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An analysis of u.s. policies targeting the iranian nuclear program
h [electronic resource] /
by Bryan Hamilton.
[Tampa, Fla] :
b University of South Florida,
Title from PDF of title page.
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Thesis (MA)--University of South Florida, 2010.
Includes bibliographical references.
Text (Electronic thesis) in PDF format.
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ABSTRACT: Iran's nuclear program continues to present a major challenge to U.S. policy. At the core of this challenge is one fundamental question: Is Iran attempting to build a nuclear weapon? Objective analysis reveals that Iran's dependence on oil and natural gas provides sufficient economic merit for Iran to pursue a peaceful nuclear program; without nuclear power to meet rising domestic energy needs, Iran's economy will suffer. Though the economic justification is valid, the security of Iran and the survival of its regime are overarching; acts of foreign interference in Iran's affairs have fueled the regime's quest for a nuclear weapon. For this reason, U.S. administrations since the 1979 revolution have striven to derail Iran's nuclear program through policies of containment, isolation, and denial of nuclear technology. Considering the current standoff between Iran and the U.S., we must ask another key question: How effective have U.S. policies been? The answer is simple; Iran has made significant progress in its nuclear program. Sanctions, political pressure, and threats proved no obstacle to Iran; worse still, ignoring IAEA and other's reports that found no convincing evidence that Iran is building nuclear weapons damaged U.S. efforts significantly. Iran's progress makes it clear that U.S. policies have failed, and its strategies must be discarded in favor of a new approach. This research implicates that a non-confrontational engagement policy, which acknowledges Iran's needs to build a peaceful nuclear program will provide President Obama and the U.S. the highest probability of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Advisor: Mohsen Milani, Ph.D.
x Government & Intl Affairs
t USF Electronic Theses and Dissertations.
An Analysis of U.S. Policies Targeting the Iranian Nuclear Program by Bryan T. Hamilton A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of Government and International Affairs College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida Major Professor: Mohsen Milani, Ph.D. Abdelwahab Hechiche, Ph.D. Scott M. Solomon, Ph.D Date of Approval: November 2 2010 Keywords: Iran, Atomic, Weapon, Obama IAEA Copyright 2010, Bryan T. Hamilton
DEDICATION I would like to dedicate this thesis to my wife, Jennifer, who has provided me with tremendous support not just during my time writing this thesis but also throughout my career in the Army to keep me moving forward. You understood that this process was one that would require more time away from you; thank you for taking care of our son and being so wonderful. I would not be successful without you. I must also thank my mother Judy Hamilton, whose support and reassurance was critical ; she read and reviewed drafts of this manuscript wh en I knew it probably put her to sleep Lastly I must thank my friend and mentor COL Ke mp Chester for encouraging me to attend this university and pursue this specific degree. Thank y ou, sir, for encouraging me to att end a school that would force my thoughts to be challenged by those that think differently f rom myself
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I must recognize the extensive assistance given to me by Major Professor Dr. Mohsen Milani in my endeavor to complete this thesis. His support and guidance in this process ensured that I left no stone unturned, and he pushed me to thi nk longer and harder about the problems that I encountered. For that, I am deeply grateful. I must also identify Dr. Abdelwahab Hechiche who provided extensive support in my quest to understand Iran in the context of the greater Middle East. His mentors hip and steering aided me tremendously over the course of my studies at the University of South Florida. Thank you, sir, for always taking the time to speak with me.
i TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ ii i ii LIST OF FIGURES ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ iv ABSTRACT ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... v INTRODUCTION ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 1 A Walkthrough ................................ ................................ ............................... 1 Research Design ................................ ................................ ............................. 3 IRANIAN NUCLEAR HISTORY ................................ ................................ ................... 7 ................................ ................................ ....... 7 The Post Revolutionary Years ................................ ................................ ...... 15 The Ahmadinejad Era ................................ ................................ ................... 20 ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONS ................................ ................................ .................. 27 The Importance of Iranian Oil ................................ ................................ ...... 28 The Natural Gas Myth ................................ ................................ .................. 33 BLANKET ................................ ............................... 36 EVOLUTION OF U.S. POLICIES TOWARDS THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 42 The Pre Nixon Years ................................ ................................ .................... 42 The Nixon Presidency ................................ ................................ .................. 46 The Gerald Ford Presidency ................................ ................................ ......... 50 The Jimmy Carter Presidency ................................ ................................ ....... 53 U.S. POLICIES TOWARDS REVOLUTIONARY IRAN ................................ ............. 57 The Reagan Years ................................ ................................ ........................ 5 8 Bush I and Iranian Policy ................................ ................................ ............. 63 The President William Jefferson Clinton Era ................................ ................ 6 7 President George W. Bush and the Axis of Evil ................................ ............ 7 9 ................................ ................................ ............. 91 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS ................................ ................................ ...... 10 1
ii RECOMMENDATIONS : A WAY AHEAD ................................ ............................... 1 12 American Responsibilities ................................ ................................ .......... 11 3 Iranian Responsibilities ................................ ................................ .............. 11 6 ................................ ................................ .................. 119 REFERENCES CITED ................................ ................................ ............................... 12 2 APPENDIX 1: NUCLEAR NON PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) ...................... 131
iii LIST OF TABLES TABLE 1: Summary of the .................... 8 TABLE 2: Pre 1979 Agreements for Nuclear Cooperation with Iran ............................. 13 TABLE 3: Post Sector ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 103
iv LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1: Number of Centrifuges Deployed Over Time ................................ .............. 24 FIGURE 2: Iran's Petroleum Production and Consumption ................................ ............ 29 ................................ ............................. 33
v ABSTRACT nuclear program continues to present a major challenge to U.S. policy At the core of this challenge is one fundamental question: Is Iran attempting to build a nuclear weapon? O bjective analysis reveals that dependence on oil and natural gas provide s sufficient economic merit for Iran to pursue a peaceful nuclear program ; without Though the economic justification is valid, the s ecurity of Iran and the survival of its regime are overarching; acts have fueled the quest for a nuclear weapon For this reason, U.S. administrations since the 1979 r evolution have striven nuclear program through policies of containment, isolation and denial of nuclear technology Considering the current standoff between Iran and the U.S. we must ask a nother key question: H ow effective have U.S. policies been? The answer is simple ; Iran has made significant progress in its nuclear program S anctions political pressure and threats proved no obstacle to Iran ; worse still ignoring IAEA and other reports that found no convincing evidence that Iran is building nuclear weapons damaged U.S. ef forts significantly U.S. policies have failed, and its strategies must be discarded in favor of a new approach. This research implicates that a non confrontational engagement policy which acknowledg es needs to build a peaceful nuclear program will provide President Obama and the U.S. the highest probability of prevent ing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapon s
1 INTRODUCTION Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran and the United States have been at odds with one another at nearly every turn. Over the past three decades, there has been a tremendous amount of animosity between the two governments with few opportunities for the resumption of normal diplomatic relations. When these opportunities did arise, though, those in power were not able to capitalize sufficiently. Today, Iran and the United States stand at odds with one another once again, and this conflict has centered upon nuclear program, its goals and motivations. The Walkthrough The c program from its roots to present day, at least as close as to the publication date of this manuscript as possible. Beginning with my research design in the following section, I will lay out my core questions along with the other principle elements of my research along with a very brief discussion of my methodology. Most importantly, the research design sect ion will present my hypothesis for this research. Following this introdu ction, I will immediately begin a detailed description of the origins of the program that received much cooperation from the west to support Mohammad Reza Shah. Foll owing the section on the Shah, I will describe the nuclear progress, and lack thereof, made by the revolutionaries foll ow ing the Iranian Revolution.
2 This section will flow directly into our present day conflict with the current Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad which will attempt to bring the reader up to speed on some of the more current events in the Iranian program. Immediately following a description of the history of the program, an analysis of two key justifications of the Iranian program will be in order. Beginning with the economic reasoning behind the program, an explanation of the significance of oil in the woes that many believe that it is. Continuing wi th the same theme, the discussion will mo nuclear program provide s to Iran. This chapter will detail why this reasoning, though not necessarily comforting to those who fear a nuclear armed Iran, is sound and rational for Iran. It details the history of fore ign in terference within Iran that has pushed Iran in this direction leaving them little choice but to protect the security of the state of Iran. The following two chapters represent a breakdown of U.S. Presidential administration policies toward the Irani an nuclear program beginning with President Eisenhower all the way up to the current Obama administration. The first of these two chapters focuses on each of the administrations prior to the 1979 Iranian revolution. After reading the history of the Irani an nuclear program; one should expect to see cooperation to be the name of the game between these Presidents and the Shah of Iran. The chapter which covers the Post Revolutionary administrations certainly gives off a
3 very different feel which is absent of much cooperation. These sections detail many of Following the discussion of the U.S. policies, my conclusion will offer a review of my research questions, my hypothesis, and my di scoveries in this research. I will discuss my findings as well as whether or not I believe I provided sufficient evidence to prove my hypothesis. This final chapter will present the implications and significance of this body of research; it will also det ail areas of areas of research in this subject that may still be useful to the field. Lastly, I will present my personal recommendations for bre aching the existing stalemate over to reassure the international community of its intentions. Though not intended to be an all inclusive list of issues, I contend that my recommendations represent the m ost critical issues to be resolved for success to be had. Research Design The speculation in the United States has been that Iran is definitively pursuing nuclear weapons. It almost appears as if many in the media and the government have completely avoided the primary questions to be addressed herein. So that there is no confu sion up front, my hypothesis is that U.S. policies after the Iranian Revolution have been ineffective at halting the advancement of the Iranian nuclear program. With this in mind, my primary research question is how effective have U.S. attempts bee n in altering In answering this question, it is important to also answer the
4 question as to attainment of a nuclear program. However, in understanding the answe rs to the first two questions, it is also critical that one be able to answer one of the other primary questions of this research. W hy is Iran pursuing a nuclear program? Is it truly for peaceful purposes, or are their intentions designed to attain a mil itary capability for their nuclear program? In addressing this What must also be examined ; are they merely a front for the acquisition of nuclear weapons and added security? Stated again; my hypothesis is that U.S. policies after the Iranian Revolution have enable d the advancement of the Iranian nuclear program. The independent variable (IV) in this research could easily be considered to be plural rather than a singular variable; however, the IV is the United States policy towards Iran and its nuclear program. In this sense, policy is defined as a program of actions adopted by a government. Here, each U.S. admini stration had the opportunity to administer their own set of policies directed at the Iranian nuclear program. Unfortunately this is not a variable that can yield any legitimate or strong quantifiable data, its measurement will strictly be of a qualitative nature. This variable will be examined through a look at specific U.S. strategies that came out of policies such as sanctions, political pressure, or military threats. The dependent variable is the Iranian nuclear program. This variable will be measured on multiple fronts to include cooperation with other states, technological advances, and all in all the overall progress of the program from 1979 forward. This
5 variable can be measured through the number of centrifuges in operation, number of facilities operational, or even in the amount of enriched uranium produced indigenously, though this last indicator could be considered a byproduct of the number of centrifuges func tioning. Though these measurements will yield some quantifiable data, its analysis will also be qualitative in nature. This research could be conducted as a comparative case study with two cases with a temporal comparison between U.S. policies pre and po st Iranian Revolution. Obviously the se two cases would be split by the occurrence of the 1979 revolution, but because my objective is to examine the effectiveness of U.S. policies towards the Iranian nuclear program after the revolution, this research wil l be presented as an individual case study. This study will have multiple units of analysis, though, where each U.S. examined. The goal will be to demonstrate that the p olicies of the U.S. administrations program. I do expect a degree of contrast within this single case and while John Stuart is meant for comparative case studies, it may prove useful within this individual case study when using it to examine the different administrations differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensible part of the cause, of the phenomenon." 1 Although this style of case study proves extremely difficult to establish causality in the complex world of international relations, the objective of this research 1 Comparative Perspectives: Theories and Methods 1970: 207.
6 will be to establish how have been, and still are, in advancing the Iranian nuclear program in the post revolutionary period.
7 IRANIAN NUCLEAR HISTORY The Iranian nuclear program has a lengthy and tumultuous history that extends back over fifty years and finds its roots in the 1950s. This section will provide a detailed description of the facts that have brought the Iranian nuclear program to the position it is in now. The program has been bes et by problems of all kinds, but the political trouble which the Iranian nuclear program has found itself in today certainly carries its own irony when one looks back at its foundations. A look at these facts may seem to indicate that the positions of tho se involved with the Iranian nuclear program have taken a complete 180 degree turn from where they stood in the beginning and up until the Iranian revolution in 1979. See table In th e aftermath of World War II, Mohammad Reza Shah the head of state of Iran from 1941 1977, sought to obtain nuclear technology for Iran, and in the wake of the Mossadeq coup, the United States represented the stepping stone to nuclear technology t hat the Shah was seeking. In 1957, the U.S. and Iran signed the Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atoms after approximately two years of negotiating, and two years later, in 1959, the Shah announced the plans for Tehran ar Research Center that would be supplied with a five megawatt (MW)
8 Date Event 1957 U.S. and Iran sign Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atoms 1967 Tehran Nuclear Research Center completed; Iran receives 5.54kg enriched uranium from U.S. 7/1/68 Iran signs Nuclear Non proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2/2/70 Iran ratifies the NPT 1974 Atomic Energy Organization of Iran(AEOI) founded 1974 Iran signs the IAEA Safeguards Agreement 1974 German firm Kraftwerk Union begins work on Bushehr nuclear reactor 1974 Iran signs contract with French firm Framatome to build Darkhovin nuclear reactors March 1975 $15 billion agreement with U.S. for construction of eight nuclear reactors 1975 AEOI signs contract with Massachusetts Institute of Technology for training of nuclear engineers. 7/10/78 Iran and U.S. signs U.S. Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement reprocessing of spent fuels 1979 1984 1987 Iraq bombs Bushehr reactor a total of six times 1984 Esfahan Nuclear Research Center opens 1985 Uranium mining in Yazd province begins
9 Date Event 1987 Iran signs agreement with Pakistan for training nuclear engineers 1/8/1995 Iran signs $800 million agreement with Russia for completion of part of Bushehr reactor 2002 Nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak discovered by the United States and publicly announced 10/21/03 3; IAEA Additional Protocol enacted; Iran suspends uranium enrichment activity 2004 Iran reportedly received support from Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan 11/15/04 Iran signs Paris Agreement with EU Abaad agreement June 2005 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad elected to first term 2009 Iran begins testing indigenously produced centrifuges termed IR 2 and IR 3 September 2009 Discovery of Fordow Fuel Enrichment Facility announced by U.S. President Obama May 2010 Iran reaches agreement with Turkey and Brazil for nuclear fuel 8/21/2010 Russia and Iran load fuel into the Bushehr nuclear reactor for the first time thermal research reactor purchased from the U.S. 2 While it was announced that this research center would be built in 1959, it would require nearly eight years for the facility 2 Middle Eastern Studies 43, no.2 (2007): 225.
10 to begin operations, and in 1967 the facility received 5.54 kilograms of enriched uranium, of which 5.16 kilograms were fissile isotopes capable of producing a nuclear bomb. 3 Shortly after the startup of the Tehran reactor, the Nuclear Non proliferation Treaty (NPT) see Appendix 1 was available for signatures by states, and Iran si gned the NPT on the first day, July 1, 1968. The treaty was ultimately ratified by the Majles the Iranian Parliament, on February 2, 1970. 4 Four years after ratifying the NPT, Iran would reement which among other things, ensures that states must declare to the IAEA the existence of any facility no later than 180 days before introducing any nuclear materials into the facility. 5 Less than a year after signing the NPT, Iran would extend the cooperation agreement with the U.S. for 10 more years. With this cooperation providing vital support, Iran Ministry of Water and Power started a feasibility study concerni ng the construction of nuclear power plants (NPP) in southern Iran. 6 While the receipt of the equipment required for the operation of the nuclear reactor standing at Tehran University was a significant step in the Iranian nuclear program, Iran still lacke d the indigenous knowledge to be self sustaining. However, there were hundreds of Iranian students enrolled in university nuclear programs 3 December 22, 2004. http://www.payvand.com/news/04/dec/1186.html (accessed July 23, 2010). 4 Ibid. 5 September 29, 2009. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/09/when did iran begin building the qom nuclear facility.html (accessed July 29, 2010). 6
11 throughout Europe and the U.S., and by the early 1970s, these trained scientists were returning to Iran to establish nuclear research and development departments in their universities. 7 Considering these newly established departments in Iranian universities, when the Shah finally made public his ambitious nuclear power program in 1974, there was a sufficient base of sc ientific knowledge available. need for energy would increase to 20,000 MW within 20 years, there can be little disputing the impact that the 1973 Yom Kippur War had in the S process. The spike in oil prices resulting from the OPEC boycott provided the Shah with a huge sum of currency that could provide the necessary monetary support for the nuclear expansion. And in March of 1974, the Shah declared a go al of establishing 23,000 MWs 8 The resulting Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) founded Akbar Etemad who is today considered the father of the Iranian nu clear program; this direction of the Shah. The 1974 establishment of the AEOI also coincides with the Shah calling for a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (MENWFZ ). 9 construction of NPPs. Two European states, Germany and France were heavily involved 7 Middle East Journal 60, no.2 (2006): 213. 8 December 22, 2004. http://www.payvand.com/news/04/dec/1186.html (accessed July 23, 2010). 9 Irania n Studies. 39, no.3 (2006): 309.
12 in the development of the Iranian nuclear program. Both German y and France were award ed contracts to build a total of eight NPPs, and their support did not stop there. In 1975, Iran was permitted to purchase a 10% share in Eurodif, a uranium enrichment company that was established among France, Belgium, Spain, and Italy. 10 Cooperation di d not stop there; as mentioned previously many Iranian students traveled to Germany and France to pursue educations related to nuclear technology. The AEOI also signed agreements with Germany for the purchase of uranium enrichment technology and nuclear f uel requirements. Iran further expanded their program by signing agreements with South Africa for the acquisition of uranium yellowcake and the financing of an enrichment plant there; beneath all of these efforts was a quest for indigenous nuclear capabil ity 11 United States and others was a spectacular one ; table 2 represents an extensive list of agreements reached for nuclear cooperation with Iran In March of 1975, a $15 billion agreement was reached for the construction of eight nuclear reactors that would provide Iran with a total of 8,000 MW of power. 12 Additionally, in 1975, the AEOI signed a contract with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to train their nuclea r engineers. 13 Throughout 1975 and 1976, Iran continued to negotiate with the U.S. in the areas of 10 Barnaby, Frank. How Nuclear Weapons Spread: Nuclear Weapon Proliferation in the 1990s. London: Routledge, 1993, p 114 117. 11 12 p. 214. 13 October 3, 2003. http://www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1015.html (accessed July 23, 2010).
13 uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities, but it was not until 1977 that another major agreement was made. On April 12, 1977, Iran signed another agre ement with the Table 2: Pre 1979 Agreements for Nuclear Cooperation with Iran Date Event 1957 U.S. signs Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atoms 1969 (CEA) of France signs agreement to repair Tehran research reactor 3/13/69 U.S. extends 1957 agreement for 10 years 1974 Iran agrees to loan $1 billion to CEA for urani um enrichment plant in France; receives 10% ownership June 1974 France signs preliminary agreement to supply five 1,000 MW reactors to Iran June 1974 U.S. and Iran reach provisional agreement to provide two nuclear reactors to Iran November 1974 German Kraftwerk Union (Siemens) agrees to build two nuclear react ors at Bushehr November 1974 Agreement with French company Framatome reached for two nuclear reactors at Bandar e Abbas November 1974 Under previous two agreements; France and Germany agree to provide enriched uranium to Iran 11/3/74 U.S. and Iran agree to form U.S. Iran Joint Commission for nuclear cooperation February 1975 India signs a nuclear cooperation agreement 1976 South Africa signs agreement to provide $700 million of uranium yellowcake 4/12/77 U.S. signs agreement for nuclear cooperation, technological exchanges, and safety 10/3/77 Australia signs nuclear waste storage agreement
14 Table 2: Pre 1979 Agreements for Nuclear Cooperation with Iran (Cont) Date Event 11/11/77 Iran and German Kraftwerk Union sign agreement to build four nuclear reactors near Esfahan 1/1/78 U.S. President Carter and Shah agree on plan for Iran to purchase 6 8 nuclear reactors from U.S. 7/10/78 U.S. Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement signed Source: Nuclear Threat Initiative (www.nti.org) U.S. to exchange nuclear technology and cooperate in the areas of nuclear safety, and was made. This agreement effecti 14 status for reprocessing of spent fuels (a very hot issue now) and announced the purchase of 6 8 light water reactors from the U.S. Signed on July 10, 1978, this agreement became known as the U.S. Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement, but the Shah put plans for his NPPs on hold as he sought to maintain power. As the Islamic Revolution gained momentum its leaders affairs. Fear ful of the direction of Iran in the event the Shah was removed from power, the U.S. halted the practice of supplying Iran with highly enriched uranium also. 16 Once the Shah was ousted from power, the U.S Iran agreement was no more. 14 16 Ibid.
15 The Post Revolutio n Years The Iranian Revolution represented a rejection of foreign and external influences within Iran ; its leaders were intent on independence for Iran. For the nuclear program, this meant that its progress would be reversed While both Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan put a stop to efforts at the nuclear program, more Neither East, nor West, only the Islamic Republic) epitomized his rejection of the nuclear modernization 17 It required little time before the post revolutionary leaders realized the mistake built by German firms were incomplete, Iraq bombed the site six times between 1984 and 1987 subsequently destroying the entire core areas of both reactors. 18 The sheer brutality of the Iran Iraq War that included the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqis against Iranians opened the eyes of the revolutionary leadership to the utility of moder n military 19 It was during the early 1980s when President Hashemi Rafsanjani received the blessings of Khomeini to atte mpt to resume 17 Vaziri, Haleh The Nuclear Non Proliferation Regime Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 315. 18 19
16 construction of the NPPs by Germany and France. To the dismay of Rafsanjani, both the German and French firms refused to resume work, and once Iran realized that no support was likely to be provided by the West, it turned to alternative supp liers to support the nuclear program. In 1984, the Iranian regime indicated a commitment to pursuit of a nuclear program with the opening of the Esfahan Nuclear Research Center; China provided support in the form of both fuel fabrication and conversion fa cilities necessary for uranium enrichment. 20 Additionally, Iran found support from Pakistan with the signing of an agreement in 1987 which sent 39 Iranian nuclear scientists to Pakistan for training in Pakistani nuclear facilities. 21 A mere three years lat er, in 1990, Iran would sign two more nuclear cooperation agreements, this time with the Russians and Chinese, and on January 8, 1995, after Iran had failed to secure support from other states to complete the Bushehr reactor, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy agreed to complete block one of the Bushehr reactor for $800 million. 22 Though this agreement was signed nearly 15 years ago, diplomatic and financial problems have prevented the reactor from becoming active on the electric grid until potentially l ater this year or in 2011 Each of these agreements played critical roles in advancing the Iranian nuclear program. nt the acquisition of dual use technology that could support both peaceful and military applications of nuclear 20 21 Ibid. 22
17 technology. The Iran Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, subsequently renamed the Iran Sanctions Act in 2006, put major restrictions on significant in vestments in the Iranian energy sector. However, the election of the reformist President Khatami in 1997 opened the door for other states to make lucrative nuclear sales to Iran despite the sanctions. 23 Despite the sanctions, the Iranian nuclear program made substantial progress through the late 1990s and early into the 21 st century. In 2002, the progress of the Iranian program was revealed through the discoveries of two nuclear facilities previously unknown. The uranium enrichment facility at Natanz an d the heavy water production facility at Arak were announced in a press conference in Washington, D.C. by an Iranian resistance movement. 24 scrutiny from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and it was revealed in 2004 that the now infamous rogue Pakistani scientist, A.Q. Khan, had provided extensive support, to include providing Pakistani centrifuges and designs to the Iranian nuclear program. 25 When the IAEA concluded their inspections t hey detailed a series of previously unknown advancements and facilities within the Iranian nuclear program. Iran subsequently conceded that the plants at Natanz and Arak were not alone; another plant was also under construction in Esfahan in order to conv ert yellowcake into enriched uranium. 26 Ad vancements in their nuclear program included efforts in laser isotope separation which can enrich uranium as well as the revelation that Iran had begun mining 23 Pollack, Kenneth. The Persian Puzzle. New York: Random House, 2004, p. 362. 24 25 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle p. 363. 26 Ibid, p. 364.
18 their own uranium ore 27 from the more than 5,000 metric ton of deposit discovered in 1985 in eastern Yazd province. 28 In the aftermath of the IAEA inspections, o n October 21, 2003, Iran signed the 3 which amounted to Iran signing the IAEA Additional Protocol and agreeing to vo luntarily suspend uranium enrichment activity. 29 Note that by being a signatory to the NPT, Iran was already subjected to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements in accordance with the NPT and IAEA, and though the Additional Protocol is not a requirement of timely detection of the diversion of significant quantities of fissile material from peaceful to military purposes in the non nuclear weapons states that are parties to the NPT 30 To put it simply, the Additional Pro tocol the IAEA expanded access to both nuclear related information and declared / undeclared nuclear facilities but without ratification, Iran is not obligated to adhere to it. 31 As stated ab ove, the a d Agreemen t enacted the Additi onal Protocol in Iran, but in agreeing to this, few incentives were given to Iran In exchange 3 right to pursue a peac 27 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle p. 364. 28 October 6, 2003. http://www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1039.html (accessed July 23, 2010). 29 Pavyand September 9, 2005. http://www.payvand.com/news/05/sep/1070.html (accessed July 23, 2010). 30 31 EA Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards IAEA. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html (accessed September 29, 2010).
19 32 So why did Iran choose to sign the agreement when so li ttle was given in return? First, the intense pressure resulting from the identification of the facilities in Natanz and Arak and other advancements played a role in Iran signing Additional Protocol but there was one other factor that was likely more critical The U.S. only m onths earlier had quickly decimated Saddam in a coalition victory in Iraq. Considering that President George W. Bush had placed Iran squarely into his Axis of Evil, Iran was fearful that they were next on the hit list. American troops were now positioned in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and U.S. naval carriers were well within striking distance in the Persian Gulf supporting U.S. operations in the region. Additionally, t he fact that President Bush had used the perception that Saddam was devel oping nuclear weapons as his central justification for the Iraq W ar certainly put the Iranian leaders on notice that the same could be done for them. At that point in time the m ; few thought that it would turn out that there was no Iraqi nuclear program. So o ne could ry strike. Ultimately, with the institution of the Additional Protocol inspections the Iranian program was not found in violation of the NPT by the IAEA as inspections found no evidence of illegal nuclear activities. 33 Additionally, Iran continued negotia ting with the EU 3 (Britain, France, and Germany) in regards to potential economic and political 32 The Middle East Journal 59, no. 2 (2005): 209. 33
20 incentives that could prevent the development of nuclear weapons in Iran. After just over a year of negotiations, the EU 3 and Iran signed on November 15, 200 4 what is known as between the EU 3 and Iran were underway. This temporary agreement i ncluded all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, the manufacturing and importing of centrifuges and their components, and any work on plutonium separation. 34 More sess nuclear technology for peaceful civilian usage in accordance with Article IV as shown in Appendix 1, of the NPT. As stated above, this agreement was temporary while the EU 3 and Iran negotiated over a set of incentives designed to ensure that Iran was not on the path to develop nuclear weapons, and despite the exchanges of several proposals between the EU 3 and Iran over the nuclear program, no further agreements were reached. The Ahmadinejad Era So in 2005 with the election of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the But how could Iran move f rom such a weak position in 2003 to a stronger more assertive position in 2005? First of all, the IAEA had not discovered any smoking gun pointing to an Iran ian nuclear weapons program; so the U.S. justifications for the Iraq War could not be applied to I ran and Ahmadinejad Additionally, U.S. forces were tied up in a resurgent insurgency in Iraq, and casualties in Afghanistan were even on the rise; with American citizens increasingly 34 Kibar
21 expressing disapproval over the war in Iraq, President Bush not only d id have the political capital to strike Iran but was also unprepared for potential consequ ences 35 he state o f the oil market at the time. With oil prices on the rise any confrontation between the U.S. and Iran would only serve to drive prices higher and damage the U.S. economy. OPEC was at nearly maximum production capacity; replacing lost Iranian oil due to a conflict was unlikely. Iran, who possessed little foreig n debt at the time, ~$10 billion, was rather well insulated from any conflict. 36 Additionally, Iran was also gaining the support of other regional powers. China and India had recently signed oil and natural gas contracts with Iran for in excess of $100 billion, and China had also invited Iran to be an observer to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which includes China and Russia. 37 This organization represented additional political support to the Ahmadinejad regime. Each of these pieces provides attitude towards the West. He was in a very strong position, and he was well aware of it. And when (UNSC) on February 4, 2006 38 Pr esident Ahmadinejad stated that Iran would ignore any 35 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38
22 39 Ahmadinejad even went so far as to refer to the Iranian nuclear pr 40 Throughout 2007 and 2008, Iran continued to advance its nuclear program. By August of 2007, Iran was operating nearly 3,000 centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP). 41 However, as of September 2007, some a nalysts argued that the plant was beset by technical difficulties as relatively small amounts of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) had been used in the centrifuge cascades indicating their performance was subpar. David Albright, an analyst from the Washington ba sed Institute for Science and International Security (IISS) to operate individual centrifuges and cascades adequately. However, it still may be struggling to operate a large number of cascades at the 42 resolved the majority of their technical problems concerning centrifuge operation s ensuring the units would spin at the proper speeds and for the necessary amounts of time to produce en riched uranium and the facilities would begin to function at or near their intended capacity. The Natanz FEP was then operating approximately 3,800 P1 centrifuges which had been designed by Pakistan with two additional cascades of up to 2,100 and 3,000 P 1 centrifuges expected to come online in 2009; two more centrifuge cascades were also under construction as of 39 Nicoll Strategic Comments 13, no.7 (2007). http://www.iiss.org/p ublications/strategic comments/past issues/volume 13 2007/volume 13 issue 7/nuclear iran/?locale=en (accessed July 14, 2010). 40 The Washington Quarterly. 33, no.1 (2009): 167. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid.
23 early 2009 at the Natanz FEP. 43 Though there are some disputes over the number of centrifuges in operation in Iran, t he nuclear program has prog ressed very rapidly over the past few years Shahram Chubin contends that it has advanced from 164 centrifuges in 2003 to approximately 8,000 in mid 2009 44 and Muhammad Sahimi stated that the Natanz facility was reported by the Iranians to have the capabi lity to house as many as 55,000 centrifuges. 45 However, Iran Watch.org lists different numbers for Iranian centrifuge progress. Figure 1 below shows the gap that exists between experts in how far along Iran truly is, but there is still no disputing the ex tensive progress made. 46 In addition to the fact that the operation of the plant has progressed, other aspects of the nuclear program have also advanced. As stated earlier, the centrifuges which Iran first put to use came directly from Pakistan through the A.Q. Khan network. Known as enrichment cascades. However, as of early 2009, Iran had begun testing their own next generation of centrifuges: the IR 2, IR 3, and p otentially a longer centrifuge. 47 Each of these centrifuges are projected to have a much greater enrichment output while also 48 If successful, these indigenous Iranian 43 Institute for Science and International Security. January 21, 2009: 7. 44 45 http://original.antiwar.com/sahimi/2009/12/01/double standards for irans nuclear program/ (accessed July 28, 2010). 46 Iran Watch. September 9, 2010. http://www.iranwatch.org/ourpubs/articles/iranucleartimetable.html (accessed September 29, 2010). 47 Albright and Shir 48
24 centrifuges will certainly replace the P1 and provide Iran with larger amounts of low enriched uranium faster than before. Figure 1: Number of C entrifuges D eployed O ver T ime Source: Iran Watch.org In September of 2009, President Obama announced publicly that the U.S. had used overhead satel lites to observe Iran building the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Facility for nearly five years in the mountains near the holy city of Qom. 49 While Iran claimed that the facility had already been disclosed to the IAEA, t he pressure resulting from this find again placed Iran at the negotiating table. Iran ian officials met with the five permanent members of the UNSC plus Germany (P5 + 1) in Geneva to discuss the program, and on ts LEU to Russia for enrichment to 19.75% which would then be sent to France to be 49 Middle East Policy 17, no. 2 (2010): 57.
25 converted into fuel rods that cannot be used for military applications. 50 The proposal also permitted inspection of the Fordow facility by the IAEA, which was inspected with no issues, but when the October agreement went to the Iranian government for approval, it was rejected outright by Supreme Leader and Foreign Minister Mottaki who proposed a simultaneous exchange of LEU and fuel rods that was rejected by the P5 + 1. 51 reached an agreement with Turkey that strongly resembled the initial proposal by the P5 + 1. Iran will ship over half of its stockpile of LEU to Turkey for further enrichment and conversion to fuel rods. 52 Most recently, o n August 21 st 2010, a new era dawned in the Iranian nuclear program. The Russians began loading fuel into the Bushehr nuclear reactor. While this does not immediately place the reactor into an o perational mode, it represents a critical point in the Iranian program that took decades to achieve. If Iran can overcome some new problems within the plant which will be discussed later, Iran will have its first nuclear power plant online and connected t o the electricity grid likely within six to seven months, and other reactors will soon follow. While t he recent history of the Iranian nuclear program is a very confrontational one, we must not forget that the program originated from the U.S. and Europe The state of the program today represents as near an indigenous capability as Iran has ever had. While Iran desires to possess the complete nuc lear cycle, they have conveyed throughout 50 51 Ibid. 52 http://original.antiwar.com/sahimi/2010/05/24/how dare they make a deal with iran/ (accessed July 29, 2010).
26 history that they are not committed to nuclear weapons. Despite th is, does Iran have a real need, economic or security related, to possess the nuclear cycle? That is the subject to be addressed in the following chapter
27 ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONS economic to security to the desire to possess nuclear weapons. This chapter will be focusing solely on the economic justifications, though some individuals have argued that Iran h as no legitimate economic reason to have a civilian nuclear program. This argument generally posits that the significant oil and natural gas reserves that Iran possesses as national resources render the need for nuclear power marginal at best. These indi is easily tossed aside when one takes a look at huge reserves of oil and gas; thus the true purpose of the Iranian nuclear program can only be the development of nuclear weapo ns. Neoconservatives such as Michael Ledeen, Richard Perle, and Andrew McCarthy are 53 Kenneth Pollac k 54 While many o f these individuals argue over the perceived intentions of the Iranian nuclear program are extremely revealing. There are several indicators that present a 53 Ross, Dennis and Makovsky David. Myths, Illusions, and Peace: Finding a New Direction for America in the Middle East. London: Viking Press, 2009, p. 184. 54 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle p. 363.
28 glaring pict ure of the Iranian need for energy sources at the present time. To obtain a thorough understanding, one must look at population growth, domestic energy consumption rates, and oil and natural gas production rates. However, what is just as important is to understand how reliant the Iranian economy is upon their oil and natural gas export revenues. approximately 70% are under the age of 30, and projections have the population potentially growing to 100 million by the year 2025. 55 These figures alone demonstrate an ever increasing need for energy sources within Iran; between 1977 and 2003, sources per year. 56 The Importance of Iranian Oil Statistics from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) demonstrate the consumption was a mere 590,000 barrels per day (BPD), but in 2009, this figure had risen to just over 1.8 million BPD. Yet while the consumption has more than tripled, the production rates have lagged and risen by only about 150% from 1.7 million BPD in 1980 to just under 4.2 million BPD in 2009 ; see figure 2 57 55 December 7, 2004. http://www.payvand.com/news/04/dec/1056.html (accessed July 23, 2010). 56 Ibid. 57 U.S. Energy Information Administration. Iran Energy Profile. J uly 14, 2010. http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=IR (accessed August 10, 2010).
29 Figure 2: Iran's Petroleum P roduction and Consumption I contend that a look at two rankings paint a stark picture of the economic and energy problems in Iran; according to the EIA, Iran ranks 4 th in the world in oil ranking is 198 th in the world; Iran nets just over 2.4 million BPD compared to the Middle 58 These rankings reveal significant problems for a state overwhelmingly dependent upon oil revenue. Iran must also contend with being an OPEC member as they are subjected to to cover their OPEC quota of 3.817 million BPD. 59 As a result, Iran must import many oil products, including gasoline, for domestic consumption. The government in the past spent nearly $6 billion per year on importing and subsidizing gasoline 60 for its 58 U.S. Energy Information Administration. Iran Energy Profile. July 14, 2010. 59 60 Ibid.
30 in creasingly gasoline hungry public; however, recent efforts to curb domestic gasoline consumption through government controlled price increases via subsidy reduction and rationing resulted in an 8 percent reduction in gasoline imports from 2008 to 2009. 61 T his rationing system also reduced private motorist gasoline quotas from 26 gallons/month (g/m) to 21 g/m in December 2009, and there is a possibility of further reductions to 16 g/m. 62 rationing sys tem has reduced domestic gasoline consumption by nearly 20 percent since January 2010, but Iran has still spent nearly $10 billion on gasoline imports since 2008 as it does not have sufficient refining capacity to meets its domestic consumption requirement s. 63 need of major repairs, upgrading, or repressurizing by natural gas, 64 the likelihood for Iran to see a significant increase in production on the horizon is unlikely. In fact, the combination of the Iran Iraq War, lack of investment, sanctions and the natural decline of the oil fields have eroded production; it is estimated that between 400 700,000 BPD is lost annually and will not be recovered without significant str uctural upgrades. 65 A 2005 report by the International Energy Agency noted that Iran required an estimated $75 61 U.S. Energy Information Administration. Iran Energy Profile. July 14, 2010. http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=IR (accessed August 10, 2010). 62 Energy Information Administration. January 2010. http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Iran/pdf.pdf (accessed August 12, 2010), p. 6. 63 Erdbrink, Thomas, and Colum Lynch. "Iran is ready for planned U.S. sanctions targeting fuel imports, analysts say." WashingtonPost.com. June 24, 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp dyn/content/article/2010/06/23/AR2010062303770.html (accessed August 12, 2010). 64 65
31 billion in oil infrastructure investments between the years 2004 2030 in order to sustain oil production and refining. 66 Looking at the project ed power requirements for Iran, by projected growth rates of 7 9 percent it is conceivable that Iran will require 70,000 megawatts (MW) of power in 2021 up from the current installed capacity of approximately 43,000 MW. 67 For each 1,000 MW of power to be p roduced by oil, it requires approximately 20 25 million barrels per year; if one uses the price of a barrel of oil in 2010, around $75/barrel, Iran stands to lose $1.5 to 1.875 billion/year per for every 1,000 MW of electricity produced by oil. 68 To be more to 112 140 million barrels per year for the 2021 projections 69 ; if oil were to hypothetically remain at $75/barrel (which is unlikely), Iran would be losing $8.4 to 10.5 billion/year in total revenue. These figures alone should provide ample economic As stated earlier, Iran has been and continues to undergo significant growth. While electricity production has witnessed approxi mately 8.5% in annual growth between 1977 and 2001, the electricity consumption rate has been outpacing it at 8.8%. 70 production rates. It is not difficult to understand that this predicament could lead to Iran 66 International Energy Agency. World Energy Outlook: 2005 Fact Sheet Iran. 2005. http://www.iea.org/papers/2005/iran_fs.pdf (accessed August 12, 2010). 67 U.S. Energy Information Administration. Iran Energy Profile. July 14, 2010. http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=IR (accessed August 10, 2010). 68 69 Harvard International Review 26, no.4 2005): 43. 70
32 becoming a net importer of oil in the coming years. Considering that oil makes up 80% of a net importer of oil would be devastat ing to the Iranian state, its economy, and its citizens. 71 These figures alone present a plausible and understandable case for the acquisition of civilian nuclear technology. The fact is that Iran is heavily dependent upon oil revenues for their government revenues, and the fluctuation of oil prices over the past 30 years has increased the importance of the development of nuclear power plants. A study produced by the International Monetary Fund in 2008 demonstrates the effects of oil pricing on I economy; it states that oil sector fluctuations caused government revenues to range between 25 and 73 percent between 1986 and 1994. 72 Figure 3 shown below paints a with the volatility of the oil sector, Iran created the Oil Stabilization Fund (OSF) in the year 2000 with the Third Five Year Development Plan (2000 revenue should be deposited in the OSF; the central government could draw from the OSF account if the 73 As oil prices began to rise in the last 10 years, Iran saw significant increases in their oil revenues and chose to use this revenue to 71 72 International Monetary Fund. Islamic Republic of Iran: Selected Issues. August 2008. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08285.pdf (accessed August 11, 2010), p. 37. 73 International Mon etary Fund. Islamic Republic of Iran: Selected Issues. August 2008. p. 38.
33 Figure 3: The Role of Oil in Iran's Economy foster economic development through loan programs and pay for gasoline imports. The just 74 The Natural Gas Myth nd largest reserves in the world, Iran already uses gas to cover more than 75% of their energy needs. 75 The gas that Iran is not using to power their electric plants is being used for a process known as secondary recovery where the gas is injected into oil r eservoirs to increase oil production 74 International Monetary Fund. Islamic Republic of Iran: Selected Issues. August 2008. p. 42. 75
34 by several thousand barrels per day; this process takes up 35 to 40 percent of the 4.1 billion cubic feet of gas that Iran produces each year. 76 More importantly, the revenue from these several thousand barrels per day or more of oil would not only pay for a nuclear reactor but also cover part of its annual operating cost ($140 million/yr) hence placing it on par with the operations costs of a gas power plant ($60 70 million/yr) but without the pollution costs. 77 The a rgument, and what I consider to be a myth, that Iran has such unlimited natural gas reserves that it does not require nuclear power cannot withstand an objective analysis. According to the study done by the EIA in 2008, Iran was already operating with a n egative Net Export/Import in natural gas by 94 billion cubic feet. 78 And while Iran does have the 2 nd largest proven reserves as mentioned above, they are only the 4 th largest producer of natural gas, but at the same time, they are the 3 rd largest consumer 79 The ongoing development of the South Pars gas field represents a tremendous economic windfall for the Iranians; not only will it earn approximately $11 billion/yr for 30 years or more, it has also brought extensive foreign investment and more than 30,0 00 jobs to Iran. 80 With all of these figures staring the Iranian government in the face, how can Iran not be expected to pursue civilian nuclear technology? Without it, their country will face 76 77 78 U.S. Energy Information Administration. Iran Energy Profile. July 14, 2010. http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=IR (accessed August 10, 2010). 79 Ibid. 80
35 severe economic challenges; without nuclear power, their econo mic fate is undeniable. The irony is that in the 1970s when there was no genuine need for nuclear power in Iran states such as the U.S., Germany, and France were encouraging the Shah to go nuclear. But now that there is a legitimate need, at least one th at is agreed to by objective parties, The economic rationale is crystal clear because Iran must generate revenues through the sales of their fossil fuels. 81 The choice is obvious and the Iranians must move ahead with nuclear power now or risk the future survival of their state. Simply considering the finite nature of fossil fuels for which Iran is so dependent upon for revenue and energy, Iran must view acquisition of civilian nuclear pow er as vital. With the future of the Iranian economy dependent upon the outcome of the nuclear program, it should come as no surprise that the Iranian 82 81 Daedalus 139, no. 1 (2010): 106. 82 Barzegar, Kayhan, interview by Mustafa Kibaroglu. Tehran, (March 2005).
36 f nuclear technology and weapons in the interests of security should be regarded as an effort to deter potential adversaries from interfering in their sovereign affairs, to include regime change, as they have fallen victim to the acts of external actors fo r greater than two centuries. However, while the economic reasoning to support the nuclear program is very strong, the issue of national security is one that is is dependent on the preservation of the regime and their revolutionary ideology; their economy are very troubling in the absence of nuclear power, the security of the r egime and state would surely be degraded given the extreme domestic conditions likely to ensue. So the pursuit of the nuclear program that receives widespread nationalist support throughout Iran is critical to preserving the economic future and physical s ecurity of the Iranian state for future generations. The security reasons behind the Iranian nuclear development s may be even more significant to the Iranian leadership than the economic despite the obvious importance of strategy, of which the nuclear program plays a key role, should be regarded as an attempt 83 The Iranian nuclear program has become a key component in the security and survival of t he Iranian regime ; 83 The Washington Quarterly 33, no. 1 (2010): 174.
37 Iran has invested far too much in its progress to tu rn back now. The Islamic Revolution promised independence, freedom, and an Islamic Rep ublic, but it ha s failed to deliver on the latter two conditions; the only winning card the regime has remaining is its independence which remains characterized by anti Americanism. 84 85 Iran has a long history of lessons learned in dealing with foreign armies and governments interfering in their affairs. The 19 th century witnessed two defeats at the hands of the Russian s who imposed humiliating treaties on the Iranians; the Treaties of Gulistan (1813) and Turkmanchay (1828) forced Iran to give up sovereign territory and make economic concessions to the Russians. 86 divide Ira n into sphere s of influence has also been a factor in the Iranian culture. The overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadeq by the British and American s in order to place the Shah back in power is perhaps the pinnacle of foreign interference in Iranian affairs. The point of 87 One might argue that the 1979 hostage crisis was a result of this conspirator ial culture as the Iranians viewed the American acceptance of the Shah into the U.S. for medical treatment was a cover for the plot to put the Shah back into power in Iran. 84 Rahnema, Ali, interview by Bryan Hamilton. Paris, (May 13, 2010). 85 Ibid. 86 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle p. 14. 87 Dalacoura, Katerina, interview by Bryan Hamilton. London, (May 10, 2010).
38 penetrated Iranian culture and the regime leade rship Iraq and Afghanistan as a precursor to a potential attack against Iranian soil in an eff ort to overthrow the regime and dismantle the nuclear program. The rhetoric against Iran over the pursuit of its nuclear program has gradually intensified over the past decade, and the Axis of Evil speech issued by President Bush in 2002 did little to dim inish the beliefs that Iran was a potential target of the West. This mindset was visible in the aftermath of the 2009 elections as the Iranians accused the British of meddling in their election process and fostering protests; the legacy of British interfe rence in Iran still lives. 88 The fact is that these incidents throughout Iranian history explain why there is such a sense of national insecurity. 89 Iran has also been at odds with states in the Middle East and the West since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, and the eight year war with Iraq solidified to the Iranians that the international community could not be counted on to come to their aid in war. When the Iraqis unleashed chemical weapons on both Iranian troops and citizens, no Middle Eastern state or the west objected once to the Iraqi actions. Over the past decade, U.S. actions in the region have done little to lessen Iranian concerns about thei r security. The the Middle 88 Dalacoura, Katerina, interview by Bryan Hamilton. London, (May 10, 2010). 89 February 11, 2009 http://www.payvand.com/news/09/feb/1 128.html (accessed August 13, 2010).
39 between Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran; it, 90 he disposal of Saddam the Sunni led Baath Party controlled Iraq. Their backyard is a very unstable one which continually witnesses sectarian strife and conflict, possesses failed or potentially failing st ates (Afghanistan and Pakistan) and authoritarian governments throughout the Persian Gulf; all of perception of insecurity. 91 Their pursuit of nuclear technology represents a step towards added security against these external threats in the region. Iran understands that a nuclear weapon or even the percept ion of the capability to produce a nuclear weapon is the truly the only effective strategic deterrent. security such as Russia, the U.S., and Britain; it is argued by Dr. Nasser Saghafi Ameri of doctrines stress the value of nuclear weapons in national and collective defense 92 He contends that U.S. unilateralism and the use o f nuclear weapons as a insecurity of non nuclear weapons states has substantially increased. 93 90 Middle East Journal 61, no. 4 (2007): 631. 91 92 Saghafi Conference on Nuclear Technologies and Sustainable Development. Tehran, March 5 6, 2005. 93 Ibid.
40 acquisition of nuclear capabilities can also be viewed a weaknesses in conventional weapons because of financial constraints and its lack of 94 The possession of nuclear weapons by states who are not allies with Iran in their i mmediate vicinity Israel and Pakistan umbrella of NATO and the U.S. extend to other regional countries such as Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia of which only Turkey could be conside red neutral or even receptive, to the Iranian pursuit of nuclear technology. Israel perhaps represents the greatest threat to Iranian security in the region though they would likely be considered to be reliant upon the U.S. for political backing. The two states are at odds over the resolution of the Arab Israeli conflict, and Israel places much of the blame for hostilities carried out by Hamas and Hizbollah on the shoulders of the Iranian leadership. Though undeclared and not a signator to the NPT, Is rael is regarded as a nuclear power, and therefore Iran is threatened by the harsh loping 95 Fearful of military action by the Israeli forces, Iran views the development of nuclear weapons as a deterrent to aggression from not just the Israelis but also from other We stern states. Regardless of what the true intentions are, there will be consequences in the region when Iran goes nuclear, which technically began on August 21, 2010 when Russia 94 Survival 40, no. 3 (1998): 161. 95 p. 232.
41 loaded fuel into the Bushehr reactor. It is important for the United States, and other states the balance of power in such a volatile and important region of the world. The U.S. and the world must act to find a fair solution to the concerns o f all, including Iran; if not, the consequences could be severe.
42 EVOLUTION OF U.S. POLICIES TOWARD S THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM This period in this research involves the policies of U.S. administrations prior to the Iranian revolution which we will separate from the next period at the end of President The U.S. approach to nuclea r program over the past half century has been like a pendulum swinging from one in our will begin with Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, the Nixon Admini stration is widely regarded as responsible, or even to blame, for the current state of the Iranian nuclear program. 96 Because of this perception, the Nixon Administration will receive greater attention than most in the period prior to the Islamic Revolutio n. Presidents Ford and Carter will also garner attention in this discussion with the final years coinciding with the start of the Iranian Revolution. The Pre Nixon Years T he roots of nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and Iran can be traced to the Eisenhower Administration 97 This program was facilitated by a presidential initiative de signed to amend the 1946 Atomic 96 97 White House. Dwight D. Eisenhower. http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/dwightdeisenhower (accessed August 17, 2010).
43 Energy Act that forbade U.S. cooperation with other countries; his December 8, 1953 speech to the United Nations not only led to the 1957 Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atoms mentioned above but also led IAEA. 98 Eisenhower stated in this historic speech that one of the missions of this agency starved areas of the world he United States would be more than w illing it would b e proud to take up with others principally involved the development of plans whereby such peaceful use of atomic energy would be expedited. 99 ar program, they are certainly indicative peaceful purposes. Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson took a much different approach towards nuclear policie s than the previous Eisenhower administration. In March 1963, during a conversation with the press, Kennedy nations possessed nucl 100 Kennedy was intent on slowing the spread of nuclear weapons, and in August 1963 the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT) was signed. 101 Though the policies of his administration concerning nuclear proliferation were not aimed directly at Iran, Ken reduced cooperation 98 99 International Atomic Energy Agen cy http://www.iaea.org/About/history_speech.html (accessed August 17, 2010). 100 Foreign Affairs 85, no. 5 (2006): 49. 101 Whit e House. John F. Kennedy. http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/johnfkennedy (accessed August 17, 2010).
44 with Iran the site of U.S. nuclear bombs to counter increasing Soviet influence in Cuba 102 However, the Kennedy Administrati on, when approached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1961 about the suggestion, immediately opposed and rejected the suggestion. 103 Ultimately, while the previous administration favored military cooperation with Iran, Kennedy was less inclined to provide the Shah with the military support he requested and insisted on internal reforms before transferring money or vital technology to co unter the perceived Soviet threat. 104 After the assassination of President Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson was sworn into office and was immediately met with the challenge of Tehran growing closer to Moscow as the Shah was growing tired of being lectured about i nternal affairs and reforms by America when he wanted to purchase military hardware. Like the Kennedy Presi dency, little, if an y, evidence of policies that were directly related to the Iranian nuclear program as he was overwhelmi ngly preoccupied with the Vietnam H owever, the period of 1965 to 1967 is regarded as an importan t timeframe in the history of U.S Iranian relations as the relationship evolved from one which was more patron client oriented to a more equal relationship after the U.S. resumed sophisticated 102 103 Ibid. 104 Summitt Middle East Journal 58, no. 4 (2004): 564.
45 military equipment sales to the Iranians. 105 Two key components made up the reasoning behind this change in behavior. First, t he U.S. was growing nervous over increased cooperation between the Soviets and the Shah as Presidents Kennedy and Johnson had not sold him with the weapons he desired. This problem had been brewing for years before Johnson finally realized the seriousness. In September of 1962, more than 18 months after President Kennedy had ruled on this subject, the Shah announced that Iran would not allow American missiles aimed at the S oviet Union to be stationed on his soil. 106 Later, in January 1967, the Shah would sign a military aid agreement with the Soviets for almost $100 million 107 Second, the U.S. needed to retain the pro Western orientation of one of its major allies in the regio n. And with American troops were stuck in a conflict in Vietnam and the British instituting its departure from the Middle East region the U.S. needed to ensure that its interests in the Middle East were protected; selling weapons to Iran was a means to m aintain their pro Western orientation. 108 These w eapons sales by the U.S. to and included a squadron of F 4 Phantom aircraft 109 Most importantly during this time period was the U.S. support and assistance to set up the Tehran research reactor at the University of Tehran with U.S. corporation United Nuclear providing Iran 5.585kg of 93 percent 105 Iranian Relations, 1965 1967: Tired Journal of Cold War Studies 9, no. 2 (2007): 89. 106 Ibid, p. 68. 107 Ibid, p. 85. 108 Ibid, p. 89. 109 Ibid, p. 88 9.
46 enriched uranium. 110 I t became clear t hat President Johnson was willing to cooperate with Iran in both military sales and nuclear technology to ensure their allegiance remained with the U.S. and that Western interests in the region were more secure. So while the Kennedy administration had beg un restricting the nuclear relationship with Iran during his brief time in office, Johnson reinstituted the modes of cooperation with Iran that had been started under the Eisenhower administration. This increased the level of cooperation between Iran and the U.S. and opened the door for the next President, Richard Nixon, to embark on an unprecedented level of coordination with their Middle East ally in the areas of nuclear power. The Nixon Presidency In one way, Nixon represented a complete shift from actions of the previous two administrations; he nearly halted all criticism of internal Iranian affairs. Moreover, as mentioned by many experts, Nixon opened a new chapter of nuclear cooperation with Ira n. He openly encouraged the Shah to pursue an extensive nuclear energy program. 111 Within two months of his inauguration in 1969, President Nixon approved the extension of the 1957 Iran U.S. Agreement for Cooperation concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy; this extension was for another 10 years. 112 This improved cooperation was I nitiated in 1969 in the wake of the Vietnam War, the doctrine meant that the U.S. would provide both military and economic 110 Iran Country Profile, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/chronology_1957_1985.html (accessed August 18, 2010). 111 112 Nuclear Threat Iran Country Profile.
47 assistan ce to its allies in the event they were threatened by external forces, namely the Soviet Union. This doctrine was also designed to give regional states a greater role in ensuring the security of their particular parts of the globe In May 1972, while ret urning from Moscow, President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visit ed Tehran to brief the Shah on what was termed the Twin Pillars policy whereby the Shah would not only be given the responsibility for ensuring the security and stability of th e Persian Gulf region but more importantly to the Shah, the 113 It was the renewed effor t of nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and Iran. 114 The 1973 Yom Kippur War between the Arabs and Israelis presented another op portunity for the Iranians. When the Arab producing countries of OPEC enacted an oil embargo against the U.S. for their support of Israel oil prices rose from $3.01 per barrel to $11.65 per barrel, a nearly 300% increase that created a major oil crisis 115 However, Iran not only chose to dis obey the OPEC embargo, but they also ramped up production by another 600,000 BPD in order to increase their profits. 116 And with oil prices reaching record highs in the aftermath of, the Shah was fiscally prepared to purchase at will, and with the Nixon Adm inistration concerned about the growing U.S. trade deficit due to 113 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle p. 104. 114 p. 213. 115 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle p. 107 116 Ibid.
48 high oil prices, there were few complaints about the Shah sending those petrodollars back to the U.S. for American products which minimized the U.S. trade deficit. 117 In looking more in de pth at the nuclear program, the Nixon administration provided direct and concrete support to the Iranian program in a multitude of ways, and after a Stanford Research Institute study in early 1974 revealed a need for more than 20,000 MW(e) capacity no late r than 1994, the level of cooperation was accelerated, and as stated earlier, the Shah then announced his plans to have 23,000 MW(e) of nuclear power as fast as was achievable. 118 Communications from U.S. Ambassador Richard Helms to the Shah and his cabinet statements were reflective of the desire for nuclear cooperation. In a letter dated April 13, 1974 to Asadollah Alam, the then Iranian Imper ial Court Minister, Helms stated how early an area in which we might most usefully begin on a specific lay out a plan for this collaboration. 119 So when Dr. Dixy Lee Ray, the U.S. Chai rman of the AEC visit ed Iran in May 1974 at the direction of President Nixon and the State Department, he entertained the possibility of establishing both enrichment and reprocessing faciliti es in Iran. It was only a month later in June of 1974 that Nixon approved an agreement for the Iranians to purchase two nuclear power plants and the enriched fuel to go with 117 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle p. 109. 118 119 Alam, A.A. : Volume 4. Edited by A. Alikhani. Tehran: Maziar Press, 2001, p. 7.
49 them, 120 but the eventual formal signing of this agreement would grow the number of pow er plants to eight. However, the signing would not take place until after President Ford took over in the aftermath of the Nixon Watergate scandal. This provisional agreement during the Nixon administration, more than any other, demonstrates that t he U.S. position at this point in the relationship with Iran was one about cooperation, collaboration, and a strategic alliance. While there was certainly a growing pattern of teamwork between the two states, certainly much of the U.S. support to the Iran ian program was based upon the fact that the Shah was going to be sending large sums of petrodollars back to the U.S. to purchase the nuclear equipment for these nuclear facilities. 121 It must be noted, though, that in the early 1970s there was no inherent need for nuclear power in Iran. There was no energy crisis or a population boom, but the U.S. and other Western states such as France and Germany were encouraging the Shah to pursue nuclear energy. In looking specifically at the U.S. economic situation d iscussed above, it is not difficult to arrive at the conclusion that this encouragement was made because of the economic benefits to be had by those selling equipment to Iran not because of any rational need for nuclear power in Iran. So the U.S. in the 1970s was very willing to provide Iran the support it required for a nuclear program, but now, when the economic justifications are clear and demonstrate a legitimate need, support from the U.S. is nowhere to be had. In fact, the U.S. now adamantly oppos es the program. So what 120 Poneman, Daniel. Nuclear Power in the Developing World. London: George Allen and Unwin Press, 1982, p. 87. 121 Erlich, Reese. The Iran Agenda. Sausalito, CA: PoliPoint Press, 2007, p. 21.
50 The Gerald Ford Presidency President Ford picked up the torch right where President Nixon left it; he continued the cooperation with the Shah, but that should come as no surprise consider ing the circumstances of how Ford came to power. He was of the same party as Nixon, Republican, and it was Nixon who nominated him for the Vice Presidency after the resignation of the former VP, Spiro Agnew. However, Ford would have very little time to m ake his mark on th e relationship with Iran considering his short tenure in office, just about 2 and a half years. Though Ford did have such a short time in office, he wasted little of it in advancing the cooperation between the two states in the nuclear a rena. Nixon had left the state of U.S. Iran nuclear cooperation in a very good position to advance, and in November of 1974 under the auspice of President Ford, the cooperation between the two states continued A U.S. Iran Joint Commission was formed to strengthen ties in numerous areas, but a specific focus was placed upon nuclear energy and power generation. The commission also referenced new provisional agreements for a total of eight nuclear reactors; and the joint statement issued by this commis sion also reinforced commitments to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 122 With these statements and agreements, there is a great deal of support to the argument that President Ford and his team offered the complete nuclear cycle to the Iranians during his tenure as President. 123 The Ford administration also supported a $2.75 billion investment by Iran into a United States uranium enrichment facility w hich was proposed in early 1975. 122 Digital National Security Archive. November 3, 1974. http://nsaarchive.chadwyck.com (accessed August 19, 2010). 123 Middle East Policy 13, no. 2 (2006): 91.
51 officials agreed that Iran should be entitled to enough fuel to meet their entire inventory of nuclear reactors purchased from the U.S. 124 President Ford and Secretary of State the Ford administration preferred a multinational facili ty as opposed to a purely Iranian one. 125 s policy of cooperation with Iran on the nuclear program was extensive and well documented Muhammad Sahimi cites multiple National Security Memorandums where President Ford expressed his desire for the extensive cooperation between the two states. Ford directed in National Security Memorandum 219 dated March 14, 1975 that U.S. officials should make al l efforts to find an agreement with Iran to facilitate sales of nuclear equipment as well as Iranian investment in U.S. facilities. 126 Several other memorandums over the following months from President Ford as well as Secretary of State Kissinger would cont inue to convey this American policy of cooperation with Iran These memorandums also reiterated the support for the establishment of a spent fuel reprocessing facility in Iran; however, as mentioned earlier, President Ford continued to insist that the fac ility be either binational with the U.S. or multinational. 127 One interesting point that should be made about the Ford administration and its extensive cooperation is the fact that two of the most senior officials in this administration, then White House Ch ief of Staff Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense 124 125 Ibid. 126 127 Ibid.
52 Donald Rumsfeld, would later hold completely opposite views on the American policy es towards Iran were evidenced in both word and deed; in a May 15, 1975 meeting with the Shah, he spoke of the importance in oil trade (much of it nuclear related) 128 with Iran extended all the way to the end of his Presidency, and in a Presidential debate with then Governor Jimmy Carter, he reinforced his support for cooperation with Iran. ng feeling that we ought to sell arms to Iran for its own 129 Instances such as these were littered through the Ford Presidency and lend strong support to the notion that the U.S. policy at the time was one of cooperation and collaboration in the arena of nuclear technology. It is clear by the support given by both the Nixon and Ford administrations that there was a policy of cooperation from the Americans directed towards the Iranian nu clear program. Regardless of whether or not it was being done to decrease So viet influence in the region, to recoup funds to minimize the growing U.S. trade deficit with the rise in oil prices, or a combination of these two reasons, it is apparent that co operation was the name of the game. During these two administrations, all types of support was provided, and considering the sensitive nature of nuclear technology at the time, there is 128 Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum. May 15, 1975. http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/speeches/750261.htm (accessed August 20, 2010). 129 Gerald R. F ord Presidential Library and Museum. October 6, 1976. http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/speeches/760854.asp (accessed August 20, 2010).
53 little doubting that the highest levels of these administrations had a heavy hand in all dealings from the sales of equipment, facilities, and fuel to the approval of training for Iranian nuclear scientists in the U.S. Though debatable, o ne nuclear expert, Muhammad Sahimi, even goes so far as to argue that neither Nixon no the Shah developed the bomb because the Shah was a close ally of the United States 130 While there is no overt evidence supporting this statement, such a significan t amount of U.S. assistance to the Shah and his nuclear ambitions would permit a reasonable person to at least entertain such a notion atomic bomb 131 The Jimmy Carter Presidency Th e election of Jimmy Carter to the Presidency continued the policy of cooperation with Iran on the nuclear program. His presidency, though, represents a transition period for the relations between Iran and the U.S. because of the coming Islamic Revolution. Though the U.S. failed to see the revolution coming, the Shah did put some of his nuclear plans on the shelf as he dealt with internal turmoil. And when the revolution began and ultimately culminated with the Islamic hardl iners in power, the place of the cooperation between the two states. While the revolution did represent the turning point in the cooperative policies between the U.S. an d Iran, up until that point, Carter continued expanding nuclear 130 Sahimi, Muhammad, interview by Rees e Erlich. Los Angeles, (October 17, 2006). 131 Erlich, The Iran Agenda, p. 22.
54 cooperation at a rapid pace. Within the first few months of his inauguration, in April of 132 The year 1977 would witness additional routine talks between the two governments on nuclear cooperation. The following year, after President Carter had a complete year since his inauguration in the White House, cooperation with Iran would accelerate. On January 1 st nation status for r 8 light 133 Within another seven months on July 10, 1978, the draft of this agreement, known as the U S Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement, was signed in Tehran. Designed submitted to the U.S. Congress. 134 However, with Iran in political turmoil and on the brink of re volution in 1978, by placed his nuclear cooperation with the U.S. on hold. 135 The change in policies towards the Iranian nuclear program could not necessarily be characteriz ed as a decision which 132 p. 214. 133 134 Kibaroglu, 135 Iran Country Profile.
55 progression of the Iranian nuclear program were direct results of the ongoing internal strife in Iran. between the U.S. and Iran in 1978 despite the internal problems within Iran. Department of Energy (DoE) Secretary James Schlesinger was heavily involved in the agreement mentioned above as well as the approval of the transfer of equipment for an emerging technology known as laser enrichment. 136 One of these transfers was conducted by a private citizen, Jeffery Eerkens, who ultimately received approval from the DoE to sell laser enrichment technology to Iran, and they were shipped in October of 1978; howeve r the lasers are reported to have failed at their intended purpose of enriching uranium. 137 After the Shah contracts with not only the U.S. but also France and Germany for nuclear projects were cancelled; Ayatollah Khomeini and t he other Islamic hardliners fought against the modernization efforts of the Shah. modernization policies meant that the nuclear program would suffer extensively, and it translated to the spending towards modernizing the military and civili an infrastructures being turned off. Additionally, the ensuing Cultural Revolution in 1980 that led to the flight of many western educated Iranians also meant that many of the highly trained nuclear scientists were allowed to leave the country. 138 The Cart er program in earlier years was now irrelevant; Khomeini and his fellow clerics in tended to destroy everything that had been part of the Atomic Energy Organization of Ira n bringing 136 137 Ibid. 138
56 virtually every project to a standstill. 139 When Khomeini finally gave the approval for the resumption of the nuclear facilities, it was too late to obtain assistance from the West. Angered over the hostage crisis and nervous over the direction of the Iranian clerical leadership the U.S. began its pattern of pressuring states not to provide assistance to Iran, and Germany and France were the first to refuse to resume work on the facilities at Bushehr, Darkhovin, a nd Esfahan. The Carter administration would be the last U.S. administration to cooperate with the Iranians in the arena of nuclear technology with Iran in the nuclear field, but also pursued a policy of denial by putting pressure on other countries not to transfer nuclear technology to Iran. 140 Additionally, the ensuing hostage crisis that was to be resolv ed upon President Carter leaving office would also permanently scar present and future U.S. politicians; U.S. leaders would subsequently 141 Amer policy was needed to cope with the regime of Khomeini. 139 140 Ibid, p. 233. 141 Dalacoura, Katerina, interview by Bryan Hamilton. London, (May 10, 2010).
57 U.S. POLICIES TOWARDS REVOLUTIONARY IRAN Our next period comes as the Islamic Revolution has swept Iran and President Reagan t ook office in January 1979. As for the Islamic Revolution and overthrow of the Shah it was the turning point when the United States changed their policies towards the Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear technology. As it has been more than thirty years sinc e this event, this will require covering each administration since. The administrations of Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, Bush II, and Obama, were confronted with a completely different regime in Iran than previous presidents; these Presidents would gradually u sher in an unprecedented policy of denial of nuclear technology that would force the Iranian nuclear program to find other means to meet their nuclear ambitions. Each of these administrations would pursue their own specific strategies to cope with the I ranian nuclear problem, but the underlying policy of denial was one that grew the first years after the revolution; the U.S. was still struggling with how to handle th e new regime as well as how to craft a policy that fit with the national security of the United States. It would take over a decade, until the Clinton administration, for a clearer policy vision to be formulated towards the Iranians. The following sectio ns will detail these policies and specific strategies employed by each administration
58 The Reagan Years When it comes to President Reagan and Iran, on the surface, one might have the impression that Reagan was cooperative with Iran due to the Iran contra affair. This covert operation ran by now retired Colonel Oliver North sent arms, munitions, and spare parts to the Iranians to use in their war against Iraq. The funds that Iran sent to the U. S. via Israel were used to support the Contra rebels in Nicaragua in their fight against the leftist elements, the Sandinistas, but more importantly for Reagan and the U.S., they were sent to Iran in exchange for the release of seven American hostages bein g held by Lebanese Hezbollah 142 In addition to the harm done by the holding of hostages at the American embassy in Tehran, the hostage taking by pro Iranian Hezbollah and the Iran ve and hostile 143 While Pollack argued that the weapons were in exchange for these hostages, Gary Sick, an Iran expert on the National Security Council during the Carter Presidency, alleges something more sinister transpired between Reagan and the Iranian leaders. Sick, in his book October Surprise and also in a New York Times article from April 15, 1991, Iranian officials to delay the release of the American ho stages until after the U.S. 144 These are strong allegations of which no definitive proof was offered, but the fact that American hostages 142 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle p. 212. 143 Survival 40, no. 1 (1998): 9. 144 New York Times. April 15, 1991.
59 were released soon after the inauguration of President Reag an only fuels the conspiracy theory. What is important, though about the Iran Contra affair is that the initial intent of the exchange was not intended as such. President Reagan said in a national address on November 13, 1986 that acting with my authority, to send a signal that the United States was prepared to replace 145 And in a later speech to the nation on March 4, 198 7, he stated that develop relations with those who might assume leadership in a post Khomeini 146 Pollack argues that duri ng the Reagan administration the U.S. probably did not have a clear policy towards Iran or a strategy towards achieving concrete goals. But while the Reagan administration was sending mixed messages and sought to cooperate with Iran in order to secure the release of the hostages and set the stage for improved diplomatic r elations in the future, there was no cooperation in sight surrounding the nuclear program. There is definitive evidence to show that. reassemble their nuclear program just as Khomei 147 The 145 The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan. Ronald Reagan Presi dential Library. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/111386c.htm (accessed August 23, 2010). 146 tra Aid Controversy March 4, The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1987/030487h. htm (accessed August 23, 2010). 147 A European Non Proliferation Policy : Prospects and Problems, edited by Harald Muller, 214. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.
60 Reagan administration, on September 9, 1982, began tightening the noose around the Iranian nuclear program by putting Iran on a lis t of countries to which th e export of nuclear technology was to be banned. 148 This pressure is believed to have resulted in the German company Kraftwerk Union refusing to cooperate with Iran in completing the Bushehr reactor deal. 149 However, it is more like ly that the Iraqi strikes on the Bushehr target of military strikes, but the U.S. role in these strikes must be discussed. tility towards Iran than the support given to Iraq during the Iran Iraq War. While t here is certainly not a smoking gun indicating that the Reagan administration provided support to these Iraqi strikes on the Bushehr nucl ear reactor from 1984 to 1988, the indicators are undeniable. Special Envoy to the Middle East, Donald Rumsfeld, visited Baghdad on multiple occasions before and after these strikes; additionally, the U.S. military support to Iraq in the war against Iran cannot be ignored. 150 Cons idering the extensive support to the Iraqis against Iran it is possible that the Reagan administration encouraged the Iraqi strikes on the Bushehr reactor especially since the legislation controlling export of nuclear technology to Iran was only completed the previous year, 1982. Rumsfeld first visited Baghdad and Saddam Hussei n on December 20, 1983 148 Iran Co untry Profile. 149 150 Slavin, Barbara. Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S. and the Twisted Path to Confrontation
61 151 A gain around March 25, 1984, 152 just a day after the first Iraqi strike on the Bus hehr reactor on March 24 th 153 Rumsfeld would visit Baghdad again. Certainly the fact that Rumsfeld would visit almost immediately after the Iraqis had conducted such a high profile airstrike against cannot be a coincidence. As we now know that the U.S. provided extensive intelligence support to the Iraqis during the war, I argue that it is likely that Rumsfeld may have provided Iraq with a battle damage assessment (BDA) of the strike. This BDA would have permitted the Iraqis to m ake more knowledgeable decisions about what types of munitions to utilize and which facilities to strike. By the end of the war, the Iraqis had struck the Bushehr nuclear plant a total of eight times with the last strike being on July 19, 1988. While the Reagan administration provided various types of support to the Iraqis during the Iran Iraq war, throughout his two terms as President he consistently to Congress expla ining Executive Order 12470 issued on March 30, 1984, again just days after the Iraqi strike of the Bushehr reactor, specifically mentioned the Middle East, though not Iran, as a target of this Executive Order. 154 151 The National Security Archive. February 25, 2003. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/ (acce ssed August 23, 2010). 152 Ibid. 153 Iran Country Profile. 154 The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/33084c.htm (accessed August 23, 2010).
62 President Rea con the Reagan administration had no clear policy on Iran is difficult to substantiate Reagan supported Iraq against Iran in the e arly years of the Iran Iraq War though the weapons he would provide to Iran via Israel later would mitigate this But o ther U.S. government an anti Iran message ; Operations Earnest Will and Praying Mantis were two U.S. military operations decidedly against Iran in an attempt to prese rve the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz by anti mine operations and reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers. Throughout his term, he did maintain Iran on the export controls list to prevent the transfer of sensitive and dual use technology which could further their nuclear program. While this political pressure proved effective, it is likely that many states were also leery of dealing with the new regime of Iran in the aftermath of the revolution. But Reagan allowed o ther trade with Iran to boom; U.S. oil companies, by the end of Reagan s 2 nd term, were the largest buyers of Iranian oil, over 500,000 BPD. 155 Reagan also upheld the Algiers Declaration which regulated the arbitration of lawsuits back and forth between the U.S. and Iran in the aftermath of the hostage crisis. as a pragmatic one, but as this research is intended to study the nuclear program, we do find evidence of the origins of the policy of denial to wards the Iranian nuclear program. pragmatic policies and strategies towards Iran would leave his successor, President George H.W. Bush, to further solidify U.S. policy towards Iran. 156 155 Slavin, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S. and the Twisted Path to Confrontation p. 179. 156 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle p. 235.
63 Bush I and Iranian Policy The first President Bush began his tenure as the 41 st U.S. President by extending an olive branch to the Iranian regime in his January 20, 1989 inaugural address. It was in this speech that he made a reference to U.S. hostages being held by Iranian sponsored Lebanese terrorists 157 This act of good faith by President Bush opened the door for a potential i mprovement in relations with Iran, and it did not go unnoticed in Iran. Two prominent Iranian leaders, Speaker and soon to be President Rafsanjani and Supreme Court Justice Ardabili, both came out with what were pro western statements and conciliatory rem arks about the Iran Iraq War and the hostage crisis, but Ayatollah Khomeini would put a stop to the rapprochement almost one month later when he issued the infamous Salman Rushdie fatwa calling for the death of this anti Islam author 158 Unfortunately for I ran, the Bush administration did not put the construction of policies towards Iran at the forefront of its initiatives. Other world events took center attention towards Iran and their advancing nuclear program. The fall of the Berlin Wall, Union, and the Madrid Peace Process all encumbered the Bush administration and left him little patience to deal with a fractured Iranian leadership. Additionally, the facts that 157 The Public Papers of George H.W. Bush. George Bush Presid ential Library and Museum. http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=1&year=1989&month=01 (accessed August 24, 2010). 158 Pollack, The Persian Puzzl e p. 239.
64 the remaining hostages in Lebanon that Bush referenced in his inaugural address were not being freed the January 31, 1989 execution of Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins, a hostag e since 1988, and the domestic killings of regime opponents turned the Bush administration against improved relations with Iran. 159 A more careful look at the Iranian nuclear program during the first Bush administration reveals an extraordinary level of coo rdination and assistance from a multitude of states. Iran sought and received materials, instruction, and other support from Argentina, China, Spain, West Germany, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union. 160 The support in 1989 and 1990 consisted of work on the Bus hehr plant, signings of new agreements for nuclear cooperation, repair to the nuclear reactor at Tehran University, and construction on a plutonium reactor. 161 With all of the support flowing into the Iranian nuclear program being reported in the open press it is unthinkable that the Bush There are entire departments in the multiple intelligence agencies (CIA, DIA, and NSA) devoted to such areas; to believe that the Irani an nuclear program was progressing in secret is to deny the tremendous amount of information available at the time. One an Iran policy include s the transfer of dual use technology to Iran between 1990 and 1991. President Reagan, as discussed above, had restricted the export of sensitive technology to Iran in his 1982 ban, but over the course of about 13 months, the U.S. 159 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle p. 246. 160 Iran Country Profile. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/chronology_1989.html (accessed August 24, 2010). 161 Ibid.
65 Department of Commerce pe rmitted the transfer of high tech equipment to Iran When reviewed by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, a Washington D C based group, it was claimed that the $59 million in program as well as ballis tic missile development. 162 The July 1990 removal of export controls on dual use technology to Eastern Europe after the disintegration of the Soviet Union also opened the door for Iran to obtain important materials for their nuclear program; at this point, U.S. State Department officials were aware that Iran was researching uranium enrichment techniques. 163 While the U.S. opened the door for the indirect transfer of U.S. technology to Iran, they made few efforts to halt nuclear cooperation between Iran and s ome of the states mentioned above. The Bush administration did pressure Spain to halt work on the Bushehr reactor in Iran in 1990, 164 but other efforts to stymie the Iranian nuclear program were not met with such success. In March of 1992, India agree d to sell a 10MW research reactor to Iran despite U.S. pressure. 165 Additionally, while Mustafa Kibaroglu rightfully emphasizes Bush administration protests to the Chinese sale of both 20MW and 330MW(e) reactors to Iran in September of 1992, 166 his research disreg ards the fact that 162 Iran Country Profile. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/chronology_1990.html (accessed August 24, 2010). 163 Iran Country Profile. 164 165 Iran Country Profile. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/chronology_1992.html (accesse d August 24, 2010). 166
66 Chinese officials stated on November 25 th of that same year that they would continue their cooperation with Iran to build nuclear power plants for peaceful purposes. 167 168 So Bush charged Scowcroft and Bruce Reidel, his director of Persian affairs with finding options to resolve the diplomatic stalemate. tions carried out by Iranian intelligence officers throughout Europe. 169 The transfers of technology mentioned above, combined with the increasing cooperation towards the construction of the Iranian nuclear complex by many parties despite pressure from the Bush administration, demonstrated a policy that could be characterized as dismissive towards Iranian nuclear ambitions. Perhaps the Bush administration was too caught up in the other events discussed earlier to give the Iranian nuclear program much seriou s thought. The Bush 41 administration was simply unable to delay the progress of the Iranian nuclear program. The 1980s and 1990s were the height of the U.S. might in the world; the U.S. was standing as the lone remaining military and economic superpower in the world after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Bush administration could not exert enough pressure to halt the Iranian nuclear program. I argue that the Bush administration simply was uncertain in how to proceed in its relations with Ira n, and the administration ineffectiveness support s that 167 Iran Country Profile. 168 Slavin, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S. and the Twisted Path to Confrontation p. 179. 169 Ibid p. 180 1.
67 assessment. While Bush 41 could not conceive of an effective policy or strategy towards Iran, the successive Clinton administration would leave little to doubt as to their policies. The President William Jefferson Clinton Era The administration of President Clinton would be the first administration to set out on developing a more clear and consistent policy towards Iran. While the policy began with both Iran and Iraq in mind, the policy was defin itively more understandable containment methods; two Clinton staffers, Martin Indyk, the Middl e East Officer on the National Security Council, and Anthony Lake, a Special Assistant for National Security, are credited with conceiving and developing the policy. 170 This overarching policy towards Iran would prove to be the driving force behind the Clin aimed at the Iranian nuclear program. One particular article from 1994 in Foreign Affairs does an exceptional job of laying out the policy of dual containment as well as the strategies to be employed against the nuclear progr was to 171 actively engaged in clandestine efforts to acquire nuclear and other unconventional 170 Sabet European Relations Policy: From Khatami to Ahmadinejad edited by Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, 59, Berkshire, UK: Ithaca Press. 171 Lake, Anthon Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (1994): 49.
68 years what Ira 172 The strategy by which the Clinton administration for their nuclear program was absolutely a key piece of the Clinton strategy against Iran. 173 consistent message to the Iranians 174 something that was partially lacking over the previ ous two administrations, and the Clinton Presidency would provide the clearest policy towards Iran and its nuclear program since the Shah, though it would be quite the opposite of that period. It should be noted, though, that their policy was not designed to rule out productive dialogue with the Iranians, the Clinton administration strongly argued that pressure was necessary to change Iranian behaviors. 175 The Clinton administration made extensive efforts to uphold their policy of dual containment mentioned above. Their efforts took little time to manifest in 1993 as attempts to con vince friendly states to halt cooperation with the Iranian nuclear program began. In June of 1993, the U.S. pressured Japan for providing a $360 million loan to Iran, and then applied pressure on European states to research the status of the Iranian nucle ar program. 176 first Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, during 172 173 Ibid. 174 Ibid p. 54. 175 Ibid. 176 Iran Country Profile. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/chronology_1993.html (accessed August 25, 2010).
69 t cannot have normal commercial relations on the one hand while trying to develop weapons of mass destruc agreed to a joint study for economic sanctions against Iran because of their supposed clandestine nuclear program. 177 Later that year in September of 1993, the United State s would make another 7 summit, Clinton officials requested that export restrictions be eased and a monitoring system directed at dual use technology be instituted. However the U.S. officials would export to a number of specific states that include Iran. 178 This type of pressure from the Clinton administration would be constant on the Ira nian nuclear program over the coming years. In his second year in office, on November 14, 1994, President Clinton rescinded and signed Executive Order 12938 (Proliferation o f Weapons of Mass Destruction). Certainly meant to encompass nuclear technology which the previous executive order had foreign country in acquiring the capability to develop, produce, stockpile, deliver, or use 177 Los Angeles Times, June 10, 1993: A8. 178 Iran Country Profile.
70 179 Though the Executive Order did not cite Iran in name, considering the actions already undertaken by the administration and those to come in the near future, it is highly unlikely that the signing of this document was unrelated to his policy of dual containment against both Iraq and Iran. Less than a year after signing EO 12938, President Clinton signed Executive Orders 12957 (Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the D evelopment of Iranian Petroleum Resources) and 12959 (Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Iran) on March 15 and May 6, 1995 respectively; these EOs represented the first steps to the Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) which is today simply known as the Iran Sanctions Act. 180 While the final legislation evolved into one including Libya, the first orders signed by President Clinton was specifically directed at Iran alone. They were the first executive orders of their kind that were drafted with Iran specifically in the crosshairs; previous administrations had not been so precise as to single out Iran for an executive order weapons of mass destruction and to fund terrorist gro ups by hindering its ability to maintenance of their petroleum sector is so important. 181 Up until the signing of ILSA, one inalienable fact crippled the Clinton admini 179 The Public Papers of William J. C linton. The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=49489 (accessed August 25, 2010). 180 Katzman, Kenneth. The Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). Washing ton DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006, 1. 181 Ibid.
71 182 isolation or containment of Iran was a good idea was offset by the reality that the U.S. 183 One specific example highlights the hypocrisy of U.S. sanctions up until this point. In 1995, U.S. oil company Conoco announced that they were signing a $1 billion contract with Iran in order to develop the Sirri gas field, and under U.S. law it was completely legal at the time. 184 Conoco had made no secret in Total; State Department officials had been made aware of its efforts. 185 Iran and specifically President Rafsanjani must have been hopeful that the deal would help to thaw out the relations with the U.S. However the outrage over the deal was unrelenting t hus company, Dupont, to cancel the contract, and a race began between the Republican led Congress and President Clinton to see who could appear more bullish with Iran the fastest. The Conoco affair thus became the precursor to a mo re stringent policy of containment and isolation by the Clinton administration and ended the extensive trade relations between the two states. The signing of the executive orders that followed the Conoco affair represented s towards st ronger sanctions aimed at Iran. Later that year, when Iran 182 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle p. 271. 183 Ambitions edited by Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, 106. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2004. 184 185 Ibid.
72 186 The legislation represented ev en more severe sanctions towards Iran than Clinton initially intended as one bill, the Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act passed on December 18, 1995, American. 187 Regard less of the more stringent terminology and the inclusion of Libya by an amendment to the original bill, President Clinton would sign the bill into law as the ILSA on August 5, 1996. The bill carried a five year term, but stated that Iran could eliminate s anctions if they cease efforts to develop WMD. 188 The ILSA certainly painted a crystal clear message to the Iranian leadership, but the implementation of ILSA by the Clinton administration would prove to be different. Unfortunately, the sanctions against f 189 The provisions in the ILSA which permitted the President to waive sanctions on the basis of national security interests were used by President Clinton in both 1997 and 1998, and this waiver permitted the French firm Total SA as well as their Russian and Malaysian partners to invest $2 billion in the Iranian energy sector without the threat of U.S. sanctions. 190 While on the surface this may appear to be an inconsistent application of the dual containment policy, the waivers which were granted to the EU represented a 186 Katzman, Kenneth. The Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). Washington DC: Congressional Resear ch Service, 2006, 2. 187 Ibid. 188 Ibid p. 3. 189 Ibid. 190 Ibid.
73 quid pro quo as the EU agreed to cooperate with the U.S. in efforts aimed at non proliferation. 191 However, the contracts that Iran awarded for development which were not sanctioned by the U.S. provided sufficient enough investment to maintain their oil production at approximately 4 million BPD, and instead of tightening the sanctions as the Clinton a In private, administration officials conceded that the policy of dual containment was a 192 Ultimate ly, 193 The 1997 election of Preside nt Khatami in Iran represented an opening for a professors, writers, scholars, artists, journalists, and 194 The Clinton administration, as would President Khatami, would take positive steps in an attempt to improve relations, and the previous policy of dual containment would be discarded in favor of a new policy of engagement with Iran. 191 Katzman, The Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), p. 3. 192 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle p. 263. 193 Forei gn Affairs 76, no. 3 (1997): 20 21. 194 Khatami, Mohammad, Interview by Christiane Amanpour. Interview with Iranian President Mohammad Khatami (January 7, 1998). http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/0 7/iran/interview.html (accessed August 26, 2010).
74 slightly ease the sanctions against Iran by permitting U.S. exports of i tems such as food and medical supplies and the import of Iranian goods such as carpets and caviar to the U.S 195 The fact that Clinton did not pressure France, Russia, or Malaysia over the $2 billion urther evidence that Clinton was not eager to sanction Iran. Clinton would also direct State Department officials to attend conferences where Iranian officials were expected to encourage dialogue on a variety of issues. The gestures of goodwill from the Clinton administration went as high as Secretary of State Albright and the President himself. sident 196 I n 1999, Clinton even sent a handwritten letter to President Khatami requesting assista nce in solving the Khobar Towers bombing; it was delivered by Martin Indyk to be carried to the Iranian President by Omani Foreign Minister Yousef Bin Alawi. 197 Unfortunately the letter was met with no response from the Iranian President, who without visibl e concessions from the U.S., could not afford to be seen as supporting the Great Satan. However, despite the positive overtures, the Clinton administration continued to coordinate with allies to prevent transfers of sensitive technology. 195 Katzman, Kenneth. Iran: Current Developments and U.S. Policy. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2002, 1. 196 197 Slavin, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S. and the Twisted Path to Confrontation p. 189.
75 Other than th e sanctions and the commitment to convince other states to work containment and engagement employed very few effective strategies One of these strateg ies was t he $18 million CIA covert action program ; this program publicly 198 Unfortunately for Clinton, it did not achieve the desired result of moderating Iranian behavior, and tensions with Iran grew more confron tational in nature. 199 Military threats against Iran for their confrontational and aggressive actions, such as the widely held belief by experts such as Ray Takeyh and Kenneth Pollack that Iran sponsored the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, 200 were nonexistent. stem the tide of Iranian nuclear development, and it showed. A review of the 199 5 2000 period just prior to and after the implementation of ILSA on the Nuclear Threat Initiative website reveals reporting of extensive support to the Iranian nuclear program from states including Russia, China, South Africa, Austria, and the Ukraine. 201 In January of 1995, Russia signed an $800 million contract with Iran to complete the construction of the Bushehr NPP with the first unit being completed within four years, and just a month later China would go on record defending their right to sell peaceful nuclear technology to Iran 198 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle p. 276. 199 Ibid. 200 Foreign Affairs, 84, no. 2 (2005): 20. 201 Nuclear Threat I nitiat Iran Country Profile. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/chronology_1998.html (accessed August 26, 2010).
76 in accordance with IAEA regulations. 202 Bot h of these deals were subjected to intense pressures from the Clinton administration, but Russia and China continually insisted that the agreements were in accordance with the IAEA and international law so they would proceed. However, in January of 1996 China announced their plan to sell two reactors to Iran was cancelled, but that they would continue nuclear cooperation with Iran to include assistance in mining for uranium in Yazd. 203 Additionally, in 1996, Russia would continue their support as their contract on the Bushehr construction went into effect giving them 55 months to complete the job. 204 Later in 1996, China would again assert its intentions to sell a UF6 plant to Iran over U.S. objections, but again Clinton would pressure China to halt the d eal. 205 U.S. pressure on China appeared to be working, possibly because of its desire for acceptance into the World Trade Organization and more importantly for the signing of the 1985 bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation that would allow pea ceful nuclear technology to be shipped to China. 206 However, pressure was having no impact on Russian support to the Iranian nuclear program. Russia would support Iran through its 202 Nucle Iran Country Profile. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/chronology_1995.html (accessed October 1, 201 0). 203 Iran Country Profile. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/chronology_1996.html (accessed Oc tober 1, 2010). 204 Ibid. 205 Ibid. 206 Ibid.
77 continued construction of the Bushehr plant along with signing additional ag reements for safety and uranium mining in the summer of 1997. 207 The year 1997 would see companies from more states step up to support the Iranian nuclear program possibly due to the election of a more moderate President Khatami. For example, a n Austrian company provided material support in the form of a violation of EU sanctions of Iran. 208 After an August 1997 IAEA inspection in Iran found no evidence of secret nuclear activity at two nuclear reactors in Iran, 209 the years 1998 to 2000 under the Clinton administration would see additional advancements in the Iranian program. During this time period, Russia would make plans to build a research reactor for Iran, and Iran would produce more purified plutonium that had been removed from the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC). 210 Iran would begin conducting centrifuge tests at the Kalaye Electr ic Company and enrich U235 to 1.2%, and the designs for uranium conversion facility in Esfahan. 211 So it was during the Clinton administration that Iran began to really progress its nuclear program. Russia was building facilities, agreements were being si gned with Russia and China, and scientists were being trained in both Russia and China. While all 207 Iran Country Profile. 208 Iran Country Profile. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/chronology_1997.html (accessed October 1, 2010). 209 Fudan University International. FDUIMUN 2010 Committee Update. Shanghai, Ch ina: Fudan University Press, 2010, 20. 210 Ibid. 211 Ibid, p. 21.
78 of these examples of progress and support to their nuclear program are small individually, collectively, I argue, they were enormous in giving Iran something to build upon. Dual containment failed in its objectives because the Clinton administration did not have the support of the Europeans and Japan who disagreed with the U.S. in the case of Iran primarily because of the lack of hard evidence on nuclear weap ons. 212 And the policy of engagement pursued during the secon d Clinton term achieved little either in terms of the Iranian nuclear program or in overall diplomatic relations. While Clinton sought containment initially, the fact that U.S. trade with Iran was soaring sent the wrong message, and when Iran showed some positive behavior towards the U.S. by offering the lucrative Conoco deal to an American company, Iran was subjected to increased sanctions rather than rewarded. Then after passing these sancti ons, Clinton attempted to reconcile with an Iran as he pressured other states to not deal with Iran economically or in the nuclear field. When Iran understan dably was unresponsive to the overtures by the Clinton team, Clinton responded with the CIA progra m in an effort to force them to strategies only put Iran on the fast track to seeking entry into the nuclear club. Just months after Clinton left office Iranian Sup reme Leader squashed talk of reconciliation with the U.S. when he threatened Majles officials who called for a normalization of relations with the United States. 213 Shortly after this October 31, 2001 statement by the Iranian Supreme Leader, Presi dent George W. Bush would completely alter relations between Iran and the United States for the better part of 212 213 Katzman, Iran: Current Developments and U.S. Policy, p. 8.
79 with those of his predecessor, President Clinton. Presiden t George W. Bush and the Axis of Evil The administration of George W. Bush would bring about another shift in policy towards Iran. However, much less clear than the policies and seemed to lurch between calling for regime change and demanding that Iran assist the stan. 214 With this difficulty in resolving the path forward, the policy tilted towards containment, isolation, and denial of nuclear technology There was a distinct stalemate in the Bush cabinet over the direction of Iran policy, but because the Clinton administration was rebuffed by Iran in earlier efforts to restart relations, the Bush policy was galvanized and prevented any major initiative towards building relations with Iran. Thro would utilize a variety of strategies to support his policies; these would include sanctions, political rhetoric and pressure, military threats, support to topple the Iranian regime, and very little dialogue. He often referred to it by saying that To understand how torn the Bush administration was over Iranian policy, we must look at the ILSA which came up for renewal in August of 2001. As mentioned above, ILSA traditionally ran for five years before requiring a renewal. With the differing opinions in the White House, a position was taken to only extend ILSA for two years as opposed to five, but in the end Congress overrode Bush and voted for another five 214 Slavin, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S. and the Twisted Path to Confrontation p. 194.
80 years. 215 Additionally, during 2001 the Bush administration would contin ue the Clinton economically or in the development of their nuclear program. The Bush administration also continued the six plus two talks on Afghanistan that included Iran However, what would happen over the next year began to cement a policy of isolation and denial towards the Iranians and their nuclear program. One lation and denial was the Israeli capture of the Karine A vessel on January 3, 2002. This ship was loaded with weapons and munitions and reportedly bound for the Palestinians; the shipment violated signed accords between the Palestinian Authority and Isr ael. The major problems for Iran, though, were the facts that the ship originated from Iran and that the weapons were manufactured in Iran as they were still in their factory crates and wrappings. 216 While some experts argued that it was possibly carried o ut as an unauthorized smuggling operation by the Revolutionary Guards without the consent of the highest levels in the Iranian government, 217 that argument was not considered by the Bush administration. Shortly after the Karine A incident came the Axis of Evil speech delivered by President Bush in his 2002 State of the Union address which lumped Iran into the company of Iraq and North Korea. The impact that this type of statement made by President Bush, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and other key officials was unmistakable and understandable. Iran began to view itself as a target of the 215 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle p. 344. 216 Ibid, p. 351. 217 Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26, no. 1(2003): 99.
81 218 The year 2003 would usher in the era of the Bush doctrine whereby the U.S. demonstrated against the Saddam Hussein regime. 219 The ground offensive of the 2003 Iraq War which was prosecuted based upon the belief that Saddam was pursing WMD was over within weeks, and it put the Iranians on notice of how the Bush administration would pursue its foes. And while the Iranians understood the Iraqi chemical weapons posed little deterrent to U.S. forces, they did note of how the U.S. has handled a now nuclear capable North Korea over the years. 220 The Iranians responded with what has Bush administration officials, it received little attention. 221 Once Bush had completed the deposing of Saddam in Iraq, he turned his attention and rhetoric towards Iran and their nuclear p rogram, and his policy of denying nuclear technology and isolating I ran from the international community began to take shape much more clearly. In June of 2003, shortly after the invasion of Iraq, President Bush would state that be dangerous if they have a nuclear weapon. I brought this up at the G 218 World Policy Journal 20, no. 2 (2003): 23. 219 Ibid, p. 22. 220 Ibid p. 24. 221 Slavin, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S. and the Twisted Path to Confrontation p. 205,
82 222 Merely a week after this statement, Bush would state that in regards to Iranian inspection compliance th 223 Additionally, in June and July, Bush would begin imposing more sanctions on firms dealing with Iran and their nuclear program; Chinese and North Korean businesses were s ingled out by the administration for their support to Iran. 224 The revelations in 2002 of previously undisclosed facilities at Natanz and Arak only gave the U.S. officials more ammunition to tell their European counterparts who resisted sanctioning under th Iranian nuclear program. This discovery by the U.S., which was originally reported by the Iranian dissident gro up National Council of Resistance, a group aligned with the Iranian labeled terrorist group Mujahidin e Khaliq (MeK) would lead to the IAEA to begin rigorous inspections of all the facilities reported. The resulting inspections by the IAEA would culminat e in an ultimatum issued to Iran on September 12, 2003 calling for 222 an Exchange with Government Printing Office. George W. Bush Presidential Library. http://frwebgate.access .gpo.gov/cgi bin/getpage.cgi?position=all&page=653&dbname=2003_public_papers_vol1_misc (accessed August 28, 2010). 223 Government Printing Office. George W. Bush Presidential Lib rary. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi bin/getpage.cgi?position=all&page=692&dbname=2003_public_papers_vol1_misc (accessed August 28, 2010). 224 Iran Country Profile. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/chronology_2003.html (a ccessed August 28, 2010).
83 have stemmed from pressure from the Bush administration. 225 While the Bush administration was leaving th e task of negotiating with the Iranians to the EU 3, President Bush and his administration would continue to put pressure on allies not to support the Iranian nuclear program. One State Department official who would later become the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, John no need for nuclear energy. 226 The as discussed earlier that the EU 3 achieved 227 Additionally, after the Iranian agreement to the Additional Protocol, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage state d that government of Iran about areas of mutual interest as 228 So while the Bush administration and the EU 3 seemed to be using somewhat of a carrot and stick approach, there seemed to be very little to the carrot as nothing was offered up front to the Iranians such as an easing of sanctions or unfreezing of Iranian assets. agreement demonstrated to the international community that Iran was prepared to 225 226 The Christian Science Monitor. September 19, 2003. http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0919/p01s02 wome.html/(page)/2 (accessed August 28, 2010). 227 228 Washington Post, October 29, 2003: A21.
84 cooperate in regards to its nuclear program by voluntarily suspending their right to peaceful uranium and enrichment activit confrontation with the West. 229 Despite the offer of dialogue with the Iranians, the Bush administration would continue their policy of isolation and denial towards Iran. In November of 2003, Secretary of Sta te Colin Powell would meet with EU members to persuade them to declare Iran in violation of the NPT at the upcoming IAEA meeting despite a November 12 2003 IAEA report that showed no evidence of a secret nuclear program. 230 In April of 2004, President Bush would again signal the pressure being exerted on allies to condemn Iran when he stated that speak as plainly as possible to the Iranians and make it absolutely clear that the development of a nuclear w 231 This last statement represented a bolder step towards denial of nuclear technology as one intolerable. Later in 2004, President Bush would again convey his policy and strategy by stating about Iran that 232 President 229 230 Iran Country Profile. 231 and a Question and Answer Session at the Newspaper Association of America Convention Government Printing Office. George W. Bush Presidential Library. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi bin/getpage.cgi?position=all&page=645&dbname=2004_public_papers_vol1_misc (accessed August 28, 2010). 232 Exchange with Government Printing Office. George W. Bush Presidential Library. http://frwebgate.access.gp o.gov/cgi
85 Bush and his adm inistration often demonstrated their disregard for IAEA reports and and continued to pressure the Iranians to essentially rollback their nuclear program. The election of Iranian President Ahmadinejad would chart an even tougher course against the Iranian nuclear program for the remaining three plus years of the Bush presidency; President Ahmadinejad would call an end to the suspension of the uranium enrichment s activities as a result of the lack of progress of meetings with the EU 3 discussed earlier. Soon after the election of President Ahmadinejad, Bush would echo his previous statements above by saying in June 2005 is unacceptable, and a process which would enable Iran to develop a nuclear weapon is 233 This policy of denial of nuclear technology just as he stated in 2004 is in contravention with the nature of the Non Proliferation Treaty which states in Article participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and 234 Jus t one day after Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters) which bin/getpage.cgi?position=all&page=1365&dbname=2004_public_papers_vol2_misc (accessed August 28, 2010). 233 Government Pri nting Office. George W. Bush Presidential Library. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi bin/getpage.cgi?position=all&page=1070&dbname =2005_public_papers_vol1_misc (accessed August 28, 2010). 234 IAEA. April 22, 1970. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf (accessed August 28, 2010).
86 froze the U.S. assets of organizations supporting the Iranian nuclear program, to include the AEOI. 235 While the President was pursuing his policies of isolation and denial via sanctions and political pressure up until now, there was no overt evidence of support to regime change. However, in 2005, the Iran Freedom Support Act (H.R. 6198) was to be drafted by Congress. It would take until September of 2006, but President Bush would sign it into law authorizing (including the award of grants) to foreign and domestic in dividuals, organizations, and 236 The law would give President Bush another tool in his foreign policy bag to wield against the Iranians. And after Ahmadinejad and the Iranian 237 their nuclear activities to include uranium enrichment activities, the Bush administration capitalized on this opportunity to ratchet up the pressure to isolate the Iranian regime to deny nuclear related and dual use technology in 2007. Prior to this, o n April 28, 2006, 235 Iran Country Profile. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/chronology_2005.html (accessed August 28, 2010). 236 Source Watch. Iran Freedom Support Act. September 30, 2006. http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Iran_Freedom_Support_Act (accessed August 28, 2010). 237 Political Science Quarterly 122, no. 2 (2007): 201.
87 Iranians should not have a nuclear weapons, the capacity to make a nuclear weap on, or 238 President Bush would repeat this statement throughout 2007 amplifying the efforts to deny any and all parts of a nuclear program, but the statement in and of itself is absurd. How can we prevent Iran from Bush succeeded in passing more sanctions in October of 2007; these sanctions targeted Iranian financial and mil itary institutions. 239 A couple of months later in December of stopped its weapons program in 2003 and that its declared enrichment program cannot be converted as easily or quickly as assumed 240 Regardless of this report, Bush administration officials, continued their demonizing rhetoric to isolate Ahmadinejad who continued defying a UN mandate to suspend uranium enrichment. A statement by Defense Secretary Rober t Gates continued the calls for and intensify our economic, financial, and diplomatic pressures on Iran to suspend 241 238 New York Times, April 30, 2006. 239 Iran Country Profile. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/chronology_2007.html (accessed August 28, 2010). 240 MIT Center for International Studies, December 2007: 1. 241 http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1201 (accessed August 28, 2010).
88 strategies. Beginning with his first radio address of the new year he would state that 242 Slightly more than a month later Bush would tout the acquisition of a mysterious laptop that proved Iranian intentions for a nuclear weapons program. The Bush administration would again petition the UNSC to approve another round of sanctions against Ira n, and on March 3, 2008, the UNSC would approve this third round of sanctions directed at more dual use goods bound for Iran. 243 Despite opportunities between the U.S., EU, and Iran to open up talks on the nuclear program, President Bush and his officials in 244 Obviously this supposed carrot and stick approach did not present the Iranians with a large enough carrot; had the offer of talks bee n granted without the precondition of suspension, there Bush officials were just not interested in granting concessions during their tenure, and during the remainder of 2008 his administration would work in concert with the EU to target more Iranian organizations and businesses for sanctions. These additional sanctions would include the Iranian maritime, agricultural, and medical industries accused of serving as fronts for the Iranian nuclear program, and inspections of ships and airplanes enroute to Iran would also be increased. Even major Russian arms exporter 242 The Public Papers of George W. Bush. The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=76256 (accessed August 28, 2010). 243 Nuclear Threat Initiat Iran Country Profile. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/chronology_2008.html (accessed August 28, 2010). 244 Farhi,
89 Rosoboronesport would fall victim to sanctions by the United States for dealings with the Iranian nuclear program. 245 And i n October of 2008, another Bush ally, A ustralia, would be convinced by the U.S. to enact its own sanctions against Iran. 246 attempts at isolation were pol icies of denial and isolation against the Iranians appear to have had no impact on the progress of the Iranian nuclear program as the previous history section shows. Another look back at Figure 1 shows that from 2007 to the Obama inauguration in 2009, Ira n went ineffective policies towards Iran and its nuclear program. ineffectual threats, or draw redlines, which it could not enforce, or threaten t o implement sanctions in the Security Council which were watered down, was further crippled by the dramatic rise in oil prices between 2005 and 2008 that provided much more revenues to Iran. 247 from 2005 forward were countered at every t President Ahmadinejad. Iran was no longer in the weak position in 2005 as opposed to capitalized on U.S. weakness in the region As discussed earlier, Ahmadinejad took advantage of not just the growing insurgency in Iraq that was seeing increased U.S. casualties, but he also took 245 Iran Country Profile. 246 Ibid. 247 The Washington Quarterly 33, no. 1 (2010): 167.
90 and in the Middle East The U.S. had backed away from the Arab Israeli conflict so much that Hamas was elected into the Palestinian parliament in January of 2006 which damaged their position in the region, and with no weapons of mass destruction discover ed in Iraq and the Abu Ghareb abuses making headlines world opinion of the U.S was on the decline. More importantly ans to a domestic political end for Ahmadinejad. 248 His strategy was to boost his political day more devout Mossadeq, a 249 Ahmadinejad halted the cooperation agreed upon in t 2003, and Iran has continued its nuclear activity ever since citing their rights under the NPT to a peaceful nuclear program. However when Iran was referred to the UNSC, gly believed that the EU 3 and the IAEA were unjust processes because they were being strong armed by the U.S. 250 As a result of this belief, Iran and Ahmadinejad looked to China and Russia to protect Iran from serious sanctions by the UN. One other key be r has been in a decline, and U.S. involvement in Iraq was the perfect example. Ahmadinejad capitalized on the Abu Ghareb scandal to show how the U.S. was morally bankrupt and unfortunately for Bush, t he Iraqi invasion had the opposite effect on Iran that he desired 248 Ansari, Ali Adelphi Papers 47, no. 393 (2007): 50. 249 Ibid. 250 Ibid p. 56.
91 as the moral corruptness of a U.S. occupied Iraq discouraged the Iranians from a democratic revolution. 251 election also gave Iranian sponsored militias in Iraq such as the Badr Corps a freer hand to create mischief and cause problems for U.S. forces; keeping the U.S. troops bogged down in a conflict in Iran meant that Bush would be less likely to look for a military conflict with Iran. Additionally, keeping U.S. troops embroil ed in a conflict in which casualties rose sharply in 2006 and generated a 2007 troop surge made the U.S. public war weary. This meant that Ahmadinejad would be more likely to have a greater percentage of the U.S. public opposed to any conflict in Iran. P resident Bush certainly had a difficult time with the radical Ahmadinejad. His harsh rhetoric since the Bush administration has not stopped, and the Obama administration would have the difficult task of finding a way to coax the Iranian leader to the nego tiating table. The election of President Barack Obama would represent another shift in U.S. policy toward Iran, but how would it impact the Iranian nuclear program? The election of President Obama in 2008 brought about more talk of change in the the two months leading up to his inauguration, there appeared to be an opening for renewed diplomacy between the two sides. A close look at President O bama and his s some significant differences from his predecessor s often inconsistent and ill fated attempts to undermine the Iranian nuclear program. 251
92 On January 26, 2009, just days after his inauguration, President Obama sta ted in an interview with the Al if countries like Iran are willing to unclench their fist, they will find an extended hand from us. 252 Yet on that same day his UN Ambassador Susan Rice trumpeted the requirement of suspended enrichment activity before talks could resume between the U.S. and Iran ; it is doubtful that this indicated an On March 20, 2009, the Persi an New Year, President Obama 253 The two statements issued by President Obama himself are were two of many that came directly from President Obama and were intended for Iranian consumption. One of the starkest differences between the Obama administration and Bush 43 the U.S. position as the moral authority in the world. The debacle of Abu Ghareb, lack of WMD being found in Iraq, position in the world. Obama immediately sought to corre ct this, and though his speeches in Cairo and around the world may have accomplished this to some extent, his position at home was criticized by some who felt it displayed America as weak rather than strong. However Obama believed engagement was the best policy for Iran. succeeded in getting Iran to the negotiating table over the nuclear program after an Iranian request to the IAEA to provide 252 Obama, Barack H, intervi ew by Hisham Melhem. Washington D.C. (January 26, 2009). 253 Cable News Network. March 20, 2009. http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/0 3/20/obama.iran.video/ (accessed August 30, 2010).
93 more fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) now primarily used for medical purposes In early October 2009, senior officials from the U.S., Iran and the other states from the P5+1 (UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany) met in Geneva for discussions where Iran tentatively agreed t o a U.S. proposal to swap Iranian LEU for replacement fuel for the TRR 254 The deal involved multiple countries with Russia enriching the uranium to the necessary level, 19.75%, and France fashioning the Russian enriched LEU into fuel rods to be used for medical radioisotopes 255 The deal presented Iran with a golden opportunity to demonstrate that their program was legitimate, and Obama went to the UN Security Council to request amendments to resolutions that forbade this export of Iranian LEU. 256 However, three weeks later, Iran reneged on the conditions of the deal and refused to transfer the requested amount of LEU to Russia; Iran countered with a request to receive the fuel rod s before giving up the ir uranium and also refused to part with the whole 1,200kg that was requested t o be transferred to Russia 257 On January 2, counter offer; in the event of no response, he stated that Iran would enrich the uranium to the necessary levels themselves which th ey began on February 9, 2010 at the Natanz pilot fuel enrichment plant. 258 As a result of Ira violated the IAEA safeguards agreement, the new IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano would issue a report claiming 254 Survival 52, no. 3 (2010): 67. 255 Ibid p. 69. 256 Ibid, p. 70. 257 Ibid, p. 73. 258 Ibid, p. 76 7.
94 that Iran was n ot sufficiently cooperating and that Iranian activities raise d the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities related to the 259 Iran while appea ring to be a failure to some demonstrated to the world that the U.S. was in fact prepared to negotiate with Iran. But this time it was Iran who backed away from the table; this incident would give the U.S. a degree of justification to seek sanctions later. program ultimately achieved nothing in its effort to slow the program ; the end result of ts to engage has been no more promising than his predecessors as a victory, and therefore there has been no need for him to turn away from his strategy of defiance and confronting the W est. But some experts, Shahram Chubin included, bogeyman bent on destabilizing t 260 The first President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Abolhassan Bani Sadr confrontational policy withdrew this gift (referring to the Bush administration s confrontational stance toward Iran) and created the politic 261 Despite 259 260 Chubin, Shahram, Alireza Nader, Jerrold D Green, David E Thaler, Charlotte Lynch, and Frederic Wehrey. Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics. Washington, D .C.: National Defense Research Institute, 2010: 11. 261 Bani New Perspectives Quarterly 27, no. 2 (2010): 35.
95 Iran has refused to cooperate at the negotiating table; President Obama, in a statement in March 2010 262 With Iran again continued attempts at dialogue and disregarding UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) u nfortunately, Obama began to have been historically ineffective stages of reconciling both the Iran Refined Petroleum San ctions Act and the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009 targeting and the bills were quickly touted as effective when several companies withdrew their business deals with Iran. 263 In addition to the U.S. sanctions, t he Obama administration also tabled more sanc tions at the UN aimed at Iran, and in June of 2010, UNSCR 1929 was passed. This resolution prohibits Iran from acquiring production or use of nucle particular uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, all heavy water activities or supplying Iran with a multitude of conventional weapons systems. 264 However, it is because of past sanctions that Iran has bee n planning for the onset of more severe sanctions ; over the past few years Iran has reduced its foreign imports of 262 Strategic Comments 16, no. 4 (2010): 3. 263 Ibid p. 1 2. 264 United Nations. June 9, 2010. http://daccess dds ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/396/79/PDF/N1039679.pdf?OpenElement (accessed October 2, 2010).
96 refined oil from 40% to 30% of its domestic fuel consumption re quirements. 265 Iran began a rationing program for gasoline that, according to Farid Ameri, head of the Iranian state petroleum distribution company, has reduced gasoline imports from 5.8 to 4.7 million gallons per day since January. 266 Also important is the f act that Ahmadinejad has programs; fortunately for him the sanctions will make it easier for him to remove the subsidies and blame the U.S. and the West for higher prices on goods to include gasoline which will rally Iranians around the regime with America again being the bogeyman 267 It is this notion of Iran against the world that maintains the Ahmadinejad regime in power; it solidifies Persian nationalism against opponents of element of the Iranian constitution that the leadership can cling to. Increased sanctions from the U.S. and the United Nations will not only be ineffective but they will be counterproductive because, in the words of Bani 268 Considering the stateme nts made by Chubin and Bani Sad r above, one begins to understand the method to President Ahmadi The outrageous statements made by Ahmadinejad about the Holocaust and regarding a 9/11 conspiracy during a U.N. address in New York City are calculated to continue the conflict with the West. Ahmadinejad knows that a non confrontational stance by Obama will jeopardize his 265 266 Ibid. 267 Middle East Policy 17, no. 2 (2010): 58. 268 Bani
97 regime and embolden his adversaries so he makes outlandish statements like he did in New York City on September 23, 2010 in order to increase the likelihood of conflict. For President Obama, compromising with an Iranian President who implies that 9/11 was an American conspiracy becomes next to impossible if not outright political suicide. Obama has come under pressure from many officials in the U.S. dinejad is a rational actor. On the contrary, Ayatollah Ali Ahmad inejad and his Revolutionary Guards. 269 Despite the sanctions t he Iranians have continued to make extensive progress in their nuclear program In May 2010, as mentioned previously, a n agreement was reached for acquiring fuel for the Tehran reactor; the deal negotiated by Turkey and Brazil to give Iran assurances for nuclear fuel added legitimacy A nd at the end of August 2010, the Russians loaded fuel into the Bushehr reactor marking a step towards bringing the plant online for the first time. accusations from within his own cabinet, namely Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, that or an effective strategy to counter an Iran with nuclear weapons. Obama was referred to by Ali Rahnema Iran expert at the Ame rican University of Paris, 269 Bani
98 looking to justify any and all actions which he takes. 270 Accusations from within his cabinet in conjunction with the eventual reliance upon previously ineffective strategies of sanctions and political pressure do not bode well for a diplomatic solution on the Iranian nuclear program in the near term The admin istration has even recently been going back development considering the stark political differences between Obama and Bush 43. has frequently been viewed as facilities, but does this translate to a military strike ? In late September of 2010, a nt. 271 Interestingly enough, the computer worm appears to be targeting Iranian computers much more frequently than those of other states; roughly 60% of Stuxnet infections have surfaced in Iran while there have been no reported infections in the United Stat es. 272 While there is speculation as to the origin of the attack, James Lewis, a cyber security expert from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argues that the U.S., Israel, and U.K. are the leading suspects in the attack. 273 Though unconfirm ed, some researchers have released information that a 270 Rahnema, Ali, interview by Bryan Hamilton. Paris, (May 13, 2010). 271 The Wall Street Journal. September 27, 2010: A12 272 Ibid. 273 Ibid.
99 file within the worm contains a word, Myrtus, which leads them to believe Israel is the most likely perpetrator of the attack because of its biblical origins 274 Regardless of which state perpetrated the attack, it is probable that the Obama administration was well aware of the plan Robert Langner, a German computer security grade cyber missile deployed early last year (2009) to seek out and destroy one real 275 So could the Obama administration have turned to sabotage as engagement was not yielding positive results? Whether or not this is the case, considering that the worm was released in 2009, another issue must be disc ussed As the computer worm has only been discovered recently, there was little speculation that a computer worm cause d trifuges in oper ation reportedly dropped by 23% between May 2009 and January 2010. 276 It is likely that the export controls on technology shipments to Iran have forced Iran to purchase illicit materials which were tions in order to induce problems down the 277 Though there is no concrete proof that the Stuxnet worm caused the centrifuge difficulties at Natanz, the evidence certainly points in that direction. Considering that the U.S. is one of the few states k nown to have an offensively geared cyber capability, it is 274 The New York Times. September 29, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 09/30/world/middleeast/30worm.html?_r=1 (accessed October 2, 2010). 275 Christian Science Monitor. September 21, 2010. http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0921/Stuxnet malware is weapon out to destroy Iran s Bushehr nuclear plant (accessed October 2, 2010). 276 of the Fuel 277 Ibid, p. 83.
100 strike which would have proven much more problematic. y from that of his predecessor George W. Bush. Despite what could eventually become a victory by o early to fully gauge what will transpire. The bottom line is that Iran has yet to suspend or halt enrichment activi ty. Their nuclear program continues to advance, though the introduction of a cyber attack to the equation has created some difficulties for the regime and has potentially stalled the Bushehr plant from becoming fully operational. If Obama can avoid legit imizing the Ahmadinejad program will be successful.
101 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS nuclear ambitions? This program has certainly not come about overnight. U.S. administrations have used policies of containment, engagement, isolation, and denial when i t comes to the Iranian program. The effectiveness of these attempts over past and the current administration is certainly in question. I contend that evidence revealed above has demonstrated that the U.S. policies towards the Iranian nuclear program and regime have been ineffective, counterprod uctive, and even potentially harmful to efforts at NPT anyways) and to the more worrisome potential goal of nuclear weapons With this in mind, I contend that my original hypothesis that U.S. policies have been ineffective i n halting the advancement of the Iranian nuclear program is valid. A new U.S. policy towards engaging Iran must be unde rtaken to ensure the order of a volatile region whose access is vital to so many. Since the Islamic Revolution, the U.S. and Iran have operated on opposite ends of the political spectrum, and U.S. policies have done little to counter what is potentially an extraordinary t hreat to Middle East security, the Iranian nuclear program. While Reagan and the first President Bush paid little attention to the program, progress was moving along quickly and publicly one might argue. Little was made of the program then, but today th e re is little acknowledgement of Our policies have focused on one thing and one thing alone, the nuclear weapon.
102 potential for developing a nuclear weapon has proven ineffective in halting the advancemen t of their nuclear program as the IAEA has continually failed to find such evidence. Before Obama, U.S. policies of engagement offered far too little to make talks with the Iranians worthwhile; and U.S. administrations since the Iranian Revolution, with t he exception of the Obama administration, have demanded full acquiescence to our desires without considering Iranian sovereignty, let alone needs. Engagement failed to take into account the domestic political situation in Iran that has been so unstable; w e have failed to strike a balance between constructive engagement and containment which has harmed our moderate Iranian allies domestically. Prior to Obama it has been since the late years of the Clinton administration that a U.S. administration made a co ncerted effort at engaging the Iranians, but it may be too late Containment and denial of nuclear technology also failed as enforcing all of the sanctions we had enacted were next to impossible ; there was no agency designed to monitor all of the intern ational trade flowing in and out of Iran U.S. administrations also effectively calculate the financial benefits to be had by states bypassing sanctions; the risk was worth the reward for many states and their companies Just see table 3 below for a list of all the states that chose to risk U.S. sanctions for the profits to be had; these most damaging prior to the ILSA was that we undercut our position by continuing high levels of trade with Iran while berating other states for doing the same; such a hypocritical stance was easily recognizable and not respected in the international community. These policies and strategies were terribly ineffective, and Iran began to
103 Table 3 : Post 1999 Major Investment/Developments in Iran's Energy Sector
104 Table 3 : Post 1999 Major Investment/Developments in Iran's Energy Sector (Cont)
105 Table 3 : Post 1999 Major Investment/Developments in Iran's Energy Sector (Cont) Even more important has been that the sanctions that the U.S. has consistently application of national 278 They have created additional problems for foreign policy with some of our most important allies. Britain and other EU states have threatened to complain to the World Trade Organiza tion if the U.S. ever applies these sanctions to one of their companies. 279 To put it bluntly, the se sanctions are terrible foreign policy and have not succeeded in slowing the Iranian nuclear program; 278 Leverett, Flynn, and Hillary Mann Leverett. China, Energy, and the Cost to U.S. Interests from Bad Iran Policy. September 15, 2010. http://www.raceforiran.com/china energy and the cost to u s interests from bad iran policy (accessed September 20, 2010). 279 Ibid.
106 they have merely created another antagonizing hurdle preventing constructive engagement with Iran over many issues to include the nuclear program. Though the continued sanctions have harmed Iran and their energy infrastructure, ll merely blame 280 Any new application of sanctions sanctions have failed. 281 The importance of this particular body of research is twofold. First, this research the groundwork for why U.S. policies should be more open to the idea of a nuclear program in addition to the simple fact that the pursuit of a peaceful nuclear program is a right of Iran as a signatory to the NPT under Article IV (see Appendix 1) The Iranian economy is dependent upon its natural resources; the evidence above displays just that. The fact that American administrations have conveniently discarded that argument is one Perhaps the most important information garnered comes from a thorough examination of the most current exchanges between the Obama administration and Iran. These exchanges have built upon previous exchanges between the two states, but I contend that it is evident how Obama has attempted to chart a different path a non confrontational pat h with the Iranian state. Obama extended his hand to Iran even before he was President. However, it is critical that Obama remain on this path; resorting to the ineffective strategies of sanctions, political pressure, and military threats will not 280 281
107 yiel d the desired result a transparent and peaceful Iranian nuclear program. Despite the more confrontation, President Obama must find a way to stay the course; this will be the from the NPT or acquisition of a nuclear weapon. The implication to be had from this is not, we can expect more of the same from Iran. While this particular research has focused on U.S. policies primarily in the past, it is not difficult to make the conclusion that the Iranian regime is a major part of the nuclear problem. The regime relies upon this notion of Iranian independence to remain in power, and as stated earlier, conflict with the U.S. only assists their efforts. So I believe that research following in this direction could focus on how to bridge a gap between advocating for democr same time promoting the same freedom that the Iranian constitution advocates? Regime reform to a more transparent and open government represents the best path to an Iranian nuclear program that poses no threat to the region or international community. While much of the focus in this body of research has focused on the words and deeds of Iranian Presidents in the regime most significantly those of the current President Ahmadinejad, it is important to briefly discuss how different regime elements are involved in the decision making process when it comes to the Iranian nuclear program. First of all, I must concede that Ahmadinejad does not have the final say when it comes to the nuclear program. He is, however, the mouthpiece by which all of the decision makers to speak to
108 the international community as evidenced by his speech es referring to the nuclear calling the nuclear issue a matter to be taken up with the IAEA and not a political one. Multiple elements of the Iranian political apparatus have a say in the state of rogram. These include the Guardian Council, the President, and most importantly, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei The Supreme Leader also who play a large role in carrying out nuclea r planning and operations in Iran Ultimately, though, it is the Supreme Leader who d reached a 282 So while President Ahmadinejad certainly speaks with the approval of the Supreme Leader and his policies in mind, it is important for U.S. policymakers not to put too much stock into often controversial comments. Our policy experts must understand that much of what is said by Ahmadinejad is aimed for domestic consumption rather than international consumption as the Iranian leadership is focused on preserving its regime and shoring up nationalistic support via the nuclear program. U.S. policy makers must heed the words and deeds of the Supreme Leader. Too much attention is garnered to the actions of Ahmadinejand (myself included) because he is the and most visible proponen t for the nuclear program. While h e is the most visible and outspoken, but Khamenei, the ultimate decider, can do that n which does include President 282 Milani, Mohsen . Foreign Affairs 88, no. 4 (2009) p. 47.
109 Ahmadinejad. 283 So with these key points in mind, it is important for U.S. policymakers to understand who will and that one individual is the Supreme Leader. U.S. policies and strategies which have included sanctions, political pressure, threats of military actions, and now possibly a cyber attack towards the Iranian nuclear program have not effectively attained the goal of halting Iran hnology The Iranian nuclear program has surpassed goal after goal and stands on the precipice of a fully functioning Bushehr reactor and the ability to enrich uranium to weapons grade levels And while Iran touts the civilian nature of the program due to the legitimate economic and energy needs of their state, considering their almost certain d esire for a strategic deterrent there is little doubting that one of their next milestones will be to attain the capability to assemble a nuclear weapon. So w hat policies and strategies can be developed that can effective cope ? This will be the subje ct of the final chapter : A Way Ahead. Before proceeding to the fi nal chapter and my recommendations I feel this is the most opportune time to clear the air on my personal thoughts regarding the direction and purpose of the Iranian nuclear program. The evidence that I have presented in this research is certainly strongly favorable to program And while the security rationale for the nuclear program is also comprehendible, there can b e no denying the economic rationality of pursuing nuclear power in Iran. 283
110 nuclear weapon. The economic rationale may be overwhelming but it also makes for a convenient disguise and excuse for the Iranian leadership to pursue its nuclear program. much more overarching and has more profound and immediate ramifications for the survival of the state and the regime. Ir an understands the role that nuclear weapons play in national security strategies, and they know that states with nuclear weapons have never gone to war with one another. Iran wants to cement their independence in stone and prevent the interference in their sovereign affairs that they are so paranoid of Now I am not saying that Iran is going to develop a nucl ear weapon as soon as possible or that they have a multitude of secret facilities enriching uranium in secret to weapons grade level s. H owev er, what I do believe is that Iran wants to possess the breakout capability to assemble a nuclear weapon in a very short timeframe, say in thirty to ninety days. Iran has already done the hard work in enriching ura nium to LEU; progressing t o weapons grade uranium takes much less time. If Iran were to be threatened by another state perhaps the United States, Iran could cite its right to withdraw from the NPT in accordance with Article X (see Appendix 1) in order to rvival. At that time they would then assemble the nuclear weapon which wou ld send a clear message to present a significant deterrent to adversaries. The Iranian leadership is determined to assert its independence. Joining the paramount. esp ecially with a nuclear Israel on their doorstep who has threatened action against Iran for their support of Hamas and Hezbollah. lack of transparency
111 284 to negotiations with the Unit ed Sta tes and its allies leads me to my inescapable conclusion that Iran seeks a nuclear weapons c apability that is not operation a lized yet. Any time we decide to weaponize it, we can do so rather 285 Despite my belief that Iran does in fact have its sights set on nuclear weapons I argue there is a course of action that can be undertaken to satisfy all parties. 284 285
112 RECOMMENDATIONS: A WAY AHEAD As stated earlier, the U.S. and the West should concede that Iran has the right to peacefully develop nuclear technology as stated in Article IV of the NPT and their economic justifications are valid. Without nuclear power, Iran is staring at an economic meltdown of epic propo rtions over the coming decade. But Iran must realize that their continued ambivalence toward the West will win them no allies, and reestablishing ties with the West will open their energy sector to unhindered investment. The policies and strategies that have been undertaken by U.S. administrations over the past three decades display what could likely be considered the most ineffective attempts at foreign policy in U.S. history. Why these policies were chosen certainly was never my intention to discuss, b ut it is likely that somewhere along the way some policy analysts convinced senior leaders that particular policies and strategies would achieve the desired effect. Unfortunately, unless they intended for the U.S. to be faced with a nuclear Iran today, th eir recommendations were faulty to say the least. What I propose below is a comprehensive roadmap which I contend comprise s of the most pressing issues surrounding the current impasse between the United States and Iran. I argue that without seriously a ddressing these issues there will be little chance for progress between the U.S. and Iran on the nuclear issue.
113 First and foremost, the U.S. must begin an effort to resume normal diplomatic relations with Iran. This may simp ly begin with a U.S. interests section in Iran, but it must evolve into a full functioning U.S. Embassy in Tehran. It has been more than thirty years since the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis; we no longer need to harbor animosity over this. Iranian leaders, specifically President Khatami, have conceded that the hostage taking was probably a mistake. Restarting diplomatic relations is certainly not so simple, and it will not immediately tear down the walls of mistrust that exist between the two states. Howe ver, it will immediately open direct channels of communication between the administrations on the nuclear issue among others and it would also open the door to increased security cooperation on a number of other regional concerns such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and drug trafficking, all of which the U.S. and Iran generally agree upon. T candidly discussing their nuclear program. 286 The U.S. must make a concerted effort so Along with efforts to reestablish diplomatic relations and serious negotiations regarding the Iranian nuclear program there must be a halt to the conditional nature of talks with Iran. Iran has made numerous gestures of goodwill over the years by halting uranium enrichment while awaiting the West to craft genuine incentive laden proposals to ensure Iran does not have an indigenous full nuclear cycle. We must not forget that it is in accordance with Article IV of the NPT to research and develop a peaceful nuclear program as detailed in Appendix 1 ; their uranium enrichment programs and other nuclear facilities have not been found in violation by IAEA inspectors to this 286
114 date. Certainly there have been some irregularities with the Iranian program as discussed current violation of the NPT let alone pursuit of nuclear weapons. For U.S. leaders to continue ass erting that Iran must relinquish their rights granted to them as one of the original signatories to the NPT could be considered arrogant at best and possibly even foolish. T hrowing out the conditions that have prevented serious discussions would be a step in the right direction, but this is where difficulties will arise. In addition to the first two measures, the U.S. must begin to scale back, if not completely eliminate the sanctions that have targeted Iran and other countries doing business with the Ira nian nuclear establishment. The bottom line up front on the sanctions which are meant to force Iran to the negotiating table is that they will have the opposite effect; sanctions will impact ordinary Iranians whose distrust of the U.S. and West will be int sanctions. 287 to further their nuclear program. The majority of the pain caused by these sanctio ns has been exacted on the very citizens the United States seeks to court in an effort to overthrow the hard line regime. Additionally, the record high prices for oil over the past three to five years have filled the Iranian coffers with funds to further their nuclear efforts and blunt the impact of sanctions. Unfortunately, the sanctions have also become a convenient excuse for the regime for why progress is not being made; they consider it a cost of maintaining their Iranian independence. The sanctions have simply played into 287 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20270/sanctions_to_spur_negotiations.html (accessed October 2, 2010).
115 their heads at U.S. efforts. Sanctions only permit the Iranian regime to place the blame for their internal problems squarely upon the shoul ders of the United States thereby making us, as I have stated before, the bogeyman. Additionally, sanctions have been circumvented by those states that we should consider critical in this negotiation process, Russia and China. While a number of sanctions resolutions have passed through the United Nations, each time the measures become watered down and reduced to nearly meaningless attempts to constrain the Iranians while permitting Russia and China to carry out business as usual there. As already mention ed earlier, Russia has supported the Bushehr reactor, and China has most recently come under scrutiny for several of its energy companies such as Chinaoil and Sinopec, violating U.S. sanctions while doing business in Iran. In addition to Russia and China striking multi billion dollar deals with Iran, India also reached a $40 billion deal to develop Iranian oil fields. 288 Multiple other states and their companies have also gotten into the business of investing in Iran. M ost recently, Turkish Prime Ministe r Erdogan stated on September 16, 2010 that Turkey would attempt to triple trade volume over the next five years; Turkish Iran trade has surged from $1 billion in 2000 to $10 billion over the past year. 289 Nearly 80% of that trade is Iranian natural gas flo wing to Turkey. 290 Swiss firm EGL also reportedly signed an 18 billion Euro gas contract with the National Iranian Gas 288 Atoms for Peace: An International Journal 1, no. 4 (2007): 295. 289 The Wal l Street Journal. September 17, 2010, A13. 290 Ibid.
116 E xport Company even though U.S. sanctions are in place. 291 See table 3 above for a list of all the companies who have invested in the Irani an energy sector regardless of the potential of U.S. sanctions. Sanctions while exerting some pain on the Iranian economy have not succeeded as a whole and are not achieving the goal of halting the Iranian nuclear program ; they only stand to harm the U.S. position in the international community. And while there is a desire by some in both the State Department and the Obama administration to specifically pressure Russia, China, and other partners to halt their sanctions busting behavior, I contend tha t such a step on the part of the U.S. would likely push these key powers further away from the U.S. and squarely into the Iran camp. may be interpreted as pr o Iran viewpoint in this research. Iran owes the international community some guarantees of its own if it wishes to join the nuclear club. Pushing forward against the will of the West has not been a strategy that has won Iran or Ahmadinejad m any allies in the West. His radic al comments about the Holocaust, Israel and 9/11 have made many skeptical of Iranian intentions commitment to transparency in their nuclear program For the U.S., its allies, and the rest of the world to continue to receive evidence of secret Iranian nuclear facilities from dissidents such as the MeK would be unacceptable. Complete disclosure of any and all nuclear related facilities will immediately stall those who call for military strikes and 291 The Jerusalem Post. August 11, 2010. http://www.jpost.com/Cooperations/A rchives/ (accessed September 21, 2010).
117 increased sanctioning against Iran. There will definitely be those that insist Iran is still hiding something, but we cannot expect to win over the most ardent of the anti Iran camp. This transparency would c omprise of several important components Iran must adopt and ratify the Additional Protocol of the IAEA; these measures will provide a degree of comfort to the international community that Iran is serious about not pursuing nuclear weapons, which I am sk eptical about myself. Iran must also honestly address the numerous reported documents concerning past Iranian nuclear weapons research to include the document on uranium hemispheres for nuclear warheads that has been found to be credible by the IAEA. 292 Th e continued assertion that these documents are fraudulent without addressing the reasons behind their claim is not sufficient. The last measure that would improve Iranian transparency will not be so easy to overcome; remote camera based monitoring should be a necessity for Iranian nuclear facilities to verify peaceful intentions and provide early warning in the event that the Iranian regime deviates from their stated desire. This measure will represent a criterion above and beyond IAEA inspection techniqu es in other parts of the world and may be seen as unjust but due to the difficult nature of travel into and within Iran, unannounced inspections cannot be reasonably expected to be truly unannounced. 293 As the West is fearful of Iran maintaining an indigenous nuclear capability within its own borders with minimal monitoring and Iran refusing to relinquish its right to a peaceful nuclear program, there appears to be only one solution: the multinational fac ility. This type of facility w as offered by Iran in the 2005 negotiatio ns and it would 292 293 Ibid.
118 provide the best transparency possible as other states would participate in the daily operations of these facilities 294 And as late as the year 2008, even EU leader Ja vier Solana lauded this proposal. 295 Th ese facilities would provide Iran with a reliable fuel supply to operate its reactors while assuag ing their energy concerns plus it could serve as a production facility for LEU to power nuclear reactors to participating states and possibly the entire Middle East. As Iran touts itself as a regional power that is bent on peace and justice, it can begin to display this by usherin g in and recommitting itself to the proverbial Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons. One of the more complicated areas of this problem concerns something that is a potential side effect of a nuclear Iran a regional arms race. States such as Saudi A rabia, Egypt, and Jordan could feel threatened by a nuclear Iran, peaceful or not, and they may choose to seek out nuclear weapons. It is important for the U.S. and other world powers to engage these states to discourage this behavior. The U.S. has alrea dy made a deal to provide Saudi Arabia with upwards of $60 billion in arms with potential sales to other Gulf states estimated at nearly $100 billion. 296 While these actions are capitalizing on fears of a nuclear Iran and potential war, they provide these s tates with a measure of conventional security that will hopefully stall if not prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons. There are other pieces to this puzzle that will also facilitate an acceptable resolution to all in regards to the Iranian nuclear pr ogram. Issues of spent fuel 294 295 Ibid. 296 The Wall Street Journal. September 12, 2010. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704621204575488361149625050.html?KEYWORDS=sa udi+weapons+deal (accessed September 22, 2010).
119 reprocessing and take back, nuclear fuel guarantees, and even progress on the Arab Additionally, Israel must be convinced to restrain from taking action against Ira n and potentially declare their nuclear arsenal The time will come for Israel to voice its concerns over Iranian threats against Israel, but they must permit the U.S. and world powers to barter with Iran without the threat of military action. T he roadma p laid out above presents what I contend are the most critical steps to finding a consensus that: A) ensures the order the international community including Israel, seeks w ith an Iran free of nuclear weapons and B) provides Iran the justice they seek to pursue their right to a peaceful nuclear program without threats from other states. So why should Iran cooperate with the United States and its allies in their quest to There are several important reasons that can answer this question and provide ample justificatio n for cooperation. To put it bluntly, Iran stands to profit considerably by cooperating, both economically and in security. The potential gains are very substantial and would provide rnational community. economy. Export revenues and the budget itself are heavily dependent on oil. While eak havoc on would promote a removal of these sanctions thereby permitting U.S. companies, who
120 have the most advanced technology in the energy sector, to help Iran ex tract the oil and natural gas that their economy is so dependent upon This support would not only provide direct monetary support to the state, but it would also provide jobs to everyday Iranian s. Obviously the benefit of the thousands of jobs these contracts would provide would have positive secondary and tertiary effects for the state of Iran. Iran has several energy projects, to include the exploration in the Pars gas fields, that would benefit from advanced U.S. technology. It would help Iran meet their rising energy demands, and allow Iran to use those funds previously used for importing oil on other state projects. At a minimum, cooperation would mean that Iran could begin receiving the financial assistance to rebuild its degraded oil infrastructure and eventually increasing their e xports thereby increasing their revenues. So this is an ob vious benefit that should be flaunted by U.S. policy makers and it should be regarded as a game changer for the Iranians. This cooperation with the U.S. in the areas of energy 297 Second, cooperation with the U.S. could bring benefits in other areas of common interests. As liberals in International Relations would argue, cooperation breeds more cooperation, and there are several areas of regio nal security that both the U.S. an d Iran agree upon Iran supported the U.S. in 2001 in the removal of the Taliban from Afghanistan, and they do not want to witness their return. Iran has also had to deal with the problems of the drug trafficking out of Afghanistan and its impacts on Ira nian citizens ; this is another area where the U.S. and its agencies could provide valuable assistance The U.S. and Iran also want to see a stable Iraq; neither want to see the state 297
121 fall back into chaos and disarray as it did in 2006 and 2007. The U.S and Iran can work together to ensure a democratic Iraq that is not in jeopardy of foregoing its Arab identity to follow the Iranian theocratic mode l. The U.S. and Iran can work together on the issue of stabilizing the Afghan and Iraqi states, but the nucl ear issue must progress before future efforts Both these security and the previous economic reasons should provide Iranian leaders with sufficient reason to cooperate with the United States in the arena of th eir nuclear weapons program.
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131 APPENDIX 1 NUCLEAR NON PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)
132 The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty", Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war a nd to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples, Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war, In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclus ion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities, Expressing their support for resear ch, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of inst ruments and other techniques at certain strategic points, Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by products which may be derived by nuclear weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties of the Treaty, whether nuclear weapon or non nuclear weapon States, Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to particip ate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective, Recalling the determination expresse d by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end, Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the eliminati on from national arsenals
133 of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, S tates must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establis hment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the worlds human and economic resources, Have agreed as follows: Article I Each nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non nuclear weapon State to manufa cture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. Article II Each non nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor what soever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receiv e any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Article III 1. Each non nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with t he International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agencys safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whet her it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
134 2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or pr epared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non nuclear weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article. 3. The safe guards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclea r activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set for th in the Preamble of the Treaty. 4. Non nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordan ce with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 1 80 day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations. Article IV 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty. 2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. Article V Each party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive
135 devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research an d development. Non nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non nuclear weapon St ates. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements. Article VI Each of the Part ies to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effecti ve international control. Article VII Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. Article VIII 1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment. 2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall ente r into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment. 3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purpose s of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty
136 may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of furthe r conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty. Article IX 1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the depos it of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967. 4. For States whose instruments of rat ification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signato ry and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notic es. 6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article X 1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decid es that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three m onths in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 2. Twenty five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be
137 extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty. Article XI This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chines e texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States. Sour ce: www.UN.org