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International society :
b cosmopolitan politics and world society
h [electronic resource] /
by Kimberly Weaver.
[Tampa, Fla] :
University of South Florida,
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Thesis (MA)--University of South Florida, 2010.
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ABSTRACT: How does the international system move from an anarchic system driven by power to a global community driven by the needs/wants of the community at large? Jrgen Habermas utilizes the tenets of his Communicative Action Theory to underline the importance of communicatively based repertoire in the international system between and among states and non-state actors and the citizens themselves. How does arguing and reasoning among states and international institutions bring together legitimization and order? My research aims to analyze the movement of the international system from anarchy towards a global civil society. In doing so, I will examine Communicative Action Theory in International Relations, in particular the development of legitimization processes in international politics, the role of state sovereignty and its effect on the legitimization process of non-state actors. I argue that underdeveloped legitimization processes at the international level consist of fragile consensus building mechanisms that explain why disagreement can and often does lead to violence. However, I also contend that the international system is moving toward a more developed global civil society.
Advisor: Steven Roach, Ph.D.
Global civil society
International public sphere
x Government and International Affairs
t USF Electronic Theses and Dissertations.
International Society Cosmopolitan Politics and World Society b y Kimberly Weaver A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of Political Science College of Arts and Sciences Uni versity of South Florida Major Professor: Steven Roach, Ph.D. Michael Gibbons, Ph.D. Bernd Reiter, Ph.D. Date of Approval: June 16 2010 Keywords: global civil society legitimization process, international public sphere, Jrgen Habermas Copyright 2010, Kim berly Weaver
Dedication I dedicate this thesis to my loving husband Mon cef for his unwavering support and encouragement throughout this journey.
Acknowledgements I would like to than k Dr. Michael Gibbons, Dr. Bernd Reiter and Dr. Steven Roach for the time and support given to me throughout this process. I would like to say a special thank you to my Major Professor, Dr. Roach, for his continued encouragemen t and motivation You truly supported and challenged my research and writing and pushed me to achieve more than I thought possible. You are a true mentor
i Table of Contents List of Figures ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... ii A b s t r a c t ................................ ................................ ................................ .............................. iii Introduction ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................... 1 Literature Review ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 5 Reasoned Argumentation ................................ ................................ ............ 6 Globalist Focus ................................ ................................ ........................... 8 Theoretical F ramework ................................ ................................ ......................... 1 0 Outline ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 1 1 ................................ .............. 1 4 Legitimization Process in International Re lations: ................................ ............... 2 1 Theory of World Organization and Cosmopolitanization of Law ........................ 2 2 Chapter Two: Challenges to Global Order: Real Politik ................................ ................. 2 7 Influence on International Politic s: ................................ ................... 2 8 Communicative Action and Anarchy ................................ ................................ .... 3 7 Chapter Three: Cosmopolitan Ethics ................................ ................................ ................ 4 1 Building Intersubjectivity into International Law and Politics ............................. 4 1 The Effects of Coercion on International Society: When Disagreement Devolves to Violence ................................ ................................ ......................... 4 4 Kosovo ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 4 5 The Iraq War ................................ ................................ ............................. 4 7 Instituting Moral Principles and Ethical Norms: The New Role of Transnational Institutions ................................ ................................ ................... 5 0 The EU Public Sphere and Citizenship ................................ ..................... 5 2 International Criminal Court ................................ ................................ ..... 5 4 Conclusion: Towards a Global Civil Society ................................ ................................ .... 5 9 ................................ ...................... 5 9 Bibliography ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 6 1 End Notes ................................ ................................ ................................ .......................... 6 5 A b o u t t h e A u t h o r ................................ ................................ ................................ ... E n d P a g e
ii List of Figures Figure 1. Three Logics of Social Action 7
iii International Society: Cosmopolitan Politics and World Society Kimberly Weaver A b s t r a c t How does the international system move from an anarchic system driven by power to a global community driven by the needs/wants of the community at large? Jrgen Habermas utilizes the tenets of his Communicative Action Theory to underline the importance of communicatively based repertoire in the international system between an d among states and non state actors and the citizens themselves. How does arguing and reasoning among states and international institutions bring together legitimization and order? My research aims to analyze the movement of the international system from anarchy towards a global civil society. In doing so, I will examine Communicative Action Theory in International Relations, in particular the development of legitimization processes in international politics, the role of state sovereignty and its effect o n the legitimization process of non state actors. I argue that underdeveloped legitimization processes at the international level consist of fragile consensus building mechanisms that explain why disagreement can and often do es lead to violence. However, I also contend that the international system is moving toward a more developed global civil society.
1 Introduction Throughout this thesis I aim to show that communicative action theory best explains the development and, in some cases, underdevelopme nt of global civil society norms and institutions. Two central questions structure my analysis: (1) How does Habermasian based IR theory help us to understand international problems regarding order and stability? (2) What evidence is there that communica tive action based repertoire can move us beyond the anarchic international system to one a of global public sphere. In this thesis, I begin by first examining the basic tenets of Communicative Action Theory; Lifeworld, legitimacy, validity claims (sincerity rightness, truth), and speech acts. In doing so, I will show that by instilling communicative action into the international system there will be greater room for argumentation among state and non state actors. I then move on to examine the relationship between legitimization and order. I argue that by creating a space for all actors to communicate in a reasonable and rational way, the international system can become more responsive to the central issues facing all global citizens.
2 So, why is it import ant to assess the relationship between legitimization and order? Moreover, how should we, as political scientists, examine the relationship between those that hold legitimate power and how order is created and maintained? Legitimization is the process by w hich state and non state actors learn to reason out their differences and to live by what Habermas referred to as the force of the better argument in the international system. Through such processes, actors deliberate upon the most reasonable courses of action for instituting democratic norms. Learning to live by the force of the better argument is crucial since it allows us to understand why actors adopt new norms and rules to resolve problems, both on the local and global level. Reasoned argumentation and moral persuasion, in this sense, are communicative aspects that legitimize the actions, rules and principles of international institutions. The evolution of the concept of legitimacy, it could be argued, encompasses the rise of the modern states syste m and social sciences. The modern social sciences, for instance, emerged out of the Enlightenment. The aim of the Enlightenment was to challenge societies' reliance on myths and religion and to understand the material properties of human society. Here th e idea was that, through scientific and philosophical study, we could discover and recognize legitimate sources of government, that is, how government justified its public right to rule. A diverse range of thinkers, including Michel Foucault, Charles Tayl or and Jrgen Habermas have focused on the problem of legitimacy and the discursive contexts of social action. Despite their differences, these scholars believe that there were elements of the Enlightenmen t that modern social science ha s abandoned,
3 such as the inclusion of the public sphere, critical questioning, and human reason. The abandonment of the Enlightenment principles, in this manner, thus begged the question: how should we live our lives? Legitimacy has also helped to shape normative internat ional relations theory, by focusing on the role of international institutions (law and diplomacy) in furthering peace and negotiations. International relations (IR), it should be noted, derives from a long tradition of analyzing societies of states, a f amily of nations and an international community. After World War II, the major state powers established the first international relations First World War so that fut 1 The social analyses of this school would help establish the basis for critical studies in IR and the emergence of critical international theory in the 1980s, which focused more attention on norm ative issues such as identity and ethics. Critical international theory emerged from the third debate in International Relations in the 1980s. 2 Within the third debate, critical theorists argued that realism's scientific focus on anarchy and state power had excluded alternative social theories that stressed the importance of social change and ethics. The first debate, for instance, pitted Realism against Liberalism, while the second debate focused on Behavioralism and Traditionalism. Unlike the first de bate, the second debate focused on empirical methods; through 3 The third debate,
4 then, was essentially about the post methods to study soci al phenomena) insistence that we ask how we know what we know, why we know what we know, and do we really know what we think we know. The post emphasized the subje 4 Ferguson argues, 5 Furthermore, it was argued that the third debate revealed the movement away from empiricism toward normative and subjective ideas. A critical analysis of the third debate presents a new way for political science scholars to view and study International Relations. Robert W. Cox discusses the different purposes of theory, problem solving theory and critical theory Whereas other theories, such as Realism, reflect a theory of problem solving (just giving the already existing system a encompassing structure to be 6 Critical theory takes the next step in examining historical circumstances of social change, and then applies the findings to what can be done to promote/encourage progressive change. When looking at general theories of pol regularities in human behavior are sufficient to justify a search for patterns that can be developed into theories of political life, it is more difficult to argue that such theories can be 7
5 It is important to stress that critical IR is not state centric, but rather attempts to go beyond this limitation. Randall D. Germain asserts that in looking at critical theory a way to conceptualize world order free of the constraints of state centric approaches and the interstate relations they focus 8 This is not to say that the importance o f the state and its dynamic role in development is inconsequential, rather the state has and will play a continued role in the realm of global politics. In these terms, the state is one of many actors involved in the international system, and though it pl ays a decisive role, it is not the only actor, as proponents of realism would assert. Nevertheless, we must recognize that foreign policy making relies rooted in rationa critical analyses of deliberation and negotiating in international politics. 9 My central aim, then, in this thesis, is twofold: (1) to focus on the influence of Jurgen Habermas's th eory in IR; and (2) to analyze the problematic (and possibly constructive) role of state power in legitimizing international rules, authority, and order. Literature R eview There are two schools of Habermasian based approaches that I will explore. The fi rst has adapted Habermas to international politics by demonstrating how his theory allows us to understand and explain the role of reasoned argumentation in international institutions and decision making. I will examine the works of Thomas Risse, Harald M uller and Jennifer Mitzen. The second school has adapted Habermas into a globalist perspective
6 with a cosmopolitan focus aimed at rethinking citizenship and the global system as a whole. For the analysis, I will examine the works of Andrew Linklater and the English School. Reasoned Argumentation Risse, Mitzen and Muller have each contributed to the research of international institutions within international relations studies. Thomas Risse examines argumentation between the two extremes of utility maximiz ing action and rule guided behavior. 10 He conceptualizing the logic of arguing and can actually be brought to bear to tackle 11 Riss 12 (See Figure 1) By doing so, Risse shows that between these two extremes lies a s pace where each meet and communicative action orientations of the participating actors are not coordinated via egocentric calculation of success, but through the acts 13 This point is key, for rather than arguing for the point of being successful in changing other minds, you argue for the sake of reasoned analysis. In order to accomplish this argumentation, Risse argues that international institutions are needed to facilitate communication among and between actors. International institutions can help to create and enhance common lifeworlds among actors and work to minimize power differentials.
7 Figure 1. Three Logics of Social Action 14 Reasoned Analysis Rational Choice Actors: Rule Followers Utility Maximizers Interpreting Habermas, Mitzen examines communicative action theory encompassed in a state of anarchy. She argues that even in the unstable int ernational order, communicative action can reduce the presence of violence in the international system and can help to facilitate ways around the security dilemma. 15 This can be accomplished in part by international institution building. By heightening in ternational institutions commonalities between differing societies are more easily reached. These commonalities will in turn influence cultural values and norms and can eventually bring lifeworlds closer together. I argue that though it is possible to wor k toward communicative action in an anarchic system, it is not enough to guarantee communicative action will take place. Logic of Consequentialism Logic of arguing Logic of appropriateness Logic of truth seeking
8 to emphasize the role international institutions play in bringing reasoned argumentation state actors influenced negotiations, despite powerful actors holding diametrically opposed preferences 16 Institutions play a criti cal role because they allow the public sphere to participate in negotiations. Participation has increased over the years due to the progress of communications technology and the increased ease of accessibility to debates for the public sphere. Institutio ns also help to inform the public of the debates that take place on densely and largely non hierarchical settings, (to) help foster trust and empathy between participa 17 The role of facilitator between powerful actors in the international system and the public sphere helps to give power to international institutions as they aim to move toward reasoned argumentation. Inte rnational institutions are key actors, according to Muller. Globalist Focus Andrew Linklater extrapolates from Habermas and moves to ward a globalist, cosmopolitan vision in rethinking the current international system and progress toward world citizenship. Linklater uses the analysis of harm inflicted in the international system to further the need to develop Cosmopolitan Harm Conventions (CHC) that would be present in a global cosmopolitan polity. 18 harm convention co smopolitan is the fact that it does not privilege the interests of insiders
9 19 The inclusion of freedom from harm for all cosmopolitan idea from the current state system where citizens are often mobilized to def ore cosmopolitan forms of national and international law are obvious ways in which the hi 20 Linklater argues, c members of different states assume political responsibility for the harm they ca use one 21 resource which can be used to imagine communities which overcome domination and 22 In addition to the role of the citizen, Linklater examines the role l egitimacy has played in the modern era to increasing states morality. 23 24 Through standards of legitimacy, the public sphere is no w be ing engaged in decision making, even if it is at the periphery. This is unique in the history of state systems predating the modern state system. 25 Furthermore, for Linklater, a s the phenomenon of transnational harm has grown in importance, internati onal law has come under pressure 26 The movement of the international system toward a globalized assertion to eradicate harm has moved one step closer to a global cosmopolitan society, that does not inflict har m for reasons such as territorial
10 disputes, power, and wealth that have been so prevalent in the wars among states and citizens in the modern state system. Though Linklater agrees that the modern state system is historically different, he also contends progress in world affairs requires 27 This progress toward a global citizenry places the individual, the citizen, at the core of a new international system. I contend that the reasoned argumentation aided by international institutions has greater merit in the current system and international relations. By positing Habermas within the confines of an anarchic international system, Risse, Mitzen and Muller have created a more relevant argument for the princi ples of Communicative Action Theory. H owever, t he progress that Linklater speaks to is situated too far outside the current international examine the in greater detail the role of international institutions. Theoretical Framework I have adopted a discursive framework to analyze the problem of order and power in communicative action theory and legiti mization. Drawing on Habermas allows me to shed theoretical light on order and legitimacy by examining rational persuasion and reasoned argumentation. Through this process, actors are able to reach compromise and er point of view. All the while, this process lead s actors to build a greater defined link between self interest and the rational pursuit for public goods.
11 Empirically I will focus on two issue areas (1) problems of the legitimization process in int ernational relations: war or the conflict in Kosovo and the U.S. led war in Iraq, and (2) the new role of transnational institutions in bringing together legitimization and order in the international system, specifically the European Union and the Internat ional Criminal Court. The Kosovo War is contextually important because it allows us to examine the breakdown of reasoned argumentation and the consequences suffered. The International Criminal Court is vital to examine in the context of Habermas as it rep resents the importance legitimacy and international law now at play in the international system. Outline In chapter one I discuss some of the historical beginnings and progression of this legitimization process in communicative action by outlining a Haber masian based strand within international relations. I begin to outline what communicative action theory is and how it can affect the lifeworld in order to heighten argumentation within the international heory of Communicative Action, including lifeworld. I then move to examine the legitimization crisis and how this crisis works within and through communicative action, moreover to look at the legitimization process in order to scrutinize what it means to gain legitimacy in the international system, of world organization and his use of the cosmopolitanization of law.
12 The second chapter I will examine the applications of communicative action theory that other international relations theorists have made in international politics. I will focuses on issues facing international relations with the legitimization process and the unstable international order and examine the to the international system. I argue that in the current anarchic international system there is a thin conception of lifeworld that hinders communication between actors. I will examine how state sovere ignty perpetuates the anarchic system and facilitate the constant security dilemma states face. However, there are benefits that exist in applying this theory to the international system that I will apply. The third chapter examines cosmopolitanism and ho w we have to address and develop institutional cosmopolitanism in order to meet the current political issues facing the international system. I will give examples of disagreements that have led to violent rather than peaceful outcomes. These disagreements are examples of the breakdown in communication between states that were for one reason or another unable to find consensus in their arguments. The lack of ability for states to use communicative action in these instances caused violent outcomes that high lighted the inability of communicative action to take place in an anarchic system. By doing so, I examine the effects of coercion on the international system by conducting a case study on both raq. My aim is to study the difference between what has been argued by some as a legitimate intervention in Kosovo and an illegitimate war in Iraq. I will then move on to a focus on bringing
13 together legitimization and order. Through power politics, sta te sovereignty and the anarchic order of the international system suppresses the full capabilities of international institutions, I will argue that certain international institution such as the EU and the ICC have shown us instances where legitimization an d order were able to grow within the anarchic international system. My conclusion focus es the sta te. The state continues to plays a role in the international system, just not the sole extrapolate the role of the state in the international system.
14 Chapter One: Haberma oriented argumentation between actors that is not strategic or for the sole benefit of upholding f the whole. Communicative action aims to promote mutual understanding among agents. As actors, there is a shared understanding that leads to an outcome that is inherently reasonable. When actors communicate or argue for the ultimate outcome of promoting the better argument, reason and rationality have been exercised to their full extent. In order for communicative action to be realized, there are foundational pieces that must first be flushed out. main tenets: Lifeworld, Legitimacy, and Validity Claims (authenticity, rightness, truth,) to create a space where communicative action can exist. According to Habermas, 28 structural transformation 29
15 30 Order in the sense that lifeworlds help to manage societies by perpetuating socially acceptable norms. Moreover, adaptive lifeworlds can bring upon new societal orde lifeworld can be cultural, media driven, or family/tradition imposed. Lifeworld is impacted by day to day interactions and overarching cultural norms for society as a whole. As Axel Honneth points he lifeworld continues to be the more comprehensive concept of order (in regards to system) given that the media steered subsystems are differentiated out from the social component of the lifeworld via the specialization of the universal medium of l 31 For this reason, lifeworlds can be international institutions and by other cultures around the globe. Lifeworld is a repository of cultural values. Habermas u ses the concept of a lifeworld to bridge different cultures together. When background. It is the unquestioned ground of everything given in my experience, and the unqu 32 It is a storehouse. Even if actors do not appear to have similar lifeworlds, the minimal ere actors can begin to reason with one another. Thomas Risse, for transparent, and at the same time vast and incalculable web of presuppositions that have
16 to be satis 33 We create our lifeworld around what we have experienced. For this reason, the public sphere is a reflection of the world that society has created in general and a reflect ion of lifeworld specifically. Legitimization is the process actors take in giving legitimacy to institutions, political order, law or social order by attaching it to the norms and values of society. Legitimization is a core component of communicative action. Lifeworlds pre given cultural understanding informs the actors on what, according to their norms and values, is legitimate. Habermas argues that the lulling of society has diminished the legitimization process within society. Communicative actio n, where actors communicate by employing reason, can lead to legitimacy. Habermas expresses the legitimization process as a key feature to moving beyond the current state of affairs. Common worldviews that societies possess have the potential to help increase the legit imization process of institutions. primarily by the fact that cultural knowledge can meet with rationally motivated 34 imization process. International law is one way for societies to adopt common values and norms by adhering to a universal code on issues such as human right. By creating a space where all cultures can identify with each other, Habermas has set the ground s for commonalities in lifeworlds that can be the basis for communicative action.
17 International law has the opportunity to circumvent the sovereignty of the state, though minimally, in order to uphold common held beliefs in the international system, such as 35 Why is legitimacy so important? Inis L. Claude asserts more effective more secure in the possession of power and more successful in its 36 Legitimacy helps society to promote institutions that reflect its valu es and norms. It provides a structure to evaluate institutions and their ability to work within and for the society that supports them. One way that society is able to legitimize institutions rsal pragmatics, he refers to validity claims as they reflect the truth of assertions made (conformity with perceived facts in the world), moral rightness of the norms underlying the argument, and truthfulness and authenticity of a speaker. Validity clai ms allow for an actor to legitimize the speech acts of another actor. In its truthfulness, its rightness and its authenticity. When determining the validity of a cla im, an actor examines both the argument itself and the person making the claim. This 37 Truthfulness is a function of the rationality of the speech acts and if the argument encompasses reason, as it relates to the lifeworld of the
18 agent to whom the argument is posed. Truthfulness is encompassed within the actor that is making an argument. For if the agent making an argument is himself not seen as trustworthy then his claims toward truth are invalidated. Claims of rightness are also dependent on the source as well as the message. In this claim agents depend on reflecting iate in relation to a certain 38 Each of the validity claims are dependent upon commonalities in the lifeworlds of the actors. Common lifeworlds enable mutual understanding of the argument(s) as each actor has a familiar reference point to gauge validity claims. In order to examine the truthfulness, rightness, and authenticity of an argument one must reflect on his or her own d experiences. Legitimacy of an argument can be explored by examining how valid the claims of an argument are. Because validity claims can be questioned, therein lies the ability to work though reason and rationality in order to gain understanding and ultimately support the better argument. We use validity claim in our day to day interactions within our community by calling upon our lifeworlds. Society helps to shape validity claims by imposing social norms and values that are inherent in a given soci ety. From these social norms, we can deduce if an argument falls within the confines of our own knowledge of the value of the argument. Habermas argues that by drawing a connecting line between lifeworlds, actors can find space to reason. From a high le vel, lifeworlds may seem disjointed; however, focusing in on the minutia of a lifeworld can expose comparatively
19 similar aspects that will allow seemingly incompatible actors to communicate within a realm where speech acts can be validated. In the followi ng chapter, I will go into greater detail of how these core tenets of communicative action theory (lifeworld, legitimacy, and validity claims) can be used in the international system to bring together actors that seem to have little in common and give them the tools to communicate on a level that upholds reason in argumentation. In Chapter Two, I focus on communicative action theory in the international realm. There are some key items to note about the international system that Habermas in particular and communicative action in general struggle with. Power in the international system has been a difficulty in International Relations Theory (IR theory). Habermas attempts to justify power in communicative action by including the nation state as an actor in the system. However, unlike other IR theories such as Realism, where power is determined by a states relative capability in the system, Habermas attempts to bring in the public sphere as a method of using the citizens to uphold the legitimacy of power str uctures and authority. For Realists, in particular, states pursue their interests defined as power where power is a zero sum game. Habermas has structured communicative action theory in a way that is pragmatic. He allows theorists in IR to address and r esolve problems by assessing the discursive requirements for instituting norms and values. Communicative action theory attempts to utilize validity claims, legitimization and lifeworlds to get past the limitation of power on the international system. Ano ther aspect
20 international system. Anarchic in that a hierarchy does not exist at the international level. The international community does not have an overarching author ity that is responsible for running or policing the world. Therefore, cooperation among states that are suspicion of each other can be difficult to achieve. In the following chapter I aim to show how on the problems and limits of an anarchic system run and allows us to move toward a global civil society reflective of the will of the citizen. In sum, Habermas sh ow s ho w legitimization ca n fu nc ti on political order or the institutional framework 39 In regards to the exclusion, generating estrangement, injus tice, insecurity and violent conflict between self 40 These shortcomings of the state do not allow the international system to move past self interest. Why is this so? The inevitabili ty of the self interest of states creates a barrier for critical theorists to cross. In examining the legitimization process we must first observe the current international order and those that have the power to grant legitimacy to institutions: the state. I will begin by outlining international relations and how it has
21 introduction to international relations, and how, over time, it has been utilized in the international sy stem. Legitimization Process in International Relations: modern politics, it is reason rather than power or violence which has become the measure chard Devetak. 41 Legitimization processes allow for meaningful value to be attached to an object that promotes its definition or understanding within the norms of a society. In Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics Ian Hurd argues that there fears the punishment of rule enforcers, (2) because the actor sees the rule as in its own self interest, and (3) because the actor feels the rule is legitimate and out to be o 42 into the international order and what brings about legitimization among participants and John Dryzek asserts in Legitimacy Eco nomy in Deliberative Democracy that legitimacy can be seen as valid when participation from the majority is employed. 43 However, it is not my contention that the key to attaining legitimacy is participation by the majority citizen group; rather it is the a cceptance by the majority citizen group that creates crystallization of judgment that may be influenced but is unlikely to be wholly determined by legal norms and moral prin 44 What types of rules do participants
22 use to influence the international system to grant them legitimacy? How do they win the favor of the masses? Does this comfort breed complacency by demanding a more just international system that fosters hum an rights for all its citizens? We cannot allow for the current international system to ignore the moral claim put forth by other actors in order to obtain consensus among other actors because the anarchic order does not claim them to be legitimate. How do we get away from this state determined process of 45 By moving the legitimization process past the realm of the state to a more global arena, we would circumvent the anarchic baggage that it brings, (a monopoly on violence within its territory, an unstable international order, the security dilemma) by linking the uncoercive aspects of moral persuasion with the efficacy of norms. Legitimacy in this sense would help to explain this link. However, within communicative action theory, there is the challenge of explicating the role or the impact of power in the international system. In chapter four, I will address this challenge of the legitimization pr ocess and order and how it relates to the European Union and the International Criminal Court. I will also address the above questions in an attempt to highlight the potentialities and limitations of legitimization. Theory of World Organization and Cosmop olitanization of Law approach to a global civil society. Habermas discusses the creation of a Global Network that would ultimately shape society. Most importantly to notice is that this global
23 structure would not divide the world into peoples based upon ethnicity or nationality. Hohendahl asserts, whereas the global network encompasses all, it is vital and essential 46 This being said, Habermas does not condone a global system to be homogeneous in that it takes on the characteristics of one nation, ethnicity or geographical region. Rather he emphasizes the importance of the individual and their r ights as citizens of the world and 47 The current world system has the primary source of power headed by the state. Habermas does not argue that the state will comes necessary as a sanctioning, organizing, 48 The world system is dependent on the state to maintain order and administer law. By establishing a structure that would bear the burden of maintaining law and order, the role of the state would become minimized but not eliminated. The disintegration of the state is not promoted in civil society would be to break up t he monopoly that states have on violence, be it legal or illegal. By dismantling the totalizing power of the state, greater equity would be given to the citizens of the world. This method of community would decrease the effects that nationalism has on th e world system. Rather than seeing somebody across the border as network has the potential to help change the structure of the world system, which will in
24 turn also change the shape of society. Through this cosmopolitan vision, the promotion of individual rights could state, but rather by a global network of structures that promote a unified understanding of rights. Accordin selective application of cosmopolitan law desired by Habermas inevitably engenders the spector if not of a hyper centralized world state, then at least the possibility of a supranatural order in which for all practical purposes the UN (United Nations) operates, in the final instance, as military 49 International institutions would foster community involvement while at the same time upholding the values and norms established by a global civil society. A second m human rights. In Between Facts and Norms by Habermas, the first chapter focuses on the rights of the individual and how they are tied into the current legal structure. These rights are a beacon of freedom and liberty for the individual. Not only do they create a space for the individual to operate in society, but it also allows for the development and for the social integration of economic societies, which rely on the decentralized decisions of self 50 By establishing structures that promote universal human rights, a more just world syste m can be accomplished. However, in order to accomplish this feat, rights would have to be administered through a global body that assumed major authority. This body would circumvent the biases of the state, which has, in the past, violated basic human ri ghts of
25 its citizens. This can be seen in Nazi Germany or in the genocide in Rwanda. The state Without a system or structure to monitor the actions of a state and more i mportantly have power over the state to administer human rights, these rights cannot be experienced on a universal level. The implementation of universal human rights is achieved through the creation of a Global Network. There are already global structur es in place that attempt to place controls on the actions of states, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the United Nations; however, these bodies do not have the backing or the power to enforce the laws of human rights worldwide. By giving greater legitimacy to these global structures, the application of universal human rights could be realized. In doing this, human rights and that differing peoples must be allowed to interpret these rights in 51 A governing body that would have the authority on a global level to enforce the rights of global citizens would force those in power to respect the rights of those they have power over. Habermas states in The Divided West : even if n
26 52 In sum, takes advantage of the ex isting power structures as a pathway to greater peace in the world. By incorporating these structures, such as the state, movement toward a cosmopolitan global society becomes more relevant because it is within the confined of the existent power structure
27 Chapter Two: Challenges to Global Order: Real Politik The current international order is one of anarchy where states are the main actors. States can be defined as having territorially defined borders that have a population and are controlled by a government, which answers to no higher authority. Most importantly, the make and enforce laws, or to control affairs within a territorially defined set of bord ers. One of the key issues of state sovereignty is whether the state's right tends to conflict with its international obligations to promote and maintain peaceful relations among (other) states. This issue also underscores the security dilemma (discussed earlier), which in turn reflects a condition of an unstable international order. States foreground action with the premise that survival is of the utmost importance and since this is the case, the for humanity is often strained. requiems for a cosmopolitan peace that promises to move us past the instability associated with power politics Let me first begin by looki ng at the influence that Habermas has had on international politics.
28 In examining how Habermas has influenced international politics, I will look at the contributions made by international relations scholar s. According to Jennifer Mitzen, 53 54 Both scholars use communicative action as a basis for argumentatio n to take place among friendly and opposing actors. Within communicative action, reason, goals, validity claims and Intersubjective recognition come together. As Habermas states, presentations and also evaluative expressions, supplement constative speech acts in constituting a communicative practice which, against the background of a lifeworld, is oriented to achieving, sustaining, and renewing consensus and indeed a consensus that rests on the Intersubjective recognition of criticizable validity claims. The rationality inherent in this practice is seen in the fact that a communicatively achieved agreement must be based in the end 55 Dealing with different cultures presents barri ers and poses questions on the ability and willingness of actors to communicate on an equal level. Habermas asserts, "the concept of communicative action presupposes the use of language as a medium for reaching understanding, in the course of which partic ipants, through relating to a world, 56 However, language can compound the problem to effective
29 communicative dialogue, as one actor may be bette r able to argue their goal more acutely and rationally in a specific language. How do we get past this? According to Habermas, action does not equate action with communica tion. Language is a medium of 57 This being said, reasoned dialogue demands acknowledgement from all parties in order to account for the inequalities. to foster not only a sense of common identity but also of political efficacy, a belief on the part of individuals that they can improve their lot or at least protect what they have if they associate with one 58 In the international realm Habermas argues that, "the actors seek to reach an understanding about the action situation and their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of agreement... a type of interaction that is coordinated through speech acts and does not coincide wit h them." 59 Understanding of norms and nuances this difference known at the beginning, communicative action can take place. Michael anding is achieved only when actors can reach actual, partial agreements about cultural meanings that can withstand potential 60 According to Habermas, these meanings can be established in a way to withstand criticism in part by creating a similar lifeworld.
30 By creating a space for actors to communicate in a way that promotes reason and rationality, the international system can move past its violent tendencies and move toward a more civil means of international policy. Habermas defines communicative 61 This framework creates a space whe re reason is used to move between the goals of two actors in order to reach understanding. We can also see the impact of Habermas (via Risse) in international relations by examining the impact that argumentation has made on the field. Argumentation take s looking at argumentation, Michael Rabinder James examines argumentation in relation to actors 62 Habermas asserts that rationality in speech or communicative rationality leads to argumentation ic way with the validity claim 63 Reason and rationality must be built into an argument for it to withstand validity claim that may deconstruct the basis of an argument. As stated earlier, these claims consist of truth, morali ty and strategy and are all rooted in universal norms. The use of reason allows actors to build understanding on common ground and universal norms.
31 It is also vital to note the difference between communicative action and strategic action. Communicative action involves moral persuasion while strategic action refers to the calculation of one's interests. 64 When two actors come together to dialogue an issue, they come together with their own sets of goals and ideas. Strategic action leads these two actors to discuss their immediate concerns (threats) and interests, while communicative 65 James differentiates between communi cative action and strategic action by asserting that strategic action includes 66 c onsensual norms which define reciprocal expectations about behavior and which must 67 Strategic action on the and 68 At a basic level, communicative action takes arguing between two actors beyond the simple rhetoric that strategic action can encompass and brings actors to the same level so they are able to communicate from the same root le vel rather than as one being powerful and one being weak. Now, I am not asserting that communicative action does not include rhetoric, because often when an actor is using strategic argumentation, it is communicated through rhetorical claims. When these exists that some manifestations of strategic action may undermine the solidaristic basis 69
32 In order to be able to reach the point of argumentation within the realm of communicative Peter Kruger, 70 Within these common lifewo rlds, argumentation can take place. Argumentation within and across lifeworlds is an integral part to communicative action. se. 71 How can true communicative action take place across lifeworlds that are dissimilar? Habermas argues that it is not the dissimilarities that we focus on, but the similarities of each lifeworld and from there build a base of argumentation. For that re ason, according to James, communicative action 72 According to the basic tenets of communica tive action, we need to form lifeworlds in the international system that possesses commonalities. However, we must ask: Are we capable of utilizing the commonalities of lifeworlds in an anarchic system that often inhibits communicative action? Anarchy can be described as the absence of a worldwide government or international governing body. It is in essence the absence of a hierarchical international structure producing conflict and the security dilemma. Security dilemma in the international system re fers to the relationship between and among states as one that lacks trust in part
33 due to each states preoccupation with power. The anarchic state is not part of the theory of communicative action because a substantive dialogue does not exist between state s. Realism asserts that international system is anarchic, meaning there is no central authority that governs the international system. 73 The anarchic reality of the international order forces states to fear each other. 74 This leads to the uncertainty amon g and between states, which have no way of knowing the true intentions of other states. States are a security dilemma. 75 While realists do not mean that the worl d is perpetually at war, they do mean that war is a part of the nature of the international system. Conflict between states can, and often does, result in war. The international system is one of self help. 76 Survival is the primary goal of any state in a self help system and it must come before any moral and ideological concerns, otherwise the state may cease to exist. 77 This aspect of the international system concerns the unwillingness of some hegemonic states to support the Kyoto Protocol or the Intern ational Criminal Court (ICC). For those states unwilling to enter into international agreements, there is a fear that binding legality could hinder their ability to act according to the sole need of the nation in order to survive. States are concerned wi th achieving a better position as opposed to that of their rivals through relative gains. The concern with achieving relative gains inhibits cooperation because states must be careful to maximize their own power.
34 Liberalism also sees the word as anarchi c, however, according to Scott Burchill, liberalism raises a challenge to the idea of an international system existing in anarchy. M. Doyle argues that there are a number of states that are resolving differences without violence. 78 Furthermore, Robert Keo hane cites the creation of informational structures acceptable as the basis for reducing conflicts and whether governmental actions are 79 International institutions also work to establish international law that cuts across differences within societies and cultures. It established cooperation among actors in that they facilitate cooperation and lead to greater transparency. For liberalism self help requires stronger international institutions. Here Keohane argues 80 Furthermore, according to Burchill, neoliberals believe that states are more interested in absolute ga ins, which is why states can cooperate with each other. 81 Though there is an overarching presence of anarchy, liberalism tries to transcend its implications in part by fostering cooperation among actors. Sovereign states have had the understanding that wh at happens within the borders of a state is not the concern of other states. There is an acceptance and recognition that the state is in control of its own territory. Two instances where there can be legitimate intervention from other states are when the re is evidence of international crimes or a state is threatening the security of another state. In other words, a state has complete and total jurisdiction over what happens in their territorial boundaries. According to William E.
35 82 influence on t he international system has declined. This does not mean that an unstable international order is now more stable, but rather the powers of other actors such as WTO), NG organizations have weakened state sovereignty. 83 State sovereignty is still a powerful force in the international system; however, other groups are rivaling this power. Multinationa l Corporations have increased their influence on state sovereignty through the tools such as economics and communications. With the decisions that are made within the territ orial borders of a state. The need for economic stability within states has forced state sovereignty to decrease. The European Union (EU) is a congregate of European nation states that have come together to, among other things; increase their influence o n the international system. These nation states standing alone had less influence than when they organized together. However, each of these European states had to relinquish some aspects of state sovereignty and autonomy to this transnational institution 84 International organizations have moved from bringing their
36 own right, wit h legitimacy derived from expertise, information and innovative political 85 Post international thinking in essence asserts that sovereignty is a social construct. Looking at this unstable international order gives us insight into what leads to violence within the system. If post internationalist thinking is correct and if sovereignty is a social construct, can this construct be changed to help move away from sovereignty bent on power, towards a more reasonable form o f order not consumed with power politics? To reiterate my earlier argument: communicative action in international relations will move beyond the built in instability th at fosters anarchy. According to Jennifer Mitzen, this unstable international order promotes a space where disagreements among states it promotes the breakdown of c ommunication and dialogue to the point where 86 As I shall demonstrate later, we can see that in instances such as the K osovo conflict in the mid Iraq War in 2003, there are examples where dialogue, diplomacy, and communication all broke down into violence; more specifically, where a lack of openness on the part of the Yugoslavian and Iraqi government s, inadequate and inaccurate intelligence and a total breakdown of reasoned argumentation disagreements lapsed into violence.
37 Despite these recurrent factors, Jennifer Mitzen argues that it is possible to move toward communicatively based repertoire in th e anarchic system by utilizing international institutions. 87 This offsets the security dilemma that states face by opening communication and increasing transparency among arguing actors. These international institutions also create a space where there are common worldviews that help to bring understanding among actors. However, when these institutions are unable to mitigate disagreements can devolve into violence in part due to the closed communication between and among actors. International institutions, though powerful, are still guests in a state based international system. These institutions are unable to completely resolve the security dilemma, and the zero sum game that states often play. Though international institutions offer help in circumventing parts of the unstable international order, we will see in the two case studies that they do not always assure that reasoned argumentation and moral persuasion will lead to a long term sustainable arrangement of mutual cooperation. Coercive practices are one permanent facet of the international system on which international institutions must still rely in order to uphold international norms. Communicative Action and Ana rchy However, the prevalent anarchic system creates a thin conception of lifeworld. According to Jennifer Mitzen, communicative action can be reached in spite of the anarchic order through the actions of international institutions. For Mitzen, there is th e 88 A thick notion of international society refers to the
38 lifeworlds that are clustered together or have greater similarities, wh ich would emphasize effect increase the likelihood of communicative action takin g place within an anarch ic system, according to Mitzen. In applying communicative action theory to the anarchic order, we can see that in part by utilizing validity claim, actors can begin to use communicative action in their argumentation. It can be arg ued that within an anarchic international system, common knowledge cannot be reached because actors do not share common lifeworlds. Risse justifies the application of communicative action theory in international relations in part by examining common lifewo 89 For example, Risse shows that meeting these validity claims are a precondition for communicative action. Within actors to communicate their own perceptions and interests among state and non state actors. 90 Another element that is key for heightened communicative action in the anarchic system would be to increase the ability for all par 91 Since there is currently no hierarchical system in place each actors is responsible for their own involvement. For the powerful it is easy to get a seat at the table, but for those states with relatively little power, not onl y is it hard to get a seat, but it is difficult to be called on to speak or to be listened to. Take for instance the UN Security Council. There are
39 five permanent members that have veto power; China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States of Ameri ca, while only ten other members hold only a two year term. For those countries that are not a part of the UN Security Council, it is hard to have their voices heard. Though non members are allowed to participate in discussions of the Security Council, i t is at the discretion of the permanent members, which ultimately leads to power disequilibrium. Furthermore, the anarchic system is by nature a closed communication apparatus. This creates a dilemma in arguing because there are misconceptions and suspic ions of intentions. If state A is too concerned about what state B may do, they will not be truthful in their intentions and argumentation breaks down in rhetorical speech. International institutions in essence help to create a discursive space, by offe ring a venue for negotiations, moral persuasion and compromise. In so doing, they help to create a collective identity that promote like values and norms. For example, the United Nations Millennium Development Goals have fostered the idea that each human should have the opportunity, among other things, to get an education. The UN has entered into communities that perhaps did not hold this value as their own and through communicating the benefits of education, have altered their values and helped to make education a norm for their society. This is just one example of how international institutions help to promote communicative action and cooperation among actors in the international system. Other examples might be the presence of Amnesty International in promoting human rights or a communications MNC installing phone lines that connect a
40 small village to the rest of the world which may help foster the exchange of information. By creating these areas of common knowledge, argumentation can be based on comm on lifeworlds, thereby providing a normative, discursive space in unstable and anarchic international order.
41 Chapter Three: Cosmopolitan Ethics Building Intersubjectivity into International Law and Politics Throughout my earlier chapters I have aimed to show that through communicative action, the international order can move toward a global civil society. This global civil society is ed to an individual state but consists of a network of observations which refers equally to individual states as to interdependencies and 92 It is necessary to move toward a global public sphere in order to effe ctively apply communicative action. The global public sphere is the ideal arena for communicative action to take place. Within this space Intersubjectivity can be brought into dialogues among actors. Intersubjectivity takes away the individual biases th at actors may possess. In working within a public sphere, states work more as a team rather than competitors. By using Intersubjectivity in evaluating the intentions of the other actors, the interpretations would have been based on hard evidence and exter nal facts, rather than on personal feeling and opinions. By bringing Intersubjectivity into the global public sphere, actors can feel a connection with each other in a way that will inhibit the partisanship that is so prevalent in the current internationa l order.
42 The current world order faces new challenges, not only in respect to power and order, but also in regards to international law and politics. The attacks of September 11, 2001 forced international law into a new era. How would global terrorist ne tworks be brought to justice, whose justice would reign supreme and whose laws would be followed? Falk tuency of networks committed in various ways to the promotion of attainment. 93 Currently, it seems as though international relations is pushing to improve the stability and current anarchic reality of the world today. The key to creating a global ci vil so ciety is the aid or social assist ance international institutions bring to differing cultures Harmony in the fighting terrorism from the ground up. The Iraq war has shown us that terrorism cannot be eliminated through more acts of violence. We need to get at the root of the problem international order. Needless to say, there is s till disharmony between international theory and diplomatic practices. What is often debated upon in the academic world is not necessarily translated into the practices of governments. The lack of transferability of the theories and understandings of the international realm has plagued this discipline. This struggle is also seen internally, for international relation is founded on the understanding that the Nation State is the ultimate source of power. International relations reflect the current
43 power g ame that is controlled by the state apparatus. T o willingly relinquished power seems almost impossible. The question remains, how can we instill global networks that can take power from the states when there is no willingness to give up power and promote change? One such remedy could be the empowerment of international institutions. According to Amitai Etzioni in From Empire to Community (2004) particular intern ational non governmental organizations (INGOs), transnational informal 94 International institutions can promote peace by encouraging negotiations and coordinating states. However, there are some obstacles standing in the wa y of this remedy. The first is that international institutions lack an external and permanent enforcement mechanism to ensure state compliance; essentially the state does not have to abide by their authority. The reason states do abide by requests made b y international institutions is primarily for self preservation. Another problem is that many international institutions are run by elites; therefore, they do not take a definably different stance than states do. Without a mix of interests being expresse d from around the globe where each actor has equal amounts of input, power will not be transferred from the elite to the people. There is also the issue of coercion and the demands that the power structure places on relationships between international inst itutions and states.
44 The Effects of Coercion on International Society: When Disagreement Devolves to Violence How does coercion effect communication in the international system? To begin with, e(ing) or restrain(ing) (an 95 Often when actors, states in particular, are communicating about their goals, they tend to use coercive actions. When coercion is used, there is a breakdown of communicative action as a whole. Th e powerful may coerce a weaker state to act in ways that may not benefit itself. When this scenario takes place, there is a breakdown in negotiations/argumentation, and a move toward strategic coercion. sed on two main objectives: 1) to study the forms of punishment needed to reverse or stop the action or the adversary; 2) ways in which the target constructs its view 96 This type of coercion leads one group to feel vulnerable and sets the stage for violent outcomes. According to James, one of two ways. On the one create a quasi Hobbesian state of nature, wherein groups confront each other in a security dilemma. On the other hand; the security logic can also prompt violence without the complete breakdown of t 97 The latter type of coercion would be found within the existing anarchic system When states are unable to effectively c ommunicate among each other they begin to confront the effects of the security dilemma (where a lack of understanding begets hostile
45 action). In Realist terms, because states cannot trust one another they are forced to use incentives, especially legal regulations, competitive incentives, and normative legitimacy James. 98 I will examine two examples of disagreements that took place in the international system that broke down into violence. I will demonstrate how each of these examples highlights the shortcomings of coercion. Kosovo The conflict in Kosovo is one example of coercion among international actors that failed and led to violence. Though coercive attempts were made by the UN and NATO to the former Yugoslavian President Milosevic international institutions were unable to bring consensus or understanding. As I mentioned earlier, James asserted that one of the breakdown s Hobbesian state of 99 J accurately describes the genesis of violence in the former Yugoslavia, where the death of Tito and the economic crises of the late 1980s weakened the coercive, peacekeeping capacity of 100 There was a synthesis of a multitude of different factors stemming from the end of WWII that impacted the strategic logics Milosevic used in dealing with the international community. The ethnic cleansing that took place in the Yugos lavian southern providence of Kosovo challenged the diplomatic strength in the international community. The UN and NATO attempted to end the purging of ethnic
46 Albanians in Kosovo through peaceful and diplomatic means in the beginning NATO used strategic argue that the coercion used did not go far enough to reach understanding among groups. that human 101 Here communicative action, which is rooted uncoerced dialogue, must contend with the difficult predicament of using force to secure a humanitarian or moral outcome. The conversation between the parties also did not put enough focus on the human cost that the conflict would bring, though for actors such as the UN this matter was addressed. Rather than focusing on the effects of the people, after the bombing, NATO seemed to want to intervene violently without comprehensive analysis of the lives that would be lost. NATO was going in to both save lives all the while aiding in the destruction of others. Both the Serbs and NATO incurred the casualties of the Kosovo War. This, however, did not resolve the above me ntioned predicament. Coercion, on the one hand, may have been used to achieve a moral goal, on the other hand, it also involved threats that dictated the dialogical process or forced each of the parties to agree to terms set forth by Madeleine Albright, the former US Secretary of State. In the end, it might be argued that NATO gained some legitimacy from the Kosovo War, by demonstrating the political will to stop gross violations of international law. By highlighting ethnic cleansing and human
47 rights v iolations, NATO appealed to the public at large to stop the atrocities that were taking place at the hands of Milosevic. This evidence after the fact allowed the actions of NATO to appear valid, however, we will see in the next case, the inability of the U.S. to provide evidence against the Hussein regime prompted the world to see the aggression of the U.S. illegitimate. The Iraq War In Habermas's writing, Letter to America in 2002 he discussed the legality of the U.S. led war in Iraq. He highlights the United States violation of international l aw when they invaded Iraq without the support of the UN. There is a tension between the role the U.S. played in WWII as the promoter of peace and supporter of international law and the war they waged in Iraq. The below quote highlights the movement on the part of the United States from a liberator that used legal means to enter into war (WWII), to an illegal war with Iraq. Not long ago, a generation of young Germans who were liberated from the Nazi regime by American soldiers developed admiration of the political ideals of a nation that soon became the driving force in founding the United Nations and in carrying out the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. As a consequence, classical international law was revolut ionized by limiting the sovereignty of nation states ... Should this same nation now brush aside the civilizing achievement of legally 102
48 The current war in Iraq is another example of the breakdo wn in diplomacy, communicative talks, and legitimate use of force in the international system. The U.S. declared war on Iraq in 2003 on the basis of preemptive war to protect the U.S. from ive war came to fruition through the Bush Doctrine. The Bush Doctrine refers to the set of foreign policies adopted by the President George W. Bush in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks. In an address to the United States Congress after the attack s, President Bush declared that the U.S. would "make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them," a statement that was followed by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. 103 Subsequently, the Bush Doctrine has come to be identified with a policy that permits preventive war against potential aggressors before they are capable of mounting attacks against the United States. The Bush Doctrine is a marked departure from the policies of deterrence that generally characteriz ed American foreign policy during the Cold War and brief period between the collapse of the Soviet Union and 9/11. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the first application of the doctrine of preemptive defense. Proponents of the war suggested that the worl d was safer without Saddam borders. However, critics countered that the war in Iraq created a new cadre of terrorists with a training ground battlefield, distracte and al Qaeda, and created the image of the U. S. as the very sort of rogue nation against
49 which it has lobbied, without regard for international law or the sentiments of the international community. The lead up to the war in the U.S. media was filled with rhetorical and coercive speech. Rather than using reason and rationality to disseminate information to the American public, the Bush administration used fear and threats to suppress dialogue The U.S. went be fore the United Nations with their evidence against the Iraqi regime possessing weapons of mass destruction, however, they were unable to gain support within the group. Though the U.S. government tried to use coercive measures to gain approval for additio nal intervention in Iraq, the majority of UN members did not support the US' call to arms. Throughout this whole process, the suppression of dialogue not only ignored the anti war protests worldwide, it also dictated the decision to go to war. As Amita i Etzioni asserts, other nations, and it generated unprecedented and coordinated worldwide demonstrations 104 There was a breakdown in understandi ng between the U.S., Iraq, and the UN. Each actor, especially the US media seemed unwilling to challenge and contest the Bush administration's strategic effort to suppress dialogue concerning the reasons to go to war (i.e., weapons of mass destruction). Moreover, by not cooperating
50 US government played over and over on the netwo rk news shows and eventually convinced the majority of U.S. citizens to go to war. In short, there was little if any discursive space for reaching mutual or consensual understanding on the most reasonable course of action. Instituting Moral Principles a nd Ethical Norms: The New Role of Transnational Institutions international institutions there is a possibility for a global network of justice to be established. Looking at the Eur opean Union, one can see that there is still the problem of the democratic deficit and nation state independence/resistance, and the challenge of citizen regardless decision makers attempting to secure their preferences must interact with domestic and transnational actors, as well as other states. Outcomes are a function of the relative power 105 According to Risse, transnational relations can be referred to as regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental or ganization 106 (which) permeate world politics in almost every issue 107 Rather than being an international system made up of only state actors, non state actors have not only come into play, but they hold legitimate power within the system. They are o ften the economic powerhouses and representatives of global societies that have often been
51 landscape of the international system and begs the question; how reliant are these actors on the state? By examining how new institutions require legitimacy to overcome their reliance on states we can see that there are difficult in moving past an unstable international order. anizations like the WTO or EU lack a monopoly on legitimate violence, and they remain normatively and politically problematic for many reasons. (However), they represent, in an apt ph r ase Habermas 108 Though organizations such as the United Nations, the International Criminal Court or NATO have legitimate power in the international system, they are still reliant on state cooperation/power to accomplish their goals. For instanc e, the UN may try to combat violence in a country that is going through civil strife by sending peace keeping troops; however, they do not have the power or authority to fully command these troops, for they are under the control of the Security Council. T he Security Council must approve each move that is made, which can be a very arduous and time consuming process. The UN does not have the flexibility or the authority to perform some of the necessary tasks needed to quell violence. That being said, there are two examples that show that there is evidence of a potential harmonization of order and argumentation. The EU and the ICC have moved beyond some of the restrictions that the anarchic order places upon international institutions by creating a space wh ere either common lifeworlds were forged was created 109 This was
52 accomplished not by going against the anarchic international order, but by working within the confines and shortcoming to provide a spa ce for critical argumentation that promoted the goals of a global civil society. The EU Public Sphere and Citizenship In response to the World Wars in the early 20 th century Richard Hermann argues that king and identities beyond the nation 110 They did this by establishing the European Union (EU) in an effort to bring stability to Europe and open a space where states could negotiate (via dialogue) their issues and problems related to the avoidance of war. By creating this transnational organization each state had to give up a bit of its sovereignty in order to do what is best arduous struggle. Though states wanted to increase security, they did not want to has expanded its powers and played a crucial role in promoting integration and over time promoting a system of governance tha Simon Collard Wexler. 111 The EU has created common set of norms and values around which expectations can converge. Still, EU states have not always proved willing to relinquish their power and sovereignty. After all, in the anarchic international system where states tend to maximize their interests, power is difficult to relinquish or sacrifice for further assurances of greater
53 regional security, even in transitional polity like the EU. Scholars such as Sim on Collard 112 If this is the case, then the EU was able to circumvent the effects o f anarchy that require states to consider survival against all else. How could states cooperate under the auspice of not only relinquishing power, but also looking out for the needs of other states when creating laws and economic policies? The EU states realized that they were no longer playing a zero sum game. They were losing power on the global stage, economic ally and politica l l y They realized that pooling their resources and giving up some of their sovereignty would lead to greater success. For th e EU, there was greater strength in numbers. Large states such as France and Germany did not prey on weaker states when the laws of the EU were established. Rather, they focused their efforts on bringing about changes and policies that heightened the pro gress of smaller states relative to their own gains. Even though some scholars may assert that the EU has overcome the fear and distrust associated with anarchy, the EU and its member states must still interact in the anarchic international system. They are not free from the constraints that anarchy places upon them. That being said, it was not only the member states that had to changes their ideas of themselves, citizens also had to change their concept of identity from belonging to a nation to belongi ng to a community of nations. National identity had to be suppressed in order to create a stronger whole. According to Collard Wexler, combined with individual
54 access to the ECJ, direct elections (which are unique as far as international institutions go) undermine the inter governmental paradigm of European politics and highlight the 113 This in effect has given the citizens more power under the EU than previously as national citi zens. They have a greater voice because those in power are not as preoccupied with the side effects of operating solely in an anarchic system. This community of nations is moving toward a global civil society. The EU, as opposed to so many critics, has b een able to move beyond the security dilemma by creating a global public sphere. This has diminished the probability of war or violent conflict among member nations because they have created a space where communicative action can take place. Within the E U, there are common values and norms that were established by international law. All member states must abide by these laws in order to create a society where all states are held reliable for their action, be it a large powerful state such as France, or a smaller relatively weaker state such as Estonia In short, the EU has been able to work towards a harmonious order based on moral persuasion and reasoned argumentation; however, the strategic interests of state can still detract from this process, as we have seen most recently with the debt crisis in Greece International Criminal Court Based in The Hague, The Netherlands, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is the first ever permanent international institution, with jurisdiction to prosecute individ uals
55 responsible for the most serious crimes of international concern: genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Important to note is that the ICC is independent of the U.N. The ICC is the first ever permanent, treaty based, international crimin al court established to promote the rule of law and ensure that the gravest international crimes do not go unpunished. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was established on July 17, 1998, when 120 States participating in the "United Nat ions Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court" adopted the Statute. The Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002. Anyone who commits any of the crimes under the Statute after this date will be li able for prosecution by the Court. Per 114 These standards may not be of the same cultural norms and values that they are being held accountable to, but they are the standards that international institutions have agreed upon as being inalienable to all citizens of the world. The ICC is designed to complement existing national judicial systems; however, the Court can exercise its jurisdiction if national court s are unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute such crimes, thus being a "court of last resort," leaving the primary responsibility to exercise jurisdiction over alleged criminals to individual states. One of the most important principles of the ICC is the complementarity principle, which
56 115 P ower and legitimization is taken away from the c ourt is in the enforcement of verdicts. The ICC can only render verdicts while the states are the actors that enforce the verdicts. The US and the Court have had what one could call a strained relationship. Though the U.S. supported the idea of an int ernational body that held the worst perpetrators responsible for their actions, they have not signed the treaty to become a member of the ICC. It is quite ironic since the US has supported international law throughout history. They did so in part because and early 21 st century claimed that the ICC was a threat to US sovereignty. The US sought certain exemptions in being held accountable for such things as military personnel during times of war an d/or conflict. In the early twenty first century, t hough the US requests of exemptions were denied President Clinton signed the treaty, all the while knowing that Congress would not likely ratify the treaty. The US Congress went so far as to pass anti I CC legislation in 2002 stating that servicemen would not be prosecuted in the ICC. In 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA), which contained a number of provisions, including prohibitions on the U.S. providing m ilitary aid to countries which had ratified the treaty establishing the court (exceptions granted), and permitting the President to authorize military force to free any U.S. military personnel held by the court, leading opponents to dub it "The Hague Invas ion Act." The act was later modified to permit U.S. cooperation with the ICC when dealing with U.S. enemies.
57 According to realist perspectives, it would not be in the best interest of states to participate in international organizations such as the ICC, because the intentions of other states are never known. Many states see the ICC as an invasion of their sovereignty even the complementarity principle by which th e ICC can only act if systems of national 116 Realists would say that the ICC is doomed to failure due in part to the bias with which rulings by the ICC are enforced. Since the ICC can only render verdicts, it depends on states to enforce them, and then, only those states that have ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court can enforce its decisions. Another line of international relations thought, Liberalism says that states are not necessarily the unitary actors in the world. States follow a system of regimes (laws, norms, customs, etc) to maintain balance in the world and the ICC is one of those regimes. States Parties are obliged to fully cooperate with the Court in its investigations and prosecution of crimes under the Statute. To this end, States Parties should designate appropriate channels of communication with the Court, ensure that there are procedures available under their national law for all fo rms of cooperation and consultation with the Court whenever there are problems that could impede or prevent the execution of the Court's request for cooperation. The jurisdiction of the ICC will be complementary to national courts, which means that the Co urt will only act when countries themselves are unable or unwilling to investigate or prosecute.
58 The ICC's mission of promoting moral accountability in the international realm, calls attention the role that its legitimacy plays in promoting global order, in particular, the deterrent effect and the fostering of responsibility. Moral accountability refers to the innate responsibility of state leaders to protect their citizens from serious harm. a great victory for the ethos of accountability, making those who abuse governmental power face the possibility of being held criminally accountable for their misdeeds as measured by accepted international standards relating to human rights, crimes against humanity, and 117 These leaps forward in creating a global court that administers law on global norms and values gives one insight into what may be to come on a larger scale. Though it remains a young court, the ICC offers a discursive space for promoting the principles of international criminal law. By establishing a permanent venue within which judges, prosecutors, and other officials can assess and debate the merits of evidence (provided mainly by NGOs) of an internation al investigation the ICC reflects an important context of the growing link between discourse and (human) security (deterrence). In short, though the ICC is not able to overcome the problem posed by state sovereignty (state cooperation), it has been able to create a promising discursive space for promoting a legitimate international order.
59 Conclusion: Towards a Global Civil Society As stated earlier, the application of communicative action theory to internation al politics underscore the importance of examining the effects of reasoned argumentation in institutional decision making processes. The emerging trend toward a global civil society is best understood in terms of these institutional contexts: namely intern ational law and diplomacy Communicative action has shown to uphold the components of international relations that assert communication should be conducted for the betterment of the community as a whole, rather than for the aims of power politics. Less ons that can be learned from the earlier case studies of Kosovo and the Iraq War are important examples of why we need to create a global public sphere. The global public sphere represents the space between the global community and states. Perhaps if dur ing the dialogue prior to the Kosovo conflict, states were able to use Intersubjectivity rather than preconceived prejudices and biases, the talk would have been more transparent. Milosevic could have perhaps seen that the ultimate goal of the internation al system was tension then he might have been more cooperative. Furthermore, if Saddam Hussein would have allowed for international law to run its course and allowed fo r greater transparency to show that he did not have weapons of mass destruction, then the US might not have declared war. I do not want to spend my time speculating about possibilities of the past, however, by examining the break in communication or lack of
60 honest negotiation, we can see that disorder can be linked to the uncritical use of coercion, and that reasoned argumentation is needed to build trust and to reach mutual consensus on international issues. Over the course of this thesis, my aim was to cosmopolitan vision is inclusive of the state. The state continues to plays a role in the international system, just not the sol e powerful role that now exists. I will examine system. I have outlined how these core tenets of communicative action theory (lifeworld, legitimacy, and validity cla ims) can be used in the international system to bring together actors that seem to have little in common and give them the tools to communicate on a level that upholds reason in argumentation. By looking at the impact that communicative action has on the international system I have shown how actors can work together to argue their own position. The utilization of communicative action in international relations can build a global civil society that postures reason and ration above power. It is also possib le for communicative action to exist within the existing anarchic system as a cosmopolitan society emerges. This allows for communicative rationality and consensus to be utilized immediately in order to bring peaceful outcomes to international conflicts.
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65 End Notes 1 Burchill, 6. 2 Burchill, 140. 3 Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach. Revenge and Future Shock (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2004), 39. 4 Ferguson, 41. 5 Ferguson, 41. 6 R obert Keohane, ed. Neorealism and Its Critics (New York, Columbia University Press, 1986), 208. 7 Contemporary Empirical Political Theory ed. Kristen Renwic k Monroe (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1997), 147. 8 Germain, 7. 9 Steven Roach, ed., Critical Theory and International Relations: A Reader (New York, Taylor and Francis Group, 2008), 197. 10 Risse, 2000, 1. 11 Risse, 2000, 2. 12 Risse, 2000, 4. 13 Risse, 2000, 9. 14 Risse, 2000, 4. 15 Public Spheres. American Political Science Review, 99, no. 3 (August 2005): 401 402. 16 cal paradise empirically lost? Arguing 17 Deitelhoff, 173. 18 Andrew Linklater, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2002. 19 Linklater, 2001, 254. 20 Linklater, 1999, 481. 21 Linklater, 1997, 337. 22 Linklater, 199 7, 323. 23 Linklater, 2002, 334 335. 24 Linklater, 2002, 335. 25 Linklater, 2002, 334 335. 26 Linklater, 1999, 480. 27 Linklater, 1999, 481. 28 Habermas, 1984, VII 131. 29 Habermas, 1984, VII, 119. 30 Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, eds, Communicative Action: Essays on Jrgen (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1991): 251.
66 31 Honneth, 262. 32 Habermas, 1984, VII, 131. 33 Habermas, 1984, VII, 131. 34 Habermas, VII, 1984, 56. 35 Roach, 2008, 197. 36 Claude, 368. 37 Habermas, 1996, 319. 38 Haber mas, VI, 1984, x. 39 Jrgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action VII, tr. Thomas McCarthy (Boston, Beacon Press, 1984), 56. 40 Habermas, VII, 1984, 148. 41 Burchill, 172. 42 International Organization 53, no. 2 (Spring, 1999): 379. 43 43 Political Theory 29, no. 5 (Oct., 2001): 652. 44 International Organi zation 20, no. 3 (Summer, 1966): 369. 45 Colonial Institutions, Post Colonial States, and Economic Political Research Quarterly 53, no. 1 (Mar., 2000): 11. 46 Hohendahl, 1985, p. 21 47 Jrgen Habermas, B etween Facts and Norms tr. William Rehg, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 26. 48 Habermas, 1996, 134. 49 Scheuerman, 141 142. 50 Habermas, 1996, 83. 51 Political Theory 31, no. 3 (200 3) 360. 52 Jrgen Habermas, The Divided West, ed. & tr. Ciaran Cronin, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004), 120. 53 American Political Science Review 99, no. 3 (August, 2005), 403. 54 International Organizations 54, no. 1 (Winter, 2000): 9. 55 Habermas, 1984, VI 17. 56 Habermas, 1984, VI, 99. 57 Habermas, 1984, VI, 101. 58 Ferguson, 154 59 Habermas, 1984, VI, 101. 60 James, 163. 61 Jrgen Habermas, VI, 1984, 86.
67 62 James, 161 63 Habermas, 1984, VI, 18. 64 James, 159. 65 James, 160 66 Group European Journal of P olitical Theory 2, no. 2 (April 2003): 159. 67 Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jrgen Habermas (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1981), 23. 68 James, 160. 69 James, 164. 70 Honneth, 141. 71 Risse, 2000, 9. 72 James, 161. 73 Jervis, eds. International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues (New York, Pearson Education, Inc., 2007) 74 Jervi s, eds. International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues (New York, Pearson Education, 2007) 75 Waltz, 2007. 76 Waltz, 2007 77 Waltz, 2007 78 Burchill, 16. 79 Keohane 80 Keohane, 196. 81 Burchill, 205. 82 Political Theory 36, no. 1 (February, 2008): 143, 83 Burchill, 12. 84 Colonial Institutions, Post Colonial States, and Economic Political Research Quarterly 53, no. 1 (Mar., 2000): 9. 85 Ferguson, 109. 86 Mitzen, 2005, 407. 87 Mitzen, 2005, 401 417. 88 Mitzen, 2005, 407. 89 Risse, 2000, 14. 90 Risse, 2000, 11. 91 Risse, 2000, 20. 92 Society for International Development 46, no 1 (March 2003): 27. 93 Richard A. Falk, (New York: Routledge, 2004), 113. 94 Etzioni, 153.
68 95 The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus, 1993, 268. 96 Steven C. Roach, Cultural Autonomy, Minority Rights an d Globalization, (Burlington, Ashgate Publishing, 2005), 85. 97 James, 166. 98 Bringing Transnational Relations Back In, Thomas Risse, ed. (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1995), 278. 99 James, 166. 100 James, 166. 101 Roach, 2005, 91. 102 The Nation, 16 December 2002, 2. 103 President George W. Bush, Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation, September 11, 2001. 104 Amitai Etzioni, From Empire to Community, (New York, Palgrave, 2004), 98. 105 Risse, 1995, 259. 106 transnational relations by encompassing both trans societal and transgovernmental 107 Riss e, 1995, 3. 108 Scheuerman, 138. 109 Mitzen, 405. 110 Richard K. Hermann et al, Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU (Landham, Rownam and Littlefield Publishing, 2004), 1. 111 Simon Collard European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3 (2006): 407. 112 Collard Wexler, 398. 113 Collard Wexler, 409 114 Falk, 130. 115 Roach, 2005, 33. 116 Falk, 129. 117 Falk, 30.
About the Author Ki mberly Weaver was born in Walnut Cr eek Ohio. She received her Bachelor of Science in International Business from the University of Akron and her M aster of A rts in Political Science from the University of South Florida