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The spatial distribution of geoprivacy concerns in Florida

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Title:
The spatial distribution of geoprivacy concerns in Florida a county level analysis
Physical Description:
Book
Language:
English
Creator:
House, Joshua W
Publisher:
University of South Florida
Place of Publication:
Tampa, Fla
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Subjects / Keywords:
GIS
Privacy
Geocoding
Reverse geocoding
Masking
Dissertations, Academic -- Geography -- Masters -- USF   ( lcsh )
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non-fiction   ( marcgt )

Notes

Summary:
ABSTRACT: Certain types of spatial data maintained and distributed by counties at taxpayer expense can be used with powerful mapping and analysis software, called Geographic Information Systems (GIS), to compromise an indvidual's locational privacy. The kind of privacy at threat here is referred to as geoprivacy, which is concerned with the rights to prevent disclosure of the location of one's home, workplace, or daily activities. While the availability of accessible and accurate geospatial data has increased geoprivacy concerns in recent years, this threat remains virtually unknown to the general public. Although previous research has explored various components of the geoprivacy debate, the fragmented and localized nature of this work does not adequately address the threat on a large scale or lend itself for use in multi-level policy discussions.This thesis fills the need for a comprehensive and systematic geoprivacy study by examining county data availability in the entire state of Florida. Ultimately, the success of geoprivacy violation attempts is determined by the availability and quality of the data being used. In order to evaluate this threat,a statewide inventory of the data necessary for a reverse geocoding operation, defined here as geoprivacy data elements, was created. A specific county (Bay County) with complete data availability was then selected and its geoprivacy data elements, specifically street, parcel, and address point layers were evaluated for their reverse geocoding and subsequent identity disclosure success. These findings were then compared with the results of the statewide inventory to determine the level of exposure that the state's residents are subjected to, based on their county's data offerings.The statewide data inventory indicated substantial variation in county availability, quality, and delivery methods of the desired geoprivacy data elements. The results of the reverse geocoding operation performed with Bay County's geoprivacy data elements revealed that both property parcels and address points in conjunction with ownership information have a high rate of identity disclosure success. Geocodable streets were found to have a low rate of identity disclosure success and their results were comparable to a non-county maintained street layer that was used for control purposes. Although the street layers had a low rate of identity disclosure success, they could be used to identify a narrow range of address possibilities and still pose a geoprivacy threat. Forty-two counties in which approximately 13 million people reside make parcel data with ownership information available for free or purchase.Given the high success rate of the parcel data to disclose individual identity, this research suggests that the majority of the state's residents are vulnerable to potential geoprivacy violations.
Thesis:
Thesis (M.A.)--University of South Florida, 2008.
Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references.
System Details:
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
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System requirements: World Wide Web browser and PDF reader.
Statement of Responsibility:
by Joshua W. House.
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Title from PDF of title page.
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Document formatted into pages; contains 62 pages.

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University of South Florida Library
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University of South Florida
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All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
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aleph - 001999212
oclc - 318186192
usfldc doi - E14-SFE0002445
usfldc handle - e14.2445
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The Spatial Distribution of Geopr ivacy Concerns in Florida: A County Level Analysis by Joshua W. House A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of Geography College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida Major Professor: Jayajit Chakraborty, Ph.D. Pratyusha Basu, Ph.D. Steven Reader, Ph.D. Date of Approval: April 8, 2008 Keywords: GIS, privacy, geocoding, reverse geocoding, masking Copyright 2008, Joshua W. House

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i Table of Contents List of Tables ii List of Figures iii Abstract iv Chapter One: Introduction and Objectives 1 1.1 Background 1 1.2 Goals and Objectives 6 Chapter Two: Background and Literature Review 9 2.1 Geocoding 9 2.2 Reverse Geocoding 12 2.3 Masking 15 Chapter Three: Methodology 22 3.1 Geoprivacy Data Availability 23 3.2 Evaluating Geoprivacy Risk 25 3.3 Population Characteristics and Reverse Geocoding Success 29 Chapter Four: Results 30 4.1 Geoprivacy Data Availability 30 4.2 Evaluating Geoprivacy Risk 39 4.3 Population Characteristics and Reverse Geocoding Success 48 Chapter Five: Conclusions 57 Chapter Six: References 61

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ii List of Tables Table 1 Geoprivacy Data Availability Codes 24 Table 2 County Availability Summary 33 Table 3 Detailed County Availability 34 Table 4 Reverse Geocoding Results 43 Table 5 Population Density Bay County 48 Table 6 Population Facing Geoprivacy Risk 56

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iii List of Figures Figure 1. Displacement Using Translation 16 Figure 2. Scaling 16 Figure 3. Rotation 16 Figure 4. Random Perturbation 17 Figure 5. Reverse Geocoding Workflow 28 Figure 6. Statewide Availability of C ounty Maintained, Geocodable Streets 36 Figure 7. Statewide Availability of Parc el Data with Ownership Information 37 Figure 8. Statewide Availab ility of Address Points 38 Figure 9. Published Map: Bay County, FL Incidences 40 Figure 10. Box Plot of Reverse Geocoding Success 46 Figure 11. Cumulative Frequency Distribution of Data Elements and 47 Reverse Geocoding Success Figure 12. Bay County Population Density 49 Figure 13. Scatter Plot: Non County Maintained Roads 50 Figure 14. Scatter Plot: County Maintained Roads 50 Figure 15. Scatter Plot: County Maintained Parcels 51 Figure 16. Scatter Plot: County Maintained Address Points 51 Figure 17. County Population 54 Figure 18. County Population Density 55

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iv The Spatial Distribution of Geopr ivacy Concerns in Florida: A County Level Analysis Joshua W. House ABSTRACT Certain types of spatial data main tained and distributed by counties at taxpayer expense can be used with pow erful mapping and analysis software, called Geographic Information Systems (GIS ), to compromise an indvidual’s locational privacy. The kind of privacy at threat here is referred to as geoprivacy which is concerned with the rights to prev ent disclosure of the location of one's home, workplace, or daily activities. While the availability of accessible and accurate geospatial data has increased geopriva cy concerns in recent years, this threat remains virtually unknown to the general public. Although previous research has explored various components of the geoprivacy debate, the fragmented and localiz ed nature of this work does not adequately address the threat on a large scale or lend itself for use in multi-level policy discussions. This thesis fills the need for a comprehensive and systematic geoprivacy study by examining county data availability in the entire state of Florida. Ultimately, the success of geoprivacy vi olation attempts is determined by the availability and quality of the data being us ed. In order to evaluate this threat,

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v a statewide inventory of the data necessary for a reverse geocoding operation, defined here as geoprivacy data elements, was created. A specific county (Bay County) with complete dat a availability was then selected and its geoprivacy data elements, specifically st reet, parcel, and address point layers were evaluated for their reverse geocoding and subsequent identity disclosure success. These findings were then com pared with the results of the statewide inventory to determine the level of ex posure that the state’s residents are subjected to, based on their county’s data offerings. The statewide data inventory indicat ed substantial variation in county availability, quality, and delivery me thods of the desired geoprivacy data elements. The results of the reve rse geocoding operation performed with Bay County’s geoprivacy data elements rev ealed that both property parcels and address points in conjunction with ownership information have a high rate of identity disclosure success. Geocodable str eets were found to have a low rate of identity disclosure success and their result s were comparable to a non-county maintained street layer that was used fo r control purposes. Although the street layers had a low rate of identity disclosur e success, they could be used to identify a narrow range of address possibilities and still pose a geoprivacy threat. Fortytwo counties in which approximately 13 million people reside make parcel data with ownership information available for free or purchase. Given the high success rate of the parcel data to disclos e individual identity, this research suggests that the majority of the stat e’s residents are vulnerable to potential geoprivacy violations.

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1 1. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 1.1 Background Advancements in the field of information technology have greatly enhanced the ability to acquire, analyze, and distribute information of varied content. Although there are many benefits associated with such progress, it is important to also consider the risks, such as the potential for privacy infringement as there are “enhanced possibilities presented by information technology for collecting data about individuals without thei r consent” (Olvingson 2003; p. 183). The rapid pace of technological evolution can make it difficult to comprehend and effectively manage its collective impact prio r to implementation, thus complicating privacy issues. This makes the development of effective information technology privacy protection efforts and risk managem ent strategies challenging, and in many cases, reactive. One of the benefactors from developments in information technology is the field of Geography, specifically a branch called Geographic Information Systems (GIS). GIS is described as “a computer-assisted process designed to acquire, store, analyze, and display spatia l data and their attributes” (Dent 1999, p. 111). A small sample of the many applications of GIS includes environmental modeling, epidemiology, urban planning, and emergency response. Any subject that has a spatial component can somehow be served, or at least conveyed, in a

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2 GIS. Riding the wave of information technology, the rapid advancement of GIS and locational capabilities such as Global Positioning Systems (GPS) has resulted in the creation of vast amounts of accurate, accessible spatial data and analytical tools that did not exist unt il only a few years ago. Although these advancements have helped society discover and analyze spatial phenomena, their inherent power has also raised concern over an individual’s right to locational privacy because some of the information available for use in a GIS can be used to disclose an individual’s identity. This privacy subset is called “geoprivacy” and “refers to individual right s to prevent disclosure of the location of one's home, workplace, daily activities or trips” (Kwan 2004, p. 15). Because of its ability to “integrate and analyze a la rge amount of geospatial data,” GIS is at the forefront of the geoprivacy debate. According to Kwan (2004; p. 15), “the potential of GIS to be far more invasive of personal privacy than many other information technologies has caused serious concern among GIS critics and the public.” When the physical location of an event is tied to its descriptive information, the potential for privacy br each is exponentially increased because of its interaction with other spatia lly located phenomena (VanWey 2005; p. 15339). GIS data such as roads, addresses, and property parcel boundaries with ownership information provide the means to link the location of events, often conveyed through other, seemingly benign means, to an actual individual. Such underlying data is commonly developed and maintained by government entities (at taxpayer expense) and made availabl e for free download via the internet.

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3 Contributing to the advancement of the geoprivacy threat is a lack of public awareness regarding both sensitive data availability and how it can be used within a GIS to disclose an individual’s identity. Therefore, the geoprivacy debate is occurring within a relatively small arena by only those who fully understand the gravity of the issue. If made known, however, the full scope of available information as well as what could be done with it by someone skilled in the spatial sciences, the issue of geopriv acy would likely garner more attention and concern from the general public. Although it is difficult to comprehens ively assess the sensitivity of any piece of information, an example of that which would be deemed “private” is the location and identity of an individual with a certain disease. Maps depicting locations such as points are commonly produced for medical studies aiming to discover spatial relationships among the a fflicted. However, “it is not widely known that such maps can be "hacked" to allow individual-level information to be recovered” (Armstrong 2005; p. 67). If ther e is sufficient detail and fidelity in the map, the locations of the individuals c an be extracted via GIS and spatially cross referenced with other data, such as property boundaries with ownership information obtained through a county w ebsite, to disclose identity. It is certainly not the goal of the re search community to compromise their subject’s identity. The assurance of the pr eservation of confidentiality is not only consistent with ethical research gui delines as defined by the American Association of Geographers, American Psychological Association, American Political Science Association, and Americ an Sociological Association, but also

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4 “necessary to guarantee the continued parti cipation of the public in censuses and social surveys” (VanWey 2005; p. 15337). If the public perceives that their privacy is being breached, they will be less likely to participate in locational studies, effectively minimizing the potent ial public benefits that the study could provide. A lack of effective research can lead to a lack of researchers so, for many reasons, it is in the research comm unity’s best interest to maintain their subject’s confidentiality and trust. Further complicating the geoprivacy iss ue is that the transparent nature of research (e.g., disclosing methods, source s, data) presents an additional source of vulnerability. Research and the pr ogression of knowledge requires outside parties validating, recreating, and building upon prior methods, data, and findings. However, such efforts can comp romise confidentiality as disclosure risk ultimately increases with access. Even if access to sensitive research material was prevented, merely knowing which research entities were involved with its production represents a potential geoprivacy leak, as institutional knowledge can lend insight or provide an unprotected gat eway to the private information (Van Wey 2005). Guidelines do exist for disclosure of non-spatial medical and financial records, but universally accepted or effective rules have not been developed for spatial records. Where there are rule s for spatial data (HIPAA) there is opportunity for disclosure as “the rule (HIPAA) creates an exception permitting disclosure of personal health information to public health authorities for public health purposes without such authorization” (Rushton 2006; p. S19). Disclosure

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5 is essentially governed by an individual privacy versus public benefit debate. However, with little public knowledge that these discussions are being held, the debate is one sided and can too easily conclude with a decision to compromise individual privacy for public benefit. Limiting the jurisdictional power of research guidelines is that the guidelines only have meaning to those who aim to be accountable to the overseeing organizations. “According to the concept of confidentiality, it is only possible to share data with others who ar e obliged to the same confidentiality concept and need the information in their pr ofession” (Olvingson 2003; p. 181). It is likely that a great amount of geos patial analysis with sensitive data occurs outside of these organizational guideli nes and is thus unregulated. Media outlets, for example, are currently not subjected to the same guidelines which govern the presentation of locational in formation of health study publications (Olvingson 2003), yet their work (e.g., newspapers, newscasts) could conceivably reach a greater audience than an academic journal article and present a greater geoprivacy threat. In an effort to mitigate the disclos ure threat, several mechanisms and procedures have been developed. These are referred to as masking techniques and they aim to provide adequate analyt ical capabilities while preserving individual privacy. Given the subjec tivities involved with determining what constitutes an adequate analysis, however, this is not an easy task. What may be a suitable masking technique for one purpose may not be for another, because an “adequately masked” data set could be combined with additional

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6 information or knowledge by a third party resu lting in disclosure. With technology making the distribution and acquisition of information easier and effortless, it is difficult to predict the intended and uni ntended uses of a mapping product as there are “many unforeseeable downstream users and uses” (Olvingson 2003; p. 183). In summary, there is an abundance of accessible, unregulated spatial data that can be used with powerful mapping and analysis software to disclose individual identity. This threat exis ts and is virtually unknown to the general public. Ultimately, the success of geopriva cy violation attempts is determined by the availability and quality of the underlyi ng geospatial data as well as the ability to use such data in conjunction with GIS software. With the increasing availability of high quality data and t he advancement and pervasiveness of the software used to engineer geoprivacy vi olations, the geoprivacy threat will continue to grow if left unchecked. 1.2 Goals and Objectives Although there is a growing body of literature on geoprivacy and its various components, most of it is fieldspecific and carries a technical tone that might be abstract, irrelevant, and inaccessible to someone unfamiliar with modern spatial technologies and venues for accessing related material. Moreover, the existing body of research is fragmented and difficult to be used “as is” to raise awareness of the issue and serve as a springboard for widespread discussion. In addition, previous research has largely been localized, focusing on specific towns, census tracts, or indi vidual counties. These delimiters, while

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7 certainly valid for their respective pur poses, do not fully explore the nature, extent, and magnitude of the geoprivacy threat. To address the need for a more comprehensive, systematic, and tangible assessment of geoprivacy, the state of Florida and its counties serve as the study area for this thesis project. Florida is an appropriate setting for a geoprivacy study of this scope because of two reasons: 1) Florida, its counties, and estima ted 18 million residents (US Census Bureau 2006) provides a geographical c ontext that is well-known, has jurisdictional significance, and appeals to a large audience. 2) Florida’s Public Records Law states that government records, including computer records and subsequently GIS data, are public information (Florida Statues, Ch. 119, AGO 89-39). Although a public record preparation fee can be assessed (Florida Statutes, Section 119.07(4)(d)), several counties make their GIS data available for free download via the internet as "providing access to public records is a duty of each agency" (Florida Statues, Section 119.01(1). Some of the GIS data that is made available by Florida government entities is suitable for use in a reverse geocoding / map hacking process. These two factors provide an important basis for investigating the following research questions: 1) In what manner does the availabilit y of certain types of information necessary to engineer geoprivacy violations influence its success?

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8 2) To what extent are Florida c ounties and its inhabitants at risk for geoprivacy violations? By investigating these questions, the thesis documents and analyzes the geoprivacy threat in a systematic manner that is easily understood yet grounded in sound research practices; ultimately lending itself for use in policy discussions at all levels throughout the state of Florida.

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9 2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW This chapter provides a detailed summary of several key aspects of geoprivacy and associated methodologies. It is important to consider that the range of geoprivacy research is rather broad and encompasses several techniques, issues, and practices. While practices such as mobile phone tracking and video monitoring are relevant, this thesis focuses primarily on the risks associated with the display of point data. The scope of the geoprivacy threat, however, is not limited to what is presented in this specific study and accompanying methodology. 2.1 Geocoding Locational studies typically aim to determine if there is an association between an entity and its proximity to an ev ent. The questions researchers try to answer is: where do the subjects live, and is there anything acting upon them that is related to the factor(s) being investigated? These questions can be explored using the powerful mapping and spatial analysis capabilities of GIS (Geographic Information Systems). One of the many functions available in GIS is a process called Geocoding, which can bes t be described as “the practice of assigning a geographic identifier to a computer record that lacks it, thereby tying information to geographic space.” (Rushton 2006; p. S16) This process is widely used in locational research (Brown stein 2006; p. 2) as the subjects’ need

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10 to first be located, typically from address information obtained by the researcher(s), before analysis wit h other spatial phenomena can begin. The geocoding process is accomplished by using GIS software in conjunction with reference data that serv es as an underlying framework for the assignment of a real world geographic i dentifier. Such reference data is available from a variety of sources and exis ts as either a line, polygon, or point. A further explanation of this reference data and how it is used in the geocoding process to assign addresses is provided below: Line (street network based) – a spatially referenced GIS “layer” which depicts streets as individual line segment s. Information such as the street name, address range, etc. are assigned to each line segment in the street layer’s attribute table. Addre sses are identified by using geocoding algorithms that attempt to locate the address(es) of interest on the underlying street network. This is c onceptually performed by searching for the components of the desired address (Street Number, Street Name, City, State, Zip) and then using t he address range information inherent to the line to locate the desired st reet number by means of linear interpolation along that street segment. Polygon (parcel based) – a spatially referenced GIS “layer” depicting the boundaries of property parcels. These parcels correspond to ownership boundaries and have the address(es) assigned in the layer attributes of each parcel. This information, in turn, can be used by the mapping software to locate or assign an address.

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11 Point (address point based) – a spatially referenced GIS “layer” which denotes an address as a discrete point location. This represents the highest level of accuracy for address in formation. Addresses are encoded into the layer attributes which is used by the mapping software to locate or assign an address. Once geocoded, the subjects can be viewed and analyzed in conjunction with other spatial data. This is the power of GIS; locating, integrating, and analyzing spatial data of varied themes. Wh ile of great benefit to a researcher who is looking to determine if high rates of cancer are related to residential proximity to toxic waste facility, the very same tools used to answer such questions can be used in conjunction with data containing personal information to disclose identity. Evaluations of geocodi ng methods and their effectiveness have provided mixed results. An assessment of the capabilities of firms that offer geocoding services (line / street netwo rk based) resulted in high variability among their products, pointing to the qualit y of the reference information used as well as the tolerances used for determining what constitutes a match (Whitsel 2006; p. 8). In addition, the geographic c haracteristics of the population being geocoded plays a role in geocoding success. Cayo’s 2003 study, “Positional error in automated geocoding of residentia l addresses,“ examined the effect of population density on geocoding accuracy (line / street network based) and observed that rural addresses were less accurately located than more urban areas. Sources of geocoding error incl ude inaccurate geometry, inaccurate attributes, and inaccurate ranging and there is also an accuracy tradeoff due to

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12 the matching tolerances applied during t he geocoding process (Rushton 2006; p. S17-S18). Despite the limitations of geocoding, it is possible to locate addresses in accurate manner. Prior studies such as Cayo (2003), Whitsel (2006), and Rushton (2006) cite the significance of accurate base data and consistent address formatting of the input and refer ence data as determinants of geocoding success. Both Whitsel (2006) and Cayo (2003) proclaim the increased accuracy of using polygon / parcel based geocoding which “is expected to grow over time as high quality, parcel-level databases become more uniformly available across larger study areas” (Whitsel 2006; p. 10). 2.2 Reverse Geocoding (also known asinverse geocoding or map hacking) The functionality of geocoding, which spatially locates addresses using underlying reference information such as street lines, parcel polygons, and address points is a critical component of m any locational studies. In addition to providing geocoding capabilities, GIS software can also be used to determine the location of a feature that has been mapped (in hardcopy or other form outside of a GIS environment) but does not have a real world location or assigned address. This process is known as reverse geocoding or map hacking (Rushton 2006; p. S19). Curtis’ 2006 study, “Spatial confi dentiality and GIS: re-engineering mortality locations from published maps about Hurricane Katrina” portrays a common reverse geocoding scenario whereby a published map is scanned,

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13 georeferenced, and the features of intere st digitized to determine real world locations. Once real world locations, or coordinates, have been assigned, these features can then be linked and analyzed in a variety of ways to and with other data; both geographic and non-geographic. In Curtis’ study, reverse geocoding was performed on a map that was published in the Baton Rouge Advocate newspaper. This map displayed Hurricane Katrina mortalities as point locations and used census tract boundaries as a background reference theme to provi de the reader with an idea of where the mortalities occurred. This map was clipped from the newspaper, scanned, and then georeferenced to an existing GIS layer of census tract boundaries. The point locations were then digitiz ed from the scanned and georeferenced map, which gave the features that were onc e merely dots on a map in a newspaper real world coordinates. To determine the accuracy of the re verse geocoding process, the real world coordinates of the digitized features were then compared with GPS measurements of homes in which mortalit ies occurred. Given that the published map and the georeferencing target we re of a common theme, (census boundaries), there was a high success rate of reverse geocoding them to their true location. The goal of Curtis’ research was to evaluate the accuracies of the reverse geocoding process, which proved to be high. Adding to the success of reverse geocoding is the presence of addi tional themes on the map such as political boundaries and roads. These greatly assist in the reverse geocoding process as they provide a common link for georeferencing. “The general point is

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14 that layers or themes potentially displa yable on a map add to the security threat” (VanWey 2005; p. 15540). These themes l end the location of the study to being vulnerable to general geographic knowledge of the area as physical indicators such as coastlines, rivers, streets, and topography could give away the location (Armstrong 1999). Of course, not every single map lends itself to successful reverse geocoding: “contributing factors in the successful re-engineering of information from a cartographic display is the published map's scale, the size (and quality) of the published map, the projection used, and the accuracy (or error) in the initial mapping of the points” (Curtis 2006; p. 2). These items, in conjunction with other information displayed on the map as well as the availability of the information that is used in the georeferencing process ultimately govern a map’s hacking potential (VanWey 2005). However, if t he maps used in reverse geocoding “accurately depict locations, they c an be used to recover individual-level information such as an address” (Rushton 2006; p. S19). It is the map’s accuracy that is paramount; factors such as resolution are not as significant assuming the map also has moderate visual clarity. Brownstein’s 2006 study of the effect of map resolution on reverse geocoding success determined that “the home addresses of many of these patient s could be discovered, despite the low resolution of the disease maps” (Brownstein 2006; p. 2). The significance of these findings is t hat it is possible to use GIS to tie these reverse geocoded or hacked locations to other spatial data, such as property ownership parcels. This type of information is commonly distributed free

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15 of charge from county maintained websit es. If this data contains ownership information it can be spatially cross-referenced to the reverse geocoded features, resulting in identity disclosure. 2.3 Masking Given the vulnerabilities associated with mapping individual locations, researchers have worked to develop methods to protect individual locational privacy while at the same time allowing valid spatial analysis to be performed. These methods are referred to as geographic masks or masking. “The goal of these masks is to modify the geographic information sufficiently to prevent disclosure of individual identities, while retaining enough spatial accuracy for geographic trends, clusters, or other patterns to be detected” (Rushton 2006; p. S20). Armstrong provided a comprehensive summary of masking techniques in his 1999 work, “Geographically Masking Health Data to Preserve Confidentiality.” A description of these masks and how they affect data are described below. Where applicable, a graphic is provided to assist with understanding the masking concept: Displacement using translation (Figure 1) – moves “each point from its original location by a fixed increm ent.” (Armstrong 1999; p. 502) This results in a uniform shift of the entire data set.

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16 Figure 1. Displacement Using Translation Scaling (Figure 2) – this mask “changes bot h the distance from the origin of the co-ordinate system (thus execut ing a displacement) as well as the distances between point locations.” (Armstrong 1999; p. 502) This results in a uniform shift of the entire data set as well as a fixed increase or decrease in the distanc e between each feature. Figure 2. Scaling Rotation (Figure 3)– simply rotates “each point by a fixed angle about a pivot point.” (Armstrong 1999; p. 502) This results in a uniform “twist” of the data at a specified rotation point. Figure 3. Rotation Concatenated Mask – using any combination of displacement, scaling, and rotation masks in conjunction with one another. (Armstrong 1999; p.

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17 503) Random Perturbation (Figure 4) – displaces “each point by a randomly determined amount, and in a randomly dete rmined direction, specific to its original location.” (Armstrong 1999; p. 504) Figure 4. Random Perturbation Point Aggregation – this technique “uses a single location to represent a defined subset of the original loca tions.” (Armstrong 1999; p. 506) An example would be to use one point to depict that several incidences of cancer occurred within the greater vicini ty of that point, but not at that discrete location. Areal Aggregation – protects against disclosure by “enumerating the total that exists within a region.” (Armstr ong 1999; p. 506) An example would be to show the total amount of incidenc es of cancer that occurred within a census block. The previously discussed masking methods have dealt with altering the physical location or amount of information that is shown. There are, however, other ways of protecting spatial data conf identiality that are based on some form of data access control, agreements among the parties involved, or alternate forms of display. These include:

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18 Enclaves and Cold Rooms – where data is made available for analysis at a physical location. No data is permitted to leave the premises, and access can be restricted to certain individuals. (VanWey 2005; p. 15338) Virtual Enclaves a computer network accessed environment where “restricted access to data can take pl ace, without requiring travel, access fees, or delays before the results ar e available to the researcher” (VanWey 2005; p. 15341). This is similar to the concept of an Enclave / Cold Room but the data user can obtain remote access to the data and / or results of the object in study. Software Agents – this masking technique involves remote access by using software to formulate data requests which are “sent to the original data repository, so the analysis c ould be done inside the original data repository and then a summary aggregat e report sent back to the researcher” (Kamel 2006; p. 165). In 1999, Armstrong discussed software agents in that “users would not be requi red to have access to confidential health records. Rather, they would submit a request to an intelligent analysis agent that would assess the r equest, and if found appropriate, would complete the analysis and return a result to the data user without exposing any individual-level health data (Kamel 2006). Virtual Institutions and Virtual Organizations – building on the concept of virtual enclaves, these are very generally described as a combination of data distribution and analysis services whose access is governed by means of pre-defined agreements. These entities can function

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19 independently or in conjunction with other s (including software agents) to judiciously serve data needs (Kamel 2006). Privacy, Access, and Usage Agreements – specific agreements outlining what can and cannot be done with the data. Reduction of Basemap Detail and Contextual Information – reducing the amount ancillary information displa yed on a map (political boundaries, roads, descriptions) so that the possib ility for identification of the study area is minimized. Abstract Methods (spider plots, graphs) – displays spatial information in a manner whereby geographical relationships are effectively communicated but not explicitly presented in a conventional mapping format. Omission not using or limiting the use of maps for publication purposes. The implementation of any masking technique will ultimately result in some type of information loss when compared to the original data. However, the information which is lost at the hands of masking might not be necessary for the objectives and subsequent accuracy needs of an analysis (Rushton 2006; p. S20). Kwan’s 2004 study, “Protection of Geoprivacy and Accuracy of Spatial Information: How Effective Are Geographi cal Masks?” evaluated how the degree of random perturbation affected accuracy. A masking threshold value was discovered at which the masked results di ffer substantially from the non-masked data. Results below the threshold were deemed adequate for the analysis. This

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20 suggests that it is possible to use masking and find balance between information loss and accuracy needs. Despite the possibility for masking success, which is certainly a subjective decree, a universally accepted solution that could be implemented on a large scale (a scale which matches the amount of sensitive data that is easily accessible) has not been developed. An evaluation of the masking techniques which alter the position of the original data (displacement, scaling, rotation, and random perturbation) suggest that “random perturbation is superior from a comprehensive information preservation st andpoint” (Armstrong 1999; p. 512). Virtual solutions (enclaves, agents) are t heoretically strong yet mostly conceptual in nature and implementation is complex. Real enclaves are believed to carry the lowest risk of confidentiality breac hes (VanWey 2005) yet this may not be something that would be possible for a ll data producers to implement as the startup costs and continued management is prohibitive. Even with the application of a maski ng technique, a dataset is still vulnerable to being “hacked” if the ma sking method employed is discovered, if alternate masked versions of the same dataset are obtained, or if ancillary information (that may have been produced or disclosed afterwards by a different party) is used in conjunction with the masked data to reveal the original locations. Unfortunately, “there are relatively few si mple cases or simple solutions” when it comes to managing the geoprivacy threat (VanWey 2005; p. 15338). Despite the uncertainties involved with masking and effective implementation on a large scale, if disclosur e risk is to be minimized it is “vital

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21 that some masking occurs of the original point data.” (Curtis 2006 p. 10) This belief was echoed at a recent symposium hos ted in part by the Association of American Geographers as “there was also a general concern expressed about preserving individual confidentiality withi n spatial displays. This concern is justified as map making, and the ability to deliver maps to a mass audience through the Internet becomes steadily easier [5-8]” (Curtis 2006; p. 2). Providing further grounds for masking is that “admin istrative records and other information, sometimes obtained as an adjunct of newly emerging location based services, can be mapped and cross-referenced to rev eal the identities and characteristics of individuals from information that is often available on-line” (Armstrong 2005; p. 64). Lending further support for the need to mask sensitive data are the uncertainties associated with other info rmation that is currently or will become available: “an experiment using 1990 U.S. Cens us summary data surprised the public health community by showing that datasets previously thought to be adequately de-identified, containing onl y 5-digit ZIP code, gender and date of birth, could be linked with other publicly available data (e.g., voting records) and used to uniquely identify 87 percent of the population of the United States [15]” (Brownstein 2006; p. 4). A seemingly sound masking technique can be foiled by something that is difficult to prepare for: the unknown.

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22 3. METHODOLOGY The geoprivacy threat is real and it requi res substantial research attention. Understanding the nature and m agnitude of the threat, however, is difficult given the fragmented and intangible nature of the existing body of geoprivacy research. This study hopes to address this need by exploring the following research questions: 1) In what manner does the availabilit y of certain types of information necessary to engineer geoprivacy violations influence its success? 2) To what extent are Florida c ounties and their inhabitants at risk for geoprivacy violations? These questions are explored by emulati ng how a “map hacker” could attempt to disclose the identity of non-masked, accurately mapped individuals using public domain data via a reverse geocoding operation. This process was performed and evaluated based on the following steps: 1) For all counties in Florida, dete rmine the availability and quality of the geospatial data that can be used for identity disclosure to occur. 2) Perform a reverse geocoding procedure to evaluate the capability of available county data to disclose identity. 3) Investigate the relationship between population density and reverse geocoding success.

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23 4) Explore the statewide implications of these findings by determining population exposure with respect to the availability and reverse geocoding success of the geoprivacy data elements. A more detailed description of this process and each individual step is described in the remaining sections of this chapter. 3.1 Geoprivacy Data Availability Since geocoding and reverse geocoding require appropriate data, the first step was to perform a county-by-county in ventory of the information that is necessary and typically used in these operations. The data must have been made available through a county conveyance so as to be considered public domain. The availability of the following county maintained data, referred to as “geoprivacy data elements”, was determined: A. Geocodable Street Layer B. Property Ownership Parcels C. Address Points Given that there were some counties which did not have any of these data elements, a non-County source geocodable st reet layer (Census TIGER/Line file) was used to establish a baseline to wh ich the other elements were compared. Another critical component of geoc oding, reverse geocoding, and mapping in general is the availability of current and accurate aerial photography. Although many counties acquire this imagery on their own and make it available for purchase or download, at the time of this study the US Department of Agriculture released imagery for the entire state of Fl orida whose acquisition date (2007) and

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24 quality rivaled or exceeded what most countie s typically offer. Since a set of high quality aerials for every county in the stat e are now available for free download, the need to evaluate variability acro ss counties was eliminated. In addition to the mere existence of the geoprivacy data elements, factors such as accessibility, ease of use, completeness, and cost were assumed to influence the ability of the layers to be used in a reverse geocoding operation. These characteristics were used to develop a classification scheme that represented the final availability code for each geoprivacy data element. The six categories in this classification scheme are described in Table 1. Table 1. Geoprivacy Data Availability Codes Data Availability Code Description Yes Layer is available and can be obtained anonymously and without charge (includes parcels that must be joined to ownership table) Purchase Layer is available for purchase therefore payment information and in some cases a usage agreement is required (includes parcels that must be joined to table) and cannot be obtained anonymously. Indirect Layer is available but difficult to obtain, use, or contact information and / or a usage agreement is required. Ineffective Layer is available but not able to be used for reverse geocoding and identity disclosure purposes due to a lack of addresses and / or ownership information. NoLayer confirmed unavailable (includes layers in process). InconclusiveLayer availability unable to be determined. Based on the classification scheme depict ed in Table 1, the county geoprivacy data elements made available for each c ounty in the State of Florida was compiled into: (a) a table that documents each county’s offering; and (b) a series

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25 of county-level maps depicting the spatial distribution of geoprivacy data element availability. 3.2 Evaluating Geoprivacy Risk In order to evaluate whether or not the aforementioned geoprivacy data elements contribute to geoprivacy risk, one county (Bay County) which has complete data availability (geocodable str eet layer, property ownership parcels, and address points) was selected and each geoprivacy data element was successively evaluated for its identity disclosure success. The subjects whose identity was targeted for disclosure were identified by randomly selecting 100 address points which represent owner / o ccupiers of the property. The address point layer is the most accurate geopr ivacy data element and best represented an individual’s discrete location. With the test population identifi ed, it was then mapped in a GIS environment, specifically ESRI’s ArcGIS, to provide the source material on which the reverse geocoding operation was perform ed. A county scale map was then produced showing only the county boundary, major roads, and the residences of the mapped individuals (un-masked, of course) displayed as point locations. The map conformed to a page size of 8.5 inches by 11 inches (letter size) and was printed on a conventional laser printer. Consistent with routine “map hacking” practices, the “published” map was then scanned at a resolution of 200 dots per inch (dpi) and geo-referenced in ArcGIS using the available sour ce data (county boundary and roads) as registration points. To determine the lo cation of the residences as depicted on

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26 the scanned and georeferenced map, the point locations were then determined by first creating a vector polygon circle t hat conformed to the areal extent of the circle representing the boundary of t he point on the georeferenced map. Maintaining a constant capture scale the boundary of each mapped residence (displayed as points) was determined in this manner, and resulted in one vector polygon for each mapped residence. The discrete location of the mapped individuals was then determined by calculating the centroid of the digitized vector polygon circles. This location repres ents the “hacked” location of the mapped individuals and was used as the common starting point for each identity disclosure effort. At this point the actual location of the individual’s residence as well as the hacked location had been established. Given that no personal information such as name or address has been introduced, the possibility for identity disclosure is minimal assuming that the “map hacker” does not have any knowledge of the study area nor its residents. To estab lish a control value, the distance between the hacked and actual locations was determined. The real-world address of the ha cked points was then determined by using each of the data elements (geocodabl e street layer, property ownership parcels, and address points) and their corresponding reverse geocoding method in ArcGIS. The assumption here is t hat a street address is needed for identity disclosure. For example, a hacked locati on may place the point in the middle of a pasture. This location is deemed to be of little value until a street address is assigned. Since the real-world address is critical, the hacked point was then

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27 moved via geocoding to the point on the reference data that represents the location of the address obtained through the reverse geocoding operation, and the distance the hacked point moved was recorded. Finally, the distance from the hacked, reverse geocoded, and geocoded position to the actual residence was determined. After determining the distance from each hacked, reverse geocoded, and geocoded location to its actual location, summary statistics were calculated to analyze the various geoprivacy data elements and their corresponding effectiveness (measured in distance from ac tual location). For all data elements, the number of alternate residences within the distance to the actual location was determined as well as an indication of whether or not the reverse geocoded point matched the actual address, actual stree t, or neither. It should be noted that when ownership information is available, an address match reveals an individual’s personal identity. A graphica l depiction of this process, using the County Maintained Geocodable Street Lay er Geoprivacy Data Element, is offered in Figure 5, Reverse Geocoding Workflow.

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28 Figure 5. Reverse Geocoding Workflow D i s t a n c e t o A c t u a l L o c a t i o n Hacked Location Actual Location GeocodedLocation Alternate #1 Alternate #2 Measures of reverse geocodingeffectiveness calculated: 1) Distance from “Geocoded”to “Actual Location” 2) Address Match: “Geocoded”and “Actual Location” 3) Street Match: “Geocoded”and “Actual Location” 4) Alternates between “Geocoded”and “Actual Location” Step 4: Measures of Effectiveness TakenCounty Maintained GeocodableStreet Layer Hacked Location Actual Location County Maintained GeocodableStreet Layer Step 1: Data Brought into GIS EnvironmentThe “Hacked Location,”“Actual Location,”and “County Maintained GeocodableStreet Layer”are displayed in a GIS Environment. Hacked Location Actual Location Reverse Geocoding Step 2: Reverse GeocodingPerformedThe address contained in the “County Maintained GeocodableStreet Layer”is assigned to the “Hacked Location”via the reverse geocodingprocess.County Maintained GeocodableStreet LayerAddress Information Hacked Location Actual Location Geocoding GeocodedLocation Step 3: GeocodingPerformedThe geocodingprocess locates the real world address derived from the reverse geocodingprocess, creating the “GeocodedLocation.”County Maintained GeocodableStreet Layer D i s t a n c e t o A c t u a l L o c a t i o n Hacked Location Actual Location GeocodedLocation Alternate #1 Alternate #2 Measures of reverse geocodingeffectiveness calculated: 1) Distance from “Geocoded”to “Actual Location” 2) Address Match: “Geocoded”and “Actual Location” 3) Street Match: “Geocoded”and “Actual Location” 4) Alternates between “Geocoded”and “Actual Location” Step 4: Measures of Effectiveness TakenCounty Maintained GeocodableStreet Layer Hacked Location Actual Location County Maintained GeocodableStreet Layer Step 1: Data Brought into GIS EnvironmentThe “Hacked Location,”“Actual Location,”and “County Maintained GeocodableStreet Layer”are displayed in a GIS Environment. Hacked Location Actual Location Reverse Geocoding Step 2: Reverse GeocodingPerformedThe address contained in the “County Maintained GeocodableStreet Layer”is assigned to the “Hacked Location”via the reverse geocodingprocess.County Maintained GeocodableStreet LayerAddress Information Hacked Location Actual Location Geocoding GeocodedLocation Step 3: GeocodingPerformedThe geocodingprocess locates the real world address derived from the reverse geocodingprocess, creating the “GeocodedLocation.”County Maintained GeocodableStreet Layer

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29 3.3 Population Characteristi cs and Reverse Geocoding Success Previous studies have indicated t hat population density has a positive influence on geocoding success when using line based, interpolation methods (Cayo 2003). Highly populated areas, such as cities, typically have shorter streets and a more uniform distribution of addresses. These two factors allow for the line based geocoding process, which utiliz es linear interpolation methods, to more accurately predict address placem ent in urban areas than in rural areas where streets are typically longer and addr ess distribution less uniform. With respect to reverse geocoding, however, higher population densities offer an ambient level of masking as there are simp ly more possibilities (people) shielding the targeted individual(s) due to closer residential proximity. It was thus necessary to look at the opposing influences of population densities, as this experiment involved both line based geocoding and reverse geocoding. This was accomplished by comparing the populati on densities for each geoprivacy data element’s reverse geocoded point as documented by its corresponding 2000 US Census Block Group value with its reverse geocoding success as measured by distance to actual location. The results for each geoprivacy data element were displayed on a scatter plot and included R-squared values as an indication of linear association. After the determination of data ava ilability, reverse geocoding success, and influence of population density, these fi ndings were examined with respect to county population totals. This compar ison was used to obtain an understanding of potential exposure to geopriva cy in the state of Florida.

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30 4. RESULTS 4.1 Geoprivacy Data Availability The initial effort to determine data ava ilability in Florida consisted of an internet search utilizing the Google engine (http://www.google.com). For each county, three separate searches were performed using the following key words: 1) Desired County Property Appraiser 2) Desired County GIS Department 3) Desired County GIS Data In addition to revealing the sought after data and contact information, these search criteria quickly returned a web site that catalogs links to Florida county GIS websites. The information provided by this website was used to supplement the existing search criteria and help dete rmine data availability. The websites retrieved from the search were ex amined for the presence of the three geoprivacy data elements: county main tained roads, property parcels, and address points. Where data elements were found and freely available, they were downloaded and examined for their ability to be used in a reverse geocoding operation. This examination was not only for the existence of address and ownership information, but also for any characteristic which impacted the usability of the data. Traits such as diffi cult access, fragmented files, or the need to perform additional processing steps such as joining ownership tables to the

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31 GIS layer, was documented. The online s earch revealed a substantial amount of variability among all counties as to what information was available, how it was offered, and how it was described. For counties whose availability could not be determined from the online search, the best contact information (email, phone number) offered by the website was obtained. For example, if there was a specific GIS or mapping contact listed, that information was determined to be the best contact and was pursued. If there was no GIS or mappi ng contact, the general email address or phone number was used. Keeping with the desire to remain anonymous, email contacts took priority over phone numbers. Only one contact was obtained for each county mapping entity, which typi cally was the property appraiser and county GIS department. To fill in the gaps for counties whose data availability could not be determined from the initial web search as well as insure the findings of the online search, an anonymous email was sent to all counties which offered an email contact inquiring about the existence of the geoprivacy data elements. The following is a transcript of the email that was sent:

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32 ________________________________________________________________ Hello. Could you please inform me as to how I can obtain GIS information for your county? I am specifically looking for the following layers: Streets with Address Ranges (geocodable) Property Parcels with Ownership Information Address Points Recent Aerial Photography* Is there a site (web, ftp) from which I c an directly access any of this information? Any assistance you could provide woul d be greatly appreciated. Thanks. ________________________________________________________________ *Aerial photography was deemed irrelevant due to the release of the USDA imagery, however the email request was sent prior to this conclusion. For counties whose best or only contact was a phone number, an anonymous phone call (*67) was made to determine dat a availability and consisted of the same verbiage as the email message. The data availability effort requir ed 201 unique web searches, 68 emails, and 35 phone calls. It should be noted that only one knowledgeable contact for each county entity, which in most case s was the County Property Appraiser and County GIS Department, was pursued. With 67 counties in the state and typically two departments being responsible for the desired GIS information, contacting every conceivable entity to achieve absolute certainty would be a monumental task. For the purposes of this thesis, it was determined that if the information could not be located by a thorough web search, email, or phone call to a knowledgeable source then the information is presumed to be difficult to obtain which provides some level of protection, intentional or not. Unexpectedly, there were a few referrals to county Emergency Services /

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33 Management department(s) for street and addr essing information. The referring county staff did not give an indication of whether or not these departments would actually provide this information, just that they were the caretakers and to contact them for availability. Given that these departments focus on providing emergency services to individuals in need and every moment of their time is critical, these contacts were not pursued. The outcome of the county data search revealed significant variability in both the availability and accessibility of the county maintained geoprivacy data elements (Table 2). A review of the deta iled county availability (Table 3) portrays Table 2. County Availability Summary Data Availability Code DescriptionStreetsParcels Address Points Total Yes Layer is available and can be obtained anonymously and without charge (includes parcels that must be joined to ownership table) 181512 45 Purchase Layer is available for purchase therefore payment information and in some cases a usage agreement is required (includes parcels that must be joined to table) and cannot be obtained anonymously. 6272 35 Indirect Layer is available but difficult to obtain, use, or contact information and / or a usage agreement is required. 7510 22 Ineffective Layer is available but not able to be used for reverse geocoding and identity disclosure purposes due to a lack of addresses and / or ownership information. 1020 12 NoLayer confirmed unavailable (includes layers in process).109 10 InconclusiveLayer availability unable to be determined.251834 77 Total 676767201 this variability in greater depth. Only seven counties make all three layers available for free, and only 12 have all three available for free or purchase. However, 24 counties make at least one county maintained geoprivacy data element available for free and 45 counties make at least one available for free or purchase. Therefore, at least one c ounty maintained geoprivacy data element

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34 can be obtained for the majority (67 percent) of the state. Table 3. Detailed County Availability CountyRoadsParcels A ddress Points CountyRoadsParcels A ddress Points Alachua IneffectiveIndirectIndirect Lee YesYesInconclusive Baker InconclusiveInconclusiveInconclusive Leon InconclusiveInconclusiveInconclusive Bay YesYesYes Levy InconclusiveInconclusiveInconclusive Bradford InconclusiveInconclusiveInconclusive Liberty InconclusivePurchaseInconclusive Brevard IneffectiveIndirectYes Madison InconclusiveInconclusiveInconclusive Broward YesPurchaseNo Manatee YesYesInconclusive Calhoun IneffectivePurchaseNo Marion YesPurchaseInconclusive Charlotte YesYesYes Martin IneffectiveYesInconclusive Citrus IneffectiveIndirectInconclusive Miami-Dade InconclusivePurchaseInconclusive Clay PurchasePurchaseInconclusive Monroe YesYesNo Collier YesPurchaseYes Nassau InconclusivePurchaseInconclusive Columbia InconclusivePurchaseInconclusive Okaloosa InconclusiveInconclusiveInconclusive DeSoto IndirectPurchaseIndirect Okeechobee InconclusiveInconclusiveInconclusive Dixie IndirectPurchaseIndirect Orange YesPurchaseYes Duval InconclusiveInconclusiveInconclusive Osceola YesPurchaseYes Escambia PurchaseIndirectNo Palm Beach InconclusiveInconclusiveInconclusive Flagler InconclusivePurchaseInconclusive Pasco IneffectiveYesNo Franklin InconclusiveInconclusiveInconclusive Pinellas YesYesNo Gadsden IndirectPurchaseIndirect Polk InconclusiveYesIndirect Gilchrist InconclusiveInconclusiveInconclusive Putnam InconclusiveIneffectiveYes Glades InconclusiveInconclusiveInconclusive Santa Rosa InconclusiveInconclusiveInconclusive Gulf IndirectPurchaseNo Sarasota YesPurchaseInconclusive Hamilton IndirectPurchaseIndirect Seminole YesYesYes Hardee IneffectivePurchaseNo St. Johns YesPurchaseNo Hendry IneffectiveIneffectiveInconclusive St. LuciePurchasePurchaseInconclusive Hernando PurchasePurchasePurchase Sumter PurchasePurchasePurchase Highlands InconclusiveInconclusiveInconclusive Suwannee InconclusiveInconclusiveInconclusive Hillsborough YesYesYes Taylor InconclusiveYesInconclusive Holmes IneffectivePurchaseInconclusive Union InconclusiveInconclusiveInconclusive Indian River IndirectIndirectIndirect V olusia YesYesYes Jackson IndirectPurchaseIndirect Wakulla NoInconclusiveInconclusive Jefferson PurchasePurchaseIndirect Walton YesYesYes Lafayette InconclusiveInconclusiveInconclusive Washington IneffectivePurchaseIndirect Lake YesYesYes Detailed County Availability Despite performing an online search and attempting to reach the best contact for each county entity, the avail ability of elements for several counties was unable to be determined and were ther efore deemed “Inconclusive.” The availability of all three county geopriva cy data elements could not be determined in 17 counties and there were 36 countie s with at least one data element whose availability could not be determined. De spite an inability to determine what, if any, county maintained information is available for these areas, it is important to remember that non-county maintained geoc odable streets are available for the

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35 entire state. The following map series (Figures 6 – 8) provides a graphical representation of state wide data availability.

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36 Figure 6. Statewide Availability of Count y Maintained, Geocodable Streets

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37 Figure 7. Statewide Availability of Parcel Data with Ownership Information

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38 Figure 8. Statewide Availability of Address Points

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39 4.2 Evaluating Geoprivacy Risk With the statewide geoprivacy data el ement availability determined, the next step was to select a pilot county for the reverse geocoding evaluation. After the initial online search, only two count ies had complete geoprivacy data element availability: Bay County and Charlotte C ounty. Bay County was selected as the pilot county because it offered a more robust suite of data beyond the geoprivacy data elements, included metadata, and had popul ation characteristics that were more similar to statewide averages. (USCB 2006 Estimates) Following the county selection, the s ubjects of the map hacking effort needed to be identified. The location of t he subjects was conveyed by the county address point layer which, in the case of Bay County, is the most accurate geoprivacy data element. To best emulate a scenario which targets residents, the county property ownership database was filtered to contain only those individuals who were listed as owner / o ccupiers of the property. This reduced the eligible population from 78,090 to 22,755. Of this subset, a simple random sample of 100 individuals were selected as the test group. A limitation of a tool used later in this experiment influenced the decision to use a sample size of 100 individuals. A county scale (1:316,800) monochrom atic map was then developed in ArcGIS showing only the county boundary as a polygon, major roads as lines, and subjects as point locations (Figure 9). This map was then printed with a conventional black and white laser printer on standard copy paper. The 100 point locations, or “incidences,” were then counted to ensure that none were

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40 obscured by the other map element s and therefore able to be hacked. Figure 9. Published Map: Bay County, FL Incidences

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41 The “Bay County, FL Incidences” map was then scanned at 200 dpi to a Tagged Image Format (.tif) file, a lossless file format, and georeferenced in ArcGIS using four road intersections as control points. The incident locations were then “hacked” by digitizing polygon circles at a capture scale of 1:4800 and then determining the polygon centroid using the ArcGIS “Feature to Point” tool. The polygon centroid locations represent ed the starting points for all subsequent reverse geocoding operations and are referred to as the “hacked” locations or points. The different types of reference data used in this experiment (point, line, polygon) warranted the use of a different process to assign addresses (reverse geocoding) to the hacked points. For the parcels (polygon layer) and address points (point layer) an ArcGIS tool called “Spatial Join” was used. This process assigns the attributes (the address informa tion) of the closest feature in another layer (the geoprivacy data element) to each feature in the target layer (hacked locations) and calculates the distance between the two. For assigning the address represented by the line features to the hacked locations, however, an ArcGIS add-in called ET Geowizards developed by ET Spatial Techniques was used. Several internal ArcGIS tools and code samples were explored prior to making the decision to use this utility, but the ease of use, low cost ($195), and effectiveness of ET Geowizards made it an appropriate choice for this experiment. This software utilized all available address components of the non-county and county maintained geocodable street layers to assign an address to the target point layer. The hacked and reverse

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42 geocoded points were then geocoded using the address information that was assigned from its corresponding reverse geocoding method. The distance from these points to the actual point, or in cident, and the number of alternates was determined using a free ArcGIS add-in (H awth’s Analysis Tools for ArcGIS). The reverse geocoding analysis with the non-county maintained geocodable streets produced eight point s that were not geocodable and one point which was an extreme observation at 42,419 feet with over 100 alternates (a limitation of Hawth’s Analysis Tools). The county maintained geocodable streets produced one point that was not geocodable and three with over 100 alternates. The parcels produced only one point that was not geocodable and no points with over 100 alternates. All of the address points were geocodable and had less than or equal to 100 alternates. The points that were not geocodable or had over 100 alternates did not produc e results which could be compared quantitatively with the corresponding results fo r the other elements. To allow for a quantitative comparison based on compar able sample size across all four geoprivacy data elements, the most extrem e ten percent (10 points) associated with each element were excluded. Table 4 represents the summary statistics for the reverse geocoding effectiveness of the four layers and the initial hacked locations which serve as control values, and thus documents the accuracy of the initial map hacking process, prior to the reverse geocoding and geocoding steps. In addition to standard descriptive statistics measures the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) was used to evaluate reverse geocoding effectiveness. This computation

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43 measures the average magni tude of the error, giving a progressively higher weight to larger error values. RMSE prov ides an indication of the consistency of the process being measured and has been utilized in previous studies of spatial proximity and accuracy (e.g., Zandbergen and Green 2007). Table 4. Reverse Geocoding Results Control Summary Statistic (excludes 10% extreme observations) Hacked Locations (no geocoding) Non-county Maintained Roads County Maintained Roads Property Parcel sAddress Points Minimum (feet)6.613.763.10.00.0 Maximum (feet)81.3503.5357.193.551.3 Mean (feet)39.8144.1132.819.40.6 Median (feet)41.1119.1115.29.80.0 Standard Deviation (feet)17.394.959.722.45.4 Root Mean Square Error43.4172.2145.529.55.4 % Match Address*Not Applicable**3.3%7.8%87.8%98.9% % Match StreetNot Applicable**66.7%86.7%98.9%100.0% Mean # Alternates0.13.31.80.20.0* When ownership information is present, an address match also reveals identity. ** The control value represents the initial map hacking effort, prior to address determination. Geocoding was not performed th erefore these measures do not apply.Geoprivacy Data Elements Table 4 shows that initial map hacking, as depicted by the values for the control “Hacked Locations”, was very accurate. The RMSE from hacked to actual locations was 43.4 feet with t he least accurate point being an extreme observation at only 81.3 feet away from its actual location. Lending further support to the claim of high map hacking accuracy is that the mean number of alternates for the hacked locations was 0.1. These values are surprising in light of the map’s small scale (1:316,800) and limited detail. Furthermore, the map was reproduced twice (printing and scanni ng) prior to georeferencing and each reproduction presents an opportunity for errors to be introduced. No geocoding was performed for the hacked locations layer as it served as the starting point for the reverse geocoding process and was a control value to which the other elements were compared.

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44 The Address Points layer produced the most accurate results, with the RMSE being 5.4 feet. This value is nine times greater than t he mean of 0.6 feet and this disparity, although small in terms of real world distance, was influenced by the maximum value of 51.3 feet. T he address and street address match rates were 98.9 percent and 100 percent, res pectively, rendering the address point layer extremely effective at identity disclosure. While the results for Property Parcels were also very accurate, these did not approach the accuracy of the address points, at least in a statistical sense. RMSE was determined to be 29.5 feet and match rates were 87.8 percent for the target’s address and 98.9 percent for target ’s street. The maximum distance to actual was 93.5 feet, a relatively shor t distance for an extreme observation, but the majority of the points were very accu rate as the mean for all points was only 19.4 feet and the median 9.8 feet. When examining the results for the Non-County and County Maintained Roads layers, it is apparent that thes e geoprivacy data elements do not approach the high accuracy values of the Addre ss Points and Property Parcels. RMSE values for the County Maintained Roads layer was 145.5 feet with an accompanying address match rate of 7.8 per cent and street match rate of 86.7 percent. Results for the Non-County Main tained Roads layer were less accurate with a RMSE of 172.2 feet and address and street match rates of 3.3 percent and 66.7 percent, respectively. Although many of the values for the r oad layers are several times greater than that of the Address Points and Parcel s, it is important to process these

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45 values in their real world context. For example, although the RMSE value for Non-county Maintained Roads was nearly si x times greater than that of the property parcels, the resulting difference in distance is only 142.7 feet; which is only a little less than half the length of a football field. The values for mean number of alternates for the roads layers were nine times higher than that of the parcels, but determining location to withi n an average of 3.3 alternates for Noncounty maintained roads and 1.8 for c ounty maintained roads still puts them reasonably close to the target. The distribution of values representing reverse geocoding success (distance to the actual location) are depi cted by a box plot in Figure 10. The extents of the vertically oriented li nes represent the minimum and maximum distance to actual values, the extents of the grey box represent the upper and lower quartiles, and the horizontal black li ne which crosses the vertical line within the grey box represents the median value. This was prepared to visually convey and compare the aforementioned statistical parameters.

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46 Figure 10. Box Plot of Reverse Geocoding Success When examining the overall effectiv eness of each element to disclose address and identity information, the summa ry statistics reveal a distinction between the road elements (non-county and county maintained) and the parcels and address points. When looking at the statistics alone, an argument could also be made that there is a similar dispar ity between the parcels and address points, but when these numbers are considered with respect to their real world significance the differences are margi nal as they are both highly accurate. Therefore, the parcels and address poi nts were superior and similar in their reverse geocoding capabilities and the roads layers were inferior, yet also similar. A cumulative frequency distribut ion (Figure 11) of the data elements and their reverse geocoding success illustrates the pairing between the data elements. Whereas all points for the A ddress Point and Property Parcel layers Box Plot of Reverse Geocoding Success0.0 100.0 200.0 300.0 400.0 500.0ControlNon County Maintained Roads County Maintained Roads Property ParcelsAddress Points Geoprivacy Data ElementDistance from Reverse Geocoded Position to Actual Position (feet)

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47 are within 100 feet or less of the actual location, and most within 50 feet, both road layers exhibit a much mo re gradual, yet similar trend. Figure 11. Cumulative Frequency Distribution of Data Elements and Reverse Geocoding Success Cumulative Frequency of Data Elements and Reverse Geocoding Success0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 80.0% 90.0% 100.0% 050100150200250300350400450500 Distance from Reverse Geocoded Position to Actual Position (feet)Cumulative Frequency of Points (%) Non County Maintained Roads County Maintained Roads Property Parcels Address Points Although the roads were less effective in disclosing the actual address and do not have the capability to inherently re veal identity as do parcels, it should be noted that the mean number of alternates for both road data elements is still a remarkably small number: 3.3 for non-county maintained roads and 1.8 for county maintained roads. Despite not being able to provide the certainty of the parcels and address points, these elements did produce very few alternates and should be thought of as an effective means of narrowing down address possibilities to a particular street with few alternates.

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48 4.3 Population Characteristics and Reverse Geocoding Success Located in northwest Florida (aka the Panhandle) on the Gulf of Mexico, Bay County ranks 25th in the state with respect to population at 148,217 and is 30th in land area at 763.7 square miles. (USCB 2000) This puts the overall population density of the county at 194 people per square mile. Nearly 25 percent of Bay County’s residents live wit hin its largest municipality and most densely populated area, Panama City. To investigate whether population density influenced reverse geocoding success within the county, a greater level of geographic detail was needed than an overall county population density calculat ion. Therefore, the county’s 87 Census Block Group boundaries and associated population densities (Figure 12) were used to better reflect variability ac ross the county. Summary statistics for Bay County’s Census Block Groups are depicted in Table 5. Table 5. Population Density Bay County Summary Statistic People per Square Mile Minimum 9 Maximum 5,338 Mean 1,686 Median 1,525 Standard Deviation 1,192 Total Population of Bay County: 148,217 Population Density US Census Block Groups (per 2000 Census) The population density value of the under lying the census block group was then assigned to each of the point locations of the test population (incidents) that were the target of this experiment. This value was then analyzed with respect to the distance that each geoprivacy dat a element and associated reverse

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49 geocoding method produced. This correlation analysis is depicted on the following scatterplots (Figures 13 16). Figure 12. Bay County Population Density

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50 Figure 13. Scatter Plot: Non County Maintained Roads Non County Maintained RoadsR2 = 0.21360 100 200 300 400 500 05001,0001,5002,0002,5003,0003,5004,000Population Density People per Square MileDistance from Reverse Geocoded to Actual Locatio n NCM Roads Linear (NCM Roads) Figure 14. Scatter Plot: County Maintained Roads County Maintained RoadsR2 = 0.1090 100 200 300 400 500 05001,0001,5002,0002,5003,0003,5004,000Population Density People per Square MileDistance from Reverse Geocoded to Actual Locatio n CM Roads Linear (CM Roads)

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51 Figure 15. Scatter Plot: County Maintained Parcels County Maintained ParcelsR2 = 0.0350 100 200 300 400 500 05001,0001,5002,0002,5003,0003,5004,000Population Density People per Square MileDistance from Reverse Geocoded to Actual Locatio n CM Parcels Linear (CM Parcels) Figure 16. Scatter Plot: County Maintained Address Points County Maintained Address PointsR2 = 0.001 0 100 200 300 400 500 05001,0001,5002,0002,5003,0003,5004,000Population Density People per Square MileDistance from Reverse Geocoded to Actual Locatio n CM Add Points Linear (CM Add Points)

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52 The results of the correlation analysis do not reveal any significant linear relationship between population density and reverse geocoding success for any data element. This is a probable consequenc e of the success of the initial map hacking effort, which placed points on average 39.8 feet from their actual location with the least accurate point registeri ng 81.3 feet. Even in high density areas there can only be few, if any, alternat es within these short distances. An exception would be high-rise residential stru ctures, but these are not prevalent in Bay County. Although low population density has been shown to negatively influence linear based geocoding, linear based reverse geocoding is a different process as it uses the street layer as a reference for determining the closest address to the target feature. Linear based geocoding was used, but it was based on an address derived from the source layer based on proximity, not an interpolation of a known address along a line segment. The address assigned via reverse geocoding may be incorrect, as is demonstrated by the low address match rates of both street based geoprivacy data elem ents, but it is an address that can reliably be used to locate the feature back to the closest address on the reference layer. In summary, linear based reverse geocoding is not influenced in the same manner by population densit y as linear based geocoding, and in the case of Bay County population density does not influence line, point, or polygon based reverse geocoding success. Data availability, the effectiveness of each geoprivacy data element, and the influence of population density has been determined; but what does this

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53 mean for the state of Florida? As stated before, Bay County has population characteristics (total, density) similar to Florida county averages (Figures 17 & 18). This likeness along with the finding t hat population density does not play a significant role in reverse geocoding su ccess permits the results for Bay County to be applied to all counties and suggests statewide vulnerability.

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54 Figure 17. County Population

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55 Figure 18. County Population Density

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56 With population size and density not significantly influencing reverse geocoding success, it is apparent that data availability is the key component of geoprivacy risk. Considering that addr ess points and parcels can provide for successful identity disclosure, the stat e’s population (United States Census Bureau, 2004 Estimate) was totaled for each geoprivacy data element and corresponding availability code (Table 6). This was developed to provide some insight as to the amount of people who, due to the data that their county of Table 6. Population Facing Geoprivacy Risk StreetsParcels A ddress Points Yes 8,514,9175,513,1284,716,269 Purchase 912,8397,519,229211,446 Indirect 299,7121,310,9391,077,635 Ineffective 1,526,169110,8160 No 26,23503,676,652 Inconclusive 6,183,1763,008,9367,781,046 Total17,463,04817,463,04817,463,048Population based on USCB 2004 EstimatesPopulation Facing Geoprivacy Risk residence provides, are potentially exposed to geoprivacy threats. As Table 6 indicates, approximately two thirds of Florida’s residents live in counties that make parcel data available, and nearly half of those counties make it available for free. Given the high success rate of parcels to disclose both address and identity, this is reason for concern as it indicates that majority of the state is exposed to a potential geoprivacy risk.

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57 5. CONCLUSIONS This thesis explored a very immi nent, yet relatively unknown issue affecting every citizen in the state of Florida, and perhaps elsewhere; geoprivacy. Two very important questions were explor ed, the first of which being the manner in which certain types of information nec essary to engineer geoprivacy violations influence success. The results indicate that if no masking of sensitive data occurs and reference material displayed on a map can be discovered or accurately replicated, reverse geocoding can be very accurate; even when working from small scale material t hat has been reproduced. All geoprivacy data elements evaluated could be used to assign an address to a point which lacks one and can subsequently serve as a reference layer to locate that address accurately relative to itself. The exis tence of parcel data or address points allow for a high risk of identity disclosure, assuming that address and ownership information is inherent to the data. Non-county and county maintained roads exhibit a moderate to high success rate of identifying the ta rget’s street and produced few alternates. Although le ss successful than parcels and address points, both street layers pose a thr eat for address disclosure; albeit a less certain one. The existence of county ma intained roads does not greatly increase the chance for address disclosure when compared to non-county maintained roads and neither road layers suggest a ri sk of personal identity disclosure as

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58 ownership information is not inherent. The second question addressed by this research was regarding the extent to which Florida counties and their inhabit ants at risk for geoprivacy violations. Although the entire state is subject to the Public Records Law, there is substantial variability in the amount, qua lity, accessibility, and delivery methods of county maintained spatial data. Desp ite these inconsistencies, this study suggests that current data availability and associated reverse geocoding success makes the majority of the state’s resi dents vulnerable to geoprivacy violations. The widespread accessibility of parcel dat a, its associated reverse geocoding success, and its lack of statistical associ ation with population density support this claim. With these findings, this thesis make s a unique contribution to the existing body of geoprivacy research by creating a comprehensive forum that exposes the geoprivacy threat to a greater audi ence while retaining its academic significance. It is anticipated that par ties from various social, economic, and professional backgrounds will use this research to engage in geoprivacy policy discussions. State and local government s hould consider the privacy risks that spatial information can create for its citizens and a debate which involves all parties should be initiated to address geoprivacy concerns. Successful collaboration will result in a more effe ctively managed threat; allowing geospatial research and services to provide cont inued public benefit while simultaneously protecting the privacy of its subjects, which has been proven to be threatened by current practices.

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59 It is important to consider some of t he limitations of this study and explore related avenues for future research. An im portant limitation of this research was that statewide data availability and qualit y could not be determined with absolute certainty. Several geoprivacy data el ements (77 of 201) were marked as “Inconclusive” for several counties. A mo re exhaustive effort to determine data availability could resolve these uncertainties. In addition to resolving the “Inconclusives”, an examination of t he geoprivacy data elements that were available only for purchase would be needed to accurately determine their suitability for use in a reverse geocoding operation. Although this was attempted to be resolved through careful wording of the data requests (with ownership information, geocodable, etc.), wit hout first-hand knowledge the county representative had to be relied upon to accura tely convey the layer’s capabilities. Another opportunity to add to this research effort would be to modify the testing population and sampling techniques. One random sample of only 100 individuals from one county was used. Additional experiments conducted with larger samples and/or samples from other counties using their geoprivacy data elements could extend the findings pres ented in this study. Within these limitations, however, the methods used fo r this experiment are believed to be appropriate and the conclusion regarding st atewide vulnerability conceptually and methodologically valid. Future research endeavors should approach the geoprivacy threat in a holistic manner and carefully explore policy alternatives for managing the vulnerabilities associated with making pr ivate data publicly available. The

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60 geoprivacy data elements used for the purposes of this thesis exist because they provide a service to the entities who commissioned their development. By allowing public availability, this data also provides a benefit to many nongovernmental entities that use this informa tion for purposes which are part of the state’s intellectual and economic engines. Widespread data availability, fostered by the state’s Public Records Law, has created a complex scenario where there are concurrent positive and negative outcome s. While personal privacy is the key concern addressed by this thesis, it is important to include these and other external, yet important, factors when addre ssing policy alternatives. Such factors can only be identified, however, if all par ties contributing to, knowledgable of, and influenced by geoprivacy concerns are in volved. This will require extensive engagement and collaboration between public officials, citizens, GIS professionals, corporate represent atives, and the academic community.

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61 6. REFERENCES Armstrong MP, Ruggles AJ. Geographic Information Technologies and Personal Privacy. Cartographica 2005;40:4:63-73 Armstrong MP, Rushton G, Zimmerman DL Geographically masking health data to preserve confidentiality. Statistics in Medicine 1999;18:497–525. Brownstein JS, Cassa CA, Kohane IS, Mandl KD. An unsupervised classification method for inferring original case locati ons from low-resolution disease maps. International Journal of Health Geographics 2006;5:56:1-7 Cayo MR, Talbot TO. Positional erro r in automated geocoding of residential addresses. International Journal of Health Geographics 2003;2:10. Curtis AJ, Mills JW, Leitner M. Spat ial confidentiality and GIS: re-engineering mortality locations from published maps about Hurricane Katrina. International Journal of Health Geographics 2006;5:44:1-12 Dent, BD. Cartography Thematic Map Design (5th Edition). 1999. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill. Kamel Boulos MN, Cai Q, Padget JA, Rushton G. Using software agents to preserve individual health data confi dentiality in micro-scale geographical analyses. Journal of Biomedical Informatics 2006;39:160-170 Kwan M, Casas I, Schmitz BC. Protection of geoprivacy and accuracy of spatial information: how effective are geographical masks? Cartographica 2004;

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62 39:2:15-28 Olvingson C, Hallberg J, Timpka T, Lindqvist K. Ethical issues in public health informatics: implications for system design when sharing geographic information. Journal of Biomedical Informatics 2003;35:178-185 Rushton G, Armstrong MP, Gittler J, Greene BR, Pavlik CE, West MM, Zimmerman DL. Geocoding in cancer research. American Journal of Preventative Medicine 2006; 30(2S):S16-S24 State of Florida Statutes 2007 http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm (Last Accessed 11/19/2007) United States Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12000.html (Last Accessed 11/13/2007) VanWey LK, Rindfuss RR, Gutmann MP, Entwisle B, Balk DL. Spatial Demography Special Feature: Confident iality and spatially explicit data: Concerns and challenges. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 2005;102:15337-15342 Whitsel EA, Quibrera PM, Smith RL, Ca tellier DJ, Liao D, Henley AC, Heiss G. Accuracy of commercial geocoding: assessment and implications Epidemiologic Perspectives and Innovations 2006;3:8:1-12 Zandbergen PA, Green JW. Error and Bias in Determining Exposure Potential of Children at School Locations Usi ng Proximity-Based GIS Techniques. Environmental Health Perspectives 2007;115:9:1363-1370.


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ABSTRACT: Certain types of spatial data maintained and distributed by counties at taxpayer expense can be used with powerful mapping and analysis software, called Geographic Information Systems (GIS), to compromise an indvidual's locational privacy. The kind of privacy at threat here is referred to as geoprivacy, which is concerned with the rights to prevent disclosure of the location of one's home, workplace, or daily activities. While the availability of accessible and accurate geospatial data has increased geoprivacy concerns in recent years, this threat remains virtually unknown to the general public. Although previous research has explored various components of the geoprivacy debate, the fragmented and localized nature of this work does not adequately address the threat on a large scale or lend itself for use in multi-level policy discussions.This thesis fills the need for a comprehensive and systematic geoprivacy study by examining county data availability in the entire state of Florida. Ultimately, the success of geoprivacy violation attempts is determined by the availability and quality of the data being used. In order to evaluate this threat,a statewide inventory of the data necessary for a reverse geocoding operation, defined here as geoprivacy data elements, was created. A specific county (Bay County) with complete data availability was then selected and its geoprivacy data elements, specifically street, parcel, and address point layers were evaluated for their reverse geocoding and subsequent identity disclosure success. These findings were then compared with the results of the statewide inventory to determine the level of exposure that the state's residents are subjected to, based on their county's data offerings.The statewide data inventory indicated substantial variation in county availability, quality, and delivery methods of the desired geoprivacy data elements. The results of the reverse geocoding operation performed with Bay County's geoprivacy data elements revealed that both property parcels and address points in conjunction with ownership information have a high rate of identity disclosure success. Geocodable streets were found to have a low rate of identity disclosure success and their results were comparable to a non-county maintained street layer that was used for control purposes. Although the street layers had a low rate of identity disclosure success, they could be used to identify a narrow range of address possibilities and still pose a geoprivacy threat. Forty-two counties in which approximately 13 million people reside make parcel data with ownership information available for free or purchase.Given the high success rate of the parcel data to disclose individual identity, this research suggests that the majority of the state's residents are vulnerable to potential geoprivacy violations.
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