USF Libraries
USF Digital Collections

A longitudinal study

MISSING IMAGE

Material Information

Title:
A longitudinal study the impact of a comprehensive emergency management system on disaster response in the commonwealth of the Bahamas
Physical Description:
Book
Language:
English
Creator:
Hughey, Erin P
Publisher:
University of South Florida
Place of Publication:
Tampa, Fla
Publication Date:

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Disaster management
Hazards
Risk
Vulnerability
Human geography
Dissertations, Academic -- Geography and Environmental Science & Policy -- Doctoral -- USF   ( lcsh )
Genre:
non-fiction   ( marcgt )

Notes

Summary:
ABSTRACT: Global trends show increasing losses from disasters as the number of people at risk grows by 70 to 80 million per year (United Nations, 2004). Although the frequency of natural disasters may be constant the human interaction with the given hazard has shifted through changes in development practices, environmental protection as well as the distribution of population and wealth. In an effort to combat the negative social, economic, and environmental impacts of hazards, strategies for identifying vulnerable populations and implementing mitigation measures is a high priority in hazards research. However despite our best efforts disasters have and will continue to negatively impact communities resulting in loss of life and property. To that end nations must establish effective emergency response capabilities to meet the needs of all residents potentially at harm.This study examined the establishment of a comprehensive emergency management (CEM) system in the nation of The Bahamas. Employing a longitudinal study design to examine the six study hurricanes: Andrew 1992, Floyd 1999, Michelle 2001, Frances 2004, Jeanne 2004, and Wilma 2005. The goal of this research was two fold; first, to test Quarantelli's (1997a) methodology for evaluating the management of disaster response to determine if it could be operationalized and second, to compare response operations under CEM with response operations prior to its implementation. Mixed methods were used to collect and analyze data. Data for the study were collected over a six-year period from 2001-2007. The following data collection techniques were employed for this study: (1) archival research, (2) structured surveys, (3) semi-structured interviews, and (4) participant observation.Data were analyzed in using three key tools: First, the surveys and closed-ended questions associated with the interviews were analyzed using standard statistical techniques. The data were then applied to 8 of the 10 criteria for measuring the management of national disaster response operations as outlined by Quarantelli (1997a). Finally, data were applied to the Model of Community Response to Disaster (Hughey, 2003). Results indicated that Quarantelli's (1997a) model for evaluating the management of disaster response could be operationalized. Findings also revealed an association between the implementation of a CEM system and improvements in disaster response within The Bahamas.
Thesis:
Dissertation (Ph.D.)--University of South Florida, 2008.
Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references.
System Details:
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
System Details:
System requirements: World Wide Web browser and PDF reader.
Statement of Responsibility:
by Erin P. Hughey.
General Note:
Title from PDF of title page.
General Note:
Document formatted into pages; contains 364 pages.
General Note:
Includes vita.

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of South Florida Library
Holding Location:
University of South Florida
Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
aleph - 002047059
oclc - 497107268
usfldc doi - E14-SFE0002743
usfldc handle - e14.2743
System ID:
SFS0027060:00001


This item is only available as the following downloads:


Full Text
xml version 1.0 encoding UTF-8 standalone no
record xmlns http:www.loc.govMARC21slim xmlns:xsi http:www.w3.org2001XMLSchema-instance xsi:schemaLocation http:www.loc.govstandardsmarcxmlschemaMARC21slim.xsd
leader nam 2200397Ka 4500
controlfield tag 001 002047059
005 20100112123900.0
007 cr mnu|||uuuuu
008 100112s2008 flu s 000 0 eng d
datafield ind1 8 ind2 024
subfield code a E14-SFE0002743
035
(OCoLC)497107268
040
FHM
c FHM
049
FHMM
090
G116 (Online)
1 100
Hughey, Erin P.
2 245
A longitudinal study :
b the impact of a comprehensive emergency management system on disaster response in the commonwealth of the Bahamas
h [electronic resource] /
by Erin P. Hughey.
260
[Tampa, Fla] :
University of South Florida,
2008.
500
Title from PDF of title page.
Document formatted into pages; contains 364 pages.
Includes vita.
502
Dissertation (Ph.D.)--University of South Florida, 2008.
504
Includes bibliographical references.
516
Text (Electronic dissertation) in PDF format.
520
ABSTRACT: Global trends show increasing losses from disasters as the number of people at risk grows by 70 to 80 million per year (United Nations, 2004). Although the frequency of natural disasters may be constant the human interaction with the given hazard has shifted through changes in development practices, environmental protection as well as the distribution of population and wealth. In an effort to combat the negative social, economic, and environmental impacts of hazards, strategies for identifying vulnerable populations and implementing mitigation measures is a high priority in hazards research. However despite our best efforts disasters have and will continue to negatively impact communities resulting in loss of life and property. To that end nations must establish effective emergency response capabilities to meet the needs of all residents potentially at harm.This study examined the establishment of a comprehensive emergency management (CEM) system in the nation of The Bahamas. Employing a longitudinal study design to examine the six study hurricanes: Andrew 1992, Floyd 1999, Michelle 2001, Frances 2004, Jeanne 2004, and Wilma 2005. The goal of this research was two fold; first, to test Quarantelli's (1997a) methodology for evaluating the management of disaster response to determine if it could be operationalized and second, to compare response operations under CEM with response operations prior to its implementation. Mixed methods were used to collect and analyze data. Data for the study were collected over a six-year period from 2001-2007. The following data collection techniques were employed for this study: (1) archival research, (2) structured surveys, (3) semi-structured interviews, and (4) participant observation.Data were analyzed in using three key tools: First, the surveys and closed-ended questions associated with the interviews were analyzed using standard statistical techniques. The data were then applied to 8 of the 10 criteria for measuring the management of national disaster response operations as outlined by Quarantelli (1997a). Finally, data were applied to the Model of Community Response to Disaster (Hughey, 2003). Results indicated that Quarantelli's (1997a) model for evaluating the management of disaster response could be operationalized. Findings also revealed an association between the implementation of a CEM system and improvements in disaster response within The Bahamas.
538
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
System requirements: World Wide Web browser and PDF reader.
590
Advisor: Graham A. Tobin, Ph.D.
653
Disaster management
Hazards
Risk
Vulnerability
Human geography
0 690
Dissertations, Academic
z USF
x Geography and Environmental Science & Policy
Doctoral.
773
t USF Electronic Theses and Dissertations.
4 856
u http://digital.lib.usf.edu/?e14.2743



PAGE 1

A Longitudinal Study: The Impact of a Comprehensive Emergency Management System on Disaster Response in T he Commonwealth of The Bahamas by Erin P. Hughey A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement s for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Geography & Envi ronmental Science and Policy College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida Major Professor: Graham A Tobin, Ph.D. Kevin Archer, Ph.D. Thomas Mason, Ph.D. Steven Reader, Ph.D. Elizabeth Strom, Ph.D. Date of Approval: August 28, 2008 Keywords: Disaster management, hazards, ri sk, vulnerability, human geography Copyright 2008, Erin P. Hughey

PAGE 2

Dedication This research is dedicated to t he staff of The Bahamas National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA).

PAGE 3

Acknowledgements I would like to express my most si ncere gratitude to t he many individuals who have assisted during my journey to pr oduce this dissertation. Above all, I would like to thank Dr. Graham A. Tobin, my advisor and fri end for his continued support and guidance. You allowed me to explore my research in a way that facilitated its growth and development. Alwa ys available to listen to my latest challenges and successes, I would not hav e been able to accomplish this without you. Thank you does not seem like enough. I would like to thank my committe e member Dr. Thomas Mason, for providing me with the opportunity to engage in research in the Bahamas and for his continued guidance along the way. The avenues for success that you have provided to me will not be wasted. I would like to thank my committe e member Dr. Elizabeth Strom for teaching me to more carefully reflec t on the language that I choose. Your contributions have aided in making this research a stronger and more comprehensive product. I would like to thank my committee member Dr. Kevin Archer for his support when I felt like I would never make it to the finish line. You have taught me to embrace the shades of gray that exist, no longer should it be only black and white. I would like to thank my committee member Dr. Steven Reader for his insightful feedback, comments, and dedicati on in working with me to reshape the

PAGE 4

way in which I viewed my data and my dissertation. I have a stronger dissertation because of it. In addition to my committee members I would like to thank the staff of The Bahamas National Emergency Management A gency (NEMA) for their support of this research. Through endless days of ar chival research, interviews, surveys, and the national response to three major hurricanes, the NEMA staff has strengthened my commitment to the importance of this re search. A very special thank you is extended to t he following individuals: Mr. Carl F. Smith; Ms. Gayle Outten-Moncur; Mr. Luke Bethel; Ms. El eanor Davis; Mr. Wendell Rigby; and Ms. Chrystal Glinton. I would also like to thank my fam ily for their encouragement during this process: Francis William Hughey, Jr.; Martha J. Hughey; Jessica A. Santillo; Sara J. Mercer; MaryRuth Briggs; Am y K. Cronk; Francis William Hughey III; Joseph A. Hughey; Joseph W. Green Sr.; Bonnie Green; and Lara McNeil. Most of all, I would like to thank my husband, Joseph W. Green Jr., for his endless support and encouragement. You have been patient, understanding, and loving throughout this process. I look forward to providing you with the same love and support as you embark on your journey towards a Ph.D. Thank You!

PAGE 5

i Table of Contents List of Tables vii List of Figures xiii Abstract xiv Chapter One: Introduction 1 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 Research Goals and Objectives 3 1.2.1 Research Objectives 4 1.3 Background 4 1.4 Study Site: The Geography of The Bahamas 5 1.4.1 Climate 6 1.4.2 Geology 7 1.4.3 The Bahamas Hydrologic Setting 8 1.4.4 Demographics 10 1.4.5 Political Structure 15 1.4.6 Economy 16 1.4.7 Hurricane Risk 19 1.4.7.1 The Bahamas Hurricane History 20 1.4.7.2 Hurricane Andrew 1992 26 1.4.7.3 Hurricane Floyd 1999 27 1.4.7.4 Hurricane Michelle 2001 27 1.4.7.5 Hurricane Frances 2004 28 1.4.7.6 Hurricane Jeanne 2004 30 1.4.7.7 Hurricane Wilma 2005 31 1.5 Problem Statement 31 1.6 Research Questions 32 1.7 Research Hypotheses 32 1.8 Research Design 33 1.9 Organization of the Dissertation 33 Chapter Two: Literature Review 35 2.1 Introduction 35

PAGE 6

ii 2.2 History of Hazards Research in Geography 36 2.3 Hazards Terminology 37 2.3.1 Defining the Field of Natural Hazards 39 2.3.1.1 Defining Disaster 40 2.3.1.2 Defining Risk 43 2.3.1.3 Defining Vulnerability 46 2.3.2 Phases of Emergency Management 48 2.3.2.1 Mitigation 49 2.3.2.2 Preparedness 52 2.3.2.3 Response 53 2.3.2.4 Recovery 54 2.4 Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) 54 2.5 Theoretical Frameworks in Hazards Research 59 2.5.1 Hazards-of-Place Model 59 2.5.2 Pressure and Release Model (PAR) 62 2.6 Local Response to Disasters 64 2.6.1 Exploring the Model of Community Response to Disasters 67 2.7 Discussion 69 Chapter Three: Study Design & Methods 70 3.1 Introduction 70 3.2 Background 71 3.2.1 Research Objectives 72 3.2.2 Research Questions 72 3.2.3 Selection of the Six Study Hurricanes 73 3.3 Methods 74 3.3.1 Data Collection Tools 75 3.3.1.1 Archival Research 75 3.3.1.2 Structured Survey Data 78 3.3.1.3 Semi-Structured Interviews 80 3.3.1.4 Participant Observation 83 3.4 Data Application and Analysis 85 3.4.1 Standard Statistical Anal ysis of Survey and Interview Data 86

PAGE 7

iii 3.4.2 Measuring The Bahamas National Response to Hurricanes: Andrew 1992), Floyd (1999), Michelle (2001), Frances (2004), Jeanne (2004) and Wilma (2005) 86 3.4.2.1 Eight Criteria for Evaluating the Management of Disaster Response Operations within The Bahamas 90 3.4.3 The Model of Community Response to Disasters 102 3.5 Strengths and Limitations to the Study Design 105 3.6 Summary 105 Chapter Four: Results, Application of Quarantelli’s Criteria for Evaluating Response 107 4.1 Introduction 107 4.2 Examination and Application of Quarantelli’s Eigh t Criteria 109 4.2.1 Criterion One: Adequa tely Carrying Out Generic Functions 109 4.2.1.1 Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion One 112 4.2.1.2 Hurricane Floyd 1999 Criterion One 119 4.2.1.3 Hurricane Michelle 2001 Criterion One 126 4.2.1.4 Hurricane Frances 2004 Criterion One 133 4.2.1.5 Hurricane Jeanne 200 4 Criterion One 147 4.2.1.6 Hurricane Wilma 2005 Criterion One 156 4.2.1.7 Criterion One Summary 163 4.2.2 Criterion Two: Effectiv ely Mobilizing Personnel and Resources 164 4.2.2.1 Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion Two 164 4.2.2.2 Hurricane Floyd 1999 Criterion Two 165 4.2.2.3 Hurricane Michelle 2001 Criterion Two 166 4.2.2.4 Hurricane Frances 2004 Criterion Two 167 4.2.2.5 Hurricane Jeanne 2004 Criterion Two 167 4.2.2.6 Hurricane Wilma 2005 Criterion Two 168 4.2.2.7 Criterion Two Summary 169 4.2.3 Criterion Three: Allo w the Adequate Processing of Information 169 4.2.3.1 Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion Three 170 4.2.3.2 Hurricane Floyd 1999 Criterion Three 172 4.2.3.3 Hurricane Michelle 2001 Criterion Three 173 4.2.3.4 Hurricane Frances 2004 Criterion Three 175

PAGE 8

iv 4.2.3.5 Hurricane Jeanne 200 4 Criterion Three 177 4.2.3.6 Hurricane Wilma 200 5 Criterion Three 179 4.2.3.7 Criterion Three Summary 180 4.2.4 Criterion Four: Permit the Proper Exercise of Decision-Making 180 4.2.4.1 Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion Four 181 4.2.4.2 Hurricane Floyd 19 99 Criterion Four 182 4.2.4.3 Hurricane Michelle 2001 Criterion Four 183 4.2.4.4 Hurricane Frances 2004 Criterion Four 184 4.2.4.5 Hurricane Jeanne 200 4 Criterion Four 185 4.2.4.6 Hurricane Wilma 200 5 Criterion Four 186 4.2.4.7 Criterion Four Summary 186 4.2.5 Criterion Five: Focus on the Development of Overall Coordination 187 4.2.5.1 Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion Five 188 4.2.5.2 Hurricane Floyd 19 99 Criterion Five 189 4.2.5.3 Hurricane Michelle 2001 Criterion Five 189 4.2.5.4 Hurricane Frances 2004 Criterion Five 189 4.2.5.5 Hurricane Jeanne 200 4 Criterion Five 190 4.2.5.6 Hurricane Wilma 200 5 Criterion Five 191 4.2.5.7 Criterion Five Summary 191 4.2.6 Criterion Six: Correct ly Recognizing Differences Between Response and Agent-Generated Demands 192 4.2.7 Criterion Seven: Prov ide the Mass Communication System with Appropriate and Accurate Information 193 4.2.7.1 Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion Seven 194 4.2.7.2 Hurricane Floyd 1999 Criterion Seven 194 4.2.7.3 Hurricane Michelle 2001 Criterion Seven 195 4.2.7.4 Hurricane Frances 2004 Criterion Seven 196 4.2.7.5 Hurricane Jeanne 2004 Criterion Seven 197 4.2.7.6 Hurricane Wilma 200 5 Criterion Seven 198 4.2.7.7 Criterion Seven Summary 198 4.2.8 Criterion Eight: Have a Well-Functioning Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 199 4.2.8.1 Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion Eight 199 4.2.8.2 Hurricane Floyd 1999 Criterion Eight 201 4.2.8.3 Hurricane Michelle 2001 Criterion Eight 203

PAGE 9

v 4.2.8.4 Hurricane Frances 2004 Criterion Eight 205 4.2.8.5 Hurricane Jeanne 200 4 Criterion Eight 207 4.2.8.6 Hurricane Wilma 200 5 Criterion Eight 209 4.2.8.7 Criterion Eight Summary 210 4.3 Chapter Summary and Discussion 213 Chapter Five: Results, Surveys & Interviews 220 5.1 Introduction 220 5.2 Survey Findings 220 5.2.1 Emergency Management Training 221 5.2.2 Planning and Information 226 5.2.3 Response Operations 228 5.2.4 Experience and Challenges Associated with Effective Emergency Response 233 5.2.5 Summary: Survey Results 246 5.3 Semi-Structured Interviews 248 5.3.1 Semi-Structured Interview Results 249 5.3.2 Summary 257 5.4 Summary: Survey & Interview Results 259 Chapter Six: Results, Application of The Theoretical Model 262 6.1 Introduction 262 6.2 Pre-CEM Model Application 262 6.2.1 Good Leadership by Prof essionally Trained Officials 263 6.2.2 A Foundation of Supportive Values for Government Action 263 6.2.3 Legal Authority to Act 264 6.2.4 An Advocacy Supporting Action 266 6.2.5 Necessary Institutional Resources 267 6.2.6 Discussion Pre-CEM 267 6.3 Post-CEM Model Application 267 6.3.1 Good Leadership by Prof essionally Trained Officials 268 6.3.2 A Foundation of Supportive Values for Government Action 270 6.3.3 Legal Authority to Act 271 6.3.4 An Advocacy Supporting Action 273 6.3.5 Necessary Institutional Resources 274 6.3.6 Discussion Post-CEM 274 6.4 Summary 275

PAGE 10

vi Chapter Seven: Summary, Conc lusions and Contributions 277 7.1 Introduction 277 7.2 Study Summary 277 7.3 Overview of Methods 278 7.4 Key Research Findings 279 7.5 Contributions to Geography 284 7.6 Recommendations and Future Research 285 7.6.1 Recommendations 285 7.6.2 Future Research 286 References 287 Glossary of Acronyms 302 Appendix A: Family Island Admini strators Structured Survey 304 Appendix B: Understanding the Hazard : The Development and Impact of the Six Study Hurricanes 307 Appendix C: Interview with Prime Minister Perry G. Christie 359 About the Author 364

PAGE 11

vii List of Tables Table 1.1 Population in isla nds Census Years 1970-2000 11 Table 1.2 Bahamas Island Population 12 Table 1.3 Key Labour Force Statistics 13 Table 1.4 Demographics 14 Table 1.5 The Governmental Structure of The Bahamas 15 Table 1.6 Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas 16 Table 1.7 Economy of The Bahamas 17 Table 1.8 Distribution of House hold by Income Group: All Bahamas, New Providence and Grand Bahama 2004 18 Table 1.9 Number of Househ olds and Household Income: All Bahamas, New Providence and Grand Bahama 2004 19 Table 1.10 Hurricanes Impacting Study Area 21 Table 2.1 Selected Definitions of Natural Hazards 40 Table 2.2a Selected Definitions of Disaster 41 Table 2.2b Selected Definitions of Disaster 42 Table 2.3a Selected Definitions of Risk 43 Table 2.3b Selected Definitions of Risk 44 Table 2.4 Selected Definitions of Vulnerability 46 Table 3.1 Semi-Structured Interviews Conducted 81 Table 3.2 Eight Criteria for Ev aluating The Management of Disaster Operations Within The Bahamas 90 Table 3.3 Sample Function Evaluation Chart 91 Table 4.1 Eight Criteria for Ev aluating The Management of Disaster Response Operations to t he Six Study Hurricanes 108 Table 4.2 Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to the Six Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion One 110 Table 4.3 Generic Function Evaluation Chart Applied to Hurricanes Andrew, Floyd, Michelle, Frances, Jeanne and Wilma 111

PAGE 12

viii Table 4.4 Evaluation of Generic Functions in Response to Hurricane Andrew 1992 112 Table 4.5 Evaluation of Generic Functions in Response to Hurricane Floyd 1999 119 Table 4.6 Evaluation of Generic Functions in Response to Hurricane Michelle 2001 127 Table 4.7 Evaluation of Generic Functions in Response to Hurricane Frances 2004 134 Table 4.8 Evaluation of Generic Functions in Response to Hurricane Jeanne 2004 147 Table 4.9 Evaluation of Generic Functions in Response to Hurricane Wilma 2005 156 Table 4.10 Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to the Six Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion Two 164 Table 4.11 Criterion Two: Effe ctively Mobilizing Personnel and Resources 165 Table 4.12 Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to the Six Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion Three 170 Table 4.13 Application of Crit erion Three: Allow the Adequate Processing of Information 170 Table 4.14 Evaluation of Hurricane Andrew Information Processing 172 Table 4.15 Evaluation of Hurricane Floyd Information Processing 173 Table 4.16 Evaluation of Hurricane Mi chelle Information Processing 174 Table 4.17 Evaluation of Hurricane Fr ances Information Processing 176 Table 4.18 Evaluation of Hurric ane Jeanne Information Processing 178 Table 4.19 Evaluation of Hurricane Wilma Information Processing 179 Table 4.20 Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to the Six Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion Four 181 Table 4.21 Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to the Six Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion Five 187

PAGE 13

ix Table 4.22 Evaluation of Criterion Six: Correctly Recognizing Differences Between Response and Agent-Generated Demands 192 Table 4.23 Evaluation of Crit erion Seven: Provide the Mass Communication System with Appropriate and Accurate Information 193 Table 4.24 Evaluation of Criterion Eight: Having a well-functioning emergency operations center (EOC 199 Table 4.25 Evaluation of Hu rricane Andrew EOC Physical Requirements 201 Table 4.26 Evaluation of Hurricane Fl oyd EOC Physical Requirements 202 Table 4.27 Evaluation of Hu rricane Michelle EOC Physical Requirements 204 Table 4.28 Evaluation of Hu rricane Frances EOC Physical Requirements 206 Table 4.29 Evaluation of Hurricane Jeanne EOC Physical Requirements 209 Table 4.30 Evaluation of Hurricane Wilma EOC Physical Requirements 210 Table 4.31 Evaluation of the EOC Physical Requirements for the Six Study Hurricanes 212 Table 4.32 Eight Criteria for Ev aluating The Management of Disaster Response Operations to t he Six Study Hurricanes 214 Table 5.1 Survey Question One, Has your island received disaster training from the NEMA office. 222 Table 5.2 Survey Question Three, Did you or a representative from your agency attend any of the NEMA Conferences held in 2004, 2005, and 2006? 224 Table 5.3 Survey Question Four, Does your island have a disaster preparedness and response plan? 226 Table 5.4 Survey Question Four(a ), When was the last time the disaster plan was reviewed and updated? 227 Table 5.5 Survey Question Five, How would you rate NEMA’s efforts to inform the public of their ro le in disaster planning and response? 228 Table 5.6 Survey Question Six, How would you rate the National Governments Response to Hu rricane Andrew? (Descriptive Statistics) 229

PAGE 14

x Table 5.7 Survey Question Six, How would you rate the National Governments Response to Hurricane Andrew? (Response Breakdown) 229 Table 5.8 Survey Question Seven, How would you rate the success of the National Governments Response to Hurricane Floyd? (Descriptive Statistics) 230 Table 5.9 Survey Question Seven, Ho w would you rate the success of the National Governments Response to Hurricane Floyd? (Response Breakdown) 231 Table 5.10 Survey Question Eight, How would you rate the success of the National Governments Response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne? (Descriptive Statistics) 231 Table 5.11 Survey Question Eight, How would you rate the success of the National Governments Response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne? (Response Breakdown) 232 Table 5.12 Survey Question Nine, How would you rate the National Governments Response to Hu rricane Wilma? (Descriptive Statistics) 232 Table 5.13 Survey Question Nine, How would you rate the success of the National Governments Response to Hurricane Wilma? (Response Breakdown) 233 Table 5.14 Survey Question Ten, Were you aware that The Bahamas has been working since 2002 to develop a CEM structure in an effort to coordinate disa ster planning and response activities? 234 Table 5.15 Survey Question Fourteen, Do you think the passage of the National Disaster Preparedness and Response Act will improve disaster response within The Bahamas? 238 Table 5.16 Number of years serv ed as an Island Administrator. 242 Table 5.17 Summary Table, the su ccess of the National Governments Response to the study hurricanes as determined by the Island Administrators rankings. 248 Table 5.18 Summary Table: Surv ey Questions 6-9. The table represents the percent of Isl and Administrators that rated each storm by category. (Response Breakdown) 248 Table 5.19 NEMA Representatives, How would you rate the National Governments Response to Hu rricane Andrew? (Descriptive Statistics) 250

PAGE 15

xi Table 5.20 NEMA Interviews, How would you rate the National Governments Response to Hurricane Andrew? (Response Breakdown) 251 Table 5.21 NEMA Interviews, How would you rate the success of the national governments response to Hurricane Floyd? (Descriptive Statistics) 251 Table 5.22 NEMA Interviews, How would you rate the success of the national governments response to Hurricane Floyd? (Response Breakdown) 252 Table 5.23 NEMA Interviews, How would you rate the success of the national governments respons e to Hurricane Michelle? (Descriptive Statistics) 253 Table 5.24 NEMA Interviews, How would you rate the success of the national governments respons e to Hurricane Michelle? (Response Breakdown) 253 Table 5.25 NEMA Representatives, How would you rate the success of the national governments res ponse to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne? (Descriptive Statistics) 254 Table 5.26 NEMA Interviews, How would you rate the success of the national governments response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne? (Response Breakdown) 254 Table 5.27 NEMA Representatives, How would you rate the success of the national governments res ponse to Hurricane Wilma? (Descriptive Statistics) 255 Table 5.28 NEMA Interviews, How would you rate the success of the national governments res ponse to Hurricane Wilma? (Response Breakdown) 255 Table 5.29 NEMA Representatives, How would you rate the National Governments Response to Hurricane Wilma? (Mean) 255 Table 5.30 Summary Table, the success of the nat ional governments response to the study hurricanes as determined by the NEMA staff rankings. 258 Table 5.31 Summary Table: The perc ent of NEMA staf f that rated each storm by category. 259 Table 5.32 Summary Table: The success of the nat ional governments response to six study hurricanes as determined by the structured surveys and semi-structured interviews. (Mean Rating) 260

PAGE 16

xii Table 6.1 Commonwealth of The Bahamas National Emergency Support Functions (Data Source: NEMA) 270 Table 7.1 Comparison betw een the perceptions of Island Administrators and NEMA Staff with regards to the national response to the six study hurricanes. 283 Table B.1 Study Hurricane Summary Table 358

PAGE 17

xiii List of Figures Figure 1.2 Geology of The Bahamas 8 Figure 2.1 Four Phases of Emergency Management 49 Figure 2.2 Framework of a Co mprehensive Emergency Management Plan 58 Figure 2.3 The Hazards-of-Pla ce Vulnerability Model 60 Figure 2.4 Pressure and Release Model 63 Figure 2.5 Model of Community Response to Disaster 66 Figure 3.1 Timeline of selected study hurricanes 71 Figure 3.2 Model of Community Response to Disasters 103 Figure 3.3 Methodology Flow Diagram 106 Figure 5.1 Hurricane Andrew Value Response of Island Administrators by Number of Years Served 243 Figure 5.2 Hurricane Floyd Value Res ponse of Island Administrators by Number of Years Served 244 Figure 5.3 Hurricane Frances and Jeanne Value Response of Island Administrators by Number of Years Served 245 Figure 5.4 Hurricane Wilma Value Re sponse of Island Administrators by Number of Years Served 246 Figure 6.1 Model of Community Response to Disasters 264 Figure 7.1 Model of Community Response to Disasters 284 Figure B.1 Hurricane Andrew Wind Speed and Central Pressure 311 Figure B.2 Hurricane Floyd 1999 Wind Speed and Barometric Pressure 319 Figure B.3 Hurricane Michelle Wind Speed and Central Pressure 329 Figure B.4 Hurricane Frances Wind Speed and Central Pressure 336 Figure B.5 Hurricane Jeanne Wind Speed and Central Pressure 346 Figure B.6 Hurricane Wilma Wind S peed and Central Pressure 353

PAGE 18

xiv A Longitudinal Study: The Impact of a Comprehensive Em ergency Management System on Disaster Response in T he Commonwealth of The Bahamas Erin P. Hughey ABSTRACT Global trends show increasing losses from disasters as the number of people at risk grows by 70 to 80 million per year (United Nations, 2004). Although the frequency of natural disa sters may be constant the human interaction with the given hazard has shifted through changes in development practices, environmental protection as well as the distribution of population and wealth. In an effort to combat the negat ive social, economic, and environmental impacts of hazards, strategies for identifying vulnerabl e populations and implementing mitigation meas ures is a high priority in hazards research. However despite our best efforts disaster s have and will contin ue to negatively impact communities resulting in loss of life and property. To that end nations must establish effective em ergency response capabilities to meet the needs of all residents potentially at harm. This study examined the establishment of a comprehensive emergency management (CEM) system in the natio n of The Bahamas. Employing a longitudinal study design to examine t he six study hurricanes: Andrew 1992, Floyd 1999, Michelle 2001, Frances 2004, Jeanne 20 04, and Wilma 2005. The

PAGE 19

xv goal of this research was two fold; first, to test Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology for evaluating the management of disaster response to determine if it could be operationalized and second, to compare response oper ations under CEM with response operations prior to its implementation. Mixed methods were used to collect and analyze data. Data for the study were collected over a six-year per iod from 2001-2007. The following data collection techniques were employed for th is study: (1) archival research, (2) structured surveys, (3) semi-structu red interviews, and (4) participant observation. Data were analyzed in using three key tools: First, the surveys and closed-ended questions associated with t he interviews were analyzed using standard statistical techniques The data were then applied to 8 of the 10 criteria for measuring the management of national disaster response operations as outlined by Quarantelli ( 1997a). Finally, data were applied to the Model of Community Response to Disaster (Hughey, 2003). Results indicated that Quarantell i’s (1997a) model for evaluating the management of disaster response could be operationalized. Findings also revealed an association between the implementation of a CEM system and improvements in disaster response within The Bahamas.

PAGE 20

1 Chapter One: Introduction Comprehensive Emergency Manageme nt (CEM) is the integrated approach of managing all-hazards through all four phases of the emergency management cycle. 1.1 Introduction Global trends show increasing losses from disasters as the number of people at risk grows by 70 to 80 million per year (United Nations, 2004). Although the frequency of natural disa sters may be constant the human interaction with the given hazard has shifted through changes in development practices, environmental protection as we ll as the distributi on of population and wealth. In an effort to combat the negative social, economic, and environmental impacts of hazards, strategies for identifying vulnerab le populations and implementing mitigation meas ures has and continues to be a high priority in hazards research. However despite our best efforts disasters continue to negatively impact communities resulting in loss of life and property To that end nations must establish effective emer gency response capabilit ies to meet the needs of all residents potentially at harm. Disaster response is a challenge fo r every jurisdiction. Meeting the immediate and long-term needs that result fr om a disaster is a complex task that requires a multifaceted integrated approach involving a variety of agencies and organizations. The hazards literature has shown that a ‘one size fits all’ cookie

PAGE 21

2 cutter approach to disaster response is i neffective. For example, White’s (1969 a) and (1974) research acknowledges that differences within communities require distinctive solutions for each location. CEM builds on that foundation through a program of risk and vulnerability assessment s as well as cataloging of resource availability. This process allows for t he identification of jurisdiction specific challenges and further facilitates a c oordinated environment well suited for effective response to disasters. Emergency management practitioners have reported that a centralized and co ordinated emergency management system improves all phases of the emergency management cycle (mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery) by decreasing the duplication of services and improving communication bet ween all agencies (Krep, 1991 a ) This research examines the effectiv eness of CEM as a national strategy for managing disaster response. T he Commonwealth of The Bahamas was selected as the study site for this res earch, which takes into consideration the geography, politics, and economic conditions within the nation. Six hurricane events were selected for this research study; three before the 2002 implementation of a CEM system and three after. This research expands beyond a comparison between response operations to address key research questions surrounding the value and effectiveness of emergency management strategies. Furthermore, this research provides a longitudinal examination of the development and implementation of a national comprehensive emergency management system.

PAGE 22

3 The Bahamas was selected as a study site for two key reasons: (1) Geography: The Bahamas faces many chal lenges to disaster response due in part to its unique geography. The Baham as is an archipelago of over seven hundred islands and cays that stretches al most 100,000 square miles from Great Inagua in the south to Walker’s Cay in t he north (Office of the Prime Minister, 2007). (See Map 1.1) With a dispersed population, inhabiting approximately 20 main islands a coordinated emergency response effort is a considerable challenge. Moreover, the location of T he Bahamas gives it a high and recurrent risk for hurricanes. (2) In 2002 The B ahamas began the proce ss of developing a CEM system. This process has been documented from the beginning and provides for a longitudinal study of CEM suitability for island nations. 1.2 Research Goal and Objectives The goal of this research is two fold ; first, to document the development of a comprehensive emergency management system within The Bahamas and second, to compare res ponse operations under CE M with response operations prior to its implementation. This longitu dinal approach to hazards research is not often used; rather the research norm has been to administer case studies following an event. Although many of the case studies conducted in hazards research have provided us with critic al findings, the longitudinal approach facilitates the establishment of baseline indicators to gauge progress over long periods. Long range research, such as this, also facilitates a broader understanding of the comple x and ever evolving dynamics surrounding disaster response within a given location.

PAGE 23

4 1.2.1 Research Objectives 1. To identify and report areas of success, as well as potential barriers to effective disaster response under the CEM system, in an effort to add to the geography literature on hazards. 2. Test the validity of Qu arantelli’s (1997) methodol ogy for evaluating the management of disaster response operations. 3. To determine the geographic, and po litical challenges to emergency management within the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. 4. To identify techniques being utiliz ed within the Commonwealth of The Bahamas to respond to and recover from the impacts of disasters. 1.3 Background This research was initially under taken through a partnership with The Commonwealth of The Bahamas and the Un iversity of South Florida’s Global Center for Disaster Management and Hum anitarian Action (Global-CDMHA). Over a six year period (2001-2007) this researcher worked directly with the government of The Bahamas to build the foundation for a national emergency management structure based on f undamental hazard and emergency management theories. The Bahamas has a long history of extreme events that has required the mobilization of national resources. Desp ite extensive experi ence with disasters, as recently as June of 2002 The Bahamas had no formalized national disaster response policy or plan in place. This re search includes an evaluation of national response to six hurricanes as well as the political developm ent of a national

PAGE 24

5 agency to coordinate emergency response. The study design provided unique insight into the development process th rough interviews with top members of the government, including the Prim e Minister. This dissertation research further facilitated the first geography hazard st udy to document and analyze the impact of the CEM system from conc eption through implementation. It is through this process that we were able to identify the value of the CEM system. This research also sheds light on the unique concerns of island nations, beyond just the challenge of remoteness. It pr ovides insight and relevance to both researchers and practitioners in a way that allows for the implementation of successful response and recovery init iatives to reduce or eliminate human suffering. 1.4 Study Site: The Geography of The Bahamas Issues of geography relate directly to the ability of The Bahamas to respond and recover from disasters, wit h particular consideration given to hurricanes. The Commonwealth of The B ahamas is an archipelagic nation which extends over 100,000 sq mi. of the sout hwestern edge of the North Atlantic Ocean, with some 700 islands and over 2000 cays totaling a land area of 5,833 sq. mi. (Office of The Prime Minister, 2007) The Bahamas are just 50 miles east of Florida and extend 750 mile s south-east to within 50 miles of Cuba and Haiti (Office of The Prime Minister, 2007). ( See Map 4.1) According to the Bahamas Environment, Science and Technology (BEST) Commission the largest of The Bahamas Islands is Andros, with an area of 2,300 square miles. Eighty percent of Andros is less than one meter above me an sea level leaving it particularly

PAGE 25

6 vulnerable to storm surge during a hurri cane. Harbour Isl and, with an area of one and a half square miles (1 sq. mi.), a nd Spanish Wells, with an area of half a square mile ( sq. mi.) are the two smallest inhabited islands (BEST Commission, 2007). Traditionally the Islands of The Bahamas are divided into three regions: Northwest, Central and Southeast Islands. The islands included in the Northwest are: Abaco, Andros, Bimini, Eleuthera, Gr and Bahama, New Providence and The Berry Islands Central Islands include Cat Island, Long Island, Exuma and its Cays, Rum Cay and San Salvador The Southeast Islands include Acklins, Crooked Island, Inagua, Mayaguana and Ragged Island (See Map 4.1) There are more than twenty inhabited islands wit h the main populat ion centers being located on the Islands of New Providenc e and Grand Bahama. The Capital City of Nassau is located on the island of New Providence and Freeport, referred to as the ‘second city’ is located on the is land of Grand Bahama. The term ‘Family Islands’ is used to describe all surrounding islands. 1.4.1 Climate Consideration of The Bahamas climat e is important to identifying and understanding challenges associated with emergency planning, response and recovery. The Bahamas is a typical tropi cal maritime wet/dry climate. The wet season occurs during the summer months and is usually in association with tropical activity such as hurricanes (B ahamas Department of Meteorology, 2006).

PAGE 26

7 The islands of The Bahamas are insulated from North America by the Straits of Florida and do not experience ex tremes in temperature. Humidity in the Bahamas is extrem ely high, principally during the summer months. Winds are predominantly eas terly throughout the year and averages below 10 knots (11.5 mph). The Bahamas Department of Meteorology (2006), reported average rainfall on the Island of New Providence at 2 inches a month from November through April and 6 inc hes a month from May through October. 1.4.2 Geology As shown in Figure 1.2 The Bahamas ar e low, carbonate islands that rest on two large bank systems; The Little B ahama Bank in the northern Bahamas; and the Great Bahama Bank which extends from central to southwestern Bahamas (Gerace et. al., 2002). The Baha mas Platform, extends more than 840 miles, from the coast of Florida to the island of Hispaniola. The Bahama Platform became exposed as a result of four major glacial advances during the Pleistocene. Weathering later altered the landscape creating kart formations such as caves, sink holes and solution pits (Weech, 2000). The Islands of the Baham as have generally low relief. According to data obtained through the BEST Commission (2007), Cat Island is home to the highest point in the Bahamas at 206 ft. The capital city of Nassau on the Island of New Providence has ridges rising to about 100 ft. Consideration for the geology of the region must be taken into consideration when developing plans to address response and recovery activi ties especially when dealing with the hurricane hazard. For exam ples, should islands with little relief have evacuation

PAGE 27

8 plans to move populations off the island in the event of a hurricane or should they shelter in place? Additionally, what type of resources would it take to move an entire island population, where woul d you move them, and for how long? Figure 1.2 – Geology of the B ahamas (Source: Curran,1985) 1.4.3 Bahamas Hydrologic Setting Due to the porosity of lim estone, water from rainfa ll and runoff is rapidly delivered underground, resulting in a scarcity of freshwater rivers and streams in the Bahamas (Gerace, 2002) Despite being surrounded by water, it is freshwater that is a scarce commodity on the isl ands. The Bahamas has no freshwater rivers or lakes and until recently has re lied exclusively on groundwater. It is important to note however that not all groundwater in t he Bahamas is salt free. “The groundwater resources of The Baham as are comprised of freshwater,

PAGE 28

9 brackish, saline and hypersaline waters found in the near and deep subsurface” (BEST Commission, 2007:16). Many of the islands have large brackish lakes and others are infiltrated by tidal creeks. The scarcity of freshwater creates a variety of c hallenges for a nation on a daily basis. Couple a limited water supply with the impact of a hurricane and the situation quickly becomes critical. Havi ng a limited supply of potable water for residents and tourists must always be a concern for The Bahamas. Cant (1996:331) cited a limited supply of fresh wate r facilities as, “a major obstacle to economic development in The Bahamas and other small carbonate islands.” In early 2000, following Hurricane Floyd, The Bahamas began the process of developing the necessary infrastructu re to allow for large desalinization facilities on several of the islands. This effort was intended to ease freshwater limitations and ensure adequat e amounts of water were available to both residents and tourists (Bahamas Water and Sewerage Corporation, 2006). In addition, construction has begun on desaliniz ation plants at many of the large tourist resorts (i.e. Atlantis, Club Med, Sandals) Despite these efforts potable water following a disaster remains a top priority. One of the challenges in response to recent hurricanes is how best to transport water supplies. Usually, transported between islands by barge the loss of ports and docks as a result of strong storm surge and heavy winds ma kes this option impossible in the immediate aftermath of a st orm. Additionally with one gallon of water weighing eight pounds it is not practi cal to transport large quantities of water by airliners.

PAGE 29

10 1.4.4 Demographics The Bahamas have a relatively sma ll population base dispersed among its twenty (20) main inhabit ed islands, with an annual grow th rate of 0.86% since 1980. The official 2005 government c ensus reported a popul ation of 303,611. Twenty-six and a half percent of the popul ation is between the ages of 0-14, 66.1% of the population is between the ages of 15-64, and only 6.4% of the population is over the age of 65 (Bahamas Census Office, 2005). Table 1.1 shows the population is center ed in the two main urban areas of New Providence and Grand Bahama. Although New Providen ce, is a small island with only 80 square miles (80 sq. mi.) of area, it is home to 69% of the nations population. Grand Bahama, with approximat ely 530 square miles (530 sq. mi.) in area, is home to 15% of the populat ion. (BEST Commission, 2007) The remaining population is scattered throughout the Family Islands Having a population dispersed thr oughout a large geographic area adds to the complexity of disaster planning and re sponse. Special considerations must be made for communication and logistic chal lenges that can exist. It is also critical to note that alt hough The Bahamas has a relatively small population with just over 300,000 there is a sharp increase in overall island population as a result of the tourism industry.

PAGE 30

11 POPULATION IN ISLANDS CENSUS YEARS 1970 2000 Island 1970 1980 1990 2000 New Providence 101,503 135,437 172,196 210,832 Grand Bahama 25,859 33,102 40,898 46,994 Abaco 6,501 7,271 10,003 13,170 Acklins 936 618 405 428 Andros 8,845 8,307 8,177 7,686 Berry Islands 443 509 628 709 Bimini 1,503 1,411 1,639 1,717 Cat Island 2,657 2,215 1,698 1,647 Crooked Island 715 562 412 350 Eleuthera 6,247 8,331 7,993 7,999 Exuma and Cays 3,767 3,670 3,556 3,571 Harbour Island 2,238 1,133 1,219 1,639 Inagua 1,109 924 985 969 Long Island 3,861 3,404 2,949 2,992 Mayaguana 581 464 312 259 Ragged island 208 164 89 72 Rum Cay 80 78 53 80 San Salvador 776 747 465 970 Spanish Wells 983 1,167 1,372 1,527 The Bahamas 168,812 209,514 255,049 303,611 Table 1.1 Population in islands Census Years 1970-2000 (Source: Bahamas Census Office Department of Statistics, 2005) According to the Bahamas Ministry of Tourism, more than 5 million tourists visited The Bahamas during the 2005 calenda r year. Therefore, all disaster planning and response activities must take into consideration not only the needs of its citizens but also the needs of touris ts. Appropriate planning activities must be implemented not only for the purposes of improving disaster response and saving lives but also to ensure the economic stability of the nation by maintaining a strong tourism industry.

PAGE 31

12 Island Total Population Males Females Number of Households The Bahamas 303,611 147,778 155,833 87,714 New Providence 210,832 101,610 109,222 59,707 Grand Bahama 46,994 23,035 23,959 13,977 Abaco 13,170 6,711 6459 3929 Acklins 428 227 201 134 Andros 7,686 3,780 3906 2145 Berry Islands 709 416 293 265 Biminis 1,717 886 831 552 Cat Island 1,647 854 793 559 Crooked Island 350 172 178 132 Eleuthera 7,999 3,933 4066 2408 Exuma and Cays 3,571 1,875 1696 1133 Harbour Island 1,639 799 840 493 Inagua 969 476 493 302 Long Island 2,992 1,533 1459 961 Mayaguana 259 129 130 96 Ragged Island 72 44 28 26 Rum Cay 80 45 35 30 San Salvador 970 497 473 279 Spanish Wells 1,527 756 771 586 Table 1.2 – Bahamas Island Population (Source: Bahamas Census Office Department of Statistics, 2005)

PAGE 32

13 Key Labour Force Statistics 1999-2004 ITEM 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total Labour Force All Bahamas New Providence Grand Bahama 157,640 113,240 23,900 164,675 117,900 25,055 167,980 119,700 25,190 173,795 123,380 26,350 176,330 125,385 26,465 Employed Labour Force All Bahamas New Providence Grand Bahama 145,350 104,440 21,625 153,310 109,770 23,345 152,690 108,255 23,580 154,965 108,685 24,050 158,340 111,725 24,000 Unemployed Labour Force All Bahamas New Providence Grand Bahama 12,290 8,800 2,275 11,365 8,130 1,710 15,290 11,445 1,610 18,830 14,695 2,300 17,990 13,660 2,465 Labour Force Participation Rate All Bahamas New Providence Grand Bahama 76.8% 77.7% 75.3% 76.2% 78.1% 75.2% 76.4% 77.6% 74.4% 76.5% 78.0% 76.0% 75.7% 77.5% 74.7% Unemployment Rate All Bahamas New Providence Grand Bahama 7.8% 7.8% 9.5% 6.9% 6.9% 6.8% 9.1% 9.6% 6.4% 10.8% 11.9% 8.7% 10.2% 10.9%Table 1.3 – Key Labour Force Statistics ( Labour Force Data is not available for the Year 2000, which was a Census y ear. The Census is a major national project; therefore the Depar tment during that year undertook no other household surveys) Source: Bahamas Department of Statistics Table 1.4 below provides additional demographic information about the Commonwealth of The Bahamas. Although t he population is growing in terms of

PAGE 33

14 numbers of births, there is a negative net migration of residents. This is attributed to limited educat ion and job opportunities within the country (Bahamas Census Office Department of Statis tics, 2005). Increased numbers of Bahamians are moving to the United Stat es and neighboring Caribbean nations. THE BAHAMAS DEMOGRAPHIC DATA Birth Rate 18.69 births / 1000 population (2002 est.) Death Rate 7.49 deaths / 1000 population (2002 est.) Net Migration Rate -2.63 migrant(s) / 1000 population (2002 est.) Infant Mortality Rate 17.08 deaths/ 1000 live births (2002 est.) Life Expectancy at Birth Total Population: 69.87 years Females: 73.49 years (2002 est.) Males: 66.32 years (2002 est.) Ethnic Groups 85% Black 12 % White 3% Asian and Hispanic Religion 32% Baptist 20% Anglican 19% Roman Catholic 6% Methodist 12% Other Protestant 3% None or unknown 2% Other Languages English Creole (among Haitian immigrants) Literacy (age 15+) Total Population: 98.2% Male: 98.5% Female: 98% Table 1.4 Demographics (Source: Bahamas Census Office Department of Statistics)

PAGE 34

15 1.4.5 Political Structure The Commonwealth of The Bahama s gained independenc e from Great Britain on July 10, 1973. As a Consti tutional Parliamentary Democracy the government structure is based on the West minister model. This three branch governmental structure ( Executive, Legislative, and Judicial) is led by The Prime Minister and elected by the people. Table 1.5 below provides an overview of the governmental structure of The Bahamas. THE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAHAMAS Executive Branch Head of Government: Prime Minister Nominal Chief of State: Queen Elizabeth II (since February 6, 1952), represented by Governor General Cabinet: Cabinet appointed by the governor general on the prime minister's recommendation Legislative Branch Bicameral Parliament The Senate (16-member body appointed by the governor general upon the advice of the prime minister and the opposition leader for five-year terms) The House of Assembly (40 seats; members elected by direct popular vote to serve five-year terms) Judicial Branch Supreme Court Court of Appeal Magistrates Courts Table 1.5 – The Governmental Structure of The Bahamas (Source: Office of The Prime Minister, 2007) The Commonwealth of The Bahamas has a two party political system; The Free National Movement (FNM) and The Progr essive Liberal Party (PLP). Table

PAGE 35

16 1.6 below displays the Prime Ministers and their party affiliation that have served The Bahamas since gaining independence in 1973. PRIME MINISTERS COMMONW EALTH OF THE BAHAMAS Term Prime Minister Political Party July 10, 1973 – Aug.1992 Lynden O. Pindling Progressive Liberal Party Aug. 1992May 2002 Hubert A. Ingraham Free National Movement May 2002 – May 2007 Perry G. Christie Progressive Liberal Party May 2007 Present Hubert A. Ingraham Free National Movement Table 1.6 – Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas The political environment within The Bahamas plays a significant role in the functioning of the em ergency management structure. The Office of The Prime Minister establishes the tone and direction for national emergency management and ultimately is seen as the responsible agent. For purposes of this research, an interview with Prime Mi nister Perry G. Christie was conducted on January 25, 2007. 1.4.6 Economy Bahamians are tied to the land and sea for economic stability and growth. Agriculture has been a key component of the economy and continues to be in the Family Islands were residents are fisherm en and/or farmers. It was not until the development of the moder n tourism industry that Bahamians began to move away from agriculture and more towards the service industries. According to data from the Central Bank of The Baham as, tourism currently accounts for over fifty percent (50%) of the GDP and directly or indirect ly employs half of the nations labor force (Central Bank of The Bahamas, 2006). Table 1.7 below provides 2004 and 2005 economic data on the nation.

PAGE 36

17 ECONOMY OF THE BAHAMAS GDP (2005) $5.8 Billion Growth Rate (2005) 2.7% Per capita GDP (2005) $18,062 Natural Resources (2005) Salt, aragonite, timber Tourism (2005) 50% GDP Government Spending (2004) 20% of GDP Financial Services (2005) 15% of GDP Construction (2004) 10% of GDP (products are largely tourism related) Manufacturing (2004) 8% of GDP (products – plastics, pharmaceuticals, rum) Agriculture and Fisheries (2004) 3% of GDP (products – fruits, vegetables, lobster & fish) Trade (2005) Exports -$450.8 million – (plastics, fish, salt, rum, chemicals) Imports – 2.57 billion – (foodstuffs and animals, machinery and transport equipment, chemicals, mineral fuels) Table 1.7– Economy of The Bahamas (Sour ce: Central Bank of The Bahamas) Imports and Exports are a large component of the economy of The Bahamas. In 2005, $2.57 billion worth of goods were imported into the commonwealth. Key imports include f ood related goods, animals, machinery, transport equipment, chemicals, and miner al fuels. Key suppliers to The Bahamas include; United States (84%), Curacao (7.2%), Puerto Rico (1.9%), European Union (1.2%), and Japan (1.2%) (Central Bank of The Bahamas, 2005). Exports in 2005 were $450.8 million consisting of plastics, fish, salt, chemicals and rum. Main market des tinations of Bahamian exports by destination: United States (66.6%), European Union (18.3%), Canada (5.1%), and South Africa (1%) (Central Bank of The Bahamas, 2005).

PAGE 37

18 Distribution of Household by Income Group All Bahamas, New Providence and Grand Bahama: 2004 ALL BAHAMAS NEW PROVIDENCE GRAND BAHAMA Income Group B$ Number. Amount B$ Number Amount B$ Number Amount B$ 0-5,000 4,475 11,187,500 2,625 6,562,500 620 1,550,000 5,00110,000 7,655 57,412,500 4,745 35,587,500 1,450 10,875,000 10,00115,000 8,490 106,125,000 5,855 73,187,500 940 11,750,000 15,00120,000 8,235 144,112,500 5,535 96,862,500 1,470 25,725,000 20,00140,000 29,735 892,050,000 20,435 613,050,000 4,920 147,600,000 40,00160,000 18,680 934,000,000 13,160 658,000,000 3,125 156,250,000 60,00180,000 10,185 712,950,000 7,245 507,150,000 1,540 107,800,000 80,001100,000 5,210 468,900,000 4,020 361,800,000 550 49,500,000 100,001 & OVER 4,905 539,550,000 3,830 421,300,000 440 48,400,000 NOT STATED 2,295 1,550 275 TOTAL 99,865 3,866,287,500 69,000 2,773,500,000 15,330 559,450,000Table 1.8 – Distribution of Household by Income Group: All Bahamas, New Providence and Grand Bahama 2004 (Source: Bahamas Department of Statistics) To ensure continued economic growth within The Bahamas it is necessary to ensure tourism, agriculture, and manufacturing are adequately equipped to plan, mitigate, respond and recover from a po tential disaster. This requires that all national emergency managem ent policies and procedures integrate public and private industry to ensure economi c stability within the nation.

PAGE 38

19 Number of Households and Household Income, All Bahamas, New Providence and Grand Bahama: 2004 ISLAND Number of Households Total Household Income B$ Mean Household Income B$ Median Household Income B$ ALL BAHAMAS 97,570 3,866,287,500 39,626 33,600 NEW PROVIDENCE 67,450 2,773,500,000 41,119 34,066 GRAND BAHAMA 15,055 559,450,000 37,160 30,820 Table 1.9– Number of Households and Household Income: All Bahamas, New Providence and Grand Bahama 2004 (Source: Bahamas Department of Statistics) 1.4.7 Hurricane Risk The Bahamas have a long history of hurricane activity with records stretching as far back as the 1500’s. Tropica l weather is a reality of living on the islands and residents take the threat of hurricane activity seriously. Long before The Bahamas Department of Meteorol ogy was around to issue hurricane warnings residents looked to the s ea and sky for clues about approaching weather. “Before the onset of an approaching st orm, the sea-level often rose to above normal positions. By watc hing the rise in the sea-level the locals could tell whether there wa s an approaching storm. Today this rise in the sea-level just before the onset of the storm and during the storm is referred to as the storm surge. Just before the onset of an approaching hurricane the seas would give these residents a small window of opport unity to prepare for a hurricane or to evacuate to a hurricane shelter” (Neely, 2006:21) The geographic location of The Bahamas gives it a high and recurrent risk for hurricanes. The Bahamas has recor ded the largest number of storm events passing within 60 nautical miles of the majo r Caribbean Islands. In fact, five of

PAGE 39

20 the top six affected islands of the Cari bbean lie within the Bahamas chain; in descending order of frequency are Abaco, Grand Bahama, Bimini, New Providence and San Salvador (Bahamas De partment of Met eorology, 2006). This low-lying archipelagic nation has ex perienced multi-island, multi-year, and multi-hurricane impacts. The commonwealth of the Bahamas is affected by hurricanes of two different origins, Cape Verde and the West ern Caribbean. The island chain lies on the most common route of the more dominant Cape Verde Hurricanes, which form over the Atlantic mainly during the mid hurricane season (August-October) (Dean and Rolle, 1999). 1.4.7.1 Bahamas Hurricane History The Bahamas has a rich hurricane histor y. A culture tied to the land and sea the country has endured numerous hurricanes with records stretching as far back as 1500. Table 1.10 below highlights the storms for which I was able to find a record. This table does not presume to capture all of the tropical activity to have impacted the islands. However, t hese data do hope to place in perspective the challenges facing The Bahamas wit h regards to hurricane preparedness and response.

PAGE 40

21 HURRICANES AFFECTING STUDY AREA Year Mon/Day Name Deaths Damage Landfall 1554 unknown 1554 unknown 2 ships & crew Great Inagua 1563 unknown 1563 35 reported ‘Urca of Tristan de Salvatierra’ ship & crew Grand Bahama 1595 unknown 1595 unknown 17 spanish treasure bearing ships & crew Abaco 1599 End of June 1599 unknown 1 ship & crew Great Inagua 1609 unknown 1609 32 reported ‘Sea Adventure’ & crew Central Islands 1622 9/15 1622 550 reported Spanish Terra Firma Fleet & crew Central Islands 1623 unknown 1623 150 reported two ships & crew Central Islands 1630 unknown 1630 unknown two ships & crew Grand Bahama 1641 September 1641 unknown one ship & crew Southeastern Bahamas 1692 10/24 1629 unknown unknown Central & Northwest Islands 1713 1st week of September 1713 unknown one ship & crew Northwest Islands 1715 7/30 1715 1000 reported 10 ships & crew Southeastern Bahamas 1720 unknown 1720 unknown 2 ships & crew Central Bahamas 1729 August 1729 unknown Significant damage to Nassau New Providence 1733 7/15 1733 unknown 16 ships & crew Southeastern Bahamas 1796 10/3 1796 unknown Damage homes in northern settlements Northwest Islands 1800 August 1800 unknown 9 ships & crew Inagua 1804 9/5 1804 unknown Numerous ships reported missing and damage to settlements throughout the island chain. Inagua

PAGE 41

22 1806 8/30 1806 unknown 26 ships destroyed in Nassau Harbour. Damage to cotton machines in the Exumas. South and Central Islands 1806 9/14 1806 unknown 124 homes destroyed (2/3 of the settlement) will the remaining homes suffering some degree of damage. Eleuthera 1813 7/26 1813 unknown 1/3 of the Nassau settlement was damaged or destroyed New Providence 1814 10/4 1814 unknown Damage to crops, ships in Nassau. Roof damage was also reported South and Central Islands 1815 8/9 1815 unknown One ship and crew Southern Islands 1815 8/29 1815 unknown Damage to homes on Eleuthera & Spanish Wells Eleuthera 1815 9/20 1815 22 reported Damage to homes on Cat Island and Salt ponds on Inadua Southern Islands 1818 10/14 1818 unknown 16 ships destroyed & crew Central Islands 1819 9/18 1819 unknown Damage to ships in port New Providence 1819 9/22 1819 unknown Major damage to agriculture and ships in port Abaco, Winward Little Island, Egg Island, Stocking Island 1822 9/26 1822 unknown Damage to agriculture and housing. New Providence, Abaco, Exuma 1824 9/13 1824 unknown Nassau: damage to the church, barracks, jail and 103 homes were destroyed. Central Islands

PAGE 42

23 1830 8/11 1830 unknown Major Damage to homes and crops in the northern islands. One ship and crew were lost. Entire archipelago chain impacted with significant damage to San Salvador, Eleuthera & Grand Bahama 1837 7/30 1837 (1) unknown Numerous ships sank in port throughout the Central and Northern Islands San Salvador, Eleuthera & Grand Bahama 1837 8/4 1837 (2) 25 reported Over 30 ships destroyed Entire archipelago chain impacted 1837 8/16 1837 (3) unknown Flooding in Grand Bahama & destroyed homes in San Salvador. Homes, crops and livestock were impacted on Long Island. Almost all homes were destroyed on Rum Cay. Central and Northern Islands 1837 9/12 1837 (4) unknown Nassau reported damage to ships and homes. New Providence 1837 10/15 1837 (5) “A captured slave ship with 500 aboard was wrecked at Governor’s Harbour with many fatalities” (Neely, 2006:30) 19 ships in Nassau Harbour Central Islands

PAGE 43

24 1844 10/5 1844 unknown “we experienced a severe hurricane on the banks of the night of Oct. 5th and the loss of lives and property has been greater than in any previous gale for some years” (Redfield, 1846:343) Central Bahamas 1848 Late Aug. 1848 unknown Damage to homes and businesses throughout the islands Entire archipelago chain impacted 1866 9/24 1866 387 reported Over 1034 persons were reported homeless as a result of the storm. Wide spread damage throughout the islands. Entire archipelago chain impacted 1883 9/4 1883 50 reported “tremendous amount of property damage” (Neely, 2006:31) Entire archipelago chain impacted 1899 unknown 1899 200 plus Damage to ships and homes Major impact reported on Andros and Exuma 1926 8/2 1926 (1) Nassau Hurricane of 1926 106 Cat. 4 storm. Delivered flooding rains and loss of crops. Major damage to structures in Nassau. Several thousand residents were left homeless. Entire archipelago chain impacted 1926 9/17 1926 (2) The Great Miami Hurricane unknown Cat 3 storm. Significant flooding and damage to crops. South and Central Islands.

PAGE 44

25 1928 9/14 1928 Lake Okeechobee Hurricane Unknown Cat 4 storm. Destroyed homes and businesses. Damage to crops and ships reported throughout the islands. Entire archipelago chain impacted. Major damage reported in central and northern islands. 1929 9/25 1929 Hundreds Cat 5 storm. Destroyed Andros, capsized ships in Nassau Harbour, and destroyed buildings in downtown Nassau. Wide spread damage was reported throughout the islands Entire archipelago chain impacted 1933 7/25 1933 (1) unknown unknown Entire archipelago chain impacted 1933 8/27 1933 (2) unknown unknown South and Central Bahamas 1933 9/7 1933 (3) unknown unknown Entire archipelago chain impacted 1933 10/1 1933 (4) unknown unknown Northwestern Islands 1933 10/25 1933 (5) unknown Tropical storm Central and Northwestern Islands 1960 9/7 Donna 114 deaths from the Leeward Islands to The Bahamas Category 4 Hurricane Southern Islands of The Bahamas 1965 9/6 Betsy 1 death Category 4 Hurricane Northwestern Islands 1979 9/3 David None Category 1 Hurricane Andros & Bimini

PAGE 45

26 1992 8/23 Andrew 4 deaths Category 4 Hurricane Central and Northwestern Islands 1996 10/18 Lili 0 Category 2 Hurricane Northwestern Islands 1999 9/14 Floyd 2 Category 4 Hurricane Central and Northwestern Islands 2001 11/05 Michelle 0 Category 2 Hurricane Northwestern Islands 2004 9/2-5 Frances 2 Category 4 Hurricane Entire archipelago chain impacted 2004 9/25 Jeanne 0 Category 2 Hurricane Northwestern Islands 2005 10/24 Wilma 1 Category 3 Hurricane Northwestern Islands 2007 10/31 Noel 0 Tropical Storm Northwestern Islands Table 1.10 Hurricanes Impacting Study Area (Source: Nelly (2006), Government of The Bahamas (2005)) 1.4.7.2 Hurricane Andrew1992 Just prior to the impact of Hurricane A ndrew in August of 1992 the nation went through a change in government lead by Hubert A. Ingraham. This was the first change in government since The Bahamas gained indepe ndence in 1973 and the first national disaster response in the nation’s history. The last major hurricane to impact The Bahamas was Hurricane Betsy in 1965, while the nation was still under British rule. On August 23, 1992, Hurricane Andrew passed over Eleuthera, the Berry Islands and South Bimini causing seve re flooding and property damage. Four (4) Bahamian lost their lives as a result of hurricane Andrew. Of cr itical concern for the nation following landfall were the immediat e emergency needs of food and clean water. The logistics of meeti ng these needs proved challenging with

PAGE 46

27 extreme damage to transportation routes (airports, ports, and roadways). The movement of goods between the Family Is lands immediately following the event was nearly impossible. Prime Minister Ingraham placed The Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF) in charge of responding to hurricane generated needs. (See Appendix B for detailed storm devel opment and impact information.) 1.4.7.3 Hurricane Floyd 1999 Hurricane Floyd devastated the cent ral and northern islands of The Bahamas. The key concerns for the nat ion were meeting immediate emergency needs of food and clean water to all areas impacted. Damage to well fields, and transportation routes (airports, ports, and roadways) prevented the movement of emergency goods between islands as we ll as on the island. A detailed discussion on the development and impact of Hurricane Floyd can be found in Appendix B of this dissertation. 1.4.7.4 Hurricane Michelle 2001 A national response to Hurricane Michelle was conducted through the Cabinet Office with direct reporti ng to the Office of The Prime Minister. Although Hurricane Michelle was not as destructiv e as Hurricanes Andrew or Floyd, the impact to the nation’s capital high lighted gaps in emergency response capabilities. Hurricane Michelle response activities were spearheaded by the RBDF with disorganized levels of s upport from a variety of ministries and organizations.

PAGE 47

28 Long-term recovery operations for Hurricane Floyd were still underway when Hurricane Michelle impacte d the nation. As a result many of the critical personnel brought together to co ordinate recovery efforts for Floyd also took on the challenge of Hurricane Michelle Applying the amended version of Quarantelli’s (1997a) criteria for evaluating the management of disaster response operations reveals that the national re sponse to Michelle was not successful. 1.4.7.5 Hurricane Frances 2004 Every island in The Bahamas was impacted by Hurricane Frances. The category 4 hurricane remained over the nation for more than 72 hours (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2004a). Of ma jor concern following the passage of Frances was clean water with extensive dam age reported to the water well fields. Transportation routes (airports, ports, and roadways) sustained considerable damage prevented the movement of em ergency goods between islands as well as on the island (NEMA, 2004a, Hughey, 2004b). Disaster response operations were for the first time coordinated by NEMA through the National EOC. The EOC was lo cated in the Churchill Building on the first floor just below t he Cabinet Office and the Office of The Prime Minister (NEMA, 2004a; Office of the Prime Mini ster, 2004a; Hughey, 2004 b). Table 6.14 shows that seven of the eight criteria we re not accomplished. The results of the evaluation are discussed in detail below. “My fellow Bahamians and residents of The Bahamas. Good Morning. You are aware by now that our beloved country and home – The Commonwealth of The Bahamas – is preparing for the almost certain landfall of Hurricane Frances. It is of the utmost importance that you

PAGE 48

29 know and accept that Hurricane Fran ces as presently constituted is regarded as the strongest and most intense hurricane force that has threatened our country. Hurricane Frances has sustained winds of 140mph which makes it a Category 4 Hu rricane and the po tential exists for further strengthening. Make no mist ake about it, this is a very intense and powerful hurricane that must be ta ken with the utmost seriousness by all of our citizens and visitors. As, I speak to you, the island of Great Inagua, Mayaguana, Acklins and Crooked Island and our neighbours the Turks and Caicos Islands are beginning to feel the wrath of Frances While hurricane warnings remain in effect for these area s, in another hour the Government of The Bahamas will issue hurricanes warnings for th e Central Bahamas to include Long Island, San Salvador, Exuma and Cays, Ragged Island, Long Cay, Cat Island, Rum Cay, South Eleuthera and South Andros. This means that hurricane conditions can be felt in the warning areas within 24 hours. A watch will also be issued for the Northwest Bahamas, including New Providence, North Eleuthera, Spanis h Wells, Harbour Island, North and Central Andros, Bimini, Berry Is lands, Abaco and Grand Bahama. Hurricane Conditions can be felt in the watch areas within 36 hours. On the present course it will affe ct New Providence and Eleuthera by Thursday night and Friday morning. The Northern Bahamas including Abaco and Grand Bahama will likely be af fected during Friday afternoon and Saturday morning. For the pur pose of impressing upon you the compelling need for urgent action, I shall again state that Hurricane Frances is a major and potentially ve ry dangerous hurricane. Hurricane force winds extend some eighty (80) m iles from the centre. Tropical storm force winds extend some 185 miles from the centre. This hurricane is therefore a large and powerful system with the potential to severely and negatively affect many of the communities in our country. As Prime Minister, I therefore urge all Bahamians and residents of The Bahamas to take this threat serious ly and to rush to complete all precautions, not in panic, but with a clear-headed resolve and a sober sense of purpose. A hurricane of this strength generally has a storm sea surge of between 13 and 18 fee above the normal tide. Persons who live in coastal areas, small cays, low lying areas and area s that are prone to flooding should evacuate their homes before the hurric ane hits and weather conditions no longer allow safe evacuations. In addition persons who do not consider their dwellings to be sound should cont act their local Ad ministrators at the earliest opportunity.

PAGE 49

30 I have asked the Secretary to the cabinet to allo w non-essential staff of Public Service to leave work today at 12:00 noon so as to enable them to complete the task of securing thei r homes and property. I also ask businesses to release their staff early so that they can likewise secure their property and homes. I need hardly tell you that early pre paration is essential for mitigating the damage that can be done by such a large and powerful hurricane. I am also exhorting businesses not to engage in what is commonly known as price gouging or profiteeri ng. This is truly a time of emergency when civil responsibility and conduct befitti ng good citizenship ought to be paramount in the minds of all our people. I urge you to continue to listen by radio to hurricane updates so that you may act on an informed basis. All of our emergency operations systems are in place at both the national le vel in New Providence and throughout the Family Islands. Every effort has been made to strengthen our communications and emergency respons e capacities and where necessary to put in place additional spec ially selected personnel. Additional resources, both skilled manpower, equipment and material resources, have been made available to the Bahamas by the United States Government, Caricom countries and other agencies and we are on standby. On behalf of the Bahamian pe ople I would take this opportunity to thank all of them for the consideration they have exercised in our favour. My fellow Bahamians although we hav e made every human effort to prepare ourselves for Hurricane Frances it is for me, on your behalf, to acknowledge that we are ultimately in the hands of God. We pray for His guidance at this time and for safekeeping during this time of crisis and peril We have faced many such perils in the course of the centuries and have always pulled through. With God’s good grace we shall do so again. Be of good courage then for our faith is in the God of all creation; the God who rides upon the storm.” (Remarks by the Rt. Hon. Prime Minister Perry Christies, On Hurricane Frances. 1st September, 2004.) 1.4.7.6 Hurricane Jeanne 2004 As Hurricane Jeanne approached t he Islands of The Bahamas, emergency personnel were just beginning th e process of trying to recover from

PAGE 50

31 Hurricane Frances. Frances, a category four hurricane, had slowly marched its way up the archipelago less then three w eeks earlier. With drained resources, tired response personnel, and already exte nsive damage to critical facilities Jeanne compounded an already extr eme emergency situation. 1.4.7.7 Hurricane Wilma 2005 Hurricane Wilma was the only storm requi ring a national response to cause any significant damage to The Bahamas during the 2005 Hurricane Season. One death was reported as a result of Hurricane Wilma and was directly related to storm surge inundation. The concentra tions of damages were mainly in the vicinities of the northwestern islands. 1.5 Problem Statement A large gap exists in the hazards research with regards to emergency management strategies, specifically the value of the Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) system. The traditional hazard case studies have not facilitated the necessary understanding of CEM which requires the integration of all four phases of the em ergency management cycle. Research by Pelling and Uitto (2001) identified remoteness, and lack of natural resources as major challenges for island nations making them increasingly vulnerable to disasters, but little is know about approaches utilized effectively to manage these challenges No island specific emergency management techniques have been established as best practices. Additionally, no analysis has been conducted to see if emergency management techniques utilized in large developed nations such as the United States and Canada are

PAGE 51

32 transferable and adequately meet the needs of island nations. Also lacking in the hazards literature is a longitudinal study that examines the development, application, and evolution of emergency management techniques within island nations. 1.6 Research Questions The primary intent of th is longitudinal study is to examine the validity of CEM as a national strategy for managi ng disaster response. The following research questions were examined within the context of the study site. 1. Can Quarantelli’s (1997) methodology for evaluat ing the management of disaster response be operationalized? 2. Can CEM, a United States emer gency management strategy, be an effective strategy for an archipelagic nation? 3. Did the implementation of a CEM system improve disaster response? 1.7 Research Hypotheses 1. It is hypothesized that Quarantelli’s (1997) can be applied successfully to evaluate disaster response operations. 2. It is hypothesized that CEM is an effective and successful emergency management strategy for The Co mmonwealth of The Bahamas. 3. It is hypothesized that the implementat ion of CEM will improve all areas of disaster response.

PAGE 52

33 1.8 Research Design This exploratory research utilized a longitudinal study design that incorporated a mixed methods approach to answering the research questions. A comprehensive literature review was c onducted to ensure that findings were placed in the appropriate context. Thr ough exhaustive archival research, six study hurricanes (Andrew 1992, Floyd 1999, Michelle 2001, Frances 2004, Jeanne 2004, and Wilma 2005) were reconstructed from development to landfall. National Government response to all six of the hurricanes was evaluated utilizing an amended version of Quarantelli’s (1997 a ) Ten Criteria for Evaluating the Management of Community Disasters to test the metric and determine its usefulness. Traditional hazards methodologies such as structured surveys and interviews were also utilized in the research design as a way to further examine the impact of CEM on emergency res ponse in the Commonwealth of The Bahamas. 1.9 Organization of the Dissertation Chapter two provides a review of the foundational literature in the field of hazards with specific attention provi ded to our understanding of hazard concepts and theoretical models. Also provided in chapter two is discussion on the key components of comprehensive emergency management. Chapter three details the study desi gn and methodology, to include data collection, data application and analysis, as well as adv antages and limitations of the methodology.

PAGE 53

34 Chapter Four begins the results sect ion of the research and provides discusses the research findings associat ed with the application of Quarantelli’s (1997a) eight criteria for evaluat ing disaster response. Chapter five discusses the results a ssociated with data collection from the structured surveys and the semi-s tructured interviews. Chapter Six examines the applicat ion of The Model of Community Response to Disasters. This theoreti cal model was applied in two distinct phases: (1) pre-CEM phase and (2) post-CEM phase. Chapter Seven provides a summary and discussion of results associated with each of the research questions and pl aces the findings within the current literature on hazards. A set of general conclusions and suggestions for future research are also provided.

PAGE 54

35 Chapter Two: Literature Review “The increasingly complex nature of hazards means that geography matters now more than ever.” (Cutter, 1994: xiv) 2.1 Introduction Hazards research requires an understandi ng of the complex interactions between the natural and social systems. This chapter pr ovides a review of key research studies that have influenc ed the way we think about hazards. Historically, hazards research has come fr om the three intellect ual disciplines of geography, sociology, and engineering. Howe ver, with the occurrence of large multi-jurisdictional disasters such as the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and Hurricane Katrina 2005, hazards resear ch has considerably intensified and expanded. A variety of di sciplines including public he alth, public administration, economics, and psychology have all produced important hazards research. This expansion is both timely and necessary as we in the academic community work to develop better strategies for saving lives and protecting property. Found throughout this chapter ar e the foundational components needed to contextualize this dissertation research.

PAGE 55

36 2.2 History of Hazards Research in Geography In the field of geography, hazards re search traditionally focused on the relationship between humans and the environment. In the mid 1940’s researchers at the University of Chic ago began a multidisciplinary research agenda with sociologists and geographers to explore the environment, hazards, and the social interaction. It is here t hat the origins of haz ards research took root. Gilbert F. White, a student in geography in the early 1940’s wrote a pioneering dissertation that first asked the questions that still direct hazards research today: Why are certain adjustments to haza rds preferred over others? Why, despite investments in thos e adjustments, are social losses from hazards increasing? (White, 1945) White, internationally renowned today as the fat her of natural hazards research (Mileti, 1999) was influenced by late 1920’s philosopher John Dewey. Dewey (1929) explored the human ecol ogy school of thought noting that humanity exists in a natural world that in innately hazardous resulting in human insecurity. He further explored how env ironmental perils such as floods and earthquakes do not exist independently of society because these events are defined, reshaped and redirected by human activities. In White’s 1973 research titled Natura l Hazards Research, he spoke to the importance of geography in hazards resear ch. In particular he noted that many geographers had neglected “the theory of manenvironment relationships” and its applications to public policy (Whi te, 1973:193). “The geographer loses an

PAGE 56

37 opportunity to apply his knowledge, skills, and insights to fundamental questions of the survival and quality of human lif e. He [The Geographer] also fails to sharpen and advance theoretical thinking by testing it in a challenging arena of action” (White, 1973:193). When addre ssing the questions associated with hazards research and geography, White also points out that hazards research is well situated within the discipline. “The research seeks application of new techniques to one of the old and recurring traditions of geographical enterprise – the ecology of human choice” (White, 1973:194). White’s work further influenced the hazards field by first utilizing a research approach related to the study of policy activities. This approach was intended to expand our under standing of the decision-making process as it relates to extreme events. His work c ontinued to develop the field by utilizing a research paradigm and m odel of decision-making focused on how man copes with risk and uncertainty in the midst of environmental events (White, 1936, 1962, 1964,1974a, 1974b). This research not only expanded the interdisciplinary field of hazards research he also illustra ted how hazards research is a traditional theme in geography and places geographers in the critical role of bridging the gap between the physical and social sciences. 2.3 Hazards Terminology To place this dissertation research into context, it is critical to review the theoretical debate over the definition of hazards terminology. Researchers have worked to define and conceptualize ‘natural hazards.’ As in all fields, attempting to classify events is critical. Resear ch must be placed within the appropriate

PAGE 57

38 theoretical framework in or der to obtain meaningful fi ndings/results and move the discipline forward. As mentioned previously, hazards resear ch is a multi-disciplinary study. The lack of clear and widely agreed upon vocabulary has plagued studies and led to some confusion. Tobin and Mont z (1997) point out that much of the terminology used in natural hazards has been used interchangeably, including references to hazard, disaster, risk, and vu lnerability. Additionally, Chakraborty, et al., (2005) note how problem atic the estimation of risk and vulnerability can be, partly due to a lack of accurate data and par tly due to the way in which available data are utilized. It is becaus e of these challenges that before moving forward in an effort to expand the liter ature we must first fully understand the current state of the discipline. It is through the examination of our current frameworks within natural hazards research that we are better able to reshape and expand our views. The following section provides discussion on the discourse surrounding hazards terminology and the theoretical framewor ks currently being applied. This provides the opportunity to perhaps rethink and re-conceptualize our understanding of hazards, facilitating a new way of examining our research questions. Furthermore, it is by doing this that we will ultimately influence the shape of the potential solutions, as well as the shape and charac ter of the means we use to attain those solutions and make them operational.

PAGE 58

39 2.3.1 Defining the Field of Natural Hazards Many of the early dominant views in t he field of natural hazards research identified disasters as a result of geophysical proc esses. A geophysical event was seen as a trigger for loss of lif e and damage to property. This approach identified the root caus e of large-scale death and destruction as directly attributed to the extremes of natur e rather than encompassing the social structures. White (1945) i dentified natural hazards as the result of interacting natural and social forces. Table 2.1 bel ow provides a temporal examination of how the field of natural hazards has been defined. Although White’s work identified an interaction between the physical and social components other researchers were slow to move away from viewing natural hazards as only a geo-physical process. By the early-1980’s steps towards a more human explanation of natural hazards was taking hold. Hewitt (1983) re search strongly spoke out against the overwhelming attention devoted to geoph ysical process and neglect of social forces. Throughout the mid-1980’s and 1990’s natural hazards research embraced the physical and human component s influencing hazards. Our current understanding of ‘natural hazards’ as a fi eld of study is one that embraces the human and physical geography.

PAGE 59

40 Author Year Natural Hazard Definition White, Gilbert F. 1945 Natural Hazards are the result of interacting natural and social forces. Burton and Kates 1964 Those elements of the physical environment harmful to man and caused by forces extraneous to him. American Geological Institute 1984 A naturally occurring or man-made geologic condition or phenomenon that presents a risk or is a potential danger to life or property. Smith, Keith 1996 The potential for extreme geophysical events, such as floods, to create an unexpected threat to human life and property. Tobin and Montz 1997 The potential interactio n between humans and extreme natural events. United Nations 2004 A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation. Table 2.1 Selected Definitions of Natural Hazards 2.3.1.1 Defining Disaster The definition of ‘disaster’ has follo wed a similar path as the development of the field of natural hazards. Historica lly disasters were s een as ‘Acts of God’ and generally outside human co ntrol. Dynes & Drabek (1992) suggest that disaster events were made worse by the idea that residents could do nothing to reduce the impact. “When such events occurred in communities, they created great fear and personal trauma. This created so cial chaos, making local communities incapable of effective action requiring outside authorities, especially the military, were needed to re-establish command and control” (Dynes & Drabek, 1992:12).

PAGE 60

41 Author Year Disaster Definition Sheehan & Hewitt 1969 Those events leading to 100 deaths, 1000 injuries, or $1 million in damages. Brown & Goldin 1973 Disasters are inherently political phenomena and should be so conceptualized. Dynes 1974 The physical agent, the physical consequences of the agent, the way in which the impact of the physical agent is evaluated, and the social disruption and social changes brought about by the physical agent and its impact. Quarantelli & Dynes 1977 Disaster is primarily a social phenomenon and is thus identifiable in social terms. Kreps 1984 Disasters are events observable in time and space, in which societies or their larger subunits incur physical damages and losses and or disruption of their routi ne functions. Both the causes and consequences of these events are related to the social structures and processes of society or their sub-units. Dynes 1988 Disasters are events, occurrences, situations which are socially disruptive. Taylor 1989 Catastrophic events that (a) interfere severely with everyday life, disrupt communities, and often cause extensive lo ss of life and property, (b) overtax local resources, and (c) create problems that continue far longer than those that arise from the norma l vicissitudes of life. Glickman et. al. 1992 The death of 25 persons. Tobin & Montz 1997 Disaster is defined as an event that has a large impact on society. Weichselgartner 2001 Disasters are more accurately seen as social phenomena whereas the ov erall damage due to natural hazards is the re sult both of natural events that act as ‘triggers’ and a series of societal factors. Table 2.2a – Selected Definitions of Disaster

PAGE 61

42 Author Year Disaster Definition (Continued) McEntire 2004 Disasters are the disruptive and/or deadly and destructive outcome or result of physical or human-induced triggering agents when they interact with and are exacerbated by vulnerabilities of diverse but overlapping environments. United Nations 2004 A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources. Table 2.2b – Selected De finitions of Disaster Table 2.2 highlights a variety of selected di saster definitions that have been used within the hazards literature. The common theme among all of the definitions is the impact to society. Wi thout an adverse reaction to the society a disaster does not exist. Brown and Gold in (1973) push the idea of ‘disaster’ further by identifying disast ers as the result of polit ical phenomena or ‘society’, removing completely a geophysical trigger. Dynes (1974, 1988) and McEntire (2004) utilize a qualitative measure to define ‘disaster’ identifying ‘disruption to society’ as a disaster. Quantitative measures have also been utilized, fo r example, Sheehan and Hewitt (1969) utilized death, injuries and economic threshol ds. Currently there is no national or international threshold which categorically defines or identifies a disaster. Within the response community a disaster is m any times identified by the types of resources that must be mobilized in res ponse to an event. A full activation of all

PAGE 62

43 agencies active in disasters, illustrates an event that is taxing on resources and requires a large coordinated effort, t hus being identified as a disaster. 2.3.1.2 Defining Risk Author Year Risk Definition Hammer 1972 The sum of possible alternative numbers of fatalities weighted by their probabilities. Zenter 1979 Risk as the total number of deaths Ritter 1981 Risk as the Probability of occurrence for an undesirable outcome UNDRO 1982 Risk is equal to loss divided by unit time Crouch and Wilson 1982 The probability of an event multiplied by the severity of that event. Crozier 1988 Risk is the expected number of lives lost, persons injured, damage to property and disruption of economic activity due to a particular natural phenomenon, and consequently the product of specific risk and elements at risk. Petak and Atkisson 1982 Risk is broken into two functions: first, the probability that an event, or a series of events of various magnitudes, will occur, and second, the consequences of those events Crozier 1988 Risk is the expected number of lives lost, persons injured, damage to property and disruption of economic activity due to a particular natural phenomenon, and consequently the product of specific risk and elements at risk. Beck 1992 Risk is a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization. Cutter 1996 Risk is the likelihood of probability that an event will occur. Tobin and Montz 1997 Risk as probability of occurrence multiplied by vulnerability Table 2.3a – Selected Definitions of Risk

PAGE 63

44 Author Year Risk Definition (Continued) United Nations 2004 The probability of harmful consequences, or expected losses (death, injuries, property, livelihoods, economic activity disrupted or environment damaged) resulting from interactions between natural and humaninduced hazards and vulnerable conditions. Hyndman & Hyndman 2006 Risk is essentially a hazard considered in the light of its recurrence interval and expected costs. The greater t he hazard and the shorter its recurrence interval, the greater the risk. Table 2.3b – Selected Definitions of Risk Table 2.3 shows some of the varyi ng definitions of risk employed by hazards researchers. Exam ining the table from a temp oral perspective highlights an interesting pattern. During the 1970s risk was often based primarily on the number of fatalities, whereas in the 1980s there was at least an effort among academics to broaden the term to incor porate the probability of a particular geophysical event recurring. By the 1990’ s, researchers turned away from numbers of dead as a measurement of risk, and focused more on geophysical mechanisms and probabilities of occurrence. This changing emphasis reflects the evolving role of emergency management and hazards research within the United States and, to some extent, globally. The 1970s witnessed a variet y of disasters both natural and technological that impacted the termi nology and definitions used by hazard researchers. For example, the super outbreak of tornadoes in 1974 and the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant incident focus ed attention on the terminology used in hazard studies.

PAGE 64

45 The 1980’s brought awareness of catast rophic man-made disasters such as 1984 Bhopal, India explosion at the Union Carbide Chemical Plant which killed thousands and sickened tens of thousands more The 1985 volcanic eruption of Nevado del Ruiz killed t housands, buried whole towns in ash, and mud. Additionally, the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster in Ukraine (former Soviet Union) brought worldwide att ention to hazards and an increased desire to further understand the concepts associated with risk. ‘Risk’ and ‘risk assessment’ have raised several research questions. For example, Cutter (1993) noted, t hat there is no such thing as a risk-free or hazardfree environment despite American preo ccupation with a zero-risk society. Clearly the idea that any area is comple tely safe from a natural or man-made disaster is incorrect. Graham’s (1995) research, which focuses on technological and environmental disasters, highlight ed the need for continued research by academics on these concepts. “The analytical tools of risk assessment, as applied to chemicals and r adiation, have assumed a cr itical role in decision making in the United States” (Graham, 1985:29). The United Nations identifies risk assessments as: “a methodology to determine t he nature and extent of risk by analyzing potential hazards and eval uating existing co nditions of vulnerability that coul d pose a potential threat or harm to people, property, livelihoods and the enviro nment on which they depend” (UN 2004:18). It is through our application of risk a ssessments that hazard practitioners have been able to make more informed decision about how best to utilize limited resources to protect lives and minimize damage. The concept of risk and risk

PAGE 65

46 assessment has been a hazard concept that practitioners have effectively made operational during the emergency management mitigation phase. 2.3.1.3 Defining Vulnerability During the 1990s researchers began to examine not only the geographic areas with potential risk for geophysical or technological events but also the populations that are most vulnerable. Table 2.4 below displays selected variations of the vulnerability definiti ons that are being utilized in hazards research. Like risk, no clear agreed upon definition has been developed and accepted by either academ ics or practitioners. Author Year Definition Timmerman 1981 Vulnerability is the degree to which a system acts adversely to the occurrence of a hazardous event. UNDRO 1982 Vulnerability is the degree of the loss to a given element or set of element s at risk resulting from the occurrence of a natural phenomenon of a given magnitude. Susman, O’Keefe, Wisner 1983 The degree to which different classes in society are differentially at risk, both in terms of the probability of occurrence of an extreme physical event and the degree to which the community absorbs the effects of extreme physical events and helps different cl asses to recover. Kates 1985 Vulnerability is the capacity to suffer harm and react adversely. Crozier 1988 Vulnerability is the degree of loss to a given element at risk or a se t of such elements resulting from the oc currence of a natural phenomenon of a given magnitude and expressed on a scale of 0 (no damage) to 1 (total loss).

PAGE 66

47 Bogard 1989 Vulnerability is operationally defined as the inability to take effective measures to insure against losses. Mitchell 1989 Vulnerability is the potential for loss. Panizza 1991 The degree to which a system, including population, buildings, infrastructures, economic activity, social organization and any expansion and development progr ams in an area may react adversely to the occurrence of a hazardous event. Watts & Bohle 1993 Vulnerability is defined in terms of exposure, capacity and potentiality. Accordingly, the prescriptive and normative response to vulnerability is to reduce exposure, enhance coping capacity, strengthen recovery potential and bolster damage control via private and public means. Blaikie et. al. 1994 Vulnerability refers to social and material conditions derived from characteristics of individuals and groups that make them susceptible to harm and loss from environmental hazards and that constrains their ability to cope with the adversity of disasters. Smith 1996 Vulnerability implies a measure of risk combined with the level of social and economic ability to cope with the resulting event. Alexander 1997 Vulnerability is defined as a measure of loss and as a measure of exposure to a loss Hewitt 1997 The attributes of persons, or activities and aspects of community that can serve to increase damage from given dangers Tobin and Montz 1997 Vulnerability is a systems approach, a combination of the physical characteristics of natural hazards, political /economic factors, and social characteristics. Comfort et. al. 1999 Vulnerability are those ci rcumstance that place people at risk while reducing their means of response or denying them available protection.

PAGE 67

48 Wisner et. al. 2004 The characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard. United Nations 2004 The conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environm ental factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards. Chakraborty, Tobin, and Montz 2005 A human-induced situation that results from public policy and resource availability/distribution, and it is the root cause of many disaster impacts. Table 2.4– Selected Defini tions of Vulnerability As is evident in the above literature review, hazards research is multidisciplinary leading to a variet y of interpretations of vul nerability. Susman et al’s. (1983), definition of vulnerability encompa sses elements of risk as well as class attributes such as poverty and support systems. Panizza (1991) characterizes vulnerability as the adverse reaction that the ‘system’ (including population, infrastructure, economy, etc. ) may have as a result of a hazardous event. Like risk it is important for researchers to explore the different variations of vulnerability in an effort to better prepare practitioners so that they may make better planning, mitigation, and response decisions. 2.3.2 Phases of Emergency Management There is general agreement among haz ards researchers and practitioners that there are four distinct phases of a disaster event: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (NGA 1979; Clary 1985; FEMA 2003 a ; Kates and Burton 1986 a 1986 b ). These phases have slight variations but as explored by Clary’s

PAGE 68

49 1985 work, all the phases are interrelated with the creation of boundaries as a simplification which aids discussi on, modeling, and application. Figure 2.1 illustrates the interrelated and cyclical nature of the emergency management phases. FEMA (2003b:9) refers to this as the “occurrence cycle”. It is through this process that emergen cy plans are constantly reviewed and updated to accurately represent a jurisdictions management capability. As shown in the figure 2.1, management strategies involving mitigation and preparedness efforts are designed to improve response and recovery. Figure 2.1 Four Phases of Emergency Management 2.3.2.1 Mitigation Phase Hazard Mitigation refers to “sustained actions taken to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people and property from hazards and their effects” (FEMA, 2006). Mitigation actions involve lasting, often permanent, reduction of exposure R e s p o n se M i t i g a t i o n P l a n n i n g R e c o v e r y R e s p o n se M i t i g a t i o n P l a n n i n g R e c o v e r y R e s p o n se M i t i g a t i o n P l a n n i n g R e c o v e r y

PAGE 69

50 to, probability of, or potential loss fr om a hazard. The National Governors Association in 1979 defined miti gation activities to includ e “arms build-up to deter enemy attack or legislation that takes t he unstable double-bottom tanker off the highways” (NGA, 1979:12). Although many researchers have removed the idea of an arms-build up as a potential miti gation measure it is important to understand the roots of mitigation lie within the military response to hazards. In the early to mid-1980’s hazard miti gation took a very strong structural path in an attempt to control t he hazard through engineered concepts. Examples of this engineered mitigation strategy incl uded the implementation of zoning and building codes, firewalls, floodwalls, levees and dams. Since the early-1990’s with hazards researchers focusing on the ident ification of social factors that may lead to vulnerability, the emergency management practitioners have slowly moved in a more balanced direction utiliz ing both structural and non-structural mitigation initiatives. Additionally community and state supported events such as ‘ Flood Awareness Week’ in combination with federal flood buyout programs are providing a more comprehensive understanding of the mitigation phase (FEMA, 2003 b ; American Red Cross, 2002; Hughey, 2003). In communities such as San Francisco, California, emergency managers have made a concerted effort to educat e businesses and the public on simple measures they can take to reduce loss or injury as a result of an earthquake, such as fastening bookshelves, water heaters, and file cabinets to walls can prevent them from falling. These structural measur es in combination with an aggressive program designed to help busines s identify ‘places of refuge’ during

PAGE 70

51 an earthquake is a simple and cost effective way, to save lives and protect property (San Francisco Office of Emergency Services and Homeland Security, 2005). Vit Nam provides another notable ca se study on mitigation. Since 1993 the nation has pursued a methodical strat egy of reducing risk through national development objectives. The National Disaster Management Unit embarked on a program focused on assisting the resi dents of the Mekong River Delta in an effort to help them learn to ‘Live With the Floods’ Mitigation measures under this new program have ranged from relocating extremely vulnerable communities, to altering the cropping calendar. Addition ally, experience gained from the 2000 and 2001 flood events resulted in an effectiv e mitigation measures designed to prevent drowning deaths of children. According to data provided by the UN, 2001 flooding in the Mekong River Delta killed 106 people, 99 of whom were children. As a result a unique mitigation concept known as “emergency kindergartens” were developed. The em ergency kindergartens allow parents to drop off their children during the rainy seas on. This allows parents to leave their children supervised at the time of emergency, when they are otherwise preoccupied with securing personal posse ssions and other resources crucial for their livelihood (UN, 2004:82). This program in comb ination with a nationwide information system that provides real-tim e information for flood and storm control has dramatically decreased children’s deaths associated with the flood hazard. During the 2002 floods 918 emergency kind ergartens were organized housing over 20,000 children.

PAGE 71

52 2.3.2.2 Preparedness Preparedness is often referred to as planning and many times the two terms are used interchangeably within the hazards literature. Preparedness is defined as “planning how to respond when an emergency or disaster occurs and working to marshal the resources to re spond effectively” (FEMA, 2003b:12). The purpose of disaster planning activities is to help save lives and minimize damage by preparing individuals and communities to respond appropriately when a disaster strikes. Emergency planning is not a one-time event. Rather, it is a continual cycle of planning, training, exercising, and revision that takes place throughout the four phases of the em ergency management cycle. According to Quarantelli (1988, 2001) disa ster planning when based in scientific research makes an important difference in reducing un knowns. All planning activities must take into consideration the geophysical components of a hazard which places a community at risk and the social constructs which create vulnerable populations. The emergency preparedness phase is where most hazards research can be applied effectively. Risk studies help to identify geographic areas that may have an increased probability of experienc ing a given disaster. Vulnerability studies have been effective at identifyi ng those populations which may not be able to respond and recover from disasters. Results from risk and vulnerability studies can most effectively be operat ionalized during the preparedness phase. The goal of all preparedness activiti es is to anticipate problems and present possible solutions. Without regular training and exercising of a disaster

PAGE 72

53 plan the activation of the plan during a di saster can result in a dysfunctional response. FEMA (2003b) identifies co mponents of a good disaster plan as: Based on facts and scientific evidence Based on community resources inventory Provides organizational Structure Uses Simple Language Elements are coordinated ‘Living Document’ which is tested and updated regularly A comprehensive document which provi des guidelines for response to any disaster It is through preparedness and mitigation activi ties that response to a disaster can ultimately be improved. 2.3.2.3 Response Response is defined as “the period during and immedi ately following a disaster” (FEMA, 2003b). Response activities are designed to provide emergency assistance to victims of a disaster and reduce the likelihood of secondary damage. The response phas e has five stages: (FEMA, 2003 b ; Quarentelli, 1997) 1. Alert and Notification 2. Warning 3. Protection of Citizens and Property 4. Providing of Public Welfare 5. Restoration The length of each of these five stages are dependent on the hazard, for example alert and notification of a hurri cane or flood may be several days while there may only be minutes or even sec onds during the notif ication stage for a tornadoes

PAGE 73

54 The goal of the response phase is to meet the immediate emergency needs of the affected population (e.g. s earch and rescue; immediate medical care; public safety; evacuation). The emergency services communities are the first responders and primary component to t he response phase. For this reason it is critical that planning and mitigation activities are done in cooperation with all individuals and agencies responsible for respond during a disaster. 2.3.2.4 Recovery Recovery is defined as “activities necessary to restore the jurisdiction to normal” (FEMA, 2003b). Although researcher s agree that recovery is a distinct phase in the emergency management process (Clary 1985; FEMA 2003a; Kates and Burton 1986a, 1986b) the activities (e.g. restoration of power, clearing of roads) and the goal of recovery is an acti ve debate in the hazards literature (Berke et al., 1993; Mileti, 1999; Mitchel 1996; Shrubsole, 1999). Like risk and vulnerability definitions of recovery vary gr eatly. In contrast to FEMA’s definition Quarantelli (1999:3) defines recovery as “a ttempting to and/or bringing the post disaster situation to some level of a cceptability. This may or may not be the same as the pre-impact level.” The v ague conceptualizations of recovery can make this phase difficult to implement. 2.4 Comprehensive Em ergency Management (CEM) To understand the application of each of the four phase of emergency management the concept of Compr ehensive Emergency Management (CEM) must be discussed. In the late 1970’s, Un ited States Governors were becoming

PAGE 74

55 increasingly concerned by the lack of national policy for managing natural and man-made disasters. It was during this time that a variety of federal agencies had responsibilities related to disaster re sponse but a clear national strategy for managing disasters was lacking. In 1977 amid growing concern that the federal government was ill equipped to aid state governm ents in response to a major or catastrophic disaster the National Governors Asso ciation (NGA) formed a subcommittee on disaster assistance to urge the President to establish a new centralized federal emergency management agency. The NGA fu rther requested that the federal government fund a year long analysis of the problems and chall enges associated with managing all types of emergencies. In 1979 the research findings of the analyses were released by the NGA. The document presented for the firs t time a comprehensive emergency management approach aimed at aiding state leaders in c oping with emergencies. Included in this document was the fi rst set of emergen cy management tools based on case studies from a variety of states. The research identified a fragmentation within and bet ween federal and state agencies as a challenge to effective emergency management. The NGA report and the establishment of FEMA was the beginning of a large consolidation of over thirty plus federal agencies responsible in some way for disaster management. For the firs t time, all preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery programs were bei ng stressed in a coordinated manner at the federal level. In the eyes of the NGA the goal of FEMA was to provide a

PAGE 75

56 foundation for a comprehensive nat ional emergency management system wherein federal, state, and local em ergency management organizations become equal partners. The 1979 NGA study not only identified fragmentation at the federal and state level as causes for ineffective emergency management programs but also identified a keystone in our modern understanding of emergency response by identifying the intertwined relationsh ip between preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. Fo r the first time in the hazards literat ure the NGA study clarifies that each mechanism is equally important to the success of the others and cannot be divorced from one another. In 1979 the term Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) was a new term referring to a “sta tes responsibility and capability for managing all types of emergencies and disasters by coordinating the acti ons of numerous agencies” (NGA, 1979:11). CEM was very diffe rent from the then popular term Comprehensive Emer gency Preparedness. Comprehensive Emergency Preparedness placed the emphasis “in practice if not legislative intent, on the preparedness phase of emergency m anagement” (NGA, 1979:11). The preparedness phase of emer gency management was focused on the exclusion of response, mitigation, and recovery for three key reasons: “1) A lack of federal funds to states to mount mitigation and long -term recovery planning; 2) a lack of state funds, staff, and ti me to coordinate these phases, and 3) a lack of understanding of the relationships bet ween the four phases” (NGA, 1979:11).

PAGE 76

57 The NGA hoped to present CEM to the f ederal government in an effort to have state and federal officials view emergency management in a more holistic and inter-connected context. The intent of CEM was to develop a program which was capable of identifying the right agenc ies and individuals in a common sense way. Those identified would have useful re sources to bring to bear on all phases of the emergency management cycle and prov ide the motivation for them to apply their resources in the most pr oductive manner and in a coordinated fashion. McEntire (2004) argues that CEM has for years organized emergency management into useful but perhaps, overly simplified, disaster phases. CEM has been the traditional theory of em ergency management. Britton (1999), Oliver-Smith and Hoffman (1999) have all no ted that this single perspective can limit understanding and expansio n. Britton further argu es that CEM has trouble capturing the wider political, economic and cu ltural explanations of disasters. CEM, although developed in the United States, has been adopted worldwide. The Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA) utilizes this same concept under the term Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM). CDM has been defined as “incl uding integrated management of all natural and human-induced hazards and involving mana gement through all phases of the Disaster Management C ycle” (CDERA, 2001:3). CEM and CDM are used interchangeably. Despite the ti tle both CEM and CDM are multi-hazard, and multi-sectoral in their application as well as both being concerned primarily

PAGE 77

58 with integrating vulnerability assessment and risk reduction into planning and management. Figure 2.2 illustrates the framework of an effective CEM plan. The major components of the CEM Plan as shown in Figure 2.2 are risk identification and social vulnerability as applied to the four phases of emergency management. The effectiveness of the mo del is based on a solid understanding of the geophysical risks that a community face s as well the social structure within that community that creates vulner able populations. Applying these two theoretical concepts to CEM allows em ergency managers to integrate community specific elements to th e all-hazards planning1 and response approach. Figure 2.2 – Framework of a Comp rehensive Emergency Management Plan (Source: Hughey, 2003) An advantage of the CEM system is the all-hazards approach. The commonalities among all types of technolog ical and natural disasters indicate 1 All-Hazards approach is a term used in the respons e community to describe, a generic, basic response planning component for all types of hazards.

PAGE 78

59 that many of the same disaster management strategies can be applied to all hazards. These common management approac hes are a primary element of CEM and CDM (Hughey, 2003; Tobin et al., 2004). The objective of CEM has been to build capacity to prepare and re spond, as well as to implement institutional mechanisms to reduce the impact of thes e extreme events. The integrated and holistic approach that is needed to minimize loss and dislocation can be advanced through the CEM process. 2.5 Theoretical Framewor ks In Hazards Research By the mid-1980’s through the 1990’s geographers and hazards research began to examine more closely the soci al frameworks that influenced how hazards affected individuals and groups, taki ng into consideration the interaction between geophysical aspects and the social environment. Researchers in the discipline have attempted to develop theor etical frameworks in an attempt to model the complex social and physical co mponents which cause disasters. This section will highlight two selected theoretical model s (The Hazards-of-Place Model and The Pressure and Release (PAR) Model) that have been instrumental in moving the hazards literature forward. Contributions and gaps of each model will be identified and discussed. 2.5.1 Hazards-of-Place Model Cutter’s 1996 Hazards-of-Place m odel shown below in Figure 2.3 develops a framework for looking at the so cial factors that influence or shape the susceptibility of various groups to harm as well as those characteristics of

PAGE 79

60 communities and the built environment wh ich create place inequalities. Cutter defines risk as an objective measure of the likelihood of a hazard event and defines mitigation as measures to less en risks or reduce their impact. These two components risk and mitigation combine to create what Cutter identifies as the hazard potential. The Geographic Context or proximity to t he hazard potential and the Social Fabric or experience with the hazard can create biophysical vulnerability, social vulnerability or both bi ophysical and social vulnerability. The combination of the two types of vulnerab ility intern creates Place Vulnerability. Figure 2.3 The Hazards-of-Place Vulnerability Model (Source: Cutter et al. (2003) Modified from Cutter (1996)) Although this model provides a path for discussing vulnerability of place, a gap exists in the understanding of the social aspects of vulnerability in both the geographic literature and di alogue. Mileti (1999), highlights components of

PAGE 80

61 biophysical vulnerability and the vulnerab ility of the built environment; largely ignoring the socially creat ed vulnerabilities. There is good reason for this; socially constructed vulnerabilities are di fficult to measure. Current hazards research has utilized individual characte ristics of persons (age, race, health, income, type of dwelling unit, employment) to estimate social vulnerability at a jurisdictional level (Cutte r, 1996, Cutter et al., 2003). I would argue that utilizing data obtained exclusively th rough the United States C ensus as the factors for determining social vulnerability eliminat es the elements that are intrinsic to a community that may increase or reduce social vulnerability. The model also fails to take into consideration the politic al and community structures which exist within an area. Cutter et al. (2003:257) describe social vulnerability in the context of the Hazard-of-Place model as a “multidimens ional concept that helps to identify those characteristics and experiences of communities that enable them to respond to and recover from environmental hazards”. I would argue however that Cutter et al (2003) selected variables for use in the study that were based on case studies that lack a larger theor etical or conceptual understanding of comparative indicators of social vul nerability. The Hazard-of-Place model provides a strong foundation but does not have the ability to adapt to each unique community. The model further has limitations that prevent it from becoming operational.

PAGE 81

62 2.5.2 Pressure and Release Model Figure 2.4 the Pressure and Release (PAR) Model developed by Wisner (1994) has been utilized as a tool fo r illustrating how disasters occur when natural hazards affect vulnerable peopl e. “The image resembles a nutcracker, with increasing pressure on people arising from eit her side – from their vulnerability and from impact (and seve rity) of the hazard for those people (Wisner, 2004:50).” It is only when the physical hazard and the social components of vulnerability come together that a disaster occurs. The PAR model identifies the disaster as the in tersection between the physical and social forces. The PAR model requires communities to trace the connections that link the impact of a hazard on people with a seri es of social factors and processes that generate vulnerability. This model pl aces significant responsibility on the structures of society believing that nat ural hazards and hazard vulnerability can best be determined by understanding the soci al processes that impact choice.

PAGE 82

63 Figure 2.4 – Pressure and Release Model (Source: Wisner, 2004) Wisner (2004) identifies the root causes of vu lnerability as economic, demographic and political processes which impact the allocation and distribution of resources among different groups. Such root causes are directly connected to the function/dysfunction of the state. Dynamic pressures are identified as the activities and processes that translate t he effects of root causes both temporally and spatially into unsafe conditions. Unsa fe conditions are the specific forms in which the vulnerability of a population is expressed in time and space in conjunction with a hazard. Placing the recent Hurricane Katrina disaster within the PAR model for examination illuminates a myriad of root causes such as poor economic conditions of residents as well as an inadequate local em ergency management structure. Add to the root causes a combination of dynamic pressures like lack of

PAGE 83

64 resources, training, and pl anning to create unsafe c onditions within the City of New Orleans. When these vulner abilities collided with an unprecedented geophysical force (category four hurricane) the disaster was considerable. The PAR model provides a valuable tool to researchers and emergency managers by identifying the co mponents that contribute to social vulnerability. The identification of these components allow for changes through application at all levels of government. To prevent anot her disaster like Hurricane Katrina the root causes and the dynamic pressures within New Orleans will have to be addressed. The PAR model provides the identification of key components that emergency managers and community l eaders can make operational. The PAR model has a wide application in both small and large communities and at the different levels of governments. Wisner (2004) model takes into consideration the larger economic and political system that impact individuals and communities abilities to effectively respond and recover from a disaster. It additionally ident ifies the potential mitigation areas to improve future disaster response. 2.6 Local Response to Disasters Disasters affect jurisdictional ar eas in unique ways with differences attributed to the type of disa ster, extent of damage, and available resources. As jurisdictions plan and mitigate for hazards they need to make sure that the plan does not fall into the common cookie cutter, one size fits all disaster plan, which may leave them more vulnerable. Wh ite’s (1969, 1974) writings acknowledge that differences in communities require so lutions to be distinctive for every area.

PAGE 84

65 The acknowledgement of risk to a disast er and the communities understanding of vulnerability is required to ensure that the planning phase of a disaster is adequate. Although communities are consta ntly faced with the risk of hazards, they are not all equally vu lnerable. White (1945) em phasizes the importance of understanding how individuals and groups make decisions about alternative programs for managing hazards. Well trained professionals are an essential component to successful emergency management (Kates and Bu rton, 1986a) although, Wolensky and Wolensky (1990), argue that four other elements are also required: 1) A foundation of supportive values for lo cal government action, 2) The legal authority to act, 3) An advocacy supporti ng action, and 4) Necessary institutional resources. Applying these five core co mponents to the four stages of a disaster, the following model (Figure 2.5) is dev eloped. The model which was initially intended to examine the effectiveness of small communities to respond to disasters could be applied to any comm unity regardless of size. The model allows for the identification of element s that may be missing resulting in poor hazard management strategies. The Model of Community Response to Disaster (Figure 2.5) takes into consideration the large cont extual setting in which disa sters take place. This model also addresses the concerns of Britton (1999), and Oliver-Smith and Hoffman (1999) that the traditional theory of emergency manage ment i.e. CEM, overly simplifies the disaster phases and has trouble capturing the wider political, economic and cultural explanations of di sasters. Figure 2.5 below ensures that

PAGE 85

66 the policy process and intergovernmental system are not divorced from one another by applying to the phases of mitigation, planning, response, and recovery the key components identifi ed by Wolensky and Wolensky (1990) and Kates and Burton (1986a): Well trained professionals A foundation of supportive values for local government action The legal authority to act, An advocacy supporting action, and Necessary institutional resources Figure 2.5 Model of Community Res ponse to Disaster (Source: Hughey, 2003)

PAGE 86

67 2.6.1 Exploring the Model of Community Response to Disaster The hazard literature illustrates agreement among researchers with regards to good leadership (Kates and Burton, 1986 a ). The key to an effective hazard management plan is good leadership and professionally trained officials. This element is the keystone to the above model while still illustrating that good hazard management is more complex t hen just this one feature. A foundation of supportive values fo r government action enables concepts to be developed into policies and provides government leaders the backing to spend money in an effort to build resource s. This is critic al when dealing with jurisdictions that have a limited economic base. Hazard mitigation and planning is only one of the many issues facing government and many times gets placed on the back burner. If both the governm ent and residents pl ace importance on hazard management the community will be be tter prepared. O ften officials are also more willing to engage in hazard po licy if constituents are encouraging of such action. Working within the constraints of any governmental systems and hazard mitigation boundaries, a jurisdiction can find itself with little or no legal authority to act. Changing political situations can seriously impair mitigation projects initiated at the local level. With ne w political leadership come new political agendas which can stop or alter mitigation measures before completion. Case studies such as Tobin and Peacock (1982) evaluations of Soldiers Grove, Wisconsin, has shed light on the U.S. federal governments’ attitude towards alternative mitigation measures. Case s in point, when dealing with the flood

PAGE 87

68 hazard, some communities have chosen to select non-structural adjustments to regulate the floodplain. However, without the authority to act and the support of government officials such measures can be halted, continuing to leave citizens vulnerable. It is important to realize that stro ng support from government leaders is not always enough to ensure that polices and mitigation measures come to fruition. Clearly following a disaster, citizen support for action is high, but consensus on which alleviation strat egy should be implemented is not always easy to achieve. As the immediat e response phase comes to an end, many citizens try to get life ‘back to normal’ and are faced with other urgent problems, such as lost wages or lost industrial production. If a strong support for action does not exist within the community, polic ies for hazard reduction can fall through the cracks. Every jurisdiction must have an accurate assessment of available resources. Being familiar with what resources and personnel are available during a disaster is crucial. Although many jurisdictions have a limited economic base and fewer immediate resources availa ble, through mutual-aid agreements with neighboring jurisdictions, resources can be easily mobilized to respond. Being able to quickly assess the comm unity needs and having the knowledge of resource availability, aid can be reques ted in a timely manner to ensure all immediate emergency needs are met. T he application of the Model of Community Response to Disaster a jurisd iction can evaluate and determine gaps

PAGE 88

69 that exist. Identification of gaps allows for the improvement and development of a more effective comprehensive emergency management system. 2.7 Discussion As a geographer in the field of hazards research I believe it is our responsibility to bridge not only the gap between physical and social sciences but also to bridge the gap between theoretic al and applied research. We have a responsibility to ensure that our research findings ar e presented in an effective and meaningful way not only to the rest of the hazards research community but also to emergency managers in the field. In an effort to reduce vulnerability and disaster losses our research must get into the hands of decision makers and we must enable them to apply the findings. Examples of research which have not only made significant contributions to t he academic community but also to the emergency management community includes White (1945, 1958) Cutter (1996), Quarantelli (1997, 2000), Wis ner et al. (2004), and Tobin et al. (2005). This research attempts to build upon the foundation that has been developed in the hazards lit erature and previously discussed in this chapter to further expand our understanding of co mprehensive emergency management and its impact on disaster response. T he selected study desi gn and methods are discussed in following chapter. Out lined are the data co llection tools and procedures as well as a description of data interpretation and analysis.

PAGE 89

70 Chapter Three: Study Design & Methods 3.1 Introduction This research study used a longitudinal approach to improve our understanding of the Comprehensive Em ergency Management (CEM) system on disaster response. The purpose of this study was to identify and report areas of success, as well as potential barriers to effective disaster response under the CEM system, in an effort to add to t he geography literature on hazards. The study design and methods utilized in this research tested the validity of Quarantelli’s (1997) methodology for ev aluating the management of disaster response operations. This longitudin al study design was intended to determine the geographic, and political challenges to emergency management within the Commonwealth of The Bahamas as well as identify and document techniques being utilized to respond to and recover from disasters. Furthermore, the study design is intended to produce benchmarks fo r further evaluation from which we can continue to gauge the impact of CEM on future disasters within The Bahamas. The following chapter discu sses the qualitative and quantitative methodology that was used and includes di scussion of the study design, data

PAGE 90

71 collection tools, and procedures. Addition ally, provided in this chapter is a description of the process through whic h data were interpreted and analyzed. 3.2 Background The goal of this research was two fold ; first, to document the development of a comprehensive emergency managemen t system within The Bahamas and second, to compare res ponse operations under CE M with response operations prior to its implementation. This resear ch study used qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze response operations to six disasters within The Bahamas. Figure 3.1 below displays the six study hu rricanes and their temporal relationship to the implementation of CEM. Figure 3.1 – Timeline of selected study hurricanes The purpose of examining the above six hurricanes was to determine the impact of CEM on disaster response. By exam ining three response operations prior to the implementation of CEM we are bette r able to evaluate through comparison Andrew 1992 Floyd 1999 Michelle 2001 Frances 2004 Jeanne 2004 Wilma 2005 CEM Implementation Begins (2002)

PAGE 91

72 the extent to which the national re sponse operations were improved or worsened. Keeping with the goal of the study, it was imperative that the research strategy employed answer the three objectives posed by the study: 3.2.1 Research Objectives 1. To identify and report ar eas of success, as well as potential barriers to effective disaster response under the CE M system, in an e ffort to add to the geography literature on hazards. 2. Test the validity of Quarantelli’s (1997) met hodology for evaluating the management of disaster response operations. 3. To determine the geographic, and political challenges to emergency management within the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. 4. To identify techniques being uti lized within the Commonwealth of The Bahamas to respond to and recover from the impacts of disasters. The research strategy additionally requi red that the selected methods of data collection and analysis address fully the research questions. 3.2.2 Research Questions 1. Can Quarantelli’s (199 7a) methodology for evaluat ing the management of disaster response be operationalized? 2. Can CEM, a United States em ergency management strategy, be an effective strategy for an archipelagic nation? 3. Did the implementatio n of a CEM system improve disaster response?

PAGE 92

73 Based on the literature (NGA, 1979; McLoughl in 1985; Petak, 1985; Quarantelli, 1997; Britton, 2001; FEMA, 2003a; McEntire 2004; Tobin et al., 2004;) it is hypothesized that the impl ementation of CEM will have improved all areas of disaster response. It is further belie ved that the CEM syst em is an appropriate and effective strategy for disaster re sponse within the Commonwealth of The Bahamas. The following section characteri zes the research strategy utilized for this study by detailing the study design to include the utilized methods for data collection and analysis. 3.2.3 Selection of t he Six Study Hurricanes The selection of the six study hurricanes as displayed in Figure 3.1 above were based on the following criteria. (1) Any disaster impacting The Co mmonwealth of The Bahamas that required a response by the nati onal government following the implementation of CEM. (2) A matching number of disast ers impacting The Commonwealth of The Bahamas that required a res ponse by the national government prior to the implement ation of CEM. To date Hurricanes Frances (2004), Jeanne (2004), and Wilma (2005) are the only disasters to impact the nation t hat have required a national response post CEM. Although there were smaller disast er such as brush fires, localized flooding events, and a ferry accident that have occurred since the implementation of CEM none of the events required a nati onal response; for that reason these events were not selected as part of this study.

PAGE 93

74 As a comparison group, three disast ers that required a national response but occurred prior to the impl ementation of CEM were also included in this study. Hurricanes Andrew (1992), Floyd (1999), and Michelle (2001) were selected for the following reasons: (1) they were the most recent national response operations to take place prior to the CEM implementation, and (2) large amounts of data were available that documented in detail the national response initiatives. Excluded from this group were Hurricane Lili (1996) and The Bay Street Fire of 2001. Hurricane Lili was excluded due to th e limited documentation dedicated to the national response. Duri ng preliminary archival rese arch only one report from the Ministry of Public Works could be located which addressed the national response initiative. The Bay Street Fire was excluded because, although it created a large negative economic impact to the nation, the response to the disaster event required t he mobilization of only three national agencies. The partial mobilization of national assets as well as limited data on the national response removed the fire from incl usion in this study. 3.3 Methods This longitudinal study used a mix ed methods research approach. The longitudinal design allowed for repeated observations of the impact of CEM on national disaster response. Creswe ll and Plano-Clark (2007) define mixed methods research as the collection and analysis of qualitative and quantitative data. Qualitative dat a can consist of “open-ended info rmation that the researcher gathers through interviews with participants” (Creswell and Plano-Clark, 2007:6). Qualitative data can also be collected th rough observation and review of records

PAGE 94

75 and reports. For this research qualit ative data were collected through the collection of documents, semi-structured in terviews, and participant observations. “Quantitative data includes closed-ended information such as that found on attitude, behavior, or performance in struments” (Creswell and Plano-Clark, 2007:6). This research collected quantitat ive data through surveys and census documents. The mixed me thods utilized for data collection and analysis are discussed in detail below. 3.3.2 Data Collection Tools This mixed-methods research utiliz ed a triangulation de sign, the purpose of which was to obtain different but co mplementary data on the national response to disaster operations in The Bahamas. Data for this study were collected over a six year period from 2001-2007. This study employed the following data collection techniques: Archival research, Structured surveys, Semi-structured interviews, and Participant observations. 3.3.2.1 Archival Research Archival research is often utilized by researchers to provide background information or to provide details to ev ents that one was unable to witness (Stake, 1995). For this research study archival data were a critical component in providing clarity wit h regards to national disaster operations preand postCEM implementation. Throughout the study period available relevant records and

PAGE 95

76 reports regarding response to the six study hurricanes were collected. This archival research was used to rec onstruct each disaster with special consideration given to the response phase. Archival data were additionally used to ‘fill in the blanks’ with regards to the social and political environment surrounding each event. The collection of records and reports were important in this study to provide a more thorough understanding of nat ional disaster response initiatives as well as provide insight into the dynamics surrounding emergency management within The Bahamas. Archiv al data were collected through the following agencies, organizations, and ministries. Department of Meteorology o Hurricane Andrew (1992) o Hurricane Floyd (1999) o Hurricane Michelle (2001) o Hurricane Frances (2004) o Hurricane Jeanne (2004) o Hurricane Wilma (2005) Office of The Prime Minister o Report on Hurricane Andrew o Report on Hurricane Floyd o The Bahamas National Geogr aphic Information Centre The Airport Authority o Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Frances and Jeanne o Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Wilma The Bahamas National Emergen cy Management Agency (NEMA) o National Emergency Response Plan o NEMA Hurricane Frances Situation Reports o NEMA Hurricane Jeanne Situation Reports o NEMA Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne Briefing Notes o NEMA Hurricane Wilma Situation Reports The Bahamas Red Cross o Hurricane Andrew Situation Report to the International Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies o Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne The Bahamas Telecommunication Company

PAGE 96

77o Hurricane Floyd Report o Report on Hurricane Michelle o Report on Hurricane Frances & Jeanne The Royal Bahamas Defence Force o Hurricane Michelle After-Action Report o Hurricane Frances Situat ion Report to NEMA o Hurricane Jeanne Situation Report to NEMA o Hurricane Wilma Situati on Report to NEMA The Royal Bahamas Police Force o Hurricane Frances Situat ion Report to NEMA The Ministry of Finance o Hurricane Wilma The Ministry of Health and Social Development o Report on Hurricane Michelle o Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Frances o Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Jeanne o Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Wilma The Ministry of Public Works and Transportation o Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Frances o Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Jeanne o Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Wilma The Ministry of Tourism o The Impact of the 2004 Hurricane Season on Tourism Water and Sewerage Corporation o Report on the 2004 Hurricane Season: Hurricanes Frances & Jeanne o Hurricane Wilma Situati on Report to NEMA Further data were obtained through regi onal and internat ional organizations active in disaster response to include: The Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA) o Comprehensive Approach for Disaster Management in the Caribbean The United Nations (UN) o Living with Risk: A Global Review of Disaster Reduction To aid in the analysis of the archival data, each document was summarized and placed in chronological order. This established order allowed for the easy identification of emerging themes and application to t he six study hurricanes.

PAGE 97

78 Strengths and Limitations of Archival Research The collection of archival data were important for this study to provide a historic understanding of disa ster response initiatives prior to the implementation of CEM. It is critical w hen using archival materials in research to understand the context in which they were written or developed. Researchers must identify the background of the document to determine the basis on which it was written, including whether it was written firsthand, through secondary resources, solicited, signed or edited (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). For this study archival data were validated through semi-structured in terviews and observation data. 3.3.2.2 Structured Survey Data Over the six-year study period t hat data were collected I developed a strong working relationship with the NEMA staff and emergency management support agencies. With strong support from t he director of NEMA Mr. Carl Smith, surveys were conducted by NEMA and the originals were provided to me for analysis and inclusion in this study. The Structured surveys were designed by NEMA for the Family Island Administrators2. The surveys were self administered and voluntary. A copy of the struct ured survey can be found in Appendix A of this document. There are a total of twenty Family Island Administrators responsible for serving as the NEMA repr esentative for each of their respective jurisdictions. There was a 100% re turn rate for t he surveys. 2 Family Island Administrators are elected official s who represent their respective islands. Many administrators have a multi-island jurisdiction since many of the family islands are small both in population and geography. Family Island Administra tors also serve as the NEMA representatives within their jurisdictions.

PAGE 98

79 The structured surveys provided data on the Family Island Administrators perspectives on national disaster response to the six study hurricanes as well as information on disaster planning and traini ng. The SPSS statistical program was used to run descriptive statistics on t he population. The survey data collected were used in combination with archival research, semi-struc tured interview, and participatory observation data to gauge the impact of the CEM system on national response to the six disaster oper ations selected for this study. Strengths and Limitations of Survey Data There are several benefits to using a self-administered structured survey. According to Bernard (2000) self-admin istered surveys allow respondents the opportunity to answer sensitive questions without the presence and pressure of a researcher. This makes the respondent feel more comfortable and perhaps more likely to answer honestly. Regardless of how the survey is administered the data obtained can have limitations re lating to retrospective questions concerning attitudes, perception, and s equence of events. Another challenge with administering surveys is participant recall. Accurately reconstructing activities surrounding an event and the timing of response initiatives is difficult. During disaster operations a variety of re sponse initiatives are required to take place simultaneously. This requires t hat researchers are familiar with the functional activities that must be ex ecuted during a disaster. Limitations associated with recall as well as question design bias must be considered when analyzing the data. To validate the dat a and address potential limitations, survey

PAGE 99

80 data were used in combination with archival research, semi-structured interviews, and participant observation data. A major strength of survey data is t he opportunity to collect data that can provide a more comprehensive understand ing of the impacts of response operations. The survey utilized in th is research allowed Family Island Administrators to rate response in itiatives based on their experiences and perspectives. The surveys utilized both open and closed-ended questions allowing respondents an opportunity to use their own words to convey their perspective on the national response. 3.3.2.3 Semi-Structured Interviews Semi-structured interviews were conducted with NEMA staff members to obtain information on the national response to the six study hurricanes as well as validate archival and survey data. Inte rviewing is a prominent means of data collection in the social science, and this study utilized semi-structured face-toface interviews. Semi-structured intervie ws were selected for this research for two key reasons. First, the semi-struc tured format ensured t hat essential topics and information were gathered while also providing an opportunity to utilize probing techniques to draw out additional information. The interviews were an important component of this research, a llowing participants the opportunity to convey their thoughts on the impact of CEM. Table 3.1 identifies the interviewees, their official title, and the date each interview was conducted. Prime Minister Perry G. Christie was selected for an interview to obtain data on the current and future direction of emergency

PAGE 100

81 management within The Bahamas. This in terview provided insight into the political and economic importance of a comprehensive emergency management structure. All six NEMA staff members were interviewed to obtain data on the management of response operati ons both preand post-CEM. Interviews were also used to validate archival and survey data. The interviews additionally provided a broad understanding of the philosophy dire cting current emergency management practices within the nation. Semi-Structured Interviews Name Official Title Interview Date(s) Perry G. Christie Prime Minister of The Bahamas January 25, 2007 Carl F. Smith Under Secretary, Cabinet Office & Interim Director NEMA December 20, 2006 January 25, 2007 June 14, 2007 Chrystal Glinton First Assistant Secretary December 18, 2006 June 13, 2007 Gayle OuttenMoncur Senior Assistant Secretary December 19, 2006 December 20, 2006 January 24, 2007 June 14, 2007 Luke Bethel Chief Petty Officer December 18, 2006 June 13, 2007 Eleanor Davis Administrative Cadet December 19, 2006 June 13, 2007 Wendell Rigby Supplies Officer December 19, 2006 June 13, 2007 Table 3.1 Semi-Structured Interviews Conducted

PAGE 101

82 Strengths and Limitations of Semi -Structured Interviews There are a number of benefits to c onducting semi-structured interviews including the opportunity it provides to respondents to have control over the flow of the interview. Instead of forced responses, the semi-structured interview encourages a two way discussion between the researcher and the participant. According to Denzin and Lincoln (1998) semi-structured interviews allow respondents not only the opportunity to pr ovide an answer but also the reasons behind their answers. Semi-structured interviews however can prove to be difficult if the interviewer is not skilled at the techniqu e. The interviewer must identify the appropriate areas and times to probe as well as know when and how to move the discussion along. The data obtained through the semi-structured interviews can be compromised if the interviewer asks l eading, vague, or insensitive questions. Other pitfalls associated with semi-structu red interviews include the interviewer’s failure to keep the discussion on topic, probe properly, and/or a failure to judge answers correctly. One of the bi ggest challenges associated with semistructured interviews comes during the anal ysis phase. The data obtained is rich with information however; a vast amount of irrelevant information can also be obtained. The semi-structured interviews prov ided clarity to questions that emerged during archival research and provided s upport to the survey data that were collected. To address and overcome t he challenges associated with semistructured interviews I developed a str ong working relationship with the NEMA

PAGE 102

83 staff and the Prime Minister before conducting the interviews. This allowed me the opportunity to develop a rapport with the interviewees and establish an open dialogue. Furthermore, during the analysi s phase the data were used in support of the archival, survey, and participant observation data. 3.3.2.4 Participant Observation The intent of the observations was to gain insight into the governmental and organizational dynamics surrounding disaster response within The Bahamas. Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) ar gue that all social research is a form of participant observation, since we cannot study the social world without being part of it. Gold (1958) outlined four methods of collecting observational data: (1) the complete participant, (2) the participant-as-observer, (3) the observer-as-participant, and (4) the complete observer. In the context of this study, participant observation represents the established participant role that this researcher took during the implement ation of the comprehensive emergency management system as well as the active role established during response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne. According to Gold (1958) this identifies a more ‘participant as observer' role. For the purposes of this study it was not possible to be a non-participant naturalistic observer due to the pre-existi ng relationships nor do I believe that a naturalistic observation technique woul d allow for the untangling of intertwined relationships that govern emergency respons e within the nation. Furthermore, it was not possible to go unnoticed and limit the affect of my presence on the behavior. I believe my interaction with all individuals and agencies active in

PAGE 103

84 disaster helped reduce bias and prevent ed participants from changing their behavior on my behalf. This has lead to a more natural emergency response environment. According to Becker (1958) sociologists utilize this method when they are especially interested in underst anding a particular organization or substantive problem. Due to the complex nature of disast ers, participation in all four phases of the emergency m anagement cycle provided a stronger understand of the comple x social dynamics impacting national response operations. Historically field research has been associated most strongly with participant observation (Becker, 1958) Fieldwork in The Bahamas was undertaken over a six year period (2001 – 2007). Actively participating in the development of an emergency management structure within The Bahamas I joined monthly disaster committee m eeting, annual disast er preparedness conferences, planning and training activiti es, as well as activations of the National Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to include Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne 2004. This component of parti cipant observation in combination with the previously stated data collection methods creates a holistic research perspective that has produced a very rich data set. Strengths and Limitations of Participant Observations There are two key limitations asso ciated with observation data collection methods. The first limitation is with data validity. Observation data are susceptible to researcher bias and subjecti ve interpretation. To overcome issues

PAGE 104

85 associated with validity the data were used in combination with archival research, survey, and semi-structured interview data. The second limitation to observation dat a is ethics. Several features of observation research make it vulnerable to questions of ethical malpractice. Invasion of privacy by venturing into pr ivate areas or by mi srepresenting oneself as a member can be an issue. During this study NEMA and all of its members were made aware of my role within the c ontext of disaster response as well as data collection. “One great strength of the observational method lies in the ease through which researchers can gain entre to setti ngs” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994: 382). Participant observation provides an opportunity for researchers to better understand the complex relationships that exist within an organization. I had the opportunity with the full support of NEMA to participate in planning, training, and response operations. The insight gained th rough participation in these activities allowed for the development of strong re lationships with individuals and agencies active in disasters. Thus, a better understanding of the complex relationships that exist at the national level relating to disaster response initiatives within The Bahamas was achieved. 3.4 Data Application and Analysis Data collected through archival research, structured surveys, and semistructured interview were analyzed in several ways. First, the surveys and closed-ended question associated with the interviews were analyzed using standard statistical techniques. The data we re then applied to 8 of the 10 criteria

PAGE 105

86 for measuring the management of national disaster response operations as outlined by Quarantelli (1997). Finally, dat a were then applied to the Model of Community Response to Disaster (H ughey, 2003). Each of these analyses techniques are discussed in detail below. 3.4.1 Standard Statistical Analysis of Survey and Interview Data Population data were gathered for both the surveys and interviews. Descriptive statistics were run utiliz ing the SPSS software and results are reported and discussed in chapter 5 of this document. 3.4.2 Measuring The Bahamas Nationa l Response to Hurricanes: Andrew (1992), Floyd (1999), Michelle (2001) Frances (2004), Jeanne (2004) and Wilma (2005) Emergency Management is the proc ess of coordinating available resources to deal with emergencies effectiv ely, thereby saving lives, avoiding injury, and minimizing economic loss (FEMA, 2003 b ). The first step towards understanding the impact of the CEM system on the ability of The Bahamas to respond during a disaster required an evaluation of response operations. Hurricanes Andrew, Floyd, and Michelle we re selected as three disasters which required a national response prior to the implementation of a CEM system. Hurricanes Frances, Jeanne, and Wilma were selected as three disasters which required a national response following the implementat ion of a CEM system. Evaluating the management of each of the six disa sters utilizing the same criteria provides a baseline for compar ative analysis. An amended version of Quarantelli’s (1997 a ) Ten Criteria for Evaluating the Management of Community

PAGE 106

87 Disasters was selected. This methodological approach is being used to both compare and differentiate between each hurri cane response in an effort to gauge how effectively3 each disaster was managed. Employing this comparative research methodology assisted in expan ding our understanding of The Bahamas disaster response capabilities. It furt her facilitated the ve rification and/or falsification of assumptions su rrounding CEM in The Bahamas. Quarantelli’s (1997a) eval uation criteria were se lected for application in this research because it is rooted in t he empirical research previously undertaken by social and behavioral scientist. The cr iteria were developed from over 500 different studies on disasters and mass emergencies conducted with the support of the Disaster Research Center (DRC). (For general summaries of the literature from which the evaluati on criteria were developed see: Kreps 1984, 1989; Drabek 1986; Dynes, Demarchi and Pelanda 1987; Auf der Heide 1989; Quarantelli and Pelanda 1989; Lagadec 199 0; Drabek and Hoetmer 1991; Clarke and Short 1993; Quarantelli and Popov 199 3; Cutter 1994; Dynes and Tierney 1994; Porfiriev and Quarantelli 1996) A prominent researcher in the field of hazards Dr. Quarnatelli has worked closely with local and federal emer gency managers to bridge the gap between researchers and practitioners. Quarantel li’s (1997a) research was chosen for application in this study to test his cr iteria to see first, if they can be operationalized and second, if they are suitable for comparing and contrasting 3 Effective is defined as a desired and intended result has been produced; this definition differs from that of efficiency which requires that t he results be obtained in the best possible way. (Quarantelli, 1997:43)

PAGE 107

88 the management of several response operations Dr. Quarantelli’s research cuts across natural and technological disast ers and identifies t hat there is no significant behavioral differences in the two types of crises. This is important to note since CEM is based on the principal t hat all disasters, regardless of the trigger require the same response mechanisms. The foundation of Quarantelli’s res earch is, “what is crucial is not management per se, but good management” (Quarantelli, 1997 a :39). The key question then becomes what constitutes ‘good management’ and how can that be measured. Quarantelli’s model, devel oped for evaluating the management of disaster response operations at the local level provided ten criteria to evaluate if the response was effective This study is examini ng the national response of The Bahamas to six hurricanes. There are significant differences to local and national response requirements and even greater difference between response operations within the Unit ed States and an archipelagic nation such as The Bahamas. Some of the major differences include: availability of resources, legal authority to act, as well as strong cont rol over governmental agency response. Because of these differences as well as challenges associated in measuring some of the criteria developed by Quarante lli, this research utilized only eight of the ten components. Table 3. 2 lists the criteria that were selected for this research to gauge effective emergency management. The two criteria suggested by Quarantelli (1997 a ) that were omitted from this study are: Generating an appropriate delegation of tasks and division of labor and blending emergent and establis hed organizational behaviors. There were

PAGE 108

89 two major challenges in including these cr iteria in the eval uation of effective emergency management within The Bahamas that lead to their exclusion. First, there are no clear benchmar ks within the hazards literat ure to measure if tasks were delegated appropriately nor is ther e agreement as to who should be doing the delegating. Secondly, although resear ch has shown that groups of private citizens carrying out important disaster tasks can be an essential part of the disaster management process (Stallings and Quarantelli, 1985) the literature is centered within the United States and does not take into consideration more remote and dispersed locations such as T he Bahamas Family Islands. In areas that are not easily accessible by outside groups with a small population base it is likely that disaster related activiti es are addressed within pre-established organizational structures such as a churches and/or local government. Furthermore, archival research and observation data did not identify any emergent organizations within the national response. For these reasons they were removed from examinat ion within this study.

PAGE 109

90 Eight Criteria for Evaluating The Management of Disaster Operations Within The Bahamas 1. Adequately carrying out generic functions; Yes/No 2. Effectively mobilizi ng personnel and resources; Yes/No 3. Adequately processing information; Yes/No 4. Properly exercising decision-making; Yes/No 5. Developing overall coordination; Yes/No 6. Correctly recognizing differences between response and agent-generated demands; Yes/No 7. Providing appropriate and a ccurate reports for the news media; Yes/No 8. Having a well-functioni ng emergency operations center; Yes/No Table 3.2 Eight Criteria for Evaluati ng The Management of Disaster Operations Within The Bahamas. Source: Amended from Quarantelli (1997a) 3.4.2.1 Eight Criteria for Evaluati ng the Management of Disaster Response Operations within The Bahamas Provided in this section is a detailed discussion of each of the eight criteria selected for use in this study. A summary of Quarantelli’s (1997 a ) research as well as how each criterion was implement ed to evaluate the six study hurricanes is presented. The first criterion is; carry out generic functions in an adequate way. Regardless of the disaster agent certain functions mu st be carried out. For evaluation of this criteria ten generic f unctions were identified by Quarantelli (1997 a ) and Kreps (1991 b ). The ten functions include: 1) Warnings; 2) Evacuations; 3) Sheltering; 4) Emergen cy Medical Care; 5) Search and Rescue; 6) Protection of Property; 7) M obilization of Emergency Personnel and Resources; 8) Assessing the Damage; 9) Coordinating emergency management

PAGE 110

91 activities; 10) Restoring essential public services. As proposed by Quarantelli (1997a) the following two questions were applied to each of the ten generic functions. 1. Was the need for the f unction recognized early? 2. Was the function carried out without too many problems? SAMPLE: FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART FUNCTIONS Was the Need for the function recognized early? (Y/N) Was the function carried out without too many problems? (Y/N) 1. Warning 2. Evacuations 3. Sheltering 4. Emergency Medical Care 5. Search and Rescue 6. Protection of Property 7. Mobilization of Emergency Personnel and Resources 8. Assessing the Damage 9. Coordinating emergency management activities 10. Restoring essential public services Table 3.3 Sample Function Evaluation Chart. (Data Source: Quarantelli,1997 a ) According to Quarantelli (1997 a ) if yes can be answered to all of the above questions then “it is very lik ely that there wa s adequate management of generic functions” (Quarantelli, 1997 a :43). To answer these questions as they apply to the six hurricanes incl uded in this research study (Hurricanes Andrew 1992, Floyd 1999, Michelle 2001, Franc es 2004, Jeanne 2004, Wilma 2005) data

PAGE 111

92 were gathered from a variet y of sources including Official Reports from the Office of The Prime Minister, Hurricane After-acti on Reports, Observation, Survey Data and Personal Interviews with individuals active in the emergency response. Due to the vague and subjective nature of the two questions, application to the six hurricanes was problematic and is discu ssed in detail in chapter 6 of this dissertation. The second criterion is: Mobilize personnel and resources effectively. Quarantelli (1997 a ) argues that in the majority of disasters, there is no lack of necessary personnel or resources. Res earch by Bolin (1990) illustrates that sooner or later, with no planning, needed personnel and resources become available. With the exception of cata strophes such as the 2004 Tsunami, this has generally been true for response. It is important to keep in mind the challenges associated with the m obilization and movement of resources/equipment between is lands. Quarantelli (1997 a ) further argues that the goal is not just mobilization or personnel and resources, but rather effective mobilization. “Effective means that a desired and intended result has been produced; this definition differs from that of efficiency which requires that the results be obtained in the best possible way” (Quarantelli, 1997 a :43). The example of evacuation operations was giv en to illustrate the distinct difference between effective and efficient. “An evacuation may have got the population out of an endangered area and been effective, but it may not have been very efficient in terms of the use of unnecessary re sources, the time consumed by the problems generated” (Quarantelli, 1997 a :43).

PAGE 112

93 To answer the question of effect ive mobilization of personnel and resources for the six hurricanes in this study the following three questions will be examined. 1. Were the needed personnel and res ources identified well in the crisis? 2. Were they located quickly and brought to bear correctly? 3. Were they appropriate to the pr oblems generated by the disaster? Quarantelli suggests that if the following questions can be answered positively then it would suggest that the “needed personnel and resources had not simply been mobilized but mobiliz ed effectively” (Quarantelli, 1997 a :44). To answer this question, data were gather ed from emergency operation center logbooks, hurricane after-action reports, offi cial reports from the Office of The Prime Minister, observation, and personal inte rviews with individuals active in the emergency response. As with criter ion one, the questions proposed by Quarentelli (1997a) to eval uate the effective mobiliz ation of personnel and resources are subjective and, as you wil l see in chapter 6, problematic. The third criterion is: allow the adequate proce ssing of information. This criterion focuses less on the technology utilized to ensure communication but rather places the emphasis on the content of what when and to whom the information was made available. Alt hough communication between the islands can be difficult during times of disasters, that, in itself, does not constitute poor management of a disaster. The amount and type of information being made available for decision making can significant ly impact the response phase. As

PAGE 113

94 Quarantelli (1997 a ) points out there are multiple streams of information flow during the response phase of a disaster: Within every responding organization; Between organizations; From citizens to organizations; and From organizations to citizens. As a result of a disaster, staffi ng requirements will increase and may alter the regular flow of information. The addition of new individuals to the daily flow of information can create real challenges. If individuals are not properly equipped to provide, receive, and process info rmation the system c an become overloaded and inadequate for managing t he disaster response operat ion. An example of this is the requirement of around the cl ock staffing. Extra demands are being placed on an organizations internal system which may bring about a loss and/or delay of information. Quarantelli (1997 a ) contends that it is possible to evaluate the adequacy of information flow in a disa ster. “If organizations and/or citizens did not get the information they needed, clearly the disa ster management was not as it should have been” (Quarantelli, 1997 a :46). Furthermore “information, the ability to process it, the relationships in a multi-person communication network and the authority to structure, control and regulate information across an emergency command affects the total effectivene ss of the response system” (Wybo & Kowalski, 1998:131-2). For the purposes of this research co mmunication flow for each of the six hurricanes were evaluated. Data we re gathered from a variety of sources

PAGE 114

95 including official reports from the Office of The Prim e Minister, hurricane afteraction reports, observation, survey data, personal interviews with individuals active in the emergency response, and local newspaper reports. The fourth criterion is: permit the proper exercise of decision-making. Research has illustrated that it is uncommon for the usual chain-of-command and/or lines-of-authority to break down during response to a disaster. The problems associated with decision-making ar e usually associated with four key areas: 1. Loss of higher-echelon personnel because of overwork. 2. Conflict over responsibility for new disaster tasks. 3. Clashes over organizational domains between established and emergent groups. 4. Surfacing of organizational jurisdictional differences. Specific tasks such as firefighti ng and law enforcement have very clear authorities responsible for performing functi ons. Rarely in a disaster operation does confusion over who is responsible for repairs to phone or sewer lines occur. The problems associated with decision making arise from the introduction of new challenges. For example number one above occurs from a tendency of key officials to work too long during the cris is period. “Personnel remaining on the job round-the-clock will ev entually collapse from exhaustion or make bad decisions” (Quarantelli, 1997 a :46). This problem is further compounded by the fact that when replacements come they will lack the necessary information for correct decision-making partly because crucial data will not have been formally recorded or processed.

PAGE 115

96 Proper decision-making requires all rele vant knowledge. If criterion four was not performed sufficiently or if any of the above four difficulties discussed occur it is appropriate to say that the proper exercise of de cision-making was not permitted. To evaluate crit eria four, each of the four questions identified by Quarantelli (1997a) were ans wered based on the data gathered through surveys of Island Administrators, interviews wit h individuals active in the emergency response, hurricane after-action reports, and observations. The fifth criterion for good disaster management is: focus on the development of overall coordination. Coordination during a disaster operation comes into play when more than one emergency organization is involved. Coordination is critical and required to make sure that the response operation goes smoothly through the facilitation of information and the synchronization of critical functions that may requi re a variety of organizations. It is vital to remember that control is not coordination. Having ‘someone in charge’ does not mean t hat the required coordinat ion of organizations is occurring. Indeed, the idea that one person is controlling response operations can prevent the necessary coordination required to meet the emergency needs. Research by (Dynes, 1994) illustrates the differences and difficulties in utilizing a ‘command and control’ model such as the Incident Command System (ICS) as opposed to a ‘ coordination’ model such as the Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) System in respons e to a disaster operation. Coordination between organizations is plagued with difficulties for several reasons beginning with mi sunderstandings about what ‘coordination’ really

PAGE 116

97 means According to Quarantelli (1997a) coor dination is neither self-explanatory nor a matter of consensus. Some groups view coordination as merely informing others of what they will be doi ng. Others see it as the centralization of decisionmaking within a particular agency or among a few key officials. Quarantelli (1997 a :48) defines coordination as “mut ually agreed upon c ooperation about how to carry out particular tasks.” Good disaster management was evaluated on the kinds of efforts made at coordination and the relative absence of problems. According to Quarantelli (1997a) a lack of coordinatio n will be apparent if there are problems associated with the delivery of services due to disagreements between organizations regarding tasks. Data relating to the deliv ery of services were gathered for each of the six study hurricanes through archival research, surveys, personal interviews and observation. The sixth criterion identified was, correctly recognizing difference between response and agent-generated demands. It is important to note that regardless of the disaster type, hurricane, flood, or radiological event; many of the same functions or activities must ta ke place. It is critical t hat these core functions, such as communication and logistics, are carried out in addition to the unique demands that are generated from a specific ‘agent’ or disaster type. Part of Quarantelli’s discussion of ‘good disast er management’ requires that there is correct reorganization of agentand response-generated needs and demands. Agent-generated needs are defined as “ demands derived from the particular disaster agent” (Quarantelli, 1997 a :42). An example of an agent-generated need

PAGE 117

98 would be the necessity of sandbags in response to a flood event. Agentgenerated needs will vary cons iderably depending upon the disaster impact and specific nature of the agent. Respons e-generated needs however are defined as “demands common to all disasters because they are produced by the very efforts responding organizations make to manage co mmunity disasters” (Quarantelli, 1997 a :42). The response-generated demands are predictable and independent of any particular disaster agency. Fo r example, effective mobilization of personnel and resources, adequate informa tion flow, good decision making, and coordination between organizations are all r equired regardless of the incident to which you are responding. Disaster planne rs have termed the planning process to meet the needs of re sponse-generated demands as ‘all-hazards’ planning. Quarantelli (1997 a ) asserts that the correct recognition between agentand response-generated demands can be determined if criteria two through five as listed below were answered in a positive way. 2. Effectively mobilizing personnel and resources 3. Adequately processing information 4. Properly exercising decision-making 5. Developing overall coordination Evaluation of criteria six is dependent upon the a ssessment of these four components which were done through the application of date obtained during archival research, surveys, interviews and observations. The seventh criterion of good disaster management is: provide the mass communication system with appropriate and accurate information. With today’s technology, the media are instantly on the scene of any disaster. The information being provided through the m edia can significantly influence the

PAGE 118

99 perceptions and responses of disaster vi ctims, potential volunteers, and even response agencies (Fry, 2003; Tobin and Mont z, 1997; Quarantelli, 1996). It is critical that appropria te and accurate information is bei ng provided in a structured and standardized approach. According to Quarantelli (1997 a :50) “good disaster management should encourage the development of patterns of relationships that are acceptable and beneficial to the responding organizations the mass media and the citizens in general.” Indicators of good relationship include: Cooperative interaction between organizational and community officials and media representatives; Regularly scheduled briefings by response organizations to the media; Citizens believe their local media are giving them a relatively accurate picture of what is happening. Quarantelli (1997 a :51) argues that “when these re lationships are good, members of the press are satisfied with the amount and quality of information that is given to them by officials, who in turn want them to di sseminate information about the disasters.” He further stat es that if relevant informa tion regarding the response is not provided to the local media they wil l disseminate, even if unintentionally, news that is inaccurate. A measure of good disaster management is if the media was provided with appropriate and accurate information. Evaluation of this criterion was done using dat a obtained from archival research, to include newspapers, radio, and television archives as well as data from interviews, and observations. The eighth and final criterion for good disaster management is: have a well-functioning Emergency Operations Center (EOC). An EOC serves as the

PAGE 119

100 nucleus for disaster response activities and facilitates the successful completion of the previous seven criteria. Gi ven the number of agencies and groups required to respond to any given disaster the likelihood of response complications resulting from poor m anagement is high. During a disaster response operation, a variety of activiti es are occurring simultaneously all with equal importance. An EOC is intended to facilitate the effective implementation of all required response activities and should be seen not just as a place and structure but also a function (Perry 1991:204, FEMA 1995:27). It is important to reme mber that more than just a common location is needed to be considered a well-functioni ng EOC. Although a coordinated and organized response can be improved if all responding organizations are represented at a common location, it does not ensure success. Response operations many times last for days and ev en weeks, this requires that the EOC meet minimum physical requirements. For Example t he EOC should: Be located in a safe area in clos e proximity to ke y transportation routes; Have sufficient work space; Have bathroom and sleeping facilities; Have adequate communication provisions; Have computers and necessary supplies; Have maps and equipment inventory. However, the physical requirements are still not enough for an EOC to be considered ‘well functioning’. An EOC is of little value if agencies and organizations active in response do not send liaison personnel to the EOC. In addition to physical requirements for an EO C, there are social requirements that are equally essential. For exam ple the EOC should require that:

PAGE 120

101 Liaison personnel be knowledgeabl e and possess certain decisionmaking responsibilities in their own organizations. An effective response is unlikely if organi zational representativ es at the EOC are low level employees. These individuals may not only have inadequate knowledge of the organizati ons capabilities and resources, but they are also not involved in the decision making process. If there is proper staffing of the EOC, information can be collected and disseminat ed appropriately to ensure that tasks are executed accordingly. Additionally, pr oper staffing of the EOC provides for an ideal problem solving env ironment. Complications with response operations can be addressed between organizations in a timely fashion to ensure effective response. It is dangerous, however, to assume that just because the physical and social requirements listed above are in place that the EOC will be ‘well functioning’. The EOC environment is both dynamic and stressful. Personal dynamics can prevent an operation from r unning smoothly. “The social climate of an EOC is a very stressful one: there is pressure to take action, limited and uncertain information, shifting priorities and overlapping lines of authority and responsibility” (Perry 1991:210). Criterion eight for determi ning good disaster management, have a wellfunctioning Emergency Operations Center (EOC), was measured by first determining if the previous seven criter ia were answered in a positive way. Additionally data were gathered through the EOC log books, hurricane afteraction reports, interviews with individua ls active in disaster response, and

PAGE 121

102 observation. Data were applied to each of the six study hurricanes to determine if there was a well-functioning EOC. 3.4.3 The Model of Community Response to Disasters Evaluating the managem ent of the six study hurricanes utilizing Quarantelli’s (1997 a ) ‘Criteria for Good Management ’ provided a foundation for examining the impact of a CEM system However, to fully understand the findings as they apply to the dynamic po litical, social, and economic environment of The Bahamas, The Model of Communi ty Response to Disasters was also applied. (See Figure 3.2) This theoretical framew ork is amended from Hughey (2003). Combining the elements put fo rth by Kates and Burton (1986a) and Wolensky and Wolensky (1990) as applied to the four phase of emergency management, allowed for the identification of gap that resulted in poor hazard management. This theoretical model furt her illustrates the importance of the policy process and intergovernmental system t hat impacts disaster response.

PAGE 122

103 R e s p o n s e M i t i g a t i o n P l an ni n g R e c o v e r y Good Leadership by Professionally Trained Officials A Foundation of Supportive Values for Government Action Necessary Institutional Resources Legal Authority to Act An Advocacy Supporting Action R e s p o n s e M i t i g a t i o n P l an ni n g R e c o v e r y Good Leadership by Professionally Trained Officials A Foundation of Supportive Values for Government Action Necessary Institutional Resources Legal Authority to Act An Advocacy Supporting Action Figure 3.2Model of Communi ty Response to Disasters The model begins with the ident ification of good leadership by professionally trained officials as argued by Kates and Burton (1986). Undoubtedly, well trained and experienc ed professionals are essential components to the successful management of a disaster. However the hazards literature (Quarantelli, 1997 a ; 1997 b ; Mileti 1999, Mitchell 1996) has further illustrated that there is much more requi red to meet successf ully the challenges of disaster response. Wolensky and Wolensky (1990), argue that four other elements are also required: (1) a foundation of supportive values for local government action, (2) the legal author ity to act, (3) an advocacy supporting

PAGE 123

104 action, and (4) necessary institutional resources. These four elements in combination with good leader ship are then applied to the four phases of emergency management: (1) Preparedness, (2 ) Response, (3) Recovery, and (4) Mitigation as displayed above in Figure 3.2. As discussed in Chapter Two the four phases of emergency management are widely accepted within the hazard resear ch field with slight variations (Clary 1985; FEMA 2003; Kates and Burton 1986) The phases of disaster management as pointed out by Bruce (1985) are interrelated, so simplification and boundaries must be devel oped in order to discuss them individually, understanding that many times these phas es are occurring simultaneously or with some overlap. The delineation between the four phases of a disaster has allowed researchers and responders to fi nd order in a disordered and chaotic environment. The application of the model was done in two distinct phases, the preCEM phase, which provides the contextu al framework necessary to understand Hurricanes Andrew, Floyd, and Michel le, and the post-CEM phase, that examined Hurricanes Franc es, Jeanne, and Wilma. By exploring emergency response in these two phases ensures that the wider political, economic, and cultural explanations surrounding respons e to the six study hurricanes is addressed. This type of examination further allows for a more complete understanding of the mechani sms that impacted response initiatives.

PAGE 124

105 3.5 Strengths and Limitations of the Study Design Longitudinal data permit the measurement of differences or change in a variable from one period to another, in th is case the management of disaster operations following the implementa tion of a comprehensive emergency management system. This allows for the description of patterns of change over time, and can be used to locate the causes of social phenomena and sleeper effects, that is, connections between event s that are widely separated in time. The major limitations to a longitudinal study which utilized the retrospective design are: 1. Recall Bias: Retrospective questions concer ning motivational, attitudinal, cognitive or affective state are particularly problematic because respondents find it hard to accurately recall the timing of changes in these states. 2. Retrospective studies must be based on survivors: For this study it means that I was limited to those individual s who were still working for NEMA or The Bahamas Government. Any individuals who have moved, changed jobs, or passed away were omitted and biases may arise. 3.6 Summary This chapter described the mixed methods approach employed for this study including the strengths and limit ations associated with the four data collection techniques: (1) archival resear ch, (2) structured surveys, (3) semistructured interviews, and (4) participant observations. Detailed descriptions of the two theoretical frameworks used as well as how Quarantelli’s (1997a) criteria for evaluating the management of disaster response operations and the model of community response to disasters (Figur e 3.2) were applied. Application and testing of these two frameworks allowed for the development of a baseline for

PAGE 125

106 comparison between the six study hurric anes as well as a more comprehensive understanding of the mechani sms impacting response. Figure 3.3 provides a flow diagram for the stages of this research. Data CollectionArchival research Structured surveys Semi-structured interviews Participant observations Research Questions Quarantelli’s Criteria for Evaluating Response Model of Community Response Research Findings Data CollectionArchival research Structured surveys Semi-structured interviews Participant observations Research Questions Quarantelli’s Criteria for Evaluating Response Model of Community Response Research Findings Data CollectionArchival research Structured surveys Semi-structured interviews Participant observations Research Questions Quarantelli’s Criteria for Evaluating Response Model of Community Response Research Findings Figure 3.3 – Methodology Flow Diagram

PAGE 126

107 Chapter Four Results: Application Of Quarantelli’s Criteria For Evaluating Response 4.1 Introduction Chapter four discusses the research fi ndings associated with the testing of Quarantelli’s (1997a) eight criteria for ev aluating disaster response. The results are presented in a combinati on of tabular and written form. The data in this chapter are formatted to answer the following research questions. Can Quarantelli’s (199 7a) methodology for evaluating the management of disaster response be operationalized? Based on Quarantelli’s methodology did the implementation of a CEM system improve disaster response? The criteria are applied to each of t he six study hurricanes to determine if improvements in disaster response were identified after the implementation of CEM. Data obtained through surveys, semi -structured interviews, archival research, and observations were applied to assess each of the eight evaluation criteria as outlined in Chapter 3. The eight criteria were equally applied to the six study hurricanes in an effort to determi ne if Quarantelii’s methodology could be operationalized as well as to identify t he success of preand post-CEM response operations.

PAGE 127

108 Eight Criteria for Evaluating The Managem ent of Disaster Response Operations to the Six Study Hurricanes Pre-CEM Post-CEM Andrew 1992 Floyd 1999 Michelle 2001 Frances 2004 Jeanne 2004 Wilma 2005 1. Adequately carrying out generic functions; No No No No No No 2. Effectively mobilizing personnel and resources; No No No No Yes Yes 3. Adequately processing information; No No No Yes Yes Yes 4. Properly exercising decision-making; No No No No No Yes 5. Developing overall coordination; No No No Yes Yes Yes 6. Correctly recognizing differences between response and agent-generated demands; No No No No No Yes 7. Providing appropriate and accurate reports for the news media; No No No Yes Yes Yes 8. Having a wellfunctioning emergency operations center; No No No No No No Table 4.1 Eight Criteria for Evaluat ing The Management of Disaster Response Operations to the Six Study Hurricanes

PAGE 128

109 Table 4.1 displays the results of the evaluation for all six study hurricanes using Quarantelli’s (1997a) ei ght criteria. Each criter ion is examined in detail below to evaluate the usefulness of Q uarantelli’s (1997a) methodology for evaluating the management of disaster response operat ions. The methodology, if it can be operationalized, will be able to examine the sh ifts in disaster response as a result of CEM. Hurricanes A ndrew, Floyd, and Michelle were managed under the pre-CEM system. Disaster respon se during this time was seen as the responsibility of the Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF) and a ‘command and control’ model for disaster res ponse was utilized. Hurricanes Frances, Jeanne, and Wilma were managed under the post-CEM system. Disaster response after the implement ation of CEM in 2002 was t he responsibility of the National Emergency Management Agen cy (NEMA) and ‘comprehensive coordination’ model for re sponse was implemented. 4.2 Examination and Application of Quarantelli’s Eight Criteria 4.2.1 Criterion One: Adequately Carrying Out Generic Functions The first component of Quarantelli’s methodology was to determine if generic emergency response functions were carried out adequately. Regardless of the disaster agent certain functi ons must be carried out. The ten generic functions were evaluated for this resear ch were identified by Quarantelli (1997 a ) and Kreps (1991 b ) and include 1) Warnings; 2) Evacuations; 3) Sheltering; 4) Emergency Medical Care; 5) Search and Resc ue; 6) Protection of Property; 7) Mobilization of Emergency Personnel and Resources; 8) Assessing the Damage; 9) Coordinating emergency management acti vities; 10) Restoring essential public

PAGE 129

110 services. According to Quarantelli’s (1997a) the following two questions must be applied to each of the ten generic functions. 1. Was the need for the f unction recognized early? 2. Was the function carried out without too many problems? As discussed in Chapter Three, if ‘yes’ can be answered to both questions then the function can be considered to be “ adequately carried-out”. Table 4.2 shows that generic functions were not “adequat ely carried-out” during any of the six disaster response operations. A detail ed description and supp orting data for the responses in Table 4.2 are provided in T able 4.3 and sections 4. 2.1.1 – 4.2.1.6. Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to the Six Study Hurricanes: Quarantelli (1997a) Criterion One Pre-CEM Post-CEM Andrew 1992 Floyd 1999 Michelle 2001 Frances 2004 Jeanne 2004 Wilma 2005 Adequately carrying out generic functions; No No No No No No Table 4.2 – Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to the Six Study Hurricanes: Q uarantelli (1997a) Criterion On

PAGE 130

111 GENERIC FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART Pre-CEM Post-CEM Hurricane Andrew 1992 Floyd 1999 Michelle 2001 Frances 2004 Jeanne 2004 Wilma 2005 FUNCTIONS Q1. Was the Function recognized early?* (Y/N) Q2. Was the function carried out without too many problems?* (Y/N) Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2 1. Warning Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 2. Evacuations Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 3. Sheltering No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 4. Emergency Medical Care Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5. Search and Rescue No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6. Protection of Property Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7. Mobilization of Emergency Personnel and Resources No No No No No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 8. Assessing the Damage No No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 9. Coordinating emergency management activities No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10. Restoring essential public services No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Table 4.3 Generic Function Evaluation Char t Applied to the Six Study Hurricanes

PAGE 131

112 4.2.1.1 Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion One: Adequately Carrying Out Generic Functions Table 4.4 provides a summary of t he ten generic functions that were evaluated for this research and their application to Hurricane Andrew 1992. Hurricane Andrew 1992 GENERIC FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART FUNCTIONS Was the Need for the function recognized early? (Y/N) Was the function carried out without too many problems? (Y/N) 1. Warning Yes Yes 2. Evacuations Yes No 3. Sheltering No No 4. Emergency Medical Care Yes Yes 5. Search and Rescue No No 6. Protection of Property Yes Yes 7. Mobilization of Emergency Personnel and Resources No No 8. Assessing the Damage No No 9. Coordinating emergency management activities No No 10. Restoring essential public services No No Table 4.4 – Evaluation of Generic Functions in Res ponse to Hurricane Andrew 1992 Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 1 (Warning) Based on data gathered from The Bahamas Department of Meteorology (1992) and interviews with NEMA staff, warnings for Hurricane Andrew were

PAGE 132

113 effectively executed. On Saturday August 22nd hurricane warnings were issued for the islands of the Northwest Baham as and were maintained until 7am on Monday the 24th (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 1992). Hurricane warnings are issued by the Department of Meteorology when hurricane force winds (sustained winds of 74mph or hi gher) are expected in an area within the next 24 hours or less. The warnings i ssued by the Department of Meteorology were provide to The Broadcasting Corpor ation of The Bahamas, ZNS, who then communicated the warnings throughout the Islands via television and radio. “I was still with the Defence Fo rce in 1992. Everyone was aware Hurricane Andrew was going to hit, we were warned to secure our homes and prepare for a category 5 storm” (Bethel, 2006). “The Met Department does a great job of tracking the storm and providing the most up to date information to the public. From Andrew to Wilma Bahamians knew the storms were coming” (Outten-Moncur, 2007a). Based on the data from the Department of Meteorolog y and the interviews with NEMA staff, the need for warnings wa s recognized early and the function was carried out with no not able problems. Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 2 (Evacuations) In 1992 there was no legal authority to act or avenue for issuing ‘official’ evacuation orders within t he Commonwealth of The Bahamas. Through archival research, interviews with NEMA staff, and informal discussions with Island Administrators there was no evidence that evacuations were issued. The Department of Meteorology (1992) did enc ourage residents in unsafe structures to relocate and seek shelter in more se cure locations. However, ‘official’ requests for evacuation were not issued and national resources were not made

PAGE 133

114 available to aid resident s. The data shows that the need for evacuations was recognized by the Department of Met eorology however the function was not carried-out effectively. Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 3 (Sheltering) The Bahamas Red Cross Society (1992) with support from the RBDF and the Ministry of Social Services (O ffice of the Prime Minister, 1992) opened emergency shelters throughout The Bahamas Data on the number of shelters opened, individuals housed, and services provided were not available. “After Hurricane Andrew passed shelte rs were opened. The shelters were run mostly by Social Services” (Luke Bethel, December 18, 2006). Based on informal discussions with Red Cross representatives, Island Administrators, as well as NEMA staff it appears that many of the shelters were opened after Andrew made landfall to deal wit h the dislocation of population due to housing damage. This post impact sheltering of a population is known as recovery shelters. In cont rast response shelters the fo cus of this research, are opened prior to landfall to provide residents with a safe location to ride out the storm. As a result the available data suggests that emergency response shelters were not recognized early or carried-out effectively. Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 4 (Emergency Medical Care) National emergency medical care wa s adequate in meeting the needs of residents in response to Hurricane Andrew. Four deaths were reported (Office of the Prime Minister, 1992) and based on info rmal discussions with the Minister of Health, and Hospital Authority repres entative Paul Newbold, the national

PAGE 134

115 emergency medical system was able to coor dinate response to injuries. At no time was the system overwhelmed or inc apable of meeting t he medical needs of the nation. Based on the available dat a, it appears that the function was recognized early and carried out effectively. Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 5 (Search and Rescue) Search and Rescue was not a formal function in 1992 during response to Hurricane Andrew. According to info rmal discussions that I had at the 2005 national NEMA conference in Nassau, wit h the Island Administrators from San Salvador and Bimini, search and rescue was an informal function conducted at the local level by a variety of organi zations in a disjointed and uncoordinated manner. Local residents, the police and fire department, as well as the RBDF provided assistance with search and resc ue services. Data obtained through archival research makes no reference to Hurricane Andrew search and rescue operations. As a result both question pos ed by Quarantelli to evaluate this functions were assessed negatively indicating the function was not identified early or executed effectively. Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 6 (Protection of Property) Protection of Government property wa s carried out by the Ministry of Works and Transportation (Office of the Prime Minister, 1992). With responsibility for Government Buildings the Ministry of Works secured all government facilities by installing hurric ane shutters and/or plywood to protect windows. The protection of government property was recognized early and

PAGE 135

116 carried out with no notable problem s. Many residents also took precautions with their property by securing windows and clearing debris. Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 7 (M obilization of Emergency Personnel and Resources) The RBDF controlled disaster operati ons in response to Hurricane Andrew (Office of the Prime Mi nister, 1992; Bethel, 2006; Rigby, 2006). No formal emergency operations center (EOC) wa s established to allow for a multiorganizational response, rather the operatio ns was controlled by the RBDF. This caused several problems, including limit ed and/or delayed pr eliminary damage assessment reports. The lack of a detail ed assessment triggered a delay in the activation of resources and personnel. General comprehensive coordination was lacking and was evident through the singular response by the RBDF. Communication was poor and potential supp ort agencies were not activated or provided with updated information. (Bethel, 2006; Rigby, 2006) As a result there were significant delays in the activati on and movement of emergency materials and personnel producing a disjointed response. Applying the data to Quarantelli’s methodology shows that the need for the mobilizat ion of emergency personnel and resources was not recogni zed early nor was it carried out effectively. Hurricane Andrew Generic Functi on 8 (Assessing the Damage) According to the Office of the Prime Ministers’ (1992) report on the impact of Andrew, it appears that some informal damage assessments were conducted by ministries to determine what type of re covery would be required (Office of the

PAGE 136

117 Prime Minister, 1992). This information however was related to long term fiscal needs to rebuild and not immediate response needs. There is no evidence that a comprehensive coordinated assessment was conducted at the national level. “During Hurricane Andrew damage assessment was not done. We now have a detailed system in place that ensures uniformed criteria for assessments” (Bethel, 2006). Because preliminary damage assessments (PDA) were not conducted it was difficult to determine in the immediate a ftermath of Andrew the full magnitude and impact of the storm. Informal discussions with Island Administrators during the 2005 and 2006 NEMA conferences revealed t hat they were not aware of any assessments that were conducted immedi ately following Hurricane Andrew to determine the level of damage. Anecdotal information indicated problems with duplication and uncoordinated repo rting, that resulted in confusion. Although the assessments by some ministries were c onducted they focused on recovery, not response. The lack of a national PDA fo llowing Hurricane Andrew indicates that the need was not recognized early or carried out effectively. Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 9 (Coordinating Emergency Management Activities) During response to Hurricane Andrew ther e was very little coordination of emergency management activities, and prim ary responsibility was assigned to the RBDF. Utilizing a military ‘command and control’ model of operation there was limited coordination betwe en multiple agencies. “Remember I was with the RBDF at that time [1992 Hurricane Andrew], and there was no structure like there is today to allow for coordination” (Bethel, 2006).

PAGE 137

118 “During Hurricane Andrew nothing was coordinated, agencies worked independently there was no structure in place to ensure the Family Islands were prepared or able to respond” (Outton-Moncur, 2006b) Government ministries lead specific emer gency activities related to their mission (Office of The Prime Minister, 1992) however, this was conducted in an uncoordinated and disjointed manner. A ccording to informal discussions with Island Administrators and NEMA staff, there was no centralized sharing of information which lead to duplications of e fforts and wasting of resources. Based on this information and applying Quarantelli’s methodology this function was not recognized early or implemented effectively. Hurricane Andrew Generic Function 10 (Res toring Essential Public Services) The restoration of essential services such as water, electricity and phone were significantly delayed following Hu rricane Andrew. Eleuthera, the Berry Islands and South Bimini all reported in terruption to services. The Bahamas Telecommunication Company (BTC), The Bahamas Electric Corporation (BEC), and the Water and Sewerage Corporation (W &SC) all worked to restore services (Office of the Prime Mini ster, 1992). Data regarding the length of outages could not be obtained. Informal discussions with the Island Administrator from San Salvador at the 2005 NEMA Conference indica ted that there were portions of the Family Islands that were without power fo r several months. There are no data to suggest that the need for the function was recognized early or implemented effectively.

PAGE 138

119 4.2.1.2 Hurricane Floyd 1999 Criterion One: Adequately Carrying Out Generic Functions Table 4.5 provides a summary of t he ten generic functions identified by Quarantelli (1997a) and evaluated for this re search as they relate to Hurricane Floyd. Hurricane Floyd 1999 GENERIC FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART FUNCTIONS Was the Need for the function recognized early? (Y/N) Was the function carried out without too many problems? (Y/N) 1. Warning Yes Yes 2. Evacuations Yes No 3. Sheltering No No 4. Emergency Medical Care Yes Yes 5. Search and Rescue No No 6. Protection of Property Yes Yes 7. Mobilization of Emergency Personnel and Resources No No 8. Assessing the Damage Yes No 9. Coordinating emergency management activities No No 10. Restoring essential public services No No Table 4.5 – Evaluation of Generic Functions in Re sponse to Hurricane Floyd 1999 Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 1 (Warning) The data gathered from The Bahamas D epartment of Met eorology (1999) and interviews with NEMA staff indicate that warnings for Hurricane Floyd were

PAGE 139

120 effectively executed. At 5pm on September 13th, 1999 tropical storm warnings4 were issued for the Southeast Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos Islands. A hurricane watch5 was also posted for the Central Islands of The Bahamas (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 199 9). The Broadcasti ng Corporation of The Bahamas, communicated the warn ings throughout the Islands of The Bahamas via television and radio. “The Bahamian public responded well to the hurricane alert messages, and took advice given to them seriously. This was subsequently reflected in the fact that there was one casua lty [later reclassi fied as two] and property damage was minimized in most islands. The department of Meteorology was commended by the me dia and the general public, for the issuing of timely and accurate warnings. The response to our warning system was just tremendous” (Lightbourne and Dean, 1999:12). In response to Hurricane Floyd data indi cates that need for warnings were recognized early and the function was carried out effectively. Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 2 (Evacuations) ‘Official’ evacuation orders in response to Hurricane Floyd were not issued for the Islands of The Bahamas. Alt hough the news media and Department of Meteorology did encourage residents of low lying areas and families with homes close to the sea to relocate to a more secure location, no ‘official’ request for evacuations were made (Office of The Pr ime Minister, 1999). The data indicates that the general function of evacuations was recognized by the Department of 4 Tropical Storm warnings are issued by The Department of Meteorology when tropical storm conditions are expected in the specified area within 24 hours. 5 Hurricane watches are issued by the Department of Meteorology to indicate that hurricane conditions are possible in the specified area, usua lly within 36 hours. When the Department of Meteorology issues a hurricane wa tch they notify residents to prepare to take immediate action to protect your family and property in case a hurricane warning is issued.

PAGE 140

121 Meteorology but not ca rried-out effectively. No resources or coordination took place to facilitate the movement of residents in response to Hurricane Floyd. Hurricane Floyd Generic F unction 3 (Sheltering) The Bahamas Red Cross Society wit h support from the RBDF and the Ministry of Social Services and Community Development opened emergency shelters (Ingraham, 1999). Data on the num ber of shelters opened, individuals housed, and services provided were not ava ilable for Hurricane Floyd. There are no data to suggest that the need for shelte rs was recognized early. Based on the Prime Minister’s Communication to Par liament regarding shelter operations, it appears that The Bahamas Red Cross So ciety in coordination with Social Services were successful in providi ng shelter services (Ingraham, 1999). However, as with Hurricane Andrew the shelters were recovery not emergency response shelters. “Social Services worked closely with the Island Administrators to ensure shelters were open for those that lost their homes [as a result of Hurricane Floyd]”(Glinton, 2006) The need for response shelters was not recognized early nor was the function carried-out effectively. Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 4 (Emergency Medical Care) “At no time following the passage of Hurricane Floyd did we [The Bahamas] experience a medical or public health emergency related to the hurricane” (Ingraham, 1999:4). National emergency medical care was adequate in meeting the needs of residents in re sponse to Hurricane Floyd with only two deaths reported in association with the storm (Office of The Prime Minister,

PAGE 141

122 1999). The Ministry of Health in c oordination with the Pan American Health Organization additionally provided suppor t in the rapid assessment of water supplies, waste water and excreta di sposal and solid waste management throughout the islands (Ingraham, 1999). Th rough informal discussions with Paul Newbold of The Bahamas Hospital Au thority, following Hurricane Andrew standard operating procedures (SOPs) were put in place in preparation for a medical emergency. Those SOP’s were fo llowed as identified by Prime Minister Ingraham (1999) and successfully executed in response to Hurricane Floyd. As a result, the need for emergency medical care was assessed to have been recognized early and carried-out with no notable problems. Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 5 (Search and Rescue) Search and Rescue was not a form al function in 1999 and operations were conducted by a variety of lo cal and national organizations in an uncoordinated manner. Based on informal discussions that I had with members of The Bahamas Police and Defence Force indicated that search and rescue was never a major focus of trai ning or concern. Buildings that were destroyed by Hurricane Floyd were searched by local resi dents, police or fire. This indicates that the function was not recognized early or executed effectively. Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 6 (Protection of Property) Protection of Government property wa s carried out by the Ministry of Works and Transportation (Office of The Pr ime Minister, 1999). The Ministry of Works was responsible for securing governm ent buildings by installing hurricane shutters and/or utilizing plywood to protect windows. The Department of

PAGE 142

123 Meteorology reported that residen ts responded effectively to their recommendations regarding the protection of homes in preparation for Hurricane Floyd (Lightbourne and Dean, 1999) Quarantelli’s criteria were applied to this function and indicate that the protecti on of private and gover nment property was recognized early and carried out with no notable problems. Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 7 (M obilization of Emergency Personnel and Resources) Although an emergency operations center was established by the RBDF it was not a multi-agency command center. This created several problems to include, limited and/or delayed pre liminary damage assessment information intern generated a delay in the activati on of resources and personnel. A lack of comprehensive coordinati on and shared communication lead to a disjointed multi-organizational response. As a result there were delays in the activation and movement of emergency materials and personnel. “Hurricane Floyd is unique in t hat long-term recovery was well organized. A Disaster Recovery Committ ee was put in place by the Prime Minister to coordinate with Social Services and develop protocol for providing aid. However, this happened weeks after Floyd impacted the nation and in the interim response effo rts were lacking” (Outten-Moncur, 2006a). Reports from the Office of the Prim e Minister (1999) indicate that the RBDF did provide emergency relief shipments of water, canned and dry food stuffs, emergency first aid kits, insect repellants and other emergency supplies such as batteries, flashlights and ch ildren’s disposable diapers that had been donated by the private sector in New Providence. Reports further indicate that churches, private radio stations and num erous corporate citizens also made

PAGE 143

124 donations. However, the movement and distribution of emergency relief was difficult and many times delayed for extende d periods of time. Applying the data to Quarantelli’s methodology indicates that the need for t he mobilization of emergency personnel and resources was not recognized early nor was it carried out effectively. This is an example of what Quarantelli classifies as eventual relief. Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 8 (Assessing the Damage) A PDA is used to determine the m agnitude and impact of a disaster as well as identify needs that require immedi ate attention. Follo wing the impact of Floyd, damage assessments were conducted by a variety of organizations to include the RBDF, Ministry of Works, OFDA, and PAHO (Off ice of the Prime Minister, 1999). However, all of t he assessments utilized different evaluation criteria for damage classification. Ther e was no uniformity to the process which created incomplete assessments and duplicati on of information. According to Gayle Outten-Moncur (2006) the uncoordi nated reporting during response to Hurricane Floyd created conf usion during the response operation. Furthermore, it created disorder in the co llection of data for this research. Applying the data to Quarantelli’s criteria indicates the need for damage assessment was recognized but the function was not effectively carried out. Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 9 (Coordinating Emergency Management Activities) During response to Hurricane Floyd ther e was very little ‘coordination’ of emergency management activities. The RBDF took the lead by establishing an

PAGE 144

125 EOC while The Bahamas Red Cross Societ y and Ministry of Social Services established shelters. Addi tional ministries lead spec ific emergency activities related to there mission however in an unc oordinated and disj ointed manner. “Everything was going so fast, things could have been more organized or more structured. At that time [1999 Hu rricane Floyd], I was still with the Defence Force, I was confused with trying to find a central point because there seemed to be so many differen t central points of operation” (Bethel, 2006) Informal discussions with Island Admini strators during the 2005 and 2006 NEMA conference, indicated that a contributi ng factor to the slow response of the national governments to Fl oyd was due in part to no centralized sharing of information. The Island Administrator fr om Eleuthera also indicated there were duplications of effort and wasting of resources due to a lack of coordination. Based on Quarantelli’s criteria this general function of coordinating emergency management was neither recognized early nor implemented effectively. Hurricane Floyd Generic Function 10 (Resto ring Essential Public Services) The restoration of essential services such as water, electricity and phone services were significantly delayed followi ng Hurricane Floyd. Reports issued on October 13th 1999 indicated that a month follow ing the event some islands were still struggling with water quality and water supply issues (Ingraham, 1999). Reports from the Water and Sewerage Co rporation indicated that “coliform indicator bacteria have been reported, and were detected during the mission, in bottled water” (W&SC, 1999). These repor ts were issued weeks after the passage of Hurricane Floyd indicating that the essential public service of clean drinking water had not been restored.

PAGE 145

126 “The storm [Hurricane Floyd] wreaked havoc on the communications system of The Bahamas, downing h undreds of telephone and electrical poles and causing major damage to te lecommunications towers. Because of this, for a time, virtually all co mmunications between our islands and to the outside world were severed. Th e absence of stand-by generators on a number of islands, such as Cat Island, meant that for some twenty four hours after the eye of the storm had crossed that island emergency satellite telephones remained inoper able and we were without confirmed accurate reports” (Ingraham, 1999:81). The statement by Prime Minister Ingraham confirms previously provided data that assessments were not conducted in a timely manner as well as illustrates that the need for restorati on of essential public serves were recognized early. 4.2.1.3 Hurricane Michelle 2001 Crit erion One: Adequately Carrying Out Generic Functions Table 4.6 provides a summary of the ten generic functions as they were applied to Hurricane Michelle. Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 1 (Warning) According to The Bahamas Departm ent of Meteorology (2001) and NEMA staff members, warnings for Hurricane Mi chelle were effectively executed. According to reports issued by the Departm ent of Meteorology (2001) at 6am of Saturday, November 3rd, residents of the Northwest and Central Bahamas were urged to monitor the progress of Hurricane Michelle as a Tropical Cyclone Alert6 was issued. A Hurricane Watch was pos ted by 11pm that evening for the following islands: Bimini, Grand Bahama, Abaco, The Berry Islands, Andros, New Providence, Eleuthera, Exuma, Ca t Island, Ragged Island, Long Island, 6 When a tropical cyclone can possibly bring storm or hurricane conditions to some part of The Bahamas within 60 hours an alert is is sued by the Meteorological Department.

PAGE 146

127 Rum Cay and San Salvador. The warnings issued by the Department of Meteorology were broadcast on ZNS radio and television channels. “Everyone took Michelle very seriously. Forecasted to directly impact the Island of New Providence, residents were uneasy. It is rare for a Hurricane to impact the capital. Warn ings were issued and most residents took action” (Outten-Moncur, 2006b). The data indicates that as with Hurri canes Andrew and Floyd, the need for warnings in response to Michelle was recognized early and the function was carried out with no notable problems. Hurricane Michelle 2001 GENERIC FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART FUNCTIONS Was the Need for the function recognized early? (Y/N) Was the function carried out without too many problems? (Y/N) 1. Warning Yes Yes 2. Evacuations Yes No 3. Sheltering Yes Yes 4. Emergency Medical Care Yes Yes 5. Search and Rescue Yes Yes 6. Protection of Property Yes Yes 7. Mobilization of Emergency Personnel and Resources No No 8. Assessing the Damage Yes No 9. Coordinating emergency management activities No No 10. Restoring essential public services Yes No Table 4.6 – Evaluation of Generic Functi ons in Response to Hurricane Michelle 2001

PAGE 147

128 Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 2 (Evacuations) In 2001 there continued to be no legal authority to act or avenue for issuing ‘official’ evacuation orders. As Hurricane Michelle approached, The Department of Meteorology, at 11pm on Saturday, November 3rd informed residents “to begin securing their proper ties, and to evacuate the following islands and cays: Cat Cay, Red Bays, Ocean Cay, Berry Islands, the UpperExuma Cays and similar Cays in the Wa tch area” (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2001:10-11). Evacuation or ders within The Bahamas are voluntary and once warnings were issued it was the responsibility of re sidents to obtain the means to evacuate. “Michelle did not cause me to evacuat e my home. I li ve on high ground and am not prone to flooding, plus my home is a very strong structure. Two or three members of my wife’s family stayed with us during the storm” (Rigby, 2006) “Department of Social Services and the Red Cross opened shelters in church facilities and schools on the is land of New Providence” (Glinton, 2006). Although no ‘official’ evacuation orders were issued by The Government of The Bahamas or the RBDF the Department of Meteorology did encourage residents in unsafe structur es to relocate. Although the need for evacuations was recognized by the Department of Me teorology the function was not carried out in a formal, uniformed way to aid residents. Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 3 (Sheltering) The Bahamas Red Cross Society wit h support from the RBDF and the Ministry of Social Services and Community Development opened emergency shelters in response to Hurricane Michelle (Office of the Prime Minister, 2001).

PAGE 148

129 Data on the number of shelters opened, individuals housed, and services provided were not available for Hurric ane Michelle. Informal discussions with NEMA staff members however, indica ted that the need for shelters was recognized early and the function was carried out without too many problems (Glinton, 2006; Outten-Moncur, 2006b). Unlike Andrew and Floyd, Hurricane Michelle impacted the capital city of Nassau where resources and personnel were available to effectively carry out the function of sheltering. Hurricane Michelle Generic Functi on 4 (Emergency Medical Care) The Island of New Providence, home to over 69% of the nation’s population, was significantly impacted by Hurricane Michelle. The Bahamas Ministry of Health (2001) reported no major emergencies or deaths in association with Hurricane Michelle. According to Paul Newbold, representative with The Bahamas Hospital Authorit y, all area hospitals and clinics were functioning normally. National emergency medical ca pabilities were adequate to meet all health related needs generated as a result of Hurricane Michelle. Based on available data it appears that the need for emergency medical care was recognized early and the function was ca rried out with no notable problems. Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 5 (Search and Rescue) Flooding was the major concern with Hurricane Michelle. Although damage to buildings was reported, unlik e Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd, the islands did not experience extensive dam age. The requirement for urban search and rescue was minimal and was successfully addressed by the RBDF and the Fire Department (Office of the Prime Mi nister, 2001). Also important was the

PAGE 149

130 need for maritime search and rescue in response to a sailboat with Haitian migrants on the Shores of Long Island (Bah amas Department of Meteorology, 2001). This was also successfully addressed by the RBDF. Based on available data it appears that search and rescue requ irements in response to Hurricane Michelle were recognized early and carried out effectively. Hurricane Michelle Generic Functi on 6 (Protection of Property) Protection of Government property wa s carried out by the Ministry of Works and Transportation. With responsib ility for Government Buildings the Ministry of Works secured government fac ilities by installing hurricane shutters and utilizing plywood to protect windows. Business owners in downtown Nassau also utilized sandbags to protect agai nst flooding. According to informal discussions with NEMA staff members ma ny residents of New Providence did not take any mitigative action to prot ect their properties in preparation for Hurricane Michelle believing that the hurri cane would not hit them. Based on the official after action report issued by t he Bahamas Department of Meteorology (2001), warnings were issued to residents to secure property illustrating that the need for the function was identified early. Yet many residents did not heeding warnings. To ensure consistent and uniformed evaluation of this generic function the focus stayed on the protection of gover nment property as it had in response to Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd. The data shows that the need for the function was both recognized early and carried out e ffectively by the Ministry of Works and Transportation.

PAGE 150

131 Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 7 (Mobilization of Emergency Personnel and Resources) Hurricane Michelle was the first hurricane to make landfall on the island of New Providence since Hurricane Janice in 1958. Mobilization of personnel was very difficult since many residents were responding to needs at their own home and were not available to participate in o fficial response operations. Additionally, as with Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd the RBDF established an EOC, however it was not multi-agency. This created se veral problems, including limited PDA information intern a delaying the activati on of resources and personnel (Office of The Prime Minister, 2001). “We [the nation of The Bahamas] were not prepared to deal with a direct hit to Nassau. Many residents did not secure food and water prior to landfall. The heavy rain and sea su rge washed out many of the roads making it difficult for emergency pe rsonnel and residents to move around the island” (Davis, 2006). “Hurricane Michelle brought awar eness about emergency management and the need to have a well coordi nated response” (Outten-Moncur, 2006b). As with previous response operations a lack of comprehensive coordination and shared communication created a disjoint ed multi-organizational response. The need for the mobilization of emergen cy personnel and resources was not recognized early nor was it carried out effectively. Hurricane Michelle Generic Func tion 8 (Assessing the Damage) According to the Office of the Pr ime Minister (2001) damage assessment in response to Hurricane Michelle was co mpleted by multiple ministries and organizations. The uncoordinated functi on produced inconsistent reporting, for instance, the RBDF (2001) i ndicated extensive damage to ports on the north side

PAGE 151

132 of New Providence, while the Ministry of Works reported no damage (Office of the Prime Minister, 2001). “Had uniformed assessment protocol been in place response could have been better organized” (Bethel, 2006). Duplicated information and uncoordinat ed reporting caused a slowdown in response efforts. The need for damage assessment was recognized, however the function was not effectively carried out. Hurricane Michelle Generic Functi on 9 (Coordinating Emergency Management Activities) During response to Hurricane Michelle t here was very little coordination of emergency management activities. Minist ries responded independently of one another to needs as they arose. “Following Michelle it was difficult to communicate as a result of downed phone lines. Offices were closed and government employees were dealing with issues at their home so it was ha rd to get things done” (Rigby, 2006). As during Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd the RBDF establis hed an EOC at the Cabinet Office, providing support and briefing s to the Office of the Prime Minister (Office of the Prime Mini ster, 2001). Overall response activities were uncoordinated, with no centralized sharing of information resulting in duplication of efforts (Bethel, 2006). The coordination function was not recognized early nor was it implemented effectively. Hurricane Michelle Generic Function 10 (Res toring Essential Public Services) Interruption to essential public services such as water, electrical power, and telecommunication operations were significant for the northwestern and central islands of The Bahamas (Baham as Department of Meteorology, 2001;

PAGE 152

133 Office of the Prime Minister, 2001). An estimated 200,000 residents were affected by power outages (BEC, 2001). Extensive flooding compromised the delicate fresh water system of the nation as well as damaged key communications hubs on the island of New Providence. Data suggests that the need to restore essential public services were recognized early however, a lack of planning, resources, and information produced extensive delays in executing the function (Office of t he Prime Minster, 2001). 4.2.1.4 Hurricane Frances 2004 Criter ion One: Adequately Carrying Out Generic Functions Table 4.7 provides a summary of the t en generic functions as they apply to Hurricane Frances. Data obtained thr ough interviews, surveys, and archival research indicate that most of the gener ic functions were both recognized early and carried out without too m any problems. However, according to Quarantelli (1997a) for us to answer yes to the first criteria we must answer yes to all ten functions. Since generic function seven (7 ), mobilization of emergency personnel and resources, was not carried out without too many problems criterion one must be answered no. A detailed review of the ten generic functions is provided below.

PAGE 153

134 Hurricane Frances 2004 GENERIC FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART FUNCTIONS Was the Need for the function recognized early? (Y/N) Was the function carried out without too many problems? (Y/N) 1. Warning Yes Yes 2. Evacuations Yes No 3. Sheltering Yes Yes 4. Emergency Medical Care Yes Yes 5. Search and Rescue Yes Yes 6. Protection of Property Yes Yes 7. Mobilization of Emergency Personnel and Resources Yes No 8. Assessing the Damage Yes Yes 9. Coordinating emergency management activities Yes Yes 10. Restoring essential public services Yes Yes Table 4.7 – Evaluation of Generic Func tions in Response to Hurricane Frances 2004 Hurricane Frances Generic Function 1 (Warning) The Bahamas Department of Meteorol ogy (2004a) issued its first alert on Hurricane Frances at 6pm on August 30th when the projected tracks indicated that the hurricane would impact the Tur ks and Caicos Islands, and the Islands of the Southeast Bahamas. Within twelve hours of the first alert Frances was upgraded to a Hurricane Watch. Hurricane Warnings were issued at noon on August 31st for The Turks and Caicos Islands and the Southeast Islands of the

PAGE 154

135 Bahamas. A Hurricane Watch was still in effect for the Central Islands of The Bahamas and a Hurricane Alert was issued for the Northwestern Islands (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2004a). At noon on September 1st, Hurricane warnings fo r the Central Bahamas were issued as the warnings for the S outheast Islands remained in effect. The Northwest Bahamas remained under a Hurr icane Watch. By 9am that evening while Frances was some 80 miles east-s outheast of the Island of Mayaguana, Hurricane Warnings were i ssued for the entire archi pelago. The Broadcasting Corporation of The Bahamas, communica ted the alerts, watches, and warnings throughout the Islands of The Bahamas via television and radio (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2004a; NEMA, 2004a). Warnings were also issued through ZN S by the Director of the National Emergency Management Agency, Mr. Carl Smith and Prime Minister Perry Christie (NEMA, 2004a; Hughey, 2004b) The need for warnings were recognized early and based on available data the function was carried out with no problems. The Bahamian public re sponded well to the hurricane alert messages securing their homes and property. All available data indicates that the general function one, warning, was both recognized early and effectively carried-out. Hurricane Frances Generic Function 2 (Evacuations) As with the previous three hurricanes examined in this study no legal authority to act or avenue for issuing ‘o fficial’ evacuation orders was in place during response to Frances. Utilizing the media, NEMA in coordination with the

PAGE 155

136 Department of Meteorology, encouraged resi dents of low lying areas and families with homes close to the water to relo cate to more secure areas (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2004a; NE MA, 2004a). These were voluntary actions Bahamians were encouraged to heed. Also important to note, although the government in the form of NEMA encouraged the population to move the responsibility to take action remained wit h residents. Data gathered indicates in response to Hurricane Frances the need for the function was recognized early but the facilitation and execution of the function was not carried-out effectively (Hughey 2004b). Hurricane Frances Generic Function 3 (Sheltering) The RBDF with strong support from The Bahamas Red Cross Society, Ministry of Social Services, and t he Ministry of Health, opened emergency shelters in response to Hurricane Franc es throughout the islands (NEMA, 2004a; Hughey, 2004b). Island Administrators, se rving as the NEMA representative on the Family Island, reported back to the national EOC on a regular basis with the status of shelter operations. Around 2am on September 2nd, Prime Minister Perry Christie participated in calls to the Isl and Administrators from the national EOC (See Picture 4.1). On t he morning of September 2nd, the following islands confirmed that shelters had been opened or would be opening within the next few hours: Inagua, Mayaguana, Acklins/Cr ooked Island/Long Cay, Long Island, Exuma, San Salvador & Rum Cay, Cat Is land, North, Central and South Andros, Nassau, Chub Cay, Great Harbor Cay, A baco, Grand Bahama, Bimini, Cat Cay, Ocean Cay, and Walker’s Cay (See Picture 4.2). NEMA was able to quickly

PAGE 156

137 identify the need for shelters and coordi nate the carrying-out of the shelter function with few problems. Picture 4.1 – National Emer gency Operations Center in Response to Hurricane Frances, September 2, 2004. Prime Minist er Perry Christie, RBDF Personnel, and Erin Hughey work to evaluate the status of shelters on the Family Islands. (Source: Global Center for Disaste r Management and Humanitarian Action) Picture 4.2 – Hurricane Frances Shelter, Island of New Providence. (Source: Erin Hughey)

PAGE 157

138 Hurricane Frances Generic Function 4 (Emergency Medical Care) All emergency medical care need s were coordinated by Emergency Support Function (ESF) 8, Health and Medical Services (National Response Plan, NEMA 2002). The Ministry of H ealth was the lead agency responsible for coordinating emergency medical care, wit h strong support from the Hospital Authority, Public Health Department, Department of Agricu lture, and Mental Health Services. Additional support came from the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), which arrived in count ry in anticipation of Frances. Picture 4.3 below displays members of ESF 8 working to coordinate the national response effort to Hurricane Frances. Picture 4.3 – ESF 8 Health and Medical Se rvice in support of Hurricane Frances response efforts. (Source: NEMA) There were two (2) deaths associated wit h Hurricane Frances (Bahamas Ministry of Health, 2004). Minor medical issues were also reported, according to the Ministry of Health, response to all health related issues were coordinated

PAGE 158

139 effectively by ESF 8 personnel. Rapid assessments of wate r supplies, waste water, and solid waste management thr oughout the islands were carried out soon after the passing of the storm (Baham as Ministry of Health, 2004). The need for emergency medical care was recognized early and based on available data the function was carried out with no notable problems. Picture 4.4 – ESF 8 Health and Medical Se rvice in support of Hurricane Frances response efforts. (Source: NEMA) Hurricane Frances Generic Function 5 (Search and Rescue) Search and Rescue operations were coordinated under ESF 10a Urban Search and Rescue. The RBDF was the lead agency responsible for coordinating search and rescue operations with strong support from the Royal Bahamas Police and Fire Departments, Mini stry of Works and Utilities, Public Hospital Authority, and the Department of Land and Survey (NEMA, 2004a; Hughey, 2004b). Unofficial search and re scue operations were also conducted by residents throughout the islands. ‘Search and Rescue’ operations were, for

PAGE 159

140 the first time in the history of em ergency response within The Bahamas, an official function (NEMA, 2002). The need for search and rescue was recognized early through pre-planning and was carried out without too many problems. As a result of the independent or unofficial s earch and rescue initiatives that did take place after Hurricane Frances, NEMA has attempted to bring training to the family island to establish community res ponse unites. This ensures citizens who are participating in the function of ‘sear ch and rescue’ have the necessary skills to be successful and prevent injury (B ethel, 2006; Outten-Moncur, 2006b). Hurricane Frances Generic Function 6 (Protection of Property) Protection of Government property was carried out by The Bahamas Ministry of Works and Transportation (2004a) as outlined in the National Response Plan (NEMA, 2002). With respons ibility for Government Buildings the Ministry of Works secured government fac ilities by installing hurricane shutters and utilizing plywood to protect windows. The Department of Meteorology (2004a) reported that resi dents responded effectively to their recommendations regarding the protection of homes in pr eparation for Hurricane Frances. Through personal observation (Hughey, 2004b) resi dents and business owners of Nassau secured windows, sandbagged doors and clear ed debris from surrounding areas. (See Pictures 4.5 and 4.6) The protec tion of private and government property was recognized early and carried out with no notable problems.

PAGE 160

141 Picture 4.5 – The protection of property in preparation for Hurricane Frances (2004) (Source: Erin Hughey) Picture 4.6 – The protecti on of government property in preparation for Hurricane Frances (2004). (Source: Erin Hughey)

PAGE 161

142 Hurricane Frances Generic Function 7 (Mobilization of Emergency Personnel and Resources) Relief supplies and distribution we re coordinated under ESF 7 (NEMA, 2002). NEMA was the lead agency responsible for coordinating the mobilization of emergency personnel and resources, with strong support from the RBDF, Ministry of Finance, Public Hospitals Authority, Ministry of Transportation and Aviation, Ministry of Works and Utilities, and the Department of Social Services (NEMA, 2004a). On September 1, 2004, NE MA activated the National EOC in response to Hurricane Frances. All agencie s and organizations active in disaster response were notified via fax, e-ma il and/or phone that the EOC had been activated and their designated EOC repres entatives were to report to the Churchill Building in downtown Nass au. Many, although not all, support agencies sent representatives to the EOC, an initial briefing by NEMA staff on the situation took place t he afternoon of September 1st (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004a). EOC staff established lines of communi cation with their respective agency as well as with their Family Island cont acts (Hughey 2004b). This coordination was intended to allow for the shari ng of information throughout the EOC, facilitating the matching of needs with avai lable resources. Required personnel and resources were identified well at the start of the crisis and the function was soundly carried out for the first 12 hour s (NEMA, 2004a). However, following landfall, communication became difficu lt due to downed phone lines and power outages hindering the coordination of res ources (NEMA, 2004a). Difficulties with communication resulted in delays, slo wing the activation and movement of

PAGE 162

143 emergency materials. The need for the mobilization of em ergency personnel and resources was recognized early but not fully effectively carried out. Picture 4.7 – National EOC, RBDF conf irms the status of Frances with a Meteorologist from The Bahamas Departm ent of Meteorology. (Source: Erin Hughey) Picture 4.8 – Hurricane Frances Na tional EOC (Source: Erin Hughey)

PAGE 163

144 Hurricane Frances Generic Function 8 (Assessing the Damage) Public Works and Engineering, ESF 3 was responsible for damage assessment activities (NEMA, 2002). The Ministry of Works and Utilities was the lead agency responsible for coordinat ing damage assessment with strong support from The Bahamas Electric ity Corporation, The Bahamas Telecommunication Company, Water and Sewerage Corporation, BEST Commission, and the Department of Environment al Health. For the first time in the history of emergency response wit hin the Bahamas, this team worked together to assess damage on each of the islands. The teams then provided a formal damage assessment report back to NEMA, from which response decision could be based (NEMA, 2004a). Additional international organizations such as USAID and the International Red Cross also accompanied many of the damage assessment teams (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA 2004a). (See Pictures 4.9 and 4. 10) This team effort provided a comprehensive understanding of the damage to each of the islands and the needed response. All damage assessments we re completed within 72 hours of the storm passing over Grand Bahama (Baham as Ministry of Public Works & Engineering, 2004). This coordinated effort allowed for a timely and appropriate response. The need for damage assessm ent was recognized early, and the function was executed with few problems.

PAGE 164

145 Picture 4.9 – Hurricane Frances Dam age Assessment Team (Source: NEMA) Picture 4.10 – Hurricane Frances, OFDA Damage Assessment Team (Source: NEMA) Hurricane Frances Generic Function 9 (Coordinating Em ergency Management Activities) Hurricane Frances was the first res ponse effort by the newly formed National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). Although problems with information flow did arise, the acti vation of a national EOC allowed for collaborative response efforts (H ughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004a). Through

PAGE 165

146 regularly scheduled briefings and situat ion reports, agencies were able to coordinate activities (NEMA, 2004). This centralized sharing of information lead to effective service delivery. The need fo r coordination was recognized early and implemented with few problems. Hurricane Frances Generic Function 10 (Res toring Essential Public Services) ESF 1: Transportation, ESF 2: Comm unication, and ESF 3: Public Works and Engineering, were responsible for c oordinating the restoration of essential public services (NEMA, 2002). The Mi nistry of Transport and Aviation, The Royal Bahamas Police Force, and The Ministry of Works and Utilities were the lead agencies responsible for coordinating the restoration of essential public services (NEMA, 2002). The restoration of water, electricity and phone services were quick to be restored in the south and central Islands of The Bahamas; approximately 48 to 72 hours following t he storm (BEC, 2004; BTC 2004). More significant delays were reported on the Island of Grand Bahama due to flooding that was later exacerbated by the impact of Hurricane Jeanne (NEMA, 2004a). Immediately following the prelim inary damage assessment reports the three emergency support functions worked toget her to prioritize the restoration of services. Of greatest concern was (1) damage to the fresh water wells in the Northwestern Islands of The Bahamas, (2 ) restoration of transportation routs (airports and ports), and (3) electrical and telecommunication services (NEMA, 2004). The restoration of essential publ ic services was both recognized early and carried-out with few problems.

PAGE 166

147 4.2.1.5 Hurricane Jeanne 2004 Criteri on One: Adequately Carrying Out Generic Functions Table 4.8 provides a summary of the ten generic functions as they apply to Hurricane Jeanne. Hurricane Jeanne 2004 GENERIC FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART FUNCTIONS Was the Need for the function recognized early? (Y/N) Was the function carried out without too many problems? (Y/N) 1. Warning Yes Yes 2. Evacuations Yes No 3. Sheltering Yes Yes 4. Emergency Medical Care Yes Yes 5. Search and Rescue Yes Yes 6. Protection of Property Yes Yes 7. Mobilization of Emergency Personnel and Resources Yes Yes 8. Assessing the Damage Yes Yes 9. Coordinating emergency management activities Yes Yes 10. Restoring essential public services Yes Yes Table 4.8 – Evaluation of Generic Functions in Res ponse to Hurricane Jeanne 2004 As noted with Hurricane Frances, due to extensive planning the identification of key functions were rec ognized early. The results shown in Table 4.8 and the discussion below illustrate t hat all of the generic functions were recognized early. Evacuations were the only function that was not carried out

PAGE 167

148 effectively. Despite the improvements in rec ognition and implementation of all ten generic functions as compared to the previous four hurricanes since yes can not be answered to all questions in all cat egories Criterion One is classified as not being effectively carried-out in response to Hurricane Jeanne. Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 1 (Warning) Hurricane Jeanne was a meandering st orm that began to approach The Bahamas approximately ten days afte r the nation had been hit by Frances (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2004b). Jeanne’s development and path were a challenge for forecasters and t heir models. The storm moved east and away from The Bahamas before l ooping back and making landfall on the northwestern islands. According to T he Bahamas Department of Meteorology (2004b) fifty-eight (58) alerts were issued during the threat and passage of Jeanne. The first news item was iss ued at 6:00pm on Monday, September 13 when a new tropical depression formed east of the Leeward Isla nds. Eighteen hours later, while moving toward the west -northwest at 12 m ph, the depression was upgraded to tropical storm st atus and was named Jeanne (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2004b). At 6:00pm, Tuesday, September 14, tr opical storm warnings were issued for the Southeast Bahamas and a tropical st orm watch was issued for the islands of the Central Bahamas. All warni ngs were lifted at 6:00 am on Sunday, September 19 when tropical storm J eanne began to move away from the Southeast Bahamas. The warnings, iss ued by the Department of Meteorology

PAGE 168

149 were communicated to the public thr ough the Broadcasting Corporation of The Bahamas (Bahamas Department of Me teorology, 2004b; Hughey, 2004b). The Department of Meteorology resum ed alerts four days later at 6:00am on Thursday, September 23 as Jeanne regained hurricane status and turned back towards The Bahamas (Bahamas Depa rtment of Meteorology, 2004b). At this time the National EOC was still acti vated in response to Hurricane Frances and in coordination with the Department of Meteorology, NEMA issued warnings to residents during already scheduled media briefings (NEMA 2004a; NEMA 2004c). The need for warnings were re cognized early and coordinated through NEMA to ensure the public was prepared. “Everyone was keeping their eye on Jeanne as we worked to recover from Frances. Trevor [Trevor Basden, Meteorologist assigned to NEMA during response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne from The Bahamas Department of Meteorology] continue d to remind us that another storm was out there. When is began to move East we thought we were out of the woods” (Bethel, 2006) Based on information gathered through NEMA documents, The Bahamas Department of Meteorology, NEMA staff members and personal observation, the need for warnings was clearly recogni zed early and carried out with no notable problems. Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 2 (Evacuations) As discussed previously during discussion of Hurricane Frances, in 2004 there was no legal authorit y to act or avenue for issuing ‘official’ evacuation orders in response to Hurricane Jeanne. NEMA in coordination with the Department of Meteorology notified the public that:

PAGE 169

150 “If you live in a coastal zone, or in a structure which might not be strong, have an evacuation plan. If you must evacuate, remember to shut of electricity and gas. Take your survival kit, shelters do not provide food, water, bedding or other essential items. Provide for your pet, if necessary. Pets are not allowed in shelters” (NEMA, 2004c). Utilizing the regularly scheduled briefi ngs that had been established during Hurricane Frances, NEMA strongly encour aged residents to take appropriate action. The need for evacuation in response to Hurricane Jeanne was recognized and encouraged early. Many residents heeded the warnings and took action early (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004b). However, since resources were not made available to aid resident s in an evacuation or facilitate an evacuation location the function was not carried-out effectively. Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 3 (Sheltering) Shelter Services, ESF 6 was responsib le for all activities surrounding shelter operations (NEMA, 2002). The RBDF was the lead agency responsible for coordinating shelter openings with s upport from The Department of Social Services, Ministry of Health, and The Bahamas Red Cross. Hurricane Frances response and recovery operations we re still underway as Jeanne threatened the central and northwestern is lands of The Bahamas (Hug hey, 2004b). Many of the same shelters that were serving as re covery shelters for Frances remained open (RBDF, 2004a; NEMA, 2004b). Data conf irms that the need for shelters was recognized early and the function wa s well coordinated and carried out effectively.

PAGE 170

151 Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 4 (Emergency Medical Care) With a strong emergency medical teams already assembled in response to Hurricane Frances, assets were already in place to address Hurricane Jeanne (NEMA, 2004b). Medical care continued to be coordinated by ESF 8, Health and Medical Services (NEMA, 2002). The Ministry of Health was the lead agency coordinating the operation, wit h aid provided by the Hosp ital Authority, Public Health Department, Department of Agricu lture, and Mental Health Services. PAHO, already in country assisting wit h response and recovery to Frances provided additional support to the ESF 8 team (NEMA, 2004b). There were no deaths or serious injuries associated wit h Hurricane Jeanne. However, mental health services were provided on the Is lands of Abaco and Grand Bahama which were seriously impacted by both storms (Bahamas Ministry of Health, 2004b). Applying Quarantelli’s crit eria for evaluation indica tes that the need for emergency medical assistance was recogniz ed early and carried out effectively in response to Hurricane Jeanne. Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 5 (Search and Rescue) As with Hurricane Frances search and rescue operations in response to Jeanne were coordinated under ESF 10a Urban Search and Rescue (NEMA, 2002). The RBDF was the lead agency respons ible for coordinating search and rescue operations, with support from the Royal Bahamas Police and Fire Departments, Ministry of Wo rks and Utilities, Public Hospital Authority, and the Department of Land and Survey. Unofficial search and rescue operations were also conducted by residents throughout the is lands (RBDF, 2004). Many of the

PAGE 171

152 response teams were already in place as a result of Hurricane Frances and were able to quickly jump back into action in response to Jeanne (R BDF, 2004). Data indicates that the need for search and re scue was recognized early and carriedout with no notable problems. Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 6 (Protection of Property) Protection of government property wa s carried out by the Ministry of Works and Transportation in response to Hurricane Frances (NEMA 2002; NEMA, 2004a). Many of the government buildings were still secured with hurricane shutters or plywood when warnin gs were issued for Hurricane Jeanne. NEMA in coordination with the Department of Meteorology urged residents in the northwestern Bahamas to again secure their homes and take appropriate precautions (NEMA, 2004c). Apply Quarantel li’s evaluation criter ia indicates that the protection of private and government property was recognized early and carried out with no not able problems. “Once residents installed shutters or plywood for Frances it didn’t come down until after hurricane season” (Rigby, 2006). Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 7 (Mob ilization of Emergency Personnel and Resources) Relief supplies and distribution were coordinated under ESF 7. NEMA was the lead agency responsible for t he mobilization of emergency personnel and resources, with support from the RBDF, Ministry of Finance, Public Hospitals Authority, Ministry of Tr ansportation and Aviation, Ministry of Works and Utilities, and the Department of Social Services (NEMA 2002). The national EOC had been fully operational since September 1st as a result of Hurricane Frances and

PAGE 172

153 remained functioning in response to Hurricane Jeanne (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004b). Already existing agency liaisons remained at the EOC to coordinate response operations. EOC staff maintained lines of communication with their respective agency as well as with their fa mily island contacts. The coordination with Family Island Administrators and the National EOC was critical to ensuring that available resources appropriate ly matched emergency needs. With depleting assets as a result of two hurri canes in three weeks information sharing and strong coordination was critical (Hughey, 2004b). Required personnel and resources were identified well and activated to respond to Hurricane Jeanne. Communicati on issues that had plagued response to Hurricane Frances were addressed thro ugh onsite training prior to landfall of Hurricane Jeanne (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004b). Applying Quarantelli’s evaluation criteria indicates that t he need for the mobilization of emergency personnel and resources was recognized early and carried out effectively. Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 8 (Assessing the Damage) Public Works and Engineering, ESF 3 was responsible for damage assessment activities (NEMA, 2002). As with response to Frances, The Ministry of Works and Utilities, took the lead in c oordinating the effort with strong support from The Bahamas Electricity Corpor ation, The Bahamas Telecommunication Company, Water and Sewerage Corporation, BEST Commission, and the Department of Environmental Health (Bahamas Ministry of Works, 2004b; NEMA, 2004b). The same damage asse ssment teams established during frances were again used to assess the damage to the Family Islands (Bahamas

PAGE 173

154 Ministry of Works, 2004b; NEMA 2004b). The teams worked well at coordinating information and providing a pict ure of the situati on on the ground. This allowed for a quick response and effective matching of assets and needs (NEMA, 2004c). International organizations such as USAID and the International Red Cross that had been in country to assi st with response to Frances also accompanied many of the Hurric ane Jeanne damage assessment teams (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA 2004c). All damage assessments were completed within 48 hours of the st orm passing over Grand Bahama. This coordinated effort allowed for a timely and appr opriate response. The need for damage assessment was recognized early, and the function was executed with few problems. Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 9 (Coordinating Emergency Management Activities) Emergency coordination activities related to Hurricane Jeanne benefited from the impact of Hurricane Frances three weeks earlier. With the EOC in place and activated, many of the ‘kinks’ relat ed to information flow in response to Frances had been worked out (Hughey, 2004b). The EOC was successfully facilitating collaborative response e fforts between numerous agencies and organizations (NEMA, 2004c). Already established briefings and situation reports continued in response to Jeanne and allowed for the centralized sharing of information. Application of Quarnatelli ’s evaluation criteria indicates that the function was recognized early and implemented with fe w problems.

PAGE 174

155 “Jeanne was easier and harder. Because the EOC was activated for Frances, we had all the right people together to quickly make decision about Jeanne. However, we were all tired” (Outten-Moncur, 2006b). Hurricane Jeanne Generic Function 10 (Restoring Essential Public Services) As with Hurricane Frances ESF 1: Transportation, ESF 2: Communication, and ESF 3: Public Works and Engineering, were responsible for coordinating the restoration of essential public services (NEMA, 2002). The Ministry of Transport and Aviation, The Royal Bahamas Police Force, and The Ministry of Works and Utilities were the lead agencies responsible for coordinating the restoration of essential public services (NEMA, 2002; NEMA, 2004b). The main challenge to restoration of services was flooding. M any of the essential services such as water and electricity were delayed in t he northwest Bahamas following Frances do to extensive flooding (BEC, 2004b). Many of the hardest hit areas were also impacted by Jeanne resulting in extended de lays. Minor outages or interruptions to services in the Central Bahamas we re brought back on line within 48 hours of the passage of Jeanne (BEC, 2004b). Immediately following the completion of damage assessment reports the three ESF’s worked together to prioritize t he restoration of serv ices. Of greatest concern was (1) damage to the fresh water wells in the Northwestern Islands of The Bahamas, and (2) the restoration of transportation routs (airports and ports) (Bahamas Port Authority, 2004; Baham as Water and Sewerage Corporation, 2004). The data suggests that the restorat ion of essential public services was both recognized early and implement ed without any major problems.

PAGE 175

156 4.2.1.6 Hurricane Wilma 2005 Criterion One: Adequately Carrying Out Generic Functions Hurricane Wilma (2005) was the final storm that was examined in the post-CEM phase. Table 4.9 provides a summary of the evaluation of the ten generic functions. As with Hurricane Jeanne all ten functions were recognized early however, general function two, evacua tions were not carri ed-out effectively. A discussion on each function is provided below. Hurricane Wilma 2005 GENERIC FUNCTION EVALUATION CHART FUNCTIONS Was the Need for the function recognized early? (Y/N) Was the function carried out without too many problems? (Y/N) 1. Warning Yes Yes 2. Evacuations Yes No 3. Sheltering Yes Yes 4. Emergency Medical Care Yes Yes 5. Search and Rescue Yes Yes 6. Protection of Property Yes Yes 7. Mobilization of Emergency Personnel and Resources Yes Yes 8. Assessing the Damage Yes Yes 9. Coordinating emergency management activities Yes Yes 10. Restoring essential public services Yes Yes Table 4.9 – Evaluation of Generic Func tions in Response to Hurricane Wilma 2005

PAGE 176

157 Hurricane Wilma Generic F unction 1 (Warning) On Sunday, October 23, 2005 hurricane wa rnings were in effect for the islands of the Northwest Bahamas incl uding Grand Bahama, Abaco, Bimini, Berry islands, Andros, Eleuthera, and New Providence (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2005; NEMA, 2005). The Bahamas Departm ent of Meteorology tracked Wilma as it moved over the Yucatan Peninsula, Cuba, and Florida always keeping NEMA up to date on the st orms status. NEMA in coordination with the Department of Meteorology, i ssued warnings to residents of the northwest Bahamas and encour aged residents in costal areas to relocate to shelters or more secure facilities (NEM A, 2005). The need for warnings were recognized early and based on available data the function was carried out with no problems. The northwestern isl ands had been significant ly impacted by Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne the year bef ore and residents took quick action in response to the warnings. Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 2 (Evacuations) As with the previous five storms examined there was still no legal avenue for issuing mandatory evacuations in re sponse to Wilma. NEMA (2005) in coordination with the Departm ent of Meteorology (2005) issued the now standard public notification: “If you live in a coastal zone, or in a structure which might not be strong, have an evacuation plan. If you must evacuate, remember to shut of electricity and gas. Take your survival kit, shelters do not provide food, water, bedding or other essential items. Provide for your pet, if necessary. Pets are not allowed in shelters” (NEMA, 2005).

PAGE 177

158 NEMA strongly encouraged resi dents to take appropriate action in response to Wilma and to continue monitoring the st orm (NEMA, 2005). Application of Quarantelli’s evaluation criteria s uggests that the need for evacuation in response to Hurricane Wilma was rec ognized and encouraged earl y. What was lacking was the effective execution of t he function through aid to residents or the establishment of evacuation centers or location points. Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 3 (Sheltering) ESF 6 Shelter Services, coordinated all shelter operations in response to Hurricane Wilma the same as had been done in response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne (NEMA, 2002; NEMA 2005). The RBDF was the lead agency responsible for shelter operat ions with strong support from The Ministry of Social Services, The Ministry of Health, and The Bahamas Red Cross Society (RBDF, 2005). Emergency shelters were opened th roughout the northwestern islands of the Bahamas. NEMA provided c oordination between ESF 6, Island Administrators, and the public to info rm them of the location and services provided at the shelters (NEMA, 2005) The need for shelters was recognized early and the function was well coordinat ed and carried out without any notable problems. Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 4 (Emergency Medical Care) Emergency medical care in response to Hurricane Wilma was coordinated by ESF 8 Health and Medical Services (N EMA, 2002). The Ministry of Health was the lead agency responsible for c oordinating emergency medical care, with support from the Hospital Authority, P ublic Health Department, Department of

PAGE 178

159 Agriculture, and Mental Health Services (NEMA 2002, NEMA 2005). There was only one (1) death associated with Hurricane Wilma and was attributed to storm surge inundation (Bahamas Ministry of Health, 2005; NEMA, 2005). Rapid assessments of water supplies, waste water, and solid waste management were conducted by the ESF 8 team following the passage of Wilma (Bahamas Ministry of Health, 2005). Application of Quarantell i’s evaluation criteria indicates that the need for emergency medical care was recognized early and the function was carried out with no problems. Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 5 (Search and Rescue) Since 2002 and the impl ementation of a CEM system search and rescue operations were addressed by ESF 10a Urban Search and Rescue (NEMA 2002; NEMA 2005). The RBDF was the lead agency responsible for search and rescue operations, with strong support from the Royal Bahamas Police and Fire Departments, Ministry of Wo rks and Utilities, Public Hospital Authority, and the Department of Land and Survey (RBDF, 2005). The most extensive need for search and rescue was r eported on the Island of Gr and Bahama (NEMA 2005). As with many of the previous disaster operations unofficial search and rescue operations were also conducted by resident s. The Data indicates that the need for search and rescue was recognized ear ly and carried out without too many problems. Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 6 (Protection of Property) The Ministry of Works and Transpo rtation was responsible for the protection of government property in preparation for Hurricane Wilma (NEMA,

PAGE 179

160 2002; Bahamas Ministry of Public Wor ks, 2005). With responsibility for Government Buildings the Ministry of Works secured gov ernment facilities throughout the northwestern islands by installing hurricane shutters and plywood (Bahamas Ministry of Public Works, 2005; NEMA, 2005). NEMA reported that residents responded effectively to reco mmendations regarding the protection of homes (NEMA, 2005). The data sugges ts the protection of private and government property was recognized early and carried out with no notable problems in response to Hurricane Wilma. Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 7 (M obilization of Emergency Personnel and Resources) ESF 7 Relief Supplies and Distributi on coordinated the mobilization of emergency personnel and resources (NEM A, 2002). NEMA, with support from the RBDF, Ministry of Finance, Public Hospitals Authorit y, Ministry of Transportation and Aviation, Ministry of Works and Utilities, and the Department of Social Services activated the National EOC to coordinate assets in an effort to successfully respond to immediate emergency needs generated by Wilma (NEMA, 2005). A partial activation of the national EOC occurred on the morning of October 22nd and was fully staffed and operational in response to Wilma twenty-four hours later (NEMA, 2005). All agencies and organizations were put on alert the early morning of October 22nd and notified of the potential full activation of the EOC. A few key pl ayers, such as the Department of Meteorology and the RBDF were activated on the 22nd and staffed the EOC in coordination with NEMA (Bahamas Depar tment of Meteorology, 2005; NEMA, 2005; RBDF, 2005).

PAGE 180

161 Once the EOC was fully activated agency liaisons reported to the Churchill Building in Nassau and quickly establis hed lines of communication with their respective agency as well as with their Fa mily Island contacts. This coordination allowed for the sharing of information throughout the EOC, facilitating the matching of needs with available resource s (NEMA, 2005). NEMA effectively mobilized emergency personnel and res ources quickly assessing the need and implementing procedures wit h no notable problems. Hurricane Wilma Generic Functi on 8 (Assessing the Damage) ESF 3, Public Works and Engi neering coordinated all damage assessment activities in response to W ilma (NEMA, 2005). The Ministry of Works and Utilities was the lead agency re sponsible with strong support from The Bahamas Electricity Corporati on, The Bahamas Telecommunication Company, Water and Sewerage Corporation, BEST Commission, and the Department of Environmental Health (Baham as Ministry of Public Works, 2005). The same damage assessment teams that had been established during Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne were again utilized. The use of these teams allowed for consistency in reporting and streamlined information flow (Bahamas Ministry of Public Works, 2005; NE MA, 2005). The coor dination of damage assessment was very successful in provid ing a comprehensive representation of the situation on the ground. It further allowed for a quick response and effective matching of assets and needs. International assistance was also pr ovided by USAID and the International Red Cross. All preliminary damage a ssessments were completed within 48

PAGE 181

162 hours of Wilma passing over Grand Baham a (NEMA, 2005). The coordinated effort allowed for a timely and appropriate response. Thus, the need for damage assessment was recognized early, and the function was executed with few problems. Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 9 (Coordinating Emergency Management Activities) Hurricane Wilma was the third nati onal disaster response operation coordinated by NEMA. Having fully implemented the CEM system and the national response plan NEMA was well equipped and trained to coordinate emergency management activities. The nat ional EOC was successfully activated with well established communication lines between NEMA and The Family Islands (NEMA, 2005). Info rmation flow was insured through regularly published situation reports and media briefings (Bahamas Department of Meteorology; NEMA, 2005). All of these activities fac ilitated centralized sharing of information and coordinated service deliver. Thus the coordination of emergency management activities in response to Hu rricane Wilma was recognized early and implemented with few problems. Hurricane Wilma Generic Function 10 (Resto ring Essential Public Services) According to the National Response Plan, ESF 1: Transportation, ESF 2: Communication, and ESF 3: Public Works and Engineering, were responsible for coordinating the restorati on of essential public services following Hurricane Wilma (NEMA, 2005). The Ministry of Transport and Aviation, The Royal Bahamas Police Force, and The Ministry of Works and Utilities were the lead

PAGE 182

163 agencies coordinating this functional response (NEMA, 2005). The main challenge to the restoration of services was flooding in Grand Bahama (Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2005). Essent ial services were delayed in areas that experienced extreme flooding or suffe red damage requiring the rebuilding of infrastructure (BEC, 2005; BTC 2005). Immediately following the completi on of Hurricane Wilma preliminary damage assessment reports ESF 1, 2, and 3 worked together to prioritize the restoration of services (N EMA, 2005). Minor outages or interruptions to services in the Central and Northwest Bahamas were brought back on line within 72 hours of the passage of Wilma. The restoration of essentia l public services was both recognized early and implemented without any major problems. 4.2.1.7 Criterion One Summary Referring back to Table 4.3, a complete exam ination of each of the ten generic functions as they apply to the six study hurricanes reveals an interesting pattern. What emerges is a clear improvement in the early recognition of each of the ten functions. Based on the data, this improvement can be associated with the implementation of a CEM system in 2002. The development of a national response plan that outlined responsib ility and standard oper ating procedures (SOPs) for each of the functions prio r an event enabled The Bahamas to more quickly identify critical functions and needs. The plan however, did not always result in each function being carried-out effectively although there was a noted improvement in post-cem response operations.

PAGE 183

164 Testing of Quarantelli’s methodology reveals a lack of detailed evaluation criteria for the ten generic functions can a llow for subjective interpretation. This can also lead to difficulty when attempti ng to compare respons e operations. The metric needs to be better refined to ensur e consistent application to reduce interpretation errors. 4.2.2 Criterion Two: Effectively Mobilizing Personnel and Resources Similar to generic function seven, criterion two of Quarantelli’s methodology is effectively7 mobilizing personnel and re sources. Table 4.10 displays the results of criterion two as it was applied to the six study hurricanes. A detailed description and supporting data fo r the responses in Table 4.10 are provided in Table 4.11 and se ctions 4.2.2.1 – 4.2.2.6. Evaluation of The Management of Disast er Response Operations to the Six Study Hurricanes: Quaran telli (1997a) Criterion Two Pre-CEM Post-CEM Andrew 1992 Floyd 1999 Michelle 2001 Frances 2004 Jeanne 2004 Wilma 2005 Effectively Mobilizing Personnel and Resources No No No No Yes Yes Table 4.10 Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to the Six Study Hurricanes: Q uarantelli (1997a) Criterion Two 4.2.2.1 Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criter ion Two: Effectively Mobilizing Personnel and Resources In response to Hurricane Andrew effective mobilization of personnel and resources did not occur. As highlight ed previously during the review of the 7 “Effective means that a desired and intended result has been produced; this definition differs from that of efficiency whic h requires that the results be obt ained in the best possible way” (Quarantelli, 1997 a :43).

PAGE 184

165 generic functions, the response operati on, commanded by the RBDF, did not coordinate national assets to manage the disaster A decentralized response to disaster-generated needs lead to multip le agencies conducting simultaneous operation in a disjointed manner. As a result needed personnel and resources were not identified quickly or brought to bear accordingly (Office of the Prime Minister, 1992, Bethel 2006). Criterion Two: Eff ectively Mobilizing Personnel and Resources Pre-CEM Post-CEM Andrew 1992 Floyd 1999 Michelle 2001 Frances 2004 Jeanne 2004 Wilma 2005 Q1. Were the Needed personnel and resources identified well in the crisis? No No No Yes Yes Yes Q2. Were they located quickly and brought to bear correctly? No No No No Yes Yes Q3. Were they appropriate to the problems generated by the disaster No No No Yes Yes Yes Table 4.11 – Criterion Two: Effectivel y Mobilizing Personnel and Resources 4.2.2.2 Hurricane Floyd Criterion Two: Effectively Mobilizing Personnel and Resources In response to Hurricane Floyd e ffective mobilization of personnel and resources did not occur. Through di scussions with NEMA staff members Gayle Outten-Moncur (2007b) and Luke Bethel (2006) needed personnel and resources were not identified quickly during the res ponse period. Due to the decentralized nature of the response, agencies and or ganizations responded without a clear understanding of critical needs or av ailable assets. Multiple damage

PAGE 185

166 assessments were conducted (Outten-M oncur 2006a) but without a mechanism to share the information necessary resources and personnel could not be brought to bear correctly. To compound the issue, international donations were arriving at an accelerated pace (Ingraham, 1999). Personnel and resources many times were not well matched to the needs of the nation or logistically could not be delivered to residents in need (Bethel, 2006). It t ook several weeks to establish a formal flow of information that would allow re sidents to seek assistance and for The Bahamas government to adequately move re sources into the appropriate impact areas (Glinton, 2006). 4.2.2.3 Hurricane Michelle Criter ion Two: Mobilize Personnel and Resources Effectively As with Andrew and Floyd, effectiv e mobilization of personnel and resources in response to Hurricane Mic helle did not occur. Michelle made landfall on the Island of New Providenc e and the impact on the functioning of government caused difficulty in mobilizing personnel and resources (Office of the Prime Minister, 2001). M obilization of personnel in response to Hurricane Michelle was very difficult since many residents were responding to needs at their own home (Davis, 2006). Also co mpounding problems with resources was the decentralized emergency respons e by a variety of agencies and organizations. A clear understanding of crit ical needs was not achieved. Without this, resources were not able to be moved into the most critical areas.

PAGE 186

167 4.2.2.4 Hurricane Frances Criteri on Two: Mobilize Personnel and Resources Effectively In response to Hurricane Frances, effective mobilization of personnel and resources did not fully occur (NEMA, 2004a). Needed personnel and resources were identified well during the first part of the crisis period. However, Hurricane Frances impacted the entire archipelago leaving the nation under direct impact from a category 4 hurricane for over 72 hours. NEMA served as the lead agency responsible for coordinating the m obilization of emergency personnel and resources under ESF 7 (NEMA, 2002). The mobilization of personnel and the delivery of essential resources were hindered significantly when communication between the islands failed (Hughey, 2004b; BTC 2004). RBDF personnel had b een stationed throughout the family islands with satellite telephones prior to Frances impact. Satellite phones had also been provided to the Family Island Administrators to ensure communication with NEMA. However, due to operator erro r and a lack of training, many of the satellite phones were useless (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004). This resulted in misappropriation of resources. A combi nations of errors and issues prevented resources from being brought to bear co rrectly and quickly (NEMA, 2004). 4.2.2.5 Hurricane Jeanne Criterion Two: Mobilize Personnel and Resources Effectively In response to Hurricane Jeanne, effective mobilization of personnel and resources did occur, due in part to Hurricane Frances (Hughey, 2004b; OuttenMoncur, 2006b). The National EOC had been fully operational since September 1st and remained functioning in response to Hurricane Jeanne. Already existing

PAGE 187

168 agency liaisons remained at the EOC im proving the movement of critical personnel (NEMA, 2004b; NEMA, 2004c). Established lines of communication between the National EOC, agency r epresentative, and Family Island Administrators were well established and functioning effectively (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004b). Resources had been inventoried duri ng response to Frances and allowed for the quick mobilization of assets. Communication issues that had plagued response to Hurricane Frances were addressed through onsite training prior to Jeanne’s landfall (NEMA, 2004b). “I traveled to many of the Family Islands and trained them on the use of Satellite Phones (Rigby, 2006).” Additionally assets such as food and water were staged in Grand Bahama in anticipation of Jeanne (NEMA, 2004b; NE MA, 2004c). Application of the evaluation criteria insinuat es that the need for the mo bilization of emergency personnel and resources was recognized early and carried out effectively in response to Hurricane Jeanne. 4.2.2.6 Hurricane Wilma Cr iterion Two: Mobilize Personnel and Resources Effectively Effective mobilization of personnel and re sources did occur in response to Hurricane Wilma. Needed per sonnel and resources were identified well during the first part of the crisis period wh en an alert was issued to all agencies and organizations active in disaster res ponse (NEMA, 2005). NEMA served as the lead agency responsible for coordinat ing the mobilization of emergency personnel and resources under ESF 7 (NEMA, 2002; NEMA, 2005).

PAGE 188

169 Through the activation of the National EOC the mobilization of personnel and resources was achieved (NEMA 2005) Communication issues that had created problems in response to previous hurricanes were addressed through coordination with the RBDF, The Baham as Telecommunication Company, and NEMA. The coordination between agencies allowed for the successful mobilization of personnel and resources in response to Hurricane Wilma. “By the time Wilma impacted us, everyone know what to do and the response ran smoothly” (Outten-Moncur, 2006b). 4.2.2.7 Criterion Two Summary As previously displayed in Tables 4.10 and 4.11 an im provement in the effective mobilization of personnel and resources occurred following the implementation of a CEM system. As wit h criterion one, an association with the improvement in the function and the development of a national emergency response plan is noted. The development of a response plan outlined activities and procedures that facilitat ed the government’s ability to locate and bring to bear the correct personnel and resources in an appropriate way. It is also important to note that the association between CEM and improvements in criterion two do not rule out the potential impact or importance that experience may have played in noted improvements to response operations. 4.2.3 Criterion Three: Allow T he Adequate Processing of Information This criterion focuses less on the technology utilized to ensure communication but rather places the emphasis on the content of what when and to whom the information was made available. Tables 4.12 displays the research findings for criterion three as they apply to the six study hurricanes. An

PAGE 189

170 improvement in information processing is noted after the impl ementation of CEM. A detailed description and supporting data fo r the responses in Table 4.12 are provided in Table 4.13 and sect ions 4.2.3.1 – 4.2.3.6. Eight Criteria for Evaluating The Managem ent of Disaster Response Operations to the Six Study Hurricanes: Quar antelli (1997a) Criterion Three Pre-CEM Post-CEM Andrew 1992 Floyd 1999 Michelle 2001 Frances 2004 Jeanne 2004 Wilma 2005 Adequately processing information No No No Yes Yes Yes Table 4.12 Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to the Six Study Hurricanes: Quar antelli (1997a) Criterion Three Criterion Three: Allow the Adequate Processing of Information Pre-CEM Post-CEM Allowed for the adequate processing of information… Andrew 1992 Floyd 1999 Michelle 2001 Frances 2004 Jeanne 2004 Wilma 2005 Q1. within every responding organization ___ ___ ___ Yes Yes Yes Q2. between organization No No No Yes Yes Yes Q3. From citizens to organizations ___ ___ No Yes Yes Yes Q4. from organizations to citizens Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Table 4.13 – Application of Criterion Three: Allow the Adequate Processing of Information 4.2.3.1 Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion Three: Allow the Adequate Processing of Information Table 4.14 displays the research findings for criterion three as they apply to Hurricane Andrew. Not enough data existed to determine if adequate processing of information was occurring wit hin every responding organization.

PAGE 190

171 According to interviews with NEMA st aff and informal discussions with members of the RBDF, there was very little in formation sharing between organizations during the response phase. “During Andrew we [Ministry of Social Services] were no t aware of what other ministries’ were doing” (Glinton, 2006) The status of information processing fr om citizens and organizations was not able to be determined. During the respons e phase of Hurricane Andrew a formal line of communication between citizens and response organizations was not identified. Emergency police and fire phone numbers did exist, however, telephone lines in the central and northwest ern islands were down. Additionally, no direct communication lines were estab lished to address exclusively hurricane generated needs. The Department of Meteorology had a strong line of communication established with citizens through The Broad casting Corporation of The Bahamas. ZNS provided regular information to the public regarding hurricane warnings. Archival research showed that newspaper articles notified residents of shelter locations, however the articles appeared afte r Andrew made landfall. Therefore, applying the evaluation process developed by Quarantelli (1997a) it becomes apparent that processing of information in response to Hurricane Andrew was not adequate.

PAGE 191

172 Evaluation of Hurricane Andrew Information Processing Allow the adequate processing of information… Yes/No Within every responding organization --Between organizations No From citizens to organizations --From organizations to citizens Yes Table 4.14 – Evaluation of Hurric ane Andrew Information Processing 4.2.3.2 Hurricane Floyd 1999 Crit erion Three: Allow the Adequate Processing of Information According to interviews with NE MA staff, informal discussion with members of the RBDF as well as information obtained through after-action documents, adequate information sharing be tween organizations did not occur (Water and Sewerage Co rporation 1999; Lightbour ne and Dean, 1999; Bethel, 2006; Outten-Moncur, 2006b). “Ensuring quick access to informa tion through improved communication is a priority for the government and something that is being address” (Ingraham, 1999:92). “In response to Hurricane Floyd, as w ith Andrew, we [Ministry of Social Services] were not made aware of how other ministries’ were responding” (Glinton, 2006) Data were not available to determi ne if there was adequ ate processing of information within every organization res ponding to Hurricane Floyd. Limited data relating to the status of info rmation processing from citizens to organizations. During the response phase of Hurricane Floyd a formal line of communication between citizens and respons e organizations was not identified.

PAGE 192

173 Emergency police and fire phone numbers as with Andrew existed but with damage to phone lines down in the immedi ate aftermath of the hurricane communication was limited. Additionally, no direct communication lines were established to address exclusively hu rricane generated needs (Rigby, 2006). A strong line of communication between the response organizations and the citizens of The Bahamas existed through The Broadcasting Corporation of The Bahamas. ZNS provided regular information to the public regarding hurricane warnings and shelter locations. As with Hurricane Andrew, Meteorologist Basil Dean provided regul ar updates on the stat us of the storm broadcast on ZNS radio and television (Dean and Rolle, 1999). Applying the available data to Quar antelli’s methodology (Table 4.15) indicates that the adequate processing of in formation did not take place during response to Hurricane Floyd in 1999. Evaluation of Hurricane Floyd Information Processing Allow the adequate processing of information.. Yes/No Within every responding organization --Between organizations No From citizens to organizations --From organizations to citizens Yes Table 4.15 – Evaluation of Hurric ane Floyd Information Processing 4.2.3.3 Hurricane Michelle 2001 Crit erion Three: Allow the Adequate Processing of Information This researcher was unable to dete rmine based available data the status of information flow within every respondi ng organizations. Interview data suggest

PAGE 193

174 that processing of information between agencies did not take place. The Hurricane Michelle report issued by the offi ce of the Prime Minister (2001) also supports challenges associated with informa tion flow between agencies. Service deliver was delayed as a result of inadequate communication between organizations. As with the previous two storms formal lines of communication between citizens and response organizations were not identified. Emergency police and fire phone numbers were available however telephone lines were down in the immediate aftermath rendering communi cation non-existent. Additionally, no direct communication lines were estab lished to address exclusively hurricane generated needs. Evaluation of Hurricane Michelle Information Processing Allow the adequate processing of information.. Yes/No Within every responding organization --Between organizations No From citizens to organizations No From organizations to citizens Yes Table 4.16 – Evaluation of Hurric ane Michelle Information Processing A strong line of communication between the response organizations and the citizens of The Bahamas was made available through ZNS. ZNS provided regular information to the public r egarding hurricane warnings, shelter information and public safety concerns. Based on the results displayed in Table 4.16, and applying the evaluation process developed by Quarantelli (1997a) as discussed in the methodology

PAGE 194

175 (chapter 3) of this document it is clear that adequate processing of information did not take place during res ponse to Hurricane Michelle. 4.2.3.4 Hurricane Frances 2004 Criter ion Three: Allow the Adequate Processing of Information Hurricane Frances was the first hurricane to impact The Bahamas following the implementation of CEM. Data obtained from Official NEMA situation reports, interviews with NEMA staff members, and personal observations indicate that organizations were adequately processing information internally. A strong communication line had been establishe d between the EOC to each of the agencies and organizations acti ve in disaster response (Hughey, 2004b). The respective agencies had EOC liaisons which provided a link allowing for the sharing of informati on (NEMA, 2004a). Based on the response activities generated, it appears that t he organizations were able to adequately process information in an effort to meet immediate emergency needs. The activation of the national EOC and the presence of EOC agency/organization representatives allo wed for the sharing of information between groups. A centralized location, regularly scheduled briefings, and detailed situation reports allowed for the coordinat ion of resources between organizations to meet the needs of residents (NEMA, 2004a). A line of communication between citi zens to the national EOC was also established through an EOC phone num ber (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004a). The lines were manned and requests for a ssistance were coordinated from the national office to the local island administ rator. Strong lines of communication also existed between NEMA and the citi zens through the media with regularly

PAGE 195

176 scheduled briefings. NEMA established a media briefing room and provided updates to the public four times a daily. The media briefings were very successful in educating the public on t he impact of Hurricane Frances and how most effectively to seek assistance if needed (NEMA, 2004a). (See Pictures 4.11 and 4.12) Based on the results displayed in Table 4.17, adequate processing of information did take place during res ponse to Hurricane Frances in 2004. Evaluation of Hurricane Frances Information Processing Allow the adequate processing of information.. Yes/No Within every responding organization Yes Between organizations Yes From citizens to organizations Yes From organizations to citizens Yes Table 4.17 – Evaluation of Hurricane Frances Information Processing

PAGE 196

177 Picture 4.11 – Hurricane Frances Regularly Scheduled Media Briefings, Mr. Carl Smith, Director of The Bahamas Na tional Emergency Management Agency. (Source: Erin Hughey) Picture 4.12 – Hurricane Frances R egularly Scheduled Media Briefings, Department of Meteorology and the Port Authority. (Source: Erin Hughey) 4.2.3.5 Hurricane Jeanne 2004 Criteri on Three: Allow the Adequate Processing of Information Data from official NEMA situation reports, interviews with NEMA staff members, and personal observations indicate that organizations were adequately

PAGE 197

178 processing information internally. Communication between ministries and organizations responding to Jeanne and the Na tional EOC were well functioning. Agency liaisons were present in t he EOC and provided an avenue to share information (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004b). During shift changes and internal EOC briefings each organization provided r eports on key shared information as it related to organizational operations. Ba sed on the response activities generated it appears that the organizations were able to adequately process information in an effort to meet immediat e emergency needs (Hughey, 2004b). A line of communication between citiz ens to the national EOC was also established through an EOC hotline (Hughey 2004b; NEMA 2004c). The lines were manned and requests for assistance were coordinated from the national office to the local Island Administrator. Strong lines of communication also existed between NEMA and the citizens through the media with regularly scheduled briefings (NEMA, 2004b; NEMA 2004c). Based on the results in Table 4.18 which display the results of the evaluation process as discussed in Chapter 3 of this document, it suggests that adequate processing of information did take place during response to Hurricane Jeanne 2004. Evaluation of Hurricane Jeanne Information Processing Allow the adequate processing of information.. Yes/No Within every responding organization Yes Between organizations Yes From citizens to organizations Yes From organizations to citizens Yes Table 4.18 – Evaluation of Hurri cane Jeanne Information Processing

PAGE 198

179 4.2.3.6 Hurricane Wilma 2005 Criterion Three: Allow the Adequate Processing of Information Data from Hurricane Wilma situation reports issued by NEMA (2005) as well as data obtained through interviews with NEMA staff, showed that organizations adequately processed information internally. A strong communication line was established between NEMA and support agencies through the national EOC (NEM A, 2005). These lines were first established with the implementation of CEm and later tested during response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne. NEMA also held regul arly schedule briefings before and after shift changes as well as provided up-dated situation reports to facilitate information flow (NEMA, 2005). Res ponse agencies had EOC liaisons available to allow for information sharing. Based on the response activities generated, organizations were able to adequately proce ss information in an effort to meet immediate emergency needs. Evaluation of Hurricane Wilma Information Processing Allow the adequate processing of information.. Yes/No Within every responding organization Yes Between organizations Yes From citizens to organizations Yes From organizations to citizens Yes Table 4.19 – Evaluation of Hurric ane Wilma Information Processing A communication hotline for citizens was established at the national EOC (NEMA, 2005). The phone line was manned by NEMA support staff and volunteers and allowed citizens the opport unity to both report and obtain critical

PAGE 199

180 emergency information. Strong lines of communication also existed between NEMA and the citizens through the media wit h regularly scheduled briefings. As with response to Frances and Jeanne, NEMA established a media briefing room to provide information and updates to the public four times a day. The media briefings were very successful in educat ing the public on the impact of Hurricane Wilma as well as provide critical in formation regarding how best to seek assistance if needed. Based on the results displayed in Table 4.19, adequate processing of information took place in response to Hurricane Wilma 2005. 4.2.3.7 Criterion Three Summary Referring back to Table 4.13, a consis tent pattern of improvement in the processing of information following t he implementation of CEM is noted. Planning to develop clear lines of communication between citizens, the government, and response agencies allowe d for faster and more accurate processing of information and improved re sponse operations. Experience and improved recording keeping may also be associated with t he improvement in information flow and should not be discard ed as a contributing factor to the improvement in the processing of information in all four categories. 4.2.4 Criterion Four: Permit the Pr oper Exercise of Decision-Making As outlined in chapter three, the problems associated with decisionmaking are usually associat ed with four key areas: 5. Loss of higher-echelon personnel because of overwork. 6. Conflict over responsibility for new disaster tasks. 7. Clashes over organizational domains between established and emergent groups. 8. Surfacing of organizational jurisdictional differences.

PAGE 200

181 Table 4.20 displays the research findings for criterion four as they apply to the six study hurricanes. An improvement in exercising decision-making is noted in response to Hurricane Wilma. A detail ed description and supporting data for the responses in Table 4.20 can be found in sections 4.2.4.1 4.2.4.6. Evaluation of The Management of Disast er Response Operations to the Six Study Hurricanes: Quaran telli (1997a) Criterion Four Pre-CEM Post-CEM Andrew 1992 Floyd 1999 Michelle 2001 Frances 2004 Jeanne 2004 Wilma 2005 Permit the Properly Exercising DecisionMaking; No No No No No Yes Table 4.20 Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to the Six Study Hurricanes: Quar antelli (1997a) Criterion Four 4.2.4.1 Hurricane Andrew 1992 Cr iterion Four: Permit the Proper Exercise of Decision-Making During Hurricane Andrew the usual chain-of-command and lines-ofauthority were in place and functioning. Direct lines of communication to the Office of the Prime Minister existed between The RBDF and Government Ministers. The problem wit h exercising proper decision-making resided not with the line of communication, but the forma t and timing of information with which high-echelon personnel coul d make decisions. During the examination of criterion one generic functions, it was noted that Ministry specific damage assessment reports were conducted i ndependently and utilized a variety of different criteria for cla ssification. This created c onfusion about the extent of damage and slowed the critical response an d recovery decision-making process. Furthermore, regularly scheduled reporting was not required at the time of

PAGE 201

182 Andrew preventing timely decision-making and delayed service delivery. The Data do not suggest any conflicts over re sponsibility for new disaster tasks or clashes over organizational domains existe d in response to Hurricane Andrew. The decentralized response did result in delays associated with information flow, slowing the decision-making process. 4.2.4.2 Hurricane Floyd 1999 Criterion F our: Permit the Proper Exercise of Decision-Making As with Andrew, during Floyd the us ual chain-of-command and lines-ofauthority were in place and functioning. The RBDF and the Government Ministers had direct lines of communicati on to the Office of the Prime Minister (Office of the Prime Mini ster, 1999). The problem with exercising proper decision-making resided not with the li ne of communication but the format and timing of information on which high-ec helon personnel could make decisions. Conflicting damage assessment r eports that utilized differe nt criteria prevented decision-makers from having a clear under standing of the situation on the ground (Bethel, 2006). According to informal discussions with members of the police and Defence Force regularly sche duled reporting was not required and prevented timely decision making and delayed the delivery of response services. “We [RBDF] were in the field distri buting supplies where needed. At no time am I aware of reporting out to anyone other than our officer in charge. As I mentioned earlier, ther e were many different central points of control, I was always trying to determine the li ne of authority” (Bethel, 2006). No formal records of conflict over response phase responsibilities were found during this research. However, based on informal discussions with island administrators and officials from a variet y of government agencies it appears that

PAGE 202

183 uncertainty regarding fiscal responsibility wa s of major concern. In an effort to preserve agency budgets many organizatio nal leaders were hesitant to spend their scarce funds. Uncertainty regarding potential reimbursement or fear of misusing government funds also caused del ays. Application of Quarantelli’s criteria indicates that at the very least proper decis ion-making was delayed by inadequate processing of information. 4.2.4.3 Hurricane Michelle 2001 Criterion Four: Pe rmit the Proper Exercise of Decision-Making During Hurricane Michelle as in the pr evious two hurricanes examined the usual chain-of-command and lines-of-author ity were in place and functioning. The RBDF and the Government Ministers had direct lines of communication to the Office of the Prime Mini ster (Office of the Prime Mi nister, 2001). The problem with exercising proper decision-maki ng resided not with the line of communication but the format and timing of information on which high-echelon personnel could make decisions (Smith, 2006). The same challenges associated wit h Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd were identified in the response to Hurricane Michelle. Conflicting damage assessment reports and changing criteria for evaluat ion prevented decision-makers from having a clear understanding of the situat ion on the ground (Office of the Prime Minister, 2001). Additionally, regularly scheduled reporting did not take place preventing timely decision-making. Also im portant to note is the impact Michelle had on the Island of New Providence and go vernment offices. Most businesses and government offices were closed for several days adding to delays and

PAGE 203

184 difficulties in processing information. Based on the data it appears that proper decision-making was prevented by inadequa te processing of information. 4.2.4.4 Hurricane Frances 2004 Criterion Four: Permi t the Proper Exercise of Decision-Making During Hurricane Frances the usual chain-of-command and lines-ofauthority were in place and functioning as outlined in the national response plan. With the introduction of a national emergency management agency and a national disaster response plan, the dire ct lines of communication were clearly spelled out (NEMA 2002). However, as pointed out by Quarantelli (1997a) the problems associated with decision-maki ng are usually not because of a breakdown in communication but rather problems associated with the following four key areas: (1) loss of high-echelon personnel because of overwork; (2) conflict over responsibility for new disaster tasks; (3) clashes over organizational domains between established and emer gent groups; (4) surfacing of organizational jurisdictional differences. The response to Hurricane Frances ex perienced a significant level of highechelon personnel who were overworked and unable to make decisions (Hughey, 2004b). Because Frances impacted the Bahamas for over 72 hours, EOC staff members worked around the clock with little or no breaks. Due to limited staffing, shifts could not be established which lead to persons being over worked, leading to irritability, argum ents, and poor decision making (NEMA, 2004a). Compounded by lack of sleep and a very stressful working environment, internal conflict over responsibilities did take place among EOC staff members

PAGE 204

185 (Hughey, 2004b). All conflicts were eventually resolved but did impact decision making for a period of time In response to Hurricane Frances clashes over organizational domains between establishe d and emergent groups did not occur. Due to the small population within the Bahamas and the remoteness of many of the islands, new emergent groups did not develop. The surfacing of organizational jurisdictional differences also did not occur in response to Hurricane Frances (NEMA, 2004a). The data suggests that proper decisionmaking was impacted most significantly by the loss of high-echelon personnel because of overwork. 4.2.4.5 Hurricane Jeanne 2004 Criterion Four: Permit the Proper Exercise of Decision-Making During Hurricane Jeanne, as with the pr evious four hurricanes that have been evaluated, the usual chain-of-comma nd and lines-of-authority were in place and functioning. However, with two hurri canes impacting the nation within three weeks the response to Hurricane Jeanne experienced a significant level of highechelon personnel who were overworked and unable to make decisions (Hughey, 2004b). Due to exhaustion and stress, both poor decision making occurred as well as conflicts over responsibilities took place. “You are exhausted and it makes it difficul t to be effective, you need to go home and take break, that is what happened in 2004 with Frances and Jeanne” (Otten-Moncur, 2006b). There were no reported clashes over organizational domains between established and emergent groups in response to Jeanne. The surfacing of organizational jurisdictional differences also did not occur in response to Hurricane Jeanne (Hughey, 2004b). Proper decision-making was impacted most

PAGE 205

186 significantly by the loss of high-echelon personnel because of stress and exhaustion (Hughey, 2004b). Quar antelli’s evaluation criter ia suggest that proper decision making did not occur in respons e to Hurricane Jeanne. The same or similar problems experienced during respon se to Hurricane Frances were also experienced during Jeanne. 4.2.4.6 Hurricane Wilma 2005 Criterion Four: Permit the Proper Exercise of Decision-Making During Hurricane Wilma the usual chain-of-command and lines-ofauthority were in place and functioning. To avoid the same problems that had been experience during response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne, NEMA required 12-hour shifts to help reduc e exhaustion and down or overworked personnel (NEMA, 2005). The very stressful working environmen t, did create some internal conflicts but they were quickly resolved and accordin g to NEMA staff did not impact their ability to make decision effectively (G linton, 2006; Outten-M oncur, 2007a). There were no clashes over organizational dom ains nor were there any jurisdiction disputes (Outten-Moncur, 2007a). Thus during response to Hurricane Wilma, the National EOC was able to effectivel y exercise proper decision-making. 4.2.4.7 Criterion Four Summary Referring back to Table 4.20, no pattern of improvement is noted following the implementation of CEM. Response operations to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne experienced the same problems t hat pre-CEM response experienced. Improvements in the proper exercising of decision-making noted in response to

PAGE 206

187 Hurricane Wilma appear to be associated with experience rather then a change in the fundamental management stra tegy of disaster response. 4.2.5 Criterion Five: Focus on the Development of Overall Coordination Criterion five focuses on the critical function of coordination. Table 4.21 displays the research findings for criteri on five as they apply to the six study hurricanes. A marked improvement in over all response coordination is seen after the implementation of CEM. A detailed description and supporting data for the responses in Table 4.21 can be found in sections 4.2. 5.1 – 4.2.5.6. Evaluation of The Management of Disast er Response Operations to the Six Study Hurricanes: Quaran telli (1997a) Criterion Five Pre-CEM Post-CEM Andrew 1992 Floyd 1999 Michelle 2001 Frances 2004 Jeanne 2004 Wilma 2005 Focus on the Development of Overall Coordination No No No Yes Yes Yes Table 4.21 – Evaluation of The Management of Disaster Response Operations to the Six Study Hurricanes: Quar antelli (1997a) Criterion Five 4.2.5.1 Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion Five: Fo cus on the Development of Overall Coordination A military response was generated to address Hurricane Andrew needs. With no official agency responsible for emergency management the RBDF established ‘command’ and provided assist ance. This structure produced a disjointed operation that did not allow fo r a coordinated civil / military response. An operation center was established by the Defence Force to coordinate the logistics of their response. The operat ion center did not facilitate the coming together of all agenc ies and organizations active in disaster response. As a

PAGE 207

188 result the facilitation of information and t he synchronization of critical functions did not occur. “2003 [in preparation for Hurricane Is abel] was the first time a national EOC was activated. Prior to that the Police and Defence Force would coordination their own activities i ndependent of one another” (OuttenMoncur, 2006a). 4.2.5.2 Hurricane Floyd 1999 Criterion Five: Focus on the Development of Overall Coordination Official Hurricane Floyd disaster re sponse operations were managed by the RBDF. As with Andrew a ‘command and control’ style response was implemented which did not facilitat e a cooperative or comprehensive arrangement for all agencies needed to respond to a major disaster such as Floyd. A national emergency operations c enter was established at the Office of The Prime Minister led by Commander Steven Russell, however it lacked the contributions of other national and international organizations responding (Ingraham, 1999). To compound th is issue, no family island EOC’s were opened to facilitate the movement of emergency response information (Bethel, 2006). The disjointed response operation prevent ed the synchronization of critical functions that required a variety of organi zations. For example, the movement of water required the RBDF ships to trans port goods, but the port department and ministry of works also were needed to coordinate delivery to areas that could receive the ships due to damage to infras tructure. Once t he goods arrive the movement from the port to a distribution center agai n required coordination with the Bahamas Red Cross and the Ministry of Social Services in an effort to provide the goods to residents that were in need. Without a clear avenue to

PAGE 208

189 communicate with all of these agencies seve re delays in the delivery of services occurred (Outten-Moncur, 2006b). “…the Police and Defence Force would coordination their own activities independent of one another” (Outten-Moncur, 2006a). The data as it was applied to Quarante illi’s (1997a) methodology indicates that overall response coordination and the synchr onization of critical functions did not occur 4.2.5.3 Hurricane Michelle 2001 Criterion Five: Fo cus on the Development of Overall Coordination As with Andrew and Floyd, Hurricane Michelle disaster response operations were ‘commanded’ by the RB DF. Again the command and control structure did not facilitat e a cooperative or comprehens ive arrangement for all agencies responding. An EOC was est ablished at the Cabinet Office but was staffed by only Defence Force personnel (Office of the Prime Minister, 2001). The lack of interaction between all agencies required to respond prevented successful coordination and synchronization of critical functions that required a variety of organizations (Bethel, 2006, Outten-Moncur, 2006b). Further preventing the development of overall coordination was a missing avenue of communication to share information or request assistance (Smith, 2007a). 4.2.5.4 Hurricane Frances 2004 Criterion Five: Fo cus on the Development of Overall Coordination Hurricane Frances disaster response operations were managed by NEMA (NEMA, 2004a). The nationa l EOC was established in Nassau with Family Island EOC established in corresponding jurisdictions (NEMA, 2002). This

PAGE 209

190 cooperative and comprehensive a rrangement allowed agencies and organizations to come together in a st ructured and coordinated way to provide necessary emergency response services. As a result of the new coordination as outlined in the emergency response plan (2002), critical services such as the movement of food and water to impacted areas occurred effectively. Fo r example, the national EOC facilitated the coordination between ESF 11: Food and ESF 1: Transportation (NEMA, 2004a). This type of coordination did not occur in response to the other three hurricanes. NEMA was able to locate national resources and coordinate with the necessary ministries ensuring the movem ent of assets to the affected Family Islands (NEMA, 2004). Once assets arrived on the fa mily islands, local EOC personal were prepared to coordinate the de liver of goods to those in need. NEMA was able to successfully ensure that immediate emergency needs were met through effective coordination of services (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA 2004a). 4.2.5.5 Hurricane Jeanne 2004 Criteri on Five: Focus on the Development of Overall Coordination Hurricane Jeanne response operations we re also coordinated out of the National EOC, managed by NEMA and si tuated in Nassau (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004b; NEMA, 2004c). Response operations to Jeanne benefited from Hurricane Frances with regards to coordi nation. Despite depleted resources and tired staff, overall coor dination was in place and functioning when the nation was impacted by Jeanne (Hughey, 2004b). Coordination and response followed t he guidelines as established in the national comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP) (NEMA, 2002).

PAGE 210

191 The established coordination system allowe d for the coming together of response agencies to manage the deliver of services to residents. As a result, critical service and immediate emergency needs were met. Application of Quarantelli’s evaluation criteria indicate that overall coordination in response to Hurricane Jeanne was effective. 4.2.5.6 Hurricane Wilma 200 5 Criterion Five: Focus on the Development of Overall Coordination Hurricane Wilma response operations were managed by NEMA through the national EOC (NEMA, 2005). All agencies active in disaster were represented at the nationa l EOC. Family Island Administrators in the Northwestern Bahamas established co rresponding jurisdictional EOC’s to coordinate response efforts. “The establishment of sub-NEMA’s on the Family Islands made it very easy to direct and coordinate the response” (Bethel, 2006). This cooperative and comprehensive arrangement between the national and island EOC’s facilitated the sharing of information and allowed for effective synchronization of response efforts (NEMA, 2005). NEMA was able to successfully ensure that immediate em ergency needs were met through planning and coordination of services. 4.2.5.7 Criterion Five Summary Referring back to Table 4.21, a marked improvement in overall response coordination is seen after the implementat ion of CEM. The key reason for this improvement is the development of a nat ional response plan that required multiagency coordination over a two-year period prior to the impact of Frances. This

PAGE 211

192 coordination helped to facilitate a strong wo rking relationship between ministries and established a successful environment for coordination when a disaster struck. 4.2.6 Criterion Six: Co rrectly Recognizing Differences Between Response and Agent-Generated Demands Criterion six focuses on the impor tance of correctly recognizing the differences between response and agent-generated demands. Evaluation of Criterion Six: Correctly Recognizing Differences Between Response and Agent-Generated Demands Pre-CEM Post-CEM Andrew 1992 Floyd 1999 Michelle 2001 Frances 2004 Jeanne 2004 Wilma 2005 2. Effectively mobilizing personnel and resources; No No No No Yes Yes 3. Adequately processing information; No No No Yes Yes Yes 4. Properly exercising decision-making; No No No No No Yes 5. Developing overall coordination; No No No Yes Yes Yes 6. Correctly recognizing differences between response and agentgenerated demands; No No No No No Yes Table 4.22 Evaluation of Criterion Six: Correctly Recognizing Differences Between Response and Agent-Generated Demands

PAGE 212

193 Quarantelli (1997a) asserts, as outlined in chapter three that the correct recognition between agentand re sponse-generated demands can be determined if criteria tw o through five we answered in a positive way. Examination of Table 4.22, which summari zes criteria 2-5 i ndicates that only during response to Hurricane Wilma did emergency management officials correctly recognize the difference between responseand agent-generated demands. 4.2.7 Criterion Seven: Provide the Mass Co mmunication System with Appropriate and Accurate Information Criterion seven focuses on provid ing the mass communication system with appropriate and accurate information. Table 4.23 shows the research findings as they apply to the six study hurricanes. A clear pattern of improvement is shown during post-CE M response operations. A detailed description and supporting data for the res ponses in Table 4.23 can be found in sections 4.2.7.1 – 4.2.7.6. Evaluation of Criter ion Seven: Provide the Mass Communication System with Appropriate and Accurate Information Pre-CEM Post-CEM Andrew 1992 Floyd 1999 Michelle 2001 Frances 2004 Jeanne 2004 Wilma 2005 Provide Appropriate and Accurate Reports for the News Media No No No Yes Yes Yes Table 4.23 Evaluation of Criterion Seven: Prov ide the Mass Communication System with Appropriate and Accurate Information

PAGE 213

194 4.2.7.1 Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion Seven: Provide Appropriate and Accurate Reports for the News Media A cooperative interaction between the Department of Meteorology and the media existed during response to Hu rricane Andrew. The Broadcasting Corporation of The Baham as and the Department of Meteorology worked in close coordination to provided regular updates and warnings. Meteorologist Basil Dean, remained on the air thr oughout the storm broadcasting over ZNS radio and television stations providi ng The Bahamas with hurricane updates (Dean and Rolle, 1992). What was la cking was the interaction between all agencies active in disaster response and the media. In 1992 there was no mechanism in place to facilitate regularly scheduled disaster briefings. As a result limited information was being released to the public regarding response efforts. The citizen’s belief and trust in the local media was not able to be determined by the available data. The lack of information provided to the media for dissemination indicated that mass co mmunication system were not provided with appropriate and accurate information. 4.2.7.2 Hurricane Floyd 1999 Criterion Seven: Provide Appropriate and Accurate Reports for the News Media A cooperative interaction between or ganizational and community officials and media, seems to have existed duri ng response to Hurricane Floyd. The Broadcasting Corporation of The Baham as, in close coordination with The Department of Meteorology, provided r egular updates and warnings regarding

PAGE 214

195 Hurricane Floyd (Department of Meteorology, 1999). As with Andrew, what were missing were regularly scheduled briefings by response organizations to the media. There is no record of briefi ngs being provided to the media through the emergency operation center or by the RBDF. After reviewing newspaper archives t here appears to be information from political representatives to the media r egarding their support for recovery but little if any indication that response organiza tions were feeding the media critical response information. The citizens’ belie f and trust in the local media was not able to be determined with available data. However, the lack of information being provided to the media for disseminatio n to the public indicates that mass communication system were not provided with the appropriate and accurate information related to the Hurrica ne Floyd response efforts. 4.2.7.3 Hurricane Michelle 2001 Criterion Seven: Provide Appropriate and Accurate Reports for the News Media A cooperative interaction between or ganizational and community officials and media, seems to have existed during response to Hurricane Michelle. The Broadcasting Corporation of The Baham as in close coordination with The Department of Meteorology (2001) pr ovided regular updates and warnings regarding the status of Mic helle. As with the two previous response operations, there were no regularly scheduled briefi ngs by response organizations to the media. There is no record of briefi ngs being provided to the media through the EOC or by the RBDF. After reviewing newspaper archives there appears to be information directly related to the physical com ponents of the storm as provided by the

PAGE 215

196 Department of Meteorology (2001) but information on response information was lacking. The citizen’s belief and trust in the local media was not able to be determined with available data. However, the lack of information being provided to the media for dissemination to the pub lic indicates that mass communication system were not provided wit h the appropriate and accurate information related to the Hurricane Michelle response efforts. 4.2.7.4 Hurricane Frances 2004 Criterion Seven: Pr ovide Appropriate and Accurate Reports for the News Media NEMA provided appropriate and accurate information to the news media using a structured and standardized approa ch(Hughey, 2004b). ESF 5 Planning and Information, instituted regularly sc heduled briefings as well as established the official position of public informa tion officer (PIO) (NEMA, 2002; NEMA 2004a). The PIO was a skilled member of the Bahamas Information System trained to provide information to the media on the daily activities of government (Hughey; 2004b). Working closely with the NEMA director, Mr. Carl Smith and top EOC management the PIO establis hed briefings at 8:00am, 11:30am, 5:00pm and 9:00pm (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA 2004a). The briefings were held daily while the EOC was fully operational. The times selected were just prior to the local news broadcasts allowing new s agencies the opportunity to have the most updated information for residents. The news media was notified by phone and fax of the scheduled briefings and we re encouraged to attend. The PIO additionally coordinated r epresentatives from a variety of agencies to ensure accurate information was provided directly from the agencies to the news media (Hughey, 2004b). This facilitated information flow from NEMA to the residents of

PAGE 216

197 the Bahamas. The PIO also addressed and provided information to international news outlets such as the BBC, NBC, CBS, and CNN upon request (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004a). The established briefings cement ed NEMA as the national agency responsible for emergency management. It was through cooperative interaction with media representatives that NEMA was able to ensure accurate information was being publicized. Residents consis tently received information on response and recovery efforts directly from NEMA (Hughey, 2004b). As a result of this structured approach the mass communicati on systems were provided with the appropriate and accurate information relate d to the Hurricane Frances response efforts. 4.2.7.5 Hurricane Jeanne 2004 Criterion Seven: Pr ovide Appropriate and Accurate Reports for the News Media Response to Jeanne utilized the same approach employed during response to Frances. Through the use of a PIO, ESF 5 Planning and Information, instituted regularly scheduled briefings. Through close coordination with the NEMA director and support agen cy liaisons the PIO held open briefings for the media at 8:00am, 11:30am, 5:00pm and 9:00pm (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2002; NEMA, 2004b; NEMA, 2004c). These daily briefings, which had been established during response to Hurric ane Frances, provided the media with an opportunity to ask questions and prov ide the most update d information to residents. As a result mass communi cation systems were provided with the appropriate and accurate information relate d to the Hurricane Jeanne response efforts (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004c). Quar entelli’s evaluation criteria suggest

PAGE 217

198 that the mass communication system was effectively provided with appropriate and accurate information with regards to Hurricane Jeanne. Data was not available to determine the citiz ens trust in the local media. 4.2.7.6 Hurricane Wilma 200 5 Criterion Seven: Provide Appropriate and Accurate Reports for the News Media Through the use of a PIO, ESF 5 Pl anning and Information, instituted regularly scheduled briefings (NEMA, 2002; NEMA, 2005). NEMA provided appropriate and accurate information to the media usin g a structured and standardized approach in response to Hu rricane Wilma. This same approach was used in response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne. Through close coordination with the NEMA director and support agency liaisons the PIO held open briefings for the media at 8:00am, 11:30am, 5:00pm and 9:00pm. These daily briefings, which had been establishe d a year earlier during response to Hurricane Frances, provided the media wit h an opportunity to ask questions and provide the most updated informa tion to residents (NEMA, 2005). 4.2.7.7 Criterion Seven Summary Referring back to Table 4.23, a clear pattern of improvement is shown during post-CEM response operations. T he improvement can be associated with the implementation of the national response plan (2002), which outlined responsibilities and operating procedures to ensure accurate and timely information regarding disasters is delivered to the public.

PAGE 218

199 4.2.8 Criterion Eight: Ha ve a Well-Functioning Emer gency Operations Center (EOC) Criterion eight examines the functioning of the EOC during each of the six study hurricanes. Table 4.24 displays the results of Qu arnatelli’s (1997a) methodology for evaluating the functioning of an EOC. Evident is the fact that none of the six study hurricanes had a ‘well-functioning emergency operation center’. A detailed description and suppor ting data for the responses in Table 4.24 can be found in secti ons 4.2.8.1 – 4.2.8.6 Evaluation of Criter ion Eight: Having a well-functioning emergency operations center (EOC) Pre-CEM Post-CEM Andrew 1992 Floyd 1999 Michelle 2001 Frances 2004 Jeanne 2004 Wilma 2005 Have a WellFunctioning Emergency Operations Center (EOC) No No No No No No Table 4.24 Evaluation of Criterion Eight: Having a well-functioning emergency operations center (EOC) 4.2.8.1 Hurricane Andrew 1992 Criterion Eight: Ha ve a Well-Functioning Emergency Operations Center (EOC) An operation center was activated by the RBDF in response to Hurricane Andrew. However no multi-agency national EOC was established. The RBDF EOC was indented only to coor dinate internal activities associated with response. The EOC did not facilitate the effective implementation of all required response activities for two key r easons. First, the EOC did not house all agencies responding (only the RBDF were present in the EOC) limiting information flow

PAGE 219

200 and preventing the coordinati on or assets. Secondly, the EOC was housed in a conference room at the cabinet office, and did not meet the necessary physical requirements as outlined by Quarantelli (1997a). Table 4.25 displays the physical requi rements for the EOC as outlined by in the methodology chapter of this document. It is clear to see that the physical requirements were not met. The EOC wa s located close to the water without easy access to key transportation routes or key facilities. The small conference room did not provide adequate work spac e for all agencies responding to Hurricane Andrew nor were there adequate sl eeping and bathing facilities. The EOC had telephone landlines but the north western islands, most significantly impacted by the storm lost telecomm unication capabilities and communication between the islands did not exist (Office of The Prime Minister, 1992). The lack of communication was further confirmed by Tellis Symonette, Vice President of The Bahamas Telecommunication Company during an informal conversation on January 26, 2007. Computers were not av ailable in the EOC and all reporting was done by hand resulting in information dissemination delays. Additionally, detailed maps and comprehensive lists of av ailable resources were not on hand. This was validated through personal observa tion of the EOC facility utilized in response to Andrew as well as informal discussion with RBDF personnel. Applying the data to Quarantel li’s criteria it appears that a well-functioning EOC did not exist in The Bahamas in response to Hurricane Andrew.

PAGE 220

201 Evaluation of Hurricane Andrew EOC Physical Requirements The National EOC was/had… Yes/No 1. Located in a safe area in close proximity to key transportation routes; No 2. Sufficient work space; No 3. Bathroom and sleeping facilities; No 4. Adequate communication provisions; No 5. Computers and necessary supplies; No 6. Maps and equipment inventories No Table 4.25 – Evaluation of Hurricane A ndrew EOC Physical Requirements 4.2.8.2 Hurricane Floyd 1999 Criteri on Eight: Have a Well-Functioning Emergency Operations Center (EOC) An EOC was activated at the Office of The Prime Minist er by the RBDF. However, to be identified as ‘well-functi oning,’ an EOC must be more that just a common location. An EOC is intended to facilitate the effective implementation of all required response activities and should be seen as a function not just a structure. The EOC activated in res ponse to Hurricane Floyd did not house all responding organization nor did it fac ilitate the coordination between public, private, local, regional, and international agencies. Manned exclusively by the Defence Force, the EOC lacked knowledgeable liaison personnel. Furthermore, as displayed in Table 4.26, the physical r equirements for the EOC were not met. The EOC was locat ed within 100 yards of the water and only 2.3 feet above sea level. Additionally the location does not have easy access to transportation routes or key facilities such as the airport or di saster warehouse.

PAGE 221

202 There would have been adequate work s pace for organizations and agencies responding to Floyd but only the Defence Fo rce was present in the EOC. There were no sleeping facilities located in the EOC and although there were bathrooms, they were not equipped with showers; hence they did not adequately accommodate for long term response operat ions with any shower facilities. Evaluation of Hurricane Floyd EOC Physical Requirements The National EOC was/had… Yes/No 1. Located in a safe area in close proximity to key transportation routes; No 2. Sufficient work space; Yes 3. Bathroom and sleeping facilities; No 4. Adequate communication provisions; No 5. Computers and necessary supplies; No 6. Maps and equipment inventories No Table 4.26 – Evaluation of Hurricane Floyd EOC Physica l Requirements The EOC, located in the cabinet o ffice, had telephone landlines as well as satellite phones that were provided by the RBDF (Bethel, 2006). However, following Floyd telecommunication lines were down throughout the islands (Bahamas Telecommunication Company, 1999). The satellite phones were reliable but operator error result ed in a limited success in reaching representatives on the family islands (Rigby, 2006). Computers and necessary supplies were not available. Records and reports were written by hand resulting in delays in the dissemination of informati on. Additionally, det ailed maps of the

PAGE 222

203 Family Islands were not available whic h limited response planning initiatives. Additionally comprehensive lists of availa ble resources did not exist. Based on all of this information it is clear that during the response operations to Hurricane Floyd the eighth criterion for good di saster management, A well-functioning Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was not achieved. 4.2.8.3 Hurricane Michelle 2001 Criterion Eight: Have a Well-Functioning Emergency Operations Center (EOC) As with Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd an EOC was activated by the RBDF (Office of The Prime Mini ster, 2001; RBDF, 2001). Howe ver, to be identified as ‘well-functioning,’ an EO C must be more that just a common location. The EOC activated in response to Hurricane Mi chelle did not house all responding organization nor did it fac ilitate the coordination between public, private, local, regional, and international agencies (Office of the Prime Minister, 2001). Manned exclusively by the Defence Fo rce, the EOC lacked knowledgeable liaison personnel. The same location for the EOC was selected for Hurricane Michelle as was used for Hurricanes Andrew and Floy d. Located within 100 yards of the water and only 2.3 feet above sea level the location was not adequate (Hughey, 2004a). Table 4.27 further examines the physical requirement of the EOC.

PAGE 223

204 Evaluation of Hurricane Michelle EOC Physical Requirements The National EOC was/had… Yes/No 1. Located in a safe area in close proximity to key transportation routes; No 2. Sufficient work space; Yes 3. Bathroom and sleeping facilities; No 4. Adequate communication provisions; No 5. Computers and necessary supplies; No 6. Maps and equipment inventories No Table 4.27– Evaluation of Hurricane Mi chelle EOC Physical Requirements The location of the EOC was away from key transportation routes and facilities such as the airport or disaster warehous e. The location did provide for large work spaces for all response agencies but there were no sleeping facilities located in the EOC and alt hough there were bathrooms t hey did not have shower facilities, making them inadequate for l ong-term response operations. The EOC had telephone landlines and the Defence Force was equipped with satellite phones (Office of the Prime Minister, 2001). Damage to the telecommunication system (BTC, 2001) prevented the use of l andlines. Additionally, the satellite phones did not successfully meet the communication needs because only the RBDF personnel had access to them. Computers and necessary supplies were not available and all records and reports were written by hand. This resulted in delays in information dissemination. Furt hermore, detailed maps of the Family Islands were not available which limit ed response planning initiatives. Also

PAGE 224

205 notable, comprehensive lists of available resources did not exist. Applying the data to Quarantelli’s evaluat ion criteria indicates that a well-functioning EOC was not achieved. 4.2.8.4 Hurricane Frances 2004 Criterion Eight: Have a Well-Functioning Emergency Operations Center (EOC) As with Hurricanes Andrew, Floyd and Michelle, an EOC was activated. In response to Hurricane Frances NEMA activated the nat ional EOC in the Churchill Building at NEMA’s national hea dquarters. This building is the same physical location that was used to respond to the three previous hurricanes. As identified in prior response efforts, to be identified as ‘wellfunctioning,’ an EOC must be more that just a common location. The EOC activated in response to Hurricane Frances housed a variety of response organization and effectively coordi nated efforts between public, private, local, regional, and international agenc ies (NEMA 2004a). The same physical location of the EOC as with Hurricanes Andrew, Floyd, and Michelle was 100 yards from the water and only 2.3 feet above sea level (Hughey, 2004a; Hughey, 2004b). Part of the Churchill Building had also been condemned due to structural damage. Table 4.28 further ex amines the physical requirement of the EOC. The location was away from key tr ansportation routes and facilities such as the airport or disaster warehous e (Hughey, 2004a; NEMA, 2004a). The location did provide for large workspaces for all response agencies. Hurricane Frances directly impacted the nation for over 72 hours, the lack of sleeping or

PAGE 225

206 bathing facilities did no t adequately accommodate t he long term response operation that was required. Evaluation of Hurricane Frances EOC Physical Requirements The National EOC was/had… Yes/No 1. Located in a safe area in close proximity to key transportation routes; No 2. Sufficient work space; Yes 3. Bathroom and sleeping facilities; No 4. Adequate communication provisions; No 5. Computers and necessary supplies; No 6. Maps and equipment inventories No Table 4.28 – Evaluation of Hurricane Frances EOC Physical Requirements The EOC was equipped with telephone landlines and satellite phone provided by the RBDF. The Defence Force also provided satellite phones to Family Island Administrators. Following Hurricane Frances many of the family islands experienced telecommunication problems (BTC, 2004a; Hughey, 2004b) NEMA, 2004a). The pre-placed satellite phones were ineffective due to lack of training and operator error (Hughey 2004B). Ham radios operated by many of the police forces were used to relay in formation back to NEMA and the national EOC (RBPF, 2004). Comput ers and necessary supplies were not available during the response to Frances (Hughey, 20 04b). Initially, Records and reports were written by hand resulting in delays in the dissemination of information. Two laptop computers were ultimately locat ed and used to track response activities (Hughey, 2004b). Additionally, detailed maps of the family islands were not

PAGE 226

207 available which limited response planning initiatives. Based on all of this information it is clear that during the response operations to Hurricane Frances the eighth criterion for good disaster management, a well-functioning Emergency Operations Center (EOC), was no t achieved. (See Picture 4.13) Picture 4.13 – Hurricane Frances 2004 Nati onal EOC, Nassau Bahamas. RBDF Personnel. (Source: Erin Hughey) 4.2.8.5 Hurricane Jeanne 200 4 Criterion Eight: Have a Well-Functioning Emergency Operations Center (EOC) The National EOC that had been activated in response to Hurricane Frances remained open to coordination activities related to Jeanne (Hughey, 2004b; NEMA, 2004b). The EOC continued to be located at the Churchill Building in downtown Nassau. As ident ified in prior response efforts, to be identified as ‘well-functi oning,’ an EOC must be more that just a common location.

PAGE 227

208 The EOC activated in response to Hurricane Jeanne housed a variety of response organizations and effectively coordinated efforts between public, private, local, regional, and international agencies. However, it was the physical location and requirements that made the EOC ineffe ctive. The same EOC location that was used for the four pr evious hurricanes was also used in response to Hurricane Jeanne. The EOC is located away from ke y transportation routes and facilities such as the airport and disaster war ehouse. Although the EOC provided for large work spaces for all response organizations, the lack of sleeping and bathing facilities made the location inadequate to handle long-term response operations. The EOC was equipped with telephone landlines and satellite phone provided by the RBDF. The Defence Force also provided satellite phones to Family Island Administrators. During Hurricane Frances response operations, it became evident that many island adminis trators did not know how to utilize the satellite phones so in addition to provid ing the equipment instructions were was provided. Computers and necessary s upplies were not available during the response to Jeanne, and initial record and reporting was written by hand resulting in delays. Detailed maps of the family islands were not available at the EOC and hindered response planning initiative s. (See Table 4.29) Thus, a wellfunctioning Emergency Operations Cent er (EOC) was not achieved during Hurricane Jeanne.

PAGE 228

209 Evaluation of Hurricane Jeanne EOC Physical Requirements The National EOC was/had… Yes/No 1. Located in a safe area in close proximity to key transportation routes; No 2. Sufficient work space; Yes 3. Bathroom and sleeping facilities; No 4. Adequate communication provisions; No 5. Computers and necessary supplies; No 6. Maps and equipment inventories No Table 4.29 – Evaluation of Hurricane Jeanne EOC Physical Requirements 4.2.8.6 Hurricane Wilma 200 5 Criterion Eight: Have a Well-Functioning Emergency Operations Center (EOC) The National EOC, locat ed at the Churchill Building in downtown Nassau is not a well-functioning facility. As displayed in Table 4.30 below, the minimum physical requirements as established by Quarantelli (1997a) were not met. The EOC activated in response to Hurric ane Wilma housed a variety of response organization and effectively coordinated e fforts between the different levels of government. However, it was the physical location and requirements that made the EOC ineffective. Located 100 yards from the water and 2.3 feet above sea level the EOC was not well positioned. Additionally the EOC was located away from key transportation routs and facilities such as the airport and disaster warehouse. Although the EOC provided fo r large workspaces for all response organizations,

PAGE 229

210 the lack of sleeping and bat hing facilities made the location inadequate to handle long-term response operations. Evaluation of Hurricane Wilma EOC Physical Requirements The National EOC was/had… Yes/No 1. Located in a safe area in close proximity to key transportation routes; No 2. Sufficient work space; Yes 3. Bathroom and sleeping facilities; No 4. Adequate communication provisions; Yes 5. Computers and necessary supplies; No 6. Maps and equipment inventories No Table 4.30 – Evaluation of Hurricane Wilma EOC Physical Requirements The EOC was well equipped with te lephone landlines and satellite phone provided by Bahamas Telecommunication Company and the RBDF (BTC, 2005; RBDF, 2005; NEMA, 2005). The Defence Force also provided satellite phones to Family Island Administrators (R BDF, 2005). Computers and necessary supplies were not available during the re sponse to Wilma, and initial record and reporting were again written by hand result ing in delays. Detailed maps of the Family Islands were also not av ailable and hindered response planning initiatives. Thus, a well-functioning EOC was not operational during response to Hurricane Wilma. 4.2.8.7 Criterion Eight Summary Referring back to Table 4.24, shows that none of the six response operations had a ‘well-functi oning emergency operations c enter’. Table 4.31

PAGE 230

211 further identifies the key physical r equirements that need to be addressed to ensure a well-functioning EOC is operational to respond to the next disaster to impact The Bahamas.

PAGE 231

212 Evaluation of EOC Physical Requirements Pre-CEM Post-CEM The National EOC was/had… (Yes/No) Andrew 1992 Floyd 1999 Michelle 2001 Frances 2004 Jeanne 2004 Wilma 2005 1. Located in a safe area in close proximity to key transportation routes; No No No No No No 2. Sufficient work space; No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 3. Bathroom and sleeping facilities; No No No No No No 4. Adequate communication provisions; No No No No No Yes 5. Computers and necessary supplies; No No No No No No 6. Maps and equipment inventories No No No No No No Table 4.31 – Evaluation of t he EOC Physical Requirements fo r the Six Study Hurricanes

PAGE 232

213 4.3 Chapter Summary and Discussion Chapter four examined Q uarantelli’s (1997a) eight criteria for evaluating disaster response as they apply to the six study hurricanes to determine if: Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology for evaluating the management of disaster response could be operationalized. Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology was able to determine if the implementation of a CEM system improved disaster response operations in The Bahamas. Table 4.32 displays the eight evaluation cr iteria as they apply to the six study Hurricanes. Criterion One, adequately ca rrying out generic functions, appears not to have been affected by the implement ation of CEM. However, upon closer examination what emerged wa s a clear improvement in the early recognition of each of the ten generic functions, wh ich are encompassed within the first criterion. The data displayed improv ements that can be a ssociated with the implementation of a CEM system in 2002 (s ee table 4.3) and the development of a national response plan that outlined resp onsibility and SOP’s for each of the functions. This pre-planning allowed The Bahamas to more quickly identify critical functions and needs. Criterion One of Quarnatelli’s (1 997a) methodology was able to be operationalized and applied to the six study hurricanes. Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodolog y identified improvements in response associated with the im plementation of a CEM system.

PAGE 233

214 Eight Criteria for Evaluating The Managem ent of Disaster Response Operations to the Six Study Hurricanes Pre-CEM Post-CEM Andrew 1992 Floyd 1999 Michelle 2001 Frances 2004 Jeanne 2004 Wilma 2005 1. Adequately carrying out generic functions; No No No No No No 2. Effectively mobilizing personnel and resources; No No No No Yes Yes 3. Adequately processing information; No No No Yes Yes Yes 4. Properly exercising decision-making; No No No No No Yes 5. Developing overall coordination; No No No Yes Yes Yes 6. Correctly recognizing differences between response and agent-generated demands; No No No No No Yes 7. Providing appropriate and accurate reports for the news media; No No No Yes Yes Yes 8. Having a wellfunctioning emergency operations center; No No No No No No Table 4.32 Eight Criteria for Evaluat ing The Management of Disaster Response Operations to the Six Study Hurricanes

PAGE 234

215 Criterion Two, effectively mobili zing personnel and resources, showed improvements following the im plementation of the CEM system. An association with the improvement in the function and the development of a national emergency response plan was noted. It is critical to identify however that the improvements associated to the CEM syst em does not rule out and take away from the impact that exper ience may have played in improvements to response operations. It is hypothesized that the implementation of t he CEM and continued response experience both contri buted to the improvement. Criterion Two of Quarnatelli’s (1 997a) methodology was able to be operationalized and applied to the six study hurricanes. Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodolog y identified improvements in response associated with the im plementation of a CEM system. Experience was also noted as a contri buting factor to the improvement of response. Criterion Three, adequately processing in formation, displayed a pattern of improvement following the implement ation of the CEM system. The implementation of a national response plan helped to develop clear lines of communication between citizens, the government, and response agencies that allowed for more accurate processing of information and improved response operations. Also associated with the im provement are experience and improved recording keeping.

PAGE 235

216 Criterion Three of Qu arnatelli’s (1997a) methodology was able to be operationalized and applied to the six study hurricanes. Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodolog y identified improvements in response associated with the im plementation of a CEM system. Experience and improved record keeping was identified as a potential contributing factor to the improvement in response post-CEM. Criterion Four, the properly ex ercising decision-making, showed no pattern or association of improvement following the implementation of CEM. Response operations to Hurricanes Fr ances and Jeanne experienced the same problems with decision-making as the pre-CEM response operations. Improvements were noted in response to Hurricane Wilma but the data indicate that the improvement is associated with experience rather then a change in the fundamental management strategy of disaster response. Criterion Four of Quarnatell i’s (1997a) methodology can be operationalized and was applied to the six study hurricanes. Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology di d not note any improvements to the exercising of decision-making as a result of the impl ementation of a CEM system. Data indicated improvements in the proper exercising of decisionmaking was associated with experience.

PAGE 236

217 Criterion Five, developing over all coordination, showed a marked improvement after the im plementation of the CEM system. Data indicates improvements are associat ed with the development of a nation response plan that required multi-agency coordination over a two-year period pr ior to the impact of Hurricane Frances. The process of dev eloping coordination helped to facilitate a strong working relationship between ministries and agencies active in response allowing for a successful envir onment for coordination. Criterion Five of Quarnatell i’s (1997a) methodology can be operationalized and was applied to the six study hurricanes. Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodolog y identified improvements in response associated with the implem entation of a CEM system and the development of a national respon se plan that required multi-agency coordination. Criterion Six, Correctly recognizi ng differences between response and agent-generated demands, was depende nt of the success of cr iteria 2 through 5. The data did not identify an associ ation between crit erion six and the implementation of a CEM system. Criterion Six of Quar natelli’s (1997a) met hodology was dependent on the success of criteria 2-5. As a result, criterion six was operationalized and was applied to the six study hurricanes. Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology di d not identified an association between the identification of re sponseand agent-generated demands following the implementation of a CEM system.

PAGE 237

218 Criterion Seven, providing appropri ate and accurate reports for the news media, showed a clear pattern of im provement during the post-CEM response operations. The data showed the impr ovement was associated with the implementation of the nati onal response plan (2002). Criterion Seven of Quarnate lli’s (1997a) methodology was operationalized and applied to the six study hurricanes. Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology i dentified an associ ation between improved reporting to the news m edia and the implementation of a CEM system. Criterion eight, a well-functioning emergency operations center, showed no improvement associated to the implem entation of a CEM system. Challenges to the physical requirements outlined by Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology indicated the EOC facilities utilized in response to each of the six study hurricanes were insufficient. Criterion Eight of Quarnatelli’s (1997a) methodology was operationalized and applied to the six study hurricanes. Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology i dentified no association between the functioning of the EOC and the im plementation of a CEM system. Quarentelli’s (1997a) methodology for evaluating the management of disaster response operations was able to be operationalized and applied to all six of the study hurricanes. It is reco mmended however that the methodology be

PAGE 238

219 refined for ease of application and to ensure consistency in use. A more detailed and structured application guideline is al so recommended to prevent subjective employment of the tool. The use of benchmarks would also provide emergency managers with the necessary apparatus to establish response goals and provide a metric to rate the overall improvem ent to response within a jurisdiction.

PAGE 239

220 Chapter Five Results: Surveys & Interviews “Emergency Management is the pro cess of coordinating available resources to deal with emergencies effectively, thereby saving lives, avoiding injury, and minimizing ec onomic loss” (FEMA, 2003b: ). 5.1 Introduction The following chapter provides the re search findings associated with data collected from the structured surveys and the semi-structured interviews. The results are presented in tabular form usi ng numerical and percentage totals when appropriate. The data in this chapter are formatted to answer the following research question. Did the implementation of a CEM system improve disaster response? 5.2 Survey Findings As discussed in chapter three of this dissertation, the structured surveys were self administered and intended to gauge the Family Island Administrators perception of disaster re sponse preand post-CEM. (See Appendix A) There were a total of twenty (20) Family Isl and Administrators responsible for serving as the NEMA representative for each of th eir respective jurisdictions. With a 100% return rate on the surveys, the entire identified po pulation data was obtained.

PAGE 240

221 Questions 1-3 on the survey gauged the respondents’ emergency management training background, as well as provided an opportunity for training recommendations. It is important to understand the respondents training and experience because both will inform the respondents perception of response operations. Questions 4 and 5 focused on planning and information. These two question help to provide additional context to the respondents’ perceptions of the national response to the six study hurric anes. If an Island Administrator had an emergency plan in place, and had open lines of communication with the national government they may have different res ponse expectations then those who did not have a plan or were not in communica tion. Questions 6-9 were focused on the response operation to the six study hurri canes. It is important to note that although there were six study hurricanes respondents were asked to rate four response operations. Family Island Admi nistrators were not asked to rate response to Hurricane Michelle 2001, bec ause the family islands were not significantly impacted by the storm. Also noteworthy, is the fact that Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne 2004 were rated as one response operation. Because the two storms occurred within three wee ks of one another it was difficult to differentiate between response operations The remaining six questions on the survey provided additional contextual information on experience and challenges to effective emergency response. 5.2.1 Emergency Management Training Table 5.1 below displays the results of question one; has your island received disaster training from the NEMA office? As the results show only 40%

PAGE 241

222 of the Island Administrators report havi ng received disaster training for their jurisdiction. Q1: Has your island received disaster training from the NEMA office? Yes No No Response Total # % # % # % # % Has your island received disaster training from the NEMA office? 8 40% 12 60% 0 0% 20 100% Table 5.1 – Survey Question One, Has your island received disaster training from the NEMA office. Of the 8 Family Island Admini strators who reported that their island had received disaster training the following traini ng courses were identified as being conducted. Communications Training SUMA Training – (Humanitarian Supply Management Training Course offered by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) in coordination with NEMA. SUMA is a tool for the management of humanitarian relief supplies, from the time pledges are made by donors, to thei r entry into the disaster area and their storage and distribution) Damage Assessment Training Shelter Management Training was reported by three island administrators Community Response General Disaster Management Training was reported by two island administrators

PAGE 242

223 Hurricane Management Community Emergency Response Training (CERT) was reported by two island administrators. Disaster Assessment Annual Conference Island Administrators were aske d what type of emergency management training they would like to see offered by NEMA their responses are provided below. The data illustrates the need for a comprehensive training curriculum. Q2 – What type of training would you like to see offered by NEMA? “Shelter management & disaster communications” “I.T. and disaster management” “More shelter management, supplie s management & distribution system implementation.” “CERT” [community emergency response team] “More First Aid and Emergency response training. Also more information about shelter management” “Mass-Casualty Incident Management” “Additional training in shelter, community response and general disaster management as well as search and rescue and environmental and demographics. “ “Shelter Management & Disaster Communications” “Before, during and after a disaster” “Proper damage assessment, fi rst responders courses for persons to deal with medical em ergencies, proper distribution after a disaster.” “Disaster preparedness, operati onal procedures for command centre, search and rescue, training in first aid.” “Working secessions with the di saster preparedness committee” “Hurricane preparedness and disaster management” “Shelter Management and Damage Assessment”

PAGE 243

224 Six of the twenty Island Administrato rs chose not to provide training recommendations while the remaining f ourteen respondents showed the need for a wide range of training. Question three asked respondents if t hey or a represent ative from their agency attend any of the NEMA Conferences held in 2004, 2005, or 2006. Table 5.2, shows that 75% of the res pondents attended or had a representative attended one or more of the NEMA Conferen ces. What is alarming however, is that 25% of the administrators indica ted that they had not participated. Q3: Did you or a representative from your agency attend any of the NEMA Conferences held in 2004, 2005, and 2006? Yes No No Response Total # % # % # % # % Did you or a representative from your agency attend any of the NEMA Conferences held in 2004, 2005, and 2006? 15 75% 5 25% 0 0% 20 100% Table 5.2 – Survey Question Three, Did you or a representative from your agency attend any of the NEMA Confer ences held in 2004, 2005, and 2006?

PAGE 244

225 As a sub section to question three, respondents who responded yes to the question were asked if they found the c onference to be useful; explain why or why not? ”The Conference was very useful because it teaches how to prevent the possible loss of life but it does not follow up with the needs in order to survive afterwards.” “It opened my eyes to a number of issues that have to do with disaster management” “Very Useful” “Yes – informative but very deta iled therefore trai ning should be held in Family Island.” “Very Useful, good information” “Provided Good Information” “Very useful. Final report from Conference would be helpful as reference material.” “Yes, because as a result were able to make plans more practical and meaningful.” “Interaction with other Island Representatives and Sharing of Information and Strategies for Preparation was useful” “Yes, we learned about what does and does not belong in a shelter. This was August 2005” “It helped in Organizing N-G-O and other volunteers for disaster.” “It was very helpful – should be extended to FI [Family Island] communities or invite more FI [Family Island] first responders.” “Very useful” “Useful. Good Information, Good Networking.” “Conferences were very useful”

PAGE 245

226 5.2.2 Planning and Information Question four, displayed in Table 5. 3, intended to determine if Island Administrators had a disaster pr eparedness and response plan for their respective jurisdiction. Eighty-five percent (85%) of re spondents reported that they did have a disaster plan in place. Q4: Does your island have a disaster preparedness and response plan? Yes No No Response Total # % # % # % # % Does your island have a disaster preparedness and response plan? 17 85% 3 15% 0 0% 20 100% Table 5.3 – Survey Question Four, Does your island have a disaster preparedness and response plan? Of the 17 respondents w ho reported having an emergency response plan, over 64% stated that thei r plan had been updated within t he last two years. (See Table 5.4) Seventeen percent (17%) reported that their plan was updated in the last three years, while another seventeen percent (17%) did not respond. This reveals that 11 of the 20 Island Administra tors (or 55%) have a disaster plan in

PAGE 246

227 place that has been reviewed within the last two years. More importantly 45% of the Island Administrators do not hav e updated emergency response plan. Q4a: When was the last time th e disaster plan w as reviewed and updated? 2006 2005 No Response Total # % # % # % # % If yes, when was the last time it was reviewed and updated? 11 64.7% 3 17.6% 3 17.6% 17 100% Table 5.4 – Survey Question Four(a), When was the last time the disaster plan was reviewed and updated? Survey question five asked Family Is land Administrators to rate on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being not at all and 5 being co mpletely) NEMA’s efforts to inform the public of its role in di saster planning and response? Table 5.6 shows that the mean ranking was 3.45 with a standard deviati on of 0.759. This indicates that the majority of respondents felt that NE MA was doing a good job at informing the public of their role in disaster planning and response. Fifty percent (50%) of the administrators rated the effort s by NEMA to inform the public of its role in disaster planning and response at a 4 or 5.

PAGE 247

228 Q5 – How would you rate NEMA’s effort s to inform the public of its Role in Disaster Planning and Response? N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation How would you rate NEMA’s efforts to inform the public of their role in Disaster planning and Response? 20 .00 5.00 3.4500 0.75915 Valid N 20 Table 5.5 – Survey Question Five, How woul d you rate NEMA’s efforts to inform the public of their role in disaster planning and response? 5.2.3 Response Operation Questions 6-9 on the survey focused on the national response to the six study hurricanes. As stated previously, Is land Administrators were asked to rate the national response to four operations: Andrew 1992, Floyd 1999, Frances and Jeanne 2004, and Wilma 2005. Omitted from the survey was response to Hurricane Michelle 2001, because the Fam ily Islands were not significantly impacted by the storm. As discussed in det ail in Appendix B of this dissertation, Michelle made landfall on the Island of Ne w Providence impacting the capital city of Nassau. Also important to note is the grouping of Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne. Because the two storms occu rred within three weeks of one another and due to overlap in response initiatives Island Administrators were asked to evaluate the response as one event. A scale of 1-5 was utilized for this research, 1 being not successful and 5 being fully successful. 1 represented not successful, 2 represented weak success, 3 represented good success, 4 represented very good success 5 represented fully successful. Because the study population is so small ( 20 Island Administrators) it is important for this research to examine the number of respondents in eac h category as well

PAGE 248

229 as the mean rating. By utilizing the mean, a rating for each response was established allowing for comparative evaluation. Question six aimed to gauge the Island Administrators perception of the national response to Hurricane Andrew Respondents were asked, to rate the response on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being not successful and 5 being fully successful). As shown in Table 5.6 t he mean ranking was 2.25 with a standard deviation of 1.48. Based on the m ean, the national response to Hurricane Andrew was weak. Table 5.7 provides the number of responses per ranking. The table however represents only 85% of the total responses. Not displayed in the table are the 3 responses (or 15%) that rat ed the national response to Hurricane Andrew at zero, displaying great dissati sfaction. The mean as well as the raw numbers show that the Island Administ rators did not perceive the national response to Hurricane Andrew to be fully successful. Q6How would you rate the success of the national response to Hurricane Andrew (1992)? N Min Max Mean Median Mode Std. Deviation Response to Hurricane Andrew 1992 20 .00 5.00 2.2500 3.0000 3.00 1.48235 Valid N 20 Table 5.6 – Survey Question Six, How wo uld you rate the National Governments Response to Hurricane Andrew ? (Descriptive Statistics) Q6On a scale of 1 to 5 how succe ssful was the national response to Hurricane Andrew (1992)? Not Successful (1) Week Success (2) Good Success (3) Very Good Success (4) Fully Successful (5) Number of Respondents 5 0 9 2 1 Percentage 25% 0% 45% 10% 5% Table 5.7 – Survey Question Six, How wo uld you rate the National Governments Response to Hurricane Andrew? (Response Breakdown)

PAGE 249

230 Survey question seven, was intended to gauge the Island Administrators perception of the national re sponse to Hurricane Floyd. Table 5.8, displays the mean rating of 2.55 with a standard deviation of 0.933. The mean ranking indicates the Island Administrators perceiv ed the national response to Floyd to have weak to good success. The mean score for Floyd was only slightly higher than that of Hurricane Andrew however the decrease in the standard deviation indicates greater agreement amon g the administrators. Q7 How would you rate the success of the National Governments Response to Hurricane Floyd? N Min Max Mean Median Mode Std. Deviation Response to Hurricane Floyd 1999 20 1.00 4.00 2.55 3.0000 3.00 0.93330 Valid N 20 Table 5.8 – Survey Question Seven, Ho w would you rate the success of the National Governments Response to Hurri cane Floyd? (Descriptive Statistics) Table 5.9 provides the number of responses per ranking. The table represents 100% of the total responses and indicates that the majority of Island Administrators perceived the national resp onse to Hurricane Floyd to have weak to good success. Forty-five percent (45%) perceived the response to be good, this was also the case for Hurricane Andrew.

PAGE 250

231 Q7How would you rate the National Governments Response to Hurricane Floyd? Not Successful (1) Week Success (2) Good Success (3) Very Good Success (4) Fully Successful (5) Number of Respondents 4 4 9 3 0 Percentage 20% 20% 45% 15% 0% Table 5.9 – Survey Question Seven, Ho w would you rate the success of the National Governments Response to Hurricane Floyd? (Response Breakdown) Survey question eight, evaluated the national response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne. Because the two hurricanes occurred within three weeks of one another and many of the response and recovery initiatives overlapped they were grouped together. Respondents were again asked, to rate the success of the national response on a scale of 1 to 5. As displayed in Table 5.10, the mean score was 3.95 with a standard deviation of 0.686. This score is a marked increase from that of Hurric anes Andrew and Floyd and show strong agreement among the Island Administrators. Q8 How would you rate the success of the National Governments Response to Hurricanes Frances & Jeanne? N Min Max Mean Median Mode Std. Deviation Response to Hurricanes Frances & Jeanne 2004 20 .00 5.00 3.9500 4.0000 4.00 0.68633 Valid N 20 Table 5.10 – Survey Question Eight, Ho w would you rate the success of the National Governments Response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne? (Descriptive Statistics)

PAGE 251

232 Q8How would you rate t he success of the National Governments Response to Hurricane Frances & Jeanne? Not Successful (1) Week Success (2) Good Success (3) Very Good Success (4) Fully Successful (5) Number of Respondents 0 0 5 11 4 Percentage 0% 0% 25% 55% 20% Table 5.11 – Survey Question Eight, Ho w would you rate the success of the National Governments Response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne? (Response Breakdown) Table 5.11 provides the number of responses per ranking for question eight of the survey. The table repr esents 100% of the total responses and indicates that the majori ty of Island Administrators perceived the national response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne to have a very good success rate. Seventy-five percent (75%) of the responden ts identified the national response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne to be very to fully successful. As displayed in Table 5.12, the means score provided by the Family Island Administrators was 4.05 with a standard dev iation of .604. The success of the national response was perceived to be ve ry successful. The standard deviation again shows strong agreement among the island administrators. Q9 How would you rate the success of the National Governments Response to Hurricane Wilma? N Min Max Mean Median Mode Std. Deviation Response to Hurricane Wilma 2005 20 3.00 5.00 4.0500 4.0000 4.00 0.60481 Valid N 20 Table 5.12 – Survey Question Nine, How would you rate the National Governments Response to Hurricane Wilma? (Descriptive Statistics)

PAGE 252

233 Table 5.13 provides the number of responses per ranking for question nine of the survey. The table repres ents 100% of the total responses and indicates that the majori ty of Island Administrato rs perceived the national response to Hurricanes Wilma to have a very good success rate. Eighty-five percent (85%) of the respondents identif ied the national response to Hurricane Wilma to be very to fully successful. Displayed is a perceived improvement in the national governments response to Hurricane Wilma when compared to Andrew and Floyd. What is not clearly revealed with this data is if the perceived improvements in the national response ar e due to the implementation of CEM or experience. Q9How would you rate t he success of the National Governments Response to Hurricane Wilma? Not Successful (1) Week Success (2) Good Success (3) Very Good Success (4) Fully Successful (5) Number of Respondents 0 0 3 13 4 Percentage 0% 0% 15% 65% 20% Table 5.13 – Survey Question Nine, Ho w would you rate the success of the National Governments Response to Hu rricane Wilma? (Response Breakdown) 5.2.4 Experience and Challenges A ssociated with Effective Emergency Response Table 5.14 displays the results of survey question ten, which asked the Island Administrators’ if they were aware that The Bahamas has been working since 2002 to develop a CEM structure in an effort to coor dinate disaster planning and response activities. An aw areness of CEM and the national efforts exists among island administrat ors with 60% reporting yes.

PAGE 253

234 Q10 – Were you aware that The Baha mas has been working since 2002 to develop a CEM structure in an effort to coordinate disaster planning and response activities? Yes No No Response Total # % # % # % # % Were you aware that The Bahamas has been working since 2002 to develop a CEM structure? 12 60% 8 40% 0 0% 20 100% Table 5.14 – Survey Question Ten, Were you aware that The Bahamas has been working since 2002 to develop a CEM structur e in an effort to coordinate disaster planning and response activities? Survey question eleven asked Family Island Administrators to identify what they saw as the biggest challenge to disaster preparedness and response on their respective islands. As outlined be low, there were a variety of different challenges identified by each administrator. Q11: What do you see as the biggest challenge to disaster preparedness and response on your island? “Hurricane Shelters” “Finances and Informing the Public; Emergency Communications; Management of Personnel and Equipment.” “Geographical layout. Communication in and between local government, districts and their cays.” “Evacuation efforts. People ta king the hurricane seriously and also them listening to the warn ings and orders from officials and responding to them appropriately.” “Geography” “Lack of interest. Where interest exists, it is personal & Selfish.” “The harmonizing of the various administrative districts. Response plans in the absence of a line of authority among the

PAGE 254

235 administrators, and an approved NEMA representative on the island.” “Shelters” “(1) Establishing good communication (inter-island & international). (2) Shelter management & support personnel. (3) Identifying adequate shelters. (4) Maintaining inventory of emergency supplies. (5) Establishing a budget for NEMA’s operations on the islands. “The potential for a major hurricane to hit New Providence.” “Better cooperation by The Public” “Suitable Shelters and Supplies.” “To have in place up to date worth while hurricane shelters with good communication and other supplies in place.” “Lack of training” “Insufficient hurricane shelters and the need for more training in disaster preparedness management.” “Lack of funding to prepared for and in the aftermath of disaster mobilization of human and technical resources.” “Geography of The Bahamas” Family Island Administrators were asked in survey question twelve to identify what they saw as the biggest challenge to disaster preparedness and response for The Commonwealth of The Bahamas. Q 12 – What do you see as the biggest c hallenge to disaster preparedness and response for The Bahamas “Geographical layout” “To much red tape and not enough acti on. People not realizing the dangers of a hurricane and not knowing how serious this matter is.” “The scattered nature of the geogr aphy of The Bahamas makes it difficult to mobilize resource s and the urgency in Eleuthera the lack of one central hurricane stre tches limited and [illegible] resources.” “The absence of an appointed NEMA representative on multiadministrative districts causes coordination problems because each administrator is responsible.”

PAGE 255

236 “Distribution of Resources, Pl anning & co-ordinating community preparedness efforts, communications.” “Developing and maintaining a satisfactory communication network for all Islands and inhabited cays.” “Hurricane Shelters and Communication.” “Geographical make-up of the co untry and scarce resources” “Finances & manpower, emer gency communication, and medical personnel and equipment.” “The biggest challenge as it relates to disaster preparedness and response would be inadequa te hurricane shelters, and persons who are reluctant to evacuate when asked to do so. Proper vehicles to be used in severe cases of flooding and voluntary manpower.” “Training & educating the general public. Institutionalizing a national awareness campaign.” “Providing suitable shelters and equipment.” “Better cooperation by the public.” “If New Providence is hit by a hurricane” Survey question thirteen asked Family Island Administrators to identify ways national disaster preparedness and re sponse can be improved. Continued coordination between the isl ands and NEMA is a main theme throughout. Also identified was the strengthening of inst itutional resources to ensure emergency needs are effectively met. This question id entifies support for government action as well as pinpoints areas for enhancement that the Island Administrators feel will improve response within the nation. Q13: How do you think national di saster preparedness and response can be improved? “By visiting each island and having neighboring islands equipped rather than wa iting on New Provid ence (e.g. Southern Islands).” “Cutting through the red tape and responding to the peoples needs as soon as possible.”

PAGE 256

237 “See #12” [“Training & Education G eneral Public. Instituting a national awareness campaign.”] “By supplying No 12” [“Prov iding suitable shelters and equipment”] “By better equipping family islands.” “National disaster preparedne ss response can be improved by frequently upgrading the level of training in New Providence and specifically the family islands.” “Government should provide more funds and employ more persons to be trained and work full time with that particular area.” “More input and pooling of resources from private sector.” “Put proper shelters in place, upgrade the telecommunication system, train personnel t hat are serious about disaster.” “It can be improved by utilizing t he Defence Force rather than volunteer personnel for disast er preparedness in most areas volunteers exist only on paper in event of crises attendance of volunteers is not guaranteed.” “The National Disaster Team needs to visit each district for onthe-ground evaluation and training.” Table 5.15 below displays the results for survey question fourteen. Island Administrators were asked if they thought that the pass age of the National Disaster Preparedness and Response Act w ould improve disaster response within The Bahamas. (Why or why not) As the results show 100% of the Island Administrators believe that the legislation will improve di saster response. This is an overwhelming response that indica tes there is awareness among the respondents that the government needs the legal authority to act in response to a national disaster.

PAGE 257

238 Q14 – Do you think the passage of th e National Disaster Preparedness and Response Act will improve disaster response within The Bahamas? Yes No No Response Total # % # % # % # % Do you think the passage of the National Disaster Preparedness and Response Act will improve disaster response within The Bahamas? 20 100% 0 0% 0 0% 20 100% Table 5.15 – Survey Question Fourteen, Do you think the passage of the National Disaster Preparedness and Re sponse Act will improve disaster response within The Bahamas? Respondents were also asked to provide additional information on why they felt the legislation would improve disaster response within The Bahamas. The majority of island administrators ident ified the legislati on as providing the legal authority for the government to act. Q.14a: Do you think the passage of the National Disaster Preparedness and Response Act will improve disaster res ponse within The Bahamas? Why or Why not. “Because it establishes t he scope of authority for the government and its representatives.” “Yes, however an act in and of itse lf will not impr ove or mitigate disasters implementation does which includes resources.” “Because more persons would be educated to act in case of emergency or disaster, because of the training received.” “Equipment will be available.” “Efforts will be more co-ordinated within a legal framework.” “Bring about greater awareness of rules and responsibilities to all stakeholders and the general community.”

PAGE 258

239 “It will allow authorities to make mandatory evacuations thus saving the lives of some people who did not want to leave their houses.” “Provides a legal framework” “To a certain extent. There is not sufficient teeth in the act.” “Provided it is presented and discussed in an island to island campaign.” “Yes, because people tend to obey the laws.” “It would be officially law and we would have to place more focus and attention towards this situation.” “Once the policies and proc edures are implemented there should be an improvement.” “Because all the right agencies will be involved.” “Everyone would know their roles. Funding and equipment will be made available.” Survey question fifteen asked Family Island Administrators what they thought other island nations in the Cari bbean could learn from The Bahamas with regards to disaster preparedness and res ponse. A theme of coordination and self-reliance comes through in the comments provided. Q15 What do you think other island nat ions in the Caribbean can learn from The Bahamas with regards to disa ster preparedness and response. “That we have a dynamic plan that is consultive based with local residents and districts.” “Multi-island strategies.” “Making all houses strong enough to withstand hurricane force winds.” “Excellent weather and comm unication reporting via ZNS network. ZNS and the met depar tment are models for the region.” “How to effectively coordinate mitigation measures, from many areas.” “Multi-island planning stra tegies, communications & transportation strategies.”

PAGE 259

240 “Not to depend on churches and lodges for hurricane shelters.” “Do not procrastinate or react, be proactive.” “That in order for it to be a su ccess, we must all join together and help our neighbors.” “By educating the public to act quickly in case of disaster.” “A coordinated effort to meet and share ideas.” “That good management can result in minimum property damage and loss of lives.” “Good planning can reduce losses.” “The Bahamas ability to garner international support and to guide and direct its people during the disaster and respond quickly to their needs after the disaster.” Respondents were also provided wit h the opportunity to offer any general comments related to emergency m anagement within the Bahamas. The responses provided as well as the answers to questions 10-15 illustrate understanding among the Family Island Administrators of the importance of disaster planning and coor dination as a means for improving disaster response and reducing losses. Family Island Administrators General Comments “The concept of Hurricane Preparedness must be taken seriously and the after actions must be declassified out of Nassau thus bringing the admin istrators more authority and flexibility to act speedily when required.” “More attention should be given be fore a disaster strikes. Teams should be sent to each island to verify if the island was prepared for the pending disaster.” “Arrangements for travel to affected Islands need to be coordinated i.e. separat e flights for politicians and assessment teams.” “Funding ought to be provided in an effort to be properly prepared.”

PAGE 260

241 “NEMA is doing an excellent job in helping to educate Bahamians and the persons living in this country about the importance of disaster pr eparedness and how to deal with National disasters.” “More resources needed to put theory into practice.” “Disaster preparedness should be an on going process.” “NEMA is to be congratulated for its proactive approach to mitigate disasters, however, visits to every family island is encouraged. The technical and human resources of Mr. Luke Bethel is user friendly.” “Disaster Preparedness requires res ource to plan properly. A designated head & item amount should be budgeted to assist with Disaster Preparations. At the end of the Season, if funds are not utilized they could be dive rted to other national events, e.g. Independence, etc. Proper coastal mapping for potential flooding areas are essential. Is lands in the Southern & Central Bahamas needs to be given more attention for Disaster Training. A co-ordinated effort is needed to construct at leas one multi-purpose building in each District that can be used as a Shelter and as a Youth Development Center.” “Generally pleased with efforts of NEMA. Keep up the good work.” “The appointment of a NEMA representative and the establishment of a clear line of authority island wide among the administrators.” Eleven (11) of the 20 Island Ad ministrators chose to provide general comments. A clear desire fo r better communication, planning and coordination to ensure that they [Island Administrato rs] are an active part of emergency management was express ed. Increases in available funding and improvements in asset coor dination were also articulated. NEMA was given praise for its proactive approach to emergency management within the nation. It is through the implement ation of a CEM system that NEMA was established and the Island Administrators took an active role in the emergency managem ent process. As stated in the

PAGE 261

242 literature (Quarantelli, 1997a, FEMA 2003a) coordination and planning prior to a disaster helps to facilitat e more effective emergency response. The structured survey conclud ed by obtaining data on experience by asking respondents the number of years they had served as an Island Administrator. Table 5.16 shows the average years served was 9.45 years with a standard deviation of 8.1. This identifies variability in experience levels of the island administ rators. It is this difference in experience and years in office that may account for differences in responses. Despite the fact that so me Island Administrators may not have been in office at the time of each response operations, they were all impacted by the study hurricanes. Q How many years have you served as an Island Administrator? N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Years Served 20 1 33 9.45 8.121 Valid N (listwise) 20 Table 5.16 – Number of years se rved as an Island Administrator. To examine more closely the rela tionship between years of experience and hurricane response rankings Figures 5.1 – 5.4 illustrate the value response of Island Administrators by number of y ears served. Figure 5. 1 shows that Island Administers who have served 5-8 years rated response to Hurricane Andrew (’92) lower then Administrators who se rved less then 5 years or more then 8 years. A very similar result is also noted in Figure 5.2 in response to Hurricane Floyd (’99).

PAGE 262

243 Figure 5.1 – Hurricane Andrew Value Re sponse of Island Administrators by Number of Years Served.

PAGE 263

244 Figure 5.2 – Hurricane Floyd Value Response of Island Administrators by Number of Years Served. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show little difference in response rating to Hurricanes Frances, Jeanne and Wilma with r egards to numbers of years served. An overall improvement in the administrators perception of response is noted.

PAGE 264

245 Figure 5.4 – Hurricane Frances and J eanne Value Response of Island Administrators by Number of Years Served.

PAGE 265

246 Figure 5.4 – Hurricane Wilma Value Resp onse of Island Administrators by Number of Years Served. 5.2.5 Summary: Survey Results The structured surveys were distributed to the Family Island Administrators to gauge their percept ion of emergency management at the national level. The survey was divi ded into three sections: Planning and Information, Response Operations, and Ex perience and Challenges. The data revealed the following key findings: Sixty percent (60%) of the Island Administrators reported that their respective jurisdiction had not rece ived disaster management training from NEMA.

PAGE 266

247 Seventy-five percent (75%) of Island Administrators reported that they or a representative had a ttended a NEMA conference. Just over half (55% or 11 respondents) reported that their island had a disaster plan in place that had been re viewed within the last two years. This data reveal that although NEMA has been working to provide training throughout the nation a more targeted appr oach needs to take place. Having 40% of your island administrators wit hout proper training and 45% without an updated emergency response plan is cause for concern. If these issues are not addressed effective emergency response will be difficult to achieve. The structured surveys were also int ended to provide data to determine if the CEM system improved disaster respons e. Based on the data displayed in Tables 5.17 and 5.18 it is apparent that improved ratings exist for response operations to post-CEM events. The data indicate a not iceable jump in the mean between Hurricane Floyd (1999) and Hu rricanes Frances and Jeanne (2004). Keeping in mind that the CEM system wa s first implemented in 2002, can the improved rating be attributed to CEM? The answer is no. Although the Island Administrators rated the post-CEM res ponse operations higher than the pre-CEM response, experience can not be ruled out as the trigger for the improved score. It is hypothesized, based on the literat ure (Quarantelli, 1997a; FEMA 2003a; and Hughey 2003) that the impr ovement in the mean score is a combination of the implementation of CEM and experience. This question is further examined in section 5.3 as well as Chapter 6 of this dissertation.

PAGE 267

248 Hurricane Island Administrators Mean Ranking Andrew 2.25 Floyd 2.55 Pre-CEM Michelle --Frances & Jeanne 3.95 Post-CEM Wilma 4.05 Table 5.17 – Summary Table, the su ccess of the National Governments Response to the study hurricanes as determined by the Island Administrators rankings. Summary Table: Survey Questions 6-9, Not Successful (1) Week Success (2) Good Success (3) Very Good Success (4) Fully Successful (5) Andrew 1992 25% 0% 45% 10% 5% Floyd 1999 20% 20% 45% 15% 0% Frances & Jeanne 2004 0% 0% 25% 55% 20% Wilma 2005 0% 0% 15% 65% 20% Table 5.18 – Summary Table: Survey Ques tions 6-9. The table represents the percent of Island Administrators that ra ted each storm by ca tegory. (Response Breakdown) 5.3 Semi-Structured Interviews Semi-structured interviews were c onducted with all staff members of The Bahamas National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). This semistructured approach to interviewing allo wed flexibility in questioning and facilitated the gathering of in formation that may not have come through in a more

PAGE 268

249 controlled survey or interview. Interv iew results are provi ded below in section 5.3.1, as well as applied to section 5.4 of this document, ‘Evaluating the Management of Disaster Response to the Six Study Hurricanes’. All NEMA staff members were active participants in the national response to Hurricanes Frances (2004), Jeanne ( 2004), and Wilma ( 2005). Since the development of NEMA is a direct result of the implementation of a CEM system not all staff members actively participat ed in a formal capacity to the national response to Hurricanes Andrew (1992), Floyd (1999), and Michelle (2001). All interviewees however were directly or indirectly impacted by all six hurricanes and were well versed on strategies and techniques utilized by the national government prior to 2002. 5.3.1 Semi-Structure Interview Results During my interviews NEMA staff was asked to evaluate the response efforts of each of the six study hurri canes. Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne were grouped together because the two storms occurred within three weeks of one another. Difficulty separating the two res ponse operations requir ed that they be evaluated as one event. A scale of 1-5 wa s utilized for this research, 1 being not successful and 5 being fully successful. A half () point scale was not provided as an option to interviewees yet some of the respondents independently chose to select a rating that utilized the scale. This was an independent decision of the part of the participants and is noted in the evaluation tables below. 1 represented not successful, 2 represented weak success,

PAGE 269

250 3 represented good success, 4 represented very good success 5 represented fully successful. Because the study population is so small (6 NEMA Staff Members) it is important for this research to examine the number of respondents in eac h category as well as the mean rating. By utilizing the mean, a rating for each response was established allowing for comparative evaluation. As shown in Table 5.19, staff member s were asked to rate the success of the national governments response to Hu rricane Andrew. T he mean score for response to Hurricane Andrew was 2.58 with a standard deviation of 0.376. This shows strong agreement among NEMA staff members that the national response effort to Hurricane Andrew had weak to good success. Additionally, Table 5.20 displays the number and percentage of res ponses in each category. Fifty percent (50% or 3 respondents) rated the success of Hurr icane Andrew at 2.5. NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national governments response to Hurricane Andrew? N Min Max Mean Median Mode Std. Deviation Response to Hurricane Andrew 1992 6 2.0 3.0 2.5833 2.500 2.5 0.37639 Valid N 6 Table 5.19 – NEMA Representatives How would you rate the National Governments Response to Hurricane Andrew? (Descriptive Statistics)

PAGE 270

251 NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national governments response to Hurricane Andrew? Not Successful (1) Week Success (2) 2.5 Good Success (3) Very Good Success (4) Fully Successful (5) Number of Respondents 0 1 3 2 0 0 Percentage 0% 16.6% 50% 33.3% 0% 0% Table 5.20 – NEMA Interviews, How woul d you rate the National Governments Response to Hurricane Andrew? (Response Breakdown) NEMA staff was asked to score th e success of the national response efforts to Hurricane Floyd. Table 5.21 shows a slight improvement over the response to Andrew with a mean score of 2.83 and a standar d deviation of 0.258. The extremely low standard devia tion indicates strong agreement among NEMA staff that the nati onal response effort to Hurricane Floyd had weak to good success. Table 5.22 shows 66.6% (o r 4 respondents) be lieve the national governments response to Hurricane Floyd had good success. NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national governments response to Hurricane Floyd? N Min Max Mean Median Mode Std. Deviation Response to Hurricane Floyd 1999 6 2.5 3.0 2.8333 3.0000 3.0 0.25820 Valid N 6 Table 5.21 – NEMA Interviews, How woul d you rate the succe ss of the national governments response to Hurricane Floyd? (Descriptive Statistics)

PAGE 271

252 NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national governments response to Hurricane Floyd? Not Successful (1) Week Success (2) 2.5 Good Success (3) Very Good Success (4) Fully Successful (5) Number of Respondents 0 0 2 4 0 0 Percentage 0% 0% 33.3% 66.6% 0% 0% Table 5.22 – NEMA Interviews, How woul d you rate the succe ss of the national governments response to Hurricane Floyd? (Response Breakdown) Hurricane Michelle was the last storm to impact the nation in the pre-CEM phase. Respondents’ were asked to rate the success of the national governments response to Hurricane Michelle. It is important to note that Michelle was the only study hurricane to make l andfall on the Island of New Providence and the capital city of Nassau. Table 5.23 shows the mean rating at 2.66 with a standard deviation of 0.408. The mean is lower than that of Hurricane Floyd and also showed slightly less agreement am ong respondents with an increase in the standard deviation. The lower mean score could be attributed to the impact Michelle had on the national government. As discussed in Appendix B Hurricane Michelle prevented the daily functioni ng of government business. Banks and national government offices remained closed days after landfall bringing the nation to a halt. The impact of Mic helle on the national government caused delays in emergency services and may have contributed to respondents’ lower rating. Table 5.24 indicates that 50% of respondents’ rated the national response to be good. However due to the small number of respondents’ this can be misleading and should be cautiously applied.

PAGE 272

253 NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national governments response to Hurricane Michelle? N Min Max Mean Median Mode Std. Deviation Response to Hurricane Michelle 2001 6 2.0 3.0 2.66 2.7500 3.0 0.40825 Valid N 6 Table 5.23 – NEMA Interviews, How woul d you rate the succe ss of the national governments response to Hurricane Mi chelle? (Descriptive Statistics) NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national governments response to Hurricane Michelle? Not Successful (1) Week Success (2) 2.5 Good Success (3) Very Good Success (4) Fully Successful (5) Number of Respondents 0 1 2 3 0 0 Percentage 0% 16.6% 33.6% 50% 0% 0% Table 5.24 – NEMA Interviews, How woul d you rate the succe ss of the national governments response to Hurricane Michelle? (Response Breakdown) The year 2002 marked the birth of CEM in The Bahamas and the early establishment of NEMA. Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne were the first response operations coordinated under the CEM syst em and occurred within three weeks of one another in the fall of 2004. Res pondents were asked to score the success of the national response on the 1 to 5 scale. Table 5.25 displays a marked improvement over previous response oper ations with a mean score of 3.5 and a standard deviation of 0.447. NEMA staff ra ted the national response to have had good to very good success. Table 5.26 shows that responses were evenly distributed between the following ratings: (3) good success, (3.5) good to very

PAGE 273

254 good success, and (4) very good success. The improvement in the mean score suggests that the national response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne were managed better then those that were previous ly evaluated. However, what is not clear is if the perceived improvement is due to CEM, personal involvement, or perhaps experience. NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national governments response to Hurricane Frances & Jeanne? N Min Max Mean Median Mode Std. Deviation Response to Hurricane Frances & Jeanne 2004 6 3.0 4.0 3.500 3.500 3.5 0.44721 Valid N 6 Table 5.25 – NEMA Representatives, How would you rate the success of the national governments response to Hurrica nes Frances and Jeanne? (Descriptive Statistics) NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national governments response to Hurricanes Frances & Jeanne? Not Successful (1) Week Success (2) Good Success (3) 3.5 Very Good Success (4) Fully Successful (5) Number of Respondents 0 0 2 2 2 0 Percentage 0% 0% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 0% Table 5.26 – NEMA Interviews, How woul d you rate the succe ss of the national governments response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne? (Response Breakdown) Hurricane Wilma, the final study hurri cane, occurred in the fall of 2005, a year following Frances and Jeanne. As shown in Table 5.27, respondents again scored the national response high wit h a mean score of 3.66 and a standard deviation of 0.408. Responses were again tightly grouped with 3 of the six

PAGE 274

255 respondents indicating that the national response to Hurricane Wilma was very successful. (Table 5.28) Although ther e continues to be an improved mean rating of the national response, it can not be determined with current data if the improvement in is due to the implementat ion of CEM, personal involvement, or perhaps experience. NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national governments response to Hurricane Wilma? N Min Max Mean Median Mode Std. Deviation Response to Hurricane Wilma 2005 6 3.0 4.0 3.66 3.7500 4.0 0.40825 Valid N 6 Table 5.27 – NEMA Representatives, How would you rate the success of the national governments response to Hurrica ne Wilma? (Descriptive Statistics) NEMA Interviews: How would you rate the success of the national governments response to Hurricane Wilma? Not Successful (1) Week Success (2) Good Success (3) 3.5 Very Good Success (4) Fully Successful (5) Number of Respondents 0 0 1 2 3 0 Percentage 0% 0% 16.6% 33.3% 50% 0% Table 5.28 – NEMA Interviews, How woul d you rate the succe ss of the national governments response to Hurricane Wilma? (Response Breakdown) How would you rate the national governments response to the following study hurricanes? Andrew Floyd Michelle Frances & Jeanne Wilma Mean score 2.58 2.83 2.66 3.5 3.66 Valid N 6 6 6 6 6 Table 5.29 – NEMA Representatives, How would you rate the National Governments Response to Hurricane Wilma? (Mean)

PAGE 275

256 In addition to interviewing NEMA respondents about the effectiveness of response operations to the six study hurri canes, they were also asked to identify the biggest challenges to response wit hin The Bahamas and their opinions on what needed to be done to ensure successful response and recovery in the future. Outlined below are the biggest challenges to emergency response, as identified by re spondents. NEMA Interviews: What do you see as the biggest challenges to successful emergency response? “Logistics! As well as account ability through documentation, there needs to be accurate relaying of information to confirm the movement of assets.” “Coordination between NEMA an d the island sub-NEMAs.” “Coordination between all the minist ries. Holding of information can not occur, successful emergency management requires information is coordinated through NEMA to ensure proper decision making.” “Training and communication at all levels.” “Lack of funding for critical assets.” “Training! Not everyone on the Family Islands has received emergency management training.” Training and coordination are two issues that were recognized as challenges to effective emergency response by the NEMA staff; these two key items were also identified by the Family Island Administrators. NEMA staff members were aske d to identify what needed to be accomplished to ensure successful respons e and recovery in the future. The responses are outlined below; training and coordination were identified as key issues.

PAGE 276

257 NEMA Interviews: What needs to be done to ensure successful response and recovery to future disasters? “Coordination from NEMA with the island sub-NEMAs is required. Inter-Island coordinat ion is needed and we are going to be establishing sub-NEMA’s throughout the Family Islands. Since 2003 we have had the Family Island Administrators working as the NEMA representatives. We hope to be able to have a full-time NEMA representativ e that works as the disaster coordinator on the islands.” “National EOC. With the cons truction of the new EOC we will be better equipped to manage response operations.” “All information needs to come through the central NEMA office.” “Training! Training! Training! All ministries should be well trained in emergency management procedures. Through our annual Emergency Management conf erence we are providing training to Family Island Repr esentatives. We have also been able to provide CERT and shelter tr aining on many of the family islands.” “NEMA needs to be able to better coordinate the ESFs and more people need to become involved in the emergency management process.” “Funding for emergency managem ent within the Bahamas needs to be addressed. Limited assets and resources make it difficult to meet needs.” 5.3.2 Summary: Semi-Struc tured Interview Results The semi-structured interviews were conducted with NEMA staff to gauge their perception of emergency management and response at the national level. The interviews as detailed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, took place on several occasions. The data discussed in this section focused on the response to the six study hurricanes and intended to provide data to determine if the CEM system improved disaster response.

PAGE 277

258 Table 5.29 provides a summary of mean scores for the study hurricanes and Table 5.30 provides a su mmary of the percentage of NEMA staff that rated each storm by category. An increase in mean score is evident between the preCEM and post-CEM response. However, there are not enough data to support CEM being the impetus fo r the improvement in re sponse. Although the data indicates a noticeable jump in the mean rating between Hurricane Michelle (2001) and Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne (2004) suggesting that post-CEM response operations were handled more successfully than those that occurred pre-CEM experience can not be rul ed out as a contributing factor. Hurricane NEMA Staff Mean Ranking Andrew 2.58 Floyd 2.83 Pre-CEM Michelle 2.66 Frances & Jeanne 3.5 Post-CEM Wilma 3.66 Table 5.30 – Summary Table, the succe ss of the national governments response to the study hurricanes as deter mined by the NEMA staff rankings

PAGE 278

259 Summary Table: The Percent of NEMA staff that rated each storm by category. Not Successful (1) Week Success (2) 2.5 Good Success (3) 3.5 Very Good Success (4) Fully Successful (5) Andrew 1992 0% 16.6% 50% 33.3% 0% 0% 0% Floyd 1999 0% 0% 33.3% 66.6% 0% 0% 0% Michelle 2001 0% 16.6% 33.6% 50% 0% 0% 0% Frances & Jeanne 2004 0% 0% 0% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 0% Wilma 2005 0% 0% 0% 16.6% 33.3% 50% 0% Table 5.31 – Summary Table: The percent of NEMA staff that rated each storm by category. 5.4 Summary: Survey & Interview Results The data in this chapter were formula ted to determine if the respondents perceived an improvement in response as a result of the implementation of a CEM system. The structured surveys identified that although the Island Administrators rated the post-CEM res ponse operations higher than the pre-CEM response, experience cannot be ruled out as the trigger for the improved score. The semi-structured interviews with NEMA staff memb ers also examined response to the six study hurricanes. As with the survey results, NEMA staff rated the post-CEM res ponse operations higher. Table 5.31 provides a comparison between the success ratings pr ovided by the Island Administrators and NEMA Staff. An increase in t he mean is evident throughout with the exception of Michelle. However, a lar ger increase in the mean is noted after the implementation of CEM. Despite this, there are still not enough data to support CEM as the impetus for the improvement in response. Experience could not be ruled out as a variable responsible for t he improvement in nat ional response. It

PAGE 279

260 is hypothesized, based on the literatur e (Quarantelli, 1997a; FEMA 2003a; and Hughey 2003) that the impr ovement in the mean score is a combination of the implementation of CEM and experience. Hurricane Island Administrators NEMA Andrew 2.27 2.58 Floyd 2.44 2.83 Pre-CEM Michelle --2.66 Frances & Jeanne 3.66 3.5 Post-CEM Wilma 4.05 3.66 Table 5.32 – Summary Table: The success of the national governments response to six study hurricanes as det ermined by the structured surveys and semi-structured interviews. (Mean Rating) Additionally provided in this chapter is an understanding of the status of the CEM program as it relates to disaster training and planning. According to the structured surveys with the Island Administ rators, since the implementation of the CEM system, 60% reported t hat their respective jurisdiction had not received disaster management training from NEMA Furthermore, 45% of the Island Administrators reported that their island did not have a disaster plan in place that had been reviewed within the last two y ears. An outdated or non-existent response plan, combined with a lack of training indica tes that there are gaps within the emergency management struct ure that need to be addressed.

PAGE 280

261 The interview with Prime Minister Perry G. Christie demonstrated awareness by the national government to the importance of a well structured emergency management system. A strong commitment to improving emergency response within the nation and protect and maintain the economic, political and social structure was evident. Through financial and legislative measures the national government has established a strong position in support of a well coordinated national emer gency management structure. The scoring of each of the six nati onal response operations provides us with an understanding of NEMA ’s perception as compar ed those of the Family Island Administrators. Data discussed in this chapter helped to identify areas where new initiatives should be developed in an effort to better prepare for and respond to disasters. Additionally, the data provide the necessary foundation and direction for further analysis as this longitudinal research moves forward. Although the improvement in response could not be directly tied to CEM the data provides a baseline for continued examination.

PAGE 281

262 Chapter Six: Results: Application of the Theoretical Model 6.1 Introduction This chapter addresses the application of the theoretical model discussed in chapter three of this dissertation and depicted below in Figure 6.1. The model was applied in two phases, (1) the pr e-CEM phase, which provides the contextual framework necessary to understand Hurricanes Andrew, Floyd, and Michelle, and (2) the post-CEM phase, that frames Hurricanes Frances, Jeanne, and Wilma. By exploring emergency respons e in these two periods, it allows for the exploration of the wi der political, economic and cultural forces affecting response to the six study hurricanes. Application of this model places each response operations into the larger comprehensive setting and provided a more complete understanding of the mechanisms t hat improved or hindered response. 6.2 Pre-CEM Model Application The Model of Community Response to Disasters was applied to the preCEM period of this research. A review of each of the key components as outlined below is discussed in detail. Good leadership by professionally trained officials A foundation of supportive va lues for government action Legal authority to act An advocacy supporting action Necessary institutional resources

PAGE 282

263 6.2.1 Good Leadership by Pr ofessionally Trained Officials The keystone to the theoretical model as illustrated in Figure 6.1 is ‘good leadership by professionally trained o fficials’. During the Pre-CEM phase, leadership and direction came from the Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF) (Office of The Prime Minister, 1992; Ingraham, 1999). The command and control response style provided by the RBDF wa s efficient at executing military type tasks but lacked the ability to manage emergency response that required civilmilitary coordination. Addi tionally problematic was t he lack of training received by RBDF Personnel. No formal em ergency management training program existed or was made avail able (Bethel, 2006). A Foundation of Supportive Va lues for Government Action A foundation of supportive values for local government action enables concepts to be developed into policie s and provides government leaders the backing to spend monies in an effort to build resources (Wolensky and Wolensky, 1990). During the Pre-CEM period there was no foundation of support within The Bahamas to encour age or require the development of emergency response policy. The Baham as, a small nation with a limited economic base, faced a variety of complex issues during this time. Despite the impacts of Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd, both category four storms, it took Hurricane Michelle impacting the nation’ s capital and interrupting government activity to spark support.

PAGE 283

264 R e s p o n s e M i t i g a t i o n P la n n in g R e c o v e r y Good Leadership by Professionally Trained Officials A Foundation of Supportive Values for Government Action Necessary Institutional Resources Legal Authority to Act An Advocacy Supporting Action R e s p o n s e M i t i g a t i o n P la n n in g R e c o v e r y Good Leadership by Professionally Trained Officials A Foundation of Supportive Values for Government Action Necessary Institutional Resources Legal Authority to Act An Advocacy Supporting Action Figure 6.1 – Model of Community Re sponse to Disasters (Source: Amended Hughey, 2003) 6.2.3 Legal Authority to Act The legal framework within which di saster operations occur can have a significant impact on all four phases of disaster management. During the PreCEM phase there was no local or national emergency management policy in place. As a direct result of Hurri cane Floyd, the Emer gency Relief Guarantee Fund Act, 1999 (Act No. 44 of 1999) was enacted to address financial support for recovery.

PAGE 284

265 Following Hurricane Floyd there was no formal way for the Government of The Bahamas to release funds to assist communities in the rebuilding process or to manage and distribute monetary relief ai d received. Act No. 44 of 1999 established an Emergency Relief Guarant ee Fund that allowed the Government to “guarantee loans for the relief of per sons who have suffered hardship and loss as a result of a disaster and for purposes connected thereto” (Government of The Bahamas Act No. 44, 1999: Chapter 35). Under this act, persons over the age of eighteen (18) were able to borrow funding to repair or replace occupied residential property, furnishings and appliances damaged or destroyed by the Hurricane or to replace or repair businesses damaged by it. This included rental accommodations, fishing boats, engines, farm buildings, farm equipment, citrus or frui t trees, vegetable crop, livestock, restaurant, processing plants and other commercial enterprises. All money provided to individuals through this act required that the money borrowed be repaid. The Emergency Relief Guarantee Fund fo rmally established a role for the Government of The Bahamas in disaster management. It also identified the Prime Minister as having the formal role of appointing The Minister responsible for disaster preparedness. Although the act placed the Government of The Bahamas in a reactive role and one of financial backer, the act triggered the development of a loosely coordinated group of representatives from various government ministries that slowly began t he process of planning for hurricanes. This informal group was known as ‘The Bahamas National Disaster

PAGE 285

266 Preparedness Committee’. Four years follo wing the impact of Floyd, this group became a formalized committee under t he coordination of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) at the direction of Prime Minister Perry Christie. 6.2.4 An Advocacy Supporting Action The backing of political leaders is not always enough to ensure that hazard polices come to fruition; strong community support is also required. Hazards research has shown (Quarant elli and Dynes, 1976) that following an event, community support for action is high. This was the case in The Bahamas following response to The Bay Street Fire (2001) and Hurricane Michelle (2001). Despite clear problems with disast er response in 1970’s, 1980’s and 1990’s an advocacy supporting action did not exist until a fire broke out in the port area of Nassau destroying two city blocks and adversely affected the tourism industry. The ‘Bay Street Straw Market Fire’ was not included in the research study because it only required the response of two national agencies and was confined to a very small area. However, the impact of the fire in combination with the shock of Hurricane Michelle tri ggered a national policy change and created the necessary advocacy seeking action. The impact of these two events on the island of New Providence highlighted the critical need for a coordinated and centralized response. Strong citizen support was energized by the local media, which documented both disaster events, making sure to identify t he negative impacts to the nation. It was

PAGE 286

267 the support generated as a resu lt that helped to push fo rward the implementation of a comprehensive emergency management structure within the nation. A strong advocacy seeking action did not exis t following Andrew or Floyd. It was this lack of support that allowed previous a ttempts at hazard policies to fail. Necessary Institutional Resources When evaluating the inst itutional resources com ponent of the Model of Community Response to Disaster (Figure 8.1) it is important to view this in two parts. First, does an accurate assessment of available resources exist within the Bahamas and second, are the necessary institutional resources accessible. During the pre-CEM phase response resources such as necessary communication equipment and supplies of fresh water existed within The Bahamas. However, the assets were di stributed between a variety of different agencies and organizations. The lack of coor dination during this time prevented the mobilization of available assets. It wa s this lack of coordination that lead to decentralized responses during the pre-CE M phase resulting in unmet disaster needs. Discussion of the Pre-CEM Application of the Model The application of the model to t he Pre-CEM phase of this research identifies gaps in emergency management capabilities. Lacking were good professionally trained officials, as RB DF were not trained emergency managers (Office of The Prime Minister, 1992). No t having the leadership and skills to effectively coordinate the necessary activi ties associated with a national disaster,

PAGE 287

268 in combination with no legal authority to act, or advocacy seeking action may have contributed to the decentralized and ineffective emergency management structure identified with the applic ation of Quarantelli’s (1997a). Post-CEM Model Application For research and discussion purposes activities within The Bahamas have been delineated as preand post-CEM. Howeve r, in practice the line in the sand is not as clear. As discussed previously, it was the impact of the Bay Street Fire and Hurricane Michelle on the City of Nass au and the Island of New Providence that triggered hazard awareness and acti on among policy makers and residents. This change in attitude and development of support for action began in 2001 and is still working today in hopes of fully achieving a nationally coordinated emergency management structure. 6.3.1 Good Leadership by Pr ofessionally Trained Officials Emergency management training for NEMA staff members and Government Ministries began in Marc h 2002 with the introduc tion of three training courses: Emergency Management 101, Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Training, and Emergency Manager: An Orientation to The Position. These three courses, provided by t he Global Center for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Action at the University of South Florida, prov ided the basics in CEM (Hughey, 2004a). In combination with training NEMA st aff, under the leadership of Carl F. Smith, began the process of devel oping a comprehensive emergency

PAGE 288

269 management plan (CEMP) (Hughey, 2004a). As identified by Quarantelli (1998) the ‘ process ’ of developing a national disaster plan is more important then the actual written document. The ‘process’ is considered by many emergency management professionals as more impor tant than the finished document because the process requires the coordi nation of information between many different ministries and organizations. It is through this process that personal and agency relationships are developed. It is believed that the interaction between ministries in a low stress environment allows for better coordination when a disaster does occur. The CEMP utilized an Emergency Suppor t Function (ESF) format. The ESF format details the missions, policies, st ructures, and responsibilities of each government ministry for coordinating resources and programmatic support to NEMA and Family Island Administrators duri ng incidents of national significance. Furthermore, the ESF structure identif ied primary and support agencies clearly for each core function, preventing confusi on over responsibilities during response and recovery. The Bahamas National CEMP has thirteen (13) ESF listed below in Table 6.1 (Hughey, 2004a).

PAGE 289

270 ESF 1 Transportation ESF 2 Communication ESF 3 Public Works & Engineering ESF 4 International Assistance ESF 5 Planning and Information ESF 6 Shelter Services ESF 7 Relief Supplies & Distribution ESF 8 Health & Medical Services ESF 9a Urban Search & Rescue ESF 9b Marine Search & Rescue ESF 10a Hazardous Material Land ESF 10b Hazardous Material Marine ESF 11 Food ESF 12 Tourism ESF 13 Volunteers Table 6.1 Commonwealth of The Bahamas National Emergency Support Functions (Data Source: NEMA) The implementation of national disa ster management training and the writing of the CEMP provided a solid f oundation on which to build a CEM system. These activities illustrate the leader ship and training provided within the Bahamas during the post-CEM phase. 6.3.2 A Foundation of Supportive Values for Government Action A foundation of supportive values for local government action enables concepts to be developed into policies and provides government leaders the backing to spend money in an effort to bu ild resources. During this Post-CEM phase of the research a st rong foundation of support exists within The Bahamas. For example despite a limited economic base, with strong support from residents, The Bahamas Government has matched a $650,000 donation fr om the United

PAGE 290

271 States Southern Command to build a new national EOC. To date the EOC has not been constructed but the money has been earmarked, architectural drawings have been developed and the land on which it is to be built has been acquired. The support from residents is high and t he local media is hopeful that the EOC will be functioning before t he next hurricane season. Another example of the strong support that exists within the Bahamas are the numerous volunteer organizations, many of which are associated with local churches, that have become certified as ESF 13 support agencies. This active participation by residents in the emer gency management process provides for a united and well coordinated environment. 6.3.3 Legal Authority to Act The legal framework within which disa ster operations occur can have a significant impact on all four phases of disaster management. During the PostCEM phase and in response to the three study hurricanes examined no strong legal or regulatory framew ork existed. As discussed previously The Emergency Relief Guarantee Fund Act, 1999 (Act No. 44 of 1999) addressed issues associated with the availabi lity of financial support fo r recovery activities. However, no policies were in place to address the management responsibilities associated with national disasters examined in this study. Following the impact of Hurricane Wilma in 2005 legislation addressing emergency management within the nation was passed. The ‘Act To Provide For a More Effective Organization of The Mitigation of, Preparedness For, Response

PAGE 291

272 To and Recovery From Emergencies and Dis asters’ also known as the ‘Disaster Preparedness and Response Act of February, 2006’ stipulated the elements of a National Disaster Organization which includ es NEMA as the driver for disaster risk management in The Bahamas. Arranged into eight sections this new legal authority to act provides the necessary foundation for the full implementation of CEM within the nation. Outlined below are the eight section of the legislation. Part I deals with definitions while Part II speaks to the establishment of a National Emergency management Agency (NEMA) as a Department of Government charged with responsibility for relief management, as well as coordination and impl ementation of government policies for disaster risk management. NEMA is to be headed by a Director, and the Act addresses the role and function of the Directo r, appointment of public o fficers to relevant posts, and to the establishment of NEMA repr esentation on the Family Islands. A Disaster Consultative Committee is to be appointed by each Family Island, and the Committee will be responsible for assi sting the Director to discharge the functions of NEMA as appropriate. Part III deals with the Nationa l Emergency Management Advisory Committee, (NEMAC) review of t he Disaster Preparedness and Response Policy, and the National Disaster Res ponse Plan. Part IV addresses the requirements and functioning of emergen cy operation centers and physical and social requirements for shelter operations. Address in Part V of the Act are the obligations of other Public Officers, including liaison functions, environmental Impact Assessments and annual reports to and consultations with the NEMA

PAGE 292

273 Director. Part VI outlines procedures wit h respect to especially vulnerable areas and precautionary and/or mitigation plans. Disaster Alerts and Emergencies are addr essed in Part VII of the Act. Part VIII, entitled Miscellaneous addresses disaster m anagement items not dealt with in the preceding sections of the Act. Subsidiary legislation is currently being considered to support the Disaster Preparedness and Response Act. The Attor ney General’s Office is examining the following priority components not addressed by previous legislation: Forecasting and the Meteorological Services Evacuations Emergency Communications Agency/Ministry Disaster Plans Disaster Management and Planning for ‘Specially Vulnerable Areas’ 6.3.4 An Advocacy Supporting Action The backing of political leaders is not always enough to ensure that hazard polices come to fruition, str ong community support is also required. Surveys of Family Island Administrato rs, informal discussion with residents, and interviews with NEMA staff reveal ed a strong support from residents for Government action. Of particular inte rest was the legalization of mandatory evacuation orders that would require residents to leave their homes. This issue is currently being debat ed and requires careful consideration of the balance between individual and government rights. Mandatory evacuation order s are but one example of the dynamic issues surrounding CEM within The Bahamas. Th e impact of two very active hurricane

PAGE 293

274 seasons may have triggered an advoca cy supporting action but it has been through strong community education that NEMA has been able to keep and strengthen support. 6.3.5 Necessary Institutional Resources As with the evaluation of the pre-CEM phase, institutional resources are examined in two parts. First, does an accurate a ssessment of available resources exist within the Bahamas and se cond, are the necessary institutional resources accessible. During the post-CEM phase, a comprehensive inventory of NEMA assets housed at the disast er warehouse in New Providence, was assembled. Utilizing the SUpply MA nagement (SUMA) System established by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), NEMA assets were well documented. The SUMA system provided a central logistics data system to manage disaster response assets. Lacking were detailed assessments of av ailable resources provided by all ministries active in disaster response. During the response phase of a disaster it is critical to match emergency needs and assets accordingly. If resources are not accessible emergency needs can go unmet or at the very least delay the delivery of services. The lack of mult iple agencies inventories means that resources that may be available can not effectively be utilized or coordinated. 6.3.6 Discussion of the Post-CEM Application of the Model The application of the model to the post-CEM phase of this research identified both strengths and weakne sses within the emergency management

PAGE 294

275 structure of The Bahamas. Leadership as compared to the pre-CEM phase was good. NEMA staff and members of gover nment ministries were provided with training to help establish an emergen cy management system. A response plan was also written to provide guidance dur ing response to a national disaster. A foundation for supportive values for government action was and continues to be strong in the post-CEM phas e. Individual B ahamians as well as established organizations are lending suppor t to the Government in an effort to build a well coordinated emer gency management structure. During the time of response to al l three post-CEM events, no legal authority to act existed. Since that time however, ‘The Disaster Preparedness and Response Act, 2006’ was established. Additional regulatory legislation is also being considered at this time with strong support from the Bahamian people. Surveys of Family Island Admi nistrators, informal discussion with residents, and interviews with NEMA staff revealed strong support from residents for Government action. Community education program s implemented by NEMA have helped to sustain support and increas e awareness of the hazards in The Bahamas. Institutional resources duri ng the post-CEM phase show improvement when compared to pre-CEM. However, the lack of multiple agency inventories limited NEMA’s ability to coordinate assets. 6.4 Summary The structured surveys, semi-structur ed interviews, as well the application of Quarantelli’s (1997a) criteria for evaluating t he management of response operations provide a foundatio n for evaluating CEM. What is missing however is

PAGE 295

276 a full understanding of the dynamic politic al, social, and economic environment within The Bahamas before and after the implementation of CEM. The application of The Model of Community Response to Disasters (Figure 8.1) allows for an expanded understanding of emergency response within The Bahamas during both periods. The application of the amended M odel of Community Response to Disasters (Figure 6.1) was easily and effe ctively applied to the Bahamas. The model helped to identify strengths and weaknesses in the emergency management structure in bot h the preand post-CEM phase. Furthermore, it placed the response to the six study hurricanes in the large comprehensive setting allowing for a more complete understanding of the mechanisms impacting disaster response.

PAGE 296

277 Chapter Seven Summary, Conclusions, And Contributions 7.1 Introduction This research sought to answer the following three research questions: 1. Can Quarantelli’s (199 7a) methodology for evaluat ing the management of disaster response be operationalized? 2. Can CEM, a United States em ergency management strategy, be an effective strategy for The B ahamas, an archipelagic nation? 3. Did the implementation of a CEM system improve disaster response within The Bahamas? This final chapter provides a summary and discussion of results associated with each of the research ques tions and places the findings within the current literature on hazards. A set of general conclusions and suggestions for future research are also provided. 7.2 Study Summary Global trends show increasing losses from disasters as the number of people at risk grows by 70 to 80 million per year (United Nations, 2004). Although the frequency of natural di sasters may be constant the human interaction with the given hazard has shifted through changes in development practices, environmental protection as well as the distribution of population and

PAGE 297

278 wealth. In an effort to combat the negative social, economic, and environmental impacts of hazards, strategies for identifying vulnerable populations and implementing mitigation meas ures is a high priority in hazards research. However despite our best efforts disasters have and will continue to negatively impact communities resulting in loss of life and property. To that end nations must establish effective emergency respons e capabilities to meet the needs of all residents potentially at harm. This study examined the establishm ent of a comprehensive emergency management (CEM) system in the nation of The Bahamas. This exploratory research utilized a longitudinal study desi gn to examine the six study hurricanes (Andrew ‘92, Floyd ‘99, Michelle ‘01, Frances ‘04, Jeanne ‘04, and Wilma ’05). The goal of this research was two fold; first, to document the development of a comprehensive emergency management system within The Bahamas and second, to compare res ponse operations under CE M with response operations prior to its implementation. 7.3 Overview of Methods This study was designed to determine the impact of CEM on emergency response in The Bahamas. Being a relatively uncharted area of hazards research, this study took an explorat ory approach that utilized a longitudinal study design, that allowed for the r epeated observation of national response operations. Mixed methods were used to collect and analyze data. Data for the study were collected over a six year period from 2001-2007. The following data collection techniques were employed for th is study: (1) arch ival research, (2)

PAGE 298

279 structured surveys, (3) semi-struc tured interviews, and (4) participant observation. Data collected through the above mentioned four methods were analyzed in several ways. First, the surve ys and closed-ended questions associated with the interviews were analyzed using standar d statistical techniques. The data was then applied to 8 of the 10 criteria for measuring the management of national disaster response operations as outlined by Quarantelli (1997a). Finally, data were applied to the Model of Community Response to Disaster (Hughey, 2003). 7.4 Key Research Findings Research Question One: Can Q uarantelli’s (1997a) methodology for evaluating the management of disaster response be operationalized? Quarentelli’s (1997a) methodo logy for evaluating the management of disaster response operations was successfully operationalized and appl ied to the six study hurricanes. Each of the eight research cr iteria were well applied and the results are outlined below. Criterion One, adequately carrying out generic functions, appears not to have been impacted by the implement ation of CEM. However, upon closer examination what emerged was a clear improvement in the early recognition of each of the ten generic functions, which are encompassed within the first crit erion. The data displayed improvements that can be associat ed with the implementation of a CEM system in 2002 (see table 4.3) and the development of a national response plan that outlined responsib ility and SOP’s for each of the functions. Criterion Two, effectively mobili zing personnel and resources, showed improvements following t he implementation of the CEM system. An association with the improvement in the function and the development of a national emergency response plan was noted. It is critical to identify however that the improvements associated to the CEM system

PAGE 299

280 did not rule out or take away from the impact that experience may have played in improvements to response operations. Criterion Three, adequately processing information, displayed a pattern of improvement followi ng the implementation of the CEM system. The implementation of a national response plan helped to develop clear lines of communication between citizens, the government, and response agencies that allowed fo r more accurate processing of information and improved response oper ations. Also associated with the improvement are experience and improved recording keeping. Criterion Four, the properly exer cising decision-making, showed no pattern or association of improvem ent following the implementation of CEM. Response operations to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne experienced the same problems wit h decision-making as the pre-CEM response operations. Criterion Five, developing overal l coordination, showed a marked improvement after the implementation of the CEM system. Data indicates improvements are asso ciated with the development of a nation response plan that required multi-agency coordination over a two-year period prior to the impact of Hurricane Frances. Criterion Six, Correctly recognizi ng differences between response and agent-generated demands, was dependent of the success of criteria 2 through 5. The data did not identify an associat ion between criterion six and the implementat ion of a CEM system. Criterion Seven, providing appropri ate and accurate reports for the news media, showed a clear pattern of improvement during the postCEM response operations. The dat a showed the improvement was associated with the impl ementation of the national response plan (2002). Criterion eight, a well-functioni ng emergency operations center, showed no improvement associated to the implementation of a CEM system. Challenges to the ph ysical requirements outlined by Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology indi cated the EOC facilities utilized in response to each of the six study hurricanes were insufficient. Although Quarantelli’s methodology was operationalized some application difficulties do existed. The subjective natur e of Quarantelli’s cr iteria for evaluating the management of emergency response operations, limits its utility as a

PAGE 300

281 practical tool. It is recommended that the methodology be refined for ease of application and to ensure consistency in use. A more detailed and structured application guideline is succes ged to prevent subjective employment of the tool. The use of benchmarks would also provide emergency managers with the necessary apparatus to establish response goals and provide a metric to rate the overall improvement to response within a jurisdiction. Research Question Two: Can CEM, a United States emergency management strategy, be an effective strate gy for The Bahamas, an archipelagic nation? Quarantelli’s (1997a) methodology was able to identify areas where the implementation of a CEM system improved disaster response operations in The Bahamas. Quarantelli’s (1997a) met hodology for evaluating the management of disaster respons e was able to identify area where the implementation of CEM improved the national management of disaster response. The research data indicated improvements associated with t he implementation of a CEM system, in the following five criteria. o Adequately carrying out generic functions; o Effectively mobilizing personnel and resources; o Adequately processing information; o Developing overall coordination; o Providing appropriate and accurate reports for the news media; The amended Model of Community Response to Disasters was easily and effectively applied to the Bahamas, identifying strengths and weaknesses in the emergency management structure in both the preand post-CEM phases. This research hypothesized that the implementation of CEM would improve all areas of disaster response within the nation of the Bahamas. Based

PAGE 301

282 on Quarantelli’s (1997a) eight criteria for evaluation im provements were noted in the following six areas following the implementation of CEM. Adequately carrying out generic functions; Effectively mobilizing personnel and resources; Adequately processing information; Properly exercising decision making; Developing Overall Coordination; Providing appropriate and accura te reports for the news media Despite the improvement in these areas, there was not enough evidence to support the claim that the impetus for improvement in The Bahamas emergency response was the implementation of CEM. Furthermore, the s ubjective nature of the evaluation criteria limits its utility as a practical tool. It was further hypothesized that CEM would be an effective and successful emergency management strategy for The Commonwealth of The Bahamas. To that end, based on anecdotal evidence from observation and interviews with NEMA staff CEM is a successful strategy for the management of disasters but continues to need work. “To continue to improve we need to improve overall coordination as well as inter-island coordination. The island administrators are too be working in the capacity of disaster coordinator at the local level (SubNEMA) and there plans need to be in position and taken to operational mode, then it can come to the national level that is where it can be confusing. We have come along way but we still have a ways to go but it is going to workout…workout in time” (Bethel, 2006) “Comprehensive emergency managemen t provides a connection between all the components of disaster m anagement. The training has really helped. We all know who to call and who has what job. Information comes through the national EOC and it a llows for better coordination. We still have glitches and we are c ontinuing to work on them, but the new

PAGE 302

283 system and the passage of the disaster legislation has legitimized NEMA and provided us with recognition” (Outten-Moncur, 2006b) Additionally, the data indicated an increase in mean score when asked to evaluate response operations on a 1 to 5 scale. An increasing mean score is identified between the preCEM and post-CEM response phases by both the Island Administrators and NEMA staff. (See Table 7.1) This further supports the the anecdotal evidence that CEM has im proved response operations within The Bahamas. However, the data are not strong enough to identify CEM as the exclusive reason for improvement. Va riables such as experience cannot be ruled out as the trigger for improvem ent in national response operations. Hurricane Island Administrators NEMA Andrew 2.27 2.58 Floyd 2.44 2.83 Pre-CEM Michelle --2.66 Frances & Jeanne 3.66 3.5 Post-CEM Wilma 4.05 3.66 Table 7.1 – Comparison between the perc eptions of Island Administrators and NEMA Staff with regards to the national response to the six study hurricanes. The amended Model of Community Re sponse to Disasters (Figure 7.1) was easily and effectively applied to this research study. The model was able to identify strengths and weaknesses in t he emergency management structure in

PAGE 303

284 both the preand post-CEM phases. The app lication of the model assisted in placing each of the six response oper ation in the appropriate context. R e s p o n s e M i t i g a t i o n P l a n n i n g R e c o v e r y Good Leadership by Professionally Trained Officials A Foundation of Supportive Values for Government Action Necessary Institutional Resources Legal Authority to Act An Advocacy Supporting Action R e s p o n s e M i t i g a t i o n P l a n n i n g R e c o v e r y Good Leadership by Professionally Trained Officials A Foundation of Supportive Values for Government Action Necessary Institutional Resources Legal Authority to Act An Advocacy Supporting Action Figure 7.1 – Model of Community Re sponse to Disasters (Source: Amended Hughey, 2003) 7.5 Contributions to Geography This study provides one of the firs t longitudinal hazards research studies conducted by a Geographer. A criticism of the hazards literature has been that many researchers take only a snapshot of disaster events omitting the temporal component in turn preventing the nece ssary examination of the dynamic and intertwined relationships that impact all four phases of the emergency management cycle. Furthermore, this research provides the hazards literature

PAGE 304

285 with an application and test of Quarantelli’s crit eria for evaluating the management of emergency response operat ions. The application of this methodology identified a need for a more conc rete metric that does not allow for subjectivity in application. This research additionally provides to the hazards research a theoretical model for evaluating community respons e to disasters. This model was previously tested at the local level in Falmouth, Kentucky and has now been successfully tested at the national level in The Bahamas. This model provides emergency managers and hazards researc hers with a tool for exploring questions surrounding the four phas es of emergency management. 7.6 Recommendations & Future Research 7.6.1 Recommendations It is recommended that a metric be developed based on a time scale for key emergency response functions. For exam ple, if general functions are carried out effectively all preliminary damage assessment report should be completed within forty-eight (48) hours of t he impact area being de signated safe for response personnel. Well established criter ia would allow for the evaluation and comparison of response operations. This type of metric would also help to establish a concrete timeline of events which could be used to improve response operations within a jurisdiction. It is also recommend that more longi tudinal research studies be conducted in an effort to more thoroughly under stand the dynamic nature of emergency

PAGE 305

286 response. Necessary evaluation of t he dynamic and intertwined relationships that exist. This study needs to be dev eloped which does not allow for the 7.6.2 Future Research This research, which began in 2001, continues today documenting and evaluating the development of the CEM system for t he Commonwealth of The Bahamas. In June of 2008, at the annual NEMA conference in Nassau, additional surveys will be conducted with Family Island Administrators to gauge the effectiveness of the national res ponse to Tropical Storm Noel. Noel significantly impacted the southeastern and central islands of The Bahamas in November of 2007 causing extensive flooding and requiring a full activation of the nation EOC. Mechanisms for eval uation and coordinatio n with NEMA and the Government of The Bahamas continues to ensure future response operations can be evaluated and more data obtained in an effort to improve emergency response.

PAGE 306

287 References Ahrens, C. Donald (1991) Meteorology Today: An introduction to Weather, Climate, and the Environment Fourth Edition West Publishing Company. St. Paul. Minnesota. American Red Cross (2002) Disaster Mitigation. American Red Cross Educational Publications. Falls Church, Virginia. Anderson, W. (1969) Local Civil Defense in Natu ral Disaster From Office to Organization, Columbus OH. Disaster Research Center, The Ohio State University. Bahamas Airport Authority (2004) Sit uation Report on Hurricane Frances to NEMA. Official Government Document. Bahamas Census Office Departm ent of Statistics. (2005) Census Data. Official Government Document of The Bahamas. Bahamas Department of Meteorology. (1992) Hurricane Andrew August 16 to 28, 1992. Official Government Docu ment of The Bahamas. Bahamas Department of Meteorology. (1999) Hurricane Floyd Official Government Document of The Bahamas. Bahamas Department of Meteorology. (2001) Hurricane Michelle. Official Government Document of The Bahamas. Bahamas Department of Meteorology. (2004a) Hurricane Frances. Official Government Document of The Bahamas. Bahamas Department of Meteorology. (2004b) Hurricane Jeanne. Official Government Document of The Bahamas. Bahamas Department of Meteorology. (2005) Hurricane Wilma. Official Government Document of The Bahamas. Bahamas Department of Meteorology (2006) Official Government Website http://www.bahamasweather.org.bs/ Bahamas Environment, Science and Tech nology (BEST) Commission. (2007) Facts About The Bahamas. Official Government Document.

PAGE 307

288 Bahamas Electric Company (BEC). ( 2001). Hurricane Michelle After-Action Report. Official Government Document. Bahamas Electric Company (BEC). (2004) Hurricane Frances Situation Report to NEMA. Official Go vernment Document. Bahamas Electric Company (BEC). ( 2004b). Hurricane Jeanne Situation Report to NEMA. Official Go vernment Document. Bahamas Electric Company (BEC). (2005) Hurricane Wilma Situ ation Report to NEMA. Official Government Document. Bahamas Ministry of Health (2001) Report on Hurricane Mic helle. Official Government Document. Bahamas Ministry of Health. (2004a) Si tuation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Frances. Official Government Document. Bahamas Ministry of Health. (2004b) Si tuation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Jeanne. Official Government Document. Bahamas Ministry of Health. (2005) Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Wilma. Official Government Document. Bahamas Ministry of Public Works (2004) Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Frances. Official Government Document. Bahamas Ministry of Public Works (2004b) Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Jeanne. Official Government Document. Bahamas Ministry of Public Works (2005) Situation Report to NEMA on Hurricane Wilma. Official Government Document. Bahamas Ministry of Statistics (2007) http://www.bahamas.gov.bs/bahamasw eb2/home.nsf/vContentW/75C05F76D DBFDCE106256ED10071A36F Obtained February 11, 2007 Bahamas Port Authority (2004) Situat ion Report on Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne to NEMA. Official Government Document. Bahamas Red Cross Society (1992) Hurri cane Andrew Situation Report to the International Federation of Red Cr oss Red Crescent Societies.

PAGE 308

289 Bahamas Telecomunication Company (BTC). (1999) Report on Hurricane Floyd. Official Government Document Bahamas Telecomunication Company (BTC). (2001) Report on Hurricane Michelle. Official Go vernment Document. Bahamas Telecomunication Company (B TC). (2004). Hurricane Frances Situation Report to NEMA. Of ficial Government Document. Bahamas Water and Sewerage Cor poration (2004) Report on the 2004 Hurricanes Season: Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne. Bahamas Water and Sewerage Corporat ion (2005) Hurricane Wilma Situation Report to NEMA. Official Government Document. Becker, Howard (1958) Problems of Inference and Proof in Participant Observations. American Sociological Review Vol. 23, No. 6. (Dec., 1958), pp. 652-660. Beck, Ulrich (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity London: Sage Berke, Philip, Kartez, Jack, and Wenger, Dennis. (1993) Recovery after Disaster: Achieving Sustainable Development, Mitigation and Equity. Disasters, Volume 17 Number 2. Bernard, H. Russell (2000) Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. London: Sage. Bethel, Luke. (2006) Chief Petty Offi cer, The Bahamas National Emergency Management Agency. Interview December 18, 2006. Bethel, Luke. (2007) Chief Petty Offi cer, The Bahamas National Emergency Management Agency. Interview June 13, 2007. Bolin R. (1990) The Loma Prieta Earthquake: Studies of Short-term Impacts. Institute of Behavioral Science, Un iversity of Colorado, Boulder. Bogard, W.C. (1989) Bringing Social Theory to Hazards Research: Conditions and Consequences of The Mitigation of Environmental Hazards. Sociological Perspectives. No 31, pp 147-68. Britton, Neil. (2001) A New Emergency Management Fo r the New Millenium? Australian Journal of Emergency Managem ent. Summer 2001 edition. pg 44-54

PAGE 309

290 Brown, M. and Goldin, A. (1973) Collective Behavior: A Review and Reinterpretation of the Literature. Pacific Palisades. California:Goodyear. Burton, I., Kates, R. W., White, G. (1993) The Environment As Hazard New York: Guilford. Cant, Richard V. (1996). Water supply and Sewage Treatment in a Small Island Environment: The Bahamian Experience. In Maul, G.A., ed., Small Islands: Marine Science and Sustainable devel opment, pp 329-340. Washington DC: American Geophysical Union. Caribbean Disaster Advisory Subcommi ttee (1994). International Disaster Advisory Committee Workshop to Impr ove the Public/Private Sector Coordination for Recovery from Caribbean Hurricanes and Other Disasters. August 29, 1994. Nassau, Bahamas. CDERA (Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency) (2001). Comprehensive Approach for Disaster Ma nagement in the Caribbean Project. Baseline Study CDM in the Caribbean. Central Bank of The Bahamas (2006) Quarterly Review Central Bank of The Bahamas (2005) Chakraborty, J., Tobin, G., Montz, B. (2005) Population Evacuation: Assessing Spatial Variablity in Geo-Physical Risk and Social Vulnerability to Natural Hazards. Natural Hazards Review, 6(1): 23-33. Christie, Perry G. (2007) Pr ime Minister of The Bahama s. Interview January 25, 2007. Clark, L. and Short, J. (1993) Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies. Annual Revi ew of Sociology 19:375-399. Clary, Bruce B. (1985) The Evolution and Structure of Natural Hazard Policies. Public Administration Review, Special Issue 20-28. Collier, David (1991) The Comparative Method: Two Decades of Change Rustow, Dankwart A. and Kenneth Paul Erickson (eds.) Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives. Pp 7-31. HarperCollins: New York Creswell, John W. and Plano-Clark, Vicki L. (2007) Designing and Conducting Mixed methods Research. Sage Publications. Thousand Oaks: London.

PAGE 310

291 Curran, H.A. (1985) Bahamas Natural History : Introduction to the Geology of The Bahamas and San Salvador Island. Carleton College Department of Geography. Cutter, Susan (1993) Living with Risk: The Geography of Technological Hazards. New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall. Cutter, Susan (Eds.). (1994) Environmental Risks and Hazards Prentice-Hall. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. Cutter, Susan (1996) Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards. Progress in Human Geography 20(4), 529-539. Cutter, Susan, Boruff, B.J. & Shirley, W.L. (2003) Social Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards. Social Science Quarterly 84 (2). 242-261 Davis, Eleanor. (2006) Administrative Cadet. The Bahamas National Emergency Management Agency. Interview December 19, 2006. Davis, Eleanor. (2007) Administrative Cadet. The Bahamas National Emergency Management Agency. Interview June 13, 2006. Dean, Basil A. and Rolle, Ar thur W. (1992) Department of Meteorology Report on Hurricane Andrew, August 22-23, 1992. Offi cial Document Government of the Bahamas. Dean, Basil A. and Rolle, Ar thur W. (1999) Department of Meteorology Report on Hurricane Floyd, September 13-14, 1999. Official Document Government of the Bahamas. Dean, Basil A. and Rolle, Ar thur W. (2001) Department of Meteorology Report on Hurricane Michelle 4th – 6th November, 2001. Govern ment of the Bahamas Official Document. Denzin, N.K., & Lincoln, Y.S. (Eds.). ( 1994). Handbook of Qua litative Research. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications. Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds.). (1998). Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications. Dewey, John. (1929) The Ques t for Certainty. In J. Boydston, Ed. The Later Works: 1925-1953. Carbondale, Ill., Sout hern Illinois University Press. Drabek, Thomas E. (1985) Managing The Emergency Response Public Administration Review 45: 85-92

PAGE 311

292 Drabek, Thomas E. (1986) Human Syst em Responses to Disasters: Ann Inventory of Sociological Fi ndings. NY: Springer Verlag. Drabek, Thomas E. (1987) The Professional Emergenc y Manager: Structures and Strategies for Success. Boulder CO: Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado. Drabek, Thomas E. (1990 ) Emergency Management: Strategies for Maintaining Organizational Integrity New York: Springer-Verlag. Drabek, T. and Hoetmer, G. eds. (1991) Emergency Management: Principles and Practive for Local Governmen t. Washington, D.C.: ICMA Dynes, R.R. (1974) Organized Behavior in Disaster. Disaster Research Center Monogr. Series (3) 235. Columbus Ohio. Ohio State University. Dynes, R.; Demarchi, B; and Pelanda, C. (eds) (1987) Sociology of Disasters: Contributions of Sociology to Disaster Re search. Milan, Italy: Franco Angeli. Dynes, R.R. (1988) Cross-Cultural International Research: Sociology and Disasters. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters (6) 101129. Dynes, R.R. (1994) Community Emergency Planning: False Assumptions and Inappropriate Analogies. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 12:141-58. Dynes, R. and Tierney, K. eds (1994) Disasters, Collective Behavior and Social Organization. Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press. EM-DAT: (2005) The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database. www.emdat.net Universit Catholique de Louvain Brussels Belgium FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency). (1995) Emergency Operations Center Independent Study Course. FEMA IS275. FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency). (2003 a ) FEMA Community Planning Guide FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency). (2003 b ) Emergency Manager: An Orientation to the Position www.fema.gov. FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency). (2006) Introduction to Hazard Mitigation Training Document IS-393.A June 2006.

PAGE 312

293 Fischer, Henry W. III (1999). Hurricane Georges: The Experienc e of the Media and Emergency Management on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Quick Response Report #117. Natural Hazards Center. Fry, Katherine (2003) Constructing the Heartland: Television News and Natural Disaster Hampton Press. Geertz, Cliford (1973) Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture In The Interpretation of Cult ures. Basic Books: New York. Glickman, T.S., Golding, D., and Silverman, E.D. (1992) Acts of God and Acts of Man: Recent Trends in Natural Disasters and Major Industrial Accidents. Center for Risk Management, Discussion Paper 92-02. Washington, D.C. :Resources for the Future. Glinton, Chrystal. (2006) First Assist ant Secretary. The Bahamas National Emergency Management Agency. In terview December 18, 2006. Glinton, Chrystal. (2007) First Assi stant Secretary. T he Bahamas National Emergency Management Agency. Interview June 13, 2006. Government of The Bahamas Act No. 44. (1999) The Emergency Relief Guarantee Fund Act of 1999. Official Government Document. Government of The Bahamas (2005) Department of Meteorology Report on the Recent Hurricane History Government Document Government of The Bahamas (2007) Graham, John (1995) Historical Perspective on Risk Assessment in The Federal Government. Toxicology, Volume 102, Issues 1-2, 1 September 1995, Pages 29-52 Hammersley, M., and Atkinson P. (1983) Ethnography: Principles in Practice. London: Tavistock. Hewitt, K. (1995) Excluded Perspectives in the Social Construction of Disaster. International Journal of Mass Em ergencies and Disasters 13:317-339. Hewitt, K (1998) Excluded Perspectives in t he Social Construction of Disaster, in E. Quarantelli (ed.), What is a Dis aster? Perspectives in the Question, London: Routledge. Hughey, E. (2003) Community Size and Response to Hazards: A Case Study of Falmouth, Kentucky. Thesis Research.

PAGE 313

294 Hughey, E.. (2004a) Final Report on The Bahamas: 2002-2004 Activities. Global Center for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Action. Hughey, E. (2004b) Participant Observations: Hurricane Response to Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne. Hyndman, Donald and Hy ndman, David (2006) Natural Hazards and Disasters. Thomson Brooks/Cole. United States. Ingraham, Hubert A. (1999) Prime Ministers Communica tion to Parliament on Hurricane Floyd. Office of The Prim e Minister, Nassau, The Bahamas. Kates, Robert (1985) The Interaction of Climate and Society. Kates, R., Ausubel, J. and Berberian, M. (E ds) Climate Impact Assessment, Wiley, New York, NY. pp 3-36 Kates, Robert and Burton, Ian. ed. (1986 a ) Geography, Resources, and Environment: Volume I Selected Wr itings of Gilbert F. White The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Kates, Robert and Burton, Ian. ed. (1986 b ) Geography, Resources, and Environment: Volume II Selected Wr itings of Gilbert F. White The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Kentucky and the Flood of 1997. Unpublished Masters Thesis. Tampa, FL: University of South Flori da, Department of Geography. Kreps, G. (1984) Sociological Inquiry and Disaster Research. Annual Review of Sociology 10:309-330. Kreps, G. (ed) (1989) Social Structure and Disaster. Newark, DE.: University of Delaware Press. Kreps, G. (1991 a ) Organizing for Emergency Management Emergency Management: Principles and Practice fo r Local Government eds. Drabek, Thomas and Hoetmer, Gerard. Internat ional City Management Association. Washington DC. Kreps, G. (1991 b ) Response to Social Crisis and Disaster Annual Review of Sociology 10:309-30. Lagadec, P. (1990) States of Emergency: Technological Failures and Social Destabilization. London: Butterworth-Heinemann.

PAGE 314

295 Lightbourne, Kenneth L. and Dean, Basil A. (1999). Report on Hurricane Floyd 12th – 15th September, 1999. Department of Meteorology, Government of The Bahamas. Lijphart, Arend (1971) Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. American Political Science Review 65 (3): 682-693. Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. (1985) Naturalistic Inquiry Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc. McEntire, David A. (2004) The Status of Emergency Management Theory: Issues, Barriers, and recommendations for Improved Scholarship. FEMA Higher Education Conference Paper. June 8, 2004, Emmitsburg, MD. McLoughlin, David. (1985) A Framework for Integrated Emergency Management. Public Administration Review, Vo l. 45, Special Issue: Emergency Management: A Challenge for Public Admi nistration (Jan., 1985), pp. 165-172 McLuckie, Benjamin (1970) Mileti, Dennis M. (1999) Disasters by Design: A Reassessment of Natural Hazards in the United States. Washington, D.C. Joseph Henry Press. Mitchel, James K. (1989) Hazards Research. Gaile, G.L. and Willmott, C.J. (Eds) Geography in America. Merill, Columbus, OH. pp 410-24 Mitchell, James K. ed (1996). The Long Road to Recovery: Community Response to Industrial Disaster. United Nations University Press, New York. Mushkatel, Alvin H. and Weschler, Louis F. (1985) Emergency Management and the Intergovernmental System. Pub lic Administration Review, Vol. 45, Special Issue: Emergency Managem ent: A Challenge for Public Administration. pp 49-56. Neely, Wayne. (2006) The Major Hurricanes To Affe ct The Bahamas: Personal Recollections of Some of the Greate st Storms to Affect The Bahamas. Author House. Bloomington, Indiana. NEMA (2002) National Emergency Res ponse Plan: Commonwealth of The Bahamas. Official Go vernment Document. NEMA (2004a) National Emergency Management Agency Hurricane Frances Situation Report. Official Government Document.

PAGE 315

296 NEMA (2004b) National Emergen cy Management Agency Hurricane Jeanne Situation Report. Official Government Document. NEMA (2004c) National Emergency Management Agency Hurricane Jeanne Briefing Notes. Official Government Document. NEMA (2005) National Emergency Management Agency Hurricane Wilma Situation Report. Official Government Document. NGA (1979) Comprehensive Emergency Managem ent: A Governor’s Guide. National Governors Association Center for Policy Research, Washington D.C. Publication printed for Defense Civil Preparedness Agency May 1979. NOAA (1992) Hurricane Andrew. http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories /images/hurr-andrew082392.jpg Retrieved May 14, 2007 NOAA (1999) Hurricane Floyd. www.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/ data/images/hurr-floyd Retrieved May 14, 2007 NOAA (2001) Hurricane Michelle. www.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/images/hurrmichelle Retrieved May 14, 2007 NOAA (2004a) Hurricane Frances. www.ncdc.noaa.gov/ pub/data/images/hurrfrances Retrieved September 2004. NOAA (2004b) Hurricane Jeanne. http://www4.ncsu.edu/~nwsfo/s torage/cases/20040927/Jeanne.sat.20040925. 1245z.jpg Retrieved September 2004. Office of the Prime Minister (1992) R eport on Hurricane Andrew. Official Government Document. Office of the Prime Minister (1999) R eport on Hurricane Floyd. Official Government Document. Office of the Prime Minister (2007) The Bahamas National Geographic Information Centre Official Government Docu ment of The Bahamas. Outten-Moncur, Gayle. (2006a) Senior Assistant Secretary. The Bahamas National Emergency Management Agency. Interview December 19, 2006 Outten-Moncur, Gayle. (2006b) Senior Assistant Secretary. The Bahamas National Emergency Management Agency. Interview December 20, 2006

PAGE 316

297 Outten-Moncur, Gayle. (2007a) Senior Assistant Secretary. The Bahamas National Emergency Management Agency. Interview January 24, 2007. Outten-Moncur, Gayle. (2007b) Senior Assistant Secretary. The Bahamas National Emergency Management Agency. Interview June 14, 2007. Pelling, Mark and Uitto, Juha I. (2001) Small island developing states: natural disaster vulnerability and global change Environmental Hazards 3 (2001) 4962. Pennings, J. (1981) Strategically Interdependent Organizations in P. Nystrom and W. Starbuck (eds), Handbook of Organizational Design, Volume 1, Adapting Organizations to Their Environm ents, New York: Oxford University Press. Perez-Lugo, Marla (1999). The Mass M edia, Political Fr agmentation, and Environmental Injustice in Puerto Rico: A Case Study of the Floods in Barrio Tortugo. Quick Response Repor t #113, Natural Hazards Center. Perry, Ronald (1991) Emergency Management: Principles and Practice for Local Government. Drabek, T. and Hoetmer, G. Eds. ICMA Washington D.C. Petak, William J. (1985) Emergency Management: A Challenge for Public Administration Public Administration Review Vol. 45, Special Issue: Emergency Management: A Challenge for Pu blic Administration. pp 3-7. Porfiriev, B. and Quarantelli, E. (1996) So cial Science Research on Mitigation of and Recovery from Disasters and Large Scale Hazards in Russia. Newark, DE.: Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware. Quarantelli, E.L. and Dynes, R.R. (1974) Response to Social Crisis and Disaster Annual Reviews Sociology (3) 23-49. Quarantelli, E.L. and Dynes, R.R. (1976) Community Conf lict: Its absence and its presence in Natural Disasters. Mass Emergencies, 1(2), 139-152. Quarantelli, E. L. (1988). Major Criteria for Judging Disaster Planning and Managing and their Applicability in Developing Societies. Newark, Delaware: Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware. Quarantelli, E.L. and Pelanda C. eds. ( 1989) Proceedings of t he Italy – United States Seminar on Preparations For, Re sponse To and Recovery From Major Community disasters. Newark, DE: Disas ter Research Center, University of Delaware.

PAGE 317

298 Quarantelli, E. L. (1991). Different Types of Disasters and Planning Implications. University of Delaware Disaster Resear ch Center. Preliminary Paper #169. Ouarantelli E.L. (1996) Local Mass Media Operations in Disasters. USA Disaster Prevention and Management: An Inter national Journal, Vol 5:5 pp 5-10 Quarantelli, E.L. (1997 a ) Ten Criteria for Evaluat ing the Management of Community Disasters. Disasters, 21(1):39-56. Quarantelli, E.L. (1997 b ) Research Based Criteria For Evaluating Disaster Planning and Managing. Newark, Delaware: Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware. Quarantelli, E.L. (1999). The Disaster Recovery Process: What We Know and Do Not Know From Research. Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware. Quarantelli, E. L. (2001). Disaster Planning, Emergency Management and Civil Protection: The Historical Development of Organized Efforts to Plan For and to Respond to Disasters. Newark, Delaware: Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware Rolle, Arthur W. and Si mmons, Jeffrey W. (2004a) Hurricane Frances in The Bahamas 2nd to 5th September, 2004. The Bahamas Department of Meteorology. Rolle, Arthur W. and Si mmons, Jeffrey W. (2004b) Hurricane Jeanne in The Bahamas 25 to 26 September, 2004. The Bahamas Department of Meteorology. Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF) (2 001). Hurricane Mich elle After-Action Report. Official Government Document. Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF) (2004). Hurricane Wilma Situation Report to NEMA. Official Government Document. Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF) (2005). Hurricane Jeanne Situation Report to NEMA. Official Government Document. Royal Bahamas Police Force (2004) Hurricane Frances Situation Report to NEMA. Official Government Document. San Francisco Office of Emergency Se rvices and Homeland Security. (2005) City and County Emergency Response Plan.

PAGE 318

299 Sheehan, L., and Hewitt, K. (1969) A Pilot Survey of Global National Disasters and The Past Twenty Years. (Natural Hazard Research Working Paper 11). Boulder, Colorado: Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado. Shrubsole, Dan. (1999) Natural Disasters and Public Health Issues: A Review of the Literature with a Focus on the Recovery Period. Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction. University of Western Ontario. ICLR Research Paper Series (4). Smith, Carl (2006) Under Secretary, C abint Office and Interim Director. The Bahamas National Emergency Management Agency. Interview December 18, 2006 Smith, Carl (2007a) Under Secretary, C abint Office and Inte rim Director. The Bahamas National Emergency Management Agency. Interview January 25, 2007. Smith, Carl (2007b) Under Secretary, C abint Office and Inte rim Director. The Bahamas National Emergency Managemen t Agency. Interview June 14, 2007. Smith, K., (1992). Environmental Hazards: Assessing Risk and Reducing Disaster London: Routledge. Stake, R. (1995). The art of case research Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Stallings, Robert A. and Quarantelli, E.L. (1985) Emergent Citizen Groups and Emergency Management. Public Administration Review, Vol 45, Special Issue: Emergency management: A Challeng e for Public Administration (Jan., 1985), pp. 93-100. Taylor, A.J.W. (1989) Disasters and Disaster Stress. Stress in Modern Society Series, No. 10. New York: AMS Press. The Bahamas Department of Meteorology (2005). Bahamas 2005 Hurricane Season Report. Official Govern ment Document. Thompson, J. (1967) Organizations in Action. New York: McGraw Hill. Timmerman, P. (1981) Vulnerability, Resilience and the Collapse of Society. Institute of Environmental Studies. University of Toronto, Toronto.

PAGE 319

300 Tobin, Graham and Peacock, Tony (1982) Problems and Issues in Comprehensive Planning for a Small Co mmunity: The Case of Soldiers Grove, Wisconsin. Pergamon Press Ltd. Tobin, Graham. (1992) Community Response to Floodplain Relocation in Soldiers Grove, Wisconsin. Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts and Letters. Vol 80 pages 87-96. Tobin, Graham, Bell, Heather, Montz, Bu rrell, Hughey, Erin, Whiteford, Linda, Everist, MaryPat, Kelsey, Clay, and Miller, Ray. (2004) Hurricane Charley the Aftermath: Impacts and Responses. Technical Report United Nations (2004) Living with Risk: A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives. United Nations New York and Geneva. Water and Sewerage Corporation (W&SC ). (1999) Report to The Prime Minister, Hurricane Floyd. Watts, M.J. and Bohle, H.G. (1993) The Space of Vulnerability: The Causal Structure of Hunger and Famine. Progress in Human Geography, No. 17 pp 43-67. Weech, Philip S. ed. (2000). Bahamas Environment, Science and Technology (BEST) Commission International Communication to the UNFCCC Official Government Document. Weichselgartner, Juergen (2001) Disaster Mitigation: The Concept of Vulnerability Revisited. Disaster Prevention and M anagement. Vol 10 (2)8594. Wendell, Rigby (2006) Supplies Officer. The Bahamas National Emergency Management Agency. Interview December 19, 2006. Wendell, Rigby (2007) Supplies Officer. The Bahamas National Emergency Management Agency. Interview June 13, 2007. White, Gilbert F. (1936) Notes on Flood Protection and Land-use Planning Planners Journal 3 (May-June): 57-61. White, Gilbert F. (1945) Human Adjustment to Floods. Research Paper No 29. Chicago: University of Ch icago Department of Geography. White, Gilbert F. (1962) Social and Economic Aspects of Natural Resources Publication 1000-G National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council. Washington, D.C.

PAGE 320

301 White, Gilbert F. (1964) Choice of Adjustment to Floods Research Paper no. 93, University of Chicago Department of Geography. White, Gilbert F. (1966) Optimal Flood Damage Management: Retrospect and Prospect Kneese and Smith (Eds.), Water Re search. Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore. White, Gilbert F. (1969 a ) Fllod Damage Prevention Policies. In United Nations Interregional Seminar of Flood Dam age Prevention: Measures and Management. Tbilisi, USSR. New York. United Nations. White, Gilbert F. (1969 b ) Strategies of Water Management. Ann Arbor, Michigan. University of Michigan Press. (In English and Russian) White, Gilbert F. (1973) Natural Hazards Research. Directions in Geography, F.J Chorley Ed. London: Methuen, pg 193-216. White, Gilbert F. ed. (1974a) Natural Hazards Research: Concepts, methods, and Policy Implications. Natural Hazards: Local, Na tional, Global. New York: Oxford University Press. White, Gilbert F. (1974b) Natural Hazards: Local, National, Global New York. Wisner, Benjamin (1994) At Risk: Natura l Hazards, People's Vulnerability, and Disasters. Routledge, London. Wisner, Benjamin ed. (2004) At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's Vulnerability, and Disasters 2nd Edition Taylor & Francis Routledge. London and New York. Wolensky, R, and Wolensky, K. (1990) Local Government’s Problem with Disaster Management: A Literature Revi ew and Structural Analysis. Policy Studies Review 9(4): 703-725. Wybo, Jean Luc and Kowalski, Kathleen Madland. (1998) Command Centers and Emergency Support. Safety Science 30:131-138.

PAGE 321

302 Glossary Of Acronyms BEC Bahamas Electric Corporation BTC Bahamas Telecommunication Company CDERA Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency CDM Comprehensive Disaster Management CEM Comprehensive Emergency Management CEMP Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan CERT Community Emergency Response Team CIDA Canadian Internationa l Development Agency EOC Emergency Operations Center ICS Incident Command System NGA National Governors’ Association NGO Non-Governmental Organization ODPEM Office for Disaster Prepar edness and Emergency Management OFDA Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance PAHO Pan American Health Organization PDA Preliminary Damage Assessment RBDF Royal Bahamas Defence Force SUMA SUpply MAnagement System W&SC Water and Sewerage Corporation UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme USSOUTHCOM United States Southern Command ZNS The Broadcasting Corpor ation of The Bahamas

PAGE 322

303 Appendices

PAGE 323

304 Appendix A: Family Island Admi nistrators Structured Survey Family Island Administrator Disaster Management Survey The following questions focus on Disaster Training, Planning and Response efforts within The Bahamas. Family Isl and Administrators are asked to please complete the following survey and fax or e-mail responses back to the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) Office at (242) 326-5456 or at NEMA@Bahamas.gov.bs by Wednesday, January 31, 2007. Thank you in advance for you assistance in this matter. DISASTER TRAINING: 1. Has your island received disaster training from the NEMA office? Yes___ No____ a. If yes, what type of training? ______________________________ ________________________ ____________________ ____________ ________________________ _____________________ ___________ 2. What type of training would you like to see offered by NEMA? _________ __________________ __________________ __________________________ __________________ __________________ __________________________ ________________________ _____________________ _________________ 3. Did you or a representative from your office attend any of the NEMA Conferences held in 2004, 2005, and 2006? Yes ___ No ___ a. If yes, did you find the conference useful; why or why not? ______ ________________________ _____________________ ___________ ________________________ ____________________ ____________ ________________________ ____________________ ____________ DISASTER PLANNING & INFORMATION 4. Does your island have a disa ster preparedness and response plan? Yes___ No___ a. If yes, when was the last time it was reviewed and updated? _____ 5. On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being not at all and 5 being completely) how would you rate NEMA’s efforts to inform the public of their role in disaster planning and response? 1 2 3 4 5 DISASTER RESPONSE:

PAGE 324

305 6. On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being not at all and 5 being completely) how successful do you think the national response to 1992’s Hurricane Andrew was? 1 2 3 4 5 7. On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being not at all and 5 being completely) how successful do you think the national response to 1999’s Hurricane Floyd was? 1 2 3 4 5 8. On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being not at all and 5 being completely) how successful do you think the nati onal response to 2004’s Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne was? 1 2 3 4 5 9. On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being not at all and 5 being completely) how successful do you think the national response to 2005’s Hurricane Wilma was? 1 2 3 4 5 10. Were you aware that The Bahamas has been working since 2002 to develop a comprehensive emergency m anagement structure in an effort to coordinate disaster planni ng and response activities? Yes___ No___ 11. What do you see as the biggest challenge to disaster preparedness and response on your isla nd?______________________ _________________ ________________________ _____________________ ______________ ________________________ _____________________ ______________ ________________________ _____________________ ______________ ________________________ _____________________ ______________ 12. What do you see as the biggest challenge to disaster preparedness and response for The Baham as?__________________ __________________ ________________________ _____________________ ______________ ________________________ _____________________ ______________ ________________________ _____________________ ______________ __________________ ________________________ _________________ 13. How do you think national disast er preparedness and response can be improved?_________ ________________________ _________________ ________________________ _____________________ ______________ __________________ ________________________ _________________ ________________________ _____________________ ______________ 14. Do you think the passage of the National Disaster Preparedness and Response Act will improve disaster response within The Bahamas. Yes ___ No ___ a. Why or why not: _________ __________________ __________

PAGE 325

306 ________________________ ____________________ ____________ ________________________ ____________________ ____________ ________________________ ____________________ ____________ 15. What do you think other island nations in the Ca ribbean can learn from The Bahamas with regards to disast er preparedness and response? ____ __________________ __________________ __________________________ __________________ __________________ __________________________ ________________________ _____________________ _________________ RESPONDENT INFORMATION: Island(s) Represented: _______________________________ _____________ How many years have you served as an Island Administrator? _____________ General Comments: _______ ___________________________ _____________ ________________________ __________________ ______________________ ________________________ __________________ ______________________ ________________________ __________________ ______________________ ________________________ _____________________ ___________________ ________________________ __________________ ______________________ ________________________ _____________________ ___________________

PAGE 326

307 Appendix B: Understanding The Hazard The Development and Impact of the Six Study Hurricanes B.1 Introduction Appendix B examines the development and impact of Hurricanes Andrew, Floyd, Michelle, Frances, Jeanne, and Wilma on the Commonwealth of The Bahamas. Provided is an overview of the development and physical parameters of each storm based on data gathered thr ough official reports issued by The Bahamas Department of Meteorology archival research, and personal correspondence with Meteorologist Trevor Basden. Included in this chapter are the devel opment characteristics of each storm and the impact to the Islands of The Bahama s. Maps are provided to display the historic path of each storm as it pass ed through the archipelago. Understanding the development of each hurricane is critic al to examining the disaster response activities that resulted. Disaster response decisions regarding evacuations, sheltering, and movement of resources and supplies are directly linked to information obtained by officials. This chapter will provide the information that was available to decision makers at t he time of each storm event as well as provide personal accounts of the impact of each storm on residents. A detailed discussion of the national response to eac h of the study hurricanes begins in Chapter 5 of this dissertation.

PAGE 327

308 B.2 Hurricane Andrew 1992 Hurricane Andrew became the firs t named storm of the 1992 season and very quickly became the first major hurri cane (category 3 or higher) to impact The Bahamas since Hurricane Betsy in 1965. As Andrew slammed into the Central Islands of The Bahamas, it caused major damage and destruction before continuing on to South Florida and South Central Louisiana. Map B.1 illustrates the historic path that Andr ew took through The Bahamas. B.2.1 Hurricane Andrew Storm Development According to The Bahamas Depart ment of Meteorology on August 14, 1992 satellite photos indicated a strong tropical wave off the African coast in the area of the Cape Verde Islands. Two days later (Sunday, August 16th) the satellite images indicated a tropical depression had formed and was located midway between Africa and the Lesser Antilles. Early reports on Monday, August 17th indicated that the depression was mo ving west at 21 mph and was located near 11.6N and 40.4 W. Within 24 hours the depression strengthened to become the first tropical storm of t he 1992 season and was named Andrew. At this time, The Bahamas Department of Meteorology was repor ting that Andrew had sustained winds of 40mph and was appr oximately 1,175 miles east of the Lesser Antilles. Andrew moved west-northwest at 25 miles per hour with storm development alternating between periods of weakening and strengthening. For the next 30 hours (11pm on the 19th to 5am on the 21st) Andrew moved on a northwest course at 14 miles per hour According to the August 21, 1992

PAGE 328

309 11:00am report from The Department of Meteorology, Andrew was becoming better organized and was predicted to st rengthen to hurricane force within the next 12 to 24 hours. Maximum sustained wi nds at the time of the report were measured at 60mph and the storm had shifted to a west-northwest course at 10 miles per hour. Information gathered by the United Stat es Air Force Reserve Unit Aircraft on Saturday August 22nd at 5am confirmed that A ndrew had reached hurricane intensity. The Bahamas Department of Me teorology reported t hat the center of the storm was located near latitude 25.8 N and longitude 67.5 W. At this time Andrew was approximately 610 miles s lightly north and east of Nassau, Bahamas and was still on a west-north west course moving at 10 mph with sustained winds of 75mph. The 11am report placed the islands of the Northwest Bahamas under a hurricane wa rning until Monday August 24th at 7am. On Sunday August 23rd official reports from The Bahamas Department of Meteorology noticed strengtheni ng of the hurricane. By early morning Andrew reached category four strength with sustained winds of 135 mph. The storm was approximately 100 miles east of Ha rbour Island, Eleuthera and 160 miles east of Nassau. The course of th e hurricane had shifted and Andrew was moving due west at 16 mph projected to cross northern Eleuthera, north of Nassau, through the Berry Islands, South of Bimini and south of Miami, Florida. According to reports from The B ahamas Department of Meteorology Hurricane Andrew’s central pressure fell steadily as it passed through the islands reaching a minimum of 922mb at about 2pm on Sunday, August 23rd

PAGE 329

310 approximately 60 miles east of the Island of Eleuthera. T he eye of Andrew moved over Harbour Island about 5pm the same day, with a central pressure of 935mb. (See Picture B.1) Picture B.1 – Hurricane Andrew as it passes over The Bahamas. (Source: NOAA, 1992) Hurricane Andrew officially moved th rough the Islands of The Bahamas as a category 4 hurricane. However dam age to monitoring equipment limited data collection. After passing through the B ahamas Hurricane Andrew moved across Southern Florida where the National Hurri cane Center (NHC) recorded gusts of 164 mph before the main radar at the NHC was destroyed. Hurricane Andrew crossed the State of Flor ida with sustained winds of 125 mph and a forward speed of 18 mph. Andrew then moved into the Gulf of Mexico and into Louisiana where it subsequently merged with a frontal trough and died.

PAGE 330

311 B.2.1.1 Central Pressure and In tensity of Hurricane Andrew Figure B.1 below shows the rela ted wind speed and central pressure associated with Hurricane Andrew. The dat a illustrate the relationship between the drop in central pressure and the in crease in wind speed. Hurricane Andrew impacted the Islands of The Bahamas on August 23rd when its winds were at their peak. Figure B.1 – Hurricane Andrew Wind Spee d and Central Pressure (Data Source: The Bahamas Department of Meteorology). B.2.2 Hurricane Andrew Impact According to The Bahamas Departm ent of Meteorology (1992), Hurricane Andrew generated hurricane force winds outwa rd as far as 30 miles from the eye and gale force winds for 105 miles. The Current and Lower Bogue, both

PAGE 331

312 settlements of North Eleuther a, reported storm surges of 25 feet and 16 feet respectively. The Bahamas Department of Meteorology also reported numerous tornadoes were spawned from “thunder clouds associated with Hurricane Andrew” (The Bahamas Department of Meteorlogy, 1992:3). Hurricane Andrew passed over Eleut hera, the Berry Islands and South Bimini on the 23rd of August, 1992. Flooding and property damage were reported on all of the respective islands and four (4) deaths were officially reported. Belo w are comments from Hurric ane Andrew preliminary damage assessment reports (The Bahamas Departm ent of Meteorlogy, 1992). (see pictures B.2 B.4) The settlements of James Cistern, Gregory Town, Alice Town and Palmetto Point on the Island of Eleuthera suffered minor damages. Coastal roads were damaged by high seas, and docks throughout the island had been extensively damaged. Minor damage was also reported in The Bluff and Lower Bogue. The Current and Current Island were extensively damaged as a result of Hurricane Andrew. Twenty-four of the thirty homes on Current Island where destroyed. Government buildings were destroyed and docks were unusable. The islands were devastated and in need of immediate emergency assistance. On Spanish Wells, the bridge that joined Russell Island to Spanish Wells was destroyed while many other fishing boats were lost to the high seas. The two main food stores on the island were also completely destroyed, while ot hers were seriously damaged. Movement throughout the island was impaired due to debris and damage to roadways. The Government Dock on Harbour Island was the only dock on the island left standing as a result of Hurricane Andrew. All buildings on the island suffered considerable damages and the main tourist destination, The Pink Sands Hotel, was destroyed.

PAGE 332

313 B.2.3 Hurricane Andrew Discussion When Andrew swept through The Bahamas it was the firs t major storm to impact the Commonwealth in twenty-seven ( 27) years. The st orm cost the nation an estimated $250 million dollars, left 1, 500 homeless, and killed four (4) residents (Caribbean Disaster Advisory Su bcommittee, 1994). Also, during this period The Bahamas was adjusting to a new government. Just weeks before Hurricane Andrew made landfal l, the Free National Movement lead by Hubert Ingraham won general elections, ending Prime Minister Lynden Pindling’s 25 year rule. The Royal Bahamas Defence Forc e took the lead role in responding to Hurricane Andrew with strong support from Social Services. Additional agencies and organizations provided support in re sponse operations but no centralized emergency management structure existed in 1992. These are important social and political components that influenc ed the national governments response capabilities. Hazards literature (Tobin and Montz, 1997) has shown that hazards experience can change perception and res ponse and were examined as part of this research.

PAGE 333

314 Picture B.2 – Hurricane Andrew Dam age on the Island of Abaco, The Bahamas. (Source: The Bahamas Information Service published in Neely 2006) Picture B.3 – Hurricane Andrew Da mage on the Island of Eleuthera. (Source: The Bahamas Information Service published in Neely 2006)

PAGE 334

315 Picture B.4 – Hurricane Andrew Da mage on the Island of Eleuthera. (Source: The Bahamas Information Service published in Neely 2006) B.3 Hurricane Floyd 1999 Hurricane Floyd was a powerful Cape Verde hurricane that impacted The Bahamas during the 1999 hurricane Season. Floyd pounded the Central and Northwest Bahamas particularly Cat Island, San Salvador, Eleuthera, New Providence, Abaco and Eastern Grand Baham a. Floyd was a category four hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson Scale and was the most intense and destructive hurricane on record to impact the Bahamas. Map B.2 illustrates the historic path that Floyd took through The Bahamas. B.3.1 Hurricane Floyd Storm Development According to reports from The Baham as Department of Meteorology, on Tuesday September 7th, 1999 tropical depression number eight formed approximately 1000 miles east of The Lesser Antilles, moving west at 14 mph. The following day the tropical depression was upgraded to a tropical storm and

PAGE 335

316 given the name Floyd. As Floyd moved we st northwest at 10-16 mph it began to slowly strengthen. The Friday, September 10th 8pm report from The Bahamas Department of Meteorology indicated that the United States Air Force Reserve reconnaissance aircraft confirmed that Floyd had strengthened to hurricane status with maximum su stained winds of 80 mph (70 knots) and a central pressure of 989mb. The storm continued to intensify ov er the next day and by the 5am report on Saturday, September 11th Floyd had developed into a category two. Sustained winds were recorded at 105mph moving in a northwest direction at 10mph. In the very early morning hours of September 12th The Bahamas Department of Meteorology noted a risi ng midto upper-level tropospheric heights to the north of Floyd was forcing t he storm to turn west. This westward turn marked the start of a major period of strengt hening for the storm. The 8am report on Monday, September 13th indicated that Floyd, had continued to strengthen and was currently a category three stor m. By the 5pm report on the same day Floyd had again strengthened to a cat egory-four storm with maximum sustained winds of over 131 m ph. At this time Floyd was located 350 miles east-southeast of San Salvador 580 miles east-southeast of Nassau, and 225 miles northeast of the Turks and Caicos Islands. A tropical storm warning was issued for the Southeast Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos Islands. A Hurricane Watch was also pos ted for the Central Bahamas. Floyd moved within 425 miles east-northeast of the Island of Mayaguana on a track that was taking it due west at 14 mph. Floyd continue d to strengthen and before

PAGE 336

317 the 13th came to an end Hurricane Floyd was packing sustained winds of 155 mph, the upper end of a ca tegory four hurricane. The Bahamas Department of Meteorology attributed the explosive str engthening of Hurricane Floyd to the very warm shallow ocean waters east of the archipelago. Floyd was in position to strike the central Bahamas when it began moving towards the west-northwest and moved so me 20-30 miles north of San Salvador around midnight on Tuesday, September 14th. As the storm continued to move west-northwest it weakened slightly in in tensity as it mov ed within 25 miles of Orange Creek and Arthur’s Town, Cat Island. Tuesday, September 14th Hurricane Floyd was moving at 14 mph in a west-northwest track parallel to El euthera. The eye of the storm was approximately 10 miles east of South and Central Eleuthera; with the western eye-wall of the hurricane crossing Centra l and North Eleuthera. The eye of Floyd made landfall near Alice Town, Eleuthera ar ound 8am. In this position it passed some 65 miles northeast of New Providence by 11am. After traveling across North Eleuther a and turning towards the northwest, Floyd struck Abaco making landfall around 2pm near Cherokee Sound, Abaco. According to The Bahamas Department of Meteorology, Floyd had weakened very slightly before hitting Abaco and wa s still a category four hurricane when it made landfall. The eye of the storm traversed Abaco moving south to north, pummeling the island with maximum sustai ned winds of 115 mph. The Bahamas Department of Meteorology reported downdrafts and tornadoes on Abaco as a result of Floyd. The eye of the storm crossed over Crossing Rock, Mastic Point,

PAGE 337

318 Woolen Dean Cay, and Cooper’s Town, Abac o. After three hours, the eye of Hurricane Floyd emerged over waters nor th of Cedar Harbour, Abaco, around 5pm on the 14th. During the evening hours Floyd pa ssed 30 miles northeast of Eastern Grand Bahama bringing with it 75 mph winds with gusts of 94 mph. Wednesday September 15th, Floyd left the waters of t he Bahamas as it established a northwest and then a north-northwest c ourse around 5am. Floyd followed the coast of Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina before maki ng landfall in the United States on September 16th near Wilmington, North Carolina. (See Picture B.5) Picture B.5 – Hurricane Floyd Satellite Image as it passes over The Bahamas. (Source: NOAA, 1999)

PAGE 338

319 B.3.1.1 Central Pressure and Intensity of Hurricane Floyd Figure B.2 below shows the rela ted wind speed and central pressure associated with Hurricane Floyd. The dat a illustrates the relationship between the drop in central pressure and the increase in wind speed. Hurricane Floyd impacted the Islands of T he Bahamas on September 13th and 14th when the winds were at their peak. Figure B.2 – Hurricane Floyd 1999 Wind Speed and Barometric Pressure (Data Source: The Bahamas Depar tment of Meteorology) B.3.2 Impact of Hurricane Floyd on the Islands With sustained winds of 155 mph, torr ential rains, and over a 20 foot storm surge Floyd devastated the islands. M any coastal communities suffered from severe flooding and widespread damage. Toppled power and telephone lines throughout the islands disrupted electric ity and communications. Initial damage

PAGE 339

320 assessment reports estimated that ar ound 27,000 persons living in the Family Islands were affected and were urgently in need of water, temporary shelter and food. The islands most significantly im pacted included: Abaco, Eleuthera, Grand Bahama, The Berry Islands, Cat Island, San Salvador and New Providence. Provided below are brief overview s of the damage assessments made immediately following the passage of Hurricane Floyd. B.3.2.1 New Providence (Nassau) Experiencing less damage than the Family Islands, New Providence reported sustained wind of 80mph. Minor damage to build ings such as windows and roofs were reported, while landsc aping throughout the island was badly impacted with hundreds of dow ned trees. Movement around the island was very difficult due to blocked roadways. T he storm surge caused damage to marinas and ports on the island, and many sma ll boats were beached or sunk in the Nassau Harbour. Two barges were also reported washed ashore. Over 2000 tourists weathered the storm in the capita l city of Nassau. However, no deaths were reported on the Island of New Providen ce as a result of Hurricane Floyd. B.3.2.2 The Abacos Hurricane Floyd left over 2,000 people homeless in the Abacos. Approximately ten percent of the islands homes were destroyed and forty percent were severely damaged. Mud Town, a settlement of Haitian immigrants was destroyed. Settlements on the northern and southern ex tremes of the Abaco’s suffered catastrophic damages with most if not all, homes destroyed.

PAGE 340

321 “Parliamentarian Mr. Robert Sweeting es timated that damage in Abaco alone was in the range of over $750 million do llars” (Neely, 2006:130). Government reports indicated that sev enty-five percent of the M oores Island’s homes were completely destroyed or uninhabitable. In Marsh Harbour many large buildings were completely destroyed and much of the area suffered considerable flooding. Storm surge caused widespread beach er osion throughout the Abaco’s. In Hope Town, homes which sat on the ocean’s edge were completely submerged under water. Both airpor ts (Treasure Cay and Marsh Harbour) sustained major damage from flooding and we re forced to close for several days following the storm. The connecti ng road between Marsh Harbour (South Central Abaco) and Treasure Cay was im passable and areas of Perimeter Road ceased to exist. Agriculture in the area was also significant ly impacted with the citrus harvest, an estimated 3,000 acres, loosing the entire 1999 crop. Hurricane Floyd was so great that it changed the si ze and shape of many of the cays that make up the Abaco’s. B.3.2.3 Grand Bahamas On Grand Bahama, the st orm produced extensive flooding and caused the closure of the Airport for several days. Flooding on the western end of the island stranded residents cutting off roads. Agricu lture was significantly impacted with thirty percent of the br oiler production for the nat ion destroyed and extreme reductions in the citrus crops reduced from 1,500 acres to 150 acres. Minor damage to homes throughout the island were also reported.

PAGE 341

322 B.3.2.4 Eleuthera Approximately 25% of Homes on the Island of Eleuthera sustained damage as a result of Hurricane Floyd, with 1% of the homes classified as destroyed. Major damage was assessed to all mail-boat docks as well as the Rock Sound Airport. Government stru ctures such as the docks and customs warehouse located at The Bluff were se riously damaged. The dock at Jean’s Bay was destroyed as were many of t he roadways on the islands. The Spanish Wells fishing fleet was devastated, many of the vessels having been breached and others having sunk in the harbour. Of greatest concern following the passage of Hurricane Floyd was clean drin king water. Eleuthera, which is normally supplied with potable water by boat, could not receive water due to damage to the ports. Additionally, st orm surge associated with the storm had severely impacted the water well fields, causing salt water intrusion making the water undrinkable. B.3.2.5 San Salvador The eye of Hurricane Floyd passed ju st north of the island of San Salvador. The island sustained damage to most structures including tourist facilities, the Bahamian Field Station (BFS ), Club Med Columbus Isle Resort, and the Riding Rock Inn. No injuries were reported on the island as a result of the storm. The island was without power and telecommunication systems for several weeks after the storm passed. Like in many of the other islands, damage to roadways and key transportation component s such as airports and docks were also reported. San Salvador suffered si gnificant beach alteration changing the

PAGE 342

323 shape and size of the island. The main concern for residents of San Salvador immediately following the st orm was drinking water. B.3.2.6 Cat Island With A total population of 1,700 resi dents, Cat Island suffered significant damage to homes and government facilities, although no injuries were reported. However the two medical facilities on the is land lost their roofs. Beach erosion, flooding and damage to roadways were considerable. Picture B.6 – Hurricane Floyd Damage on Arawak Cay, The Bahamas (Source: Neely 2006)

PAGE 343

324 Picture B.7 – Hurricane Floyd Damage on the Island of New Providence, The Bahamas (Source: Neely 2006) Picture B.8 – Hurricane Floyd Damage on the Island of New Providence, The Bahamas (Source: Neely 2006) B.3.3 Hurricane Floyd Discussion Hurricane Floyd devastated the cent ral and northern islands of The Bahamas. The key concerns for the nat ion were meeting immediate emergency needs of food and clean water to all areas impacted. Damage to well fields, and

PAGE 344

325 transportation routs (airports, ports, and roadways) prevented the movement of emergency goods between islands as well as on the island. The Royal Bahamas Defence Force led by Commander Steven Russell, activated an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) based at the Cabinet Office in Nassau. Although the response and event ual recovery of Hurricane Floyd required multiple ministries, agencies, and organizations the coordination of assets was not centralized. B.4 Hurricane Michelle 2001 Hurricane Michelle was the first hurric ane in over 35 years directly to impact the Island of New Providence. New Providence is not only the most densely populated island in the archipelago it is also home to the City of Nassau, the nation’s capital. Interruption in government operations would devastate the economy of the nation and Hurricane Miche lle served as a reminder to many residents of New Providence that the island is very much at risk to the impact of hurricanes. Map B.3 illustrates the historic path that Michelle took as she passed through The Bahamas. B.4.1 Hurricane Michelle Storm Development Tropical depression number 15 of the 2001 season, developed on Monday October 29th near the coast of Nicaragua. The depression remained virtually stationary until the very early morn ing hours of Wednesday, October 31st. According to reports by The Bahama s Department of Meteorology on the morning of October 31st, the depression began to move slowly towards the north

PAGE 345

326 at 6mph, with no change in strength. Reports from Thursday, November 1st indicated a drop in the central pressure to 997 with a corresponding increase in the winds to 60mph. This resulted in the fourteenth tropical storm for the season and was given the name of Michelle. At th is time Michelle wa s not of particular concern as the tropical storm continued to move north-northwest at 5 mph. Morning reports on November 2nd showed Michelle had begun to slow to 3 mph as it intensified to hurricane strengt h. The maximum sustained winds were measured at 75 mph, and a central pressure of 980 millibars. By the next morning Hurricane Michelle, which was so mewhat erratic, began to intensify rapidly becoming a category four hurric ane, with sustained win ds of 135 mph. Near the end of the day on November 3rd Hurricane Michelle slowly picked up forward speed with a shift in track to wards the north-northeast. A hurricane watch was posted at 11pm on the 3rd for the Northwest and Central Bahamas to include: Bimini, Grand Bahama, Abac o, The Berry Islands, Andros, New Providence, Eleuthera, Exuma, Cat Island, Ragged Island, Long Island, Rum Cay and San Salvador. The Bahamas D epartment of Met eorology “urged residents in the Northwest and Central Bahamas to monitor the progress of Michelle closely and be prepared to take quick action” (Dean & Rolle, 2001:3). The afternoon report on Sunday November 4th noted that Hurricane Michelle’s forwards speed had accelerate d to 13 mph. While over Cuba late around 7pm, Michelle began to lose str ength and her maximum sustained winds decreased to 125mph. By 10 pm that night reports indi cated that the weakening

PAGE 346

327 trend was continuing and Michelle’s sustained wind speed decreased to 110 mph. According to The Bahamas Department of Meteorology at around 1am on Monday, November 5th the leading edge of Michelle began to impact the island of Andros. While still on the northern shore of Central Cuba, about 175 miles southwest of Red Bays Andros, tropica l storm force winds began to batter the island of Andros. Approximately an hour later the first tropical storm force winds were recorded on the Island of New Providence. By 7am that morning, the eye of Michelle was over the island of Andr os. Maximum sustained winds outside of the eye were around 80-85 mph with higher gusts and very heavy rain showers. Michelle continued tracking northeast at 19 mph and by 9:30am the eye of the hurricane moved over the island of New Pr ovidence. According to Reports from The Bahamas Department of Meteorology “the passage of the eye over the island caused some persons to believe that the hurricane had passed” (Dean & Rolle, 2001:3). Just bef ore 11am the second assaul t began with winds shifting northwest to north and increasing from 16 mph to sustained winds of 46 mph sustained with peak winds up to 103 mph. By 4pm on the 5th Hurricane Michelle passed over North Eleuthera, as the storms track shifted towards the eas t-northeast at 21 mph. The Bahamas Department of Meteorology report ed that by 10pm on November 5th all warnings were dropped as Michelle moved away from The Bahamas and back into the open ocean. (See Picture B.9)

PAGE 347

328 Picture B.9 Hurricane Michelle Satellit e Image as it approaches The Bahamas. (Source: NOAA, 2001) B.4.1.1 Central Pressure and In tensity of Hurricane Michelle Figure B.3 shows the related wind s peed and central pressure associated with Hurricane Michelle. The data illustrate the relationship between the drop in central pressure and the increase in wind speed. On October 29th Michelle, a tropical depression at the time had a c entral pressure of 1005 mb. Michelle’s pressure slowly began to fall reac hing a low of 933 mb on November 3rd. At this time Michelle was a category four hu rricane and was moving towards Cuba and The Islands of The Bahamas. The storm impacted The Bahamas on the 4th and 5th of November as the wind speed began to diminish.

PAGE 348

329 Figure B.3: Hurricane Michelle Wind Speed and Central Pressure (Data Source: The Bahamas Department of Meteorology). B.4.2 Impact of Hurricane Michelle on the Islands According to The Bahamas Departm ent of Meteorology (2001), Hurricane Michelle produced a 10 foot storm surge. Many of the islands suffered moderate to severe coastal flooding as a result. Washed out roads on the islands of New Providence, Andros, Eleuthera, Cat Isl and, Exuma and Abaco were reported. Damage to roofs throughout the islands were also noted in preliminary damage assessment reports. Government build ings reported minor to major damage, with missing roofs and broken windows. Damage to communication equipment and broadcast towers were severe with m any radio stations being put out of commission as a result of the storm.

PAGE 349

330 There was no loss of life in The Bahamas associated with Hurricane Michelle. The storm caused extensive flooding throughout the islands dumping more then thirteen (13) inches of rain in some areas. As with Andrew and Floyd the well fields, located in low-lying areas suffered extensive flooding. Saltwater intrusion occurred and contaminated t he main supply of fresh water. Reports from the Bahamas Electric Company (BEC) indicated that two days following landfall of Hurricane Michelle, the island of New Providence remained in darkness with 60% of the populat ion without electricity. Additionally, The Bahamas Telecommunications Co mpany (BTC) also reported that thousands of telephones were still out of or der a week following the storm. Many residents were also struggling with no wa ter or low water pressure a week following Michelle’s impact. For several days following Miche lle banks and government offices remained closed, with the Police and Roya l Bahamas Defence Force calling for people to remain in their homes to allo w for the clearing of the roads and the restoration of utilities. (See Pictures B.10 – B.12)

PAGE 350

331 Picture B.10 – Hurricane Michelle Damage on the Island of New Providence, The Bahamas (Source: Neely 2006) Picture B.11 – Hurricane Michelle Damage on the Island of New Providence, The Bahamas (Source: Neely 2006)

PAGE 351

332 Picture B.12 – Hurricane Michelle Damage on the Island of New Providence, The Bahamas (Source: Neely 2006) B.4.3 Hurricane Michelle Discussion Although Hurricane Michelle was not as destructive as Hurricanes Andrew or Floyd, the impact to Nassau highl ighted the gaps in emergency response capabilities at the national le vel. Hurricane Michelle response activities were spearheaded by the Royal Bahamas Defenc e Force with disjointed support from a variety of ministries and organizations. The impact of Michelle on the citizens of Nassau and daily government activi ties shed light on the need for a well coordinated emergency management structur e. The impact to the nation’s capital, created the necessary advocacy seeking action helping to initiate the birth of a coordinated and centralized emergency management st ructure.

PAGE 352

333 B.5 Hurricane Frances 2004 Hurricane Frances was the sixth named storm of the 2004 Atlantic hurricane season and the fourth hurricane. Frances was also the first hurricane since 1866 to impact the entire Bahamian Archipelago. Frances was a slow moving storm with a very large eye, approximately 80 miles across, which impacted the island chain for over 72 hours. The center of circulation remained in the northwest Bahamas for an extraor dinarily long time causing substantial damage to the northern islands (Rolle & Simmons, 2004 a ). Map B.4 illustrates the path that Frances took as he passed through The Bahamas. B.5.1 Hurricane Frances Storm Development According to the Bahamas Department of Meterology, Tuesday, August 24th satellite images indicated that a tropical depression had formed from a strong topical wave in the Eastern Atlantic, approximately 870 miles westsouthwest of Cape Verde. Movement of the depression was to the west at 17 mph. Within less then 24 hours the depression gained str enth and was upgrated to a tropical storm and given the name Frances. By Thursday August 26th, Frances was again upgraded to hurricane status (Rolle & Simmons, 2004 a ). Frances continued to strengthen r apidly and by Friday, August 27th it reached category 3 status (winds of 111130 mph). Exactly twenty-four hours later Frances was upgraded to category 4 st atus (winds of 131-155 mph). On August 31st, a hurricane warning was issued for the Turkes and Caicos Islands and the Southeast Bahamas as Frances was approximately 600 miles eastsoutheast of the island of Inagua. A hur ricane watch for the central Bahamas

PAGE 353

334 and a Hurricane Alert for the Northwes t Bahamas was also issued by The Bahamas Department of Meterology (Rolle & Simmons, 2004 a ). At noon on September 1st, a hurricane warning for the entire archipelago was issued. At this time Hurricane Frances was about 80 miles east-southeast of the island of Mayaguana. Frances’ intens ity fluctuated over the next few hours before winds peaked at 145mph on September 2nd. With sustained winds measuring 145mph Frances moved diretly over the Island of San Salvador near to Cat Is land. Frances was moving on average 13mph in a west to west-north-west dire ction. However, on September 3rd as Frances moved over James Cistern, El euthera the forward speed decreased dramaticly to 5 mph. Franc es began to stall as it passed into the vicinity of Abaco and directly over Grand Bahama. Although Frances was downgraded to a category 3 and later to a category 2 stor m the slow forward movement and the abundance of rain created devistating flooding to the northwest islands. Sunday, September 5th the center of the br oad eye of Frances finally moved inland over Florida provinding reli ef to The Bahamas. Frances impacted the whole of the Bahamas and according to data from The Bahamas Department of Meterology sustained hurricane force winds were experience in the islands of Abaco, Grand Bahama, San Salvador, Ru m Cay, Cat Island and Eleuthera as the eye passed near or over. New Prov idence and many of the other islands received sustained tropical storm forc e conditions. (See Picture B.13)

PAGE 354

335 Picture B.13 Hurricane Frances Satellite Image as it approaches The Bahamas. (Source: NOAA, 2004a) B.5.1.1 Central Pressure and In tensity of Hurricane Frances Figure B.4 shows the related wind s peed and central pressure associated with Hurricane Frances. The data illustrate the relationship between the drop in central pressure and the increase in wind speed. Hurricane Frances impacted the Islands of The Bahamas ov er a 72 hour period September 1st – 3rd when the hurricane was at peak intensity.

PAGE 355

336 Figure B.4: Hurricane Frances Wind Spe ed and Central Pressure (Data Source: The Bahamas Department of Meteorology). B.5.2 Impact of Hurricane Frances on the Islands Hurricane Frances is a perfect exam ple of why disasters should not be classified merely by the number of deat lhs directly associated with the event. Although the loss of live was small the liv elyhoods of many were destroyed. For instance, Hurricane Frances was the first storm since 1866 to impact the entire archipelago. Frances strong winds and heavy rains caused substantial damage especially to Grand Bahama where the sto rm stalled for over 24 hours. According to the Bahamas Water and Sewerage Corporation (2004) storm surge from Frances caused dr amatic increase in chlorides in the trenches in the North Andros Wellfields and the Grand Bahama Wellfields. The water supply to New Providence, where over sixty per cent of the population resides, was

PAGE 356

337 seriously affected due to the fact that t he wellfields were inoperable as was the Reverse Osmosis plant, due to power outages. Further compounding water availability issues, damage to ports on almost all the islands prevented the barging of water between islands. Freshwater supplies were delayed for several days and in some cases several weeks. (Bahamas Water and Sewerge Corporation, 2004) Island infrastructure was heavily impacted by Hurricane Frances. According to the Ministry of Public Works (2004), New Providence sustained major damage to roadways as a reslut of inadequate storm su rge protection. Extensive damage was also done to the r oads in James Cistern and Governor’s Harbour, Eleuthera and Elbow Cay, Abaco. Other islands notably impacted were Cat Island, Long Island and Mayaguana a ll suffing damage to roadways. Docks and Ports throughout the country were heavily damaged and in some cases they were completely destr oyed. According to the Bahamas Port Authority (2004) three do cks in Lower Bogue, South Palmetto Point and James Cistern, all settlements of the island of Eleuthera were destroyed. Similar damage was seen on the island of Abaco. Docks in Cat Island, Long Island and Mayaguana also suffered some degree of damage. According to the Bahamas Airpor t Authority (2004) damage to airport facilites at Freeport, Grand Bahama and Marsh Harbour, Abaco were completely inundated with water as a result of sotr m surge and compromized the structural integrity of the fa cility. There was no major damage to the Control Tower in Grand Bahama closing the airport for more then a week.

PAGE 357

338 The Bahamas Ministry of Education (2004) reported major damage to public school facilities on the Berry Islands, and Grand Bahama. As a result school opening were significantly delayed. Bahamas Electric Corporation (BEC ) (2004) reported widespread power outages throughout the islands. Damages included downed power lines, downed poles and structural damage to power stati on sites on many of the islands. The impacts were minimized due to preplanni ng and mitigation effo rts which allowed for the shutting off of power before and dur ing the storm. Gr and Bahama, which is part of a private elec trical supply had the most extensive damage with over 1300 power poles downed (NEMA, 2004) (See Pictures B.14 B.22) Picture B.14 – Hurricane Frances Damage on the Island of Grand Bahama, The Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004)

PAGE 358

339 Picture B.15 – Hurricane Frances on the Island of Grand Bahama, The Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004) Picture B.16 – Hurricane Frances Dam age on the Island of Grand Bahama, The Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004)

PAGE 359

340 Picture B.17 – Hurricane Frances Dam age on the Island of Grand Bahama, The Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004) Picture B.18 – Hurricane Frances Damage on the Island of Grand Bahama, The Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004)

PAGE 360

341 Picture B.19 – Hurricane Frances Damage in the settlement of Gregory Town on the Island of Eleuthera, The Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004) Picture B.20 – Hurricane Frances Damage on the Island of Andros, The Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004)

PAGE 361

342 Picture B.21 – Hurricane Frances Damage on the Island of New Providence, The Bahamas (Source: Erin Hughey, 2004) Picture B.22 – Hurricane Frances Damage on the Island of New Providence, The Bahamas (Source: Erin Hughey, 2004)

PAGE 362

343 B.5.3 Hurricane Frances Discussion Hurricane Frances impacted the w hole of The Bahamas. The key concerns for the nation were meeting immediate emergency needs of fresh drinking water and shelter. Extensive damage to well fields, and transportation routs (airports, ports, a nd roadways) made difficult the movement of goods between the islands as well as on the island. Hurricane Frances was the first NEMA coordinated emergency response. Strong support came from the Royal Bahamas Defence Force as well as a variety of ministries. B.6 Hurricane Jeanne 2004 Hurricane Jeanne was the second hurricane of the 2004 season to hitt The Islands of The Bahamas, making la ndfall less then three weeks after Hurricane Frances. The tenth named st orm of the 2004 s eason, the sixth hurricane, and the fifth major hurricane (category 3 or greater) Jeanne developed as an open water hurricane east of the Lesse r Antilles. With plenty of time to develop Jeanne gained and lost speed, twis ted and turned, all before slamming into the Northwestern Islands of The Bahamas. This erratic storm caused problems for forecasters and emergency management officials who were not sure were it was headed. While watching Jeanne, officials were also continuing with Hurricane Frances response operations. Map B.5 illustrates the path that Jeanne took through The Bahamas.

PAGE 363

344 B.6.1 Hurricane Jeanne Storm Development According to the 5pm tropical report on Monday, September 13th issued by The Bahamas Department of Meteor ology, tropical depression eleven had formed from a tropical wave 70 miles east-southeast of Guadeloupe in the Lesser Antilles. By the next morning the storm had been upgraded to a Tropical Storm and was named Jeanne. Jeanne was moving in a west-north west direction at 8-12 mph and attained hurricane strength two days later on September 16th. It was not long before Jeanne lost str ength and on September 17th it was downgraded to a tropical depression as it moved across the Dominican Republic. On September 18th, while near the southern Bahamian Island of Great Inagua, a new center formed to the nor theast and the previous circulation dissipated. The 5pm report issued by The Bahamas Department of Meteorology on September 20th indicated that the newly deve loped center of Jeanne had strengthened again and becoming a hurri cane for the second time. Hurricane Jeanne meandered for days before moving in a westerly direction towards the Northwest Bahamas. “This behavior was similar to that of Hurricane Betsy of 1965 and presented numer ous challenges for forecasters and their models” (Rolle & Simmons, 2004 b :3). Continuing to strengthen Hurricane Jeanne headed toward the west, making landfall on the Island of Abaco in the early morning of September 25th. “Shortly thereafter, it reached category 3 status on the Saffir-Simpson scale and maintained this intensity as it passed over

PAGE 364

345 Grand Bahama during the remainder of the day” (Rolle & Simmons, 2004 b :3). (See Picture B.23) Picture B.23 Hurricane Jeanne Satellite Image as it impacts The Bahamas. (Source: NOAA, 2004b) B.6.1.1 Central Pressure and Intensity of Hurricane Jeanne Figure B.5 shows the related wind s peed and central pressure associated with Hurricane Jeanne. The data illustrate s the relationship between the drop in central pressure and the increase in wi nd speed. Hurricane Jeanne impacted the Northwestern Bahamas on September 25th when the storm was at peak intensity.

PAGE 365

346 Figure B.5: Hurricane Jeanne Wind Speed a nd Central Pressure (Data Source: The Bahamas Department of Meteorology). B.6.2 Impact of Hurricane Jeanne on the Islands There were no deaths or reported injuries in association with Hurricane Jeanne. However according to a report issued by The Bahamas Department of Meteorology, “many residents in the extreme northwest Bahamas (Abaco and Grand Bahama, in particular), had to undergo psychiatric evaluation after experiencing two hurricanes in approximat ely three weeks and losing all of their belongings” (Rolle & Simmons, 2004 b :7). Attempting to attribute damages ex clusively to Hurricane Jeanne was difficult since Frances impacted the same islands less then three weeks prior. The northwestern Bahamas received the brunt of Hurricane Jeanne and extensive flooding occurred. As a re sult local and national resources were

PAGE 366

347 heavily taxed during the 2004 hurricane s eason in response to both storms. (See Pictures B.24 – B.29) Picture B.24 – Hurricane Jeanne Damage on Treasure Cay, The Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004) Picture B.25 – Hurricane Jeanne Dam age, Abaco (Source: NEMA, 2004)

PAGE 367

348 Picture B.26 – Hurricane Jeanne Damage on the Island of Abaco, The Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004)

PAGE 368

349 Picture B.27 – Hurricane Jeanne Damage on the Island of Abaco, The Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004) Picture B.28 – Hurricane Jeanne Damage, Haitian Community on the Island of Abaco, The Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004)

PAGE 369

350 Picture B.29 – Hurricane Jeanne Damage, Haitian Community on the Island of Abaco, The Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004) B.6.3 Hurricane Jeanne Discussion Hurricane Jeanne impacted the northern is lands of the Bahamas just three weeks after the archipelago was impact ed by Hurricane Frances. The key concerns for the nation continued to be meeting the immediate emergency needs of fresh drinking water and shelter. Logi stics and communication were extremely challenging as transportation routes and communication lines were damaged. Hurricane Jeanne was the second NEMA coordinated emergency response and it occurred simultaneously to the Hurric ane Frances response. Strong support came from a variety of ministries and organizations and was coordinated through the National Emergency Operati ons Center in Nassau. B.7 Hurricane Wilma 2005 The 2005 Hurricane Season experienc ed a record breaking 26 tropical cyclones and two tropical depressions, it al so also marked the first time that meteorologists had to utilize the Greek al phabet for the naming of storms. Five tropical cyclones impacted the B ahamian archipelago that year: Franklin, Katrina, Ophelia, Rita and Wilma However, it was Hurric ane Wilma that “wreaked havoc on the nations second largest city Freeport, in Grand Bahama” (The Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2005:1). W ilma was also the only storm of the season that required a national response. Map B.6 illustrates the path that Wilma took through The Bahamas.

PAGE 370

351 B.7.1 Hurricane Wilma Storm Development According to The Bahamas Departm ent of Meteorology, on Saturday, October 15th Hurricane Wilma developed from a tropical depression that formed about 195 miles southeast of Grand Cayman. The syste m was monitored over the next few days as the system moved sl owly between a west and northwest direction in the Western Caribbean Sea. The 11am report from the Department of Meteorology on Tuesday, October 18th indicated that Wilma had officially become the twelth hurricane of the seas on. Hurricane Wilma struck Cozumel, Mexico and Honduras before making a tu rn to the northeast and accelerating towards Florida on Sunday, October 23rd. The Bahamas Department of Met eorology reported on Monday, October 24th that Hurricane Wilma was moving to the northeast near 25 miles per hour and was passing within 60 nautical miles nor thwest of Freeport, Grand Bahama. “Tropical storm force winds (sustained 3973mph) were experienced by residents in Grand Bahama from 7:00am through 8:00pm. However, during the period of 11:00am to 2:00pm hurricane force winds (winds of 74 mph or greater) were experienced. The later event appeared synch ronous with the intesnsification of Wilma to Category 3 (115 mph) status around 1pm of the same day” (The Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 200 5:1). It was high tide (1:49pm) when Hurricane Wilma hit the southwest shor eline of Grand Bahama and the Lucayan Harbour. These areas sustained major damage from strong waves and high storm surges. (See Picture B.30)

PAGE 371

352 Picture B.30 Hurricane Wilma Satellite Image as it impacts The Bahamas. (Source: NOAA, 2005) B.7.1.1 Central Pressure and In tensity of Hurricane Wilma Figure B.6 below displays the re lationship between wind speed and central pressure associated with Hurri cane Wilma. The data illustrate the relationship between the drop in central pressure and the increase in wind speed. Hurricane Wilma impacted the Northw estern Bahamas on October 24th luckily, this was not at its peak intensity.

PAGE 372

353 Figure B.6: Hurricane Wilma Wind Spee d and Central Pressure (Data Source: The Bahamas Department of Meteorology). B.7.2 Impact of Hurricane Wilma on the Islands Hurricane Wilma was the only storm to cause any significant damage to The Bahamas during the 2005 Hurricane S eason. One death was reported as a result of Hurricane Wilma and was directly related to storm surge inundation. The concentration of damages was mainly in the vicinities of the northwestern coastal areas. It was in this area that st orm surge was measured at 12 feet (The Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2005) Early damage estimates were in the amount of $6.5 milli on and ranged from widespread destruction of roofs and vehicles to the uprooting of poles and tr ees and the displacement of tombs from the graveyard near the coast (The Bahamas Department of Meteorology, 2005). (See Pictures B.31 – B.36)

PAGE 373

354 Picture B.31 – Hurricane Wilma Damage on the Island of Grand Bahama, The Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004) Picture B.32 – Hurricane Wilma Damage on the Island of Grand Bahama, The Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004)

PAGE 374

355 Picture B.33 – Hurricane Wilma Dam age on the Island of Grand Bahama, The Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004) Picture B.34 – Hurricane Wilma Dam age on the Island of Grand Bahama, The Bahamas (Source: NEMA, 2004)

PAGE 375

356 Picture B.35 – Bahamas Telecommuni cations Company Building Hurricane Wilma Damage, Jones Town, Gr and Bahama (Source: NEMA, 2004) Picture B.36 – Hurricane Wilma Damage. Ray of Hope Church, Hanna Hill, Grand Bahama (Source: NEMA, 2004)

PAGE 376

357 B.7.3 Hurricane Wilma Discussion Hurricane Wilma significantly impac ted the northwestern Bahamas with concentrated damage on the western porti on of Grand Bahama. The islands of Abaco and Bimini also sustained consider able damage. The key concerns for the nation were meeting immediate emer gency needs of fresh drinking water and shelter. The response to Hurricane Wilma was coordinated by NEMA. B.8 Conclusions Chapter 5 provided the development characteristics of each hurricane events as well as the impact each storm had on The Bahamas. Table B.1 provides a summary of the key characterist ics of the six hurrica nes. Of important note is Hurricane Michelle, although Andr ew and Floyd both viol et category four storms caused major destruction, it was t he category two storm making landfall in Nassau that triggered an overhaul to t he emergency response structure. The impact to government and 60% of the nations population highlighted the within The Bahamas. response only a category two storm it was the first storm to impact Nassau, the nation’s capi tal. Michelle, interrupted the business of government raising

PAGE 377

358 SUMMARY TABLE Hurricane Name Date of Landfall in The Bahamas Category at Landfall Sustained Wind Speed At Landfall (mph) Barometric Pressure At Landfall (mb) Number Dead Andrew 8/23/1992 4 150 922 4 Floyd 9/14/1999 4 135 921 2 Michelle 11/05/2001 2 105 965 0 Frances 9/2-5/2004 4 145 936 2 Jeanne 9/25/2004 2 105 952 0 Wilma 10/24/2005 3 125 950 1 Table B.1 – Study Hurricane Summary Table (Data Source: Bahamas Department of Meteorology)

PAGE 378

359 Appendix C: Interview With Prim e Minister Perry G. Christie C.1 Interview with Prime Minister Perry G. Christie (January 25, 2007) To assess the national governm ents position on emergency management an interview was conducted with Prime Mini ster Perry G. Christie in January of 2007 (See Picture 5.1). The transcript and di scussion of the interview is provided below. Question: What is your vision for NEMA and emergency management in The Bahamas? “Firstly, it is of critical importanc e that The Bahamas applies the same level of interest in deve loping a disaster preparedne ss entity that it does in developing its economy, because our ability to respond and manage disasters will be directly related to our ability to secure our future. The fact that we are a different kind of country than most countries in the region, and in the hemisphere, in that we are a chain of islands separated by expanses of water with sparse population centers throughout makes our task even more onerous as well as more important. Therefore, the people who are invited to be a part of NEMA must be prepared to be special people in terms of the initiatives that they take, really the preparations that they make to prepare themselves They must ‘know’ the Bahamas and so the government must be committed and in its commitment the government must be sure to recru it the right people with the right qualifications to lead NEMA. Those qualifications must be beyond academic qualifications, they must I think, give a lot of weight to leadership. The ability to lead and insp ire people, get people to listen to you and to understand is cr itical. They must ha ve special qualities of being able to ensure that they are able to lead a coordinated and integrated sort of effort to ensure th at all of the sector s of government and private sector are working together. My vision is that we begin… I think I should also add that th rough the leadership must also have people who can easily work with persons from outs ide the country. It is necessary for us to have good working relationships w ith those interna tional agencies at the regional level, or across border in the United States of America. NEMA personnel must have the stature and ability to lead NEMA in that direction on a sustained basis. Ha ving done all of those things, having

PAGE 379

360 ensured that the right legislation is in place, the government must demonstrate its continuing support for the strengthening of NEMA, because of that level of importance t hat I have assigned when I spoke of it being directly linked to the economy of the c ountry, and therefore the survival of our people. The final po int I want to make about it is, because we are a chain of islands we have to put a lot of effort into planning. So the most important aspect of NEMA is anticipating the varying types of disasters that could impact our c ountry and creating models for the necessary response that would be th ere. For example, when we are confronted by the enormity of the pot ential impact; like an island really having 200mph force coming into it. What do we do in terms of evacuation? If one were to therefore look at the fact that we are a chain of islands the question fo r the country is do we have an organization in place that is efficiently empowered and funded to go through the various studies and determinations that would be there to protect our country. It therefore requires the political will and the political commitment to ensure the success of that. Hopefully I ha ve given you the right feel for my vision”. (Prime Minister Perry G. Christie, January 25, 2007) Prime Minister Christie’s response illustrates a clear awareness of the importance of emergency management, and the economic and political impact a major disaster could have on the Nation. Also revealed is his understanding that the geography of The Bahamas places it at a high and recurrent risk of hurricanes. Weeks after Prime Minister Ch ristie took office Hurricane Michelle impacted the nation’s capital. The interruption to government caused by Michelle as well as the impact of September 11th on the world, created within the nation an advocacy supporting action. As a resu lt, the Prime Minister pushed for the development of a national agency focu sed on managing disasters. Financial support for the development of NEMA was provided by the office of the Prime Minister and later legislated under the 2006 Disaster Preparedness and Response Act.

PAGE 380

361 Strong support from the Prime Minister for the creation of NEMA and the implementation of a CEM system has brought disaster awareness to the forefront. Through this process res ources have been made available to develop planning and training initiatives in an effo rt to improve disaster response. The political support provided by the Prime Minister has made emergency management a national priority. Question: The Bahamas has a unique Geography with over 700 islands and cays covering over 100, 000 square miles. Is there one thing that you think other island nations could learn from how The Bahamas are managing disaster preparedness and response? “Again it is difficult for me to comment on what ot her nations are doing in terms of their levels of preparati on. I would like to believe The Bahamas in terms of our resent experienc es, has gone about using all of our resources and international help, like the International American Bank, to affect an understanding to the entire country of the importance of working together and not underestimating a potential impact always knowing that the country could be cut-off and that we have to be prepared to deal with that. I think if one were to look at The Bahamas over the last five to ten year and see the rapid progress that we have made forging an understanding that we have to be st rong and we have to integrate the necessary forces in the country. NEMA will never have the manpower available to it, in terms of its ow n 1000 staff members and so therefore it needs to forge relationships and m odels of participation that will be triggered when disasters strike. Ble nd everyone into a working instrument that would properly coordinate an d properly manage, is the goal of NEMA. So, I think the challenge for us is that that we look to the future to develop a model of each island taking into consideration all of their peculiarities so that this coordina ting body at the cente r in the capital would be able to coordinate. I think currently there are levels of that, but we need to continue to move in that direction. My job would be to ensure that those who are leading NEMA are in fact making progress and are moving forward not just waiting for the next hurricane season and so it is a full time preoccupation and something that we will manage effectively.” (Prime Minister Perry G. Christie, January 25, 2007)

PAGE 381

362 Prime Minister Christie’s respons es illustrate his understanding of the critical nature of emergency management. He is committed to a comprehensive preparedness and response campaign that requires an understanding of the unique physical and social environment of the nation. His commitment has been articulated through legislation and fi nancial support for NEMA. He believes strongly that his job is to ensure NEMA is proper ly equipped to effectively manage disaster and prot ect the nation. Picture 5.1 – Prime Minister Perry G. Christie and Erin Hughey, January 25, 2007. (Photographer: Gayle Outton-Moncur) The intent of the interview with the Prime Minister was to assess the national governments pos ition on emergency management. Through strong political and fiscal support for NEMA posit ion of the governm ent with regards to emergency management is a proactive one. Prime Minister Christie personally provided strong support to NEMA in response to Hurricanes Frances, Jeanne,

PAGE 382

363 and Wilma through participation in media briefings, active involvement in discussions with Family Island Administra tors, and contributions to the national EOC. His involvement has raised awar eness within the nation and facilitated the development and implementat ion of a CEM system.

PAGE 383

364 About the Author Erin Hughey received a Bachelor’s Degree in Government from Morehead State University in 1998. Following Graduation Ms. Hughey began her work in the field of disaster management as a Dis aster Specialist wit h the American Red Cross. Upon completion of her tenure with the Red Cross Ms. Hughey began work on her Master’s degree in Geography at the Universi ty of South Florida. While working towards her Master’s degree, Ms. Hughey was a researcher and instructor with the Global Center for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Action at the University of South Florida. She earned her MA in geography in 2002. Ms. Hughey began the Ph.D. progr am in Geography & Environmental Science and Policy at the University of South Florida in 2005. Her research has focused on the political and social cha llenges associated with developing a comprehensive emergency management syst em for The Commonwealth of The Bahamas. Ms. Hughey’s work has been published in The Southeastern Geographer and the Fl orida Geographer.