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The gulf of mexico red snapper individual fishing quota program :
b the effects on the fishing industry and potential outlook
h [electronic resource] /
by Nathan Miller.
[Tampa, Fla] :
University of South Florida,
Title from PDF of title page.
Document formatted into pages; contains X pages.
Thesis (MS)--University of South Florida, 2010.
Includes bibliographical references.
Text (Electronic thesis) in PDF format.
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ABSTRACT: In January 2007, the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery took a step toward sustainability and began management under an individual fishing quota (IFQ) system. The hope is that direct ownership stakes by fishers brings more direct involvement on behalf of the boat owners and fishermen as well as more responsible and sustainable fishing practices on depressed fish populations. The research was conducted in order to study the welfare of local fishing communities as well as the effects on the red snapper fishery itself. Traditional fisheries and economic data were analyzed. In addition a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) of the Florida Gulf Coast communities involved in the red snapper fishery was performed to compare to the analysis of fishing communities prepared by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). Finally, online and phone surveys of fishermen involved in the red snapper fishery were performed to gauge their responses to the change in management. The study reveals a strong correlation between the DEA analysis of fishing communities affected and the analysis performed by NMFS, and reinforces DEA as a method of determining involvement in a fishery. Additionally, the thesis indicates the red snapper IFQ has performed as expected in some areas by its supporters an average gulf-wide ex-vessel price per pound increase of 10% in just three years; elimination of the rush to fish due to guaranteed quota; and a shift in fleet composition as the number of share owners owning less than 2.00% have dwindled, and the number of shareholders possessing greater than 2.00% of the quota has increased gulf-wide by 50%. However, in other areas such as effort reduction and bycatch rates, the IFQ appears to have mixed results. A reported decline in effort is likely attributable to a reduction in the overall gulf-wide red snapper quota between 2007 and 2008 rather than the IFQ, and even NMFS doubts the bycatch data that are being reported by fishermen. Most importantly, current IFQ shareholders were surveyed via phone and internet revealing not only an overall disapproval by most fishers of the IFQ design process, but also effects contrary to those publicized by IFQ supporters, and a general distrust in fisheries management.
Advisor: Kamal Alsharif, Ph.D.
Individual fishing quota
Data envelopment analysis
x Environmental Science & Policy
t USF Electronic Theses and Dissertations.
The Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper Individual Fishing Quota Program: The Effects on the Fishing Industry and Potential Outlook by Nathan Miller A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science Department of Geography College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida Major Professor: Kamal Alsharif, Ph.D. Pratyusha Basu Ph.D. Mark Hafen, Ph.D. Date of Approval: August 27, 2010 Keywords: fishery management, individual fishing quota, data envelopment analysis fishing communities, bycatch Copyright 2010, Nathan Miller
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank all my thesis committee members, Dr. Kamal Alsharif, Ph.D. Dr. Pratyush Basu Ph.D. and Dr. Mark Hafen, Ph.D. for their numerous contributions to the formation of this research. Without their continued support and guidance this effort would not have been possible. Dr. Alsharif in particular devote d many hours and much energy to aid in this work and it should be viewed as a reflection of his dedication to solid research as well as his student s academic development. I must also thank the National Marine Fisheries Service, in particular Andy Strelc heck. Mr. Strelcheck was open and forthcoming and a tremendous help throughout the process of writing this thesis, answering any questions asked of him and guiding me to the proper channels when he was unable to help. Finally, I must thank the fishermen involved in the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery. The main goal of this thesis was to determine how the red snapper IFQ affected the average fisherman, and the only way to truly determine that is to go directly to those fishermen. Each and every one I contacted was gracious, helpful, and eager to voice an opinion in the hope that they could contribute to this effort to examine not just a fishery, but their future.
i Table of Contents List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... iii List of Figures .................................................................................................................... iv Abstract ................................................................................................................................v Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................................................1 Chapter 2: Literature Review ...............................................................................................7 2.1: History of Red Snapper in the Gulf of Mexico and Prior Management Efforts ............................................................................................................7 2.2: Growth of Individual Fishing Quota Systems and Specific Examples .............8 2.3: Assessments of Fishing Communities and Improving Assessment Techniques ...................................................................................................10 Chapter 3: Research Design ...............................................................................................13 Chapter 4: Methodology ....................................................................................................17 4.1: Fishery Analysis .............................................................................................17 4.2: Community Analysis ......................................................................................18 4.3: Surveys ............................................................................................................25 Chapter 5: Results ..............................................................................................................27 5.1 Fishery Analysis ...............................................................................................27 5.1.1 Red Snapper Population Estimates ...................................................27 5.1.2 Red Snapper Catch Rates and Fishing Effort ...................................29 5.1.3 Bycatch Rates and Size of Caught Individuals .................................32 5.1.4 Red Snapper Market Prices ...............................................................37 5.2 Community Analysis .......................................................................................39 5.2.1 IFQ Shares and Allocation ................................................................39 5.2.2 Data Envelopment Analysis ..............................................................41 188.8.131.52 Dependence ........................................................................43 184.108.40.206 Engagement ........................................................................45 5.3 Survey Responses ............................................................................................48 5.3.1 Online Surveys ..................................................................................51 5.3.2 Phone Surveys ...................................................................................59
ii Chapter 6: Discussion ........................................................................................................71 6.1 Fishery Analysis ...............................................................................................71 6.1.1 Red Snapper Populat ion Estimates ...................................................71 6.1.2 Red Snapper Catch Rates and Fishing Effort ...................................72 6.1.3 Bycatch Rates and Size of Caught Individuals .................................72 6.1.4 Red Snapper Market Prices ...............................................................74 6.2 Community Analysis .......................................................................................75 6.2.1 IFQ Shares and Allocation ................................................................75 6.2.2 Data Envelopment Ana lysis ..............................................................76 6.7 Survey Responses ............................................................................................79 Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations ..................................................................87 Chapter 8: Works Cited .....................................................................................................93 Appendices .........................................................................................................................97 Appendix A: DEA Results .....................................................................................98 Appendix B: Survey Questions and Results ........................................................104
iii List of Tables Table 1: Florida Gulf Coast Communities Affected by Management Decisions ..............19 Table 2: Nominal Commercial Fishing Effort on Red Snapper in Florida Waters IFQ Years ...............................................................................................................31 Table 3: Self reported Yearly Commercial Red Snapper Discards ...................................34 Table 4: Observer reported Y early Commercial Red Snapper Discards ...........................35 Table 5: Nominal Price per Pound of Red Snapper Landings ...........................................37 Table 6: Number of Shareholders ......................................................................................40 Table 7: DEA Communities, Inputs, and Outputs .............................................................47 Table A1: CCROutput Oriented for Dependence Score and Slack ...............................98 Table A2: BCCOutput Oriented for Dependence Score and Slack ...............................99 Table A3: BCCOutput Oriented for Dependence RTS ...............................................100 Table A4: CCROutput Oriented for Engagement Score and Slack .............................101 Table A5: BCCOutput Oriented for Engagement Score and Slack .............................102 Table A6: BCCOutput Oriented for Engagement RTS ...............................................103 Table B1: Quota Amounts of Survey Participants in Eastern Gulf/Peninsula .................110 Table B2: Quota Amounts of Survey Participants in Northern Gulf/Panhandle .............111
iv List of Figures Figure 1: Self reported Total Discards in Number of Fish, 19932008 .............................35 Figure 2: Nominal Price per Pound of Red Snapper Landings ..........................................38 Figure 3: Opinion of IFQ Systems Prior to This Experience .............................................61 Figure 4: Opi nion of IFQ Systems S ince Implementation of the Red Snapper IFQ .........62 Figure 5: Satisfaction with Amount of Input Sought During the Design Process. ............63 Figure 6: Opinions on Equal Representation by A ll Stakeholders ....................................64 Figure 7: Opinions on Whether the IFQ Helps to Preserve the Small Owner Operated Fishing Interests in the Fishery ..................................................65 Figure 8: Opinions on Whether the Red Snapper IFQ Helps to Preserve the Interests of the Local Fishing Dependent Communities in the Fishery ................65 Figure 9: Opinions on the Accuracy of Numbers Posted in the Annual IFQ Prog ram Report ..............................................................................................67 Figure 10: Overall Feeling about the Design Process of the Red S napper IFQ ................69 Figure 11: Overall Feeling a bout the Implementation of the Red Snapper IFQ ................69
v The Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper Individual Fishing Quota Program: The Effects on Fishermen and Potential Outlook Nathan Miller ABSTRACT In January 2007, the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery took a step toward sustainability and began management under an individual fishing quota (IFQ) system. The hope is that direct owne rship stakes by fishers brings more direct involvement on behalf of the boat owners and fishermen as well as more responsible and sustainable fishing practices on depressed fish populations. The research was conducted in order to study the welfare of local fishing communities as well as the effects on the red snapper fishery itself. Tr aditional fisheries and economic data were analyzed In addition a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) of the Florida Gulf Coast communities involved in the red snapper fishery was performed to compare to the analysis of fishing communities prepared by the N ational M arine F isheries S ervice (NMFS) Finally, online and phone surveys of fishermen involved in the red snapper fishery were performed to gauge their responses to the change in management. The study reveals a strong correlation between the DEA analysis of fishing communities affected and the analysis performed by NMFS, and reinforces DEA as a method of determining involvement in a fishery. Additionally, the thesis indica tes the
vi red snapper IFQ has performed as expected in some areas by its supporters an average gulf wid e ex vessel price per pound increase of 10% in just three years; elimination of the rush to fish due to guaranteed quota; and a shift in fleet composition as the number of share owners owning less than 2.00 % have dwindled, and the number of shareholders possessing greater than 2.0 0% of the quota has increased gulf wide by 50% However, in other areas such as effort reductio n and bycatch rates, the IFQ appears to have mixed results. A reported decline in effort is likely attributable to a reduction in the overall gulf wide red snapper quota between 2007 and 2008 rather than the IFQ, and even NMFS doubts the bycatch data that are being reported by fishermen. Most importantly, current IFQ shareholders were surveyed via phone and internet reveal ing not only an overall disapproval by most fishers of the IFQ design process, but also effects contrary to those publicized by IFQ supporters, and a general distrust in fisheries management
1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION The Gulf of Mexico is home to a diverse field of economically and socially important fisheries. In Florida alone in 2008, the Gulf of Mexico seafood industry as a whole provided 108,695 jobs and $5.7 billion in sales (NMFS, 2010). A key component of that success, particularly in Florida, is r ed snapper ( Lutjanus campechanus) As of 2008, red snapper w as in the top ten of total commercial landings revenue in the state in addition to holding the secondhighest average annual price for a key commercial species in the Gulf of Mexico (NMFS, 2010). Red snapper has established a place of historical importanc e in the state, with a history of Florida fishermen harvesting it commercially since the 18 50s (Garber, Tringali, & Stuck, 2004) Their catches have been sold in markets as far away as New York since the 1870s, and fishing communities throughout Florida have grown and thrived because of fish such as red snapper (Garber, Tringali, & Stuck, 2004) Y et management efforts for the red snapper fishery did not begin in earnest until November of 1984 when the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council (GMFMC) established the Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan (FMP) (Garber, Tringali, & Stuck, 2004). Managed primarily by setting a fleet wide total allowable catch (TAC) and adjusting the seasons accordingly, the red snapper population dwindled and year after yea r the fleet saw worsening economic conditions. From a high of 14 million pounds annually in the mid 1960s, the yearly take in 1990 was down to less than 3 million pounds. Beginning in the 1980s chain reactions began occurring as the GMFMC set
2 TAC quota s that were correspondingly caught within the first few months of the year. Shutting down the season so early caused economic and social turmoil, requiring emergency reopening of the seasons to alleviate the strain on the fishermen, which in turn led to th e fleet exceeding the initial TAC (Keithly Jr., 2001). This cycle of open and closed seasons and the resulting rush to catch fish led to seasonal market gluts which in turn led to continually declining exvessel values (the price paid to the fishermen for the fish) of red snapper. By the 1990s, despite establishing a moratorium on issuing new fishing permits as well as a tiered system of trip limits the gold rush, or derby style of fishing commonly found in open access fisheries continued. As a result, in 1996 an Individual Fishing Quota program (IFQ), was instituted and scheduled to begin in April of that year. An IFQ is a method of fishery management in which ownership of specific, guaranteed amounts of the allotted fleet wide quota are spread amo ng individual users. However, that same year in reauthorizing the Fishery Conservation and Management Act, now referred to as the Magnuson Stevens Act (MSA), Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska introduced a rider to the act completely restricting development of any new IFQs in the entire United States until more research was conducted. Thus the red snapper fishery continued operating as it had been I n addition to the race that fishing had become and the ensuing problems it created, also at issue was the over capacity of the fishing fleet. There were more boats than necessary to harvest red snapper in an effi cient manner (Keithly Jr, 2001). Finally, in 2006 the moratorium on IFQs was dropped with the renewal of the MSA The following year the red snappe r fishery took its next step toward sustainability and began management under an IFQ
3 system. Benefits from the reduced derby conditions are anticipated to be safer fishing conditions, reduced discards, and protracted seasons resulting in fresher product a nd higher ex vessel prices. H owever the primary goal is to reduce overcapacity in the commercial fishery and to eliminate, to the extent possible, the problems associated with derby fishing, in order to assist the Council in achieving optimum yield (GMF MC, 2006). These benefits would not be exclusive to the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery. They have in fact been demonstrated in numerous IFQ programs throughout the world, including in some of the United States most important fisheries F or many rese archers and managers these have become the de facto benchmarks by which to measure the success of a program. A remarkable reduction in the number of vessels in the Bering Sea Aleutian Islands crab fisheries has been attributed to the introduction of an IF Q system (Abbott, Garber Yonts, & Wilen, 2009), and Dinneford, et al, (1999) cites IFQs as having the same effect in the Alaskan h alibut and sablefish fisheries. Sigler and Lunsford (2001) also cited a 1.8 times more efficient fleet in the Alaskan sablefi sh fishery after the introduction of the IFQ program, while vessel captains in both the Alaskan halibut and sablefish industries reported improved safety as one of the top benefits after the first year of an IFQ program (Knapp, & Hull, 1996). Weninger and Waters (2003) predicted that if a system such as an IFQ would have been in place in 1993 it would have eliminated market gluts in the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery and produced a 49% increase in dockside prices. Finally, Branch (2009) lists numerous fisheries as continually exceeding their TAC before establishment of an IFQ system, and then experiencing little if any overruns afterwards.
4 Yet while individual fishing quotas have been lauded by many as the way to fill the responsibility gap missing i n openaccess fishery situations first detailed by Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955), they have always faced criticism. The thought of privatizing what has traditionally been a free and open resource often reaffirms small fishermens distrust of governmental management systems and elicits fears of a permanent loss of culture as well as livelihood (Burton, 2003). The definition of privatization in the Merriam Webster dictionary refers to a change from public to private control or ownership (Merriam Webster, 2009) and it is easily argued that the phrasing held for exclusive use by a person (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006) in the MSA definition of an IFQ denotes private control if not also ownership. In addition, access to the fishery is no longer fre e and raising the principal for the initial investment may be hard if not impossible for small scale fishers (McCay, 1995). Therefore, although IFQs may be put into place to address various issues in a fishery, the pivotal issue surrounding IFQs revolves around the initial distribution of the quota and subsequent redistribution through the market that develops. The MagnusonStevens Act contains National Standards which must be adhered to when designing a fishery management plan. National Standard 8 m aintains that conservation and management measures shall take into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing communities by utilizing the best economic and social data available to science in order to minimize adverse economic impacts on such communities and aid in their sustained participation in the fishery (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006). While environmental effects will become apparent in a relatively short time, and the economic effects on the fishermen who were allotted quota can b e quantified relatively
5 easily, the compounding social and economic effects on local fishing communities are vastly harder to measure. The National Marine Fisheries Service acknowledges that current data and literature on Gulf Coast fishing communities is extremely lacking despite mandates by both the MSA and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to conduct a social impact analysis (SIA). The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) concludes that, it is not possible to fully analyze the impacts the red snapper IFQ program would have on fishing communities and that there is a great need for indepth, ethnographic study of the different fishing sectors or subcultures ( GMFMC, 2006). NMFS also calls for socio economic data to be collected on a continuing basis, and in particular may include occupational satisfaction as well as fishermens attitudes and perceptions of management, and views of their personal future in fishing ( GMFMC, 2006). While the EIS calls for dedicated studies of the welfare of local fishing communities and traditional smallscale fishers to be part of future Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Plans ( GMFMC, 2006), certainty of the social effects of any plan can only be discerned by actually examining fishing communities after the progr am has been implemented. Therefore, this thesis is an analysis of the effects of the new red snapper IFQ on the health of the Florida Gulf Coast red snapper fleet and respective communities as well as the effects on the red snapper fishery itself. In per forming this investigation the goal was to analyze the effects the IFQ has had on red snapper fishermen and communities by 1) examining the resource itself utilizing common measures found in fisheries research, 2) determining the dependence of Florida Gulf Coast communities on the fishery, and 3) incorporating actual attitudes and perceptions
6 of fishermen involved in the red snapper fishery. The ultimate objective was to explore the impact of NMFS regulations and address the lack of socio economic data th at is so vitally necessary in managing the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery.
7 CHAPTER 2: LITER A TURE REVIEW This research obviously owes much to the data collection efforts of the National Marine Fisheries Service and the resultant literature detailing that data, such as the annual IFQ program reports. However, just as important to this effort were the academic endeavors embarked upon by previous researchers. Highlighting these attempts are articles detailing the history of red sna pper in the Gulf of Mexico and prior efforts to manage it the growth of individual fishing quota systems and examinations of specific IFQ examples, and the assessments of fishing communities and attempts to improve on assessment techniques. 2.1 History of Red Snapper in the Gulf of Mexico and Prior Manage ment Efforts Any discussion of the red snapper fishery in the Gulf of Mexico must begin with a basic background story, and Garber, et al (2004) was useful in its presentation of the history of the red snapper fishery in Florida, as well as the goals and subsequent effects of management efforts to date Keithly, Jr. (2001) then takes the next step with an in depth look at the allocation process of IFQ when this type of system was initially proposed and planned for the red snapper fishery in the mid 1990s. To understand what an IFQ system is and why it became the favored option for the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery one must again go back to the beginning of the story, to a period when economics and science began to merge.
8 2.2 G rowth of Individual Fishing Quota Systems and S pecific Examples Any indepth research into IFQ systems must begin with H. Scott Gordons (1954) s eminal effort in the examination and understanding of fishing economics. Gordon demonstrated why open access fisheries often perform poorly in economic terms, and how fish price and fishing cost relate to fishing pressure, attributing this to the fact tha t fish stocks are common property. Anthony Scott (1955) expands on Gordons theory, arguing that if given sole ownership of a stock, the stockholder would have incentive to maintain the stock at an economically optimal level and to keep fishing costs to a minimum. This argument became the focal piece of future efforts to privatize fisheries and turn to rights based quota systems. The economics of fishing, from employment to the market price of fish, would become the dominant force behind the transition of many fisheries to individual quota systems. Buck (1995) details the changes that occur once an IFQ program is established. According to Buck, consolidation will begin to occur as fishers with small amounts of quota begin to exit the fishery as their pr ofit margin becomes correspondingly too small to operate. Abbott, et al ( 2009) examines the Bering Sea Aleutian Island (BSAI) crab fishery quantitatively for the effects that an IFQ system had on employ ment statistics in the fishery. The authors find the re is no single perfect method for evaluating a fisheries management system, and ultimately judgment is based on how managers value t he individual factors involved. They do, however conclude that in the BSAI crab fishery the compensation for fishermen se emed to rise overall after implementing an IFQ program, along with numerous additional benefits.
9 Dinneford, et al (1999) cites the same effect in the Alaskan halibut and sablefish fisheries with establishment of IFQs. Closer to the subject of this particular research, before the red snapper IFQ program began Weninger and Waters (2003) examined the e conomic benefits of management reform in the Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery and they correctly predicted improved exvessel prices with the advent of the program McCay (1995) however, questions the economic benefits touted by proponents of IFQ programs, stating the programs make it difficult if not impossible for entry into the fishery by new fishers with little startup capital. Other effects of IFQs h ave been documented and are examined in the literature as well. Knapp and Hull (1996) report the findings of a mail based survey examining the effects of the Alaskan halibut and sablef ish IFQ on the fish processors. Among their findings was that captains involved in the program reported improved safety with the IFQ. Sigler and Lunsford (2001) also studied the Alaskan Sablefish I FQ system demonstrating that IFQ management among other things increased fishery catch, decreased harvest of immature fish, and increased catching efficiency 1.8 times with the change from an openaccess to an IFQ fishery. They also showed that the improved catching efficiency of the IFQ fishery reduced variable catch costs and that the decreased harvest of immature fish improved the chance that individual fish will reproduce a t least once. Branch (2009) highlights numerous fisheries which continually exceeded their TAC until they established an IFQ system. Alternatively, numerous authors have published research contradicting va rious benefits touted by IFQ proponents. Two articles in particular, Harley, et al (2001) and Jennings and Polunin (1996), both highlight research which brings into doubt one of the arguments upon which IFQs are billed as a
10 superior management tool the linear relationship posed by others between catch per unit effort (CPUE) and fish abundance. If CPUE doesnt have a direct and strong influence on the abundance of fish, then the claim of IFQs helping to rebuild fish populations through improved effort be comes a moot point. 2.3 Assessments of Fishing Communities and Improving Assessment Techniques It must also always be kept in mind that f isheries management decisions have far reaching consequences beyond their effects on fish populations. Research effo rts have been devoted to focusing on fishing communities and how they are affected by these decisions Burton (2003) looks at various methods of regulation ranging from traditional taboos to modern gear restrictions. He argues for community management in order to combat the alienation fishers may feel when the resource is managed from the outside. Clay and Olson (2008) call for more research into how communities are affected by management decisions as well as better coordination between all parties inv olved. They also suggest that multiple local governing management systems might be better from the community perspective than one over arching system. Ingles and Sepez (2007) highlight the diverse array of methods utilized in studying and managing the fi sheries of the United States, and describe a need for more anthropological contributions to the field. Jacob, et al (2002) attempt to address this need by developing a protocol for identifying fishing dependent communities and identified five commercially dependent fishing communities in Florida Panama City, Apalachicola, Panacea, Steinhatchee, and Ochopee/Everglades City Jepson and Jacob (2007) not only call for more detailed research into fishing communities, but take their prior research further and present a
11 ranking method of vulnerability to management decisions which is subsequently utilized by the GMFMC in the environmental impact statement prepared for the red snapper IFQ program. Sepez, et al (2008) detail a different classificatio n method which utilized dependence and engagement factors applied to data envelopment analysis (DEA) to determine the vulnerability of North Pacific communities to fishery management decisions. This article provides the method of implementing DEA to fishing communities which was subsequently utilized for this research, but it was Charnes, et al (1978) who established DEA with the CCR model. In other fisheries related functions, DEA has been used to evaluate fleet capacity by Dupont, et al, (2002) and mea sure vessel efficiency by Walden (2006). Data envelopment analysis does have its drawbacks however. A s pointed out by Stolp (1990) the lack of contribution by inefficient decisionmaking units to the shape of the efficiency frontier might be viewed as a loss of information. Pedraja Chaparro, et al (1999) also point out that the results are sensitive to the many factors involved with observing data and choosing the right DEA model The academic literature surrounding individual fishing quotas to this point ha s been built primarily from third party perspectives and most analyze numbers with the express purpose of validating IFQs in modern fishery management techniques. A select few have focused on specific cases, but only to the extent of analyzing eff ects of IFQs on fish populations and markets. Concerning red snapper, statistical data exist concerning the population and market trends H owever the IFQ program is too new to have undergone any extensive analysis. This research utilizes data conducted on other IFQ programs as well as some of the methods implemented in other limited social research to
12 measure the effects of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ program in an attempt to add to the collective knowledge as well as possibly challenge current p reconceptions of IFQs.
13 C HAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN With Amendment 26 to the Gulf of Mexico Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan the GMFMC established an IFQ program in the red snapper fishery and sought to reduce overcapacity and various other problems associated with the open access system that was in place. However, like every solution to a problem it has its detractors and must be analyzed on many levels to determine its success and future potential. Any program of this magnitude deserves a proper examination of its effects, and t his thesis attempts to pr ovide that analysis. It offers an indepth comparison between the results of the first two years of the red snapper IFQ and the 14 years under the limitedentry, class permit system which began in 1993. The red snapper population itself is under examina tion through analysis of compiled fishing effort data. This work shows the effects of the IFQ on the market prices that fishermen are receiving for their effort as well as the potential implications in the popularity of red snapper due to its changed avai lability. A large portion of this research is dedicated to the real life effects of the IFQ on the actual livelihood of the industry. The social landscape of the red snapper fishery, both before and after the IFQ, is examined in order to highlight its ef fects, as well as which communities stand to be affected most by this change in management. Finally, there will be actual opinions of the IFQs effectiveness from the shareholders involved.
14 The research seeks to answer t hree main questions, which are as follows: (1) What are the effects on the red snapper fishery? Does the red snapper fishery show signs of improvement or decline under the IFQ system as compared to previous management techniques? The necessary tools for a critical analysis of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ begin with statistical data overview from years before and after the initiation of the IFQ system. Th ose data include red snapper fishing effort and catch rates, size of caught individuals, bycatch rates, market response to the system, and opinions from scientists, managers, fishermen, and processors. Catch and fishing effort data ha ve already been processed from the years before the IFQ as well as the first two years under the new system and w ere obtained from the National Marine Fisheries Service. Does the red snapper market show signs of improvement/decline/stagnation under the IFQ system? One of the most glaring issues with the pre IFQ red snapper fishery was the stagnation and drop in market price of red snapper due to periods of market glut resulting from the old derbystyle of fishing. Proponents of IFQs point to guaranteed quota rights as a way to promote fishing when it is the safest and most profitable for harvesters as well as sustainable for the fish population. This in turn should lead to a red snapper harvest that is more reliably spread out during the year, raising the average p rice and providing stability, as opposed to the decline of red snapper market prices when fishermen would race against each other and unleash a glut of fish onto the market. To this end, landings and market price data attained from NMFS were ascertained f or
15 monthly fluctuations throughout the entire year which can indicate the steadiness of red snapper supply and in turn the steadiness of income to the fishermen. Th ese same data w ere examined from the current and previous years to compare the possible cha nges in pre IFQ and post IFQ incomes. ( 2) What are t he effects on the red snapper fleet ? What are the effects of the red snapper IFQ on the composition of the red snapper fleet? The composition of a fishing fleet can change drastically under different management systems, from the size of the boats to the gear types utilized and even the communities involved. An analysis of the initial allocation of IFQ shares, the changes in shar e ownership over the first two years of the program, and the resultant transformation of the red snapper fleet is a good indicator of the effectiveness of the IFQ policies and the direction of t he fishing industry as a whole. Utilization of data envelopme nt analysis (DEA) will provide a unique examination of the communities involved in the fishery, indicating which communities stand to be most affected by management changes. ( 3) What is the perception of the red snapper IFQ among the fishing communities an d does the IFQ system meet/exceed/fail the expectations of all parties involved (harvesters, processors, managers)? T he opinions of the scientists, fishers, and processors who deal with the red snapper fishery every day and depend on it to make a living a re important to the success of any management system Survey responses of actual fishermen participating in the fishery are utilized to reveal not only their general feelings towards the IFQ but any
16 modifications they feel might be necessary or beneficial In addition, hard data such as the actual price of the red snapper quota shares is a good indicator of the fishing communitys confidence or skepticism in the IFQ system and therefore will help determine the value and health of the fishery.
17 CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 4.1 Fishery Analysis This thesis seeks to evaluate the Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ program in Florida by analyzing its performance in achieving the stated goals and anticipated benefits of the program. To examine effects on the red snapper population, projected stock data developed from models are presented, along with mortality trends. Fishing effort data is presented, in the form of vessel and trip counts, days away, and average landings per trip. In the evalua tion of bycatch rates, fisherydependent and fisheryindependent discard estimates are considered alongside average lengths of kept and discarded fish. The yearly average ex vessel price per pound of red snapper from 1993 through 2008 is scrutinized in an examination of red snapper market prices before and after the I FQ program. As the National Marine Fisheries Service is the natural reporting agency for the fishery in focus, and in fact is the sole possessor of much of the data necessary for this resear ch, a comprehensive examination of the data compiled by NMFS provided sufficient information for the purposes of this paper. The annual red snapper IFQ program reports published by NMFS contained a great deal of the data necessary for this analysis, and a dditional data was accessed freely from the NMFS online database and from NMFS through Freedom of Information Act requests.
18 4.2 Community Analysis Coastal communities rely on fishery resources to varying degrees, and changes in management techniques have a corresponding varying effect on the communities. This thesis is an examination of the red snapper IFQ programs effects on the fishing industry. To begin this assessment IFQ share owners are categorized by state and share percentage, and changes in sha re price are discussed. Again, data obtained from NMFS will be utilized. I t is also necessary to include an assessment of many Florida G ulf coast communities dependence and engagement in the red snapper fishery. For the purpose of this research, depen dence refers to a communitys activity level in a fishery, and engagement refers to a communitys activity level in a fishery compared to the overall activity in that fishery. Research into Gulf coast fishing communities is scant H owever in developing the Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan and IFQ program the GMFMC and NMFS were obligated to investigate which communities might possibly be impacted by their decisions. They relied on a protocol developed by Jacob, et al. (2002) to determine which communi ties were dependent on fishing, and a vulnerability index developed by Kitner et al (2002) to determine how vulnerable the communities were to management decisions. Jacob et al. (2002) developed their community assessment method around central place theo ry, utilizing fishing permit data and employment data from the census, accumulated at the zip code level. They designated five distinct communities in Florida as commercially fishing dependent: Steinhatchee, Apalachicola, Panama City,
19 Ochope e/Everglades C ity, and Panacea. The version employed by the GMFMC and NMFS used census data at the zip code level only when the community was not a census designated place, in which case no community specific employ ment information was available. The vulnerability index designed by Kitner et al. (2002) gauges employment opportunities, the poverty rate, and average wage/salary for a community against that of the corresponding county. The resulting list amassed by the GMFMC, utilizing both these methods and seen in Table 1, includes 35 communities in Florida, and assembles them by three possible scores on the index: not vulnerable, somewhat vulnerable, and very vulnerable. Table 1: Florida Gulf coast communities affected by management decisions. (source: Gulf of Mexi co Fishery Management Council, 2004) Apalachicola 1 Ft. Walton Beach 1 Naples 5 Big Pine Key 4 Gulf Breeze 5 New Port Richey 1 Bokeelia Homosassa 5 Panama City 1 Carrabelle 1 Horseshoe Beach 0 Panama City Beach 3 Cedar Key 3 Inglis 1 Pensacola 1 Clearwater 1 Islamorada 4 Port St. Joseph 0 Cortez 1 Key Largo 4 St. Marks 1 Crystal River 5 Key West 4 St. Petersburg Destin 5 Madeira Beach 2 Tampa East Point 3 Marathon 1 Tarpon Springs 4 Everglades City 4 Marco Island 5 Yankeetown 3 Ft. Myers Beach 5 Matlacha Not Vulnerable (Index Scores from 3 to 5). Somewhat vulnerable (Index scores from 1 t o 2) Very vulnerable(Index scores from 5 to 2)
20 This thesis utilizes Data Envelopment Analysis ( DEA) to determine community involvement in the fishing industry and subsequent vulnerability to management decisions. DEA was developed by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) as a nonparametric approach to estimating efficiency and productivity of decision making units (DMUs). This approach (CCR model) can handle multiple inputs and outputs, and the efficiency of DMUs is defined as the ratio of the weighted sums of the outputs to the weighted sums of the inputs. In DEA the excess inputs and outputs are defined as slacks, and efficiency for a DMU is attained if any increase in inputs or decrease in outputs serves only to worsen the level of other inputs or outputs. T he basic CCR model as expressed by Emrouznejad (1995) is : Where M = The number of inputs m = 1,2,...,M ; m = Indices of input N = The number of outputs n = 1,2,...,N ; n = Indices of output J = The number of observed units j=1,2,...,J ; j = Indices of unit jm = Amount of input m of unit j jn = Amount of output n of unit j = ( 1,..., M) = General vector of input = ( 1,..., N) = General vector of output j = ( j1,..., jM) = Vector of inputs of unit j j = ( j1,..., jN) = Vector of outputs of unit j The original CCR model automatically assumes constant retur ns to scale, while other models, such as th e BCC model developed by Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984),
21 have been developed to accom modate varying returns to scale. The output oriented BCC model as conveyed by Emrouznejad (1995) and implemented within can be written as: Where M = The number of inputs m = 1,2,...,M ; m = Indices of input N = The number of outputs n = 1,2,...,N ; n = Indices of output J = The number of observed units j=1,2,...,J ; j = Indices of unit jm = Amount of input m of unit j jn = Amount of output n of unit j = ( 1,..., M) = General vector of input = ( 1,..., N) = General vector of output j = ( j1,..., jM) = Vector of inputs of unit j j = ( j1,..., jN) = Vector of outputs of unit j DEA has been applied in a wide variety of scenarios, including the analysis of capacity ( Dupont et al 2002 ) and vessel efficiency (Walden, 2006) in fisheries. More importantly, DEA permits flexibility in the weights to allow for maximization of the ratio of the sums of the weighted outputs to the weighted inputs. However, as has been noted in articles focusing on DEA as a modeling tool, any DEA model used is likely to have deficiencies to some degree (Pedraja Chaparro, et al 1999). Perhaps the most noteworthy drawback to DEA for our purposes is its vulner ability to significant error when outliers are present. F or example the model might ass ign so low a weight to an output that it essentially removes it from the analysis. If enough outputs are given low weights, a DMU might then be deemed efficient based on a few strong outputs rather than all of the
22 outputs as a whole, skewing the overall pict ure. To gauge just how influential a potential outlier might be on the DEA results a simple tally of how often that DMU appears in the reference set of inefficient DMUs (PedrajaChaparro, et al 1999) Additionally, the results revealed by DEA are obvious ly dictated by the accuracy of the data provided, the number of observations, and model specification among other factors. However, as Pedraja Chaparro, et al (1990) continues, this same scrutiny is present with any quantitative modeling method, not just DEA. The benefit of DEA in non traditional situations is that instead of estimating the average relationship across inputs and outputs it presents a frontier composed of the most efficient DMUs. While the inefficient DMUs do not contribute to the shape of the frontier which can be viewed as a loss of information on returns to scale among other things, these drawbacks are less important when utilizing DEA simply for relative efficiency, as is the case here (Stolp, 1990). Sepez, et al (2008) prev iously introduced DEA into the assessment of fishing communities involved in West Coast and North Pacific fisheries and this research attempts to employ that form of analysis on the Florida Gulf Coast communities involved in the red snapper fis hery. As a nonparametric method of examining various aspec ts of DMUs, DEA models indicate those DMUs (in this case Florida communities ) most heavily involved with the red snapper fishery without requiring presumptions about the importance of any of the indicators (outputs) used in the model. In the output oriented DEA models employed here each community (DMU) studied uses its population (the input) to generate outputs (e.g. fish landed, fish delivered) in the red snapper fishery. Entering the input and various out puts provides the efficiency frontier to be generated, in this case the communities most dependent upon and engaged in the fishery. This also
23 allows for comparison of communities that are less efficient, i.e. less involved in the fishery, to the front ier as a way of gauging the potential impact of management decisions on those communities. The relatively small sample size employed allowed for a comprehensive yet manageable analysis via DEA leading to a comparison of these results with the communities previously determined to be commercially dependent. The intent is to combine the goals of t he previous research, providing not only an analysis of what communities might be affected by the IFQ but to what degree. In addition it will verify the methods by which the GMFMC is determining it s fishing management practices. This research will utiliz e both the CCR model, detailed above, and the BCC model (Banker, et al 1984). The output oriented dependence analysis will consist of one input, the population of the community from the U.S. Census 2000. The outputs for this model are as follows: pounds of snapper landed by a community (determined by the community in which the fisherman was registered ) value in dollars of that snapper landed number of IFQ shareholders in the community in 2008 (determined by the physical address listed on the account) num ber of registered IFQ lan ding locations in the community the number of registered reef fish dealers with IFQ endorsements in the community
24 In t he output oriented engagement analysis, each community is being analyzed to determine how active it is in the red snapper fishery compared to the overall activity in the fishery. Therefore, each community will have their input normalized to a value of one and the outputs it produces will be converted to a percentage of the total outputs produced by the fishery. T he outputs for this model will be as follows: percentage of snapper poundage landed by a community (determined by the community in which the fisherman was registered ) percentage of IFQ shareholders in the community in 2008 (determined by the physical addr ess listed on the account) percentage of registered IFQ lan ding locations in the community percentage of registered reef fish dealers with IFQ endorsements in the community. As this study is only concerned with studying Florida fishing communities, the percentages were determined by ranking the communities against only other communities in Florida participating in each output category. The most troubling issue involved with the DEA analysis performed herein was missing and misleading data ut ilized in som e of the outputs. Because of confidentiality concerns some of the data released by NMFS for the purposes of this thesis was left clustered in community groups, while other data for certain communities was not released at all. It is obviously preferabl e to have all outputs for each DMU present, and the standard practice is to eliminate from the analysis DMUs which contain missing outputs or input data. However, for this study that would have meant excluding thirteen
25 of the twentytwo total DMUs, and the desire to include as many communities as possible led to the decision to eliminate the incomplete output categories from the analysis rather than the DMUs. Two outputs were eliminated from the dependence analysis (the pounds of snapper offloaded in each community as determined by dealer location, and the dollar value of those pounds offloaded), and one output was eliminated from the engagement analysis (the percentage of pounds offloaded in each community). Complete results of the DEA analysis can be fo und in Appendix A. 4.3 Surveys Throughout fisheries literature, numerous authors have concluded that community research performed in the past by nonsocial scientists who had no actual contact with the community in question was entirely inadequate, and in turn called for more detailed research into the effects of management decisions on fishing communities (Jepson & Jacob, 2007; Clay & Olsen, 2008; Ingles & Sepez, 2007). Indeed, the EIS prepared in advance of the red snapper IFQ calls for research into th e attitudes and perceptions concerning management among affected communities (GMFMC, 2006). To this end, the analysis presented here includes a detailed survey performed amongst the fishermen and fishery scientists. Two separate surveys were designed, one for the managerial stakeholders (e.g. fisheries scientists) and another for the stakeholders in the actual red snapper fishery (e.g. fishermen). The format for both was a multiple response, multiple choice and short answer questionnaire to allow for as much latitude in answers while avoiding as much ambiguity as possible. Due to the large geographical area covered in this research, as well as the strong possibility that some fishermen were
26 unlikely to receive the notice of the online survey or were una ble to access it, it was determined that the most effective and efficient manner of gauging the opinions of these participants would be a twofold survey system. This thesis made use of the university provided webbased survey system, Survey.acomp, for those people who have regular access to the internet, while a second survey attempt utilized the same questionnaire via telephone interviews. A list of all IFQ shareholders, addresses included, is available on the NMFS website and it was decided that the mo st valid data and reliable measure of opinion for a purposive sampling method such as this could be obtained only through an attempt to survey all of them. Question format varied from multiple choice to short and long answer, and ranged over topics such a s: previous exposure and opinions on IFQ systems; opinions on how the red snapper IFQ was developed and implemented; how the IFQ has affected their fishing habits; and opinions of how well the IFQ is performing in relation to its stated objectives. Each survey was submitted to, and met the approval of, the University of South Florida Institutional Review Board. Participants were assured that any information they divulged would remain confidential at all times and in no way be used to identify them specifi cally. In addition they were reminded they could refrain from answering any question they did not want to and could end the questioning at any point. Copies of both surveys used, along with the accompanying responses are included in A ppendix B
27 C HAPTER 5: RESULTS 5.1 Fishery Analysis 5.1.1 R ed s napper p opulation e stimates The 2008 Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper Individual Fishing Quota Annual Report (2009) asserts that the red snapper population has rebounded at least somewhat from its previously overfished sta te along the west Florida shelf; h owever not much more is mentioned in the annual report. To find information on the status of the red snapper population one must look to the most recent Southeast Data, Assessment, and Review (SEDAR) stock assessment report of red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico published December 3, 2009. The updated stock assessment presented in 2009 utilized the CATCHEM_AD model as the base model for the assessment, as did the original SEDAR 7. For this algorithm the ass essment workshop employed data on red snapper populations from 1872 to 2008, although recent data is given more credence because of the unreliability of historical catch data. The Gulf of Mexico was split into two regions (east and west, divided by the Mi ssissippi River) with each containing five designated fisheries (handline, longline, recreational, closed season discards and shrimp bycatch) each associated with landings and/or discards. Separating the gulf into two regions for mo deling purposes was important a s the eastern and western populations are assumed to spawn and recruit independent ly of each other (Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council [GMFMC], 2009).
28 An attempt was made to stay consistent with the previous SEDAR by providing a continuity model incorporating data through 2008 that is comparable to the one adopted before. This continuity model indicated little change in the spawning stock of red snapper and a potential decreasing trend in age 0 recruitment. Also, recent decreases in fishin g mortality were predicted as well as a snapper population dominated by young fish (< 4 years old). However, relevant information pertaining to the biology and population of red snapper has evolved since the last update; therefore three alternative models were also advanced. In summary, all of the alternative models show improvement in fishing mortality and number of spawners in the western subunit since the last assessment. On the other hand the estimates for the east subunit show variances, even indicating slight declines, due to contradictory indicators in fisheryindependent and fisherydependent data. A major problem is that there is very little fishery independent data. Regardless, fishery independent indicators point towards an increasing trend i n fish abundance in both regions. For all models the 2009 projected yield or red snapper was revised to 6.82 lbs. and the 2010 quota was established at 5 million lbs (GMFMC, 2009). Because this projected increase in abundance appears to indicate an end t o overfishing, in 2010 NMFS released a rule change rais ing the TAC, thereby adjusting both commercial and recreational quotas ( Fisheries of the Caribbean 2010). Additionally, similar projections from all models into the year 2032 indicate lower producti vity in the eastern sub unit of the gulf, and that fishery will most likely continue to be executed mainly on smaller, younger fish. Meanwhile, the west sub unit will consistently become an overall older, more highly fecund, age class of snapper (GMFMC, 2 009).
29 5.1.2 Red s napper c atch r ates and f ishing e ffort. Fisheries managers constantly seek sound, detailed data about the catch that fishermen bring in and the effort that was put into it. While this obviously represents what is being taken out of the ocean, it can also present a good portrait of what was in it to begin with. In order to effectively and sustainably manage a fishery administrators must assess the stock, and while there is no shortage of complicated ways of doing this one simple method is to evaluate the amount of fish caught and the effort it took to catch it. Landings data can fluctuate for many reasons therefore it must be gauged against how much effort was expended on its behalf in order to get a true picture of the target stock. Catch per unit effort, commonly referred to as CPUE, is the simple ratio of landings divided by the fishery effort. An effective fishing effort utilizing a standardized measure such as the rate of fish capture is an attempt to account for variability in t he efficiency of different vessels and captains, while nominal fishing effort is a simple measure of the resources spent on fishing (such as days or hooks fished). When both catch and CPUE decline the usual assumption by managers is overfishing, and the usual rationale is overcapitalization of the fishing fleet. Generally in this ratio, as more effort is applied to a fishery the catch declines, and obviously the CPUE correspondingly declines. Overcapitalization can happen through the participation of too many boats as well as through advances in technology that allow boats to fish more efficiently. To lessen the pressure on the stock certain fishing technology may be regulated or forbidden, but the most common measure taken is a fleet reduction through vessel buyback programs or license limitations.
30 The Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper fishery operated under an open access system until declining stocks led managers to implement a license program. Initially established as a temporary license, holders were allo wed to keep 2,000 pounds of red snapper per trip, with nonlicense holders allowed to keep only 200 pounds per trip. By 1998 two class limits (200 and 2,000 pounds per trip) were officially established and commercial fishers had to hold one of these licen ses in order to retain red snapper. However, these licenselimitation measures were merely a stop gap measure taken after Congress issued a moratorium on new IFQ programs in 1996, and when the moratorium was lifted in 2006 the long anticipat ed IFQ program was established. One of the stated primary objectives of the newly established program was reducing overcapitalization of the fleet. In constructing the assessment of the red snapper stock for the updated SEDAR in 2009, scientists utilized data from the NMFS logbook program. As mentioned in the previous section they divided the Gulf of Mexico into eastern and western halves at the Mississippi River and devised abundance indices for both. Indices of abundance are relative measures of the size of a populat ion or subpopulation, by way of a weighted average catch rate. Since this data has been treated it can only be realistically compared to data treated in the same way. Data from 1990 2006 comprised the indices developed for the SEDAR update. Scientists felt that under the IFQ program data might have been affected enough by potentially altered fishing behavior and catchability to warrant excluding information from 2007 and 2008 in their analysis (GMFMC, 2009) They argue that this issue also prevents dir ect comparison of pre IFQ and post IFQ CPUEs These concerns are valid and have been voiced before in studies of IFQs in New Zealand fisheries (Lindner, et al,
31 1992). CPUE results utilizing nominal effort data for Florida from the first two years of the IFQ program are listed in Table 2. It must be noted that days away rather than days fished has been used because this is how it is reported in the NMFS annual program reports. Also, it can be argued that days away from port, even when not actually fishing, is still effort expended towards catching fish because these days are used to travel to fishing grounds, etc. In fact, the 2007 MSA (Sec. 3(16)(D)) cites the definition of fishing as any operations at sea i n support of, or in preparation for, harvesting or the attempted harvesting of fish. The numbers presented below in Table 2 indicate a decline in CPUE in average landings per trip as well as average landings per days away. Also present in the fishery is a decline in landings from 2007 to 2008. However, this decline in landings is likely attributable to a reduction in the overall gulf wide red snapper quota between 2007 and 2008, from 2,986,712 lbs to 2,297,466 lbs (gutted weight). The percentage of the total gulf wide quota caught actually increased from 96.0% in 2007 to 97.4% in 2008. Table 2: Nominal Commercial Fishing Effort on Red Snapper in Florida Waters IFQ Years. (source: NMFS, 2009) Years Vessels* Trips Days Away Avg. Landings/Trip Landings (l bs) 2007 219 1623 6405 692 1,122,379 2008 216 1501 5901 614 921,927 *Based upon the vessel reporting the majority of its landings in Florida waters Finally, though effort data between the two periods was not compared side byside, NMFS did compare simple landings data reported in the online IFQ system with other available data and believes that reported landings to the IFQ system may be underreported or even nonreported, therefore leading to an underestimation of total
32 landings. This fact, taken together with the mounting scrutiny among scientists of the linear correlation between CPUE and the abundance of fish stocks (Harley, Myers, & Dunn, 2001; Je nnings & Polunin, 1996), leads to hesitancy in drawing any steadfast conclusions about the state of the red snapper stock or fleet efforts. What can be concluded is that the primary goal of reducing overcapitalization of the fleet has not yet been realized. The first two years of the program only witnessed a reduction of three vessels delivering to the state of Florida, and gulf wide only a nine vessel fleet reduction, despite a 14.6% decrease in the number of IFQ shareholders. 5.1.3 Bycatch r ates and s ize of c aught i ndividuals The updated SEDAR assessment of red snapper commercial bycatch utilized data from any trip that reported discards between January 1, 2002 and December 31, 2006. This was prior to the IFQ program, so each year is com prised of multiple seasons open and closed to fishing. Therefore, discard rates as well as the size of the snapper discarded, would be expected to vary between the open and closed seasons. With the advent of the IFQ program fishers with IFQ quota had a continuous open season for the year as long as they held unused quota and fishers without quota had no open season. Because of these changes different discard calculations were used for the two time periods. Data was first split between the eastern and w estern Gulf of Mexico, then subsequently divided by vertical line and longline gear types. For years prior to 2007 separate calculations were made for the open and closed seasons and the following factors were examined for any impact they made have had on discard rates: year, area
33 fished, days at sea, season (Jan Apr, MayAu g, etc.), red snapper permit (no permit, 200 pounds 2,000 pounds ), and number of crew (GMFMC, 2009). Resulting data was then stratified by those factors having a significant impact, a mean discard rate was calculated for each stratum, and this was consequently applied to the reported fishing effort data from the years prior to 2002 to calculate discard rates for those years. Finally, total stratum effort consisting of vertical line ho ok hours and longline hooks fished was determined from logbook data and applied to each stratum mean discard rate to find total discards for each stratum. It is worthwhile to note that the SEDAR panel believed their estimates may have been affected by und erreporting of discards by the vessels. According to reported data, the percentage of trips reporting no discards has increased over time, with the eastern region rising from 10% to over 20% among vertical line fishers and from slightly over 25% to as high as 45% among longliners during the ye ars of 2002 2008 (GMFMC, 2009). Additionally, official NOAA reef fish observer data does not corroborate no discard levels this high, although the Gulf of Mexico observer program for commercial longline and vertical line vessels didnt begin until Ju ly 2006. Funding doesnt allow for extensive sampling via the observer program, consequently in 2006 only 32 trips total onboard 26 different vessels were observed. In 2007 that number rose to 78 trips total onboard 56 vessels, but after funding cuts the numbers dropped in 2008 to 23 trips total onboard 21 vess els (many chosen nonrandomly). Discard calculations utilizing fisher reported data (refer to Table 3 and Figure 1) were lower than results utilizing the observer data (refer to Table 4) again ind icating that under reported discard data by fishers may have affected discard calculations of those data (GMFMC, 2009).
34 Table 3: Self reported Yearly C ommercial R ed S napper D iscards. Number of f ish. Eastern Region of the Gulf of Mexico ( source: GMFMC, 2009). vertical line vessel longline vessel Year Open C losed Total Year O pen C losed Total 1993 46,533 188,400 234,933 1993 1,281 19,590 20,871 1994 45,122 295,649 340,771 1994 1,511 23,027 24,538 1995 34,448 288,620 323,068 1995 981 19,226 20,207 1996 67,658 407,907 475,565 1996 1,469 19,885 21,354 1997 60,221 306,885 367,106 1997 1,413 25,105 26,518 1998 80,215 322,611 402,826 1998 1,115 23,281 24,396 1999 90,206 396,085 486,291 1999 1,475 22,473 23,948 2000 126,271 214,221 340,492 2000 1,376 17,264 18,640 2001 114,197 204,485 318,682 2001 1,194 16,697 17,891 2002 166,918 141,832 308,750 2002 1,429 9,027 10,456 2003 149,519 343,558 493,077 2003 1,356 5,014 6,370 2004 70,602 164,189 234,791 2004 1,708 28,166 29,874 2005 131,854 114,879 246,733 2005 1,439 9,383 10,822 2006 101,010 82,891 183,901 2006 1,879 5,909 7,788 MEAN 91,770 248,015 339,785 MEAN 1,402 17,432 18,834 IFQ 2007 223,141 2007 33,942 2008 274,198 2008 31,918 MEAN 223,141 MEAN 33,942
35 Figure 1: Self reported Total Discards in Number of Fish, 19932008. (source: GMFMC, 2009) Table 4: Observer reported Yearly C ommercial R ed S napper D iscards. Number of f ish. Eastern Region of the Gulf of Mexico (source: GMFMC, 2009) Vertical line vessel Longline vessel 2006 Open 173,085 Closed 275,375 Total 448,460 Open 705 Closed 8,714 Total 9,419 IFQ 2007 612,538 34,180 2008 349,613 4,120 On May 2, 2007 the minimum size limit for red snapper was reduced from 15 inches to 13 inches. Prior to this change the ratio of landed snapper to discarded snapper gulf wide was 1.13. After the new size rule took place the ratio of landed to discarded 0 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000 Vertical Longline
36 snapper increased to 3 4 fish. The 15 inch size limit saw 52.7% of caught red snapper retained, while the 13 inch size limit is being credited with helping to raise that percentage to 74.6% for the remainder of 2007 after the change and to 79.3% for the 2008 year. However, the size limit change coincides closely with the implementation of the IFQ, which obviously changes the efforts of fishers targeting red snapper (NMFS, 2009). This change in fishing effort is alluded to in the number of observed discards in 2008. The vast majority of landings (88%) were less than or equal to 20 inches in total length, and half (51%) were between 13 and 16 inches total length. So the drop in the minimum size limit to 13 inches obviously attributed to a significant portion of the catches, allowing those fishers with quota to expend less effort by throwing back less and keeping more of what they catch. Yet 59%of the observed discards were greater than 13 inches. Some of these might be attributable to cases of highgrading (throwing back an acceptable fish for a b igger one), but more likely the fishermen simply lacked IFQ allocation to land these fish. It is also important to note that the west coast of Florida is still plagued with the issue of more red snapper being discarded than landed. In 2008, while observe r trips on Floridas west coast accounted for only 4.8% of the total landings observed they accounted for 30.6% of the total discards observed. Specifically, in the ten months prior to the drop in minimum size, the landing to discard ratio along the Flori da panhandle to Mississippi area and along the Florida peninsula w as 1.55 and 1.22 respectively. After the 13 inch size limit took effect the ratio for the Florida panhandle jumped over five fold (8.14) from May 2, 2007 to the end of that year before dropping to 4.43 in 2008. Along
37 the peninsula portion of Floridas west coast however, the ratio dropped to 0.08 for the remainder of 2007 after the change and rose slightly to 0.49 for 2008 (NMFS, 2009). 5.1.4 Red s napper m arket p rices. One of the primary goals of the red snapper IFQ program is to raise the value of red snapper exvessel prices and the preliminary results indicate that effort has been successful so far. Per the 2008 annual IFQ program report, after increasing 5.4% annual ly from 19992005 the Gulf wide nominal exvessel price for red snapper increased 12% in 2007 alone. The second year of the program saw another rise in exvessel prices and after adjusting for inflation in just three years the average Gulf wide ex vessel price per pound has increased 10%. In 2008 m anagers also reported prices ranging from $1.00 to $5.25 a pound, explaining that the vast fluctuations in prices could be due to dealers factoring in various expenses (fuel, bait, etc.) in the price they repor t. (NMFS, 2009) Table 5: Nominal Price p er P ound of R ed S napper L andings Florida w est c oast ( source: NOAA, 2007) Year Avg. Price per Pound Year Avg. Price per Pound 1993 2.31 2001 2.31 1994 2.30 2002 2.35 1995 2.24 2003 2.50 1996 2.14 2004 2.68 1997 2.23 2005 2.81 1998 2.28 5006 3.05 1999 2.21 2007 3.34 2000 2.32 2008 3.49
38 When broken down by state, the average price per pound varies widely and Florida led the Gulf States in yearly average in both 2007 and 2008. Utilizing the landings and price data from the NMFS Fisheries Statistics Division online database, the nominal annual average price per pound of red snapper landed on the west coast of Florida averaged $2.24 between 1993 and 1999, $2.57 between 2000 and 2006, and $3.42 in 20072008 (Table 5) That average price in 20072008 is a 53% increase from the 19931999 average price and a 33% increase from the 20002006 average price. Additionally, according to this data the average yearly fluctuation in price per pound between the years 1993 and 2006 was $0.65, while in the first two years of the IFQ program the average yearly fl uctuation was smaller, at $0.40 ( NOAA, 2007 ) Figure 2: Nominal Price p er P ound of R ed S napper L andings Florida w est c oast. ( source: NOAA, 2007) This data must be accompanied by the qualification that while landings data in annual IFQ program reports is listed in pounds gutted weight, landings data from the NMFS online database uses a standard conversion factor and reports data in whole $2.00 $2.20 $2.40 $2.60 $2.80 $3.00 $3.20 $3.40 $3.60 $3.80 $4.001993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008Avg. Price per pound (nominal dollars) Avg. Price per pound (nominal dollars)
39 weight. Als o, species specific data provided by NMFS may be purposely misleading in certain cases to protect confidentiality. Therefore the results of calculations provided here in Table 5 and illustrated in Figure 2 may differ slightly from numbers presented by NMF S however all results appear to match closely with NMFS published data and draw the same conclusions. 5.2 Community Analysis 5.2.1 IFQ s hares and allocation In the beginning of the IFQ program a grand total of 546 individuals qualified for initial share s. An additional seventynine individuals who did not hold a commercial Gulf reef fish permit were also issued shares at this time. By the end of the first year there had been a 10.4% reduction in quota owners. As of the publishing of the 2008 Annual report there had been a total reduction in shareholders of 14.6%. A list of Gulf wide and Florida shareholders categorized by percentages has been provided by NMFS (Table 6), however due to confidentiality reasons shareholders with 2.0000% 2.9999% and 3.0000% 6.0203% have been grouped together. Gulf wide and in Florida alone, all share percentage categories below 2.0000% have seen reductions in size, while the category of shareholders possessing greater than 2.0 000% of the quota has increased in Florida by 1 person and Gulf wide by 50%, though that is admittedly a small jump from just 8 to 12 people ( NMFS 2009). For its part, Florida accounted for 44.0% of the total IFQ shares at the start of the IFQ program, the largest out of the Gulf States; by the end of 2008 that percentage had dropped slightly to 42.3% ( NMFS, 2009). However, while Florida only slightly edges
40 Texas in total share percentage amount ( 42.3% compared to 35.8%) it clearly accounts for the majority of individual shareholders (69%). As seen in Table 6, during the first two years of the IFQ program Florida accounts for the overwhelming majority of shareholders holding less than 0.1000% (over 70% in each category) but accounts for only 34% of those holding 0.1000% 1.9999% of the total share and 50% of thos e holding 2.0000% 6.0203%. The average price paid per share increased from $18.75 to $22.70 between 2007 and 2008, however the number of entities reporting a price paid f or shares was only 68% in 2008. The National Marine Fisheries Service itself brings into doubt the accuracy of this price data considering the lackluster reporting effort, and has as one of its program goals improvement in this area of data collection ( NMFS 2009) Table 6: Number of Shareholders. Gulf wide vs. Flor ida. Grouped by p ercentages. (source: NMFS, 2009) Share Percentage Jan. 1, 2007 Dec. 31, 2007 Dec. 31, 2008 % in FL as of Dec. 31, 2008 Gulf FL Gulf FL Gulf FL 0.0001% 0.0049% 159 133 150 125 146 120 82% 0.00 50 % 0.0099 % 91 72 76 64 68 60 88% 0.0100% 0.0999% 184 127 158 113 147 104 71% 0.1000% 1.9999% 104 36 94 34 93 32 34% 2.0000% 6.0203% 8 5 11 5 12 6 50% Total 546 373 489 341 466 322 69%
41 5.2.2 Data e nvelopment analysis In order to determine the involvement of Florida Gulf Coast communities in the red snapper fishery, and consequently the potential extent of fishery related decisions on the communities, this study made use of DEA. This effort was modeled after an attempt by Sepez, et al (2008) to rank communities involved in the West Coast and North Pacific fisheries, in which outputs based on landings and permits data were measured in order to determine the dependence and engagement of each community in a fishery. For t he purposes of this thesis, two separate output oriented DEA models CCR and BCC, were designed and run utilizing DEA Solver software. Table 7 at the end of section 5.6 list the twenty two communities analyzed for this study and their respective inputs and outputs for both dependence and engagement tests. Dependence is hereafter defined for these purposes as the activity lev el of a fishery in a community. As such, all of a communitys outputs (i.e. how many residents are involved in the red snapper fishery and how much they catch and deliver) are measured against each communitys population, the lone input. Engagement for these purposes is defined as a com munitys involvement in the fishery compared to the Gulf wide activity level in the fishery. This translated to using the same outputs as the dependence model, altered to reflect them as a percentage of the red snapper fishery as a whole. Again, only one input is used, although for the engagement model each communitys input is normalized to one since each community is examined in relation to the fishery as a whole.
42 For this research data was obtained from NMFS via request and online resources, speci fically: pounds of snapper landed in each Florida community, as classified by where the shareholder is registered (output 1) value in dollar s of snapper landed (output 2) pounds offloaded in ea ch Florida community (output 3) value in dollars of snapper of floaded (output 4) number of IFQ shareholders in the community (output 5) number of registered landing locations in ea ch Florida community (output 6) number of registered reef fish dealers with IFQ endorsements in each Florida community (output 7). Whil e the outputs chosen do not cover all the indirect ways in which communities might benefit from fishing, such as marinas or bait shops, they should be a reliable measure of the direct and immediate financial impacts that the red snapper fishery would have. The data released by NMFS via Freedom of Information Act Request contained the grouping of certain communities to retain confidentiality, and unfortunately the landings and offloading data were not presented in similar groupings. The offloading data was assembled into nine groups, while the landing data was separated into 23 groups. In addition, both data groupings contained one catch all group labeled other communities . Due to the disparate community groups in which the landing and offloading data wer e provided, outputs 3 and 4 contained data for less than half of the DMUs. Therefore, the decision was made to eliminate these two outputs from the DEA models.
43 In total, twenty nine Florida Gulf coast communities were analyzed for their involvement in the red snapper fishery, grouped together into tw entytwo decision making units. These twenty two DMUs were analyzed using one input and five outputs in the dependence model, and one input and four outputs in the engagement model. The data was run first utilizing the CCR model, assuming a constant returns to scale, and then again using the BCC DEA model for comparison, assuming a variable returns to scale. 220.127.116.11 Dependence. In the CCR Dependence model (see column 2 in Table 7) three communities were deemed efficient, or in this case, the most dependent: Steinhatchee, Apalachicola, and Carrabelle. Yankeetown and Panacea round out the top five dependent communities, and all five contain populations of less than three thousand people. Carrabelle and Apa lachicola both exhibit high poundage of red snapper landed and correspondingly high dollar values of landed red snapper, while Steinhatchee lacks high poundage landed but does contain the third highest number of landing locations. Comparing these top thre e to the index used by the GMFMC, Carrabelle and Apalachicola are listed as somewhat vulnerable to management decisions while Steinhatchee is not listed at all. Panama City and the Destin/Ft. Walton Beach/Santa Rosa Beach community group are the two most populous groups listed in the top ten most dependent communities, with populations exceeding thirty thousand people. Panama City, ranked sixth by the CCR model, and Destin/Ft. Walton Beach/Santa Rosa Beach, ranked eighth, had the highest and second highest amounts of pounds landed, value landed, and shareholders, respectively. The Lynn Haven/Southport group, ranked tenth, had the third
44 highest amount of pounds and value landed with a population of only 12,451 people. The rest of the top ten communities co ntain less than 4,600 people. The three most populous community groups on the list, St. Petersburg/St. Petersburg Beach, Tampa and Clearwater/Clearwater Beach/Dunedin are the b ottom three ranked DMUs. St. Petersburg/St. Petersburg Beach has the third highest amount of shareholders on the list at twenty seven, yet landed only 3,670 pounds and 13,946 dollars. Implementing the BCC model for dependency (see column 3 in Table 7) yielded eight communities out of twentytwo tied for most dependent, although St. Petersburg/St. Petersburg Beach had slacks in each category except for dealers, therefore it wasnt deemed technically efficient. Joining St. Petersburg/St. Petersburg Beach were the three communities ranked as the most dependent in the CCR model, Apalac hicola, Steinhatchee, and Carrabelle, as well as Panama City, Destin/Ft. Walton Beach/Santa Rosa Beach, Yankeetown, and Madeira Beach. All of these communities, with the exception of St. Petersburg/St. Petersburg Beach, were ranked in the top ten most dependent communities by the CCR model. Regarding returns to scale (RTS), the variable RTS allowed by the BCC model raised the efficiency scores of all but three DMUs over that reported by the CCR model. Apalachicola, Steinhatchee, and Carrabelle remained at an efficiency score of 1 and were the only three to have constant RTS (see column 4 in Table 7). Yankeetown was the only community to exhibit increasing RTS and also exhibited an efficiency score of 1. The other eighteen DMUs had decreasing RTS and four of them (Madeira Beach, Panama City, St. Pete/St. Pete Beach, and Destin/Ft. Walton Beach/Santa Rosa Beach ) had efficiency scores of 1 Although the efficiency rankings do not appear to be correlated to
45 population, it is noteworthy that population did se em to influence returns to scale. All large population DMUs resulted in decreasing returns to scale, the three constant returns to scale DMUs had populations under 3,000 people, and the lone DMU with increasing returns to scale was the smallest community analyzed (Yankeetown, population of 629). Four of the communities ranked by the BCC model as the most efficient, i.e. dependent were only ranked somewhat vulnerable to management decisions by the GMFMC, two were not even ranked (Steinhatchee and St. Pet ersburg/St. Petersburg Beach), and Destin/Ft. Walton Beach/Santa Rosa Beach were individually ranked not vulnerable, somewhat vulnerable, and unranked, respectively. 18.104.22.168 Engagement Both models, CCR and BCC, exhibited constant RTS, and hence the exac t same rankings for engagement. Three community groups ranked as the most engaged Destin/Ft. Walton Beach/Santa Rosa Beach, St. Petersburg/St. Petersburg Beach, and Panama City (see columns 5 and 6 in Table 7). All three held the largest percentages of shareholders and registered landing locations amongst the DMUs. Additionally, all three ranked at the top of dependence under the BCC model, although not under the CCR model. Apalachicola, Panacea, Madeira Beach, and Steinhatchee were the only four communities with populations under 21,000 ranked in the top ten for engagement. While Apalachicola, Carrabelle, and Steinhatchee all rank as the most dependent communities by both BCC and CCR models, none of those three rank as one of the most engaged communi ties. Apalachicola and Steinhatchee come somewhat close, ranked f if th and sixth respectively, however Carrabelle ranks seventeen th. In fact, with the exception of
46 Yankeetown and Carrabelle, the two engagement models produced rankings for the communities similar to the BCC dependence model. In summary, no community ended up ranked at the top in all four model runs; however five communities were ranked in the top ten by all models Apalachicola, Steinhatchee, Madeira Beach, Panama City and Destin/Ft. Walton Beach/Santa Rosa Beach. Additionally, although three communities ranked at the top in the BCC dependent and both engagement models, no community ranked at the top in the CCR dependent and both engagement models.
Table 7: DEA Communities, Inputs, and Outputs (Referring to returns to scale, Inc = increasing, Dec = decreasing, Con = constant) DMUs Dependence Engagement Input Outputs CCR BCC BCC RTS CCR BCC BCC RTS population pounds landed dollars landed shareholders landing locations dealers YANKEETOWN 4 1 Inc 17 17 Con 629 2,145 8,151.00 4 3 0 CARRABELLE 1 1 Con 17 17 Con 1,303 23,777 90,352.60 11 3 0 STEINHATCHEE 1 1 Con 6 6 Con 1,453 1,668 6,338.40 11 10 1 PANACEA 5 13 Dec 10 10 Con 2,165 3,217 12,224.60 5 3 3 APALACHICOLA 1 1 Con 5 5 Con 2,334 14,013 53,249.40 16 7 5 CRYSTAL RIVER 11 19 Dec 14 14 Con 3,485 2,677 10,172.60 7 2 2 CORTEZ 9 9 Dec 15 15 Con 4,491 1,387 5,270.60 14 2 1 MADEIRA BEACH 7 1 Dec 4 4 Con 4,511 9,879 37,540.20 11 12 2 INDIAN ROCKS BEACH 17 22 Dec 22 22 Con 5,072 2,866 10,890.80 1 1 0 GULF BREEZE 12 17 Dec 21 21 Con 5,665 15,347 58,318.60 9 1 1 PANAMA CITY BEACH 14 20 Dec 17 17 Con 7,671 8,866 33,690.80 7 3 0 LYNN HAVEN/SOUTHPORT 10 14 Dec 16 16 Con 12,451 83,946 318,994.80 11 1 0 HUDSON 13 18 Dec 13 13 Con 12,765 1,678 6,376.40 11 4 2 TARPON SPRINGS 15 11 Dec 9 9 Con 21,003 5,435 20,653.00 7 4 4 DESTIN/FT WALTON BEACH/SANTA ROSA BEACH 8 1 Dec 1 1 Con 31,092 218,729 831,170.20 39 9 6 PANAMA CITY 6 1 Dec 1 1 Con 36,417 353,686 1,344,006.80 57 13 3 FT MYERS/FT MYERS BEACH 18 10 Dec 7 7 Con 54,769 913 3,469.40 6 7 4 PENSACOLA/NICEVILLE 16 12 Dec 8 8 Con 67,939 71,362 271,175.60 24 9 2 LARGO 19 21 Dec 20 20 Con 69,371 1,013 3,849.40 13 0 0 CLEARWATER/CLEARWATE R BEACH/DUNEDIN 21 15 Dec 10 10 Con 144,478 13,861 52,671.80 12 4 3 ST. PETE/ST. PETE BEACH 20 1 Dec 1 1 Con 294,161 3670 13,946.00 27 5 6 TAMPA 22 15 Dec 10 10 Con 303,447 3,117 11,844.60 8 0 3 47
48 5.3 Survey Responses Initially two surveys were established, both with similar lines of questioning differing only slightly in wording, as one was geared towards fishermen with red snapper IFQ shares and the other was geared towards the scientists and managers involved with developing and implement ing the IFQ system. Both surveys were developed and hosted on the University of South Floridas online website, Survey.acomp Development and execution of the IFQ program falls under the jurisdiction of numerous scientists and planners at the National Marine Fisheries Service and the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, and as such both agencies were contacted via email regarding participation in this survey. After requesting more details, the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council did not respond to any further emails. The National Marine Fisheries Service responded to the request for participation by indicating that the website address for the online survey would be distributed intra agency for anyone desiring to participate. A second round of requests to participate in this survey was distributed due to lack of response from both agencies after the first round, and a total of two responses were received. Owing to the unknown number and anonymous nature of the managers involved in the IFQ program on the management side, there was no feasible method to verify that these two responses were completed by persons who actually had any dealings with the IFQ program. Due to this factor as well as the small sample size, it was decided that the manager surveys would not be included in this thesis. The fishermens survey was also hosted online at the USF Survey.acomp website. Only fisherm e n who had at one point owned IFQ shares were included. An attempt to also include those fishermen leasing IFQ shares was ruled infeasible due to the
49 confidentiality of this data, the constantly changing members of this particular user group, and the sheer impracticality of surveying so potentially large a population. A list of all IFQ accounts, those currently holding IFQ shares and those not, is freely available to the public on the NMFS website and this list was utilized for the survey. Although the listing distinguishes persons who currently hold IFQ shares, the goal of the survey was to obtain opinions of anyone w ho has held red snapper IFQ shares at any point, therefore all names on the list were contacted. This study is trying to address how the IFQ system is affecting Florida Gulf fishermen; therefore 535 letters were mailed via post to the account addresses of Florida residents only. The letter provided an introduction to the survey and the online web address to it. In an effort to maintain and assure anonymity, each letter also contained a five digit code. The codes were predetermined but randomly assigned to each letter, and no record was kept matching shareholders to the codes they received. By entering the codes contained in their letter when they part icipated in the survey, it was possible to validate not only that the person participating was actually one of the recipients of the letters, but assure they only participated once by way of tracking how many times a code was entered. No duplicate or false codes were entered in the online tally of participants, and no survey response was entered without a code. Fortynine people responded out of 535 notice letters mailed out, with two participants responding via mail that they did not have access to a computer or were not comfortable using one, but still wished to participate. In these specific situations a paper form of the survey was mailed to them and then returned containing their responses.
50 Despite the precautions taken with the predetermined entry codes, i t was deemed possible that some of the online responses might come from nonholders of IFQ shares. A second survey was completed to validate the information gathered from the first attempt. For this second attempt the same list of IFQ account holders was utilized and an effort was made to find phone numbers for all entities listed and contact them by phone. It must be noted that many of the accounts were set up under the name of a fishing vessel, and although a corresponding address was listed in almost e very case it was impossible to locate phone numbers for these account holders. However, in some cases the attempt was successful and the account holder was indeed listed elsewhere under their actual name. It would not seem unreasonable to assume that in cases where a phone number could not be tracked down for a vessel that the actual account holder was listed elsewhere on the registry under their actual name, increasing the odds that they were indeed contacted. In the end it was not possible to locate a correct phone number for all accounts listed. One hundred and thirtythree phone numbers were correctly identified and for each three attempts were made to contact them via phone before marking them off the list as unreachable. Those marked as unreachabl e included three persons out fishing, eighteen people not at home at the time of the phone calls, and fortyfive answering machine responses. In addition, fourteen responded that they never held IFQ shares at any point and were therefore ruled out of the survey, while four people held shares but declined to participate. All who were successfully contacted were informed of the purpose of this research and the survey and advised that their responses would remain confidential. In total, fortynine people pa rticipated in the survey. At no time are identifiable characteristics about the respondents released nor are their answers tied
51 specifically to them in any way. All questions for the phone version of the survey are identical to the online version with th e following exceptions on the phone survey the physical location listed on the IFQ account holder list has been noted, and the participants were asked how much quota they held and the disposition of it in 2008 (was it fished, sold, leased, or left unused). These questions were added in order to test for correlations between certain opinions and geographical location as well as amount of IFQ held. 5.3.1 Online s urveys As the red snapper IFQ program was the first of its kind in the Southeastern United St ates, the first group of questions was geared towards gaining an understanding of the fishermans knowledge and opinions of IFQs in general, and whether that has changed with implementation of the red snapper IFQ. The questions included: How much previous exposure to IFQs did you have before implementation of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ? From where was your previous knowledge of IFQ systems drawn? What was your opinion of IFQ systems prior to this experience? Why did you feel this way? Has your opinion of IFQ systems changed since implementation of the Red Snapper IFQ? If yes, in what way? Almost half of the respondents (49%) had no previous exposure to or knowledge of IFQ systems before their involvement with the red snapper program. Twentynine pe rcent stated they had never actually participated in one before but they had some knowledge of them, and 16% claimed to have studied the concept intently although never
52 personally participating in one before. Two respondents (4%) had participated in one prior. Those who did have previous knowledge of IFQ systems gathered their information from a wide variety of sources. When asked to choose all sources they had consulted, the top two were trade publications/websites (41%) and government publications (33% ). Twentyfour percent obtained information from published studies, and 12% gained knowledge from someone they knew who had participated in an IFQ system. When it came to their attitude entering into the IFQ program, nearly 70% claimed they were opposed to IFQs. Forty seven percent were strongly opposed while 20% were mildly opposed. Ten percent held no opinion either way going into it, leaving only 6% strongly in favor a nd 14% mildly i n favor of IFQs. When asked if their opinions toward IFQs had changed since implementation of the red snapper IFQ, just under half (43%) said yes. However, among that 43%, only 6% had become strongly in favor of them. In addition, only 13% had become less opposed but not totally in favor of them, while 23% had become less in favor while not totally opposed to them and 48% had become totally opposed to them. Ten percent had decided to reserve their opinions until they had further experience with IFQs. The most common rea soning of those opposed to the IFQ seemed centered around the allocation of the shares. Most believed too much allocation would be granted to the larger fishermen, who were also pointed to as the primary culprits in the overfishing of snapper. A handful of respondents in favor of it held hope that the IFQ system would be a more just management style, would end the race for the fish, and result in a safer fishery.
53 The next three questions were designed to find out the fishermans impressions of the red snapper IFQ design process. Do you feel satisfied with the amount of input sought from you and/or your representative(s) during the design process of the Red Snapper IFQ? Do you feel that all stakeholders have been represented equally in the final product? If you answered no, then who do you feel is under or over represented? When asked for a simple yes or no response, 80% of respondents were not satisfied with the amount of input sought from them or those designated to represent them when the red snapper I FQ was being designed. Additionally, when asked if they felt that all stakeholders were represented equally in the final product a resounding 90% answered no. Forty respondents listed who they felt was over or under represented, and the most common response was either Class II license holders (often referred to by the respondents as the small fisherman) were underrepresented and/or the large fishermen (previously Class I holders) were overrepresented (55%). The second most common response was an unde rrepresentation of fishermen in the eastern Gulf of Mexico/west coast of Florida (10%). Some seemed to hold the opinion that there was collusion between NMFS and large fishermen (those previously holding a Class I license) to give these fishers unfair a dvantages in the referendum and quota distribution processes. The third group of questions goes into detail about the stated objectives of the red snapper IFQ program, i.e. the reduction of capacity in the red snapper fleet and alleviation of the rush to f ish witnessed under the previous management scheme. The benefits are expected to be realized in more stable ex vessel prices, greater flexibility for
54 fishers in how they operate, improved vessel safety, reduced bycatch and bycatch mortality, and optimiza tion of net social, economic, and biological benefits (GMFMC, 2009). Correspondingly, the following questions and responses cover this range of topics. When it comes to limiting access to the fishery, the Red Snapper IFQ goes (Choices were too far, not far enough, just far enough) Do you feel the Red Snapper IFQ helps to preserve the small owner operated fishing interests in the fishery? Do you feel the Red Snapper IFQ helps to preserve the interests of the local fishing dependent communities in the fish ery? Did your fishing habits/routine/schedule change due to the Red Snapper IFQ? If yes, then how did they or how will they change? Has the intensity level in your fishing process (i.e. days spent at sea, time actually fishing, etc.) increased/decreased si nce inception of the IFQ? If yes, then what were the changes? Did the IFQ help or hurt with any financial costs of fishing (e.g. costs of fuel)? How did it help or hurt your fishing costs? Do you feel your personal income has been affected by the Red Snapper IFQ? Rank, in order of importance to you, the top three potential effects of the IFQ: (A) species protection/recovery; (B) reducing fishing costs; (C) preserving the fishing fleet; (D) safer fishing practices; (E) stabilizing the price of red snapper. R egarding the main goal of the program to reduce overcapacity in the fleet, 63% of those surveyed believe the red snapper IFQ goes too far in trying to achieve this goal.
55 Twenty percent believe the IFQ goes just far enough in limiting access to the fishery, while 8% believe it doesnt go far enough. When it comes to helping preserve the interests of the smaller fishermen and fishing dependent communities, in both cases an overwhelming percentage of respondents (82 88%) believe the IFQ fails. The IFQ program is designed to change how fishermen operate by eliminating the rush to fish, and 86% of those surveyed affirmed that their fishing habits, routine, or schedule had changed. At least two people saw the expected benefit of being able to fish whenever th ey wished, unfortunately the vast majority reported of changing their fishing operations due to a problem that NMFS itself acknowledged in the 2008 annual report: a resurgence in the red snapper population off of Floridas west coast and a lack of IFQ shar es in this region. Out of the thirtynine responses received for this question, only two listed the intended benefit of being able to fish when it is convenient for them. Twenty nine of the respondents explained their change in fishing habits as revolving around the diminished amount of red snapper they are allowed to catch now. Seventeen of these lamented having to now throw back an abundance of snapper that they cannot legally keep while relocating more often to new fishing grounds so as to avoid snapper, and twelve stated they are simply fishing less now A related topic is the intensity level of fishing how many days spent fishing and the amount of effort put into fishing when out on the water. The IFQ program is supposed to result in a more effici ent fishery since fishermen can now fish at their own pace and on their own terms, however the program did not seem to have this effect on the surveys respondents. Instead, the respondents who stated their intensity level had indeed declined (41%) overwh elmingly attributed that decrease to a simple lack of quota to fish
56 with. Just as bothersome is the 24% who claimed their intensity level had increased, since this obviously runs counter to the intentions of the program. The increase was also due to a lack of quota, as some fishermen with low snapper IFQ amounts had to expend more energy avoiding red snapper and fishing for other species. When asked about the effects of the red snapper IFQ on their professional and personal finances the opinions remained negative. Only 4% of fishermen stated that the IFQ helped with the financial costs of fishing, while 71% believed it hurt. Again, most of the responses focused on the double edged problem of lower quota amounts: not being able to keep as much red snapper as before while at the same time spending more money on bait and fuel to avoid the snapper. Six participants directed their responses at either the large initial investment of buying shares, or the low profit margin when leasing shares. As for the effect on their personal income, an overwhelming majority (76%) felt that their personal income ha d declined due to the IFQ, and a mere 2 people (4%) felt the IFQ had improved their income. The survey participants were then asked to contemplate a list of potential effects an IFQ might possibly have on its shareholders and the fishery and rank the top three in order of importance to them. The top priority was species protection for thirteen of the twenty eight total people who ranked the effects. Safer fishing practices and stabilizing the price of red snapper were each chosen as top priority by six respondents respectively. When choosing between second and third in importance, it became a much more uncertain decision. Preserving the fleet and stabilizing the price of snapper were each favored by seven people as the second most important effect of IF Qs, and six people chose safer fishing practices. The third most important effect was also a tie, with species
57 protection and stabilizing the price of red snapper tying at seven votes a piece. Preserving the fleet came in second i n this category with six votes. Overall, species protection was placed somewhere in the top three most important potential effects of IFQs by twentytwo out of thirty eight total people choosing to rank the effects. Stabilizing the price of red snapper came close to it with twen ty people placing it somewhere in their top three. Safer fishing practices followed with seventeen votes, preserving the fleet received fourteen votes, and reducing the cost of fishing garnered only eight votes overall. The final group of questions was ai med at understanding the fishermans feelings toward the red snapper IFQ after having two years of experience operating under it. Do you feel the analysis and final numbers posted by the National Marine Fishery Service in its annual Red Snapper IFQ Program reports are an accurate representation of the IFQs effects? (e.g. enforcement activities, bycatch data, price per pound) If you feel it may be inaccurate, describe how. Looking back after two years, what is your overall feeling about the design process o f the Red Snapper IFQ? Looking back after two years, what is your overall feeling about how the Red Snapper IFQ has actually been implemented? What aspect(s) do you like most and/or least about the Red Snapper IFQ? What improvements if any do you feel can be made to the Red Snapper IFQ? When asked how accurate they believed the annual program reports put out by NMFS have been in portraying the effects of the IFQ system, a combined 55% of those surveyed believed them to be either very inaccurate (41%) or som ewhat inaccurate
58 (14%). A total of 14% believed the reports to be either somewhat (10%) or very (4%) accurate, and 24% had not even read the reports. Asked what they felt the inaccuracies were the responses were varied but if a consensus can be found it is that most fishermen dont believe NMFS collects enough field data. While a few fishermen make it clear they will never believe NMFS based purely on philosophical differences, most doubt the numbers NMFS produces because they dont believe NMFSs data is grounded in reality. When asked to judge the IFQ program now that they possess a two year perspective, the majority of fishermen felt negatively about the design process (59%) as well as the implementation of the program (57%). In the minority were th ose who had either a somewhat or very positive feeling about either the design process (16%) or how the program has been implemented (18%). Finally, when asked what they liked most about the IFQ program the general response was the ability to fish at thei r pace, when they so desired. What was liked the least garnered much more responses, and the common theme was the perceived elimination of the small fishermen from the industry and the small net gain of leasing shares versus the pro hibitive cost of buying shares. When asked what improvements could be made to the system, the responses were varied and generally in direct relation to their leas t favorite part of the program. Many called for an improved, more up to date assessment of the red snapper populati on corresponding with a wider distribution of the quota. Some called for a division in the Gulf of Mexico into separate management sectors to allow for geographical differences in fishing styles and snapper populations. Others bemoaned the size limit of 1 5 inches, attributing much of the bycatch to it. Finally, while some called for the complete abandonment of the IFQ program, others
59 simply wished to see a revision in which the lease option was removed, effectively assuring that all those involved in the f ishery are actually fishing and not collecting income for merely owning shares that they lease out. It should be noted that both those with negative and positive feelings toward the program design and implementation felt the program could be improved with a revised assessment of the stock and quota disbursement. 5.3.2 Phone s urvey s. Questions for the phone survey were identical to those utilized in the online survey with the exception of three new ones added as methods of relating the opinions of respondents with their physical location and quota allotment. The new questions were: Location? How much quota were you allotted? In 2008 did you fish your quota, sell (lease) it, or do nothing with it? In total, 49 people chose to participate in the phone survey; 20 were from the eastern Gulf/peninsula of Florida region and 29 were from the northern Gulf/panhandle of Florida region. For the purposes of this survey the dividing line between the northern Gulf/panhandle region and the eastern Gulf/peninsula region is defined as the city of Steinhatchee, Steinhatchee being included in the panhandle region. According to the amount of quota that respondents reported, thirteen of them owned more than 1,000 lbs. of snapper and twentyeight owned less than 100 lbs., with the amounts ranging from 120,000 lbs. on the top end to 1 lb. at the bottom. Only one person did not wish to submit their quota information. While quota is allotted in percentages, the vast majority of participants did not know the exact IFQ percentage they owned and instead responded
60 with a poundage amount. However, as this amount merely represents a persons quota percentage translated into actual pounds, it is still reflective of the relative size of the respondents quota percentage. For purposes of this research an IFQ share allocation calculator provided by NMFS is being utilized to conve rt poundage to percentage. The average quota allotment of the eastern Gulf/peninsula region shareholders was 197 lbs, with the highest amount being 2000 lbs. The average quota allotment of the northern Gulf/panhandle region was 10,312 lbs., with the highest amount being slightly less than 120,000 lbs. Out of the forty seven people who divulged their quota allotment twentytwo people fished their quota, ten leased it, and two did some combination of the two options. Only thirteen people (27%) did nothing w ith their quota, and the average annual allotment of these people was eighty pounds. This includes one person who held 500 pounds of quota, signi ficantly higher than the rest; if that persons allotment is excluded from the calculation then the average al lotment of those who did nothing would be 42 pounds. Although there appears to be an obvious connection between those who did not utilize their quota allotment and the amount of quota they hold, the same cannot be said for those who either fished or lease d out their quota. The highest amount of quota fished was 50,000 lbs. (just over a 2% share amount) and the lowest amount fished was 7 lbs. (0.0003% share amount). Of those who leased all of their shares, 400 lbs. (0.0174%) was the highest associated amount and 100 lbs. (0.0044%) was the lowest. There were also four respondents who leased at least half of their shares and fished the rest. Their allotments ranged from approximately 1,600 lbs. to just under 120,000 lbs.
61 Fifty five percent of the phone i nterviewees stated they had no previous exposure to IFQ programs, 45% claimed they at least had some knowledge of them, gleaned from a variety of sources. As in the online survey, the majority in the phone survey gained their knowledge of IFQ systems from trade sources (20%), followed closely by experience of someone they know i n an IFQ system (16%) and information collected from government sources (14%). Opinions of IFQ systems previous to implementation of the red snapper program seemed to be closely di vided between those who thought favorably of IFQs and those who didnt (Figure 3) The majority were strongly opposed (33%), however only 8% were mildly opposed, and a total of 34% (20% strongly and 14% mildly) held a previously favorable opinion of IFQs. Twenty four percent, the second highest percentage rate, held no opinion either way of IFQs previous to the red snapper program. Those who were opposed, either strongly or mildly, ended up being allotted an average of 328 lbs., and came equally from the northern Gulf/panhandle (10 people) and the eastern Figure 3: Opinion of IFQ systems prior to this e xperience. Respondents were asked how they felt towards IFQ systems in general before the red snapper IFQ. 0 5 10 15 20 25 16 4 10 7 12 0 23 10 3 7 5 1 Phone Online
62 Gulf/peninsula (10 people) regions. Those in favor of IFQ systems prior to the red snapper IFQ program ended up being allotted an average of 15,629 lbs. and predominantly came from the northern Gulf/panhandle region (13 people) as opposed to the eastern Gulf/peninsula region (4 people). Wh en asked if their opinion of IFQ systems had changed since implementation of the red snapper IFQ (Figure 4), only 37% had changed their opinion, and of these a slight majority became totally opposed to IFQs (41%). In all, the respondents who became totally opposed or less opposed but not in favor of the program ended up with an average quota allotment of 3,168 lbs. and hailed predominantly from the northern Gulf/ panhandle region. However, the phone survey also found 32% strongly in favor of IFQs after im plementation of the red snapper program, and these respondents along with those less in favor but not opposed to the program (23%) held an average of 22,046 lbs. and also hailed predominantly from the northern Gulf/panhandle region. Figure 4: Opi nion of IFQ Systems since i mplementation o f the Red Snapper IFQ. Respondents whose opinions had changed since implementation of the red snapper IFQ were asked how they felt about IFQ systems in general now. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 7 1 0 5 9 27 2 4 3 7 15 18 Phone Online
63 The phone participants were asked next whether they fel t satisfied with the amount of input sought from them or their representative, and if they felt all stakeholders had been represented equally in the final product. The resounding majority (71%) was not satisfied (Figure 5) nor did they feel that all the s takeholders had been represented equally (73%) (Figure 6). When asked who they felt was misrepresented a combined 22 out of 31 people responded that either smaller fishermen were underrepresented and/or bigger fishermen were overrepresented. The ave rage quota amount held by the 73% who did not feel that all stakeholders had been represented equally was 2,596 lbs., with the highest amount held by any one shareholder being 35,000 lbs. Figure 5: Satisfaction with a mount of i nput s ought d uring the d e sig n process. P articipants were asked if they were satisfied with amount of input sought from them. 0 10 20 30 40 Yes No No answer 11 35 3 8 39 2 Phone Online
64 Figure 6: Opinions on equal representation by all stakeholders Participants were asked if they felt all stakeholders had been represented equally. In answer to questions of the IFQ program limiting access to the fishery, the majority of people deemed that the IFQ went too far in limiting access to the fishery (55%), although a slightly higher amount (33% phone vs. 20% online) believed the IFQ went ju st far enough. The overwhelming majority (71%) did not feel that the IFQ was helping to pre serve the smaller fishermen (Figure 7 ), nor helping to preserve the interests of the fishing dependent communities (61%) (Figure 8). In response to both questions, 22% felt the IFQ was helping in those respects. Those who felt the IFQ was not helping to preserve the small owner operator fishing interests in the fishery held an average of 1,522 lbs. of quota and were distributed fairly evenly between the northern Gul f/panhandle region (19 people) and eastern Gulf/peninsula region (16 people). The respondents who believed the IFQ was in fact helping to preserve those interests held an average of 19,089 lbs. of quota and hailed overwhelmingly from the northern Gulf/panhandle region (9 out of 11 people). In regards to helping to preserve the interests of fishingdependent communities, eleven respondents believed that the IFQ does help, 0 10 20 30 40 50 Yes. No. Not sure at this time. No answer 9 36 2 2 2 44 2 1 Phone Online
65 ten of those coming from the northern Gulf/panhandle region, and the average quota am ount held by all eleven was 18,421 lbs. Thirty people did not believe the IFQ helps fishingdependent communities. Those people held an average of 754 lbs of quota and hailed equally from the northern Gulf/panhandle region (15 people) and eastern Gulf/peninsula region (15 people). Figure 7: Opinions on w hether the IFQ h elps to p reserve the s mall owner operated f ishing i nterests in the f ishery. Figure 8: Opinions on whether the Red Snapper IFQ h elps to p reserve the i nterests of the l ocal f ishing d ependent c ommunities in the f ishery 0 20 40 60 Yes. No. I'm not sure at this time. No answer 11 35 3 0 4 43 2 0 Phone Online 0 10 20 30 40 Yes. No. I'm not sure at this time. No answer 11 30 7 1 4 40 5 0 Phone Online
66 Fifty nine percent of the phone interviewees responded that their fishing habits or routine had indeed changed with the implementation of the red snapper IFQ, 27% lower than the affirmative answers in the online surve y yet still the majority answer. The listed reasons for change were evenly divided between being able to fish out of convenience now rather than in derby conditions, and fishing less for snapper and more for other species because of a lack of quota. Rega rding the intensity level of their fishing, 72% of the phone respondents stated that it had either stayed the same or decreased, and of the 39% who responded that it had indeed changed half of those listed the benefits touted by IFQ proponents eliminatin g the rush to fish leads to more convenience which in turn le ads to less time on the water. There were a total of sixteen respondents who stated that their fishing habits and intensity had both changed. Their individual quota allotments ranged from 3 lbs to 50,000 lbs., and as a group the average allotment was 5,525 lbs. These people overwhelmingly came from the northern Gulf/panhandle region (12). For eight out of the sixteen people this change in habits and intensity can be classified as bad, meanin g they changed their habits and fish less now due to small quota amounts. Five of the sixteen can classify their change as good, meaning they fish when and where they desire now instead of operating under derby conditions. Forty three percent of those surveyed maintained that the IFQ had no effect on the financial aspects of their operations and 18% stated that it helped them, while only 29% claimed it hurt. The ways in which the phone respondents had been affected financia lly also differed from those given online. Though five fishermen complained that they either made less profit because of low quota amounts or spent more fuel and bait trying to avoid snapper which they now do not have quota for, seven stated that they had a better profit
67 margin because of better fish prices and no derby conditions. New to the complaint list was incurred expenditures on the required vessel monitoring system (VMS), mentioned by three respondents. When asked if their personal incomes had be en affected by the red snapper IFQ, a 57 % majority responded that it had decreased their income. When asked to rank the potential effects of an IFQ system in order of importance to them, most of the phone survey respondents listed only their top priorit y, so that is all that will be discussed here. The most popular responses were species protection, safer fishing practices, and stabilizing the price of snapper, with the most popular choice for top priority of potential effects being the price stabilization of red snapper. Reducing fishing costs and preserving the fleet were rarely picked as someones preferred potential effect. Figure 9: Opinions on the accuracy of n umbers p osted in the annual IFQ p rogram r eport. 0 5 10 15 20 5 7 8 16 13 0 5 2 7 20 12 3 Phone Online
68 Thirty three percent of phone respondents felt that the numbers posted by NMFS in their annual IFQ program reports were very inaccurate, and 16% felt the data was somewhat inaccurate (Figure 9) When asked how the data was inaccurate, the same responses that were voiced in the online survey were repeated: the amount of red snapper is being underreported, the bycatch data is inaccurate, and a general manipulation of the data by NMFS to suit their purposes. When asked of their overall feeling of the red snapper IFQ design process after a two year perspective, the majority of participants (63%) held either somewhat (20%) or very (43%) negative feelings, although this number is slightly lower than the combined 81% of online respondents who held a negative opinion (Figure 10) However, the implementation of the program seemed to be held in higher regard by phone respondents than those online, as 47% felt positive about it (35% somewhat and 12% very) compared to the 35% who held either very or somewhat negative feelings about the implementat ion process (Figure 11). Seventeen people in total stated they held negative feelings about how the red snapper IFQ program had been implemented, although approximately half of those (9) were opposed to IFQ programs in general before the red snapper progr am even began. It should be noted that of the other eight who were either in favor of IFQ programs in general (4) or held no opinion of them (4) before the red snapper program was implemented, after implementation of the red snapper IFQ one person became less in favor and all four of those who held no opinion prior became opposed. In total, only four of the seventeen people who held unfavorable feelings about the red snapper IFQ implementation held favorable opinions of IFQs in general after the red snapper program
69 had been implemented. The majority (13 people) were neither in favor of IFQs in general nor the red snapper IFQs implementation in particular. Figure 10: Overall f eeling about the d esign p rocess of the Red S napper IFQ. Figure 11: Overall feeling about the implementation of the Red Snapper I FQ. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 4 10 4 10 21 0 3 5 0 11 29 1 Phone Online 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 6 17 7 4 13 2 3 6 2 9 28 1 Phone Online
70 Finally, when asked their favorite and least favorite aspects of the program, phone respondents answered similarly to online respondents. Twenty complaints were registered regarding the qualifications involved in the design process and the resulting quota distribution amounts. These complaints ranged from perceived inequalities in representation between big and small fishermen during the process, to the distributions given to midGulf and sma ller fishermen, to the formation of quota monopolies. The second most mentioned group of complaints, listed eight times, revolved around the bureaucracy and paperwork involved in the programs procedures. Others voiced concerns over the elimination of op portunities for newer and younger fishermen (4 responses), erroneous and dated data being used by NMFS to manage the fishery (3), and thin profits m argins when leasing shares (2). Praise for the IFQ was listed in the form of improved safety (7 responses), the effectiveness of the program as a stock management tool (5), and the stabilization / increase in the price of red snapper (4). Again, with the final question of how they would improve the IFQ, the phone respondents echoed the online respondents call s for quota share adjustments, management of the Gulf of Mexico by zones, closer working relationships between NMFS and fishermen to improve data, use it or lose it scenarios in which leasing is not an option, and of course the requisite calls for total abandonment of the IFQ system.
71 CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION This thesis is an effort to analyze the Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper IFQ program in an attempt to answer three questions: 1) what effects is it having on the red snapper fishery, 2) what effects is it having on the red snapper fleet, and 3) what is the perception of the IFQ among fishers. The research conducted here has demonstrated these three questions are inextricably intertwined. The effects of the red snapper IFQ on the fleet is clearly reflected in the attitudes of the fishermen interviewed for this s tudy. Hence, our discussion of the results uncovered during this research will focus individually on each effect, while the discussion of the survey responses will serve to combine those effects into a coherent, comprehensive examination of the red snappe r IFQ program. 6.1 Fishery Analysis 6.1.1 Red s napper p opulation e stimates There is little doubt at this point that the population of red snapper off the Florida Gulf coast has improved over the condition which brought about the IFQ program in the first place. Estimates produced by the SEDAR Update of 2009 led NMFS to declare an end to overfishing and raise the TAC on June 2, 2010 by almost two million pounds. The fishermen interviewed in this study confirmed that the stock has recovered, especially al ong the eastern coast of Florida where the predominantly low quota allotments of fishermen located here are certainly contributing to this effort. Although many of the fishermen were reluctant to attribute this improvement to the IFQ, the inability of the m to
72 target red snapper with as much effort as before can only contribute to the recruitment of fish. The amount of credit for this to attribute to the IFQ program may be in question, but the fact that the IFQ has been successful in this regard is not. 6.1.2 Red s napper c atch r ates and f ishing e ffort. A Gulf wide fleet reduction of only nine vessels, and only three fewer vessels in Florida waters, is far from enough to make a noticeable difference. To counter this fact, NMFS touts a 16% Gulf wide reductio n in days that vessels spent away from port in the first two years of the IFQ program. Although the average landings per days away decreased by only 19 pounds, total days away did in fact decrease by 504 in Florida from 2007 to 2008. In addition, the tot al number of trips decreased by 122 and average landings per trip decreasing by 78 pounds, indeed confirming less effort was expended during the second year of the program (NMFS, 2009). But the full picture also reveals a decrease of 689,246 lbs. in the total allotted quota between 2007 and 2008. So the decrease in effort was accompanied by a decrease in the nominal CPUE. If the drop in effort were expended catching roughly the same amount of fish in both years it would be reflected in a higher nominal CPUE, signifying a truly sustainable decrease in capitalization. The 16% reduction in days away from port touted by NMFS quite possibl y resulted simply from the lowered overall quota Less fish to catch means less effort required, and it also means that it had nothing to do with the IFQ program. 6.1.3 Bycatch r ates and s ize of c aught i ndividuals A highly touted reduction in red snapper bycatch has been viewed as a major highlight of the IFQ program by its proponents. However, closer examination has
73 rev ealed that these numbers must also be viewed with some skepticism. As mentioned before, there is minimal fishery independent data due to a lack of federal observer coverage onboard fishing vessels. The observer data that does exist appears to contradict the diminished bycatch being reported by fishermen, to the extent of causing the SEDAR panel members to question whether their data was affected by underreporting of bycatch by vessels (GMFMC, 2009). This leads into the next issue concerning bycatch under the IFQ program, an issue that NMFS itself refers to in the 2 008 Annual Program report. D ue to the red snapper population being in decline during the years that the IFQ based its qualifying historical catches on west coast Florida fishermen as a whole r eceived small allocations of quota. The west coast population of snapper has undeniably rebounded and under an open access system fishermen would naturally refocus their efforts on red snapper. However, under the IFQ program they are stuck with small all ocations and cannot do this. This has led to the landing ratio along the peninsula of Florida actually dropping after the IFQ program began, compared to the rise in landing ratio witnessed in the panhandle of Florida. Finally, proponents point to the IFQ as the main reason that a drop in the minimum keeper size from 15 inches to 13 inches was able to be implemented, and that this drop in minimum size has allowed for a higher retention rate of snapper caught. Being able to keep smaller fish obviously allow s for more efficient fishing, yet when the numbers reveal that 59% of those fish that were observed being thrown back were greater than the minimum size limit, the obvious question is why? The answer is most likely a case of highgrading or lack of quota. Highgrading can happen under any system, but is
74 more likely to occur when a crew is limited on the amount of red snapper they can keep and are aiming to keep the best fish they can. In summary, NMFS acknowledges that the red snapper population has recover ed enough to raise the TAC, that along the peninsula of Florida fishermen do not possess the necessary quota to keep in check this resurgent red snapper, and that bycatch data self reported by fishermen does not match data reported by observers. Taken together, one must assume that at least in parts of the Gulf of Mexico, the IFQ has not helped to reduce red snapper bycatch. In fact, if one adds in the possibility of highgrading becoming more prominent because of the IFQ, then there exists the strong chan ce that the IFQ has actually increased the amount of red snapper bycatch. This would seem to be the case reported by numerous survey respondents, as highlighted in section 6.7. 6.1.4 Red s napper m arket p rices. The accuracy of ex vessel prices of red snapper is unsure as well, hampered by the lack of reporting by many fishers and the wide fluctuation in some of the exvessel prices that were reported to NMFS. However, the data that is available points to a 10% increase (after adjusting for inflation) in the price that fishermen are receiving for their catch, and there is reason to believe this number would be even higher with more accurate reporting. All historical evidence of IFQ programs effects point s to upward responses in ex vessel prices, and in this case numerous fishermen participating in the survey not only verified the rise in red snapper price but didnt hesitate to attribute it to the IFQ program. This is not just good news for the fishermen, but for program supporters as well because this was touted as a top benefit of the elimination of previous derby fishing conditions. Ironically however, as detailed in sections 6.5 and 6.7, while
75 the ex vessel price for red snapper has risen, the allotment of small IFQ shares and the price of leasing additional shares actually lowered incomes for many fishermen surveyed. 6.2 Community Analysis 6.2.1 IFQ s hares and allocation So the expected drop in vessels numbers has not yet occurred and it seems the reported drops in effort and bycatch are dubious. But this certainly doesnt mean the IFQ is not functioning as it was intended. The reduction in capitalization that NMFS is aiming for would ultimately present itself first in a shareholder reduction, and here is where the IFQ program is giving some indi cation of what is to come. The IFQ program has had a 14.6% reduction in shareholders during the first two years of the program, which would truly be impressive if combined with a correspondingly significant reduction in vessels. However, this decrease al one without a corresponding decrease in vessels points more to a consolidation of shares (i.e. power) into a system containing just as many fishers as before, but in which more and more who cannot afford to buy shares have to pay annually through share lea sing for the privilege of fishing. That lease price has reached an average of $2.45 per share, while NMFS estimates a price hovering around $20.00 per share to buy them outright (NMFS, 2009). Although NMFS questions that high of a price because of incons istent reporting, many fishermen surveyed for this study confirmed this price. The following statement made by one of the fishermen in the online survey sums up the sentiments of many respondents, Leasing IFQ means a net profit reduction (or) break(ing) even at best. Why do I want a $1 per lb fish taking up space that can be
76 occupied by a more profitable one? My commercial Red snapper (shares) are now bycatch discard . As Buck (1995) points out, when fishers decide their profit margin on red snapper is too small to justify continued effort, or the lease price rises above their means, the number of fishermen opting out of the market entirely will likely increase. The National Marine Fisheries Service contends that shares will be bought by those that val ue the fishery most. However, not only is the smallest share category shrinking, but all three categories of shareholders owning less than 2.0000% of the total quota h ave seen their numbers drop since the IFQ program began while those holding more than 2.0000% have grown. Smaller fishers are leaving the fishery as the shares are being consolidated by fishermen owning greater than 2.0000% of the TAC. If t his trend continues it should lead to the desired reduction in fleet capitalization that the Council desired. This becomes a big issue because w hile Florida just slightly beats out Texas in the total share percentage amount, it contains by far the most shareholders of any state and almost 70% of them hold less than 0.1000% of the total red snapper quota. Clearly this IFQ affects more people in Florida than anywhere else along the Gulf coast, and most of those affected are small fishers. Unfortunately for these small fishers, the process by which the red snapper IFQ was s haped and approved was clearly led by and geared towards fishermen who would eventually become large shareholders under the IFQ system and this is affirmed by the trend indicated above. Regardless, the goal of reduced fleet capitalization appears to be w ell on its way towards being met based on the trend in share ownership. 6.2.2 Data e nvelopment analysis C omparing the results of the DEA analysis to the vulnerability index produced mixed results however overall this proved ineffectual. The index cont ains only three
77 different categories of vulnerability based on a set of preset qualifications. The DEA analysis compares each community against each other and ranks them accordingly. Therefore, while the DEA method clearly points to some communities as very dependent or engaged, the vulnerability index doesnt even rank any Florida communities as very vulnerable. Additionally, numerous communities analyzed for this research were not even ranked in the vulnerability index and several communities listed separately in the index were lumped together in the D ata E nvelopment A nalysis. Comparing the CCR model with the vulnerability index seems to match up well. The three communities determined to be the most dependent by DEA were listed as somewhat vulnerable by the index, others listed as somewhat vulnerable were generally ranked ne ar the top for dependence, and the four least dependent communities were not even ranked by the vulnerability index. The BCC dependence model differs slightly from the CCR model, producing more communities ranked as efficient or truly dependent, yet the communities seem to follow the same trend established in the CCR model. The one major exception is the community grouping of St. Petersburg and St. Pete Beach, which is ranked 20th most dependent community by the CCR model but at the top by the BCC model T he high number of shareholders and dealers present combined with the low number of other outputs points to St. Petersburg/St. Pete Beach acquiring its top dependency rating as an outlier, rather than as a truly dependent DMU. St. Petersburg/St. Pete B eachs potential effects on the overall results of this analysis appear to be minimal; it was only a secondary reference DMU for one inefficient DMU in the BCC model, Clearwater/Clearwater Beach/Dunedin, which itself ranked as merely the 15th most dependen t DMU. On the opposite end of the spectrum is Panama City,
78 which served in the peer group of 10 inefficient DMUs in both the BCC Dependence model and the engagement models. As the leader in pounds landed, shareholders, and landing locations Panama City definitely makes a strong case for itself as the most dependent and engaged community in the red snapper fishery. Both CCR and BCC engagement models produced the same, somewhat expected results. Larger communities tended to be more engaged in the fishery than they were dependent on it. This shows that while they might lack dependence due to having more diversified economies, their involvement in the fishery can still be a significant one. The abundance of shareholders in the larger communities seems to b e the dominant factor contributing to their engagement. The St. Petersburg/St. Pete Beach DMU again stands as a potential outlier, as it lacks the overall high outputs of the other top engaged DMUs with the exception of shareholders and dealers. Additionally, it serves as only a secondary reference DMU for a mere three inefficient DMUs (Apalachicola, Clearwater/Clearwater Beach/Dunedin, and Tarpon Springs). The results of DEA necessarily hinge on what outputs and inputs are used. The decision to eliminate potential outputs, rather than include them with 0 entered for data or eliminate altogether the DMUs with missing data, stands as a critical decision. While in the end all twenty two community groupings provided by NMFS were analyzed, it is impossible to tell how eliminating some of the original outputs affected the outcomes. In short, this analysis has been based on incomplete data, and it is certainly possible that the rankings might have turned out differently if data was available for those output s. It is the hope that the inclusion of both CCR and BCC models, and their similar results, provided some sense of assuredness to help overcome doubts brought on by this.
79 While in the end it was not really possible to make a true comparison between the DE A results and the vulnerability index, the DEA analysis did produce some interesting and noteworthy results. T he majority of cities involved in the red snapper fishery to whatever degree have populations under 13,000 and these smaller communities, especially those with populations under 5,000 people, tended to be deemed more dependent than large or even midsized communities. Contrast this with the larger communities tending to be more engaged than the smaller ones. While Apalachicola, Steinhatchee, and Madeira Beach clearly are heavily affected by events in the red snapper fishery, this DEA analysis has shown us not to overlook the effects of this fishery on either the smallest of communities or the largest. 6.7 Survey Responses The fishermen surveyed entered into the program with little to no exposure to IFQ programs in general. Those who did chose to investigate the issue beforehand studied both trade and governmental publications, and while these two sources tend to portray IF Q in a good light, the prevailing attitude of those surveyed was one of opposition. In both the online and phone surveys the majority of respondents were opposed to IFQs in general, and to no surprise opinions seemed to fall along geographical lines as we ll as how much quota they stood to receive. Even many of those who believed change in management styles was necessary for the health of the fishery expressed doubts they held going into the IFQ program. The troubling point for most centered on the abilit y of an IFQ system to operate in the Gulf of Mexico without drastically altering the fisherys landscape. The common fear was that the small fisherman would get pushed out of the fishery:
80 IFQ Based on History is not fair for persons that fished in areas that had small stocks. American Red Snapper were extremely rare on the Florida West Coast 15 years ago, and are now prevelant. IFQ should be equitable to all permit holders and guards in place to keep large entities from pushing the small fisherman out of business. If you look, most IFQ shares are being purchased by the larger commercial businesses, which will restrict any new small business ventures. They can't afford to compete. ifg create a monopoly. the big fish mafia gains control of all the shares eventually and the small fisherman gets gobbled up because he doesnt get enough shares to stay in business and can't afford to buy additional shares or they are not available Because the fishing vessels that caused the most damage to the fishery where t he ones that where rewarded with the biggest ifq. I was punished by a low ifq because i chose to be a little more conservative then others even though i had a permit to fish just like the others did. After gaining firsthand experience with the red snapper IFQ program, the fears seemed realized and again the majority in both surveys stated they either became less in favor or totally opposed to IFQs. When asked if they felt that all stakeholders were represented equally in the final product a resounding 90% answered no, and were very clear who they thought was over or under represented: The Class 1 license holders were the only ones who knew about and were consulted in the design of the program. Again, assuming snapper were overfished (which I seriously doubt given the number and size of red snapper in the Gulf over the past 5 years) the Class 1 permit holders were the ones who overfished the resource. I submitted extensive comments to NMFS when they finally published the rule that they developed with th e Class 1 license holders. My comments were totally disregarded --clearly NMFS had made up its mind what it was going to do at that time. The large snapper vessels were highly over represented. I have been told by [name omitted], one of the representatives on the advisory committee that the 200lb trip limit boats had only 2 reps vs 12 reps on behalf of the fish buyers and the large boats with large landing histories. It has virtually killed the small boats. There were only 92 large landing boats and over 500 small landing boats. does that sound like equal representation?
81 The findings of both surveys appear to confirm managers suspicions of underreported data and reveal a more detailed and accurate picture than the few numbers published in the annual reports. One of the most important revelations of this survey is a dichotomy created by the IFQ when fishermen dont have quota allocation and the sna pper population has rebounded. Although the fishermens efforts in catching red snapper may have been reduc ed by virtue of not owning IFQ shares, the fishermen are actually exerting more energy when fishing for other species since they must now avoid red snapper and deal with red snapper bycatch they cannot keep. S ome of the phone survey participants cited their intensity decreasing for beneficial reasons, for example, I'm better able to fish during good weather and spread my activities over a longer period. U nfortunately, m any more fishers experienced the situation previously described: Cant take advantage of the megatons of red snapper crowding every rockpile reef and ledge. Must spend more time, fuel and bait to catch grouper and work through the hundreds of large snapper caught each day. My fishermen report what I do. We catch and release (dead and aliv e) 600700 lbs of red snapper per day to keep 4 500 grouper. Something is wrong. I am forced to go farther out to sea and stay longer in order to fish for other species. I am also forced to throw back many red snappers caught as by catch because I had t o sell off my shares of the quota in order to pay for my vessel maintenance. In other words, the IFQ system gave me too small an annual allocation to stay in business, it was a financial squeeze. I have been throwing back more red snapper because of lack of quota. Ive had to fish longer hours, fish in more inclement weather,& change areas of fishing, because even though there are pleanty of other reef fish in the same location as the red snapper, we tend to catch too many to make it worth staying. Ive s pent twenty years of my life trying to learn where snapper congregate, now Im having to spend that time finding out where they dont. Being I have to lease red snapper quota the price I receive per lb is far lower than before ITQ implementation.
82 Survey re spondents also detailed how some fishermen along the west coast of Florida are now intentionally killing their snapper bycatch since the fishermen have no quota to keep them and the snapper are becoming so abundant they are out competing other species. The design of IFQ systems is to limit the amount of target species harvested but in such a way that those desiring to participate in the fishery can do so by investing in shares. However, while the high share price of red snapper being reported is obviously good for large shareholders, and should probably be expected at the beginning of any IFQ program as consolidation is at its highest then, more than one survey respondent expressed concern that such high prices effectively prevented not only expansion by sm aller fishermen but also entry by new participants. The assertion in the IFQs environmental impact statement that investment in IFQ shares would not necessarily be prohibitive for small operators, part time fishermen, or fishermen who participate in several fisheries throughout the year appears to contradict the real life effect that it is having on a multitude of fishermen surveyed for this thesis (GMFMC, 2006) Overwhelming majorities of survey respondents believed that the red snapper IFQ goes t oo far in limiting access to the fishery and that it does not aid in preserving small owner operated fishing operations or fishingdependent communities. In a somewhat surprising turn, quota allocations revealed in the phone survey demonstrate that not only were these sentiments expressed by small shareholders as expected, but also a good many large shareholders as well. In fact when questioned directly about it, the majority of online respondents felt the IFQ had no effect on their financial costs of fis hing, while in the phone survey the majority felt it had hurt them. Even more to the point, the majority in both surveys felt their personal income had been decreased by the IFQ. Higher
83 ex vessel prices are of course beneficial, but looking at the whole picture draws serious questions about how financially beneficial the IFQ is to those fishermen not granted large initial allotments of quota. For these fishermen, the increased fishing costs associated with leasing additional IFQ shares is not offset by slightly higher prices for the fish they catch, as expressed by one of the respondents: It might be argued that in the short term it could help. We are currently paying 3.00 per pound to lease snapper. We get, if we are lucky, 4.50 dockside. Less the govt fee .14 nets us 1.36. This is by far the cheapest fish I bring to the dock. One could say that 1.36 is better than nothing. However, in order to be a true stockholder one needs to buy shares. They are somewhere north of $ 20 per pound. For me to buy 2,000 pounds I would need to spend 4050 thousand dollars. This is a large 'financial cost' that is added to my operation. As more species go ifq many fishermen will be faced with a choice of perpetual leasing or large indebtedness. Compounding this problem is an issue brought up during the two surveys that demonstrates how the links between these share prices and ex vessel prices can be exploited. Several fishermen pointed out in survey responses the ability of fish houses to own shares, a fact when taken alone is not a concern. However, as the fishermen explained further this obviously means the fish houses can not only determine what price they want to lea se their shares for, they can also obligate the fishermen to subsequently sell the catch exclusively to them at an ex vessel price also determined by the fish house Quite possibly the biggest source of frustration by those fishermen who oppose the red snapper IFQ program might be that the potential benefits of an IFQ program deemed most important to them seem to be secondary in importance to the fishery management. The respondents in both polls consistently chose species protection, safer fishing practices, and stabilizing the price of snapper as what they desire most from the IFQ program. These effects are indeed enumerated by proponents of the IFQ as
84 additional benefits; however the main goal of the program has always been to reduce the overcapitalization of the fleet. While reducing the fleet has the potential to accomplish these goals, clearly the f eelings of many fishermen is that these rewards are not worth the prices paid in lost income and possibly livelihoods. This would seem to just reinforce the overall feeling of disconnect that the majority of fishermen feel is present between them and the m anagement. This is reflected in the decidedly negative feelings about the design process of the IFQ, still felt two years into the program. A common theme among the interviews with fishermen is that the IFQ program was already a foregone determination in the collective mind of the fishery management, a conclusion that may or may not be true but one that is easy to draw when a feeling of disconnect is present. Combine the disconnect with the distrust that these fishermen felt towards any numbers that NMFS puts out THE NMFS'S DATA SEENS TO LAG BY A YEAR OR TWO. i have never seen so many red snapper as i encounter when i am trying to pull up a grouper Alot of Captain may not want to be riddled with discard reports, therefore they are innaccurate. and it becomes obvious why the IFQ lost favor in the minds of fishermen over the first two years instead of winning them over. I am concerned how the program will alter who profits from what. The fishermen will become sharecroppers. I like not a sin gle aspect of the program. Wholly unfair, inneffective and destructive to the traditional commercial fishing way of life. NO CHANCE FOR HARD WORKING YOUNGER GENERATIONS.
85 In an effort to examine the relationship between the phone and online survey re sults Fishers exact test was performed to test for statistical significance. Fishers exact test was chosen over a chi square test because the significance value provided by the chi square test is only an approximation which can be inadequate when sample sizes are small and data is very unequally distributed among the cells of the table. Fishers test can be used regardless of sample characteristics and is designed for use with small data amounts. Fishers exact test was run on selected survey questions with a null hypothesis of There is no correlation between answers on the phone survey and answers from the online survey. These particular questions were chosen for analysis because of the similarity between the responses in the two surveys an d the extremes of those responses (i.e. overwhelming positive or negative responses). Utilizing a twotailed test with a p value of 0.05%, the results from six out of eleven tests were deemed statistically significant, with the other five exceeding the p value, resulting from insufficient data to make a conclusion (see Appendix C). The following questions, with their corresponding pvalue, from the surveys were deemed statistically significant: What was your opinion of IFQ systems prior to this experience ? ( 0.037) Do you feel that all stakeholders have been represented equally in the final product? ( 0.027) Do you feel the Red Snapper IFQ helps to preserve the interests of the local fishingdependent communities in the fishery? (0 .046) Did your fishing habi ts/routine/schedule change due to the Red Snapper IFQ? ( 0.014) Did the IFQ help or hurt with any financial costs of fishing (e.g. costs of fuel)? (0 .002) Looking back after two years, what is your overall feeling about how the Red Snapper IFQ has actually been implemented? ( 0.00)
86 According to the results from the Fishers test analysis the similarity of the results from both the phone and online surveys was not mere chance, therefore the null hypothesis is rejected. Additionally, the following questions r esulted in Fishers test exceeding the p value, indicating that there was not enough data to draw a conclusion as to the relationship between the phone and online survey results. If yes, in what way? (In reference to how opinions on IFQs in general had changed since implementation of the red snapper IFQ). ( 0.343) Do you feel satisfied with the amount of input sought from you and/or your representative(s) during the design process of the Red Snapper IFQ? ( 0.450) Do you feel the analysis and final numbers posted by the National Marine Fishery Service in its annual Red Snapper IFQ Program reports are an accurate representation of the IFQs effects? (e.g. enforcement activities, bycatch data, price per pound) ( 0.287) Looking back after two years, what is your overall feeling about the design process of the Red Snapper IFQ? ( 0.143) Do you feel the Red Snapper IFQ helps to preserve the small owner operated fishing interests in the fishery? ( 0.052) After performing Fish ers exact test on those questions which seemed to indicate closely related results between the two different surveys, the fact that six of the eleven questions tested showed statistical significance leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis and valida tes the results revealed in these surveys.
87 C HAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS The primary stated goal of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ program has always been to reduce overcapitalization of the fleet. The fleet reduction that NMFS hoped for may take several more years to come to fruition, but it does seem to be inevitable O nce that occurs then a true reduction in effort on the red snapper population would appear definite as well The more immediate success of the program is t he elimination of the previous derby fishing conditions as fishermen are no longer racing to catch the fish and the dockside price has risen considerably and stabilized. Additionally, the red snapper stock has improved to a state where the TAC can be raised. Whether or not this is a consequence of the IFQ program or just a natural resurgence of snapper in the dynamic natural cycle of fishing, is uncertain If this is ind eed an effect of the IFQ program, then one can call the program a success in this regard and only predict even better results for the snapper population and the fishermen able to survive in the new system. If the population resurgence is merely a natural o ccurrence then the IFQ program may in fact just be the beneficiary of good timing. Regardless, its structure appears to be one that can take advantage of this and build a more solid base from which the fishery as a who le can proceed into the future. But t he evaluation of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ program does not end there. Upon closer examination evidence presented here suggests that other purported bene fits are questionable at best. While a reduction in effort expended by fishermen catching red snapper was heralded in reality the IFQ may simply be disguising fishing
88 effort. F ishermen with low quota amounts, especially those fishing the eastern waters of the Gulf of Mexico, are now e xpending more time, fuel, and energy avoiding red snapper and searching for other fish which the y are still allowed to harvest. This then brings about other questions which may be hard to answer using traditional effort calculations how has the red snapper IFQ affected the fishing effort of other fisheries? Are fishermen who could once harvest red snapper now focusing more effort on other fish, and are those fishermen exerting more effort than before to catch those other species because they have to avoid snapper now instead of keeping them? The IFQ was also praised with reducing bycatch in the fishery, and as mentioned above aiding in the recovery of the species. Truthfully though, t o lay the successful recovery solely at the feet of the IFQ would be presumptuous considering the program is still in its infan cy and the data used actually took into account only the first year of the program. In fact, the recommendations to raise the TAC come from assessments and mere projections that overfishing of red snapper would end in 2009. Multiple fishermen surveyed for this thesis made a point of stating that the red snapper population was rebounding before the IFQ program took place and point to the reduction of red snapper bycatch in the shrimping industry as the real reason for the upward trend in the stock. Concer ning the bycatch issue, if we combine the doubts NMFS itself has expressed about the accuracy of its scant data and the testimony of fishermen surveyed for this study, bycatch may not only have failed to decline it might actually be on the rise. Simply put, many fishermen do not possess the quota to harvest the amount of red snapper they once could, while at the same time the population of snapper is rebounding. The IFQ is therefore forcing these fishermen to throw back more fish than they did
89 before. Even a drop in the minimum size limit cannot hide this fact or the possibility of highgrading, which is a concern anytime an IFQ is put into place. Most importantly though is the effect the IQF is having on the fishermen. By law NMFS has an obligation to protect the small fishermen in its policymaking, and hopefully this research will demonstrate NMFS should also feel a moral obligation to better serve the small fishers. The DEA analysis reveals that numerous communities, big and small, are affected by management decisions. However, when the majority of fishermen in the state are classified as small quota holders then at the very least they must be included in the decision making processes which affect their livelihoods. By allowing only those fishermen w ho held a Class I license under the previous structure to have a voice in designing and approving the IFQ system, NMFS and the GMFMC adhered to established guidelines and in that way cannot be faulted for having done their respective jobs. Yet, when the is sue at hand is a multimillion dollar industry in which the majority of participants may be priced out of it because they are in the minority when it comes to actual power, the issue becomes a political and social one. It is not hard to understand why many would feel that small fishermen were the targets of this reduction effort when the very processes by which the IFQ system was approved were weighted in favor of the socalled big fishermen. In this regard, one has to question whether or not the IFQ as it is currently set up is adequately and appropriately meeting the needs of the entire fishing fleet that is affected by it. Overall, the short term results indicate the beginning of the type of fluid market desired by NMFS and the Council. The number of share owners is shrinking, but those fishers without shares are leasing the ability to continue fishing. Yet, the eventual trend
90 in most IFQ cases is that the number of those willing and able to lease or buy shares declines over time, and the results of t his survey confirm this. The question of whether or not there is room in the fishery for both big fishers who focus solely on red snapper and small fishers who focus their effort on multiple species has effectively been answered by the IFQ system and the outcome is decidedly in favor of the big fishers. An IFQ system completely free of regulatory burdens might be best from a purely economic sense; however no IFQ system of this sort exists in the world. All have been tailored specifically for their regions and the Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ program is no different. However, as NMFS is finding out the current program still needs adjustments, and to their credit they have taken s teps to address problem issues. While the suggestion by many of the survey respondents to restrict ownership of IFQ shares to actual fishermen who work on boats may seem extreme, a regulation of this sort to some degree may be appropriate. Especially considering what may happen in 2012 when ownership of IFQ shares becomes open to even nonholders of reef fish permits. Additionally, while there will always be those who feel slighted in the initial allotment of a new IFQ system, the extreme lack of quota distributed to shareholders along t he west coast of Florida is a problem that even NMFS acknowledges. Basing the initial allotments of quota on ca tch history unfortunately means that those fishermen who either were unable to find fish or purposely chose to focus their effort on other speci es when red snapper was scarce, were in effect p unished. Now that the red snapper stock has recovered to the point of outcompeting other fish species the fishermen along the peninsula of Florida deserve to have their situation reevaluated and quota alloc ations adjusted. This is an issue that can and should be addressed, along with the lack of
91 reli able fishery independent data. It is impossible to efficiently and adequately manage a resource with the miniscule amount of fisheryindependent data available in the red snapper fishery. Finally, an important part of this thesis research has been the DEA analysis that examined the efficiency of the communities participating in the red snapper fishery. The vulnerability index utilized by NMFS for its environme ntal impact statement regarding the IFQ has value in determining which communities might be vul nerable to management decisions. H owever it does not include every city that participates in the red snapper fishery and in employing it NMFS highly recommends other factors be considered when assessing communities (GMFMC, 2004) This research views that as a shortcoming, as every city that participates in the fishery has at least some residents that will be affected by the decisions of NMFS and the GMFMC. A m ore detailed measurement tool such as DEA can not only effectively analyze every city but measure them against each other to shed a more quantitative look at how much each community might be affected. As Ingles and Sepez (2007) assert there is no one best method to assess communities, and the results of this research prove that it does take a multidimensional approach to fully realize the effects of fisheries management decisions. This thesis attempted to analyze the red snapper fishery in the Gulf of Mex ico utilizing multiple methods, however it could be improved. First and foremost with any analysis is the importance of detailed and accurate data. The ambiguity of data provided by NMFS hampered the accuracy of this research and a truly detailed analysi s would require complete, individualized, detailed data for all communities, especially for DEA analysis.
92 Additionally, the phone survey revealed the valuable insight that could be provided if the online survey had been accompanied by participants quota amounts and location of residence. Regardless, t he DEA analysis and fishermen surveys within reveal a picture of a red snapper fishery in Florida which is spread out through a network of midsized to smaller communities, most of which would be very affecte d by any management decision. Combine this with the fact that the majority of fishers in Florida are small shareholders and the picture becomes complete small fishers in small communities, who feel their livelihood is being threatened by the IFQ and dont see a place for them in its future. The National Marine Fisheries Service and supporters of the red snapper IFQ program have pointed to areas in which the program could use improvements while declaring it an overall success. But this thesis posits that any ruling after two years on a program of this magnitude which deals with such dynamic factors is a premature decision. At this time the lack of verifiable data, unreliability of fisherydependent data, still undetermined effect on small fishers, and s hort life history of the IFQ program simply cannot justify ruling the program a success or failure yet.
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96 Sigler, M, & Lunsford C. (2001). Effects of individual quotas on catching efficiency and spawning potential in the Alaska sablefish fishery. Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 58 doi: 10.1139/cjfas 58 7 1300 Stolp, C. (1990). Strengths and weaknesses of data envelopment analysis: an urban and regional perspective. Computers, Environment and Urban Systems, 14 (2), doi: 10.1016/0198 9715(90)90016M U.S. House of Representatives. MagnusonS tevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006 Walden, J.B. (2006). Estimating vessel efficiency using a bootstrapped data envelopment analysis model. Marine Resource Economics 21(2) Weninger, Q, & Waters, J. (2003). Economic benefits of management reform in the northern Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 46 doi: 10.1016/S00950696(02)000426
APPENDIX A: DEA RESULTS Table A1: CCROutput Oriented for Dependence Score and Slack No. DMU Score Excess population S(1) Shortage pounds landed S+(1) Shortage dollars landed S+(2) Shortage shareholders S+(3) Shortage landing locations S+(4) Shortage dealers S+(5) 1 PANAMA CITY 0.558034 0 0 0 201.3079 62.29823 0 2 DESTIN/FT WALTON BEACH/SANTA ROSA BEACH 0.445961 0 0 0 165.0627 55.78038 0 3 LYNN HAVEN/SOUTHPORT 0.369473 0 0 0 75.33994 25.96037 0 4 PENSACOLA/NICEVILLE 6.68E 02 0 0 0 191.9847 31.39585 0 5 CARRABELLE 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 GULF BREEZE 0.20375 0 0 0 1.69E 02 9.731319 0 7 APALACHICOLA 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 CLEARWATER/CLEARWATER BEACH/DUNEDIN 1.18E 02 0 0 0 10.44317 75.50592 0 9 MADEIRA BEACH 0.489095 0 0 0 11.49808 0 0 10 PANAMA CITY BEACH 0.11114 0 25366.64 96393.22 0 0 1.402227 11 TARPON SPRINGS 8.89E 02 0 64963.97 246863.1 65.24068 17.99743 0 13 PANACEA 0.646836 0 8024.909 30494.65 7.11154 1.855184 0 14 TAMPA 4.61E 03 0 1146442 4356480 346.6975 910.081 0 15 INDIAN ROCKS BEACH 4.85E 02 0 0 0 20.48408 0 1.345339 16 CRYSTAL RIVER 0.288285 0 14656.08 55693.12 0 3.342653 0 17 YANKEETOWN 0.818326 0 576.1205 2189.258 0 0 0.333274 18 HUDSON 0.115824 0 119753.5 455063.4 0 0.470935 0 19 STEINHATCHEE 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 CORTEZ 0.388802 0 63683.57 241997.6 0 6.032519 0 21 LARGO 2.22E 02 0 1220240 4636912 0 159.7183 0 22 FT MYERS/FT MYERS BEACH 3.70E 02 0 273142.1 1037940 217.9629 0 0 98
Table A2: BCCOutput Oriented for Dependence Score and Slack No. DMU Score Excess population S (1) Shortage pounds landed S+(1) Shortage dollars landed S+(2) Shortage shareholders S+(3) Shortage landing locations S+(4) Shortage dealers S+(5) 1 PANAMA CITY 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 DESTIN/FT WALTON BEACH/SANTA ROSA BEACH 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 LYNN HAVEN/SOUTHPORT 0.653192 0 0 0 8.763712 4.643859 0.952441 4 PENSACOLA/NICEVILLE 0.692308 31522 250607.6 952308.7 22.33333 0 0.111111 5 CARRABELLE 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 GULF BREEZE 0.449842 0 13093.52 49755.38 0 5.363391 2.581535 7 APALACHICOLA 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 CLEARWATER/CLEARWATER BEACH/DUNEDIN 0.5 47618.75 137242.3 521520.6 12 0 0 9 MADEIRA BEACH 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 PANAMA CITY BEACH 0.332346 0 39296.4 149326.3 0 0 3.290661 11 TARPON SPRINGS 0.708068 0 139233.9 529088.7 21.04499 2.649176 0 12 ST. PETE/ST. PETE BEACH 1 263069 215059 817224.2 12 4 0 13 PANACEA 0.666013 0 8006.427 30424.42 7.303199 2.099087 0 14 TAMPA 0.5 272355 212495 807481 23 9 0 15 INDIAN ROCKS BEACH 9.22E 02 0 0 0 3.662509 0 1.463132 16 CRYSTAL RIVER 0.404208 0 18389.35 69879.55 0 2.237038 0 17 YANKEETOWN 1 0 0 0 0 0 6.00E 06 18 HUDSON 0.446243 0 91563.52 347941.4 0 0 0 19 STEINHATCHEE 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 CORTEZ 0.752901 0 33667.57 127936.8 0 4.723327 3.54523 21 LARGO 0.22807 32954 349244.4 1327129 0 13 3 22 FT MYERS/FT MYERS BEACH 0.72549 22813.49 239355.5 909550.7 33.64865 0 0 99
Table A3: BCCOutput Oriented for Dependence RTS No. DMU Score RTS RTS of Projected DMU RTS Eff Proj Total 1 PANAMA CITY 1 Decreasing No. of IRS 1 1 2 2 DESTIN/FT WALTON BEACH/SANTA ROSA BEACH 1 Decreasing No. of CRS 3 0 3 3 LYNN HAVEN/SOUTHPORT 0.653192 Decreasing No. of DRS 3 14 17 4 PENSACOLA/NICEVILLE 0.6923077 Decreasing Total 7 15 22 5 CARRABELLE 1 Constant 6 GULF BREEZE 0.4498423 Decreasing 7 APALACHICOLA 1 Constant 8 CLEARWATER/CLEARWATER BEACH/DUNEDIN 0.5 Decreasing 9 MADEIRA BEACH 1 Decreasing 10 PANAMA CITY BEACH 0.3323461 Decreasing 11 TARPON SPRINGS 0.7080679 Decreasing 12 ST. PETE/ST. PETE BEACH 1 Decreasing 13 PANACEA 0.6660129 Increasing 14 TAMPA 0.5 Decreasing 15 INDIAN ROCKS BEACH 9.22E 02 Decreasing 16 CRYSTAL RIVER 0.4042085 Decreasing 17 YANKEETOWN 1 Increasing 18 HUDSON 0.4462431 Decreasing 19 STEINHATCHEE 1 Constant 20 CORTEZ 0.7529005 Decreasing 21 LARGO 0.2280702 Decreasing 22 FT MYERS/FT MYERS BEACH 0.7254902 Decreasing 100
Table A4: CCROutput Oriented for Engagement Score and Slack No. DMU Score Excess S (1) Shortage pounds landed S+(1) Shortage shareholders S+(2) Shortage landing locations S+(3) Shortage dealers S+(4) 1 PANAMA CITY 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 DESTIN/FT WALTON BEACH/SANTA ROSA BEACH 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 LYNN HAVEN/SOUTHPORT 0.237346121 0 0 1.991436 5.261532 4 4 PENSACOLA/NICEVILLE 0.692307593 0 27.18301 4.174454 0 0.148148 5 CARRABELLE 0.230769626 0 27.18789 1.744564 0 4 6 GULF BREEZE 0.2 0 20.2814 0 3.193623 0 7 APALACHICOLA 0.833333333 0 18.40222 3.364491 0 0 8 CLEARWATER/CLEARWATER BEACH/DUNEDIN 0.5 0 14.88648 2.242993 0 0 9 MADEIRA BEACH 0.92307722 0 37.20292 8.426792 0 1.111112 10 PANAMA CITY BEACH 0.230769626 0 34.1965 4.984433 0 4 11 TARPON SPRINGS 0.666666667 0 5.345594 3.644862 0 0 12 ST. PETE/ST. PETE BEACH 1 0 23.32712 2.242991 2.39521 0 13 PANACEA 0.5 0 23.02731 5.420561 1.7964 0 14 TAMPA 0.5 0 23.049 4.299065 5.38922 0 15 INDIAN ROCKS BEACH 0.07692278 0 34.32244 8.22429 0 4 16 CRYSTAL RIVER 0.333333333 0 22.85409 3.364486 1.79642 0 17 YANKEETOWN 0.230769626 0 37.35556 7.414336 0 4 18 HUDSON 0.392156959 0 27.65265 3.056077 0 0 19 STEINHATCHEE 0.769230374 0 38.12857 7.981307 0 2.266666 20 CORTEZ 0.266666667 0 34.13996 0 2.694627 0 21 LARGO 0.228070175 0 37.882 0 7.78443 4 22 FT MYERS/FT MYERS BEACH 0.72549062 0 25.96253 6.289472 0 0 10 1
Table A5: BCCOutput Oriented for Engagement Score and Slack No. DMU Score Excess S (1) Shortage pounds landed S+(1) Shortage shareholders S+(2) Shortage landing locations S+(3) Shortage dealers S+(4) 1 PANAMA CITY 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 DESTIN/FT WALTON BEACH/SANTA ROSA BEACH 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 LYNN HAVEN/SOUTHPORT 0.237346121 0 0 1.991436 5.261532 4 4 PENSACOLA/NICEVILLE 0.692307593 0 27.18301 4.174454 0 0.148148 5 CARRABELLE 0.230769626 0 27.18789 1.744564 0 4 6 GULF BREEZE 0.2 0 20.2814 0 3.193623 0 7 APALACHICOLA 0.833333333 0 18.40222 3.364491 0 0 8 CLEARWATER/CLEARWATER BEACH/DUNEDIN 0.5 0 14.88648 2.242993 0 0 9 MADEIRA BEACH 0.92307722 0 37.20292 8.426792 0 1.111112 10 PANAMA CITY BEACH 0.230769626 0 34.1965 4.984433 0 4 11 TARPON SPRINGS 0.666666667 0 5.345594 3.644862 0 0 12 ST. PETE/ST. PETE BEACH 1 0 23.32712 2.242991 2.39521 0 13 PANACEA 0.5 0 23.02731 5.420561 1.7964 0 14 TAMPA 0.5 0 23.049 4.299065 5.38922 0 15 INDIAN ROCKS BEACH 0.07692278 0 34.32244 8.22429 0 4 16 CRYSTAL RIVER 0.333333333 0 22.85409 3.364486 1.79642 0 17 YANKEETOWN 0.230769626 0 37.35556 7.414336 0 4 18 HUDSON 0.392156959 0 27.65265 3.056077 0 0 19 STEINHATCHEE 0.769230374 0 38.12857 7.981307 0 2.266666 20 CORTEZ 0.266666667 0 34.13996 0 2.694627 0 21 LARGO 0.228070175 0 37.882 0 7.78443 4 22 FT MYERS/FT MYERS BEACH 0.72549062 0 25.96253 6.289472 0 0 102
Table A6: BCCOutput Oriented for Engagement RTS No. DMU Score RTS RTS of Projected DMU RTS Eff Proj Total 1 PA NAMA CITY 1 Constant No. of IRS 0 0 0 2 DESTIN/FT WALTON BEACH/SANTA ROSA BEACH 1 Constant No. of CRS 2 20 22 3 LYNN HAVEN/SOUTHPORT 0.237346 Constant No. of DRS 0 0 0 4 PENSACOLA/NICEVILLE 0.692308 Constant Total 2 20 22 5 CARRABELLE 0.23077 Constant 6 GULF BREEZE 0.2 Constant 7 APALACHICOLA 0.833333 Constant 8 CLEARWATER/CLEARWATER BEACH/DUNEDIN 0.5 Constant 9 MADEIRA BEACH 0.923077 Constant 10 PANAMA CITY BEACH 0.23077 Constant 11 TARPON SPRINGS 0.666667 Constant 12 ST. PETE/ST. PETE BEACH 1 Constant 13 PANACEA 0.5 Constant 14 TAMPA 0.5 Constant 15 INDIAN ROCKS BEACH 7.69E 02 Constant 16 CRYSTAL RIVER 0.333333 Constant 17 YANKEETOWN 0.23077 Constant 18 HUDSON 0.392157 Constant 19 STEINHATCHEE 0.76923 Constant 20 CORTEZ 0.266667 Constant 21 LARGO 0.22807 Constant 22 FT MYERS/FT MYERS BEACH 0.725491 Constant 1 03
104 APPENDIX B: SURVEY QUESTIONS AND RESULTS ONLINE SURVEY How much previous exposure to IFQs did you have before implementation of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ? No exposure at all. 24 49% No actual participation but knew of them. 14 29% No actual participation but studied the concept intently. 8 16% Participated in one before. 2 4% no answer 1 2% From where was your previous knowledge of IFQ systems drawn? (check all that apply) Personal involvement in another IFQ system. 2 4% Experience of someone I know in another IFQ system. 6 12% Information from trade publications and/or websites. 20 41% Information from governmental publications and/or websites. 16 33% Information from published studies. 12 24% No previous knowledge. 14 29% other: 8 16% What was your opinion of IFQ systems prior to this experience? Strongly opposed. 23 47% Mildly opposed. 10 20% Strongly in favor. 3 6% Mildly in favor. 7 14% I had no opinion. 5 10% no answer 1 2% Has your opinion of IFQ systems changed since implementation of the Red Snapper IFQ? Yes 21 43% No 28 57% no answer 0 0% If yes, in what way? I've become strongly in favor of them. 2 4% I've become less opposed but not totally in favor of them. 4 8% I am now reserving any opinion until I have more experience with this IFQ. 3 6% I've become less in favor but not totally opposed to them. 7 14% I've become totally opposed to them. 15 31% no answer 18 37%
105 Do you feel satisfied with the amount of input sought from you and/or your representative(s) during the design process of the Red Snapper IFQ? Yes. 8 16% No. 39 80% no answer 2 4% Do you feel that all stakeholders have been represented equally in the final product? Yes. 2 4% No. 44 90% Not sure at this time. 2 4% no answer 1 2% When it comes to limiting access to the fishery, the Red Snapper IFQ goes Not far enough. 4 8% Too far. 31 63% Just far enough. 10 20% no answer 4 8% Do you feel the Red Snapper IFQ helps to preserve the small owner operated fishing interests in the fishery? Yes. 4 8% No. 43 88% I'm not sure at this time. 2 4% no answer 0 0% Do you feel the Red Snapper IFQ helps to preserve the interests of the local fishing dependent communities in the fishery? Yes. 4 8% No. 40 82% I'm not sure at this time. 5 10% no answer 0 0% Did your fishing habits/routine/schedule change due to the Red Snapper IFQ? Yes. 42 86% No. 6 12% Not yet, but they will soon. 1 2% no answer 0 0% Has the intensity level in your fishing process (i.e. days spent at sea, time actually fishing, etc.) increased/decreased since inception of the IFQ? No change. 13 27% Yes, increased. 12 24% Yes, decreased. 20 41% Both increased and decreased, in different ways. 4 8% no answer 0 0%
106 Did the IFQ help or hurt with any financial costs of fishing (e.g. costs of fuel)? It helped. 2 4% It hurt. 35 71% No effect. 10 20% no answer 2 4% Do you feel your personal income has been affected by the Red Snapper IFQ? No, and I don't foresee that it will be. 3 6% Yes, it has improved. 2 4% Yes, it has decreased. 37 76% Not yet, but it will improve my income in the future. 2 4% Not yet, but it will decrease my income in the future. 3 6% no answer 2 4% Do you feel the analysis and final numbers posted by the National Marine Fishery Service in its annual Red Snapper IFQ Program reports are an accurate representation of the IFQs effects? (e.g. enforcement activities, bycatch data, price per pound) Somewhat accurate. 5 10% Very Accurate. 2 4% Somewhat inaccurate. 7 14% Very inaccurate. 20 41% I have not read the reports. 12 24% no answer 3 6% Looking back after two years, what is your overall feeling about the design process of the Red Snapper IFQ? Very positive. 3 6% Somewhat positive. 5 10% No Feeling. 0 0% Somewhat negative. 11 22% Very negative. 29 59% no answer 1 2% Looking back after two years, what is your overall feeling about how the Red Snapper IFQ has actually been implemented? Very positive. 3 6% Somewhat positive. 6 12% No feeling. 2 4% Somewhat negative. 9 18% Very negative. 28 57% no answer 1 2%
107 PHONE SURVEY How much previous exposure to IFQs did you have before implementation of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ? No exposure at all. 27 55% No actual participation but knew of them. 17 35% No actual participation but studied the concept intently. 5 10% Participated in one before. 0 0% no answer 0 0% From where was your previous knowledge of IFQ systems drawn? (check all that apply) Personal involvement in another IFQ system. 0 0% Experience of someone I know in another IFQ system. 8 16% Information from trade publications and/or websites. 10 20% Information from governmental publications and/or websites. 7 14% Information from published studies. 2 4% No previous knowledge. 28 57% other: 3 6% What was your opinion of IFQ systems prior to this experience? Strongly opposed. 16 33% Mildly opposed. 4 8% Strongly in favor. 10 20% Mildly in favor. 7 14% I had no opinion. 12 24% no answer 0 0% Has your opinion of IFQ systems changed since implementation of the Red Snapper IFQ? Yes 18 37% No 29 59% no answer 2 4% If yes, in what way? I've become strongly in favor of them. 7 14% I've become less opposed but not totally in favor of them. 1 2% I am now reserving any opinion until I have more experience with this IFQ. 0 0% I've become less in favor but not totally opposed to them. 5 10% I've become totally opposed to them. 9 18% no answer 27 55%
108 Do you feel satisfied with the amount of input sought from you and/or your representative(s) during the design process of the Red Snapper IFQ? Yes. 11 22% No. 35 71% no answer 3 6% Do you feel that all stakeholders have been represented equally in the final product? Yes. 9 18% No. 36 73% Not sure at this time. 2 4% no answer 2 4% When it comes to limiting access to the fishery, the Red Snapper IFQ goes Not far enough. 0 0% Too far. 27 55% Just far enough. 16 33% no answer 6 12% Do you feel the Red Snapper IFQ helps to preserve the small owner operated fishing interests in the fishery? Yes. 11 22% No. 35 71% I'm not sure at this time. 3 6% no answer 0 0% Do you feel the Red Snapper IFQ helps to preserve the interests of the local fishing dependent communities in the fishery? Yes. 11 22% No. 30 61% I'm not sure at this time. 7 14% no answer 1 2% Did your fishing habits/routine/schedule change due to the Red Snapper IFQ? Yes. 29 59% No. 16 33% Not yet, but they will soon. 0 0% no answer 4 8% Has the intensity level in your fishing process (i.e. days spent at sea, time actually fishing, etc.) increased/decreased since inception of the IFQ? No change. 20 41% Yes, increased. 3 6% Yes, decreased. 15 31% Both increased and decreased, in different ways. 1 2% no answer 10 20%
109 Did the IFQ help or hurt with any financial costs of fishing (e.g. costs of fuel)? It helped. 9 18% It hurt. 14 29% No effect. 21 43% no answer 5 10% Do you feel your personal income has been affected by the Red Snapper IFQ? No, and I don't foresee that it will be. 8 16% Yes, it has improved. 7 14% Yes, it has decreased. 28 57% Not yet, but it will improve my income in the future. 3 6% Not yet, but it will decrease my income in the future. 1 2% no answer 2 4% Do you feel the analysis and final numbers posted by the National Marine Fishery Service in its annual Red Snapper IFQ Program reports are an accurate representation of the IFQs effects? (e.g. enforcement activities, bycatch data, price per pound) Somewhat accurate. 5 10% Very Accurate. 7 14% Somewhat inaccurate. 8 16% Very inaccurate. 16 33% I have not read the reports. 13 27% no answer 0 0% Looking back after two years, what is your overall feeling about the design process of the Red Snapper IFQ? Very positive. 4 8% Somewhat positive. 10 20% No Feeling. 4 8% Somewhat negative. 10 20% Very negative. 21 43% no answer 0 0% Looking back after two years, what is your overall feeling about how the Red Snapper IFQ has actually been implemented? Very positive. 6 12% Somewhat positive. 17 35% No feeling. 7 14% Somewhat negative. 4 8% Very negative. 13 27% no answer 2 4%
110 In 2008, how m uch quota percentage were you allotted and what did you do with it? Table B1: Quota Amounts of Survey Participants in Eastern Gulf/Peninsula Community Quota (pounds) Disposition of quota KEY WEST 100 did nothing SAFETY HARBOR 113 fished it YANKEETOWN 100 sold some of it PARRISH 30 no answer FT MYERS BCH 80 fished it REDINGTON SHORES 100 fished it TAMPA 500 nothing PALM HARBOR 7 nothing MORRISTON 34 nothing HUDSON 7 nothing HERNANDO BCH 37 nothing SARASOTA 50 nothing ST. PETERSBURG 138 sold it SEMINOLE 7 fished it SEMINOLE 167 sold it NAPLES 1 nothing HUDSON 200 fished it PALMETTO BAY 200 sold it INDIAN ROCKS BEACH 67 fished it BRADENTON 2000 fished it
111 Table B2: Quota Amounts of Survey Participants in Northern Gulf/Panhandle Community Quota (pounds) Disposition of quota PENSACOLA 13,000 fished it STEINHATCHEE 2,800 fished it STEINHATCHEE 125 did nothing PANAMA CITY 0.07% fished it STEINHATCHEE 37 did nothing FT.WALTON BEACH 200 sold it DESTIN 24000 fished it PANAMA CITY 3 did nothing PANAMA CITY 92 did nothing PENSACOLA 1400 fished it PANAMA CITY 1000 fished it DESTIN >5% both fished and sold it CARRABELLE 200 sold it TALLAHASSEE 52 did nothing PANAMA CITY No answer fished it CARRABELLE 165 sold it PANAMA CITY FL 473 fished it PANAMA CITY 300 fished it PANAMA CITY 240 fished it MARY ESTHER 50,000 fished it DESTIN 7980 fished it GRAND RIDGE 2000 fished it LYNN HAVEN 30,000 leased most LYNN HAVEN 35,000 leased most STEINHATCHEE 200 fished it CRAWFORDVILLE 400 sold it PANAMA CITY BEACH 260 fished it CANTONMENT 200 No answer PANACEA 600 fished it