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Making and keeping the peace :
b an analysis of African Union efficacy
h [electronic resource] /
by Nicholas Temple.
[Tampa, Fla] :
University of South Florida,
Title from PDF of title page.
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Thesis (M.A.)--University of South Florida, 2009.
Includes bibliographical references.
Text (Electronic thesis) in PDF format.
ABSTRACT: The African Union (AU) has pledged to create a continent of peace and solidarity. However, dozens of socio-ethnic conflicts occur across the continent despite the AU's best efforts to prevent them. In this thesis, case studies of Darfur and Western Sahara were used to assess the efficacy of the AU in the realm of peacemaking and peacekeeping. Within each of these studies, AU impediments to peacemaking and peacekeeping on financial, political, and socio-cultural fronts were analyzed. The findings suggest that while socio-cultural conflict continues to proliferate, the AU has neither the financial resources nor the political clout to meet peacemaking and peacekeeping milestones. Furthermore, findings from this research suggest that conflict founded upon socio-cultural diversity undermines the very foundation of regionalism solidarity and therefore compromises the overall application of regionalism as a mechanism for peacekeeping. This in turn stymies the AU from becoming internationally respected for making and keeping the peace.
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Advisor: Earl Conteh-Morgan, Ph.D.
x Political Science
t USF Electronic Theses and Dissertations.
Making and Keeping the Peace: An Analysis of African Union Efficacy by Nicholas Temple A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of Government and International Affairs College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida Major Professor: Earl Conteh-Morgan, Ph.D. M. Scott Solomon, Ph.D. Abdelwahab Hechiche, Ph.D. Date of Approval: June 26, 2009 Keywords: Regionalism, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, Darfur, Western Sahara Copyright 2009, Nicholas Temple
i Table of Contents Abstra ct................................................................................................................ iii Chapter 1: In troduction.........................................................................................1 Methodology..............................................................................................2 Case Study Analysi s.......................................................................2 Conceptual Clari fications................................................................3 Literature Review.......................................................................................6 Cold War to Post-Cold War: Th e Evolution of Peacekeeping.........6 RegionalismÂ’s Role in C onflict Pacifi cation...................................10 Peacekeeping in Africa.................................................................14 The Creation of the OAU/AU-T heir Mission and Their Challeng es...............................................................................16 Impediments to Peacemaking and Peacekeeping in Africa..........17 Chapter 2: Darfur Case Study ............................................................................21 Darfur Ba ckground ...................................................................................21 Who are the J anjawee d?..............................................................24 Chronology of Peacemak ing and Peacek eeping..........................25 Peacemaking and Peac ekeeping A genda...............................................26 The Darfur Peac e Agreem ent.......................................................27 Financial Shor tcomi ngs............................................................................35 Hybrid Force: Me ssiah or My th?...................................................38 Political Im pediment s...............................................................................40 State Sponsor ed Violen ce.............................................................40 Sudanese President Om ar Al-Bas hir............................................41 The Chinese Variabl e....................................................................43 Socio-Cultur al Cla sh................................................................................45 Ethnic Cl eavages..........................................................................45 Conclusi on...............................................................................................47 Chapter 3: Western Sahara Case Study............................................................49 Chronology of Conf lict..............................................................................50 Agenda for Peace....................................................................................52 Financial Woes........................................................................................54 U.S.-Morocco Re lationshi p...........................................................55 A War Over Re source s?...............................................................56 Political Im pediment s...............................................................................57 Loophole in Inter national Law.......................................................58
ii SADR Admission to AU: A Shot in the Arm or a Shot in t he Foot?.................................58 Socio-Cultural Issues...............................................................................60 A Case for the Internati onal Court of Justice.................................60 The Elusive Re ferendum...............................................................61 Conclusi on...............................................................................................64 Chapter 4: Comparis on and Conc lusion.............................................................66 Comparison of Over arching Tr ends.........................................................66 Suggestions for the Futu re.......................................................................68 Regionalism for Peacekeepi ng?..............................................................70 Referenc es.........................................................................................................72
iii Making and Keeping the Peace: An An alysis of African Union Efficacy Nicholas Temple ABSTRACT The African Union (AU) has pledged to create a continent of peace and solidarity. However, dozens of socioethnic conflicts occur across the continent despite the AUÂ’s best efforts to prevent t hem. In this thesis, case studies of Darfur and Western Sahara were used to assess the efficacy of the AU in the realm of peacemaking and peacekeeping. Within each of these studies, AU impediments to peacemaking and peacekeepi ng on financial, political, and sociocultural fronts were analyzed. The findi ngs suggest that while socio-cultural conflict continues to proliferate, the AU has neither the financial resources nor the political clout to meet peacem aking and peacekeeping milestones. Furthermore, findings from this re search suggest that conflict founded upon socio-cultural diversity undermines the very foundation of r egionalism solidarity and therefore compromises the overa ll application of regionalism as a mechanism for peacekeeping. This in turn stymies the AU from becoming internationally respected for making and keeping the peace.
1 Chapter 1: Introduction Since decolonization of Africa, the power struggle within and between African governments has resulted in civil unrest and interstate warfare. These conflicts have been the target of peacem aking and peacekeeping initiatives of the Western powers, the United Nations (UN), and neighboring African states. The European Union (EU) has found region alism to be a preventative solution to conflict. After two world wars, Eur opean states used economic interdependence and political integration to establish t he EU as a forum to negotiate and mediate issues across a table instead of on a battlefield. With the success Europe has experienced in quelling violence and civil unrest through regional ism, many hope this interdependence of states through regional integration has may be a possible remedy for African turbulence. This thesis seeks to evaluate the efficacy of AfricaÂ’s response to regionalism, in particular the Afric an Union (AU), and its peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in Darfur and West ern Sahara. It wil l examine questions stemming from three quintessentia l areas of AU peacemaking and peacekeeping: economical, political, and soci o-cultural. Why is the AU having financial problems? If the purpose of peac ekeeping is to broker peace through compromise between opposing parties, is it within the interest of member states
2 that are the subject to peac ekeeping measures to cont ribute state funds to the AU Peace Fund? Why do Governments su ch as Sudan and Morocco object to the intervention of UN peacekeeping forc es while inviting an AU peacekeeping mission? Is AU peacekeeping more acceptabl e because of its African origin, or is it because of its widespread record of lame-duck peacekeeping missions that offer little threat to the offending governm ent? This study will attempt to address these questions within two case studi es of Darfur and Western Sahara. Methodology Through the use of primary source s such as UN and AU publications and secondary sources such as periodicals, books, articles, and newspapers, I will address the issue of AU peacemaking an d peacekeeping efficacy by analyzing two case studies: the Darfur crisis and the Western Sahara stalemate. The analysis will focus on whether or not econom ic, political, and cultural factors have stymied AU peacemaking and peacekeeping effo rts in these two distinct African regions. Case Study Analysis The Darfur and Western Sahara conf licts were chosen for analysis due to their high level of AU involvement and t herefore offer sufficient evidence of AU peacemaking and peacekeeping c apabilities. Other crises, such as Congo and
3 Rwanda were subject to more outside peacemaking and peacekeeping assistance rather than driven by a high le vel of AU involvement. Furthermore, cases such as Liberia and Sierra Leone are more of an example of the peacekeeping efforts of sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS). The Darfur and Western Sahara case studies, however, offer suffi cient data for greater understanding of the AU peacemaking machine due to the A UÂ’s deep involvement in each of these conflicts. Moreover, the comparison of the two cases will offer a more balanced understanding of the AUÂ’s capacity fo r peacemaking and peacekeeping as a whole. Conceptual Clarifications Understanding the difference bet ween peacemaking and peacekeeping are integral to the evaluat ion of AU conflict resolution because the benchmarks towards peace outlined within each approach will be used as a measure for efficacy evaluation. Because this thes is will evaluate how effective the AU can meet the goals of peacemaking and peacekeepi ng, it is important to first define these and other terms for cl arification and understanding. Richmond (2002) defines conflict in a multilateral context wherein the definition involves the inte rjecting agendas of human rights, sovereignty, territory, self-determination, and i dentity that result in c onflicting ethnic groups and nationalities. For the purposes of th is thesis, conflict will be defined as an
4 occurrence whereby two or more groups are engaged in a struggle founded on contradicting agendas. Peacemaking has been defined as the proactive intervention to encourage warring factions to settle their disput e (Conteh-Morgan, 2004). For the purposes of this study, peacemaking will be defined as the use of both non-military and military interventions as a means to achieve cessation of open hostilities. Peacekeeping has been used as a blanket terminology to incorporate other approaches to used to achieve peace such as peace-building, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and prev entative diplomacy (Conteh Morgan, 2002; Diehl, 1993). Peacekeeping has also been defined simply as the use of military intervention to maintain peace and prevent an incr ease in confrontation (Conteh-Morgan 2004). Kieh and Muk enge (2002) define the traditional peacekeeping approach as the use of militar y force and political pressure by a third party to maintain the peace achieved by the peacemaking process. Diehl (1993) has defined peacekeeping as Â“any international effort involving an operational component to promote the te rmination of arm ed conflict or the resolution of longstanding disputesÂ” (p. 4), while Goulding (1993) defines it as a technique set up to help settle armed conflic ts. Lastly, the UN Charter (October 1945) Chapter XII, Article 41 states, Â“The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the us e of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisionsÂ…Â”. For the purpose of this study, peacekeeping is defined as the
5 act of maintaining and sustaining peace through the use of military intervention forces. Mediation is an international engagement where a third-party will convene at the negotiating table with warring parties and employ diplomatic methods to help both parties reach a peaceful resoluti on (Goulding, 1993). Wall, Stark, and Standifer (2001) agree with this definition that mediati on is when a third-party intercedes between two opposing forces. Howe ver, they add that this third-party may or may not have the author ity to compel an outcome of the warring parties. Taking these definitions into account, mediation in this thesis s defined as the intercession of a third-party to fac ilitate the resumption of communication between two or more conflicting groups to achieve a resolution through compromise. In addition, financial impediments to peace are those obstacles, financial in nature, which obstruc t the proliferation of peacekeeping endeavors. Political impediments are those hurdles peacekeepers fa ce which stem fr om the use of rules, alliances, and other political dev ices to obstruct the progression of peacekeeping endeavors. Socio-Cultural impediments are obstacles born through circumstances that involve conf licting groups whereby the source of conflict is ethnic, cultural or societal by nature. Because this thesis evaluates how well the AU engages in peacemaking and peacekeeping, the dictionary defines the term efficacy as Â“the power to produce an effectÂ” (Morehead & Morehead, 2009). Therefore, AU efficacy will be
6 defined as the AUÂ’s ability to meet peac emaking and peacekeeping goals wherein peace is attained and sustained. For the purposes of this thesis, the goals for peacemaking are, To halt hostilities through the attain ment and continuance of ceasefire; The goals for peacekeeping are; To bring warring parties to the negotiations table; To Facilitate negotiation whereby bot h parties are likely to maintain peaceful relations over time; and To maintain peace longevity amongst the populace. Literature Review Peacekeeping as a general concept has evolved over time, incorporating a wide scope of approaches and philosophies over the course of the twentieth century through today. Cold War to Post-Cold War: The Evolution of Peacekeeping During the Cold War, peacekeeping oper ations were quite simplified. Richmond (2002) states that t he balance of power that is characteristic of the state-centered Realpolitik philosophy created a backg round for much of the UN peacekeeping polices. He states that this international backdrop lays the foundation for the first of three generations of peacekeeping. Because the first
7 generation is state-centered, it primarily focused upon a state-centered approach wherein a conflict is stifled by the effo rts of an outside source and sought to maintain the balance of power through t he maintenance of hostility cessation. Furthermore, Diehl (1993) covers seve ral cases wherein the U.N. had many peacekeeping operations bet ween 1955 and 1992 that obliged the peacekeepers to maintain the target of peacekeeping oper ations to reside at the state level. The second generation flies in the fa ce of the statecentrism of its predecessor. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a shift in the peacekeeping paradigm fr om the use of force to inte rcede within conflicts to the use of conflict resolution methods (Bandura, 1982; Diehl, 1994; Wall and Druckman, 2003). The conflict resoluti on theories of the second generation according to Richmond (2002), are cent ered upon the individual and therefore stress that a peace agr eement cannot be achieved until the consent and consideration of the rankand-file is considered. In response to this shift, three main approaches to obtaining peace have been developed. These new approaches including peace enforcement, preventive diplomacy, and peace-build ing (Conteh-Morgan, 2004), offered a significant paradigm shift in peacekeeping methods. Because of the shift these peacekeeping approaches represent, they have been labeled as a Â“third generationÂ” of peacekeeping by Richmond (2002). This change is marked by peacekeeping operations of the UN from a stance of Â“interpositionÂ” in which highprofile levels of mediat ion and negotiation exist, to that of Â“integrated and
8 multidimensional operationsÂ” marked by the peace enforcement operations for which the UN was later to be known (Richmond, 2002, p. 11). He states that this generation of peacekeeping Â“approaches [to ] peaceÂ…signify the attempt to create an operational, normative, just, dem ocratic fabric of mediation in and between civil societiesÂ” ( Richmond, 2002, p. 11-12). A closer look at peace enforcement will offer evidence of this paradigm shift. Peace enforcement is based on t he access the peace enforcer has to the necessary material and personnel to enc ourage compliance of the disgruntled parties. The peace enforcer must be of a neutral party and they Â“must demonstrateÂ…willingness to induce complianc e from all of the parties to the conflict, without exception. [The willingness to induce comp liance] is critical for establishing the enforcerÂ’s credib ility with both the disputants and the international community at largeÂ” (Kieh & Mu kenge, 2002, p. 17). It is important for the peace enforcer to be knowledgeabl e of political, as well as social, economic, and cultural aspects of the conf licted region, as this knowledge is crucial to peace enforcement (Kieh & Mu kenge, 2002). The recognition of these other aspects towards conflict demonstr ates the major par adigm shift within peacekeeping as a whole. Another addition to peacekeeping operat ions is the use of preventive diplomacy. Preventive dipl omacy is the employment of diplomatic measures to arrest conflict before it can prolif erate (Conteh-Morgan, 2004). Furthermore, Murray (2001) argues that much of conf lict outburst stems from human rights
9 violations. She continues to add t hat if human rights violations were diplomatically addressed early, conf lict could be preempted. Amnesty International (1998) agrees stating a cl ear link between the preservation of human rights and the minimization of conflict. Peace-building has become more co mmon since the end of the Cold War as a potential replacement for peacekeep ing (Shimizu and Sandler, 2002). Rather than rely on a m ilitary presence to induce compliance, peace-building focuses more on the rebuilding of infr astructure and establishing a transparent government as a means of mainta ining peace (Conteh-Morgan, 2004). Furthermore, Samuels (2005) believes t hat a lasting peace is contingent upon three interrelated aspects to building democratic governance: The society is transitioned from the utilization of violence to political means of settling conflict; There is a reformation of governance that ensures equity amongst warring parties and the development of democratic governance; There is an establishment of sust ainable, meaningful institutions. In agreement, Adedeji (1999) believes it is important to under stand the complex dynamic of African conflict; he states that sustainable peace is found in good governance, democracy, and development. As presented, peacekeeping has evolved from simply focusing upon the solution to conflict at the state level to emphasizing the individual, cultural,
10 economic factors. Furthermore, there is also a movement by states within the developed world to shar e the peacekeeping burden. RegionalismÂ’s Role in Conflict Pacification Regionalism has become a growing trend in international politics as well as international economics. In the realm of peacekee ping, the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have ta ken the lead to initiate peacekeeping operations in many conflicts worldwide. Furthermore, many regions of the world are aiming to follow the path of the EU as they watched the European Coal and Steal Community evolve into the worldÂ’s largest single market economy, as well as bring a region that was the epicenter of two world wars to over 50 years of peace (Dinan, 2003). Discuss ing the peacekeeping examples of each of these noteworthy organizations in brief offers an opportunity for understanding context and the lessons learned within the wo rld of peacekeeping operations by international organizations. The UN has been the internat ional figurehead for peacekeeping operations. Its evolution of peacekeeping me thods since its conception illustrate the very change in peacekeeping over time as stated in Richmond (2002). According to the Department of Peac ekeeping Operations within the UN: The nature of conflicts has also changed over the year s. Originally developed as a means of dealin g with inter-State conflict, UN peacekeeping has been increasingly appl ied to intra-State conflicts and civil wars. Although the militar y remain the backbone of most peacekeeping operations, the many fa ces of peacekeeping now include administrators and economists, police officers and legal experts, de-
11 miners and electoral observers, human ri ghts monitors and specialists in civil affairs and governance, hum anitarian workers and experts in communications and public information. (UN, 2008b) This evolution can be seen when compar ing the mandates of United Nations Operation in the Congo in 1960 (ONUC) with that of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda in 1993-1995 ( UNAMIR) (UN, 2008d). Within the Congolese operation, ther e was a short mandate speak ing of installing a ceasefire by offering the Government of the Republic of the Congo military assistance to help quell the intrastate violence (United Nations, 2008c). By contrast, UNAMIR offers a much more multifaceted approach to peacekeeping. UNAMIRÂ’s mandate was to monitor the ceasef ire in addition to the distribution of humanitarian aid. Furthermore, the UNA MIR mandate stated that peacekeepers were to: Stabilize and monitor the situation in all regions of Rwanda to encourage the return of the displaced population; provide security and support for humanitarian assistanceÂ…; and to pr omote, through mediation and good offices, national reconc iliation in Rwanda. (United Nations, UNAMIR, 2008). Furthermore, in International Peacekeeping, Diehl (1993) comments on the UN peacekeeping missions in the past 50 years, highlighting 10 such operations. One in particular, UN Em ergency Force-I (UNEF I), the United NationÂ’s first peacekeeping mission to the Suez Canal in 1956, offers evidence noteworthy of future peacek eeping trends. Despite UNEF I achieving its first two goals of arresting conflict and facilitati ng the withdrawal of Israeli, French, and
12 British troops from the area, the withdrawal of UN troops at the request of EgyptÂ’s President Nasser offered Israel an opport unity for a preemptive strike against Arab forces near its borders. The Six-Day War subsequ ently ensued. According to Diehl (1993), this occurred because UNE F I failed to extingu ish the source of Arab-Israeli conflict. UNEF I offe rs an example of first generational peacekeeping of which Richmond (2002) spea ks, concentrating upon a solution at the state level by arresting violenc e without addressing the underlying sources of the conflict. Furthermore, the respect for state borders the UN offers within its charter is suspect to RichmondÂ’s (2002) first generational peacekeeping theory as well. According to Goulding (1993) Â“Â… [UN] peacekeeping operations could be set up only with the consent of the parties to the conflict in questionÂ” (1993, p. 454). The UNEF I operation illustrates the under lying reasons for the change in peacekeeping ideology between ONUC and UNAMIR. The North Atlantic Treaty Organiza tion (NATO) is another example of peacekeeping by a regional or ganization. Created durin g the Cold War as an allied response to a perceived growing communist threat world wide, NATO came to represent the WestÂ’s counterbal ance to the Soviet heavyweight. After the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union, many expected that NATO would dissipate without its adversarial mandate; yet it has become a major player in regional security operations in the post-Co ld War world (Duffi eld, 1994; Solana, 1999). Evidence of this can be seen in NATOÂ’s most recent success in their intervention within the Kosovo conflict (S olana, 1999). Howeve r, Dobbins (2005)
13 states that NATO lacks the same resour ces as the UN and the EU to cover those functions that stem beyond military in tervention which this new age of peacekeeping requires. Due to European solidarity, EU peacekeeping efforts have stemmed outward with moderate success. T he creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) is a demonstration of this fact through its use of market liberalization techniques to maintain peac e. Young (2003) covers at length the EMP goals of political, economic, and social stability through promoting economic, political, and social union wit h EU policies. Young (2003) describes the peacekeeping and security goals of t he EMP as alleviating socioeconomic factors within the area by establis hing a free-trade area by 2010. This peacekeeping initiative is set fort h between the EU and South Mediterranean states including Morocco, Algeria, Tuni sia, Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey. Th is Â“zone of interest and stabilityÂ” is criticized for being counter-productive because it opens these underdeveloped markets to EU competition, which thr eatens to destabilize the region (Young, 2003, p. 414-416). As seen through the ex ample of NAFTAÂ’s effect upon Central American countries, peacemaking and peac ekeeping through liberalization of markets may very well backfire as busi nesses are forced to compete with the competitive goods of developed countri es thus increasing unemployment, recession, and poverty (Schoultz, 1998). Lack of public provisions can erode public trust, which in turn can inflame rank-and-file tensions. Because of the
14 EUÂ’s lack of attention upon domestic re venue development, Green (1999) argues that the subsequent lack of infrastructure basic service rehabilitation, and public service pay guarantees that it is only a ma tter of time be fore the next conflict. Peacekeeping in Africa Many believe that decolon ization led to the prolifer ation of conflict in the under-developed world (Sadowski,1998; Szi rmai, 2005). Consequently, many scholars and peacekeeping envoys are looking towards newer and less expensive measures to facilitate peacek eeping operations. One difficulty with this endeavor is the longstanding animosity with former colonial powers that further complicates and affects the e fficacy of African peacekeeping (Addison & Murshed, 2002). Addison and Murshed ( 2002) argue the initial creation and agreement to a peace agreement depends la rgely upon the credibility of those making the offer. Proof of this is noted by Diehl ( 1993), who states that the ONUC was a break in the traditional peacekeeping operations of the time because regional countries donated troops to help build the credibility of the peacekeeping force with the Congolese peopl e. Many are now looking at the ethnic component as well as the po litical and economic components when considering African peacekeeping operations. In regards to preemptive peacekeeping measures, many scholars aim to study the source of conflict within Africa, hoping that understanding it can prescribe methods for the lasting effect s of a successful peacekeeping mission.
15 Though ethnocentric peacekeepin g orthodoxy is widely a ccepted, Adedeji (1999) objects to ethnic divisions being a dividing force, so long as languages, religions and cultural differences define ethnicity. He states that several stereotypes for the source of African conf lict are rooted in ethnic and tr ibal conflicts that often stymie or regress development processe s. According to Adedeji (1999), these ethnic and tribal rivalries are often flared by the political elite for their own ends, which in turn has led to conflict. Howe ver, Yahya Sadowski (1998) disagrees, citing examples from the French and Belg ian eras of Rwandan colonization. Sadowski (1998) mentions that the Rw andan genocide was r ooted in Belgian political and social mechanisms that st ymied the inter-caste movement which existed during the French colonization period. This led to an adversarial social construct between the two castes, and became increasingly militaristic. Toure (1999) explains that peac e is best achieved, through the cooperation, strengthening and reexamination of s ub-regional peacekeeping capabilities. One of the reoccurring themes Toure (1 999) touches upon is the logistical, training, and financial shortc omings of these groups despite their ideological strengths a nd commitments. These i deological strengths and commitments are grounded in prevention. Some of the socio-economic preventative measures include: Instituting and implanting efficient democratic systems which take the ethnic realities of each state into account
16 Instituting a system of government based on permanent social dialogue and quest for political consensus Establishing a judicial system which is accessible to and is perceived by all as independent of the state Respect for human rights and the rejection of impunity Eradicating exclusion and intertwining ab ility in the running of public affairs In cooperation with international or ganizations, conducting policies which address issues such as debt, regional integration, women, children and cultural identity. (Toure, 1999, p. 24) Despite the creation of the Cairo Declarat ion, which was meant to point to the Organization of African Unity (OAU)/AUÂ’s need to take a wider view of conflict prevention, conflict management, and its resolu tion, Murray (2001) states that the OAU/AU must improve their record of quelling gross human rights violations if they are to meet the goals of conflict prevention. The Creation of the OAU/AUThei r Mission and Their Challenges The AU was born out of the (OAU). The OAU was created as a measure of African resolve for pan-decolonization and promotion of Af rican solidarity in 1963. When the OAU charter was signed, it incorporated 47 countries of varying black and Arab origins as a measure to pr omote this solidarity (Binaisa 1977; Biswaro, 2005). At a meeting of nati on-states in Tripoli, Libya, H.E. Alpha Omar
17 Konare, President of the Republic of Mali at the ti me and Chairmen of The Economic Community of Western Afric an States (ECOWAS) suggested the use of the AU as a replacement for the OAU because the mission of OAUÂ—African liberation from the hold of colonialismÂ—had been realized. According to Alpha Omar Konare, the OAU had lost its po litical mandate and could not uphold the economic mandate stated by the Abuja Treaty. It theref ore follows that the AU should function as a replacement for the OAU and should also serve as a consolidation medium for t he Regional Economic Communities (RECs) leading to a (con)federation of states (Biswaro, 2005). This led to the genesis of Sirte II, a draft Treaty to be submitted and signed in Lome on July 2000, marking the beginning of the African Union (Biswaro, 2005). Considering the motivation for peace wa s the catalyst for the formation of regionalization, it follows that many regions have found themselves in peacemaking and peacekeeping oper ations (Dinan, 2003). Therefore, once the OAU met their goal of widespread decoloniz ation, their focus shifted toward a new mission: peace. Because the time span of the case studies within this thesis straddles this change in the organizationÂ’s mission and title, this thesis will use Â“AUÂ” to refer to the Â“OAUÂ” despite a reference prior to the 2000 conversion. Impediments to Peacemaking and Peacekeeping in Africa Despite the virtue of peacemak ing and peacekeeping, achieving and maintaining peace in Africa is expensiv e. It is noted that UN peacekeeping
18 operations are mainly cont ingent upon the contributions of a disproportionate few member states (namely the United States and a select ot her few wealthy nations) (Khanna, et al., 1998; Sandler & Shimizu, 2002). Even though the UN does not design its peacekeeping agenda based upon the price of a mission (Lebovic, 2004), insufficient funds can impede upon mission effectiveness (Khanna et al., 1998). The probability of success within a peacekeeping mission relies largely upon the organization, deployment, or direct ion of the force (Diehl, 1993). The increase in demand for peacemaking and pea cekeeping efforts is apparent by the increase of the UN annual budget of peacemaking and peacekeeping initiatives. In 1980, the annual budget fo r peace efforts was $180 million. In 1994, that cost increased to $3.5 billion (Shimizu & Sandler, 2002) and stands at about $7 billion in 2008 (Deen, 2008). This documented proliferation of conflict combined with a member-supported Peace F und result in an over-stretched AU peacekeeping machine. The UN reports that the AU Peace Fund is $48 million in arrears in funding its peacemaking and peacekeeping operat ions (Berman & Sams, 2000). This shortcoming in AU member funding provides an alarming illustration of the organizationÂ’s i nability to finance necessary and effective peacemaking and peacekeeping campaigns. Gi ven the price tag of peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts, it follows that more effective and efficient uses of peacekeeping funds are needed. Mediation has been found to be one of those price-efficient forms of peacekeeping. Mediation, as defined above, is the intercession of a third-party to
19 facilitate the resumption of communica tion between conflicting groups. This often involves a face-to-face conversati on to work out differences and offers clarification of issues of contention, bot h with the intent to pacify conflict (ContehMorgan 2004). RAND corporation attribut es the UNÂ’s recent employment of mediation tactics upon the African cont inent to a 40 percent decline in the number of conflicts since 1992 (Deen, 2008). Furthermo re, previous Secretary General to the UN, Kofi Anan, utiliz ed this form of peacekeeping to end postelection riots in Kenya at the price of a mere $208 thousand (Deen, 2008). Given its recent track record, its recent deploy ment to stop the fi ve-year conflict in Darfur (Sudan Tribune, 2008), it s history in other conflicts in Africa, as well as its inexpensive price tag, mediation is notew orthy within the study of peacekeeping because of its efficacy and relatively miniscule price tag. However, financial and logistical means are not the only impediments to peace. Political and cultural issues aris e as well. Political constraints can include policies of inaction. This is exemplified by ChinaÂ’s inaction towards leveraging its economic power with Sudan to encourage a cessation in hostilities (Yardley, 2008). Other political constrai nts include policies of home countries which prevent peacemaking and peacekeepi ng goals from being set, such as MoroccoÂ’s refusal to withdraw troops from Western Sahar a as well as its rejection of the presence of UN and AU tr oops in the area to facilitate a selfdetermination referendum (Naldi, 1985).
20 Political impediments can also inte rtwine with ethnic constraints. The drawing of arbitrary borders during co lonization, for example, have separated indigenous peoples, coupling rival clans t ogether and potentially sewing seeds of conflict. Furthermore, American and Russian funding of rival factions during the Cold War have fanned hot flames of conf lict, further deepening conflict (Binaisa, 1977). This thesis will expl ore the potential impediments cu ltural conflict offers to the AU peacemaking and peacekeeping process. In sum, the remainder of this thesis will focus on the record of effectiveness of AU peacemaking and peac ekeeping in the face of financial, political, and socio-cultural obstacles. In particular, to what degree was the AU able to accomplish the goals of peacemaking and peacekeeping in Darfur and Western Sahara? What economic, political and socio-cultural factors influence the degree of the AUÂ’s effectiveness in these conflicts? Are AU peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts effective enough to influence the behavior of conflicting parties towards a lasting peaceful coexistence? These questions are addressed in the next two chapters dealing with the crisis in Darfur and Western Sahara, respectively.
21 Chapter 2: Darfur Case Study Darfur Background The Darfur crisis starte d when non-Arab ethnic gro ups believed their Arab counterparts in the region were being disproportionably favored by the government. This favoritism drove the disgruntled non-Arabs to take up arms and on March 2003, fighting broke out between the government and these groups. With the violence quickly esca lating and the Government of Sudan unable Â– or unwilling Â– to intervene in the hos tilities, the Darfur crisis rapidly grew to international spotlight as a genocidal catastrophe.1 This case study aims to survey and assess the AUÂ’s intervention within this crisis by first exploring the history of the conflict as well as its key groups and players. It then outlines the peacemaking and peacek eeping agenda of the AU as it develops over time, follow ed by an assessment of this agendaÂ’s effectiveness. It aims to answer questions asking why this agenda has not met its goals and fighting in the region continues to proliferate. 1 I use the term Â“genocidalÂ” over actually calli ng it a genocide because of the United NationÂ’s conclusion that the Darfur crisis promulgated in Resolution 1564 (CNN, 2005), though dire, does not fall under the categorization of genocide because the violence is indiscriminant and does not target one ethnic group over another. This, of cour se, falls contradictory to many Fur nationalists who claim quite the opposite. Given this contradict ion in findings, the change in terminology is an appropriate compromise between these two ideologies.
22 Many ethnic groups reside within the area of Darfur, however the Furs account for a majority of the population. With 40 percent of the total population as non-Muslim Furs, Darfur has become a battleground wherein ethnic Furs have become locked in warfare amongst Arab ethn icities in the region. Furthering their distaste for Khartoum, many Furs perceived the gover nment was arming militias against them. Th is perception proliferated when policies following a drought and famine sparked their estrange ment from the Sudanese government due to government favoritism toward s the Arab population, state-program mismanagement and overall neglect (BBC, 2008; Global Security, 2007). This estrangement came to a head in Febr uary 2003 when both the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) attacked government troops in protest of the governmentÂ’s neglect to protect local villagers from nomadic groups as well as t he governmentÂ’s failure to prevent their economic marginalization (Am nesty International, 2008). Although the majority of Darfur is comprised of ethnic Furs, it is important for the sake of this case study to understand the ethno-geographic makeup of the region. In addition to the Furs, Global Security (2007) r eports that the central belt region of Darfur also includes the non-Ar ab Masalit, Berti, Bargu, Bergid, Tama, and Tunjur. The North is comprised of Zaghawa and Bedeyat who are also nonArab. It also includes the Arab Mahariya, Irayqat, M ahamid, and Beni Hussein. Furthermore, the Arabs in the East and South are made up of Habbaniya, Beni Halba, Maaliyya, Taaisha, and Rezeigat peo ples. Much of the literature relating
23 to conflict within this region classifies t he inhabiting ethnicities as either being Arab or non-Arab. This religious dichotom y illuminates the source of much of the alienation which ethnic Fu rs and other non-Arabs feel toward the Arab-dominated capitol of Sudan. The fighting in Darfur became mo re pronounced as hostilities became defined by a cleavage between Arab and non -Arab tribes. Furthermore, the logistical and financial support offer ed to the Arab tribes by the Sudanese Government continuously justified t he non-Arab distaste and skepticism for Khartoum and its policies (Human Right s Watch 2004). Non-Arab tribes began to group together to fight against what they consider to be a central government plot to redefine the demography of the Darf ur region (Global Security, 2007). The first of these groups, the JEM, is a rebel group whose leadership has changed over the years. Global Securi ty (2007) reports that the Sudanese opposition leader, Hassan al-Turabi, was a former speaker of SudanÂ’s parliament and later became a tenant of a Sudanese pr ison. Afterward, the BBC (2008) states JEM was led by Lawyer Khali Ibrahim Muhammad who wrote The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in the Sudan Â—a work documenting a disproportionate amount of Arabs in power ful positions within Khartoum. This group is a splinter cell of the SLM/A and had a few other rebel groups split off of it, most notable of which are The National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) and the National Redemption Front (NRF) (BBC, 2008).
24 The SLM/A started as the title of a self-defense milit ia comprised mostly of ethnic Furs. Starting as the Darfur Liber ation Front (DLF), it changed its title to SLM/A in March of 2003 (Global Secu rity, 2007). Founded by Minni Arkoi Minawi, SLM/A differs from its DLF se cessionist movement by calling for a creation of a Â“united, dem ocratic SudanÂ” (Global Se curity 2007). The SLM/A eventually split along ethnic cleavages in 2005. This schism produced the SLM/A-Minni Faction, SLM/A-Abdel Wahi d al-Nur faction, and the SLM/A-Unity faction, which is most recently blamed for a September attack on an AU base in which 10 AU soldiers were killed (BBC, 2008). The SLM/A-al-Nur, SLM/A-Minni, and the JEM are the three most notable groups that figh t for the causes of the non-Arab tribes against their governm ent-backed opposition, the Janjaweed. Who are the Janjaweed? In opposition to the SLM/A and JEM movements are the government of Sudan and the Arab militias, namely the J anjaweed. The Janjaweed, loosely translated to Â“a man with a horse and a gunÂ”, is an Arab militia with whom the SLM/A have been in conflict. The Janjaw eed have been strong in the region; they have pushed local communities off of their land and have secured funding and armament from the Sudanese government to be a means of pro-government support in the region. Khartoum denies supporting the militia despite Sudanese government documents secured by Human Rights Watch (2004) that demonstrate otherwise. According to Wa x (2004), the Janjaweed is used by the
25 government as a proxy fighting force agai nst the JEM and SLM/A. As of 2004, the Khartoum-backed Janjaweed militia has displaced 1.2 million people in the Darfur region via violence, rape, and pillaging of villages (Wax, 2004). Chronology of Peacemaking and Peacekeeping According to the Darfur Consortium (2008), the first rebel attack occurred in February of 2003, and attempts at ceasefire agreements were achieved in September of that same year. However each gr oup accuses the other of violations. April 2004 saw representatives of the rebel groups and the Government of Sudan sign a ceasefire and protocol on the establishment of humanitarian assistance in NÂ’djamena. Th is agreement established a Ceasefire Commission (CFC), and in June 2004 the fi rst six observers were deployed to the CFC headquarters in Darf ur. One month later, t he AU deployed a mission to Darfur (AMIS) to help facilitate the ceas efire as well as peacekeeping operations. That following August, the AU deployed its fi rst set of troops in Darfur with the assignment of monitoring the ceasef ire, and January of 2005 brought a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the government of Sudan and the JEM as an agreement to end NorthSouth conflict. Yet these agreements were not upheld by all parties involved, namely the JEM. The AU increased the number of its troops to 7,731 to be present in the vast region. However, this did not prove to be enough support to contai n the violence, and Khartoum endorsed an additional 3,000 UN troops to support th e currently struggling AMIS. Once
26 again, the government of Sudan and the SLM/A-Minni signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in Abuja, Nigeria in May 2006. However this agreement did not incorporate the other rebel groups in the region. So in June 2006, the AU commission for Peace and Security and t he Sudanese AU representative once again met with SLM/A and JEM and signed a De claration of Commitment to the DPA. Later that month the AU iss ued sanctions against any group undermining the DPA and reiterated its di sapproval of the gross human rights violations within the region. With chronic ceasefire vi olations, the AU accepted UN support thus transferring power from AMIS to the United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (AMID) in 2009 (NATO, 2009). The need for peacemaking and peacek eeping is apparent in Darfur; however, the financial, political, and so cio-cultural hindrances make these operations increasingly difficult for the AU. To better understand these hindrances, this case study will analyze the AU agenda for peace followed by an analysis of the financial, political, and soci o-cultural impediments to achieving a lasting peace in Darfur. Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Agenda Per the definition of peacemaking and peacekeeping outlined previously, there first must be a successful peacem aking mission to achieve peace before peacekeeping activities can maintain i t. Therefore, t he main item on a
27 peacemaking agenda is to achieve a ceasefire because peacekeeping operations must be done in a context fr ee of the antagonism of open violence. However, as expanded upon below, achiev ing a ceasefire agreement on paper is much easier than enforcing one. The Darfur Peace Agreement Examination of the DPA offers a clos er look at the goals and aspirations of the Darfur peace process. Signed May 5th, 2006 by the Government of Sudan and SLM/A-Minni Faction, the DPA outli nes in six chapters a comprehensive peace agreement stating the peacemaki ng and peacekeeping goals outlined within its chapter titles: Chapter 1: Power Sharing Chapter 2: Wealth Sharing Chapter 3: Comprehensive Ceasef ire and Final Security Arrangements Chapter 4: Darfur-Darfu r Dialogue and Consultation Chapter 5: Gener al Provisions Chapter 6: Implementati on Modalities and Timelines (Darfur Peace Agreement, 2006, p. i) I will focus mainly upon Chapters 1-3 as th ey contain the major thrust of the peacemaking and peacekeeping strategy within the region. Because the chronology of the DPA requires the goal s in the Â“Comprehens ive Ceasefire and Final Security ArrangementsÂ” chapter to be met first, I wil l focus upon this
28 chapter and then follow with the goal s outlined within Chapters 1 and 2 thereafter. Chapter 3, titled Â“Comprehensive Ceasefire and Final Security ArrangementsÂ”, offers a more detailed view as to how ceasefire agreements are to be handled by the signatorie s. Section (A) deals wit h the ceasefire itself, stating a reaffirmation of commitment to previous c easefire agreements. It continues to state that t he parties will refrain from a rmed conflict as well as undertake Â…measures to neutralize and disarm the Janjaweed/armed militias in like with UN resolutions 1556 and 1564, the AU summit Resolutions, the NÂ’djamena Agreement and the November 2004 Abuja Protocol such that security in Darfur is assured. (DPA, 2006, Arti cle 22, paragraph 214(f)) Additionally, Article 23 surveys the purpose of the comprehensive ceasefire beginning within 72 hours of the signing of the DPA, stating it aims to: Ensure that a ceasefire is maintained within the region, Uphold a commitment to prevent violence, intimidation, or forced displacement, Place population safety as the highest priority, To ensure humanitarian aid to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and Demonstrate a commitment of all t he parties involved within the peace agreement to cooperate with AMIS in facilitating it. By signature, this portion of the agreem ent obligates the signatories to spread awareness of the ceasefire to all allies, citizens, and associated groups. Article
29 24 states the prohibited activities whic h include attacks, harassment, or violence upon AMIS personnel, activities which are gender-based, or which impede the distribution of humanitarian aid. Furthe rmore, it restricts covert and overt activities which may impede upon the peacekeeping mission within the area. Article 25 speaks towards methods to re inforce the ceasefire agreement by asking the AU and its international partner s to maintain proper funding so that AMIS may fulfill its mission. It mandates the creati on of a Ceasefire Commission chaired by the AMIS Force Commander to engage in monitoring on behalf of a Joint Commission. The Joint Commission will be based at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa and chaired by a Special Representative of th e Chairperson of the AU Commission, and together these two commissions will monitor and police the ceasefire. This Article 25 also creat es the Joint Humanitarian Facilitation and Monitoring Unit (JHFMU) which is a joint UN-AU body which was created to observe and facilitate the humanitarian assi stance in the area, as well as observe the safety of human rights. The JHFMUÂ’s observations will be sent to the Joint Commission, the Ceasefire Commission, AMIS and other regulatory bodies where appropriate for oversight. While Article 26 speaks toward the care of internally displaced peoples, Article 27 outlines the goals and methods of which all parties are to disengage and exhibit mean s to control the distribution of arms and assigns the charge of policing of this endeavor to the Ceasefire Commission. The rest of this chapter describes the communication strategies and organizational plans for the completi on and maintenance of the ceasefire.
30 Preparations for this ceasefire are to be done within 30 days of signing the DPA, and the first phase of disengagement is to be completed within 45 days. Phase one consists of a quar antine of activities of the undersigned parties to prescribed areas as well as the creati on and monitoring of buffer zones around the IDP camps and humanitarian aid routes. The control of t he Janjaweed militia will also begin within phase one. Phase two, which continues many of the projects of phase one (with the exception of starting to disarm the Janj aweed, releasing of detainees, and the beginning of restoration of the area) is mandated to take no longer than 45 days as well. Phase three, whic h mandates the detainment of large artillery and other types of weaponry is to be handed over to secure locations maintained by AMIS. Phase three is to be started after phas e two and should be completed within 30 days. Article 29 explains the reintegration of Darfur into t he national system. Much of this portion of the DPA spends ti me explaining how to disarm, assemble, and demobilize former combatants and rein tegrate them into society. Furthermore, it creates a security advisor y team which will aid in this endeavor. It also speaks toward building the capacit y and the capability of the police force of the Government of Sudan. The cessation of hostilities, as out lined above, marks the beginning of the peacekeeping process. The fi rst two chapters of the DPA offer insight as to how exactly the signatories are to share power and distribute wealth once hostilities
31 have ceased. Knowing that the Darfur crisis started with rebel groups acting out in response to the neglect of its civiliansÂ’ ci vil rights, it follows then that Chapter 1 of the DPA outlines the importance of mutual respect between the state and its citizens. This is expressed through Ar ticle 1 wherein the sovereignty of the Republic of Sudan is recognized as well as the importance of respect for human and civil rights, particularly voting rights is stressed. Article 2 expresses the agreed upon criteria and gui delines for power shar ing, where Article 3 emphasizes and elaborates upon human ri ghts and freedoms. This article outlines the rights afforded to every i ndividual and reads much like the United States Bill of Rights, including inter alia the right to due process, the right to vote despite gender, the right of every citi zen to own property, and the right of freedom of assembly regardless of gender, ethnic origin, place of birth, or religion. This is of importance becaus e these are the very rights and freedoms which served as the catalyst of the Darfur crisis. To best facilitate the rights outlined wit hin the DPA, Articles 4-7 outline the system of governance between all levels of government. In particular, Article 6 offers how state governance will take affe ct and speaks to the administration of Darfur. It also establishes a Transiti onal Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) in which the SLM/A and the JEM are represent ed, and it serves as the principle implementation authority of the DPA within the region. It further outlines how the TDRA will be structured, how it would be financed, and that the TDRA would be in charge of its own rules of procedure. Article 6 further creates a permanent
32 status of Darfur through a referendum in three states within the region, and states that this referendum will be supervised by the National Election Commission (NEC). Articles 8, 9, and 10 offer governance structure of an executive, legislative, and judicial branch of the national government, respectively, while Article 12 offers how military and police enforcement shall be structured. Articles 13 and 14 discu ss how other national institutions, commissions, and bureaucratic agencies will be organized. Article 15 speaks of the location of the national capitol, while Article 16 explains pre-election power sharing within Darfur. It states the composition of gubernatorial seats shall be held by one of the states in Darfur as well as assigns deputy governor powers to nominees of the SLM/A and JEM. In simila r vain, this article continues to assign various administrative responsibilities to representatives from both of these groups. Chapter 2, titled Â“Wealth Shari ng,Â” emphasizes fiscal and monetary principles that shall be created to ensure the equity of wealth across social classes, not only on a fiscal level, but on a livelihood basis as well. Per Article 17, the DPA states that all have the right to, inter alia safe drinking water, free access to markets, access to quality educ ation, security of property, freedom from hunger, promotion and protection of cu ltural heritage, and restitution of property for those affected by conflic t. As seen here, the DPA creates a construct wherein the state revenue and wealth is appropriated to assure human rights as well as fiscal responsibility to citizenry. Article 18 outlines the fiscal
33 federalism and the intergovernmental rela tionships that are to take place amongst the various levels of government. Chapter 2, Article 19 discusses t he economic policies that would fund reconstruction and development. It emphasizes creating macro economic policy which favors investment, devel opment, research and development, and it recognizes the need to support the large agric ultural sector within the region. It further surveys strategic post-conflic t objectives towards development and reinvigoration of Darfur, most of which covers the build ing of infrastructure as well as the encouragement of the people of Darfur to produce goods and services. Furthermore, it creates t he Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund (DRDF), which it wil l serve as an intermediary between domestic or international donors and Darfur for the regionÂ’s reconstruction. It also states that the Sudanese Government will allocate $300 million as seed money for the DRDF as well as an additional $200 million for 2007 and 2008 depending on the outcome of the Joint Assessment Missi on to Darfur. The Joint Assessment Mission for the Darfur states (JA M) was also created by the DPA to: Â…identify and quantify the needs of pos t-conflict economic recovery, development, and poverty eradication pr ogram for Darfur states. These needs will be presented to the donor s at a donorsÂ’ conference to be convened three months after the signing of this Agreement. (DPA, 2006, Article 19, para. 155) This conference will potentially include the African Development Bank, the AU, the EU, the League of Arab States and the US amongst others.
34 Article 20 defines of land rights as well as the disbursement of natural resources. Article 21 speaks toward s the needed programs for internally displaced persons (IDPS) and refugees who have been affected by the conflict by first legalizing their right to fundament al freedoms and reinforcing their human rights, especially choice of residence whic h includes their right to re-establish a homestead at their place of or igin. It is clear through th is chapter that the desire of all parties involved (on paper at least) is to assure human rights especially with the allocation of funds, policies of redev elopment, and equity in disbursement of natural resources. One of the issues that plagued the DPA was that only one of the three rebel forces initially signed the agreem ent (Sudan Tribune, June 2006). The fact that the other remaining rebel groups di d not sign the DPA resulted in many incidences where violence was committed by these groups (Sudan Tribune, June 2006). In February of 2007, the Darfur Peace Agreement Joint Commission reported to the AU Commissi on regarding the ceasefire vi olations which occurred since their last report in December of 2006 (Sudan Tribune, Febr uary 2007). The noted decrease in Janjaweed activity was starkly contrasted by reports of the Joint Commission of a continuance of viol ence between all parties within Darfur as well as an increase in assaults on AMIS and aid agenciesÂ’ personnel (Sudan Tribune, February 2007). Further agreements and ceasefires hav e been made since the DPA, all of which have not been respected. In No vember 2008, Sudan President Al-Bashir
35 made a ceasefire announcement only for re bels to allege attacks by government military two days later (Sudan Tribune, November 2008). With the many ceasefire agreements signed, dated and violated by the si gnatories in the past, the collapse of the recently-signe d Doha peace agreement between the Government of Sudan and the JEM in February 2009 is not a question of if but likely when The consistent reiteration of peace agreements displayed in this timeline illustrates AMIS aptitude to mediate a ceasefire agreem ent but lack of ability to enforce it. Furthermore, closer asse ssment reveals that poor funding and inadequate logistical support is only part of the puzzle. Financial Shortcomings As a demonstration of the AUÂ’s failure to meet logistical and financial needs of peacemaking and peacekeeping, t he AU has made calls for funding vital to these missions. Due to the ov erstretched 7,000 troops in the region, many AU soldiers are not paid fo r weeks on end. Furthermore, AU peacekeepers are consistently attack ed or abducted; 19 AU peacekeepers have been killed in Darfur since 2004, a Niger ian officer has been reported missing, and approximately 90 AU vehicles in the region have been hijacked (Sudan Tribune, May 2008a). Since the failure of the 2006 peace deal signed by the Minni-faction of the SLM/A, Khartoum continues to reject the use of a UN
36 peacekeeping troop support for the AU. Furthermore, the government and rebels have both been guilty of ceasefire viol ations; the AU publicly condemned an Â“unprovokedÂ” attack by government aircraft on rebel territory in northern Darfur, and though rebels have claimed there hav e been other attacks thereafter, the Sudanese government has denied these cl aims (Sudan Tribune, May 2008a). Analysts have stated, Â“without the capacit y to forcefully implement the [DPA], security has deteriorated, its im plementation fell behi nd schedule, and its perceived failure became a self-fulfilli ng prophecyÂ” (Sudan Tr ibune, September 2006). The financial shortcomings of the AU to meet the logistical challenges of the Sudanese infighting conti nue to force the organization to look for international support. Much of this support is financial rather than troop contributions because, according to Human Rights Watc h (HRW), the Â“UN has sought to place most of the burden of carrying out the goals contained in Security Council resolutions 1556 and 1564 on the shoulders of the nascent African UnionÂ” (Human Rights Watch, 2005). Furthermore HRW believes that much of the world looks to the AU for solving the Darf ur crisis because of their ability to achieve an, albeit short, ceasefire in 2006 with the DPA. Concurrently, the US and the EU see this prospect to s upport the AUÂ’s assumption of this responsibility as an opportunity to prevent their own soldiers from going into a violent milieu. However, the AU also views this as an opportunity to establish itself as a significant regional power on the African continent (Human Rights
37 Watch, 2005). This reliance on outside funding, however, ultimately chips away at the AUÂ’s chances at achieving th is reputation. Furthermore, these shortcomings continue to illustrate that the AU has assumed a responsibility far greater than it can handle. AU su ccess is dependent, according to HRW, upon the willingness of the U. S. and the E.U. to fu nd the AUÂ’s peacekeeping endeavors within the region (H uman Rights Watch, 2005). The willingness to fund the AU can be easily documented. Britain offered support and training for the AUÂ’s plans to increase troop output to 7,700 troops and civilian police at the cost of $466 mill ion (Global Security, 2005). The EU pledged Â€40 million which the AU designat ed as development funds to help keep the peacekeeping effort afloat. Furthe rmore, in June 2005, Britain raised its financial contribution to the AUÂ’s peacekee ping force in Darfur from Â£6.6 million to Â£19 million. This money was meant to help fund the peacekeeping operations until the UN-AU hybrid force is active (Sudan Tribune, May 2008a). Secretary of State for international development, Hila ry Benn, mentioned that these funds would be used to buy 500 additional vehicles as well as other rapid deployment equipment (Sudan Tribune, May 2008a). Mu ch of this equipment is needed, especially when the Janjaweed militia continues to be s ubsidized by KhartoumÂ’s oil revenue. The shortcoming of arms was supplemented by an arms embargo, but in October of 2006, UNSC Panel of Exper ts reported all parties in violation of the arms embargo in DarfurÂ—much of these violations belonging to China (African Consortium, 2008).
38 Hybrid Force: Messiah or Myth? The UN-AU hybrid force will be used to replace the ineffective AU force of 7,000 troops with a 23,000 person operation. The EU has already given Â€400 million to the AU mission to help with the tran sition to the hybrid force. However, plenty of accusations coming from outsi de the government stat e that Khartoum has been trying to delay the deploym ent of the much-needed force (Sudan Tribune, May 2008b). A US State Department official st ated that they believe Sudan was still looking for a way out of accepting the hybrid force. Sudan insisted that any forces that were in terms of the Addis Ababa communiqu will be under AU command. However, former President BushÂ’s Special Envoy to Sudan stated that the Addis Ababa communi qu expressed clearly that the hybrid force would be under UN command and control. In actua lity, the hybrid force has a military and political component. T he political component will be reporting to the UN as well as the AU (Sudan Tribune, April 2007). UNSC resolution 1706 in August 2006 authorized deployment of 17,300 troops to Darfur to assume Â“responsibilit ies currently taken on by the AMIS in relation to implementation of the Darf ur Peace Agreement. Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir calls the resolution Â‘ part of a comprehensive conspiracy for confiscating the countryÂ’s sovereigntyÂ’ Â” (Darfur Consortium, 2008). While AlBashirÂ’s anti-UN message is reiterated at the summit of Ch inese and African
39 leaders in Beijing in November 2006, the Sudanese Government accepted UNAU hybrid force in June 2007 with the c ondition that the tr oops are recruited primarily from African countries (Darfur Consortium 2008). This seems to be an exploited loophole by Khartoum officials, as the 7,700 troops currently in the region are donated from African countries; cl early, if more troops were available for donation, they would be there already. Understanding this, the U.S. rejected this allegation, stating that the US st rongly encourages further contributions of troops to this force by African nations, but if they fall short, they have no other choice than to look outside the cont inent (Sudan Tribune, April 2007). Furthermore, juxtaposing the A ddis Ababa communiqu with Resolution 1706, it becomes clear why Khartoum stre sses this slant of the agreement over the UN resolution. The tripartite commission created by the Addis Ababa agreement gives Khartoum veto power on the composition and size of the peacekeeping force (Sudan Tribune, Ap ril 2007), furthering its power and influence on the pace and effectiv eness of peacemaking and peacekeeping operations. If the monies and logistical support offered by the UN was not hampered by political conditions and motivations on the part of Khartoum, the hybrid force would likely offer the AU much needed support in peacemaking and peacekeeping endeavors. However, it se ems clear that Khartoum has made every effort to increase the difficulty of the AMIS mission. It is these political impediments which reinforce the financ ial shortcomings, which further
40 exacerbate the Darfur crisis while making the peacemaking and peacekeeping mission increasingly difficult. Political Impediments Political impediments to AU peacemaking and peacekeeping span across the domestic as well as the international realm. As explai ned below, funding of Arab militias by an Arab run Sudanese Govern ment as well as working with the emboldened Sudanese President, Omar Al-Bashir, presents an uphill battle to making and keeping the peace in the region. Adding insult to injury is the Sudanese oil export to China which provid es the government with the revenue to arm their military as well as the Janjaw eed militia. This systemic opposition to peace illustrated below offers insight to the failure of the DPA, representing present and future challenges fa ced by the AU-UN mission. State Sponsored Violence The state-sponsored violence is a unique impediment to the peacemaking and peacekeeping process because it inco rporates all three impediments which are discussed in this case study; it is the use of oil revenues by political officials to exploit the religious and ethnic cleav ages. The state-sponsored violence waged against the ethnic tribes by t he Arab militias has continued to fuel hostilities and stymie AU efforts to maintain a ceasefire. Given the oil revenues
41 used for the purchasing of arms, the Government-backed Janjaweed have acted as the military proxy against SLM/A and other s. This was in response to the nonArab groups taking up arms in 2003 as pr otest against KhartoumÂ’s neglect of upholding their land and economic rights (A mnesty International, 2008). Though some Janjaweed have been captured, tried and punished, many believe this to be a symbolic gesture by Khartoum to appeas e international pressure to reign in the Arab vigilantes (BBC News, 2004). Given their heavy funding and armam ent from Khartoum, the Janjaweed have become a formidable foe for the JEM and SLM/A factions. The numbers of casualties reported to date in 2006 have varied greatly. Global Security (2007) reports that 600,000 civilians have been displaced and 75,000 have fled to neighboring Chad, while 3, 000 unarmed civilians have been killed in 2003. Furthermore, International Herald Tribune (Polgreen, 2006) reported that at least 200,000 died at the hands of the Janj aweed and government forces. Other experts in the field put the deat h range between 300,000 to 550,000 people (Hearn, 2006). Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir As mentioned earlier, there have been c easefire violations on the part of rebel groups as well as the Government of Sudan. While each accuses the other as the main perpetrator of the violati on, many cannot help but look at the leadership of Sudan as a main impediment to AU-UN peacekeeping operations.
42 President Omar Al-Bashir has refus ed the use of UN peacekeeping forces as a supplement to AMIS several times. Because of these ceasefire violations, the refusal of logistical help from the international community, and the undeniable religious cleft between warring factions, many have accused Al-Bashir of engaging in genocidal activities, leadi ng an Arab centered government and funding an Arab militia agai nst predominately Christian rebel groups (MSNBC World News, 2009). The International Criminal Court (I CC) issued a warrant for Al-BashirÂ’s arrest on charges of war crimes on March 4, 2009. The warrant illustrates that Al-Bashir is charged with five counts of crimes against humanity and two war crimes. It states that: The above-mentioned crimes were alleg edly committed during a five year counter-insurgency campaign by the Government of Sudan against the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (S LM/A), the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and other armed gr oups opposing the Government of Sudan in DarfurÂ…. A core component of that campaign was the unlawful attack on that part of the civilian populat ion of Darfur Â– belonging largely to the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups Â– perceived to be close to the organized armed groups opposing the Go vernment of Sudan in Darfur. (ICC, 2009) Al-BashirÂ’s response to this warrant was to denounce the ICC Tribunal, the UN, and aid agencies as a Â“new colonialismÂ”. He thereafter revoked the licenses of 10 aid agencies and ordered them to leav e Darfur. One of these agencies, CARE, is a Kenyan based agency which focuses upon water and food distribution to approximately 600,000 peopl e in the region (MSNBC World News,
43 March 2009). Revoking aid will only furt her destabilize and consequently inflame violence in the region. Many have been waiting anxiously for the repercussions of the international indictment and now are atte mpting to find everyway to contain its fallout. Methods range from the new US administration pushing for Al-Bashir to step down to the UN Security Council invoking its power to postpone the warrant for one year (Hanson, 2009). Al-BashirÂ’ s recent emboldened actions show that the former is far less likely than the latter. Despite the disagreement amongst the I CC tribunal justices as to whether Darfur qualifies as a genocide, this i ndictment and its results illustrate the reactionary personality of President Al-Bas hir, placing him as another step in the uphill climb for an AU-brokered peace. The Chinese Variable Some believe that KhartoumÂ’s perpet uation of violence and reluctance to cooperate with international pressure to c ease their support of ethnic violence is due to the fact that peace would mean exposing the Chinese oil industry to international competition in Sudanese oil fields and would jeopardize their Sudanese-Sino relationship (Goodman, 2004). This relationship is highly prized by the Sudanese Government because Khar toum reaps hundreds of millions in oil sales to China. Heavy investment of Chinese oil firms in the area, as well as construction of basic infrastructure meant to efficiently extract and ship oil has led
44 to the Sudanese GovernmentÂ’s protection of Chinese intere sts while fueling motivation for assault on rebels who reside within the oil rich region. Sudan is ChinaÂ’s largest supplier of oil while China is SudanÂ’s largest supplier of arms. Of the $500 million in revenue received from oil sales to China in 1999, 80 percent went to arms purchases. Furthermore Sudan enjoyed Chinese assistance to build and outfit three weapons factories outside of Khartoum (Goodman, 2004). Needless to say, AMIS forces are outgunned as well as out-funded by the Government of Sudan, making peac emaking and peacekeepi ng operations difficult while rebel groups take out thei r frustrations upon Chin ese workers. For example, 9 Chinese oil workers were kidnapped, presumably by the JEM, in October of 2008 (New York Times, October 2008). Furthermore, ChinaÂ’s friendly foreign relations with Sudan combined with its position on the UN Security Counc il has proven advantageous in defending against potential UN disciplinary action. An y threat of sanctions on oil sales is countered by a threat of Chinese veto of any such policy (Goodman, 2004). However, recent voting patterns in the UN Security Council have demonstrated a positive Chinese voting pattern. The re solution to create an AU-UN hybrid force was nearly unanimously passed, with the only abstention coming from the US. This abstention has been hypothesized to result from the US intelligence community who has relied upon Khartoum to provide intelligence on al-Qaeda whereabouts within the region (Sudan Watch, June 2005).
45 As seen above, the empowerment of the Janjaweed by a rebellious president offers an uphill battle for the UN-AU mission in Darfur. Chinese funding offers Khartoum the opportunity to out-gun, outnum ber, and out-finance the rebel groups which it is charged to er adicate as well as the peacemakers who aim to stop them. Socio-Cultural Clash When considering the Darfur crisis one must also consider the vast cleavages between the various ethnicities a nd religious groups. Not only is there a clear division and clash between Arab Janjaweed and Christian rebel groups, but differing agendas within the SLM/A has also led to infighting. The introduction to this case study outlines the various factions of the SLM/A, however, it is important to highlight her e in depth the differences between the first and largest split of the SLM/A. Ethnic Cleavages The splintering of the SLM/A and JEM in to multiple ethnic fighting groups makes achieving a ceasefire agreement and other peace talks difficult (Amnesty International, 2008). Because mediatio n involves achieving a compromised solution between all warring parties, it bec omes increasingly difficult when the number of warring parties continues to pr oliferate, as do their unique demands
46 and priorities. As seen by the excluded factions in the CPA and the DPA, the mandate of the peace agreements is undermi ned due to lack of representation. This in turn offers the unrepresent ed groups license to continue with attacks because of a perceived illegitimate mandate. To understand the SLM/A unity issues it is important to understand the leaders and their backgrounds. The polit ical arm of the SLM/A, led by Abdulwahed Mohamed al-Nur of Fur ethnici ty, split over a power struggle with Minni Arkou Minnawi of Zaghawa ethni city and the head commander of the military arm of the SL M/A. The split came as a majo r tactical blow to the SLM/A because the Zaghawa represent a majority of their military force (Sudan Tribune, October 2005). The division has been noted to hamper peace talks, negotiations, as well as the strength of peace agreements. Afte r the signing of the DPA, violence increased as many factions stated that the D PA does not meet t he concerns of Arab nomadic groups due to exclusion from the development process. The Nurfaction as well as the JE M refused to sign the DPA because they state that it failed to fulfill their demands for a greater political representation, compensatory aid, and stronger security. In light of this, the DPA became an issue of contention between the rebel groups and a source of infighting in the region (Sudan Tribune, September 2006). Humanitarian source s state that signatories use the DPA as a Â“shieldÂ” to justify waging war on those who had not signed it while the non-signatories use its shortcom ings as license for hostilities (Sudan
47 Tribune, September 2006). In the region west of El Fasher, for example, al-NurÂ’s forces clashed with minni-SLM/A commanders and displaced 50,000 people between July and September of 2006 (Sudan Tribune, September 2006). However, nearly a year later, peace was brokered between the factions, uniting nine rebel Darfur fact ions under one charter. This unification involves six factions of the SLM/A, the Demo cratic Popular Front, the Sudanese Revolutionary Front, and a JEM splinter gr oup under the single umbrella of the SLM/A. The factions united stating that a peace in Darfur starts with a united front (Sudan Tribune, November 2007). The lack of infighting represented by this unification increases the probability that a lasting peace could be assured, if only slightly. Conclusion Much of the peacemaking and peacekeep ing agenda in the Darfur region was subject to poorly financed operati ons combined with political impediments empowered by Chinese involvement and in vestment in the region. Furthermore, ethnic and religious tensions continue to flare while Khartoum, until recently, refused the incoming of much-needed UN ai d, infrastructure, and personnel. However, with the peacekeep ing personnel on the way in, humanitarian aid is prematurely on its way out, leaving a gr eater chance for the proliferation of violence.
48 The failure of the DPA exemplifie s the failures of the AU peacemaking machine. The 2006 Agreement outlined p eacemaking as well as peacekeeping procedures in depth; however, it failed to secure a lasting ceasefire that prevented any further peacek eeping endeavors. Without a legitimate ceasefire agreement signed and respected by all warring parties, peacekeeping missions will not be successful. The mutual desir e between the international community and the AU to tackle the Darfur issue o ffers potential for the AU to meet peacemaking and peacekeeping goals with inte rnational funding. However, the funneling of oil profits into the region offe rs a defiant Khartoum the use of these funds to arm the Janjaweed. This offers a large hurdle to AU peacemaking and peacekeeping as attempts to achieve and ma intain a ceasefire are thwarted by financial shortcomings, political impedi ments, and ethnic cleavages. But are these findings limited to Darfur? We ex plore this question in Chapter 3 with the study of Western Sahara.
49 Chapter 3: Western Sahara Case Study When Western Sahara underwent decolonization, Morocco and Mauritania jumped at the opport unity to lay claim to the territory. Th e AU Charter states that the colonized territory is to be returned to the country that held sovereignty over it prior to coloni zation (Binaisa, 1977). While Morocco and Mauritania claim that portions of Western Sahara were within their territory, the indigenous people to the land claimed the region was home to nomadic tribes who bore allegiance to neither country when it was colonized and therefore did not belong to either country. An arm ed resistance movement to MoroccoÂ’s annexation of the area resulted in over a decade of violent conflict. Increased hostility over these irreconcilable diffe rences has brought the Western Sahara case to the fore in international peacemaking and peacekeeping. This case study aims to examine the AUÂ’s intervention in this crisis by first exploring the history of the conflict as we ll as its key groups and players. It will then outline the peacemaki ng and peacekeeping agenda of the AU as it developed over time, follo wed by an appraisal of this agendaÂ’s successes and challenges. It will aim to answer a majo r question: Why has the AU met only some of its goals, resulti ng in a 17 year stalemate?
50 Chronology of Conflict The source of conflict in the ar ea began when Spain withdrew from the colonized region of Western Sahara. Mo rocco and Mauritania both laid claim to the region while the indigen ous people decided to exercise their right to selfdetermination as supported by the UN Charter (1945).2 Despite an International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision upholding the SaharawisÂ’ right to selfdetermination in 1975 (Okere, 1979) in a ccordance to the UN Charter, Morocco and Mauritania annexed Western Sahara. In response to this annexation of the region by the two countries, the Saharaw is people armed themselves to defend their right to self-determinati on. Calling themselves the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro (Polisario Front), they constitute a liberation movement made up of the areaÂ’s indigenous people, the Saharawis (Hodges, 1984). They also founded the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in 1976, which is their polit ical and governmental arm. Though the Polisario Front drove out Mauritanian forces, the c onflict between the Polisario Front and the Moroccan government has been ongoing until a ceasefire agreement in 1991 (Naldi. 1985). When conflict became hot in 1976 it lasted until the above mentioned ceasefire in 1991. During this time, the Polisario Front appeared to have the 2 Chapter I, Article 1, subsection 2 reads, Â“The purposes of the United Nations are to develop friendly relations among nations on respect for principle for equal rights and self-determination of peoplesÂ…Â” (UN Charter, 1945). Also, the 61st session of the of the General Assembly adopted resolution 61/295, Â“United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous PeoplesÂ” which further provides support for the Saharawis right to self-determination (UN, 2007).
51 advantage by forcing the Mauritanian forc es to withdraw and inflicting large losses upon the Moroccan forces. Events we re in favor of Western Saharan selfdetermination until US funding and support of the Moroccan government turned the tide. In 1988, Morocco and the Polisario Front agreed to settle the dispute by referendum for self-determination; but di sputes over voter eligibility and ballot content prevented the referendum from ever occurring. As a renewed attempt to achieve the referendum, the 1991 ceasefir e offered a bargain between the two by offering a ceasefire in exchange for the referendum for self-determination. The Polisario Front agreed to cease arm ed conflict, however the referendum has yet to occur. In 2007, after several attempts at administering a referendum, AU facilitation and UN observati on brought the two warring par ties together for faceto-face negotiations. Morocco offered a politic al solution to allo w the territory of Western Sahara to have autonomy within the Ki ngdom of Morocco. In return, the Polisario Front agreed to continue the cessa tion of hostilities so long as there would be a referendum in the near future The talks ended with the extension of the UN Mission for Referendum in West ern Sahara (MINURSO) until April of 2009 per UN resolution 1813 (2008e). While the Saharawis people still wait for their referendum, the US State Depar tment (February 2009) press release states that Morocco still considers t he Western Sahara part of the Kingdom, as a result all civil liberties and human right s are modeled after the same laws which
52 apply to the Kingdom of Morocco, therefor e creating ultimate authority in the region to stem back to King Mohammed IV of Morocco. While the need for peacemaking and peacekeeping in Western Sahara is clear, financial, political, and socio-cult ural obstacles prevent the AU from effective peacemaking and peacekeeping endeavors. To understand these obstacles, this study will survey and asse ss them in the context of the AUÂ’s agenda for peace in the region. Agenda for Peace The AUÂ’s agenda for peace met difficult opposition when Morocco vehemently rejected many of the AU peace in itiatives. In 1979, the AU took its first attempt at creating a peace init iative that involved assessments and recommendations with regards to how to proceed in peacemaking and peacekeeping within the region. In so doing, the AU designated Â“two committees: the Ad Hoc Committee, also known as t he Committee of Wise Men; and the Implementation CommitteeÂ” to the Western Sahara conflict (Naldi. 1985, p. 34). Each of these commi ttees are discussed in turn. The Ad Hoc Committee created a sub-committee charged with the task to accumulate and implement the best plans toward the restoration of peace and security in the region. This involved a tour of Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and Spain, resulting in the Ad Hoc CommitteeÂ’s adoption of recommendations for
53 self-determination for Western Sahara and di rections to reach this objective. These recommendations were submitted in July of 1979 which led to AU Resolution 114 (1979). It recommended the following: A ceasefire between warring parties to be supervised by the AU; The withdrawal of Moroccan tr oops from Western Sahara; The right for Saharawis to hold a re ferendum deciding self-determination; A meeting of all involved parties to support the decision of the referendum; and The establishment of a special co mmittee, with the hel p of the UN, to oversee and maintain a fair election. (Naldi, 1985) Consisting of representatives from Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leon, Sudan, and Tanzania, the Impl ementation Committee was charged with the responsibility to work with the UN r egarding the implementat ion of the ceasefire and to oversee the administration of the referendum (Naldi, 1985). In addition to the peacemaking and peaceke eping forces which would be in the region, the also suggested a possibl e military observation group possibly including a civilian police component wh ich would have the authority to oversee the ceasefire as well (Naldi, 1985). Each of these recommendations by the ad hoc and implementation committees has merit based on the principles of peacemaking and peacekeeping; however, theory and reality rarely coincide. The AU voted to
54 endorse the recommendations made by the Implementation Committee to attempt to achieve a ceasefire and to hold a referendum in December 1983 (Naldi, 1985). Despite several fruitle ss negotiations promising a referendum vote by the mid-1980s, joint AU-UN peacemaki ng operations did ac hieve a ceasefire in exchange for a promised referendum vote for self-determination of the Saharawis people to take place shortly ther eafter. While the Polisario Front has faithfully and strictly held to the ceasefire agreement si nce 1991 until today, Morocco has left the referendum vote to currently remain as a promise (Zunes, 2007). Financial Woes Financial impediments have plagued the AU in Western Sahara since the AUÂ’s peacemaking and peacekeeping experienc e in Chad. Naldi (1985) offers a concise account of the AUÂ’s peacek eeping debacle in Chad which had lasting effects upon the AUÂ’s peacekee ping reputation as an under-funded and unreliable peacekeepi ng organization. The 1981 peacekeeping force sent by the AU to Chad was envisioned to be an armed, neutral party to cease host ilities and negotiate peace. However, their peacekeeping mandate in the region wa s unclear to the warring parties, and the peacekeeping force was seen as another force to battle. Combined with lack of financial and logistical capabilitie s, the negotiating apt itude of the AU
55 peacekeeping force was undermined. A fter suffering losses and lack of a political solution on the horizon, count ries began withdrawing troops from the already under-manned peacekeeping force, guar anteeing the failure of the AUÂ’s peacekeeping mission in Chad. Some member states may have been reluctant to show support for a peacemaking or peacekeeping force in We stern Sahara because of the Chadian debacle. Furthermore, the UNÂ’s resolution to help with aid and logistical support further justifies member statesÂ’ desire to limit contributions (Naldi, 1985). US-Morocco Relationship When assessing the supporters of each side of this conflict, the financial support appears to fall along a Cold War divi sion. While the Soviet Union was in alliance of Algeria, who support the Polis ario Front, the US has poured over 20 percent of its African aid into Morocco. This funding allowed Morocco to turn the tide of war to their favor (Zunes, 1998).3 Nevertheless, the additional fiscal US support creates a financial hardship on the AU and UN as peacemaking missi onaries who are out-funded and outgunned. Morocco has received in excess of $1 billion in military aid and $1.3 billion in economic assistance from the United States in exchange for Morocco to be the United State's longest and most reliable ally within Africa and the Arab 3 The Cold War relationship which describes those funding both sides of the Western Sahara conflict begs the question: was the 1991 ceasefire agreement and the end of the Cold War shortly thereafter a coincidence?
56 world. In exchange for the financial s upport, US forces are welcome at all Moroccan ports-of-call and have rights to land, refuel, and airspace within Morocco. Furthermore, Moro cco has participated in helping the US to support pro-Western regimes within Africa and has c ontributed troops to US led military operations in Kuwait duri ng the early 1990's (Zunes, 1998). This special relationship between Morocco and the US helped turn the tide of the war in MoroccoÂ’s favor, and therefore changed King HassanÂ’s openminded outlook towards peace and mediatio n (Naldi, 1985) MoroccoÂ’s newfound leverage on the battlefield has translated into leverage at the bargaining table. A War Over Resources? Offering an additional financial impediment is Western SaharaÂ’s wealth of resources and the resulting dividends they paid to the owner of that land. Though Morocco and Mauritania have express ed ethical or historical possession of Western Sahara, the am ount of economic advantage it offers questions the legitimacy of these countriesÂ’ hi storical and ethical claims. The Western Saharan coastline has so me of the largest fisheries in the world. Furthermore, its oil deposit s, iron ore mines and its huge phosphate deposits can offer the host country a large economic bounty (Hodges, 1984). With 10 billion tons of phosphate and 1.7 billion tons of hi gh-grade ore, the phosphate proceeds could ensure Western S aharaÂ’s place as the second largest phosphate exporter next to Morocco. Consequently, it could single-handedly
57 support Western SaharaÂ’s sma ll population, offering it the opportunity to have a per capita income equivalent to Western Europe. However, exportation of oar collapsed shortly after war broke out in the region (Hodges, 1984). The AUÂ’s difficulties with financing peacemaking and peacekeeping operations stems from an AU track reco rd that has dissuaded member states from contributing to the AU Peace Fund. In light of this, it becomes increasingly difficult to engage in peacemaking and peac ekeeping activities when the warring parties are the well-financed Moroccan Go vernment and the formidable Polisario Front. These financial issues are fu rther compounded by the irreconcilable differences between the warring parties driv en (in part) by economic gain offered by Western SaharaÂ’s natural resources. Political Impediments The AU did achieve an agreement for a ceasefire and referendum by King Hassan II of Morocco. However, these efforts were slowed by the AUÂ’s inexperience with successful administration of referenda in other areas in Africa and the growing rift between AU member s regarding SADR membership to the AU in 1984 (MINURSO, 2007). MoroccoÂ’s la ck of commitment to negotiate with the Polisario Front created a political at mosphere that provided an uphill battle for the AU and UN to facilitate peacemaking op erations. It was not until 1991 that a ceasefire was agreed upon by the Polisario Front in exchange for the referendum
58 for their sovereignty. T he Moroccan Government has yet to grant and administer any such vote (Zoubir & Pazzanita, 1995). Loophole in International Law Part of the difficulty with peacemaking and peacekeep ing operations is the fact that the intervening force is to res pect the sovereignty of the host country. Despite the UN and AU rejection of Mo roccoÂ’s annexation of Western Sahara, they still allow Morocco to include the r egion within its sphere of sovereignty. This presents a conflict of interest, as seen in Darfur, because the governmentÂ— the perpetrator of the offensesÂ—denies the international community access to engage in peacemaking and peacekeeping endeavor s (Naldi, 1985). This is a major impediment to the establishment of peacemaking and peacekeeping forces within Western Sahara. In addition, the lack of access was initially an impediment to holding a re ferendum for self-determi nation (Zunes, 2007). Many expect that the Polisario FrontÂ’s patienc e will run short as they continue the ceasefire in exchange for a referendum t hat has yet to come (Thorne, April 2007). SADR Admission to AU: A Shot in t he Arm or a Shot in the Foot? In 1980, SADR first applied for member ship to the AU citing Article 28, which states that Â“any sovereign African State may at any time notify the Administrative Secretary-G eneral of its intention to adhere or accede to [the AU]
59 charterÂ” (as cited in Naldi, 1982, p. 152) MoroccoÂ’s main contention to this request for membership came from the wo rding of this quote which states that SADR did not qualify as a sovereign Â“stateÂ” per se and therefore was not eligible for membership despite SADRÂ’s recogni tion of statehood by 35 other African countries (Naldi, 1982). SADR was invited in accordance with the AU Charter to join the proceedings; however, a simple majo rity at a previous meeting in Tripoli already decided SADRÂ’s admission into t he AU. Further illustrating the AUÂ’s division on the issue, Morocco and 19 other allied states sat out of the meeting, thus preventing a two-thirds quorum. Th is did not stop admission of the SADR to the AU, which resulted in Moroccan withdrawal of its membership from the AU in protest (Hodges, 1984). The AU attempted many times to reach a compromise between SADR and Morocco as a means of demonstrati ng its moderate position towards the Western Sahara conflict. Neverthele ss, by granting admission of SADR membership, the AU alienated the Mo roccan Government while simultaneously allowing it to become a polit ical statement, thus polar izing its members on the issue. Because the nature of the dis pute is centered on the Saharawis' right to sovereignty, this maneuver completely undermined the AUÂ’s positioning as an objective party in the peac ekeeping process between Morocco and the Polisario Front. As Naldi (1985) notes, Â“SADRÂ’s admission as an [AU] member has seriously undermined the prospect of further Moroccan cooperation with the Implementation CommitteeÂ” (p. 600).
60 Socio-Cultural Issues Self-determination is a key issue wit hin the peace process of this case. The conflict started with the Saharawis peop le claiming they were an ethnically distinct people prior to S panish acquisition and theref ore should be granted selfdetermination immediately after Spanish decolonization. This claim is best upheld within the ICJ and is maintained by the difficulty to produce a referendum for self-determination. A Case for the International Court of Justice Because the central question of this conflict is based on the legitimacy of the Moroccan claim to the region of Wester n Sahara, a survey of the ICJÂ’s ruling on this matter is important to establish credence to the Saharaw isÂ’ claim to selfdetermination within the in ternational community. After decolonization of Western Sahara, it the AU requires that the territory be returned to the country from which it was taken. Both Morocco and Mauritania laid claim to the Western Sahara region. This resulted in the ruling of the ICJ in 1974 (Okere, 1979). In this dispute, there were thr ee questions to be answered that would determine the fate of Western Sahara: Was Western Sahara a land of no national allegiance? Morocco argued t hat because indigenous clans of the region displayed loyalty to Moroccan royalt y at time of colonization, they were therefore granted possession of the land via Â“immemori al possessionÂ” (Okere,
61 1979, p. 307) as well as by Â“geographic c ontiguityÂ” (ibid, p. 307). Mauritania, however, claimed that even though it was not a state at the time of Spanish colonization, it was still a region of peoples tethered by a common culture and social structure, which included the West ern Sahara region. The court found that Western Sahara was not terra nullius (territory belonging to no one) which led them to the second and third questions. On the Moroccan l egal claim of the territory, the court found that: In the absence ofÂ…proof of unam biguous and continued display of authority [on part of the Western S aharan clans], the Court found that there were not ties of territorial sove reignty but only legal links arising from personal allegiance by some nomadic tribesÂ—more out of religious loyalty or expediency than from a feeli ng of obligation (emphasis added). (Okere, 1979, p. 310) In addition to not finding any legal c onnection between Morocco and Western Sahara, the court also found that no legal connection between Western Sahara and the Mauritania entity (Oke re, 1979). Despite the ICJ advisory decision with a 15-1 vote to uphold Saharawis self-determinat ion, it offered little help in settling the dispute. The Elusive Referendum Because of the abounding international recognition of Western SaharaÂ’s right to self-determination, the AU had been attempting to gain a ceasefire and referendum 12 years prior to the 1991 UN brokered agreement (MINURSO, 2007). Crucial to achieving the ceasef ire was the promise to the Saharawis people and their Polisario Front that a referendum vote for self-determination
62 would occur. Despite several attempts this has yet to happen. Because the region is largely comprised of the Sahar awis population, it is clear that the referendum would surely result in Western Saharan independence and the legitimization of SADR. According to the UN Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) timeline (MINURSO, 2007) the UN and AU began mediation discussions with Western Sahara and Morocc o by first proposing the ceasefirereferendum negotiations in 1979. This attempt, however, was rejected by Morocco. By 1981, King Hassan II expressed a willingness to hold a referendum; however, he still qualified that willingness with a statement regarding MoroccoÂ’s Â“historical claimsÂ” to the territory. As expl ained earlier, the following year marked the SADRÂ’s admission into the AU and MoroccoÂ’s response of a suspension and eventual withdrawal from the Union in 1984, widening the political rift between the AU and Morocco. In 1984, the UN and AU collaborat ed to present the Â“Settlement ProposalsÂ” to the warring parties in 1985 as a solution to the conflict. Six years later these proposals were adopted by the Security Council (April 19, 1991) and became known as the Â“Settlement Plan. Â” MINURSO was created in 1991 pursuant to Security Council resoluti on S/1991/690 and was directed to oversee and conduct the referendum in conjunction with the AU. Immediately after establishing a re ferendum timetable, arguments arose as to who would qualify for voting rights. Seddon (1992) notes of a plan outlined
63 in the UN SecretaryÂ’s draft report that included voters whose fathers were born in the area and those who had intermittently liv ed in the region before December of 1974. This plan added 30,000 voters to th e qualifying pool who may or may not live in the region. Seddon further notes: The report received the backing of the US and FranceÂ—staunch and longtime supporters of the Moroccan regi me and its position on the Western Sahara. But it drew strong criticism from a number of n on-aligned states as well as from the [AU], which includes the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic as a member state and whic h, with the UN, co-sponsored the peace plan. The Polisario Front ca lled the report, Â‘partial, unjust and completely aligned with the position of the aggressor, the Moroccan colonists. (p. 103) As seen here, division between Moroccan and Polisario interests have infected the UN and AUÂ’s outlook towards the conflict. Furthermore, the dichotomy between Moroccan and Saharawis interests continue to widen as they attempt to establish a list of qualified voters. By 1999, the first Provisional Voters List (PVL) was published to survey the qualified voters This list was followed by a number of appeals which led to a second PVL. This second list states that out of the 250,000 Saharans identified, 86,425 voters are deemed eligible to vote. The two PVLs were a result to conflic ting opinions over the relevance of the date of a voter census. Where Mo rocco believed that the 1974 census should be a mere point of reference for pr oducing a voter list, the Polisario Front believed that the 1974 census should be the Â“sole basis for the application of the criteria for voter eligibilityÂ” (UN Resolution 809, 1993).
64 The disenfranchisement of two-th irds of the populat ion triggered 131,000 appeals filed against the PVL (MINURSO, 2007). While the Saharawis wish to be fairly represented in the fate-changing referendum, Morocco is still unwilling to agree to any referendum that incorporates more of the population than previously agreed. Despite an extension of the referendum deadline to July of 2000 (Seddon, 2000), there has yet to be one (U N List of Operations, 2008a).4 Conclusion The Western Saharan stalemate continues t oday with Morocco and the Polisario Front stalemated over irreconc ilable differences. The UN and AU face a difficult mission to maintain a ce asefire based upon the promise of a referendum that has yet to come. T he financial impediments represented by a strong Moroccan-US relationship, an irresi stible bounty of natural resources, and a lack of peacemaking and peacekeeping fi nancing for the AU has allowed the continuance of the conflict. MoroccoÂ’s abi lity to maintain a formidable military front against the Polisario Front has fu rther emboldened their position against negotiation for the referendum. Furthermore, a combination of political snafus as well as a reputation for poorly exec uted peacemaking missions have further impeded upon peacekeeping efforts in this case and explains why the Moroccan 4 The most current date shown on the UN List of Operations is 2008. MINURSO is still listed ongoing as of that date. Because I cannot find any sources between December 2008 and March 2009 stating the missionÂ’s completion, I am left to assume that efforts to conduct a referendum in Western Sahara are ongoing.
65 Government and the Polisario Front have been at a stalemate for 17 years (United States Department of State, 2009). Though the AU did achieve a ceasefire agreement in 1991, they did require the UNÂ’s help to do it. A ccording to a MINURSO timeline (MINURSO, 2007), UN participation did not come to t he fore until after SADRÂ’s admission to the AU and the resulting revocation of MoroccanÂ’s AU member ship (Pazzanita, 1994). AU peacemaking and peacekeeping effi cacy is lacking due to the inability to fund a viable peacemaking force. Fu rthermore, the financia l impediments to efficacy are compounded by the AUÂ’s loss of objectivity and trust with one of the parties with whom negotiations are to take part. The dissolving trust between the AU and Morocco, MoroccoÂ’s longstanding relationship with the US, and the US influence within the UN may also explain MoroccoÂ’s openness to UN led negotiations. What implications for the AU re sult from the dichotomy between the stalemate of Western Sahara and the crisis of Darfur have for the African Union? The answer is discussed in the following chapter.
66 Chapter 4: Comparison and Conclusion At present, both Darfur and Western S ahara are no further along than they were in years past. La ck of mutual trust between Khartoum and Darfur rebel groups still exist, leaving little room for fruitful negotiation or quality ceasefire (Sudan Tribune, May 2009). The recent indict ment of al Bashir has shown some movement towards relieving one of the political impediments. However, the announcement of the indictm ent has already proven counter-productive; al BashirÂ’s loyalists are not likely to give him up without a fight nor will angering the emboldened leader help humanitarian effort s any in the region. To the West, Western Sahara is still locked in a st alemate with little word on when the promised referendum will occur. As a symptom of this, MINURSO has been extended yet again until Ap ril 2010 (UN, 2009). Comparison of Overarching Trends These case studies illuminate the fi nancial, political, an d socio-cultural trials the AU must face when engagi ng in peacemaking and peacekeeping. While each study illuminates the AUÂ’s consistent need for UN assistance with
67 their peacemaking and peacekeeping initia tives, further observation of these trends demonstrates their transcendence fr om the case studies themselves, offering a deeper insight into the peacem aking and peacekeeping shortcomings within the AU itself. Each case study offers insight to the AUÂ’s difficulty in funding peacemaking operations. First, the AU alone has difficult y meeting the logistical goals necessary for the scale of its peacemaking and peacekeeping missions. Further exacerbating this issue are t he military and logistic capabilities of governments who oppose AU initiatives for peace. While the AU relies on voluntary contributions from member states and the international community, both Sudanese oil revenue and Moroccan phos phate profit continue to fund each nation-stateÂ’s milit ary initiatives. Furthermore, the will of these states to use alliances to openly oppose the AU in favor of their own interests demonstrat es political challenges as well. Both the Darfur and the Wester n Sahara cases demonstrate the AUÂ’s inability to compete with international allies who are economically strong and politically powerful. While Darfur enjoys a financ ial alliance with China, MoroccoÂ’s longstanding political alliance with the US further complicates the negotiations process. Additionally, t he Moroccan case demonstrates the fragility of the AU alliance which undermines its ability to fund peace missions and negotiate with a unified voice. Therefore, not only is the AU proving inept in funding its own
68 peacemaking and peacekeeping missions, t heir opponents are proving to out fund and out gun the AU as well. The last over-arching impediment to AU peacemaking and peacekeeping is the overwhelming diversity of the contin ent. These two case studies illustrate conflict fuelled by socio-cultural rivalry. While the symptoms of these conflicts are socio-cultural by natur e, experts in the field di sagree on how it is to be addressed. In summary, these case studies demonstr ate that the AUÂ’s membership is much too large, and its goals are too grand to financed and completed on a continental scale. Its inability to financ e peace missions combined with memberstatesÂ’ cavalier attitude toward AU policie s diminishes the organizationÂ’s viability in peacemaking and peacekeeping. Suggestions for the Future If the AU is to salvage any peacekeeping validity, some changes ought to be considered. First, the AU must start peacekeeping with international support, rather than requiring it later. This partnership could use the colonialist attitude many African dictators take towards in ternational aid and use it to their advantage, creating a Â“good-cop, bad-copÂ” dichotomy. Ho wever this partnership is spun, the AU must frame their peacekeeping endeavors with international partnership in mind given the effects great nations have on the outcome of
69 peacekeeping missions. For example, the USÂ’s help in Sudan is producing progress in humanitarian aid as well as furthering negotiations, whereas the USÂ’s clear support of Moroccan interests pr oduce hindrances at the Western Saharan negotiations table. Second, a shortage of funds prevents the AU from producing a substantial peacekeeping mission. This reality theref ore prescribes the AU to investigate more economically efficient means of atta ining peace. As mentioned in chapter 1 of this thesis, mediation has proven pr omising in this regard as has peacebuilding and preventative diplomacy. Third, for regionalism to take hold there must be some economic interdependency. African peace in this vain requires the AU membership to maintain the development of infr astructure and economic interdependency between members. However, a large caveat to this is infrastructure in Africa most likely originates from foreign in vestment overseas. This requires AU membership to be economically dependent upon foreign investment rather than being interdependent upon each other. Finally, if a sub-regional organi zation has a better understanding of regional and cultural i ssues, then this could potentially lead to better peacekeeping operations vis-vis sub-regional advisory (e.g. ECOWAS). However, given the conflicting needs, in terests, and opinions of the member states that have joint membership to the AU as well as to sub-regional organizations, the path to peace may be stymied by organizational conflict of
70 interest, leading to distrust. Since r egionalism requires the AU membership to relinquish their sovereignty to the organi zation, then this organization is only as strong as the mutual tr ust of its members. Regionalism for Peacekeeping? The socio-cultural divisions repr esented by the Darfur and Western Sahara conflicts reflect the most fundamental impediment towards peace achieved by regionalism. The economic interdependence which led to the EU success story was only possible with an economic partner ship founded upon a mutual trust and distaste for conflict am ongst the parties involved. Following the European example, political integr ation flows from this economic interdependence while peace proliferates from a fundamental economic dependency the aggressor has upon the opponent, forcing a political solution. The development of the AU from the large OAU seems to be developing in reverse from that of the EU. While the EU started with 6 countries and grew over time, the AU incorporated 47 countries at its start. Furthermore, while the EU developed through economic in terdependence and integrated politically overtime, the AU seems to be starting with a polit ical union while expecting economic development to occur simultaneously. T hese two case studies clearly illustrate that this simultaneous progression is counterproductive as socio-cultural cleavages prevent any economic inter dependence, further pr eventing political
71 integration. Therefore, if sociocultural upheaval must be absent as a prerequisite for economic interdependence and political integrat ion, then the AU experience demonstrates that regionalis m cannot be implemented as a platform for peacekeeping, but rather is a tool for perpetuating an existing peace. In conclusion, the case studies of Darfur and Western Sahara suggest that while socio-cultural conflict continues to proliferate, the AU has neither the financial resources nor the political clout to meet peacemaking and peacekeeping milestones. Furthermore findings suggest that conflict founded upon socio-cultural diversity undermines the very foundation of regionalism solidarity. Theref ore, this conflict compromise s the overall application of regionalism as a mechanism for peacekeepin g. All of these impediments work in concert to stymie the AU from becoming internationally respected for making and keeping the peace.
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