE in the form of a book. Reece-Smith examined the statements because of a suggestion [by an unnamed person he interviewed] that the formation of [COMES] was influenced by the organization known as [WISE] (p. 7). The statements above were made by Dr. Jamil Jreisat, a professor of public administration who served on COMES. Of th em, Reece-Smith concludes: While the latter part of this statement is somewhat ambiguous it can be read to suggest that [COMES] was created at the instance of WISE to facilitate work with WISE and its like organizations (p. 8; italics added). Upon interview, Reece-Smith states that Dr. Jreisat believes his remarks are not correctly transcribed. But assuming they are, he says he erred and he confirmed to me, as others have done, that WISE had nothing to do with the creation of [COMES] (p. 8) In Abu Rabis edited book publication, Jreisats opening remarks occurred in con cert with Ramadan Shallahs, known to most as Ramadan Abdallah, although the curriculum vita and employment application he gave to the GI A department toward his hiring as an adjunct professor teaching out-of-field identifies him by his full name, Ramadan Abdallah Shallah (see USF Media Files with vita contained in them, USF Library Sp ecial Collections). These observations do not imply any wrongdoi ng by Abu Rabi or Jreisat. They are simply clarifications of the historical reco rd of the Islamist movement at USF. Abu Rabis list of Ahmad roundt able participants re-appear s as an appendix in the 1996 Reece-Smith report to President Castor. Th e typography of the list in Reece-Smith (1996) indicates that it was a direct photocopy of the Abu Rabi (1995) list. 487

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Campus holy war also involved USF constituents confusion over the identity of Ramadan Shallah and whether Al-Arian knew him prior to Shallahs arrival in Tampa to teach under the auspices of USF-WI SE. For his part in Shallahs arrival at USF, Al-Arian would tell the media that he had not known of Shallah until his appearance in Tampa, despite Emersons (1994) ability to factually prove that Shallah had been a speaker at Al-Arians ICP c onferences in Chicago in the 1980s. In addition, Shallah cites Al-Arian as a lo cal contact person on his USF employment application found USFs Special Collections Media Files. That detail also suggests that Shallah knew Al-Arian prior to his appearance in Tampa Bay. Moreover, while Shallah was known to his colleagues at USF as Ramadan Abdullah or Abdallah, his employment applications and tax form s show him as having signed the name Shallah to the official USF record. In addition, some university forms reveal the economics professors full name in type-w ritten lettering, Abdullah-Shallah. Later during his appointment at USF, Shallah would turn up in October 1995 in Damascus to announce that he had beco me the PIJs second Secretary-General, after Fathi Al-Shiqaqis assassination, blamed on the Israeli Mossad. Shallahs assumption of the PIJ post in Damascus, which occurred after he had informed his colleagues at USF that he needed to go home to visit his ailing father (Reece-Smith, 1996), became a point of contention in Ta mpa Bay that would serve as further support for Emersons allegations that had surfaced initia lly in late 1994. While many professors who knew Shallah would say they were surprised that a quiet, Muslim professor at USF would turn in to a terrorist (Media Files, p.32), some archival information indicates that the po ssibility could have been foreseen. For 488

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example, Shallahs curriculum vita initially given to Government and International Affairs, the department that hired Shallah to teach Middle East courses, shows that he had served on the editorial board of what is described as an Arabic Monthly, the Al Mukhtar Al-Islami, or The Islamic Selection published in Cairo and an official publishing organ of the neo-Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Modeled after The Readers Digest, this is also the same magazine that was banned in Cairo after the assassination of Anwar Al-Sadat, and al so implicated in the blacklisting of orientalist professors, Muslim and non-Mu slim, who advocate peace with Jews and Christians, Egyptian Copts in particular. According to press reports, some USF professors and others on campus defended Shallahs hiring, claiming that he had amassed a scholarly record (ReeceSmith, 1996). Neusner (1996) harshly critici zed that defense, noting that the WISE scholars at USF were working out of fiel d from their profes sional qualifications. Shallah, hired to teach Middle East politics, held a Ph.D. in economics. Nafi, WISE research director, held a Ph.D in biology. Al-Arian, CEO of WISE, an Islamic studies think-tank, was a computer engineer. Even so, after Shallah announced to the world media that he had become the second Secretary General if the PIJ, there was a period of denial on behalf of USF faculty and one administrato r that the Ramadan Abdallah Shallah in Damascus and the Ramadan Abdullah, as he was known to mo st at USF, were the same individuals. For example, Harry Battson, Associate Vice Pr esident for Public Affairs, stated, We have no independent confirmation that Abdallah is the same person who is reported to now head the Islamic Jihad (Press Statement, 1995). However, as mentioned above, 489

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independent confirmation did exist--in Shalla hs employment files and in other public domain sources, such as Al -Arians Tampa publication, Inquiry. The denials also came despite USFs hi ring of the previous PIJ SecretaryGenerals younger brother, Khalil Shikaki, as a Middle East speci alist in political science. The younger Shikaki was known by COMES professors to be related to the PIJs secretary-general but his credentials were unimpeachable, unlike Shallahs, which, as shown above, is represented by unacademic publications like the Islamic Selection (see Kepel, 1983/2004). In addition, the younger Shikaki was thought not to hold his older brothers militant views, nor did anyone believe he was an actual member of the PIJ. Evidence provided by Katz (2003) in and in the FBI composite video also shows that Shikaki had lectur ed with Al-Arians ICP, knew Ramadan Shallah prior to WISE, yet he denied knowing Shallah outsi de their shared experience with USFWISE. Interestingly, however, the younger Shikaki would be among the few academics intimately familiar with USF-WISE to admonish his colleagues at USF about the blurring of ICP politics with the think-tank, WISE: It was certainly inappropriate for WISE to re ly heavily, if this has been the case, on many people with similar socio-political agendas. USF should encourage WISE to strengthen its scholarly and academic integrity and indepe ndence on ICP (Scholar From the West Bank Shares His Views on USF-WISE Relationship, 1995). Even after August 2002, Al-Arian continued to support for the blur ring of the monolithic political program of ICP with USF-WISE (Minaret of Freedom transcript, 2002). 490

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Campus holy war at USF eventually sp read beyond the USF service area and into the national academic arena, whose l eading legal voices objected to changes in the nations counterterroris m legislation. By 1995, the U.S. State Department had placed the PIJ on its terrorist group list. Furt hermore, under the newly legislated AntiTerrorism Act and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1995 (AEDPA), the material and financial support of international terr orism became illegal and punishable under federal law. In addition, federal law had b een enacted making attempts to disrupt the Israel-Palestinian Peace accords, Oslo I, a federal criminal offense. AEDPA did not go uncontested, howev er, by the well-know n law professor David Cole of Georgetown University, w ho petitioned U.S. Congress to overturn the legislation criminalizing ma terial and financial support for terrorism. Cole, who was one of Mazen Al-Najjars many legal cons ultants during his first detention for immigration violations, later drafted anot her petition against the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act. Both petitions were signed by some of the nations lead ing law professors, including one who would become the lead AAUP investigator regarding alleged academic freedom violations at USF, Dr. William Van Alstyne (Cole, 1996; Dempsey & Cole, 2001). Cole appeared on the USF ca mpus several times to speak about the so-called new McCarthyism and infringements on academic freedom allegedly embedded in the nations counterterrorism laws. His most recent appearance was on May 25, 2006, in the aftermath of Al-Arians confession of conspiracy to commit terrorism. At the same time AEDPA was enacted and contested, some faculty at USF would call the on-going media allegations a bout Al-Arians role in disrupting the 491

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peace process journalistic terrorism (Fasching, 1995). Moreover, USFs vice president for public relations, Dr. Harry Battson, when asked by The St. Petersburg Times in November 1995 to discuss USFs nume rous faculty connections to the PIJ, explained that the PIJ was a humanitarian group. In the process of defending the USF-WISE partnership, he stated, We en tered into the relationship because we thought there were mutual gains. We espouse diversity, we espouse understanding different cultures, and we will always do that (Media Files, p.3). In addition, he was paraphrased as stating that there was no proof that Shallah, WISE or the Islamic Jihad promoted terrorism. The Islamic Ji had does a lot of things, Battson stated, There may be a terrorist element to it, but it is also an important cultural group in the Middle East. Youre making an assumption that because [Shallah] was elevated to the head of an organization that has a terrorist element that he has terrorism on his mind. (Media Files, p.3). After being criticized for those statements, Battson later told the press that he had been misquoted. Whether Battson was accurately quoted or not, academic justification for groups that double as terrorist fronts is not unique. Indeed, the same justification has been argued forcefully by the nations lead ing law professors. Wh ile in the previous chapter this study showed that the PIJ ne ver has maintained a humanitarian wing like its HAMAS counterpart, law professor Davi d Cole would continually press that AEDPA, and later the USA PATRIOT Act, was a means of punishing individuals based on their association and not criminal actions related to international terrorism financing. Or, in other words, he would a pply the same logic in more general terms than USFs various external and internal constituents in Tampa Bay would apply in 492

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their defense of Al-Arian, two gradua te students (Mazen Al-Najjar and Sami Hammoudeh), one board member (Tarik Hamd i), and two other pe ople who taught at USF-WISE (Ramadan Shallah and Bashir Nafi). The contours of campus holy war manifest ed in other ways that went largely unobserved to the masses of constituents at USF and in Tampa Bay. Nevertheless, the battle drew a distinct parallel to th e ways in which problems regarding the intimidation of takfir or orientalist professors o ccurred on campuses in the Middle East, in Egyptian versions of campus holy war. For example, one case involves Khalid Durans reprisal after he published unfavorable views of Saudi Arabia in The Role of Political Islam in 1978, noted above. Emerson (2002) states that, originally, Saudi Arabian government agents blacklisted Duran and then, years later, Duran was blacklisted again by the Council for American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), an advocacy group for civil rights. That blacklisting later evolved into a fatwa or religious ruling, by a Jordanian cleric calling for the University of Chicago professors blood. Blumer (1946/1951/1993) calls the groundswell of support for a mass social movements beliefs and actions, while often not directly rela ted, a form of contagion typical of mass movements. Arguably, that kind of cont agion led to Durans fatwa through the communications of Islamists and sympathetic in stitutional support apparatuses. Duran would not be the only dissenting professor targeted for blacklisting. Campus holy war also manifested in th e apparent blacklisti ng of an alleged orientalist professor at USF, according to several documents found in President 493

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Castors archives labeled Islamic Jiha d. Those documents reveal a surprising history of the problem at USF of which few people are aware. Findings in Castors Islamic Jihad file indicate that in 1981, a local newspaper reporter accused USFs senior Middle East specialist, Dr. Abdelwahab Hechiche, who was hired in 1970 to teach international affairs, of supporting the PLO. The public accusation came many years before the PLO was recognized internationally as anything except a terro rist organization. Hechiche informed the university that he would resign from his pos ition if proven guilty of the charges. He faced his accuser in a public forum and re futed the journalists claims. In a letter found in Castors files, Hechiche claims that his campus colleagues did not defend him when the allegations surfaced. Hechic hes 1981 predicament, combined with later developments regard ing his scholarship in J udeo-Arab relations and humanitarian peace initiatives, resurfaced within the chambers of his department, GIA, the USF administration, and the USF po lice department as the Al-Arian affair unfolded in 1994-1995. Some context here is on order: re call that after the November 1994 PBS documentary Jihad in America and the May 1995 Tampa Tribune s Ties to Terrorists series, Hechiche became the first and one of the few faculty to state that he and the university had been manipulated and exploited. In the press, he also stated that the university had failed to grasp the internati onal significance of what had happened at USF. The universitys hand ling of the case apparently compelled Hechiche to resign from his COMES member position, as he urged the university to investigate the allegations. The following y ear, an article bearing his name and other 494

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university personnel names appeared in an Arab-American newspaper in Washington, D.C., Al-Nashra Then in 1998, a video produced by an organization started and presided by Sami Al-Arian, appeared in Tampa Bay. It, too, presented Hechiches name and 1995 press statements about U SF-WISE in it, tacitly implicating the professor and mysterious forces in the U SF service area in a conspiracy to defame Muslims and Arabs. According to confiden tial sources, at various points in time over the past decade, those documents were distributed or shown on campus, in Tampa, and to select Muslim-Arab audiences around the country who would have been subscribers to the Engl ish-language magazine Al-Nashra headquartered in Washington, D.C.. Al-Nashra has affiliated publishers in the Palestinian territories, as a basic on-line search shows. These works published by Arab Media and pro-Islamist groups in the United States and in the Palestinian territories variously implicated Hechiche and several other USF employees in an Israeli-led cons piracy to disrupt th e Middle East peace process (The Melissa Carlson Story) or to defame devout Palestinian Muslims residing in America ( The Case of Mazen Al-Najjar ). Both accusations are quite grave if directed toward a Muslim. In the eyes of Islamists, conspiracy with Jews and Israel signify apostasy (see, for example, Chapte r Fours discussion about the pamphlet The Neglected Duty and Al-Sadats a ssassination following Egypts peace accords with Israel). The first of the two works appeared one year after Clintons executive order making the disruption of the Oslo Peace Accords a federal criminal offense. In 495

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consideration of these documents and in lig ht of Al-Arians confession, one must ask whether their publication signified an attemp t to deflect attention from Al-Arian onto someone else. Section III: Conclusion Perhaps the most salient finding about the contours of re-Islamization at USF amounts to another paradox of Islamisms Western mind hostile to the West. The academics that served on the board of directors of WISE and who worked at USFWISE published and wrote articles denouncing the full course of world history after the Reformation. They believed the Reformation rendered legitimate a conspiracy that granted tolerance toward Jews. Yet, the Reformation denounced by Islamists at USF in their English-language publications in Tampa Bay brought them the one value they would esteem when challenged about their alleged misuse of it: academic freedom. Up until his arrest in 2003 and subsequent firing, Al-Arian displayed masterfully his grievances in a way that appealed to broad groups of people on campus, off campus, and on the international stage. Like the leaders who had used universities as ladders to power in Mi ddle Eastern and African universities, he astounded friends and enemies alike in his persuasive arts and organizing skills. Colleagues who participated in or defended USF-WISE and its roundtable lectures had cast themselves as part of an accepting, like-minded group espousing terms that seemed good but might not have been good, dialogue, understanding, 496

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resurgence, and revival. Beneath the ve neer of those soft terms that never were fully defined in the media war after the challenge was the program re-Islamization of society and knowledge. That program hid in a curriculum in plain sight, as all hidden curricula do hide. When evid ence of it in a thirty-two page brochure was given to them, key faculty and administrators apparen tly did not question it. Moreover, it may have been wrought by non-criminal secret so cieties hiding in broa d daylight: those of the ISNA network, for which Al-Arian was a founding member. Re-Islamization of society and knowledge was the product of an Islamist epistemological ferment perhaps within the purview of academic experts at USF to debate in scholarly forums. Instead, di scourse apparently degenerated into ad hominem sparring matches in the local media. Counter-Reformationist hostility to ward academic freedom rights and responsibilities at USF, inauspiciously c onceived by what Lowrie in June 2005 called Sami Al-Arians lies, was comparable to similar assaults identified in Chapter Four in the form they took but not in degree. At USF there would be no kidnappings or murders of Orientalist professors collabo rating with Zionists, Jews, Crusaders, and Christians; but there may have been denial s of course teaching and subtle and not-sosubtle blacklisting in Arab media and civil rights advocacy videos. Those challenges to the academic ethic apparently may have been overlooked by a coalition of onand off-campus consti tuencies who, for over ten years, charged that Al-Arian was the target of a conspir acy to defame and stereotype Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims, and Islam itself. That coalition focused on the ideologies of Israel, America, the West, capitalism, nationalis m, multinationalism, Zionism, Judaism, 497

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498 secularism, racism, neoconservatism, Mc Carthyism, counterterrorism, but not Islamism as the cause of Al-Arians unwelcome PBS exposure in 1994. Al-Arian himself had laid the foundati on for this remarkable organizational network that may have kept th e university in a state of conflict for over ten years. Many onlookers were persuaded by the deep expressions of his grievances and charges of racism and discrimination; others, such as pot ential apostates and dissenters suffered silently, chilled by th e threat of professional recrimination, campus intimidation, and defamation litigation. September 11, however, emboldened people--including a new univers ity president--to ask, How much must we endure? The voice of a religion transformed into a political ideology thus may have come to USF and its service community in the form of front groups having criminal and non-criminal purposes. They co-opted a universitys sympathy for minorities, its ambiguous academic ethos, and its institutional policy vacuums during a period of program expansion, mission internati onalization, and governance change.

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Chapter Six Summary, Conclusions, Implications, and Suggestions for Future Research Problem Statement Leading scholars in the field of Middle Eastern studies, especially through its professional group, The Middle Eastern St udies Association (MESA), have not studied the interplay of Islamism, if view ed as a totalitarian mass social movement, with higher education. By interplay, this inquiry means the ideologies, strategies, and legacies of direct and indirect action a ssociated with Islamist movements as those movements interact with highe r education. In short, that interplay may be referred to as re-Islamization from above and below. The term re-Islamization refers to a mid-twentieth-century intellectual trend in th e Middle East that cont radicted an earlier one known as de-Islamization in which modernizing societies began separating sacred and profane spheres of life (D uran & Hechiche, 2002). The terms from above and from below also require some definition, owing inspiration to Tibis (1998) and Kepels (2002) hi stories of the Islamist movement. From above is a term employed in political and military science to denote dramatic, direct action aimed at preparing a society for the ultimate objective of wholesale governance changethe creation of a new socio-polit ical order. From below is a term employed in political and military science to denote indirect action, especially through covert propaganda campaigns and institutional subversion, aimed at preparing a society for wholesal e governance change. As Arendt 499

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(1948/1951/1966/1968/1976/1979/1994) overtly c onveys, and Tibi (1998) and Kepel (2002) imply, where there manifests th e above strategy, there manifests the below kind, as well. In addition to the absen ce of inquiry in Middle East studies, experts in the field of higher education have not studied Islamisms interplay with higher education, which ostensibly could lay out baseline information about the characteristics and substantive causes and conditions that invo lve Islamism in higher education. While this study considers terrorism or political vi olence as a potential characteristic of the Islamist movement, coverage in this an alysis extends to the mass movements nonviolent characteristics. The problem of Islamism in higher educat ion is apparently worldwide, existing not only in universities in the Middle East but also in North American universities, most notably at The University of South Florida (USF), in Tampa, Florida, a highly publicized case in which computer engi neering professor Dr. Sami Al-Arian, a Palestinian born in Kuwait and self-descr ibed enlightened Islamist (qtd. in Time 2002), was indicted by the federal government on terrorism and criminal racketeering charges and later fired by university presid ent Dr. Judy L. Genshaft. At the time of writing, Al-Arian has confessed to a crim inal charge of conspiracy to commit terrorism. Findings of fact in the trial U.S.A. v. Al-Arian (2005) reveal that some of that conspiracy occurred on the USF campus through the establishment of a front organization attached to the university in the form of a legal partnership for the purpose of directing communications on beha lf of the criminal enterprise, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). 500

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Of the case against Al-Ari an, terrorism expert Steven Emerson (1998), in consideration of his and other media inve stigations resulting in the governments occasional declassification of in formation to the public, writes: Beyond the issue of how a terrorist front could operate undetected for nearly five years, an interesting question raised was to what degree was The University of South Florida complicit in the creation of a terrorist cell? According to documents collected by federal authorities and interviews with various university officials, mounting ev idence suggests that university officials closed their eyes to the warnings an d indications that a terrorist cell was operating with the university imprimatur. (p.40) Of that alleged terrorist cell operating at USF, Emerson (1998) further states that it succeeded, in large part, in establishing [its] support infrastructure because [it] networked together with other militant Islamic groups in a pan-Islamic militant partnership most readily seen in the first World Trade Center bombing, a collaboration from five diffe rent radical Islamic organi zationsthe Gama Islamiya, Islamic Jihad, al-Fuqra, Sudanese Nati onal Islamic Front, and Hamas (p.41). While radical Islamic fundamentalism, or Islamism, has been studied widely in the academy, the tendency of the most publicized and, arguably, the most influential of intellectuals is to palliate its more inimical aspects (e.g., intellectual persecution, religious persecution, rarefaction of know ledge), favoring it as a revolutionary liberation theology that champions the self -determination of oppressed cultures (see, inter alia Said, 1978, 2001; Chomsky, 2001; Esposit o, 2002). That view represents a core element of post-colonialism and anti-W estern resistance theory fashionable in Middle East studies (see, inter alia Lewis, 1994, Tibi, 1998: Kramer, 2001). Outside the academys orthodox point-of-view, however, are many scholars throughout the world who do regard Islamism as a totalitarian threat or at least as a 501

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mass social movement with hegemonic objec tives that destabilizes societies and discriminates against women, secularists, humanists, Westerners, Jews, Christians, non-Arab minorities, and liberal Muslim s (Tibi, 1998; Duran & Hechiche, 2001; Kramer, 2001; Pipes, 2002; Yeor, 2002; Meddeb, 2003; Warraq, 2003). What that may signify, in effect, then, is that few in the academy, owing to professional views that might cause them to look positively or naively toward mass social movements in education, simply have not conceived that there may be a difference between Islam, the religious faith of millions of Muslims around the world, and Islamism, a violent, repressive political ideology with aspi rations of global hegemony (Fregosi, 1998; Tibi, 1998; Duran & Hechiche, 2001; Pipes, 2002; Yeor, 2002; Meddeb, 2003; Warraq, 2003) that deliberately uses higher education to advance itself ideologically and strategically. Therefore, and arguably, when such a political ideology establishes itself within a higher educati on institution, few in that institution possess the kind of specialized knowledge or criti cal judgment that would pr ovide cause for concern, or even the moral resolve to question the propr iety of that movement on a university campus. Purpose of the Study Specialization in area studies programs like Middle East and higher education seldom advance conceptual research models that triangulate their and other multiple fields of theoretical expertise and practice from across academic disciplines in order to create new knowledge out of existing knowledge, and then enrich that same discourse with current case study observation. In this study, the researcher consulted numerous works by the worlds foremost au thorities and publishing houses in Middle 502

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East and higher education studies, concluding that experts in both areas have not explored directly Islamisms interplays w ith higher education to advance Islamisms agenda for worldwide reformation. Thus, the purpose of this study was to explore that interp lay. Therefore, the researcher situated the case of alleged Is lamist international terrorism and related matters at USF in a global context, comparing and contrasting conditions and characteristics involving Islamism and USF with similar problems in other parts of the world. At the same time, however, th e study triangulated extant theory and research from social psychology, political sc ience, and history about the collective behavior and characteristics of mass movements, their leaders, and their followers. According to Walker (1979), a university chancellor and sociol ogist, the collective nature of mass social movements is more responsible for the problem of mass movements in higher educati on than are the ch aracteristics and c onditions of higher education itself in drawing mass movements to it. Walker (1979) does state, however, that the democratic nature of the university offers a loophole of which mass social movements take advantage. Within that overarching context, the case involving Islamism at USF, 1986-2007, became an important example for analysis. Research Questions Out of the aforementioned strands of discussion about the problems hypothetical conditions and characteristics, the researcher established two overarching research questions for the study: 503

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1. What are the conditions and characte ristics of Islamisms interplay in higher education in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Levant, Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan? 2. What are the conditions and characteristics of Islamisms interplay with USF and its service area, 1986-2007? In this study, interplay came to be unde rstood as the contours of interrelating ideologies, strategies, and legacies of di rect and indirect action undertaken by the Islamist movement in the university milieu and its surrounding environment. In short, it connotes a decades-old process that Kepel (2002) in his work The Trail of Political Islam calls re-Islamization from above and below. That interplay involves a range of temporal developments manifesti ng as conditions upon which the Islamist movement exacted its influence in host societies, and out of thos e conditions arise the Islamist movements characteristics. In this analysis, we examine those conditions and characteristics as they pertain to ma tters of higher education. In this inquiry conditions signify things that give rise to the occurren ce of the Islamist movement in higher education institutions in a partic ular place and time. Characteristics refers to certain features that are typical of the Islamist movement in higher education institutions in a particular place and time As will be shown, sometimes a condition in one place represents a char acteristic in another. Method So with those details abou t the array of extant lite rature about mass social movements in higher education in mi nd, this study employs a method of historiography involving Foucaults (1969, 1971) theory of institutions to investigate 504

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Islamisms interplay with higher educati on, culminating in a study of the movement and its leadership at USF. Its philosophi cal base being postmodernist in origin, Foucaults theory of institutions acce pts Derridas (1966, 1967) arguments that language, or signification, is not transcendental, and is, to the contrary, quite arbitrary and sometimes coerced in institutional settings regarding meaning, which happens through a process of signification, or free pla y, or interplay. In short, things signify other things but they do not mean other things in a transcendental sense. Writing about the history of sexuality and pe nal systems, Foucault (1969, 1971) employs Derridas deconstruction of what Derrida calls the transcendental signified and shows how institutions and sub-institutions engage in an interplay of linguistic signification and other practices in or der to consolidate power and knowledge, imposing limitations on discourse through structures of instit utional thought. In the study of organizations, inst itutional analysis focuses on the multiplicity of factors involved in describing organizational life and events (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998: p. 43). Hence, in their drawing upon Foucaults theory, Said (1978, 1983), White (1974), Leitch (1992), Czarniawska (1997), and Meddeb (2003) variously employ Foucaults theory to culture, academic disciplines, literature, organizations, and Islamism, respectively. T hose institutions are each involved in a signification process with other sub-inst itutions, such that critics of those institutions and sub-institutions may interpret the signification process by analyzing, inter alia ideological habits of mind, basic assumptions (and reactions to challenges of those basic assumptions ), actions, archives, pedagogy, taboos, publishing records, religious texts, and judici al texts. In turn, au thors, or people who 505

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signify, lose control over the meaning of their institutions andsub-institutions. At the same time, critics can, as White (1974) states, re-familiarize us with events which have been forgotten through either accident, neglect, or repression by looking at the ways in which events evol ved, providing more information about them, and showing how their developments conform to or deny other [signifying] story types (pp.399-400). In this analysis, a three-year process of coding for thematic association reveals an interplay of ideologies, strategies, a nd legacies of direct and indirect action diffused across geographical space and time, with higher education representing organizational territory upon which the Islami st movement and its leaders exact their plans for ultra-nationalist conquest. By codi ng, this inquiry means the simultaneous collection and analysis of da ta that is compared and contrasted to the point that interrelated concepts are ref ined and integrated into the theoretical framework of the study (Charmaz, 2000: p. 509). This coding process proved to be well-suited for an inquiry that draws from multiple academ ic fields of study because it accounts for variation and permits modification of es tablished analyses as conditions in the research changed or as further data were gathered (p. 510-511). Coding of the data also involved textual analysis of the Islamist movements discourse on three interrelated levels identified by Johnston in Methods of Social Movement Research (2002): world-historical (e.g., the discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood and its leadership), organizational (e.g., the educational discourse of the International Institute of Islamic Thought), and individual (e.g., the discourse of Sami al-Arian). As the researcher amassed and an alyzed evidence over the past three years, 506

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the aforementioned research que stions were reframed into their current form for the purposes of systematically presenting the fi ndings in later chapters. Eventually, the coding method led to the classification of c onditions and characteristics essential to Islamisms interplay in higher education, th e contours of which are presented in rich detail in Chapters Four and Five. Response to Research Question One The first research question examined Islamisms interplay in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Levant, Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan. The fi ndings reveal a process of re-Islamization in higher education th rough direct and indi rect action across geographical times and space, with the transnational organization the Muslim Brotherhood serving as a purveyor of fr ont activity aimed at undermining existing civil service organizations, including higher education, from below That kind of decomposition of the status quo, as Arendt calls the process in The Origins of Totalitarianism signifies a form of covert acti on aimed at the slow subversion of overarching culture, after which would result in Middle Eastern versions of what Walker calls campus holy war engendered by professor-led militant third-sector groups in The Effective Administrator In the process, purveyors of re-Islamization view the higher education milieu as fresh territory for conquest. As part of the process, Islamists develop and establish codified educational programs and hidden curricula directly tied to thei r stated world-historical discourse to bring the entire world under the banner of true Islam, th at amounts to nothing more than a revolutionary paradigm paradoxically inspir ed by Western ideologies conceived and cultivated in Western universi ties. Over a span of severa l decades, the conditions and 507

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characteristics of Islamism in higher educat ion arose first in Egypt and then expanded into other locales. In the locales studied, the Ikwhan (Muslim Brotherhood) movement proved itself very adroit at fill ing large and small po licy vacuums in the societies where it maintained charters, but there was a tradeoff: academic freedom and the sense of physical security requisite for it to take place in the locales studied suffered huge losses in the Islamist m ovements battle for the Muslim mind. In Egypt, particular conditions were found, the first which was a major temporal development affecting the entire Islamic world, the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate. That major condition engendered Ikwhan ideologies, strategies, and legacies that would be carried forward into the other locales studied. A second condition that primarily in E gypt, the intellectual center of the Islamic world, was the exposure of Salafist theologi cal doctrine to radical Wester n ideologies and an overall de-Westernizing ferment in Western-style institutions during Egypts period of deIslamization. A third condition in Egypt was the exposure of Ikwhan ideology to European Fascism through a strategic and id eological alliance with the Nazis in World War II. Finally, a fourth condition giving rise to Islamisms continued interplay in higher education was the Egyptia n governments alternating attempts to appease or repress the Ikwhan movement. Characteristic of Islamism in Egyptian higher education were the amassing of organizational networks run by highly educated elites interacting with universitie s and their service area communities. That front activity served the Ikwhan movements two-pronged reformist program, reIslamization from above and below. Other characteristics included implementation of a codified educational theory to intellectuall y subvert universities and their societies; 508

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the enactment of an distinctly Islamist version of campus holy war that involved intellectual intimidation, persecu tion, and terrorism; and the transnational influence of the Islamist movement in Egypt to other locales through the migration of Ikwhan professors and students. In Saudi Arabia, the Levant, Algeria, T unisia, and the Sudan, the transnational migration of professors and students from Egypt became a major condition toward the advancement of Islamisms interplay in higher education in t hose locales. Saudi Arabia had another distinct condition, how ever, owing to its accumulation of oil wealth that necessitated the expansion of its educational bureaucracy: changes in educational policy to appease the isolationi st Wahhabi sect that, in turn created, a range of transnational organizations w hose members consisted of the Al-Sheikh family (e.g., Wahhabi) and exiled Ikwhan members residing in the Kingdom. In Saudi Arabia, the Levant, Algeria, Tunisia, a nd the Sudan, higher education saw similar characteristics such as organizational front activity, campus holy war, and outmigration of professors and students to other places in the world, including North America, Tampa Bay, and USF. Response to Research Question Two Islamisms conditions and characteris tics at USF and its service community could be examined more closely as events unfolded in the resear chers presence and because the researcher could obtain subs tantial documents from websites, news media, and USF archives. While there ar e some differences between the global referent and the local one, the overarching similarities are striking, especially in terms of the characteristic establishment of ex ternal and internal front organizations 509

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interacting with USF, the intended use of c odified Islamist educational theory as part of a hidden curriculum at USF, and the fomenting of campus holy war. Ikwhan activity was documented in the USF case and connections to the other locales studied were explicitly established. Conditions laying the foundation for Islamism at USF and in Tampa Bay included changed in the university mission ove r a period of several decades leading to the internationalization of th e university. Those changes cu lminated in a partnership agreement between USF and World Islam St udies Enterprise (WISE), funded by an Ikwhan-associated think-tank, the International Institute of Islamic Thought, and run by members of the Palestinian Islamic Ji had who held dual membership in the Muslim Brotherhood. In turn, those memb ers brought other Muslim academics from places like Tunisia and the Sudan. Those academ ics also held dual membership in the Muslim Brotherhood, aside from being the leaders of the Islamic Tendency Movement and the Sudanese Liberation Front. Another condition involved epistemological changes in higher educati on that gave rise to de-Westernizing intellectual trends affecting Middle East studies. That condition further laid the groundwork for the front activ ity that would develop at USF. Furthermore, the activity would not have occurred ha d there not been a migration of Ikwhan-associated students (e.g., Sami al-Arian, Ramadan Shallah) from the Mi ddle East to North America. Those students--who became profe ssors at USF and directed the think-tank at USF, WISE, a front for the PIJ--were mo tivated to turn USF and its service area community into territory for intellectu al conquest, inasmuch as they sought a command and control center for conspir acy to commit international terrorism. 510

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Relevance to the Literature Review Higher Educations Characteristics and Conditions This inquirys findings suppor t most of the discussion in the literature review about organizational and administrative theo ry and practice in hi gher education. Here, we discuss higher educations characteristic s that cause higher education to welcome the mass movement into its milieu. Numerous books and articles studied seem generalizable in an international context, with Western theory and practice applicable to the Middle Eastern and African locales selected for this inquiry. The reason for application of Western theory and practi ce to Middle Eastern and African locales involves the simple fact that Islamists a nd Islamist organizations have what Pipes calls a Western mind. As Lewis suggests, even their concept of world revolution toward achieving the Nizam Islami is not located in the Koran. To the contrary, the concept emanates from Islamisms exposur e to revolutionary ideologies conceived and cultivated in Western universities or through the Muslim Brotherhoods strategic and ideological alliance with the Nazis during World War II. All of the Islamist educat ional theory and practice studied in this inquiry embraces de-Westernizing principles discussed by Chaffee and Jacobson (1997), Stark and Latucca (1997), Musil (1997), Kramer (2001), Margolis (2001), and Soldantenko (2001). At USF that de-Wes ternizing presupposition appears crucial toward the partnership formation of USFWISE, which internal campus constituents hoped would become a formidable area stud ies program in the Southeastern United States. Globalization, as discussed by Gaff and Raticliff (1997), Johnston and 511

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Spalding (1997) and Cohen (1997), was also a driving force behind the partnership, for who would deny the need for USF to know about non-Western cultures? The Islamist epistemology that supported the U SF-WISE curriculum also received support from a broad base of social science scholars who organized the production and dissemination of knowledge ar ound neo-Marxist and postcolonial theories (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Stanley 2002; Margolis, 2001; Soldantenko, 2001). As Becher (1989/1993/1996) and Birnba um (1988) could have guessed, the organized anarchy of a university during a pe riod of rapid expansion left many policy vacuums for people with common ideological ca uses to fill, and those people reacted mightily when their basic assumptions were challenged. They rested their selfdefense on academic freedom claims and avoided the real issue affecting the curriculum, the clash of epistemologies. At various points, th e university either passively withdrew from the conflict or was accused of wan ting to silence intellectual exchange. Supportive of Shils (1997) and Wa lker (1979) the university became mired in campus holy war in which grievances we re aired almost entirely in the media, and not in traditional academic forums. Islamisms Characteristics and Conditions This inquirys findings demonstrate st rong support of the various strands of research in the literature review on the social psychology of mass movements, Islamic fundamentalism, and terrorism. Here, we st art with a discussion about Islamisms characteristics that render higher educa tion susceptible to being viewed as a dar alharb (domain of war), which Islamist leaders and their esprit d corps of external and internal constituent gr oups attempt educational refo rm--understood in Islamist 512

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terms as zalzalah, or shaking--or use university infrastructure for purposes other than research and teaching in order to cause instability in societies leading toward the overthrow of existing governments. Whether abroad or at USF, all university systems studied were subjected to zalzalah, re-Islamization from below. Herbert Blumer, first a sociologist at The University of Chicago and later distinguished chairperson of sociology at The University of California at Berkeley, is most responsible in Western research for advancing a theory of collective behavior developed initially in the 1940s and refine d through the 1960s. Defining collective behavior as the way in which a new soci al order arises [under] the emergence of new forms of collective behavi or (p. 169), the chapter findi ngs about the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood suggest similar genesi s of elementary co llective groupings in Al-Bannas village, where Al-Banna, a sheikhs son, became the leader of two societies that predate the Muslim Brothe rhood. These were small-order social groups that fined, denounced, or drafted secret a nd often threatening letters (Mitchell, 1969/1993: p. 2) against people alleged to have acted un-Islamically. That early activity in those small socie ties would be repeated in a grand manner later on with Al-Bannas f ounding of the Muslim Brothe rhood in 1927 and, as the Twentieth Century progressed, into an Islamist internationale of leaders and followers caught by a social contagion that always continues to operate . for a long time and in which unreflective responses of individuals . becomes pronounced (Blumer, 1946/1951/1963: p. 176-177). In turn, th at social contagion --which is a term employed by the Tunisian scholar Meddeb (20 03) to describe the malady of Islam-is in its more advanced stages one that causes far-reaching effects on institutions 513

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ensuing from shifts resulting from the selective interests on the mass (p. 187) to establish a new order of life (p. 199). While the Mu slim Brotherhood, through its administrative structure and tasks would pr ovide helpful educational assistance to Egyptian students in mass universities, ultimately the influence of the organization would become responsible for its and its asso ciated terrorist groups affronts to higher education in the totalitarian quest for Nizam Islami (i.e., Islamic Order). As in the overseas cases, Islamist leaders at USF also demonstrated uncanny skill for appealing to a broad base of onand off-campus cons tituents in the service of their objectives. In this sense the greatest goal was to re-Islamize society and knowledge by harnessing control not only of educa tional curricula but also the media. In the service of that utopian end, Islamism developed a program of re-Islamization that came to be prom ulgated through secular and religious universities. As Blumer (1946/1951/1993) states, the development of a specific program is a hallmark of any mass movement. In so doing, the program possesses its own distinct propaganda and behavior requi ring an appealing setting (p. 194). In this chapter, higher educati on represents one of those appealing settings for reIslamization of society and knowledge from above and below. That program is a mainstay of Islamist groups in all locales studied, and is also the mission of the IIIT in Herndon, Virginia, whose Saudi-published ed ucational texts are distributed in over seventy countries. Islamists at USF made no secret of their intentions. The objectives of their secret societie s hid in broad daylight. As Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) writes, that program enjoins various means to achieve its objectives: agitation, an esprit de corps morale-building, ideological 514

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formation, and operating tactics. Through higher education, the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups and sub-groups exam ined exhibit those same traits, replete with slogan The Koran is My Const itution and other discourse such as The Protocols of the Elders of Zion that utilizes the emoti onal attitudes and prejudices which people already have (p. 195). Th at behavior, Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) would argue, classifies Islamism as a reli gious nationalist movement in which the past of the people is glorified and is int imately associated . with a feeling of inferiority (p. 219). The idea expounded in Islamist educational discourse that Muslim civilization was weakened and oppressed by an alleged Jewish-Crusader conspiracy, in which the creation of the state of Israel was the alleged final turn of the screw, underscores the inferiority comple x of the worlds most pressing problem today, a religious ultra-nationalist moveme nt with adherents willing to use mass casualty terrorism to restore the ummah or Community of the Faithful. Arendts (1948/1951/1966/1968/1976/1979/1994) study The Origins of Totaliatarianism also proved applicable to a Middle East context, especially in terms of its analysis of Islamisms potential to subvert education and commit terrorism through a build-up of criminal and non-cr iminal front groups interacting with universities. Arendt understands that the pa ramilitary character of totalitarian mass movements cannot be appreciated fully if they are not examined in connection to other organizations created by those moveme nts (e.g., legal, educational, university professional, etc.). What Arendt calls a t echnique of duplication was documented in all locales studied, whether in the Middle East, Africa, or North America. Those secret societies hiding in plain sight ma y serve important humanitarian purposes 515

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but they nevertheless exist as instruments of destruction as non-initiated people involved with the movement are consistently lied to and intellect ually prepared to accept swift and radical deterioration of professional standards (p. 372). Blumer and Arendt notwithstanding, a nother scholar from the Fourteenth Century, Ibn Khaldun, writes presciently in The Muqaddimah (1377/1989) about characteristics of Islamic civilization. Written during a period in which Islamic civilization was in a state of decline, after having made gr eat scientific achievements, one of Khalduns chapters is about educa tion and ways of knowing things. Khaldun (1377/1989) suggests that di vine knowledge and other forms of knowledge, like medicine, should be kept separate and not subsumed under religious law. His reasoning stemmed from his obs ervations of the decline of the Muslim world. In his work, he lamented the takeover of religi on and life by a group of Islamic scholars who had confused matters of theology with those of philosophy (p. 137). The same process is happening throughout the world today, but the diffe rence is that the year is 2008, not 1377, and the confusion of faith and reason aff ects the entire world, not just the Islamic world. It is those same orthodox scholars, who might be better described as Islams first fundamentalists and whose so-called Golden Age Islamists expound perennially through their educational theory, that seek application of Koranic law to the study of the academic disciplines. As Khaldun (1377/1989) observed in his day, that kind of intellectual coup-making results not in an expansion of knowledge but, rather, in its contraction, which is not a purpose of higher education. It should come as no surprise, then, that members of the Ibn Khaldun Society in Cairo, Egypt, and in 516

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the United States (e.g., Khalid Duran) ha ve been denounced, blacklisted, jailed, attacked, and murdered for arguing that Egypt needs to reform its educational teachings in order to reduce the culture of terrorism and re-stabilize Egyptian society. Another prescient element of The Muqaddimah is its treatment of the term group feeling, which bears strong resembla nce to other terms from the literature review such as social contagion, collective delusion, group mind, groupthink, and groupism. From the fiel d of social psychology, those terms were defined originally in Bions (1959) studies of basic assumptions groups, which are groups of people characterized by losses of self-reflection, self -consciousness, and individual identity. Basic assumptions groups are the opposite of creative, taskoriented work groups. They form what Meddeb (2003) calls irrational solidarity. Khaldun (1377/1989) observes that once group feeling has established superiority over people who share in it, it will, by nature, seek superiority over people who have other group feelings unrelated to the first (p. 108). Th ereunto, this inquiry supports Khaldun (1377/1989) in that Islamism, havi ng developed into an international mass social movement advocating Nizam Islami seeks to subject all people, including liberal Muslims, under its own aegis of the rig ht path or true Islam, which the movement regards as a supe rior way of life. Furthermore, the goal is achieved through propaganda and viol ence (pp. 248-249). In times of power vacuums those who have group feeling seek superiority and domination (p. 293) and persecute others through assassina tion and exile (p. 250). This study demonstrates in various contexts that Is lamism seeks institutional vacuums of power inside secular and religious uni versities and also in whole societies mired in warfare. 517

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Similar to Khalduns (1377/1989) observat ions about persecution, this inquiry suggests a similar pattern of activity taking place on behalf of the Islamist movement. Its manifestations range broa dly, from the domination of student councils that coerce universities to recodify educational curricula and campus life along Is lamist lines to the persecution of liberal Muslim and non-Muslim intellectuals. While a group like the Muslim Brotherhood or Islamic Jihad or Islamic Tendency Movement might justify such actions under its interpretation of Islamic law, Khaldun (1377/1989) does not equate that use of propaganda, intimidation, and violence with jihad In his work, jihad is an inner spiritual struggle or a form of religious defense. Actions resulting from people having been afflicted w ith the contagion of group f eeling categorically are not jihad The call for religious reformation by sc holars associated with the Ibn Khaldun Society indicates that higher education is a kind of battleground for that reformation. Therefore, the counter-Reformationist Islami st discourse explicated in this inquiry directly contradicts Khaldun (1377/1 989) and his intellectual heirs. Tibi (1998) calls that edu cational theory and practic e paranoid scholarship. The extended review of Al-Faruqis schol arship and IIIT theory--published through Saudi Arabias education ministry and distributed worldwid e--along with the theories of Qutb, Shariati and Choudhury, illustrate the paradoxes of the movement, which is hostile to the West and modern ity but nevertheless is Western and modern. Hence, the inquiry supports Pipes (1997) who writes extensively about radical Islams Western mind, whose leaders are educated in Wester n or Western-style universities and who adopt Western principles to re-invent the worlds Western institutions, its universities notwithstanding. Islamists at USF as we ll as abroad exemplified that paradox. 518

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Freud (1915, 1930) also rece ives support from the inquirys findings, for through Freuds discussions of humanitys death and life instincts one may witness Islamisms desire to become civilized or to be civilized. However, as the movement progressed it became more radicalized, not le ss, under the teaching and direction of the movements leading theorist, Qutb, an Egyp tian educator. In the process, the inquiry shows how higher education--an instituti on customarily considered a place of creativity--being appropriated for the purpose of destroying civilization and, hence, for its own self-destruction. Marcuses profound influe nce on the development of Marxist theory and on American intellectual life in the middle of the Twentieth Century and in the American academy also maintains a tacit subtext in th is inquiry. King (1972) discusses Marcuses influence on the rise of the New Left intelligentsia who would garner respectability from their positions in American universi ties starting in the 1960s. However, one witnesses in this inquiry a similar devel opment taking place in European universities where Islamists would study, translate, a nd assimilate Marxist doctrine into an Islamized form. Of the many themes from Marcuses works are justifications for two-tiered standards of liberty and violence for oppressed and oppressors as part of a Third World critique of the West and West ern science, in which higher education is indicted for capitulating to the forces of total administration, with scientific objectivity existing as a form of social control and dominati on (King, 1972: 101). Given that sad state of affa irs, Marcuse (1966) calls fo r selective tolerance to overturn the institutional repr ession of aggrieved groups. Sele ctive tolerance holds that forms of knowledge and speech are excluded if they are oppressive (p. 116). If the 519

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suppression of speech is deemed insufficien t to liberate so-called oppressed groups, then terrorism, re-defined as a natural right of resistance, becomes acceptable by activist-intellectuals who direct research and teaching toward the liberation of oppressed groups. In this inquiry, educationa l theorists like Qutb follow in Marcuses legacy, using Marxist terms to rationalize their militant worldview of Islamic liberation, a point touched upon in Keddie and Monian (1993), who write about Iranian adoption of Marxist terms in the 1960s. Therein, a pre-modern Islamic etiquette, adab, morphs into a modern form of Islamist negative tolerance, in which no one is allowed to criticize Islam or Islamists without risk of impunity because to do so is, arguably, defamatory and might lead to Muslim stereotyping and further oppression. Nowhere in this inquiry was this viewpoint expressed better than in the media war waged by Al-Arians extensive network of external and internal campus advocacy groups. However, Marcuse (1966) also argues that violence, as a means of lifting cultural oppression, should be used only to lift oppression and, if it leads to more oppression, then it was used illegitimately. This is an aspect of Marcusian doctrine that Islamist intellectuals and the many non-Musl im intellectuals in higher education who support the movement and its us e of political violence seem to have forgotten, given their continued support of activ ist-intellectuals who have manipulated and abused their universities on the way toward Nizam Islami Jungian social psychology, in context to Nazism and the aggression of the Third Reich, also maintains relevance in that both movements, Nazism and Islamism, are totalitarian ones whose core ideology hinges upon a strong, 520

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myth-based ultra-nationalism seizes both the leader ship and the popular imagination (Catherwood, 2002: p.94). This is an example of what Blumer calls social contagion. The goal is the restor ation of lost dignity and power by blaming and repudiating enemies, a circumstance in which a group of people become overidentified with their shadow selves to the ex tent that they lose their individualist, selfreflective capacities and project their ow n problems elsewhere. Social contagion manifests in a variety forms, su ch as repudiation of enemies in, inter alia Islamist educational theory, academic journals, magazi nes, videos, and reli gious teachings show that Islamisms locus of blame is an alleged Jewish-Crusader conspiracy that dates back to Islams beginnings. Indeed, Islamists synthesized the conspiracism of the Nazi movement into their own religious worldvi ew during the 1930s and 1940s when the Muslim Brotherhood formed an alliance with the Axis powers. Given the reformist nature of Islamism as a form of religious fundamentalism, we understand better how Islamists adopt a militant posture that causes them to gravitate toward higher education institutions as a domain of war. This inquiry shows that Islamists are not different than ot her fundamentalists from other religions in that they reorder scientif ic inquiry and reshape e ducational systems including non-fundamentalist state or social ins titutions (Marty & Appleby, 1993: p. 2; Mendelsohn, 1993; Tibi, 1993; Ramadan, 1993). In contradiction to Marty & Appleby (1993), however, this inquiry suggests that Is lamic fundamentalists are a threat to the state in addition to society. Hoveydas (1998) discussion of the financing of Islamist institutions, including those discussed in the section a bout Saudi Arabian education, further illustrates the state threat of Isla mist education reform. He mentions that 521

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WAMY printed a bombing manual found in the possession of one of the young men convicted in the first Worl d Trade Center attacks. The inquiry also supports Tibi (1993), Keddie & Monian (1993), and Rapoport (1990/1998) who write variously that the c onflict about Islamist methodology in higher education is at the heart of most intellectual censorship, intimidation, and charges of blasphemy in the Middle East, especially that which came after 1969, with the advent of Qutbs ultra-radical reform ulation of religious terms in Signposts That same conflict about educational methodology extends to Laqueurs (1999) discussion about the international victims of Islamism, which i nvolve not only the fam ous case of Salman Rushdie and the assassinations of his editors in the early 1990s but also to political dissidents in France, Germany, Austria, Italy, Venezuela, Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan. The researcher would add the United States to the list, too, however, where the case of blacklisting and a fatwa against Khalid Duran for his role in translating documents related to the case against the Islamic jihad leaders at USF may be regarded as the archetypal example of how what used to be confined to over there is now here. Blacklisting also came to USF in the form of hoax newspaper reports and a video variously accusing a liberal Mu slim professor of being a pa rt of an elaborate Zionist plot to undermine the Oslo Peace Accords and to defame Islam. As has been shown through the IIIT edu cational theory, in particular, Islamist methodology is rooted in a mythic ultra-nationalism to reclaim the dominance of the ummah or Community of the Faithful, such that it translates into reactions against foreign influences, thereby supporting Tehr anian (1993a), who illustrates how Islamic fundamentalism turns to education and medi a for new socialization, recruitment, and 522

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organization of their members with traditional and modern networks of communication in the religious institutions, schools, and media serving as indispensable tools in the formation and dissemination of fundamentalist messages (p. 316). Those observations are at the heart of the attempts at establishing Nizam Islami in the various locales studied, but most succe ssfully in Iran and th e Sudan and also in the Palestinian territories, where professo r-imams in nearby mosques leading student movements caused what Tehranian (1993a 1993b) calls the total control of education and media. Insofar as challenges to religious education are co nsidered, Piscatori (1993) suggests that religious authority beca me fragmented in modern Muslim societies (p. 143) leading to the proliferation of Islami st activist-intellectuals who compete with traditional leaders for authorit y. In addition, in the Algerian context, Laqueur (1999) makes similar observations. Th is inquiry, in its discussion of vacuums of power in ancient religious universities during some countries establishment of postcolonial Marxist or ultra-secular governm ents that marginalize religion, supports Piscatori (1993). At USF, vacuums in th e form of weak polic ies for non-immigrant scholars, graduate supervision, mission cha nge, ambiguity in the academic ethic, and governance restructuring were also used to Is lamist advantage, apparently keeping the university in a divided political condition for over a decade. This inquiry denies another claim by Pi scatori (1993), however, who writes that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and in the Pales tinian territories is 523

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non-militant. Al-Bannas development of the Secret Apparatus, which was the first group led by the Muslim Brotherhoods cadre of activist-intellectuals and student followers in Egypt and the Palestinian terr itories, belies Piscatoris (1993) statements. The inquiry supports Piscat ori (1993) elsewhere, how ever, in his non-detailed discussion of the Islamic Jihads use of ch arismatic leaders who infiltrate and gain control of mosques in West Bank and Gaza, and then gain control of the Islamic Universitys administrative and student bodies. Finally, the inquiry also supports Rugh (1993) who discusses how the Muslim Brotherhood and its charitable networks gained influence among Egypts youth requiring tutoring in their desired fields of study, engineering, science, and math areas of study that do not afford them much opportunity for criticism and evaluation (p. 153). In turn, Rughs (1993) assertions echo that of Duran (1978) who writes in The Role of Political Islam that Saudi Arabia was spreading a divisive form of Islam around the world through educational institu tions, and who also comments that in Egypt the joke is that the Muslim Brotherhood is really the Engineering Brotherhood, whose political imams lack th e intellectual capacity to see shades of gray in matters of politics, religion, a nd life itself. The tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood appears, too, to have found its way into the USF-WISE curriculum, through its initiates who became leaders in the PIJ and its North American front organizations. These individuals gave noti ce of their organizational world view by offering USF faculty and administrators a brochu re that articulated in over thirty pages the principles for Islamization of secu lar higher education pr ecisely through thinktank partnerships with universities. 524

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Major Implications This study has revealed the basic assumptions and paradoxes of a mass movement that started in Egypt in the late 1920s and had come to USF and its service community in the 1980s. In turn, more so than any article, essay, or book written about the case to date, by grounding the case in mass movements theory and New Historical analysis, this study seemingly reveals how so many highly intelligent, qualified people in the academ ic profession supportive of the academic enterprise could become enamored with a mass movement that, as Meddeb (2003) notes in The Malady of Islam is a social contagion marked by anti-intellectualism and intellectual persecution. From this study, the followi ng major implications are identified: 1. The postmodernist methodology of this study challenges the claims of an assumption currently popular in the fi eld of Middle East studies, the politics of self-representation, which holds that observers must merely report the claims of Islamist leaders without questioning their authority. In other words, if an Islamist tells th e media that Death to America. Death to Israel and The Koran is my Constitution are not part of a program of terrorism and religiously-i nspired imperialism, th en observers must not question his utterances any further; fo r to do so might means that they are imposing observers own allegedly raci st or culturally imperialist assumptions on his. And his assumptions, by default, trump the observers. That is so because the Islamist res earch subject is from an allegedly oppressed culture and his observers are from a culture that allegedly oppresses his. So observers are to accept what the author of Death to-- and The Koran is my Constituti on tells observers to accept. His definition is therefore the only defini tion that should matter to observers who are not part of his culture. Fu rthermore, observers need not probe the issue any further because that would mean opening up lines of inquiry that are currently taboo in the field of Middle East studies. Taken to its logical conclusion, the mimetic ba sis of the politics of selfrepresentation--while situ ated in a culturally specific context--holds that observers must not question the just ifications of any discourse or referential actions produced by th e Islamist movement, including Pax Islamica suicide bombings, fatawa against Salman Rushdie, hudud punishments, testimonies of apostates, c onspiracy theories, etc. In effect, what observers are expected to do under the precepts of politics of selfrepresentation is arrogate their tr adition of independent judgment, free 525

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speech, and academic freedom to another persons puritanical interpretation of Islamic law and totalitarian political ideology. On the other hand, postmodernist historiography fr ees observers from that trap of institutionalized censorship that is d rigueur in the academy today. 2. In addition, the social psychology detailed in this studys literature review may enable understanding of the deep ly-felt reactions of onand offcampus stakeholders at USF regardi ng the furor over academic freedom at USF. A professors right to free sp eech garnered the most consistent media discussion but the emotionally charged atmosphere and defensive posturing surrounding that discussion a pparently obscured a much graver issue involving the Islamist movement, Sami Al-Arian, and academic freedom: re-Islamization in higher education. 3. The Islamist movement, while having been lauded as a benign theological force of liberation and democratic spirit, has, over an eighty-year time period extending from Cairo, Egypt, to Tampa, Florida, proven itself hostile to the values of the Reformation, including those values embodied in the term academic freedom, which carries a core assumption that a university will be vigilant and not become party to a codified educational theory and practice that seeks to br ing the production and dissemination of knowledge under an elite groups inte rpretation of Gods will, under a divisive ideological politic s, or in this case both. 4. As such, the Islamist movements program of intellectual subversion maintains an ancient referent in Is lam, that of the School of Recent Scholars, a religious orthodoxy who, by the time Khaldun had written his last work in 1377, had taken over intelle ctual life in the Islamic world by insisting that matters of faith and reason were inseparable things. While Khaldun did not rule out jihad as a leg itimate form of warfare, he did not equate it with the persecution of people by political violence, physical liquidation of opponents, and banishment. In his writing, Khaldun implies that the intellectual retrenchment of the School of Recent Scholars coincided with waves of political violence that marked the decline of Islamic civilization. 5. The forces of internationalization and mission expansion have not been entirely positive for The Universi ty of South Florida, as the USF-WISE case suggests, especially as that case is compared with what is known about the impact of the Islamist movement in the locales studied in Chapter Four; indeed, the university s better nature the one that encourages civility and multicultura l tolerance seems to have been misused purposefully by various lead ers and external players in the Islamist movement under the guise of a qualified free expression, in which some cultures and religions have grea ter, encompassing, rights and in which other cultures and religions have lesser rights. The problem may be 526

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defined best by terms emanating from the Islamist movements reformulation of premodern tradi tions of Koranic exegesis and jurisprudence: academic dhimmitude and academic adab As Lewis (1994) and Yeor (1998, 2005) note, wh en modern scholars subvert their or others right of inquiry to anci ent contractual tr aditions between Muslims and non-Muslims, the end result is historical negationism in which knowledge is sought and taught on the basis of what is best for the ummah and God. 6. In such an atmosphere, the signing of a partnership agreement with a group of academics who believe they know Gods will, becomes a kind of dhimma or a contract made between believing Muslim and non-Muslim parties. A serious mistake on behalf of the university and its academics may have been made in that different groups operationalized the terms of the USF-WISE contract differently. For example, civi lizational dialogue may not mean the same thing to a non-Muslim as it does for a Muslim; and neither might a legal contract si gnify the same thing for an orthodox Islamic fundamentalist as it would for mainstream academics operating in a secular university in a secular society. 7. In that sense, the university a ppears to have underestimated or misunderstood the values of the think-tank WISE and its Muslim constituents in Tampa Bay and its pr imary source of funding, the IIIT in Herndon, Virginia, assuming that WISE and the IIIT held the same values, which they apparently did. Interestingly, this is a problem identified in the 9/11 Commission Report (2004) on the underestimation of the nations intelligence community about the nature of the Islamist mass movement and its potential threat to world peace and security. The problem is widely referred to as mirror imaging (Lowenthal, 2000). 8. A fair amount of information (e.g., the mosque leadership coup involving a USF math prof essor, publication of Inquiry Ramadan Shallahs vita, the Al-Nashra document, Dr. Hechiches resignation letter, Dr. Neusners concerns about Islamist epistemology as it affected Judaic studies) found in USFs pres idential and media archiv es indicates that the William Reece-Smith Report to Betty Castor (1996) may not have captured the full gravitas of the USF-WISE case. After the William-Reece Smith report, the university stopped fo rmally investigating the case, even as it seems to have progressed as pa rt of a widening mass movement in Tampa Bay that would continue to have severe impact on the university, from souring relations among student religious groups to pressures on the curriculum by external advocacy groups. 9. This study sheds new light on the USF case itself in that, given its consistent connec tions with the Muslim Brotherhood--the least common denominator of all Salafist-Sunni-Arab Islamist 527

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terrorist organizations in the world today--this study implies that it was the Muslim Brotherhood and not th e PIJ that infiltrated USF through its partnership with WISE, largely funded by the IIIT, a Muslim Brotherhood front, and through its hosting of numerous visiting lecturers such as Al-Turabi and Al-Ghannoushi who were Muslim Brotherhood leaders who, like the PIJ leaders in the study, went on to found terrorist groups. 10. The September 2007 indictment against two USF students of engineering, one of whom lived in a house that Sami Al-Arian had rented on behalf of WISE during its partnership with USF raises a new question: to what extent is USFs international re putation now based on a capacity for providing anonymity and safe haven to Islamic radicals, especially those in the engineering profession and who hail from Egypt, a leading passport nation for Islamisms mujahideen ? Suggestions for Future Research Therefore, in light of these implications, which lay out baseline information about the interplay between the Islamist movement and higher education, the university may want to consider re-opening the case about Sami Al-Arian for further study and debate. The researcher recomme nds that the case be investigated by qualified academics from both the faculty and high administration, with additive testimony by the universitys religious student groups. Pe rhaps a special commission of Faculty Senators and administrators coul d jointly review the case as far back as 1986, when Sami Al-Arian was hired and his later acquisition of tenure in the early 1990s, around the time of the USF-WISE partnership. Among the many questions requiring answers include: Who recommended that Al-Ari an apply for his position at USF? Which external community actors we re involved? Who was on his search committee? Tenure review committee? How did he become the faculty advisor of the Muslim Students Association? Was the Mu slim Students Association involved with 528

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his off-campus activities in the Islamic Association for Palestine and related external organizations? Besides Hussam Jubara, a deported HAMAS operative in 2004, how many foreign national students did Al-A rian recommend attend USF? What were their academic success rates? Where are th ey now? How and when did Sami al-Arian begin to amass political power on campus ? Who supported him and why? What were their shared values, if any? Did they have ext ernal business or non-profit conflicts of interest that might have induced the on on-campus partnership with USF-WISE? Can it be determined whether Al-Arian had any in volvement with the hiring of faculty or student admission recommendations outside his field of teaching and research in computer engineering? If so, what are th e academic ethics of that? What are the views of dissenting, non-Islamist faculty and other groups and when and why did they dissent? Before, during, or after Steven Emersons and Michael Fechters exposure? Who and what processes were involved in de rogating their voices from the official and unofficial record? Should a university al low an outside court decide whether an accused terrorist has misappropriated his c ontract to teach and research? Or should it investigate and make its own decision indepe ndent of an outside court? How does a university that values the pr incipal of due process assist a colleague who chooses to air his or case in the medi a instead of arbitrating his grievances through designated university channels? In addition and given that the terrorists who inserted themselves into the USF milieu were supportive of Hasan Al-Turabi--whose genocidal regime in the Sudan purged the Sudanese university system of its intellectual content and forced students and professors, along with millions of other citizens, into refugee camps 529

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(McCrummen, 2007: p.2A)--the researcher recommends that USF establish a program to locate Sudanese refugee-intellectuals and offer them scholarships to complete the education denied to them by the Sudanese Islamist movement became the ideological and civil servic e mainstay of the 1989 government. Future research also should involve asking questions and conducting studies about the range of sub-issues embedded in th is study, all in an effort to cure USF and higher education around the world of that Blumerian social contagion. Ways of measuring the degree of the malady of Islam in individual higher education institutions must be found. Ways of healing those institutions must be sought according to need and circumstance. A very important question that requires longitudinal analysis is how extensive is the Interna tional Institute of Islamic Thoughts (IIIT) influence on higher education systems in other countries and regions? and What is the effect of that possible influence on higher education and the surrounding milieu in those areas? In other words, have they achieved or do they seek total control over the meaning of Islam in those other regions, as they apparently do in the places studied in this thesis ? Moreover, are other IIIT chapters involved with terrorism financing and s upport in those countries and regions? Are they involved with Islamic insurgencies in West Africa and Sout heast Asia? Do they influence governments and agencies? Do th ey have connections to academics in the West? Are they engaged in exchange programs with the West? While this study presents characterist ics of Islamism in higher education generalizable across time and space, no two uni versities are completely alike. So a monolithic program for change must be resi sted. In other words, these implications 530

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and suggestions for future research do not signify a remedy of counter-hegemony. To the contrary, they signify a need for co mpetition in a marketplace of ideas--a truly diverse intellectual economy instead of one based on limited commodity production. International constituents that support such an educa tional enterprise must be identified and supported. Cooperation with governments like our own, which in the 9/11 Commission Report acknowledged that terrorism was a symptom of a larger social movement, must be broached collegially and not with hostility and suspicion. The way to contend that mass movement in higher education is not to deny that millions of people around the world practi ce the worlds youngest monotheistic faith, Islam. As Jung similarly noted of the Germ an people, Muslims have genuine spiritual gifts that have been obscured by apologetics for a repressive creed, what some refer to coyly as True Islam. Higher educa tion must acknowledge those Muslims who understand the difference between Islamism and Islam. As Jung also noted of the German people, over-identification with a destructive influe nce upon the Muslim mind, Islamism, must be challenged--even at the risk of ad hominem accusation. When Islamism came to Tampa Bay and its university, it a pparently brought with it an impoverishment of intellectual thought, not an enrichment of it that might advance the collective aims of the universit y. Media reports dating back to the early 1990s showing Al-Arians views on Salman Rushdie demonstrate that point. So does his and his brother-in-laws highly un-colle gial overthrow of an imam, a USF math professor and co-holder of property deeds with Al-A rian, from his mosque. The imams pregnant wife suffered a miscarriag e after being physically assaulted in the 531

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coup. Apparently, that early action against a fellow religious leader in Temple Terrace speaks volumes about Al-Arians apparent hubris as an enlightened Islamist in apparent need for cover in a mo sque located near USF. The contents of Inquiry, an ICP publication said to have been cited in Al-Arians annual review file, also maintain an anti-intellectual character reminiscent of Meddebs (2004) critique, further distinguishing Islamisms closing of the Muslim mind. Do not Muslims and Arabs in our nations universities deserve bette r than what international affairs expert Dr. Walid Phares calls in Future Jihad (2007) the mollification of intellect through an intellectual coup detat that distorts the ideol ogy of jihadism (p. 226)? That anti-intellectualism, supported by a pre-modern epistemology that merges faith with reason and justifies the subjugation of Jews and other groups that Islamists believe are in their purview to conquer, a ppears to have been imported to USF and Tampa Bay by highly educated leaders who l earned those things in the Middle East and other Islamic countries, largely th rough Muslim Brotherhood organizational channels. Finally, the Islamism that came to USF derives, in part, from an anti-intellectualism that is exported from a publishing house in Saudi Arabia to over seventy countries. Suffice it to say, countering that anti-intel lectualism of the Islamist movement might start in higher education institu tions, but it cannot if higher education institutions defend Islamist epistemology on grounds that a univer sity is not supposed to be the arbiter of good or evil or by intellectuals who believe in human sacrifice disguised as justifiable therapeutic warfar e. Oppressed people everywhere deserve a much greater political economy than that. A country that exemplifies a different way 532

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is Poland, whose Solidarity Movement led by Lech Walesa demonstrated and effected change in a dignified, lasting manner. True Thoreauian heroes love life. They do not condone human sacrifice. They do not love death more than they love life. For those reasons, this study also recomm ends that the university support and fund a War and Peace Studies Program, for it is clear that the university and its service area possesses only limited understand ing of either war or peace and the knot of marriage between the two. For example, without systematic study how could the university and its service ar ea know that a non-kinetic, non -violent, informational war of re-Islamization was being wage d on the campus as Pax Islamica and civilizational dialogue? At the same time, some internal and external university constituents justified the practice under the principles of free speech and the right of revolutionary rebellion. Like wise, achieving peace among Israelis, Palestinians, and the Arab world by means of suicide attacks on unarmed civilians was lauded as the only feasible means of uprising by a weaker enemy against a militarily stronger one. The Polish Solidarity Movement in the 1980s, however, proves that peaceful means of political change and international recognition can and does happen. Marcusian rebellion that encourages perpetual revol ution is not a means to achieve peace. Since the September 11th attacks, our society has learned much more about the nature our ideological adve rsary, but it has not fully aw akened and as of 2008 it may be sliding back into a pre-9/11 state of unconsciousness. Many academics who hold the most coveted positions in Middle East studies programs still research and teach from a limited perspective that the threat of Islamic is a myth. In addition to this study, Walid Phares (2007) draws a similar conclusion. These academics have not 533

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studied how what is typically called res urgence also may be an insurgence. Many of them refuse to entertain such a possibil ity as they promulgate a doctrine that The West manufactures such que stions in order to oppress non-Western cultures. In another respect, however, those academics ma y be correct. Perhaps Islam is not a threat, but Islamism is. And those who ha ve suffered from it the most have been Muslims themselves. Like Jacques Derrida, an Arab Jew from Algeria who felt alienated from his Arab ethnic brothers many Muslims feel a similar alienation. If such alienation exists in the Islamic-Arab wo rld, then what is the magnitude of that alienation among them in Western soci eties where Muslims have immigrated? In other words, has that alienation been imported to the West? If so, how does it manifest psychologically, po litically, religiously? Our society still has a long way to go to ward understanding that Islamism and its more violent offshoot Jihadism signify a long-term strategic/id eological threat in both the domestic and interna tional arena. In the past the United States and the world were faced with a previously identif ied long-term strategic/ideological threat, Communism. At that time, in the 1940s, the nations premier doctoral research institutions had defense studies programs that provided the institutional and intellectual capital to assist peaceful democracies in effectively countering a hostile adversary that they understood as an exis tential threat. We may only imagine what our lives would be like today had not thos e university programs existed. The manifest absurdities of McCarthyism, the Vietnam War, and the rise of Marcusian doctrine in education changed academias view of defense studies. According to Major General Robert Scales, who holds a doctorate in hi story from Harvard Univ ersity, not a single 534

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such program exists today. The university and the nearby MacDill Air Force Base have enough intellectual capit al between them to jointly oversee a War and Peace Studies Program at USF. Such an enterp rise would be wholly aligned with the universitys strate gic plan for 2007-2012. USF may have a debt to pay in its ro le in aiding and abetting a political ideology that is apparently hostile to acad emic freedom everywhere in the world. It does not matter whether people aided and ab etted that ideology knowingly or not. When USF-WISE came to be, USF appare ntly stopped asking traditional academic questions about fundamental academic thi ngs. The promotion of a political program called re-Islamization of society and know ledge cloaked in the more benign terms of civilizational dialogue seems to have become the overriding reason for curriculum decisions. Acceptance of that doublespeak apparently resulted in a university suffering from, in Jungs terms, collective guilt. More over, the leaders of WISE apparently were courted and one was given teaching assignments in Middle East courses not because they or he possessed the proper academic credentials but because they were of a particular religious faith. It is true that USF strengthened its co llective bargaining contract and that the faculty and administration mended fences si nce Al-Arians arrest and confession of conspiracy to commit terrorism by using USF infrastructure and personnel in his front activity. But a newspaper report in The St. Petersburg Times saying that USF has moved on may deny a deeper problem that apparently has not been redressed. Blaming the media, 9/11 hysteria, a new McCarthyism, the U.S. government, or a 535

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foreign government is not the way for USF to expiate its problems regarding the findings of this study. Academic freedom is a product of the Reformation. The writings of Islamists who came to USF-WISE have demonstrated by word and deed that they are not academic freedoms friend because they ar e not the Reformations friend. Indeed, where they have succeeded in overthrowing governments, they have used universities as ladders to power and then ruined academic freedom at great cost to human life. They have betrayed their colleagues both abroad and at USF. Two of the people on the USF-WISE visiting scholars list, Ha san Al-Turabi and Rashid Al-Ghannoushi, were leaders in that betrayal. Yet Islamist doublespeak at USF referred to them as respected intellectuals. Universities professional associations, academic disciplines, students, publica tions, student groups, and area studies institutes are not supposed to be places where logos is used to consolidate power and knowledge in the service of a single po litical ideology. The sense of the academic ethic govern ing how USF makes amends rightly comes from Edward Shils great essays on the subject. Shils possessed a living memory of how a political ideology in the form of Nazi sm slowly prepared Nazi Germany for the Holocaust through the advanc ement in the universities of a kind of social justice for an aggrieved German pe ople following the Treaty of Versailles. The results of that slow takeover of the once envied German universities harmed Germans inasmuch as they harmed Jews and world civilization itself. That takeover of the academic disciplines by a political ideology le d directly to the destruction of Europe, the self-destruction of Germany, and the im plementation of the Final Solution. The 536

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537 subversion of Germanys academic ethic to a political ideology is why, after the defeat of Germany, in 1947 the new German constitution made academic freedom a constitutional amendment. Shils memory of Germanys intellectual holocaust in the 1930s and 1940s is why he objected to the advancement of Marcusian doctrines of two-tiered standards of soci al justice in American uni versities in the 1960s and 1970s. Perhaps more concrete implications th an a discussion of USFs role in advancing a social movement that denies in tellectual freedom could be addressed in this final chapter about USFs long walk in a dark wood, but they are embedded in the deeper implication above regarding what Jung in the early part of the Twentieth Century would call higher educations collective soul. Until measures are taken to acknowledge fully USFs problems that led to a social contagion that overtook the campus and its service area, smaller measures like investigating partnerships with outside sources thoroughly or even firi ng a professor later convicted of providing services to a terrorist group will remain just that, small measures that treat symptoms and not problems. A world suffering from a gr ave social contagion deserves so much more than that.

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