The jewish trail of tears the evian conference of july 1938

The jewish trail of tears the evian conference of july 1938

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The jewish trail of tears the evian conference of july 1938
Laffer, Dennis Ross
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[Tampa, Fla]
University of South Florida
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Forced Emigration
Immigration Restrictions
Intergovernmental Committee
Dissertations, Academic -- European History American History -- Masters -- USF ( lcsh )
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ABSTRACT: ABSTRACT The purpose of this thesis was to explore the origins, formulation, course and outcome of the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees meeting (better known as the Evian Conference) of July 1938. Special emphasis was placed on contemporary and later historical assessments of this assembly which represented the first international cooperative attempt to solve an acute refugee crisis. A general review followed by a more detailed evaluation was made of existing official and un-official accounts of the meeting utilizing both public records, private diaries, books, newspapers, journals and other periodicals for the period of January 1, 1938 through December 31, 1939. This data was supplemented by later recollections of conference participants as well as post-Holocaust historical scholarship. Various appraisals have been made of the motivations behind the summit and its ultimate success or failure. Franklin Roosevelt has particularly come under criticism by scholars who believed that his Administration had "abandoned" the Jews to their fate. The President's supporters, on the other hand, declared that FDR did everything possible given the existing political, economic and social conditions of the late 1930's. It is my conclusion that although Roosevelt may have been sympathetic to the plight of Central European Jewish refugees their resettlement and ultimate destiny merited a lower priority given his focus upon rebuilding the national economy and defense. The President clearly recognized the looming threat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan but was unwilling to expend political capital on an issue that faced domestic and political opposition. I further maintain that the conference was set up to fail while providing propaganda value for the participating democracies. The hypocritical rhetoric and actions of the delegates and the ineffectiveness of the conference's sole creation, the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees, was clearly recognized by Nazi Germany and ultimately influenced its anti-Jewish policies. Thus, it is not a coincidence that the pogrom of November 1938, Kristallnacht, occurred only four months later. The avoidance of dealing with the Jewish refugee problem was further highlighted in the futile Wagner-Rogers Bill of 1939, the Hennings bill of 1940 and especially the Bermuda Conference of 1943, a time in which the details of mass murder of Jews and other groups was already well known within official circles. Further work needs to be done on the diverse responses of the Jewish community both within the United States and abroad to the peril facing their co-religionists.
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The jewish trail of tears the evian conference of july 1938
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by Dennis Ross Laffer.
[Tampa, Fla] :
b University of South Florida,
Title from PDF of title page.
Document formatted into pages; contains 410 pages.
(M.A.)--University of South Florida, 2011.
Includes bibliographical references.
Text (Electronic thesis) in PDF format.
ABSTRACT: ABSTRACT The purpose of this thesis was to explore the origins, formulation, course and outcome of the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees meeting (better known as the Evian Conference) of July 1938. Special emphasis was placed on contemporary and later historical assessments of this assembly which represented the first international cooperative attempt to solve an acute refugee crisis. A general review followed by a more detailed evaluation was made of existing official and un-official accounts of the meeting utilizing both public records, private diaries, books, newspapers, journals and other periodicals for the period of January 1, 1938 through December 31, 1939. This data was supplemented by later recollections of conference participants as well as post-Holocaust historical scholarship. Various appraisals have been made of the motivations behind the summit and its ultimate success or failure. Franklin Roosevelt has particularly come under criticism by scholars who believed that his Administration had "abandoned" the Jews to their fate. The President's supporters, on the other hand, declared that FDR did everything possible given the existing political, economic and social conditions of the late 1930's. It is my conclusion that although Roosevelt may have been sympathetic to the plight of Central European Jewish refugees their resettlement and ultimate destiny merited a lower priority given his focus upon rebuilding the national economy and defense. The President clearly recognized the looming threat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan but was unwilling to expend political capital on an issue that faced domestic and political opposition. I further maintain that the conference was set up to fail while providing propaganda value for the participating democracies. The hypocritical rhetoric and actions of the delegates and the ineffectiveness of the conference's sole creation, the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees, was clearly recognized by Nazi Germany and ultimately influenced its anti-Jewish policies. Thus, it is not a coincidence that the pogrom of November 1938, Kristallnacht, occurred only four months later. The avoidance of dealing with the Jewish refugee problem was further highlighted in the futile Wagner-Rogers Bill of 1939, the Hennings bill of 1940 and especially the Bermuda Conference of 1943, a time in which the details of mass murder of Jews and other groups was already well known within official circles. Further work needs to be done on the diverse responses of the Jewish community both within the United States and abroad to the peril facing their co-religionists.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
System requirements: World Wide Web browser and PDF reader.
Tunstall, Graydon .
Forced Emigration
Immigration Restrictions
Intergovernmental Committee
Dissertations, Academic
x European History American History
t USF Electronic Theses and Dissertations.
4 856


The Jewish Trail of Tears The Evian Conference of 1938 by Dennis R. Laffer A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of History College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida Major Professor: Graydon Tunstall, Ph.D. John Belohlavek, Ph.D. Kees Boterbloem, Ph.D. Date of Approval: March 16, 2011 Keywords: Intergovernmental Committee, refugees, Anschluss forced emigration, immigration restrictions Copyright 2011, Dennis R. Laffer


DEDICATION I dedicate this thesis to Ellen, my wife of almost twenty five years, whos e love, comfort, guidance and wisdom sustained me through sickness and health and enabled me to complete a long-held dream. The completion of a MasterÂ’s degree program in history and the writing of a thesis would not have been possible without her presence at my side. For her great patience, insight and support I will always be truly grateful. I dedicate this work also to my daughters, Lauren Abigail and Jenny Elizabeth for their love, encouragement and patience. My interest in the topic of this work began in 1999 when they were both young and I deeply appreciate their understanding of the time I needed to spend in my quest for knowledge about the Evian Conference. I hope that I have set an example for them that it is possible, even in the latter years of middle age, to reach new levels of accomplishment. My greatest achievement will, however, always be the family with which I am blessed. Finally, I dedicate this work to the victims of the Nazi era whose lives could have been saved had the world acknowledged, cared about and acted upon the coming catastrophe. I honor those exceptional individuals and institutions, the


upstanders that had the courage to speak out against tyranny and offer relief and refuge to the innocent victims of manÂ’s hatred against his fellow man.


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Mao Tse-Tung once wrote that “a journey of a thousand miles starts with a single step.” My excursion into the world of history began many years ago but gradually crystallized into certain topics and themes; a focus that would not have been possible without the influence of many people and institutions. I would particularly like to mention Dr. Donald M. Goldstein, the National Center for the Pacific War, the Florida Holocaust Museum and especially Dr. Mary Johnson, f or helping to focus my attention on the history of the Evian Conference of 1938 and her encouragement to tell the story. I hope that this work warrants her confidence. I had always considered returning to academia to obtain a Master’s degree in history and so I want to especially thank for their kindness, support, expertise, guidance and incredible patience Drs. Stefan Huber, Graydon Tunstall, John Belohlavek, and Kees Boterbloem. The research and the writing of this thesis were greatly facilitated by Frank Castellano, Scott Nieves, Brandy Pa dgett, Barbara Cabot, Lynn Wagner, Maria Cabrera and Lisa Piazza. I also wi sh to thank my wife and my friends who had to listen to my incessant discussion of the Evian Conference and the trials and tribulations of a late middle aged man writing a thesis. Without the help of these individuals and many others this journey into the past could never have been undertaken.


“But I suppose it has always been that way in the world; people are concerned with their own immediate affairs and when it comes to the sufferings of other people, especially when the people are far away, most people…have not the imagination to be concerned.” James G. McDonald New York Times July 3, 1938.


i TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES iii ABSTRACT iv “A REFUGEE’S PRAYER” vi INTRODUCTION 1 PART I GATHERING THE STORM 9 Chapter 1: “Heaviest of Blows” 9 Chapter 2: Anschluss “The Leader is Coming” 19 Chapter 3: Flight “Problem of Growing Gravity and Complexity” 56 Chapter 4: “Firmly Fixed American Tradition” 119 PART II: HOPE ASCENDING 154 Chapter 5: Day One “Actual Racial Problem” 154 Chapter 6: Day Four “Humanity Now Plunged Into Despair” 196 Chapter 7: “Great Human Tragedy” 219 Chapter 8: Day Six “Greatest Sympathy” 226 Chapter 9: Days Nine and Ten “Serious Spirit of Cooperation” 235 Chapter 10: Palestine “Waste of Time” 245 PART III: HOPE DENIED 250 Chapter 11: “Unique Opportunity to Study Jewish Question” 250 Chapter 12: Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees “Face Saving Organization” 301


ii PART IV: APPRAISALS 312 Chapter 13: “No Confidence in the Idea” 312 Chapter 14: Ominous Tidings Conclusions and “Unintended Signals” 346 REFERENCES 352 APPENDICES 385 Appendix A: Country-by-country Breakdown of Jewish Refugee Immigration from Nazism—1933-1945 386 Appendix B: Estimated Number of Unassimilated Political Refugees Officially Recorded in France 1922-1939 389 Appendix C: List of Jewish and non-Jewish relief organizations testifying before the Evian Conference Subcommittees 390 Appendix D: Decisions taken at the Evian Conference on Jewish Refugees, July 1938 392 Appendix E: Jewish Population of the World at the End of 1937 395 Appendix F: Proposals regarding Intergovernmental Committee expenses and allocation 396 ABOUT THE AUTHOR END PAGE


iii LIST OF TABLES TABLE 1: Jewish Occupations in Germany in 1933 Census 57 TABLE 2: Emigration of Jews from Austria and Germany April1933-May 1939 59 TABLE 3: Austrian Jewish Emigration 1938-1945 60 TABLE 4: Foreign Born in U.S., 1850-1940 78 TABLE 5: Immigration 1851-1950 79 TABLE 6: Demographics of Jewish Population in Germany as of January 1, 1938 164


iv ABSTRACT The purpose of this thesis was to explore the origins, formulation, course and outcome of the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees meeting (better known as the Evian Conference) of July 1938. Special emphasis was placed on contemporary and later historical assessments of this assembly which r epresented the first international cooperative attempt to solve an acute refugee crisis. A gener al review followed by a more detailed evaluation was made of existing official and unofficial accounts of the meeting utilizing both public records, private diaries, books, newspape rs, journals and other periodicals for the period of January 1, 1938 through December 31, 1939. This data was supplemented by later recollections of conference partici pants as well as post-Holocaust historical scholarship. Various appraisals have been made of the motivations behind the summit and its ultimate success or failure. Franklin Roosevelt has particularly come under cr iticism by scholars who believed that his Administration had “abandoned” the Jews to their fate. The President’s supporters, on the other hand, declared that FDR did everything possible given the existing political, economic and social conditions of the late 1930’s. It is my conclusion that although Roosevelt may have been sympathetic to the plight of Central European Jewish refugees their resettlement and ultimate destiny merit ed a lower priority given his focus upon rebuilding the national economy and defense. The President clearly recognized the looming threat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan but was unwill ing to expend political capital on an issue that faced domestic and political opposition. I fur ther


v maintain that the conference was set up to fail while providing propaganda value for t he participating democracies. The hypocritical rhetoric and actions of the delegates and the ineffective ness of the conferenceÂ’s sole creation, the Intergovernmental Committee for Politic al Refugees, was clearly recognized by Nazi Germany and ultimately influenced its anti-Jewish policies. Thus, it is not a coincidence that the pogrom of November 1938, Kristallnacht occurred only four months later. The avoidance of dealing with the Jewish refugee problem was further highlighted in the futile Wagner-Rogers Bill of 1939, the H ennings bill of 1940 and especially the Bermuda Conference of 1943, a time in which the details of mass murder of Jews and other groups was already well known within official c ircles. Further work needs to be done on the diverse responses of the Jewish community both within the United States and abroad to the peril facing their co-religionists


vi “A Refugee’s Prayer” Representative James, J. Davis, Penn. entered the prayer of Martin Marden, a 16year-old German refugee, which had been “recommended for reading by every Amer ican by the superintendent of New York City Schools, Harold G. Campbell. We may all be proud that we live in a land where, as this lad says, ‘the youth of all races have a tomorrow.’ Despite the unemployment here, the problems of the depression, the difficulties of the stock market, and the war clouds which loom ever closer, who among us does not respond enthusiastically to these radiant words?” One day in the year should be reserved for prayers of thanksgiving in which we give thanks for something that has been granted us ; for having been saved from some great destruction caused by nature or man. I am thankful that I have been given an opportunit y to be educated in the United States of America. I am thankful that I live in a land where, regardl ess of race, everyone may take part in national ceremonies. I am thankful that I live in a land where a person may sing the National Anthem without having someone tell him that he may not bec ause of his race. I am thankful that I live in a country governed by democracy rather than force. I am thankful that I live in a country where one i s not persecuted. I am thankful that I live in a land where there ar e people who have real sympathy for refugees from European countries who h ave gone through horrible experiences. I am thankful that I have been given the opportuni ty to enjoy the many privileges that are unheard of in European countrie s. I am thankful that I shall be able to realize my a mbitions, which would have been impossible had I remained in my native land. I am thankful that I live in a land where the futu re seems bright and hopeful rather than dark and hopeless. I am thankful that I live in a land where the yout h of all races have a tomorrow, rather than in my native land, where the youth of the race is without a tom orrow. I am thankful that I have been permitted to tell y ou of the troubles in European lands in order that you may develop a real sympathy for the oppressed of the earth. I am thankful that I am happy and free. 1 1 Martin Mardin, “A Refugee’s Prayer,” Washington Her ald, March 31, 1938 cited in Congressional Record Appendix, Seventy-Fifth Congress, 3 rd sess., vol. 10, April 1, 1938 (Washington, D.C.: G PO, 1938), 1269. He left Germany during 1935 with his sister and rejoined his widowed mother, Mrs. Betty Mardin, who had emigrated to the U.S. a year earlie r.


1 INTRODUCTION On Rosh Hashanah it is written, On Yom Kippur it is sealed: How many shall pass on, how many shall come to be; Who shall live and who shall die; Who shall see ripe age and who shall not; Who shall perish by fire and who by water; Why by sword and who by beast; Who by hunger and who by thirst; Why by earthquake and who by plague; Who by strangling and who by stoning; Who shall be secure and who shall be driven; Who shall be tranquil and who shall be troubled; Who shall be poor and who shall be rich; Who shall be humbled and who exalted. But REPENTENCE, PRAYER and CHARITY temper judgmentÂ’s severe decree. 1 1938 was a portentous year in the history of German and Austrian Jewry and ultimately for the Jews of Europe. The Anschluss or annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany on March 12 signaled to the world that Jews could no longer survive within the German community. Faced with an existential threat and unable to adopt the time honored stratagem of accepting the status of a protected but second class and subordinat e minority, the Jews of Germany were once more forced upon the road of the wanderer seeking sanctuary and resettlement. The American President, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, seemed to offer such salvation through his call for the creation of an international conference to deal w ith this 1 Central Conference of American Rabbis, Gates of Repentance: The New Union Prayerbook for t he Days of Awe (New York: Central Conference of American Rabbis an d Union of Liberal and Progressive Synagogues, 1978), 313-314.


2 refugee crisis. The meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee for Pol itical Refugees (better known as the Evian Conference, held in France during July 1938 and attended by thirty two nations), raised expectations that a solution would be found to the problem of forced emigration but such hope proved to be ill-founded. Faced with a humanitarian crisis of immense proportions democratic governments sought a workable solution t o this problem but in a half-hearted, constrained and hypocritical fashion. While offerin g expressions of sympathy, each delegation, with few exceptions, justified its inability to admit the displaced and oftentimes impoverished refugees. The decisive failure of the meeting and the inadequacy of its sole construction, t he Intergovernmental Committee established in London, filled the victims of perse cution with despair and their persecutors with a sense of impunity. It demonstrated to a n emboldened German leadership that the strategy of compulsory emigration had fail ed due to the resistance of other nations to offer havens to involuntary, stateless and de stitute refugees. Consequently, a far more radical approach would be required. It can be argued that the Evian disappointment and the abandonment of Czechoslovakia during the Munich Crisis encouraged the Nazis to carry out Kristallnacht the November 1938 pogrom that swept Germany and Austria. It was not a coincidence that Crysta l Night occurred only four months after the conclusion of the Evian Conference. The liturgy of the “Days of Awe,” the Jewish High Holidays, declares that on Rosh Hashanah t he fate of man is written and on Yom Kippur it is sealed. The destiny of Central European Jewr y was written on the day of the Anschluss and sealed on Kristallnacht Eventually, the cover of European war would provide the most radical solution to the problem of the Jews.


3 The Evian Conference, the Wagner-Rogers bill of 1939, the Hennings Bill of 1940 and the Bermuda Conference of 1943 illustrate the diverse attitudes and approaches adopted by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, his Administration, Congress and the American public as well as the global community in dealing with European im migration and refugee issues. 2 Whereas the Evian Conference and Wagner-Rogers bill were regarded as a measure primarily favoring German and Austrian Jews that s ubsequently failed, the Hennings bill was an attempt to rescue British Christian refu gee children (although not refugees in the true sense—not fleeing persecution but potential bombing) that, after receiving widespread public and governmental support, successfully made its way through Congress and was written into law. The sentiments and actions of the American public, Roosevelt, the departments of his Administration and the legislat ive branch and their international counterparts demonstrated similarities but als o many contradictions and inconsistencies during these 1938-1940 events. These differences have led to disparate and controversial perceptions of the adequacy of the American a nd worldwide response and the assessment of responsibility during the years of t he pre-war period and the Holocaust. Various opinions have been offered regarding the reactions of Roosevelt and the democratic nations to this humanitarian calamity. Some writers have asse rted that FDR could have done more to aid the refugees but instead abandoned them to their collective fate. Others claim that given the economic, social and political context and cl imate of the 2 The Wagner-Rogers Bill called for the entry of 20,0 00 Jewish and non-Aryan children into the United States outside of the annual quota from Germany and Austria (27,370)—10,000 in 1939 and 10,000 in 1940. The Hennings Bill offered an Amendment to th e Neutrality Act allowing American “mercy” ships to transport British Christian children, in unlimited numbers outside the quota to the United States duri ng a time of war. The Bermuda Conference of April 1943 was convened by the United States and the United Kingdom ostensibly to consider the issue of wartime Jewish refugees at a time the Allies were aware of the Final Solution but it too, like its Evian predecess or, was set up to fail.


4 time the President did everything that was possible to resolve the problem. This author however, contends that the Jewish Question was a matter of low priority to a Chief Executive whose major focus was upon domestic economic and political recovery and the strengthening of national defense. Little political capital would be expended upon a n issue that lacked widespread public support. Furthermore, it will be demonstrated t hat the invitation to and the framing of the Evian Conference was primarily a thinly guised publicity ploy that was set up to fail; a move clearly recognized by parti cipating countries and by the Nazi regime. The London based Intergovernmental Committee was likew ise an illusion, an operation of smoke and mirrors, designed to demonstrate official action but in reality geared to accomplish little. This thesis will focus in detail upon the initiation, planning, execution, reactions to and the aftermath of the Evian Conference which affected future international re fugee policies during the critical inter-war years of 1938 and 1939 and, following the outbr eak of hostilities on September 1, 1939, the fate of European Jewry itself. The paper is divided into sections that will examine pre-war Austria and the Anschluss the origins, construction, course, results and consequences of the Evian Conference and contemporary and later historical assessments of the actions of Roosevelt and t he convention participants. A general review followed by a more detailed evaluation w as made of official and un-official accounts of the meeting utilizing public records, private diaries, books, newspapers, journals and other periodicals for the period of January 1, 1938 through December 31, 1939. This data was supplemented by later writings and statements of conference participants as well as post-Holocaust histori cal scholarship.


5 Part I, “The Gathering Storm,” includes Chapter 1-4. Chapter 1 provides information regarding the Austrian Jewish community prior to the Anschluss Jewish emigration from Germany, beginning with the ascension to power of Adolf Hitler, i s broken down into four distinct phases. Chapter 2 describes the Anschluss itself and the Jewish and international reactions to what many regarded as a violation of the Ve rsailles Treaty. The specter of forced emigration from the Eastern European countrie s of Poland, Hungary and Rumania appears on the horizon as a potential and greater threat and will influence the formation and scope of the Evian Conference. The immigration policie s of various countries are touched upon and the positive actions of Bolivia and a Chinese diplomat, Feng Shan Ho are highlighted. Warnings about the dangers of mass mig ration are broached by such journalists as Dorothy Thompson and are influential in the American decision to convoke an international refugee conference. Chapter 3 explor es the failure and successes of the League of Nations in dealing with refugee matters and frames the United States Department of State official invitation to att end the meeting which will be held in Evian, France. Initial reactions for and against the meeting are discussed and greater details of national immigration policies are provided. The ominous threat of the Eastern countries is again addressed to a greater degree and Pa lestine is excluded from discussion as a site of possible refuge. Chapter 4 delves more deeply i nto the reactions of the American and foreign press, politicians and Jewish and Muslim communities towards the convocation of the conference. The Presidential Advisory Committee for Political Refugees, created by Roosevelt and headed by the for mer High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany, James G. McDonald makes its appearanc e on the scene.


6 Part II, “Hope Ascending,” includes Chapters 5-10. Chapter 5 describes the planning of the Evian Conference and the creation of two technical sub-committe es. The panels were established to hear testimony from refugee organizations and obtai n confidential information regarding each nation’s immigration policies and willingness to accept involuntary immigrants. Palestine is secretly excluded from conside ration due to British pressure and Myron C. Taylor, the chief American delegate, announced tha t the annual immigration quota of Germans and Austrians would be combined. This consolidation marked the limits of action on the part of the United States and would have profound ramifications on the policies of the other participants as well as on German y itself. Day One began with opening statements from Henri Brenger, the chi ef French representative, Taylor and Lord Winterton, his British counterpart. The delega tes of The Netherlands, Belgium, Australia, Canada, Argentina and Brazil expressed a com mon theme that would run throughout the conference and, with few exceptions, would be echoed by the subsequent speakers. Each nation was sympathetic to the plight of real and potential Jewish refugees but domestic conditions precluded mass immigration. Further analysis of the immigration rules and regulations of the attendees are provided. Cha pter 6 opens with Day Four of the Conference; two days were spent in electing Tayl or President of the meeting. Statements are made by a number of Latin Ameri can nations, Denmark and Haiti and continue the premise “we are sympathetic but…” The sole exception is the Dominican Republic which, for a variety of reasons that will be outl ined, agreed to receive one hundred thousand refugees. Chapter 7 discusses the activities of the Technical Sub-Committees and the testimony provided by Jewish and non-Jewish refugee organizations as well as t he


7 League High Commissioner Sir Neill Malcolm. The organizations offer four pos sible approaches to solving the emigration impasse. Chapter 8 reports the activities of D ay 6 in which Sweden, Ireland, Switzerland, Paraguay and Central American countri es continue the sympathetic but hollow rhetoric. Behind the scenes, however, the Swiss diplomat is secretly negotiating with the German Government to block all Je wish immigration into Switzerland. Chapters 9 and 10 analyze the reports of the Technic al Sub-Committees and include the closing statements of Taylor, Brenger an d Winterton. The latter, for the first time, openly addresses the issue of Palestine as a site of resettlement but discounts it as a site of relocation. The question of the retention of Jewish capital to facilitate migration is raised and will become the ma jor confounding factor ensuring the failure of the Conference. Chapter 11 described the role of Pal estine and Jewish attitudes towards Zionism and its interaction with the meeting. Part III, “Hopes Dashed,” includes chapters 11 and 12. Chapter 11 discusses the initial assessments and criticisms of the Evian Conference. Italy now appe ars on the scene as a possible additional source of forced Jewish emigration due to enactment of Aryan racial policies. The role of Jewish disunity and the failure to provide a unit ed front at the Conference is analyzed as are differing opinions regarding the role of Palestine. German Nazi reaction to and criticism of the lack of success of the meetin g is described; a disappointment that will affect subsequent dealings with the Reich authorities and result in a profound change in the tenor of German policies towards its Jewish population. Chapter 12 discusses the sole creation of the conference, the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees, based in London and its attempts to negotiate with the Germans to facilitate orderly migration.


8 Part IV, “Appraisals,” includes chapters 13 and 14. Chapter 13 analyzes the role played by Roosevelt and lays out the arguments regarding Presidential actions and inactions during this critical time in Jewish history. Chapter 14 concludes the work a nd continues the discussion of the effect of the Conference on German as well as Polis h policies. It also offers a link to future refugee problems. The Evian Conference marked the first global attempt to resolve an internationa l refugee crisis through diplomacy. Its success hinged on the interplay betwee n varied economic, social, political, racial and ideological factors that came into conf lict and eventually resulted in the “Perfect Storm.” The destiny of Continental Jew s and of the world itself was ultimately affected by the decisions (or lack thereof) of the meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees held in the confines of a luxurious hotel on the shores of a scenic and serene lake.


9 PART 1: GATHERING STORM Chapter 1 “Heaviest of Blows” “ The world seems to be divided into two parts—those where the Jews could not live and those where they could not enter. 1 “The emigration problem is therefore for all practi cal purposes insoluble…” 2 The rise of Nazism to the central stage of domestic politics and authority threatened and eventually revoked the rights and privileges granted to Jews fol lowing the Emancipation of the Nineteenth Century. Jews who had considered themselves Germans first and practitioners of the Judaic faith second found themselves in a position of increasing social, political and economic isolation and disenfranchisement. The application of state sponsored violence and arbitrary imprisonment eventually convi nced the majority of German Jews that continued existence within the borders of Germa ny was no longer a viable or realistic possibility. Consequently, forced migration beca me the primary modus of survival. 1 Chaim Weizmann, Manchester Guardian May 23, 1936 cited in A.J. Sherman, Island Refuge: Britain and Refugees from the Third Reich 1933-1939 (Portland Oregon: Frank Cass, 1994), 112. Weizmann was a British Zionist leader, chemist and first President of the State of Israel. 2 Joachim von Ribbentrop, “The Jewish Question as a F actor in Foreign Policy in 1938,” Foreign Ministry Circular January 25, 1939 available from urce/Holocaust/forpol.html+%22The+Jewisy+Question+a s+a+Factor+in+Foreign+Policy+in+1938%22&c d=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us ; Internet; accessed May 29, 2010.


10 The period of Twentieth Century Jewish emigration from Germany (and later Austria) can be demarcated into four well-defined phases. The first stage bega n with the ascension of Adolf Hitler to national power in January 1933 and ended with the enactment of the Nuremberg Racial Laws in 1935. A limited degree of flight oc curred during September 1930 when 107 National Socialists gained seats in the Reichstag but the overwhelming majority of Jews continued to maintain a sense of personal sec urity within the new Nazi State. This self assurance, however, dramatically chang ed following the destruction of the national parliament building ( Reichstag ) on February 27 and the subsequent proclamation of the “Decree of the Reich President for the Prot ection of the People and State” on February 28, 1933. This edict, purportedly issued to prevent further “Communist acts of violence” against the State, indefinitely suspe nded a number of the Articles of the Weimar Constitution. 3 Strict limitations were placed on civil liberties granted by law such as the freedoms of expression and of the press, the ri ght of free association and assembly, the privacy of personal and business communications a nd the sanctity of the home and property. The central government assumed powers originally allocated to the Federal States and could issue draconian punishments for offenses that previously warranted life imprisonment. 4 The Reichstag on March 23, 3 The “Decree of the Reich President for the Protecti on of the People and State” ( Verordnung des Reichsprsidenten zum Schutz von Volk und Staat ) was also known as The Reichstag Fire Decree. The Weimar Constitution was signed on August 11, 1919 f ollowing the collapse of the German Empire. It provided for universal suffrage and a nationally el ected parliament but ultimately proved unable to withstand economic collapse, rising nationalism and conflicting ideologies. For a delineation of the A rticles of the document see “The Constitution of the German Federation of August 11, 1919” cited in H. Oppenheirmer, The Constitution of the German Republic available from ml ; Internet; accessed October 8, 2010. 4 “Decree of the Reich President for the Protection o f the People and State of 28 February 1933” cited i n United States Chief Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression vol. III, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Pr inting Office, 1946), Document 1390-PS, 968-970.


11 1933, approved the Enabling Act or the “Law to Remedy the Distress of the People and the Empire” which granted Hitler dictatorial powers under the veneer of legali ty. The Reich Chancellor was empowered to issue laws without the consent or participation of the members of the Reichstag 5 Subsequently, on July 14, 1933 the Government enacted the “Law against the Establishment of Parties” which effectively made t he National Socialist Party the only legally sanctioned political party. 6 The adoption of dictatorial powers and the escalating hegemony of the Nazi Party over the operations of the State and society led to the relentless implementation of increasingly severe anti-Jewish and anti-non-Aryan policies. These acts w ere formulated to disenfranchise and separate the Jews and non-Aryans from the heart and fabr ic of German society and the economy. Random and orchestrated psychological terror, physical violence, arrest and the ominous threat of the concentration camp became an increasingly common modus operandi designed to create a fearful atmosphere in which Jews would be forced to emigrate, providing a solution to the “Jewish Question” in Germany. 7 However, by the fall of 1933 it was clear to many in the German Jewish 5 “Law to Remove the Distress of the People and the S tate” (The Enabling Act or Ermchtigungsgesetz ), reprinted in U.S. Department of State, Division of European Affairs, National Socialism. Basic Principles, their Application by the Nazi Party’s Foreign Organ izations and the Use of Germans Abroad for Nazi Aim s (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), Appendix, Document 11, 217-18. 6 “Law against the Establishment of Parties” July 14, 1933 cited in Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds., Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945 (London: Cape Publishing, 1974), 200. Article I: The National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) was the “only political party” and Article II: Anyone who sought to continue an existing or create a new party faced a three year term of “penal servitude” unless the offense mandated a “heavier penalty.” 7 Dachau was the first concentration camp officially established by the fledgling Nazi regime in March 1933 and was initially utilized primarily for Socia l Democrats, Communists, trade unionists and other political prisoners. Gradually, Dachau and other c oncentration camps began to house additional groups considered inimical to the Reich such as the Roma, Jehovah’s Witnesses, homosexuals and Jews. The use of the camps as a weapon of terror against the Jewi sh population rapidly accelerated following the


12 community that the Enlightenment strategy of “accomodationist secularism” tha t had promoted the assimilation of Jews into the dominant culture of Germany would no longer provide security. 8 Consequently, many German Jews resorted to the age old formula of survival, utilized in previous periods of persecution, in which second class status was accepted with the hope that conditions would improve in the future. As a result, the number of Jews seeking to emigrate with the help of the Aid Association of German J ews ( Hilsverein der Deutschen Juden ) the Palestine Office and other relief and resettlement organizations dramatically fell. During April-July 1933 four hundred to five hundred Jews per day sought emigration assistance decreasing to one hundred to two hundred per day in the autumn of the year and to ten to twenty per day in early 1934. 9 Such Jewish sentiments were facilitated by some Government officials while others sought the institution of more discriminatory, punitive and ultimately sepa ratist policies. This reflected the contradictory nature of the anti-Jewish paradigm adopted by the Nazi regime; a conflict between those who opted for a conservative and gra dual approach to exclusion and disenfranchisement and those who sought a more radical resolution. The Wrttemberg Minister of Economics, for example, banned on November 24, 1933 any acts of discrimination against Jewish and other non-Aryan artisans, busine ss Anschluss and Kristallnacht during which Jews faced mass arrest. If a Jew cou ld find the wherewithal to emigrate abroad he would be released from incarcera tion. 8 Bernard Susser and Charles S. Liebman, Choosing Survival: Strategies for a Jewish Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 123. 9 Mark Wischnitzer, “Jewish Emigration from Germany 1 933-1938,” Jewish Social Studies 2, no. 1 (January 1940): 26-27. The mission of the Palestin e Office was to facilitate Jewish immigration into the British Mandate of Palestine. “ Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden ,” Shoah Resource Center available from %20-%206371.pdf ; Internet; accessed October 1, 2010; “Palestine Office” Jewish Virtual Library available from /ejud_0002_0015_0_15348.html ; Internet; accessed October 1, 2010.


13 owners and laborers and offered police protection to skilled craftsmen at loca l fairs and markets. 10 The Reich Minister of Labor, Franz Seldte, decreed on the same date that Jewish workers were to enjoy the same privileges and legal protections as t heir Aryan counterparts. 11 The Reich Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick issued an order to the Governors of the German States that Jewish businesses were not to be harmed by Ary an rules and regulations. 12 Dr. Loewenstein, President of the Union of Jewish Front Fighters ( Reichsbund jdischer Frontsoldaten ), declared in their official publication, The Shield ( Das Schild ), that the “solution of the Jewish question within our homeland” is obtainable provided “racial differentiation” did not connote “racial defamation” which the Jewish wa r veterans would denounce on the “grounds of our equal-born achievement.” 13 The sons of such veterans would be allowed, according to Prussian Minister of Education Bernhard Rust, to take their final exams in school. 14 Jews who had fought in the post-Great War period in the Baltic and Upper Silesia or against the Spartacist, Communist and Separatists revolutions would also be considered “front fighters” and would be exem pt from the “Aryan clause.” 15 The President of the Hilsverein declared on May 27, 1934, 10 Harry Schneiderman, ed., The American Jewish Year Book 5695 September 10, 1934-S eptember 27, 1935 vol. 36 (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Soc iety of America, 1934), 168 available from 934_1935.pdf ; Internet; accessed October 8, 2010. 11 Wischnitzer, “Jewish Emigration,” 27. 12 Ibid., 27. 13 Schneiderman, The American Jewish Year Book 5695 181. 14 Ibid., 187. 15 Ibid., 192.


14 and again on June 18, 1935, that German Jews sought to remain within “their homeland, Germany, whose future was their own.” Jews would seek to emigrate only for economic reasons or for the education of their children who were excluded from mainstream schools and universities. The February 4, 1934 issue of the C.V. Zeitung the publication of the Central Association of German Citizens of Jewish Faith ( Centralverein Deutscher Staatsbrger Jdischen Glaubens ), commented that German Jewry cannot and would not “surrender the values which German culture and nature have given to us.” It did, however, acknowledge the right of the “German nation to decide,” with the partic ipation of the Jewish community, “the limits and the extent of our scope of activity and the f orm and content of our co-operation” within German society. 16 Overall, the League High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany, James G. McDonald, noted that by 1935 more than eighty thousand people had emigrated from the Reich of whom fifteen to twenty percent were non-Aryan or Aryan Christians oppose d to Nazism and its anti-theological stance. 17 Thirty thousand immigrated to France from which twenty thousand departed for other destinations. 5,263 refugees found haven in The Netherlands and more than five thousand entered Czechoslovakia. 18 16 Die Arbeit des Hilfsvereins der Juden in Deutschlan d 1934-35 (Berlin: 1935), 6, 11 cited in Wischnitzer, “Jewish Emigration,” 27, 28. 17 McDonald letter of resignation to the Secretary-Gen eral of the League of Nations, December 27, 1935 cited in Wischnitzer, “Jewish Emigration,” 26. 18 Ibid. Supplementary sites of potential immigration during 1933-1935 in addition to Palestine, included: Canada, United States, Mexico, Costa-Rica Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, Salvador, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Argentina, Brazil, Chile Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, Paraguay, Venezuela, Egypt, Algeria, Tunis, Morocco, Kenya, S outh African Union, South-West Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Angola, China, Manchukuo, India, Siam, th e Philippines, Persia, Netherland India, Syria, Turkey, Cyprus, Australia, and New Zealand.


15 The second phase of emigration was initiated by the adoption of the Nuremberg Racial Laws of September 15, 1935. 19 The loss of German citizenship and the gradually expanding pool of anti-Semitic rules and regulations finally convinced many Germ an Jews that continued existence within the homeland was no longer a plausible proposition. Only emigration with its potential for resettlement and the re-establishm ent of normalcy in their lives offered a viable solution. More than two hundred potential refugees approached the Hilsverein in Berlin every day for emigration assistance. 20 Increasing British and Arab resistance and concerns about the absorptive capacity of Pale stine, however, diverted the quest for resettlement to other locations: Emigration Palestine Other Locations 1933-35 12,871 3,615 1936-37 5,879 10,106 21 German Jews belonging to the Reich Association of German Jews ( Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden ), however, maintained their belief that continued Jewish existence within Germany was practicable. 22 Although the Laws dealt the 19 The Nuremberg Race Laws were officially announced d uring a Nazi Party Rally on September 15, 1935. The “Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honor” banned marriages and sexual relations between Jews and Aryans. Jews were barred from emp loying Aryan women as domestic servants and could not display the German flag. Violations of t his law would be punishable by imprisonment and har d labor. “The Reich Citizenship Law” defined the par ameters of citizenship granted to persons living wi thin the Reich and annulled Jewish citizenship in the Ge rman State. A citizen was defined as a “subject wh o is of German or kindred blood” who demonstrated “that he is both desirous and fit to serve the German people and Reich faithfully.” Only officially recog nized citizens would be granted “full political rig hts.” Both laws provided a legal basis for further discri mination and isolation of German Jews and were late r applied to Austria following the Anschluss Noakes and Pridham, Documents on Nazism 463-467. 20 Wischnitzer, “Jewish Emigration,” 29. 21 Reports of the Reich Association of Jews in Germany cited in Wischnitzer, “Jewish Emigration,” 29. 22 The Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden replaced the earlier Reichsvertretung and represented a unification of the State Association of the Jewish Communities, large Jewish private organizations and major Jewish population centers. This reordering w as in response to the recognition that German Jewis h


16 “heaviest of blows” to the Jewish community it was still possible, it assumed, to cr eate a “tolerable relationship” between the Aryans and the Jewish minority provide d the regime ended “defamation and boycott.” The creation of an “autonomous Jewish leadership” headed by the Reichvertretung could accomplish this goal. Emigration would depend upon “large-scale planning” with a focus on young adults who required instruction in the necessary skills and professions for resettlement. The Reichvertretung would attempt to safeguard “the existing means of livelihood” as well as provide necessary “ economic aid.” 23 More than ten thousand potential refugees underwent occupational training for new pursuits during 1938 and 1937. 24 However, unemployment rose as Jewish owned enterprises declined and hiring preference was given to Aryans. 25 Consequently, demand for the opportunity to emigrate escalated but was countered by increasing for eign nationalism and greater admission selectivity that limited the number of potent ial permanent sites of resettlement. For example, the South African Aliens’ Act of February 1, 1937 based admission on the likelihood of assimilability into the dominant European survival depended upon “unity and cooperation.” Ge rman Jews, it was felt, needed to speak through one voice and structure in order to “struggle for every right, for every place, for every opportunity to c ontinue to exist.” Failure to comply with such a design wo uld be regarded as a “wrong [committed] against the vital needs of the German Jews.” The leadership, he aded by Rabbi Leo Baeck, Otto Hirsch and others, “hope[d] for the understanding assistance” of the N azi Government and the “respect of our gentile fell ow citizens, who we join in love and loyalty to German y.” “Proclamation of The (New) Reichsvertretung ” in the Juedische Rundschau no. 78, September 29, 1933, available from st/proc.html ; Internet; accessed October 8, 2010. 23 “German Jewish Response to the Nuremberg Laws (Sept ember 24, 1935) available from st/jewnurm.html ; Internet; accessed October 1, 2010. 24 Rudolph Stahl, “Vocational Retraining of Jews in Na zi Germany 1933-1938,” Jewish Social Studies 1 (April 1939): 169-194. 25 Wischnitzer, “Jewish Emigration,” 30.


17 derived population. An Immigrants Selection Board was empowered to admit or bar entry to any immigrant who was not of British or Irish extraction. While 3,615 Ge rman Jews entered the Union of South Africa during 1933-1936, following the enactment of this bill only 1,900 managed to gain entrance during 1937-1940. 26 Seizure of Jewish passports by the German Government also led to greater pressures (and larger obstacles preventing migration) upon Jews to leave the country. The period of March-November1938 has been described as a “crucial milestone” in the history of Central European Jewry and represented the third stage in emigr ation from the Reich. (The fourth phase of emigration, commencing with Kristallnacht will not be considered within the context of this paper.) It marked the cathartic mome nt in time when a majority of German (and later Austrian and Czech) Jews at last recognized that their continued existence within the bounds of the Reich was no longer tenable. Involuntary emigration, oftentimes to points unknown, became the only alternative to potential “annihilation.” 1938 also represented for the German leadership a major turning point because the official policy of forcibly exiling Jews and non-Aryans was proceeding too slowly. Involuntary migration was hampered in large part by the Nazi seizure of financial assets and businesses that increasingly disenfranchi sed and ultimately impoverished the would-be migrs, thus diminishing their value as desirable immig rants and potential citizens. The barriers to both exit and entry proliferated creating a pool of 26 Richard S. Levy, ed., Anti-Semitism: A Historical Encyclopedia of Prejudi ce and Persecution vol. 2, (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2005), 672.


18 stateless refugees dependent upon the inadequate resources of Jewish and Christi an relief organizations, the charity of others and the whims and rhetoric of government. 27 Following the enactment of the Nuremberg Laws the German Jewish leaders hip estimated ten years would be required to complete an orderly mass migration of Jews from Germany at a rate of twenty thousand to twenty five thousand per year. Approximately 135,000 German Jews had already left the Reich by December 1937 of whom 43,000 had entered Palestine. After the Anschluss the impetus to emigrate accelerated and one hundred thousand Jews departed Germany. 28 An additional 128,000 refugees quit Vienna between March 1938 and mid-November 1941 when S.S. leader Heinrich Himmler blocked further emigration. 29 Overall, between March 1938 and August 1939, prior to the outbreak of the German invasion of Poland, roughly 380,000 Jews had fled Germany, Austria and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. 30 As will be seen in the next chapter the events of March 12, 1938 was a wakeup call for the majority of Jews of Greater Germany but was it simply too late? 27 Joseph Tenenbaum, “The Crucial Year,” Yad Vashem Studies 2 (1958): 49 28 Sir John Hope Simpson, The Refugee Problem (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), 142, 148. 29 Wilhelm Krell, “ La Communaut Culturelle Israelite de Vienne, ” Les Juifs en Europe, 1939-1945 vol. 8 (Centre de documentation juive contemporaine: Paris 1949), 191-192. 30 Tenenbaum, “The Crucial Year,” 49-50. Destination s of the 128,000 Jews who left Vienna: 85,000 Europe, 28,000 North America, 11,580 South America and 9,195 in Palestine. Sir John Hope Simpson was a Liberal MP and Vice-President of the Refugee Sett lement Commission which was created to resettle Greek refugees following its war with post-Ottoman Turkey.


19 Chapter 2 ANSCHLUSS: “The Leader is Coming” “And thus it is all over Germany; wherever the Lead er goes there is rejoicing, gigantic crowds; all want to be where he is, to see the Leader. One sees their eyes shine, particularly those of youth; one sees i n their boundless gratitude crowds of men and women reach a state bordering on ecstasy; like an electric current the news passes through the teeming masses— ‘The Leader is coming!’…And the German people know that the longed -for and inspired leader is Adolf Hitler! 1 The post-Great War independence of Austria under Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg ended at daybreak on March 12, 1938 when the German Army crossed the Austrian border in violation of Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles and Articl e 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain which guaranteed the sovereignty of Austria. 2 A plebiscite would be held on April 10, 1938 among eligible voters (those twenty years of age and older who were not Jewish or of Jewish background) to ratify this unification or Anschluss This was seen as a “mere formality” or legal faade since 99.7% of the Austrian popul ation or 4.287 million voters out of an eligible pool of 4.3 million voted Ja for union which became formalized via the Federal Constitutional Law Regarding the Reuni on of 1 Hermann Goering, Germany Reborn (Strand, W.C.2, UK: Elkin Mathews & Marrot LTD: 19 34), 87, 89. 2 “The Versailles Treaty June 28, 1919: Part III.” Th e Avalon Project available from ; Internet; accessed March 8, 2010; “Treaty of Peac e between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria; Protocol, Declaration and Special Declaration,” September 10 1919, available from 20/3.html ; Internet; accessed March 8, 2010.


20 Germany and Austria. 3 The ballot asked the voter: “Do you acknowledge Adolf Hitler as our Fuehrer, and acknowledge the reunion of Austria with the German Reich which was effected on March 13, 1938?” Sirens signaled German and Austrian residents and road traffic on the day of the vote to come to a halt for two minutes while planes circli ng over head dropped leaflets calling upon the public to vote yes for union. 4 Those who had voted Ja were awarded a pin and opponents, who had voted against the Anschluss received nothing, making the dissenters readily identifiable in the public eye. 5 The Archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal Theodore Innitzer, ordered the bells to be rung and swastikas flown from all Catholic Churches within the city. 6 Austrian Catholic bishops had come out publicly in favor of unification with Germany prompting a rebuke from the Vatican. A “solemn declaration” had been issued in all Catholic Churches calling upon the faithful to vote Ja in the plebiscite. The bishops issued “this appeal without apprehension” because they had been assured that Hitler’s policies were “guided by the words, ‘Render unto God that which is God’s and unto Caesar that which is Caesars.’” A Vatican City radio broadcast warned, however, that any churc h official who made “declarations of a political or economic nature” was accountable for a “br each of 3 The Glasgow Herald March 14, 1938, 14. Preliminary results of the ple biscite (combining German and Austrian voters) were reported on April 11, 193 8 in the Evening Post (Wellington, New Zealand) April 12, 1938, 11. Electorate: 49,546,950 Total votes: 49,326,791 Votes for union: 48,799,269 Votes against union: 452,180 Invalid votes: 75,342 Percentage in favor of union: 99.08 4 The Straits Times April 10, 1938, 1. 5 The Jewish Criterion, April 15, 1938, 20. 6 Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis (NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000), 81.


21 trust and loyalty.” Such actions represented “political Catholicism” whic h was to be reviled. Consequently, any true Austrian Catholic was not morally bound to follow the dictates of their bishops who had demonstrated themselves to be “cowards [who did] not [recognize] the wolf in sheep’s clothing [and] were unworthy to carry on the struggl e for Christ.” 7 Although there was an atmosphere of intimidation during this vote many Austrians viewed this national merger as a means of ending the political instabil ity of the First Republic, an opportunity for economic revitalization, fulfillment of a pan-Ge rmanic ideology and the creation of a relationship to Germany that would resemble the ear lier Dual Monarchy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. However, reality soon set in w hen Dr. Artur Seyss von Inquart addressed Hitler in Vienna: “As the last head of the Aus trian State, I announce the legal execution of the German nation’s will. Austria is now a Federal State of the Reich. A century-old dream has come true.” 8 Instead of becoming co-equal with Germany Austria became the Ostmark a province of the Greater German Reich. Egbert Krispyn has argued that for Hitler the Anschluss possessed potent “private [and] emotional significance” as it represented an “act of revenge” on his na tive homeland for its failure to appreciate and recognize “his genius.” Consequently, planning for annexation began soon after the Nazi accession to power. 9 Observers noted that the German Army was warmly received by the bulk of the Austrian population who bore flowers and waved Nazi flags. One soldier, Ludwig 7 Evening Post April 4, 1938, 11. 8 The Sydney Morning Herald March 16, 1938, 17. Seyss-Inquart was named Mini ster of the Interior and Director of Public Security and Dr. Guido Schmi dt assumed the position of Foreign Minister. 9 Egbert Krispyn, Anti-Nazi Writers in Exile (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1978), 6 3.


22 Sertorius, viewed the Anschluss as the fulfillment of “ancient German longings” in which a “great German people’s Reich” was created. German soldiers entered Aust ria not as combatants or conquerors but as “representatives of a general…will” to unify t he German Nation through ties of “brotherhood”; an emotion reciprocated by their Austrian c ousins. There was a “spontaneous [connection linking] heart to heart.” It simply was “love at first sight.” 10 Hermann Goering described Hitler’s reception by the Austrian populace as a scene of “overwhelming joy” coupled with “absolute [and] complete enthusiasm ” for the National Socialist ideology. The entire “affair,” to his surprise, had “cr ystallized into a march of joy.” 11 Hitler returned to the land of his birth with a grand entrance, like a “modern Caesar,” that absolved the personal failings of his youth, the obscurity of his ar tistic work and his life as a penniless house painter. Standing erect with an outstretched arm i n a large black open Mercedes Benz he received a tumultuous “royal” welcome in his hometown of Linz with cries of “today Germany is ours!” and “tomorrow the whole world!” 12 A “million shouting, flag-waving Viennese in a state of mad frenzy” gree ted the Fuehrer as he coursed through the city streets. Storefronts were adorne d with flowers and placards acclaimed “Welcome to our Fuehrer.” 13 “Masses of shouting, singing, flagwaving Viennese” paraded and drove through the streets uttering “Seig Heil! ” (Hail 10 Ludwig Sartorius Mit den deutschen Soldaten im befreiten sterreic h (“With German Soldiers in Liberated Austria”), Die Wehrmacht 2, no. 6 (1938) 4-5, German Propaganda Archive av ailable from ; Internet; accessed March 8, 2010. Sertorius late r served as Hitler’s favorite radio correspondent for the German Transocean News Service. 11 Robert E. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg (NY: Carroll & Graf Publishers, Inc. 2000), 145. 12 Time March 21, 1938, 18-22 13 Tampa Daily Times March 14, 1938.


23 Victory!) and “One Reich, One People, One Fuehrer!” 14 An Austrian, Susi Seitz, recalled the warm sentiments elicited by Hitler’s arrival. As one the y called upon the Leader to “‘get us to the German country, get us to Germany, let us be with you.’” 15 Women street vendors sold flowers, metal swastika pins and homemade flags. Hit ler proclaimed from the balcony of the Imperial Hotel that “no force on earth can shake ” the resolve of the Greater Germany. “The German Reich as it stands today is i nviolable. No one can shatter it!” 16 “An eternal historic bond” linking Germany and Austria was restored following its disruption in the aftermath of the Great War. 17 Following the Anschluss the Austrian Federal Army was placed under the control of the Reich and its officers, as well as Aryan public officials, were require d to take a personal oath of allegiance to “Hitler, Fuehrer of the German Reich and Pe ople.” Jewish officials were excluded. The assets of the Austrian National Bank were tr ansferred to the Reichsbank and 21-year-old men were ordered to report for active military ser vice. A decree issued by Hitler and the German Minister of the Interior, Wilhelm von F rick, applied the Reich laws, including the Nuremberg Racial Laws of 1935, to the Ostmark Opposition of the other European powers to the annexation of Austria was limited. Hitler obtained Mussolini’s acquiescence in return for the Italia n retention of South Tirol. The United Kingdom, following a policy of appeasement under Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, would not take up arms over Austrian independence and 14 Washington Post March 14, 1938, 7. 15 Laurence Rees, The Nazis: A Warning from History (London: New Press 1997), 110. 16 Tampa Tribune March 15, 1938, 1. 17 The Montreal Gazette March 14, 1938, 11.


24 France, scarred by memories of the 1914-1918 war, was unable to act unilaterally and would remain in a defensive posture. Preceding the Anschluss the Habsburg Statute of 1890 had granted the Austrian Jewish community ( Kultursgemeinde ) religious autonomy. Although there were only 190,000 Jews (three percent of the total population) residing within Austria, primarily in Vienna (ten percent of the city population), the community was quite diverse with mor e than 440 synagogues (Sephardic and Ashkenazic), museums, libraries, schools, medic al clinics and hospitals, orphanages, theaters, sports associations, political groups newspapers, journals and the Jewish Great War Veterans Association. Jews cont rolled a significant percentage of the textile industry and were heavily repre sented within academia, the arts, medical and legal professions, industry, newspapers and the s tock market. 18 The Anschluss marked the major turning point in the lot of Jews and non-Aryans residing within Greater Germany. 19 Prior to March 1938 German anti-Jewish laws and 18 “The Austrian Jewish Community before the Anschlus s,” The Claims Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany available from re ; Internet; accessed March 12, 2009; Robert S. Wistrich, Laboratory for World Destruction: Germans and Jews in Central Europe (Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism: Jerusalem, 2007), 62. 19 Anti-Semitic actions and edicts did occur under the Schuschnigg regime although not to the same extreme as the Nazi program. The Ministers of Just ice and Social Welfare banned doctors from practici ng medicine (July 1937) unless they had worked for at least one year in an Austrian hospital; an opportun ity denied Jewish physicians since 1933. The Federal Court voided the Austrian nationality of the childr en of naturalized citizens unless the children had been n aturalized at the same time as their parents, poten tially affecting hundreds of Jews. During July 1937 the G overnment barred the establishment of a society to aid Russian Jews on the grounds that such an organizati on would create an “influx” of Russian Jews into Austria. In September 1937 the Government introduc ed the “Aryan paragraph” which defined membership in the Association of Blind Musicians and Piano Tun ers (an act refused by the Association). Jewish students began to be segregated from their Christia n counterparts during October. On the other hand, the Chancellor appointed several Jewish professors to u niversity posts and donated 10,000 schillings to a Jewish winter relief fund. Anti-Semitic activities and the proliferation of anti-Jewish groups, howev er, increased in number and frequency as pressure for A nschluss gained momentum. Schneiderman, ed., American Jewish Year Book Review of the Year 5698 205-208.


25 regulations had been introduced slowly and incrementally due to concerns about adverse domestic and foreign public opinion. The Government also feared that the sudden expulsion of Jews from the national economy would have disruptive effects on German economic recovery from the Depression and Hitler’s plans for military rear mament. Between 1933 and 1937 135 anti-Jewish laws were enacted, marked especially by the 1935 Nuremberg Racial Laws. Many Jews, as noted earlier, hoped that the latter promulgations would lead to an inferior but stable position within German society; a situation reminiscent of previous events in Jewish history. Hitler, however, had issue d a warning during a 1935 speech in Nuremberg that if this arrangement for a “sepa rate secular solution” collapsed then it would become necessary to grant to the Nazi Soci alist Party the legal authority to devise a “final solution” to the Jewish Question. 20 Hitler undoubtedly had long hoped for the failure of such a “secular” solution. Reflections within Mein Kampf as well as a discussion held with a journalist and retired Major, Josef Hell, in 1922, revealed that the would-be Fuehrer predicted the slaughter of German Jewry if he acquired the reins of national authority. His “first and foremost task” would be the “annihilation” of Jews by public hanging. Jews would be executed “indiscriminately…until the last Jews in Munich has been exterminated.” Such a program would continue until the Fatherland had “been entirely cleansed of Jews.” 21 Anti-Jewish laws and regulations were enacted rapidly within Austria ove r the course of two to three months. The seizure of Jewish monies and other assets were 20 Max Domarus, ed., Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen 1932-45 (Wrzburg, 1962), I 537, Institut fr Zeigeschichte Munich, cited in Paul Johnson, A History of the Jews (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987), 483, 484-5. 21 Josef Hell, Aufzeichnung 1922, ZS 640, 5, Institut fr Zeitgeschichte cited in Gerald Fleming, Hitler and the Final Solution (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984 ), 17.


26 followed by a policy of forced emigration. Jews were ordered on April 27, 1938 to register with the Government all resources exceeding $2,000 (personal, bank or saving accounts, stocks and bonds, insurance policies, pension payments and other forms of revenue and wealth); a cumulative sum estimated to be worth $800,000,000. The amount of money that could be withdrawn from bank accounts per week (except for the payment of wages or business expenses) was severely limited in order to prevent the “smugg ling of ‘Jewish capital’” out of the country. 22 All postal packages leaving Austria would be subject to search and seizure. Such a program was to be carried out in an orderly fashi on to avoid economic disruptions. The French Police reported in April 1938 that the speed and rigor with which antiSemitic policies were enacted within Austria far surpassed that of Germa ny itself. “The misery that has overtaken Vienna's Jewish population is indescribable.” 23 Jews in Austria constituted three percent of the population as compared to one percent in the Reich. More than six hundred thousand “half-Jews” or roughly ten percent of the Austrian population would fall victim to the racial clauses of the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 which were instituted during May 1938. 24 Unification allowed legitimization and expression of Austria’s own anti-Se mitism as well as the proliferation and dissemination of German anti-Jewish policies Many Catholic, rural and conservative Austrians resented and felt threatened by Jewis h inroads 22 The Times March 15, 1938, 14. 23 Police report, “ Information: La Situation des juifs Vienne ,” April 13, 1938, Archives Prfecture de Police Paris (APP) BA 269P 163-300-C cited in Vicki Caro n, Uneasy Asylum: France and the Jewish Refugee Crisis, 1933-1942 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 17 2. 24 New Republic March 30, 1938, 212.


27 into the economic, cultural and political spheres of Austrian life, especially i n the capital of Vienna, in which the majority of Jews in 1938 resided. Whereas the Socialists and Communists were the first victims of Hitler’s accession to power, in Vienna i t was the Jews who bore the “brunt of the Nazis revolutionary fire,” facing mass arrest plunder, impoverishment and the fury of the mob. The Central Office for Jewish Emigration ( Zentralamt jdischer Auswanderung or ZjA) was established in March 1938 in Vienna by Adolf Eichmann of the Sicherheitsdienst or S.D. (in the former Rothschild palace at 20-22 Prinz-Eugen-Strasse) to systematize and expedite the emigration process and the transfer of Jewis h capital. He compared the process to that of a factory conveyor belt: “The initial application a nd all the rest of the required papers are put in at one end, and the passport falls off at the othe r end.” 25 Eichmann informed his superior in the Gestapo Department of Jewish Affairs, Herbert Hagen, on May 8, 1938 that he had “demanded” that twenty thousand Jews “without means” emigrate from Austria during the period April 1, 1938-May 1, 1939 and received assurances from the Jewish community and Zionist groups “that they would keep to this.” 26 Eichmann and many other Nazi ideologues viewed the Jews as the “eternal” and “most dangerous enemy” of National Socialism. Germany had to become Jdenrein or 25 Statement given by Eichmann during his trial in Jer usalem in 1962cited in Debrah Dwork and Robert Jan van Pelt, Holocaust: A History (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 121. 26 Saul Friedlnder, Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Persecution 1933-1939 vol. 1 (New York: Harper Collins, 1999), 244. For a fuller acc ount of Eichmann’s recollection of this period in t ime see “The Trial of Adolf Eichmann Session 18 (Part 5 of 6)” available from transcripts/Sessions/Session-018-05.html ; Internet; accessed March 12, 2010. Eichmann and Hagen had tr avelled to Palestine in 1937 to assess the possibilities of mass German Jewish emigration.


28 free of Jews by forced emigration based on financial, social and political disenfranchisement. However, such resettlement could not threaten German inte rests and should be focused on the “backward” regions in Palestine, Africa, Asia and South America. 27 This pro-Zionist view of Palestine as a potential haven was, according to Hanna Arendt, an “indisputable” component of the early phase of German anti-Jewish policy. Eichmann’s success served as the model for the management of Jewish a ffairs in Berlin and later in Prague following the creation of the Protectorate over B ohemia and Moravia as well as the forced deportation of Jews and Poles during 1939-40 from regions of occupied Poland and their replacement by ethnic Germans, the Volksdeutsche 28 Fear rapidly engulfed the Jewish community as the Nazis assumed power in Austria, accelerated by the rapid enactment of anti-Semitic laws couple d with a one week long pogrom. Hundreds and later thousands of terrified Jews would besiege foreign consulates seeking visas that would aid their escape from the Reich. Jewish men a nd women were randomly assaulted on the streets and Jewish owned stores and businesses were ransacked and destroyed. Jews tried to hide themselves within the confine s of their homes located in the Leopoldstadt suburb of Vienna in which one-third of the city’s Jews resided. This area, allocated to the Jews by Emperor Ferdinand II in the Edict of 27 Eichmann outlined the aims and methodologies of the S.D. in a training paper, “The Jewish Problem,” during early 1937. Wildt, Die Judenpolitik des SD 95-105 cited in David Cesarani, Becoming Eichmann Rethinking the Life, Crimes, and Trial of a “Desk M urderer” (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2006), 51. Following a trip to Palestine Eichmann and Hagen co ncluded that Palestinian resettlement would only strengthen Judaism in the Middle East and the creat ion of an independent Jewish State needed to be prevented. 28 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem—The Banality of Evil (London: Penguin Books, 1994), 58. During the period of December 1939 and March 1941 5 00,000 Jews and Poles were forcibly deported. Eichmann attempted during October 1939 the first ma ss deportation of Jews to a reservation near Lublin Poland in the unsuccessful Nisko project but later was promoted to the directorship of the Central Off ice for Jewish Emigration for the entire Reich.


29 Privileges in 1624 as a ghetto and later known as District II, was situated wi thin the heart of the capital, and formed, together with Brigittenau (20 th District), a large island bounded by the Danube River and the Danube Canal. Jews comprised 38.5 percent of the population in 1923 and consequently the region was nicknamed Mazzesinsel or “Matzoh Island.” 29 By March 14, 1938 approximately 191,000 Jews (ten percent of the city’s population) lived within Vienna, making it, after Warsaw and Budapest, the third la rgest community of Jews in Continental Europe. 30 Following the Anschluss all Austrian Jews were ordered to relocate to Vienna and eventually into Leopoldstadt itself. The “relentless tramp of Nazi storm tr oopers’ boots on the stairs and the knocks of rifle butts” on the doors of Jewish residences signaled impending arrest or the plundering of their businesses. Members of the Hitler Y outh ( Hitler Jugend ) rousted Jewish merchants living in the Jew’s Alley ( Jdengasse ) and compelled them to open their stores from which goods were plundered. Jewish coffee houses were forcibly closed or turned over to new Aryan managers. 31 Jews were forced to their knees to scrub Schuschnigg crosses (placed by the Fatherland Front, two weeks earlier in support of an antiAnschluss plebiscite) from the pavement and were serenaded by the gathering crowd with the shouts of “Perish Jewry”, “Out with the Jews” a nd “Who 29 “Leopoldstadt, Vienna” available from .html ; Internet; accessed March 13, 2010. 30 Debrah Dwork and Robert Jan Pelt, Flight from the Reich: Refugee Jews, 1933-1945 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2009), 97. 31 Washington Post March 15, 1938, 4


30 has found work for the Jews? Adolf Hitler!” 32 Stores that were not marked by a swastika, the inscription “Aryan Store” or other sign of Aryan ownership were highlighted by a red painted Jude Many cafs posted notices that “Jewish customers [were] not desired.” 33 Jewish businesses were to be boycotted by Aryan customers. 34 The ultimate goal was the Aryanization of Jewish holdings at the lowest financial costs. The Reich Governor or Statthalter Dr. Seyss-Inquart, decreed that a “trustee manager” would be appointed to take over the operation of a Jewish business concern if the owner disappeared, was incarcerated, unable to conduct business or posed a threat to smuggle assets out of Austria. 35 Jews were conscripted by Nazi brownshirts (S.A. or Sturmabteilung ) for forced labor in “cleaning brigades” so that Jews would “learn what real manua l labor means.” 36 Field Marshal Herman Wilhelm Goering warned that Jews no longer had a place in Austrian society and must emigrate. He warned that Vienna would “become G erman again. The Jew must know we do not care to live with him. He must go.” 37 He also announced that the Government would begin the process of “legally and quietly” 32 New York Times March 16, 1938, 8. The Fatherland Front ( Vaterlndische Front or Patriotic Front) was a right-wing fascist organization founded in 19 33 by the Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss in an attempt to create a one-party state linking Austria n nationalism with Catholicism. 33 The Times March 17, 1938, 14. 34 “Letter by a German Official to Goering,” March 26 1938, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Military Trials Nuremberg vol. 5 (Washington, 1946), 275-276 available from -3577-ps ; Internet; accessed March 16, 2010. 35 The Times March 31, 1938, 13. 36 Tampa Tribune March 20, 1938, 4. 37 Washington Post March 27, 1938, 1.


31 converting Jewish firms into Aryan enterprises. 38 1,000-1,500 Jews besieged the American Consulate in Vienna per day in their quest for immigration visas foll owing the Reich Marshal’s speech and warning. 39 Dr. Leo Lauterbach, the London based Director of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) and a secretary of the Zionist Executive, reported from Vienna to the E xecutive of the WZO on April 29, 1938 that the new policies within Austria appeared to be “essentially different from that adopted in Germany” and threatened the “c omplete annihilation of Austrian Jewry” by their exclusion from “economic life,” the depr ivation of “all their financial resources” and their ultimate starvation or forc ed expulsion “without means,” dependent upon Jewish charity and the “help of such countries as may be willing to receive them.” 40 A petition was submitted to the Executive Council of the League of Nations in Geneva calling for an end to the “martyrdom of Austrian Jews ” and warned that failure to intervene would result in suicides. 41 The international press reported that “plunderings, beatings, arrests and dispossessions were only a forerunner of a more drastic persecution” to come. 42 “Brutal terrorism” awaited every Austrian regardless of “class or creed” w ho stood for national independence. The Jews in Austria were destined to be subjected to “unrelenting 38 Miami Herald March 27, 1938, 1. 39 Washington Post March 29, 1938, 10. 40 Leo Lauterbach, “The Situation of the Jews in Austr ia, April, 1938,” London Zionist Archives, S5/653 available from /part1/doc43.html ; Internet; accessed October 8, 2010. Lauterbach was one of t he Zionist co-founders of the post-Great War Polish Zionist student movement, Agudat Herzl He was an attorney and later general secretary o f the leadership committee of the World Zionist Organization and dir ector of its organizational committee. 41 Tampa Tribune March 23, 1938, 1. 42 Washington Post March 15, 1938, 4.


32 persecution” but without knowing where Hitler would “strike next” how could the Jewi sh victims “find certain sanctuary?” 43 The British muted acceptance of the Anschluss was criticized as “sheer boot-licking” while the League of Nations refused t o accept the Italian seizure of Abyssinia. 44 One Jewish editorialist observed that the fate of Austrian Jewry was clear. “Hitler’s brown-shirted executioners [were] alr eady at work” and their labors would not cease “until the destruction of the Jewish community in Austria is complete.” 45 The New York Times noting that the daily Jewish suicide rate in Vienna had dramatically increased, commented that “death [had become to the Jews] the kindes t gift”; a means of avoiding the “great gates of the central prison” which, for many, marked the “first stage of [perhaps the final] journey to the concentration camp. 46 Austria had been transformed into a “vast prison from which there is no outlet and with which all chance of a livelihood is dead.” Jewish leaders noted that the number of suicides was “increasing by the hour” but such acts were viewed with an air of complacency by t he Gestapo. 47 The Viennese police reported that between March 12 and 21 approximately one hundred suicides had been reported, averaging four to five per day. 48 Reportedly a “suicide epidemic” was rampant among Jewish students and youth who were expelled 43 Prescott Evening Courier, March 12, 1938, 3. 44 Evening Post April 6, 1938, 10. 45 Norton Belth, “The Fate of Austrian Jewry,” The Sentinel March 24, 1938, 6. 46 G.E.R. Gedye, “Old Vienna is Dead: A Nazi Vienna is Born,” New York Times March 20, 1938, 61. 47 Washington Post March 17, 1938, 1. 48 The Times March 24, 1938, 14. By the end of April 1938 the J ewish Telegraphic Agency reported that at least 2,000 Jews had committed suicide. Sc hneiderman, ed., American Jewish Year Book Review of the Year 5698 214.


33 from academic institutions and who only had bleakness on their horizons. 49 Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels noted in his diary entry of March 23, 1938 that increasing numbers of Jews were taking their lives in the Austrian capital. “Previously,” he claimed, “Germans committed suicide. Now it is the other way round.” 50 Goebbels declared before an Austrian crowd of 25,000, that it was impossible for the authorit ies to “protect every Viennese Jew with a special policeman” to prevent suicide f rom occurring. 51 Putting it more clearly into human terms it was reported from Vienna that the suicide of a Jewish eighteen-year-old musician, Gertrude Wolkner, marked the ex tinction of three generations; her entire twenty two member family. All had taken thei r own lives with the exception of a brother who died in a concentration camp. Prior to ending her short and unfilled existence Gertrude left a message requesting that a sin gle grave marker be placed over the burials of all of the fallen Wolkners. 52 Suicides were not limited to Germany or Austria. Liesel Wolfe, a thirty seven year old woman from Ge rmany, leapt to her death from a window on the fifth floor of the Do Hirsch Residence Hall for Young Women in New York. Unable to provide immigration authorities proof that she would not become a public charge she was due to be deported back to the Reich on the following day. 53 49 Jewish Criterion, April 8, 1938, 4. Sources within Germany “reliabl y reported Jewish suicides are still averaging 25 daily,” The Sentinel, April 7, 1938, 33. 50 Christian Goeschel, Suicide in Nazi Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 100-101. 51 Time April 11, 1938, 19. 52 “Young Girl’s Death Reveals 22 Suicides in One Fami ly,” The Southern Israelite July 1, 1938, 2. 53 “German Woman Jumps from Fifth Floor,” The Southern Israelite June 10, 1938, 3.


34 Israel Cohen, another representative of the WZO in Vienna, noted that rising levels of “despair” drove “thousands of Jews” to besiege the Embassies and Cons ulates of different Governments in frantic efforts to obtain visas” 54 It was estimated that by the end of April twelve thousand Jews had been arrested and an additional one thousand were charged during May with violation of the Nuremberg Racial Purity Law. Ar rests continued for the next two months with many prisoners dispatched to concentration camps, especially Dachau. 55 Conditions within Germany and Austria thus drove Jews to seek legal and illegal means of escape to other nations. European countries enacted special precautions at their borders to prevent a flood of Jewish refugees. Switzerland ordered reinforcement of its customs and sec urity forces along the Austrian frontier and the placement of barbed wire to block an invasion of Jewish and non-Aryan refugees. 56 The Dutch Government decreed on May 7, 1938 that The Netherlands would no longer accept forced migrs. Instead, all migrant s “will in future be considered persona non grata…an undesirable foreigner” who must be “expelled” or barred from entry. 57 Dutch Jews were also concerned about the incursion of refugees into their country. R.H. Eitje, one of the two primary assistants to D avid Cohen, the head of the Amsterdam based Committee for Jewish Refugees ( Comit voor Joodsche 54 Israel Cohen, Travels In Jewry (NY: Dutton, 1953), 42cited in Ronald Sanders, Shores of Refuge A Hundred Years of Jewish Emigration, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1988), 436-443. Cohen had served for more than thirty years in the secretaria t of the Central Office of the WZO. 55 Schneiderman, American Jewish Year Book Review of the Year 5698, 208-209. 56 “Swiss Disturbed: Reinforce Border,” New York Times March 13, 1938, 36; “Swiss Bars Refugees with Barbed Wire,” New York Times August 31, 1938, 3. 57 Circular of the Minister of Justice, May 7, 1938, A rchive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hague, A-185, box 508 cited in Dan Michman, “The Committee for Jewish Refugees in Holland (1933-1940),” Yad Vashem Studies 14 (1981), 213.


35 Vluchtelingen ), claimed that the organization had prevented the admission of more Jews into Holland than the entire “police and Government put together” by advising their “contacts” within the Reich “as we still do today” that the “flood of refuge es” into the country must be prevented. 58 Edouard Daladier assumed the mantle of French Prime Minister again on April 10, 1938 marking the rise to power of a center-right political coalition that would disavow the liberal immigration policies of the Popular Front under Lon Blum. A Decree of May 2 legally differentiated between prior groups of political re fugees and the new wave of forced migrs. Russians and Armenians who had entered France during the 1920s were granted permanent residence but Spanish, German and other more recent entrants were obligated to apply for increasingly more restricted temporar y residency permits. In addition, security forces on the frontiers were allocated great er authority to block the entry of refugees. 59 Daladier advised Justin Godart, president of the Committee for the Defense of Jews in Central and Eastern Europe, that “humane suggestions might be entertained” regarding Spanish and German refugees in F rance but temporary or permanent havens could not be assured due to the potential threat of conflic t with neighboring Fascist countries. 60 British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain addressed the House of Commons on March 14, 1938 and noted that both England and Germany were signatories to treaties 58 Eitje to G. van den Bergh, March 23, 1938, Archives of the Jewish Relief Committee, file 5 in Michman, “The Committee,” 219. 59 Timothy P. Maga, “Closing the Door: The French Gov ernment and Refugee Policy, 1933-1939,” French Historical Studies 12, no. 3 (Spring 1982): 435. 60 Daladier to Godart and Godart to Myron C. Taylor, M ay 24, 1938, Box 9 of the Papers of Myron C. Taylor, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N Y cited in Maga, “Closing the Door,” 436.


36 which guaranteed the independence of Austria and required the approval of the Council of the League of Nations for any union with the Reich. The Anschluss called for the “severest condemnation” of an act that threatened the preservation of “Europea n peace” and the policy of appeasement. However, the British Nation had to face the “hard fact ” that Germany would have only been deterred by force and any response offered by th e United Kingdom or other nations would have to be tempered by “cool judgment” and a review of national defense. 61 Many in the press viewed British acquiescence as a sign of a “new realistic [diplomatic] policy” or recognition that a German confront ation with Austria represented a “danger point” that threatened stability on the Continent. 62 Other editorialists predicted that another Anschluss “will be only a question of time,” most likely against Czechoslovakia. 63 On March 12 the Foreign Office did, however, send a memo to Vienna describing the “Desire of his Majesty’s Government to Protect the Jews and Socialists in Austria” and articulated “considerable anxiety” for the pli ght of these minority groups. 64 Major Herwald Ramsbotham, the Minister of Pensions and a Conservative government spokesman, asserted that it is one thing to proselytize about the sanctity of international treaties, brotherhood, minority rights and the rule of law but a reali st faced 61 Neville Chamberlain statement on the Anschluss Foreign Affairs (Austria) House of Commons Debate, March 14, 1938, vol. 333 cc 45-169 availab le from /14/foreign-affairsaustria#S5CV0333P0_19380314_HOC_256 ; Internet; accessed October 7, 2010. 62 Evening Post April 4, 1938, 11. 63 Evening Post April 26, 1938, 11. 64 Public Records Office, Foreign Office (PRO FO) 371/ 22317, R2907/137/3 March 12, 1938 cited in Gemma Romain, “The Anschluss: the British Response to the Refugee Crisis,” The Journal of Holocaust Education 8, no. 3 (Winter 1999): 91.


37 with a struggle with “cold, hardheaded, ruthless [and] determined men” acknowledged that the British people cannot save Europe by acting like a “knight-errant rescui ng damsels in distress.” It was not the Nation’s role to act as “our brother’s kee per” or an “amiable Don Quixote.” 65 Some Home Office officials suggested that a prime motivating factor behind the Nazi anti-Semitic policies was to create a forced em igration dilemma that would create for the United Kingdom a domestic “Jewish problem.” 66 Such sentiments were, of course, applicable to all of the Western nations. Home Office Assistant Under-Secretary Courtenay D.C. Robinson advised Sir Neville Bland, British Minister to The Hague, that German annexation of the Aus trian Republic mandated that the Royal Government revisit its policies allowing the ent ry of “aliens” possessing “Austrian passports. who may seek admission” into the United Kingdom. These emigrants would in all probability, Robinson believed, have the status of stateless refugees and consequently, it would become “impossible” to expel s uch people once they gained admittance. In addition, despite the 1933 written assurances to the Home Office from the leaders of the British Jewish community that all Jewish refugees would be financially provided for by private sources and thus avoid going on the public dole, by 1938 the scope of the new refugee crisis prevented Jewish relief organizations from bearing the economic costs of resettlement and assimilat ion. Therefore, Robinson concluded, the Government needed to institute stricter passport controls that would severely curtail the numbers of foreigners admitted into t he country. 65 Time April 4, 1938, 18. 66 PRO FO 372/3282, T3517/3272/378, March 15, 1938, “Q uestion of Admission to the United Kingdom of Aliens holding Austrian Passports.” The Memoran dum noted that “the latest information is such that pressure is already intensified as a matter of deli berate policy, with the express purpose of creating a Jewish refugee problem in this country and stimulating a N azi reaction” cited in Romain, “The Anschluss,” 97.


38 Visas would be required of all refugees possessing Austrian or German passpor ts. 67 The “potential threat” of the admission of “enemy agents” among the Jewish refug ees was also touted as a rationale for restricting immigration. 68 Similar fears would greatly influence immigration policies of the United States following the outbreak of the European War in September 1939 and would be used as justification by the Administration for severely limiting the entry of aliens from Germany a nd Austria. Sir Andrew Noble, an expert on artillery and explosives, observed that the Home Office regarded the “visa system as more humane than a scheme of uncontrolle d immigration” as it would be less likely that emigrants would be barred from e ntry at their port of call. 69 The Government would be spared the “ultimate” embarrassment of returning a refugee to the Reich who faced the real possibility of imprisonment w ithin the concentration camp system. 70 The press echoed such sentiments warning that an open door policy would create selection problems for the immigration authorities and i nflict “hardships” on all who had undertaken “fruitless journeys across the continent.” 71 The Foreign Office did attempt to achieve some form of balance between humanitaria nism, the British historical tradition of admitting forced exiles and the interes ts of the nation and viewed it “extremely undesirable to restrict more than absolutely necessa ry the 67 PRO Kew, FO372/3282, T3398/3272/378, Robinson to Bl and, March 14, 1938 cited in Romain “The Anschluss,” 89, 90. 68 PRO FO 371/22317, R2907/137/3 A. Noble March 21, 19 38 cited in Romain, “The Anschluss,” 97. 69 PRO FO 371/22317, R2907/137/3 March 21, 1938 cited in Romain, “The Anschluss”, 91. 70 C.B. McAlpine (Aliens Department) memorandum, March 1, 1938, PRO HO (Home Office) 213/94 cited in Romain, “The Anschluss,” 93. 71 The Daily Telegraph March 23, 1938 cited in Romain, “The Anschluss,” 91


39 immigration of Austrian refugees at the present time.” 72 However, emphasis was placed on the provision of temporary havens with a view to future migration to a place of permanent resettlement. 73 The Foreign Office stressed that the United Kingdom was not an “immigration country” due to its “being an old country…highly industrialized, very densely populated” suffering from high domestic unemployment. 74 Such rationalizations would be utilized by Britain as well as other nations during the Evian Conference as justification for containing Jewish immigration. Austrian Jewish refugees attempting to enter Britain without sufficie nt funds to support themselves without the public dole were barred from entry. 75 Between March 13 and 20 the Home Office reported that 422 applications for landing had been received but 61 were denied. Fourteen thousand Austrians were already residing in the Unite d Kingdom but naturalization law required the alien to reside within the Dominions for fi ve out of the prior eight years, of which one must have been spent in Britain. 76 The Labor Party introduced into the House of Commons a bill that would grant unlimited and unrestricted admission and British citizenship to Austrian refugees but was de feated by a 72 PRO FO 372/3282, T3272/378, Director of the Central European Department of the Foreign Office William Strang to Holderness, March 12, 1938 cited in Romain, “The Anschluss,” 90. 73 David Cesarani, ed., The Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 90. A number of refugee organizations agreed with this policy of pr oviding only temporary refuge with the ultimate goa l of emigration overseas. Claudena M. Skran, Refugees in Inter-War Europe: The Emergence of a Re gime (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 221. 74 RO FO 371/22530, March 13, 1938 cited in Fiona Horn e, “Explaining British Refugee Policy, March 1938-July 1940,” Masters of Arts in History Thesis, University of Canterbury, New Zealand (March 2008) 5. 75 “Britain Stops Refugees,” Washington Post March 16, 1938, 4. 76 “Austrians in Britain: Recent Applications to Enter ,” The Times March 31, 1938, 8


40 vote of 210 to 142. 77 The Labor Member of Parliament (MP) for Newcastle-under-Lyme, Colonel Wedgwood, asserted, in his motion concerning “Austrian Refugees Immigrat ion and Naturalization,” that British honor would suffer if German and Austrian refug ees were prohibited from entry. The United Kingdom could not be perceived as being “less generous than the French” and the “voice and spirit of Cromwell, of Palmerston, of Gladstone” must be preserved. During the Nineteenth Century the British had provided aid and succor for the “negro slaves.” Failure to act similarly for the pers ecuted of Central Europe would “destroy the traditions of our race and sacrifice to unw orthy fears the honor of England.” 78 Major Sir George Davies, Conservative MP from Yeovil, asserted, in the debate over Wedgwood’s motion, that the refugee community should be viewed as a whole, composed of both Jews and non-Jews, and special consideration could not be granted to one group over another “when the conditions that appeal to the hearts of all of us may be the same in many other countries.” 79 Davies was not, however, averse to using late Nineteenth Century negative imagery of Eastern European Jewish immigrants tha t had been utilized in anti-alien debates: Think of the difficulty after their landing, after their spreading amongst the population, of the police department, the safet y department of this country, which has to see that our own people are p rotected against 77 New York Times March 23, 1938. 78 House of Commons Debates March 22, 1938, PRO FO, 37 2/3282 cited in Romaine, “The Anschluss,” 93, 100. Wedgwood’s Parliamentary motion called fo r amending the “Aliens Acts and Naturalization Acts.” The Secretary of State for the Home Departme nt would be empowered to permit entry into the United Kingdom of Austrian refugees for “a period o f six months from the date of the passing of this A ct, and the granting of British nationality to such imm igrants.” 79 House of Commons Debates, March 22, 1938, PRO FO 37 2/3282 cited in Romain, “The Anschluss,” 95.


41 those who might quite easily slip in—drug trafficke rs, white slave trade traffickers, people with criminal records. 80 C.B. McAlpine and others feared that the admission of sizeable numbers of Jewish refugees would create a domestic Jewish Question and its attendant risk of a ntiSemitic hostility. The United Kingdom had “benefited greatly” by the adm ission of talented and resourceful Jews but such progress “may be too dearly bought at the pric e” of unbridled immigration. 81 Similar concerns were presented in the press. The Daily Express warned that increased Austrian and German Jewish immigration would foster home grown anti-Semitism and garner support for the “extreme left.” A libera l admission policy could also prompt the Eastern European countries of Poland, Rumania and Hungary to forcibly expel their own Jewish population. Would Britain, they asked, be obligated to “admit them too? Because we DON’T want anti-Jewish uproar we DO ” insist upon the application of “common sense in not admitting all applicants.” 82 Home Secretary Samuel Hoare acknowledged that Britain had a long standing policy of granting sanctuary to victims of political, racial and political pe rsecution but concerns about the domestic economy and unemployment would, by necessity, temper such a compassionate policy. He warned that while he was willing to be supportive in aiding refugees “there was a good deal of feeling growing up in this country—a feeling which was reflected in Parliament—against the admission of Jews to Britis h territory.” 80 Ibid., 96. 81 C.B. McAlpine memorandum, March 1, 1938, PRO HO 213 /94 cited in Romain, “The Anschluss,” 9697. 82 Ari Joshua Sherman, Island Refuge, Britain and the Refugees from the Third Reich, 1933-1939 (London: Elek Book Limited, 1973), 94.


42 Consequently, the decision to admit a refugee would have to be individualized but the Government would attempt to maintain its “traditional policy…of offering asyl um” with the greatest latitude. 83 As early as 1933 the Home Office was dismissive of a “right of asylum… [for] political refugees.” The granting of entry into the country woul d not be based upon strict humanitarian concerns but whether or not the alien would serve “the public interest.” 84 Parameters were established by the Government that would gauge the admissibility and desirability of prospective emigrants. The absence of s ufficient “resources” and the lack of “definite prospects” for self sufficiency t hat would potentially place the refugee on the public dole served as grounds for automatic exclusion. The Nazi appropriation of Jewish funds and its resultant impoverishment severely limited the number of desirable migrs. Other groups were labeled as “ prima facie unsuitable” due to the risk of competition with local labor. 85 Once again, similar themes would resonate throughout the dialectic of the Evian Conference. Fears of escalating immigration of non-Anglo-Saxon stock driven by political and ethnic instabilities within Eastern Europe and the Czarist Empire coupled wi th domestic 83 E.L Woodward, et al. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-39 3 rd ser., I (London: H.M.S.O., 1949), 44-48; Cabinet Conclusions 33, July 20, 1938 CAB 23/94 cited in Sherman, Island Refuge 93; 333House of Commons Debate, 991-994, March 22, 1938 cited in ibid., 121. 84 Michael R. Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees from the First Worl d War through the Cold War (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2002), 150. 85 PRO FO 372/3284, T7056/3272/378 Foreign Office, Pas sport Control Department, Visas for Holders of German and Austrian Passports entering the Unite d Kingdom, April 27, 1938, 2-3 cited in Romain, “Th e Anschluss,” 94. The other groups considered undesi rable for admission included “(a) Small shopkeepers retail traders, artisans and persons likely to seek employment; (b) Agents and middlemen, whose liveli hood depends upon commission and therefore on trade acti vity; (c) Minor musicians and commercial artists of all kinds…; and (d) The rank and file of professional me n—lawyers, doctors, dentists.” Exceptions would be made for those who faced “special danger because of [their] political views or activities” or those wh o possessed familial or friendship connections who co uld offer “hospitality” and the guarantee of “suppo rt while arrangements are made for [their] future.”


43 economic, labor, social and racial concerns had led the British Government to earli er embark on a policy of increasingly restrictive immigration controls. Betw een 1905 and 1920 Parliament enacted four series of progressively stringent measure s against the entry of aliens which would remain operative until the outbreak of war in 1939 and beyond. The 1905 Aliens Act was written in reaction to the mass migration of Eastern Europea n and Russian Jews and introduced a system of admission controls at approved ports of entry. The poorest of the migrs were obliged to undergo official inspection by immigration officials who were authorized to deny admittance to refugee s considered undesirable for health, psychiatric, criminal or economic reasons (unable to dem onstrate the ability to provide for themselves and their dependents). Exceptions would be made for those who feared persecution for religious or political reasons should they retur n to their country of origin. 86 With the outbreak of the Great War in August 1914 the Government issued the Aliens Restriction Act which obligated all foreign migrs to registe r with the police and reside within specified areas. The Home Secretary was granted the power to bar or deport any refugee; such individuals were denied the right of appeal. Thirty two thousand a liens were interned during the conflict and 28,744 were deported. 87 The wartime Restriction Act was formulated to be a temporary measure that would be rescinded with the comi ng 86 Louise London. Whitehall and the Jews 1933-1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 16; B. Wasserstein, “The British Government and the German Immigration 1933-1945” in Gerhard Hirschfeld, Exile in Great Britain: Refugees from Hitler’s Germ any (London: Berg Publishers, 1984), 64; Louise London, “British Immigration Control Procedu res and Jewish Refugees 1933-1939,” in Werner E. Mosse, Second Chance: Two Centuries of German-Speaking Jew s in the United Kingdom (Tbingen: Mohr, 1991), 489. 87 Colin Holmes, “The Myth of Fairness: Racial Violenc e in Britain 1911-1919,” History Today 35, no. 10 (October 1, 1985): 43.


44 of peace but Parliament annually renewed this policy until 1971, while adding more stringent controls. 88 The subsequent Aliens Restriction Act of 1919 and the Aliens Order of 1920 decreed that every immigrant (except those entering on a temporary basi s) who lacked sufficient means of support or a work permit from the Ministry of Labor would be barred from landing. Any right of appeal to the Home Secretary was again abrogated and the traditional claim of asylum was revoked. 89 The Government would selectively admit refugees on the basis of national need but in the “rhetoric of debate on refugee questi ons, the tradition of asylum was accorded quasi-constitutional sanctity.” 90 French Interior Minister Albert Sarraut sent reinforcements to the bor ders to prevent Jews without proper documentation from entering France. The Government was opposed to the admission of any new refugees and informed the German Government that France would no longer tolerate the dumping of German and Austrian refugee s across the border onto French territory. A decree was issued on May 2, 1938 that categorized potential immigrants as “desirable” or “undesirable.” Sarr aut justified this edict by claiming that “the ever-growing number of foreigners” that had c rossed into France posed an internal threat to the economy and national security. Therefore the granting of permission to enter and reside within French territory would have to bec ome highly selective, differentiating between the “foreigner[s] of good faith” w ho demonstrated “an absolutely correct attitude vis--vis the Republic and its inst itutions” 88 Paul Gordon., Policing Immigration: Britain’s Internal Controls (London: Pluto Press Ltd., 1985), 9. 89 Hirschfeld, Exile 64-65. 90 London, “British Immigration Control Procedures,” 4 89.


45 and those “’clandestine’ foreigners, irregular guests…unworthy of living on our soil” who would be forcibly expelled. 91 The 1920s marked a shift in French immigration policies which previously had been very liberal in its scope. The growth rate of the French population during the time span 1836-1936 had been relatively flat increasing from thirty six million to thirty nine million. A steadily declining birth rate coupled with the male casualties of t he Great War, an aging population and a need for manpower to reestablish and expand the domestic economy and military led France to adopt an open door policy for migrs. During the Nineteenth Century France had received the greatest number of imm igrants in Europe and, prior to August 1914, the majority of aliens originated in Belgium, Italy a nd Spain. 92 Following the War many Russians sought refuge in the wake of the November Revolution. 93 As national recovery progressed, however, the demand for foreign labor diminished. Thus, the French Government began to adopt more restrictive measures (applied to the immigrant population as a whole) during the late 1920s in an attempt to stem the tide of immigration that threatened the employment of French citiz ens. Unemployed foreign workers were deported and residency permits were not rene wed for aliens working in sectors in which French laborers remained idle. Labor contr acts with 91 Prefect, Gironde, to the Prefect, Bas-Rhin, June 21 1938, ADBR D 391/19 (dos. 182), HICEM report, “ Note sur l’tat actuel de l’migration d’Allmagne e t d’Autriche ,” from Oungre to George Rublee, September 7, 1938, 3, AN 14 (13/56) cited in Caron, Uneasy Asylum 74, 181. 92 Jean Pierre Dormois, The French Economy in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 2, 4. 93 Maga, “Closing the Door,” 425.


46 foreign workers were discouraged and pressure was exerted upon employers to ter minate these agreements. 94 1931 marked the high water mark of French immigration with an estimated three million alien laborers and their dependents residing within the Republic. 95 By 1932-1933 the Government attempted to limit the number of immigrants, differentiating be tween political refugees and economic migrants. Nazi persecution of its Jewish popula tion was initially seen as a transient phenomenon but the realization of the scope, magnitude a nd probable permanence of this humanitarian problem drove the French authorities to adopt a harsher immigration doctrine. The implementation of accords dealing with the problems of Russian refugees in 1922 and Armenian refugees in 1924 elevated the issue of the care and protection of refugees onto the international stage. 96 Consequently, France would view its moral obligations towards German and Austrian refugees as a burde n to be shared by the international community as a whole. Bolivia was one of the few nations in the world to accept Jewish refugees following the Anschluss although primarily as a temporary haven, later known as “Hotel Bolivia.” Prior to Hitler assuming the mantle of the Reich Chancellor and Fuehre r less than one hundred Jews had immigrated to Bolivia. However, beginning in the mid-1930’s thousands of refugees, Jews and non-Aryan political exiles, from Central Europe found shelter in this Latin American nation. Between Kristallnacht and the end of 1939 approximately twenty thousand refugees from Germany and Austria had enter ed this 94 Greg Burgess, “France and the German Refugee Crisis of 1933,” French History 16, no. 2 (June 1, 2002): 213. 95 Dormois, The French Economy 4. 96 Burgess, “France and the German Refugee Crisis,” 21 1.


47 republic; a number exceeding Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India and C anada combined. Most of the immigrants settled in the area of La Paz and smaller urba n and agricultural communities. 97 Feng Shan Ho (1901-1997) served as the Consul General of China in Vienna during the period of the Anschluss A political economist with a Ph.D. from the University of Munich in 1932, he observed that the persecution of Austrian Jews by “Hitler’s devils” was increasing on a daily basis prompting him to maintain secret contacts with American charitable and religious organizations involved in refu gee work. He recalled that he “spared no effort in using any possible means” to rescue “ innumerable Jews” by adhering to a “liberal” policy of granting visas to Shanghai to any and all who requested one. This Chinese port city, however, was then under Japanese occupation and thus outside of sovereign Chinese control and authority. Although an entry permit was not required for admission into this coastal city it served as proof of destinati on to the German authorities and opened the door to escape to Shanghai and other locations. The Shanghai visas also served as a means of release of Jewish inmates from Da chau and other prisons. The Chinese Ambassador to Berlin and Ho’s superior, Chen Jie, viewed the granting of visas to Jews as an impediment to friendly German-Chinese diplom atic relations but was unable to curtail the Consul’s activities. Chang Kai-Shek, faci ng war on two fronts with the Chinese Communists and Japanese, depended upon German weapons and military advisors. His son, educated in Germany, became a second lieutenant in the German 98 th Jaeger Regiment and took part in the takeover of Austria. When asked years later why he was willing to intervene and rescue the Jew s of Austria 97 Leo Spitzer, “Rootless Nostalgia: Vienna in La Paz, La Paz in Elsewhere,” Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies 10.3 (2001): 6-17.


48 Ho responded that “I thought it only natural to feel compassion and to want to help. From the standpoint of humanity, that is the way it should be.” The number of visas granted by Ho remains a matter of speculation but by October 1938 1,900 visas had been issued and by the time of the outbreak of war in September 1939 more than eighteen thousand European Jewish refugees had immigrated to Shanghai. 98 Prior to the Anschluss many Americans in their private, professional and official capacities condemned Nazi policies of persecution. The U.S. Ambassador to Berlin, William E. Dodd, resigned from his position on December 7, 1937 and was replaced by Hugh R. Wilson on January 7, 1938. On January 8 Dodd condemned the German record of anti-Semitism, rearmament and violations of the terms of the Treaty of Ver sailles. He believed that it was the responsibility of American diplomats to remind the wor ld of the “significance of democratic civilization for which peoples have struggled since the sixteenth century.” Speaking on January 13 Dodd denounced the tenets of Aryanism and accused the Reich Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, of murdering “more personal enemi es in five years than Charles II of England did in twenty years” precipitating an off icial protest from the German Ambassador to Washington, Dr. Hans Dieckhoff. During February the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America and the Universal Christian Counci l for Life and Work held a dinner in New York City honoring Dodd. One of the speakers, Dr. Ernst Wilhelm Meyer, who until May 1937 had been a career German diplomat and 98 Eric Saul, “Response to the Article by Joan R. Dema n ‘A Rebuttal to the Claims Made by the Organization Visas for Life’” available from /ericSaul.html ; Internet; (Last update October 22, 2009); accessed March 19, 2010; “Feng Shan Ho and t he Rescue of Austrian Jews” Visas for Life Project available from engShanHo-bio-Eric.html ; Internet; accessed March 19, 2010; “The Angel of Austria’s Je ws” by Mark O’Neil South China Morning Post available from ws.html ; Internet; accessed March 20, 2010.


49 first secretary of the Embassy in Washington, expressed harsh critici sm of Hitler and his regime, categorizing them as betrayers of the “lasting interests of the German Fatherland…[and] the foe of so many things I had been taught Germany stands for.” One could not serve the Reich, he argued, if it was necessary to abandon “moral law a nd loyalty to the true Germany” while supporting false doctrines of Aryan sup eriority. Meyer condemned Nazi anti-Semitism and declared that the German Jew had alwa ys been a “devoted and useful citizen” and to claim otherwise represented “ignoranc e or lying.” The American Association for the Advancement of Science meeting, held in Indianapolis during late December 1937, denounced the suppression of “intellectual freedom” as “intolerable forms of tyranny.” An earlier resolution, introduced b y physicist Dr. Robert A. Millikan and astronomer Dr. Henry Norris Russell, wa s reaffirmed and viewed the “suppression of independent thought and its free expression as a major crime against civilization itself.” Scientists and all such thinkers were duty bound to rebuke “all such nations as intolerable forms of tyranny” with whom compromise was inherently impossible. On January 17, 1938 a large percentage of leading American publishers announced that they would withdraw from the annual Leipzig International Congre ss of Book Publishers. Such participation, it was felt, would represent a “contradiction of t he very essence of our function as publishers.” They criticized the censorship, banning and criminalization of the possession of ninety percent of the works of modern German writers whose works had been translated into English. The German Publishers Association planned to introduce into the Congress a resolution calling for internationa l


50 cooperation in preventing the publication of all works “libeling the head of a State or the sacred institutions of a State through misrepresentation of history.” Such a res olution was declared unsupportable by the American publishers and represented a source of “humiliation.” 99 American political and popular reaction to the Anschluss was mixed. President Roosevelt ended the preferential tariff treatment of Austria and Secretary of State Cordell Hull advised the German Government that the American Administration held the Reic h responsible for the payment of Austrian financial debts to the United States—bot h actions signaling American acquiescence to the annexation of Austria. 100 Hull directed U.S. Ambassador to Berlin Hugh Wilson to protest the persecution of Jewish American citizens and the confiscation or the destruction of their property. The Reich Governme nt granted in return limited concessions: American Jews would not have to comply with t he mandatory registration of their property unless they were living within Germ any or Austria or had been German citizens who emigrated after 1933. 101 A survey of newspaper editorials on the Austrian situation noted that fifty three percent favored isolationism while forty seven percent believed that a strong na tional defense and a willingness to fight would ensure the peace. 102 Senator Elbert D. Thomas 99 Schneiderman, ed., American Jewish Year Book Review of the Year 569, 89-93. The American publishers included John Day Co., E.P Dutton and Co ., Farrar and Rinehart, Harcourt, Brace and Co., Harper and Bros., Macmillan Co., and the Harvard, O xford and Yale University Presses. 100 “Austria Removed from Preferential U.S. Tariff Lis t,” Tampa Tribune April 8, 1938, 6. 101 Sheldon Spear, “The United States and the Persecuti on of the Jews in Germany, 1933-1939,” Jewish Social Studies 30, no. 4 (October 1968): 221-222. Following Kristallnacht however, these concessions were ended as new anti-Semitic policies called for the total disenfranchisement of all Jews, foreign a nd domestic, from the German economy. 102 US News March 21, 1938; The Times March 23, 1938, 15.


51 argued that the failure of the Great War victors to contest German violation s of the Treaty of Versailles proved that war was a futile means of resolving international conflicts. He anticipated the abolition of freedom of religion, speech and the press in Austria and predicted future Hitlerian expansion into Central and Eastern Europe. Recent event s had demonstrated that the European War had failed to preserve democracy on the Continent and consequently, American attention and resources needed to remain focused at home. 103 This theme that the United States should avoid foreign entanglements and focus its resources on the needs of the American citizen would echo throughout the future debates on national defense and immigration policies. Washington Representative John M. Coffee addressed the National Jewish Unity Conference at the Mecca Temple in New York City on March 12 and claimed that Je wish persecution was not a unique phenomenon but rather the “Jewish problem” needed to be viewed in its economic and social milieu. “Never in history have the ‘chosen people’ alone been chosen for oppression.” The destiny of the Jews was “inseparable from the fate of all the common peoples of the world…The future of the Jews is the future of democracy.” The “Jewish problem” would be forever solved if the problems of food, shelter, jobs, clothing and freedom were eliminated. 104 103 Congressional Record Appendix, March 15, 1938, Seventy-Fifth Congress, Third Sessi on, vol. 9, 1016-1017. Senator Thomas: June 17, 1883-February 11, 1953; Democratic Senator from Utah, 19331951. A critic of Nazi anti-Semitic policies and a supporter of American rearmament he called for the rescue of European Jews during the Second World War “It is the first time in history that the physic al extermination of a whole people—the Jewish people—h as become declared policy, in fact, one of the major policies and war aims, of a powerful aggressi ve nation.” The rescue of Jews and creation of a J ewish homeland in Palestine was “the last question on whi ch we can afford to be silent or evasive.” Novembe r 1942, “Senator Elbert D. Thomas: A Courageous Voice against the Holocaust” available from pdf ; Internet; last update 2004, accessed March 14, 2010. 104 Congressional Record Appendix March 15, 1938, Seventy-Fifth Congress, Third Session, v ol. 9, 1036-1037.


52 The National Conference of Jews and Christians issued a declaration of principles, co-signed by ninety-nine leading Jewish, Protestant and Catholic theologians, predicting that Nazi policies would be “relentlessly furthered in Austri a” and that all of the religious faiths were obligated to unite in the defense of universal “human r ights and liberties.” 105 Dr. Cyrus Adler expressed in a statement, issued in the New York Journal and American (among other Hearst papers), that only force could alter the ideological path of Hitler as there were “no forum or bar to which decent world opinion can appeal from the unconscionable assaults of Nazi Germany.” Adler called on Americ an Jews to “steel themselves” in order to provide aid to their beleaguered co-religioni sts. The Executive Committee of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in Amer ica passed a resolution critical of the “extension to Austria of the [German policy of] inhum an persecution of the Jews” which threatened “our Christian brethren in Austria, both Catholic and Protestant, whose religious liberty is destroyed with the loss of the ir political independence.” The Women’s Division of the American Jewish Congress on March 30 condemned the Anschluss and its resultant persecution of religious minorities, Jew and non-Jew. 106 Herbert Feis, a Jewish economic advisor in the State Department and a supporter of New Deal policies, called for American engagement in the refugee crisi s and noted 105 The signers of this declaration included President Henry Sloane Coffin of the Union Theological Seminary; Dr. Robert J. Cannon, President of Fordha m University; Dr. Cyrus Adler, President of the American Jewish Committee; Dr. Stephen S. Wise, Pre sident of the American Jewish Congress, and Dr. Edgar de Witt Jones, President of the Federal Counc il of the Churches of Christ in America. 106 Schneiderman, ed., American Jewish Year Book Review of the Year 5698 94-96.


53 FDR’s receptiveness to such an idea. 107 He viewed Under Secretary of State George S. Messersmith (considered the State Department’s authority on the Reich with influence over the Visa Division) as a possible impediment to any refugee rescue plan. Fe is believed Messersmith was “slow to recognize the inadequacy” of American immigration practices and was hampered by the “fear [of] any new though wholly reasona ble and justified flexibility in our laws.” 108 Foreign correspondent and Berlin bureau chief for the New York Post Dorothy Thompson, observed that the Anschluss was an international incident of the “first order” that threatened to generate an uncontrollable cascade of events that would result in American entrapment in foreign affairs, war or the “utter capitulation” of the world’s democracies. The drama being played out on the streets of Austria—the beatings, terrorization, imprisonment and economic disenfranchisement—had been predicted by the earlier events within Germany itself. The world had already been provi ded with a “blueprint” of fascist plans and the ultimate question was whether or not “western li beral culture can indefinitely tolerate the aggrandizement upon it, step by step, of a ba rbarian revolution!” Democracies were not threatened by nation-states but by “int ernational revolutionary movements” of which fascism posed the greatest danger. The democr acies, although endowed with “enormous wealth and power”, were “totally paralyzed” and unable to see the ideological peril. Isolationists were “blind and worse than blind” for 107 Breitman, American Refugee Policy 56. 108 Herbert Feis to Felix Frankfurter, March 22, 1938, Herbert Feis Papers, Box 33, Library of Congress cited in Breitman, American Refugee Policy 57.


54 awareness of that danger is the first true line of defense. 109 Thompson also warned that the forced expulsion of unwanted minorities threatened international order with anar chy. If involuntary migrs were not provided with the means to reestablish themselves as productive citizens then they would “become [an unwanted] burden upon their hosts.” As a result, the immigrants and receiving nations faced potential “catastrophe.” Mass migration, she believed, was no longer solely a matter of humanitarian concern but “m ust now be regarded as a problem of international politics.” 110 Consequently, she called upon the Roosevelt Administration to enter into discussions with the German Government to devise a rescue scheme along the lines of t he earlier Ha’avarah Agreement which coupled Jewish immigration into Palestine with increased German foreign trade; a process that allowed migrs to retain ade quate monies to facilitate resettlement and assimilation into a new homeland. 111 She believed that only the United States, with its “faith in the democratic principles,” could lead an inte rnational 109 “On the Record Wake Up and Live!” by Dorothy Thomps on in Congressional Record Appendix March 16, 1938, Seventy-Fifth Congress, Third Sessi on, vol. 9, 1046-1047. Thompson was the Berlin bureau chief for the New York Post and in 1934 she became the first journalist to be expelled by order of the Fuehrer from Germany because of her criticism o f Hitler and the Nazi Government. 110 Dorothy Thompson, “Refugees: A World Problem,” Foreign Affairs 16 (1938): 377. 111 The Ha’avarah or Transfer Agreement was an accord arranged durin g 1933 between the Jewish Agency for Palestine, the German Zionist Federation and the Reich Ministry of Economics. The plan allowed those Jews who were immigrating to Palestin e to transfer a portion of their wealth and propert y in the form of German trade goods purchased within Ger many. Subsequently, such merchandise, equipment, etc. could be resold in the Mandate for Palestinian currency. The nature of this exchange of Jewish b odies for German wares was kept confidential due to its p otential controversy until it was revealed in 1935. The Nazi regime was motivated by the significant effect of the world wide economic boycott of Germany in 1933. Jews who supported this arrangement were opp osed to such an embargo although, in the view of many contemporaries and later historians, the boyco tt and the loss of foreign exchange could have forc ed the collapse of Nazi rule. “The Transfer Agreement and the Boycott Movement: A Jewish Dilemma on the Eve of the Holocaust” by Yf’aat Weiss, Shoah Resour ce Center, available from %20-%203231.pdf ; Internet; accessed October 7, 2010. For a more detailed analysis of this even t and the marked divergence of opinion within the international Jewish community see Edwin Black, The Transfer Agreement (New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers), 2001.


55 rescue effort; a project based not on “pity for the exiles” but as a symbolic “ reaffirmation of our own [core] beliefs.” 112 Thompson argued that any solution to the refugee crisis would require multinational cooperation and the creation of an organization that would have the proper amount of expertise, influence and finances. The European refugee situation, however, created a potential “trap” for the United States and the West ern European nations. Any failure to act could “make them complicit” in Hitler’s a nti-Jewish policies and “discredit them before their own publics” or “force them into ineffect ual action divisive of their domestic public opinion.” 113 Richard Breitman and Alan M. Kraut have suggested that Feis and Thompson were the sources of “four key proposals” adopted by the U.S. Government in its a pproach to the refugee problem. Feis argued for the consolidation of the annual German and Austrian immigration quotas; “streamlining” the mechanism of obtaining and pr oviding “affidavits of support” from American sponsors and the creation of the Presidentia l Advisory Committee for Political Refugees. Thompson’s primary focus was on the creation of an international refugee organization to deal with forced migration as a multinational effort. 114 Some historians, as will be described, have asserted that it was Thompson’s public criticism of the Administration for its official inaction that prompted FDR to call for a refugee summit 112 Thompson, “Refugees,” 387. 113 Conrad Black, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Champion of Freedom Publi c (New York: Public Affairs, 2003), 487. 114 Herbert Feis to Felix Frankfurter, March 22, 1938; Feis to Cordell Hull, March 22, 1938, Feis Papers, Box 33, Library of Congress; Moffat Diary, March 16 1938, Moffat Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University cited in Breitman, American Refugee Policy 57.


56 Chapter 3 Flight: “A Problem of Growing Gravity and Complexity” Austrian refugees in Bolivia: “Visas! We began to live visas day and night. When we were awake we are obsessed by visas We talked about them all the time. Exit visas. Transit visa s. Entrance visas. Where could we go? During the day, we tried to get the proper documents, approvals, visas. At night, in bed, we tossed about and dreamed about long lines, officials, visas.” 1 The world is closing in on the Jews as Fascism is t riumphing over democracy. The Jews as Jews seem powerless to do a nything about it. Only the voice of Secretary Hull has been lifted in viting the governments to give the refugee problem immediate a nd practical attention. 2 The goal of the first phase of Nazi anti-Jewish policy was to make Greater Germany Jdenrein or cleansed of Jews by means of forced emigration, the seizure of their assets and property, the elimination of Jews from the workforce and by the use of terror. 525,000 Jews resided primarily within the urban areas of Germany when Hitl er assumed the Chancellorship in January 1933 (one percent of the total population with one-third of Jews living within Berlin) and two hundred thousand dwelled in Austria at the time of the Anschluss. Seventy percent, or four hundred thousand Jews, resided within municipal communities with half located within the ten largest German ci ties. Four hundred thousand Jews (eighty percent) living within Germany held German citizenship and the remainder were primarily of Polish origin; the majority born in 1 Leo Spitzer, Hotel Bolivia: The Culture of Memory in a Refugee f rom Nazism (NY: Hill and Wang, 1999), 35. 2 The Southern Israelite April 29, 1938, 20.


57 Germany who had been granted permanent resident alien status. Table 1 demonstrat es that the majority of Jews were of non-agricultural backgrounds; a deficie ncy that would greatly hinder resettlement. TABLE 1: Jewish Occupations in Germany in 1933 Census Occupations Percentage Agriculture 1.0 Industry and handicraft 19.1 Trade, insurance, communications and Transportation 52.5 Public service and professions 10.7 Domestic service 0.7 Independent; no occupation 16.7 Die Glaubensjuden im deutschen Reich 25 cited in Tartakower, “The Jewish Refugees,” 332-333. Hitler’s rise to power led 37,000-38,000 Jews to move to neighboring European countries, primarily France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerla nd and Czechoslovakia. “Stabilization of the domestic political situation” and increas ing resistance of the United States and other nations to accept refugees, however, led to a decline in the number of migrants seeking refuge. The passage of the 1935 Nurembe rg Racial Laws did not significantly accelerate the emigration proces s. 15,000-135,000 Jews left Germany between 1933 and 1937 of whom 42,000 entered Palestine, 48,000 migrated overseas and 25,000 returned to their countries of origin. 3 3 “Memorandum of the Jewish Agency, Palestine, to the Evian Conference” The Central Zionist Archive S7/693 available from Terror/RefugeeP/Memoran1.html ; Internet; accessed May 15, 2010; “Germany: Jewish Population in 1933,” Holocaust Encyclopedia available from 005276 ; Internet; accessed June 12, 2010. According to the 1922 Census 168,000 Jews or 4% of the total population lived in the capital Berlin wi th 26,000 in Frankfurt am Main, 20,000 in Breslau, 17, 000 in Hamburg, 15,000 in Cologne, 13,000 in Hanover and 12,000 in Leipzig. Approximately 10,00 0 lived in the Free City of Danzig. During 1933 20% of Jews lived in smaller town. An estimated 178,00 0 Jews lived in the Austrian capital Vienna and 35, 000 in Prague.


58 The Anschluss (and Kristallnacht ) clearly revealed the fragility and the precarious situation of the German Jewish community. State sponsored terror generated a “flood of visa applications.” The initial migrs in 1933 were able to retain seventyfive percent of their assets but expanded anti-Semitic measures, Aryanization of Jewis h enterprises, economic disenfranchisement and the pre-Nazi era Flight Tax or Reichsfluchtsteuer reduced their resources to ten percent with the balance seized by the Nazi gover nment. 4 Following Kristallnacht and the enactment of the Atonement Fine Jews were able to retain only ten Reichmarks per person. The ultimate impoverishment of the real and potential refugees would prove to be one of the critical factors complicating resettlement efforts. It was the plight of these Jews and non-Aryans and fears of involuntary ma ss migrations from other European locales that led to calls for an international sol ution to this refugee crisis. Eventually, 36,000 Jews managed to leave Germany and Austria during 1938 and 77,000 in1939. The latter year marked the first time that the entire American annual quota for Germany and Austria was filled (including the annexed portions of Czechoslovakia following the Munich Agreement). 5 305,000 Jews and non-Aryans had filed applications for approximately 27,000 visas by June 30, 1939. Prior to the onset of hostilities in September 1939 282,000 Jews had emigrated from Germany and 117,000 from Austria of which 95,000 entered the U.S, 60,000 Palestine, 40,000 the United Kingdom, 75,000 Central and South America (primarily Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 4 The Times July 6, 1938, 15. 5 The Munich Agreement of 1938 that ceded the Sudeten land to Germany, the establishment of the Hlinka Autonomists, the pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic r egime of Slovakia and the return of the Free City o f Danzig to the Reich led to a significant worsening of the Central European refugee crisis.


59 Bolivia) and 18,000 to the port of Shanghai, China. By the end of 1939 202,000 Jews remained within Germany and 57,000 within Austria. Further emigration was blocked b y order of the S.S. Reichsfuehrer Heinrich Himmler in October 1941. 6 Table 2 and 3 provides a detailed breakdown of the numbers and destinations of Jews who were able to flee Greater Germany. TABLE 2: Emigration of Jews from Austria and Germany April 1933-May 1939 US 63,000 Palestine 55,000 UK 40,000 France 30,000 Argentina 25,000 Brazil 13,000 South Africa 5,500 Italy 5,000 Other European countries 25,000 Other South American countries 20,000 Far Eastern Countries 15,000 Other 8,000 Total 304,000 110,000 fled to neighboring countries only to fall under German control during the war. “Jews in Germany 05: Third Reich 1933-1939,” Encyclopedia Judaica (1971), vol. 7, col. 491, available from ; Internet; accessed March 12, 2008. 6 “German-Jewish Refugees, 1933-1939,” Holocaust Ency clopedia, available from Id=10005468 ; Internet; accessed January 6, 2008.


60 TABLE 3: Austrian Jewish Emigration, 1933-1945 NO. OF AUSTRIAN JEWS Europe 69,390 United Kingdom 31,050 Switzerland 5,800 France 4,800 Czechoslovakia 4,100 North America 29,942 United States 29,860 Palestine 15,200 Asia 7,190 Shanghai 6,220 South America 6,845 Argentina 1,690 Bolivia 940 Africa 1,125 South Africa 332 Australia 1,050 Jonny Moser, Demographie der jdischen Bevkerung sterreichs 1938-1945 DW, Vienna, 1999, in “The Austrian Jewish Community before the Anschluss ,” Claims Conference The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany. Consequently, on March 25, 1938, the U.S. State Department issued a press release announcing that the President and the American Government had recognize d the “urgency” of the refugee crisis (ninety percent of real and potential ref ugees were Jews; remainder were primarily non-Aryan Christians or political dissidents) and sought to establish a “special committee” of European and Western Hemisphere nations, i ncluding New Zealand and Australia, that would meet in Europe with the goal of “facili tating the [orderly] emigration from Austria, and presumably from Germany, of politic al refugees.” Invitations were to be limited to those nations that could be categorized as “recei ving States,” i.e., those countries that had already received or could potentially acce pt forced emigrants. Special emphasis was placed on the countries of Latin America which, it was


61 anticipated (and which proved to be a wrong assumption), could be coerced into accepting European Jewish refugees. The British Dominions and Colonies were also regarded as likely sites of resettlement. 7 Following Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s advice Germany was not invited as Hull felt that it was improper to “negotiate with the felon about his misdeeds.” 8 It was hoped that a form of international passport would be granted to these stateless refugees along with a permis de sejour (residence permit) and permis de travail (work permit). 9 Officially, the Conference was to deal with all refugees coming from Germany and Austria but it was blatantly clear that the vast majority would be Jewish. The United States Government had not communicated diplomatically with the German Government (nor the League of Nations or High Commissioner for Refugees from 7 It was assumed by the American and European planner s of the Evian Conference that the readiness of Latin American countries to receive immigrants duri ng earlier periods of migration would translate int o an acquiescence to accept Jewish refugees, especially in Argentina and Brazil. However, it was clear tha t the Jewishness of the potential migrs would play a cr itical role in opening (or closing) the doors to immigration. A high level Brazilian official obser ved that “all the South American Republics made it clear at Evian that they were repulsed by Jewish immigrat ion [and would never] receive these subversive elements who bring social disorder.” Others warned that such charity would lead members of the domesti c German minorities into the ranks of an enemy fifth column threatening national security. Brazil was viewed as the Latin American nation with the greate st potential for receiving refugees and was specifi cally “targeted.” However, the existence of domestic proNational Socialist or anti-refugee groups was ignor ed by the U.S. State Department. It was believed that the “similarity of outlook and traditional close collaboration” between the two large Western Hemisp heric states would bridge such gaps and gain Brazilian cooperation. Jeff Lesser, Welcoming the Undesirables: Brazil and the Jewish Q uestion (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995), 112, 191 -192, 199 8 Henry L. Feingold, The Politics of Rescue The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938-1945 (Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1970), 27, 32. Ultimately, the Latin American countries introduced or changed existing laws to severely limit or bar completely Jewish immigration. Myron Taylor to Cor dell Hull, August 5, 1938, Foreign Relations of the United States 1938, vol. 1, 760. 9 The Times July 6, 1938, 15.


62 Germany) regarding aid to refugees and it became apparent that the Reic h authorities first became aware of the Conference planning following the Hull announcement. 10 The terms of the American invitation set the hypocritical tone for confere nce, provided an official basis for inaction and helped to guarantee its failure: UNITED STATES PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFEREN CE ON REFUGEES: The government has become so impressed with the urg ency of the problem of political refugees that it has inquired of a number of governments in Europe and in this hemisphere whethe r they would be willing to cooperate in setting up a special commit tee for the purpose of facilitating the emigration from Austria, and presu mably from Germany, of political refugees. Our idea is that wh ereas such representatives would be designated by the governme nts concerned, any financing of the emergency emigration referred to would be undertaken by private organizations with the respec tive countries. Furthermore, it should be understood that no countr y would be expected or asked to receive a greater number of im migrants than is permitted by its existing legislationÂ… It has been p rompted to make its proposal because of the urgency of the problem with which the world is faced and the necessity of speedy cooperative effor t under governmental supervision if widespread human suffer ing is to be averted. 11 It appeared that the plan had been promoted by the President without prior consultations with foreign governments and without formulation of specific goals and proposals. It followed upon the heels of earlier refugee organizations which had a limited degree of success such as the Nansen International Office for Refugees (es tablished by the League of Nations in 1931 and scheduled to be closed in 1938) and the Migration Bureau of the International Labor Office. The High Commission for Refugees Comi ng from Germany was launched on October 11, 1933 by the League Secretariat to provide for the political and legal protection of forced refugees. It was accountable to the fifteen 10 The Deseret Times July 1, 1938, 36. 11 Department of State, Press Releases, XVIII, March 26, 1938.


63 nations Governing Body under the leadership of the American, James Grover Mc Donald (October 1933-December 1935) and his successor, Major General Sir Neill Malcolm. 12 More than one million Russian refugees had sought shelter in European countries following the November Revolution of 1917, the Russian Civil War and the famine of 1921. This led the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to demand that the League of Nations provide relief to these now stateless refugees. The ICRC P resident, Gustave Ador, noted that this particular group of migrs lacked “legal protec tion,” clearly delineated “legal status” or “any legal means of subsistence.” T herefore, an “obligation of international justice” necessitated the appointment of a High Commissioner for Russian Refugees. 13 Consequently, the League named Fridjhof Nansen as the first High Commissioner for Russian Refugees. He introduced a form of pas sport that officially recognized these migrants who were granted the right to a twelve month period of foreign travel. This system was later expanded to include Turkish, Armenia n 12 The League Assembly meeting of September 30, 1938 d ecided to replace the Nansen Office and the High Commission for Refugees from Germany with a ne w organization, the Office of High Commissioner for Refugees under the Protection of the League of Nations, headed by Sir Herbert Emerson (commencing on January 1, 1939). Emerson would later assume th e directorship of the Intergovernmental Committee f or Political Refugees following the resignation of Geo rge Rublee (who had been chosen by the Intergovernmental Committee to negotiate with Germa ny and nations of potential refuge). McDonald had been the president of the Foreign Policy Associatio n and a professor of political science and history. As High Commissioner he dealt with the issues of passp orts, travel and identification documentation and permits granting the right of residence and work. He also sought sites of permanent resettlement abro ad aided by less restrictive German policies on the tr ansfer of capital and foreign exchange. After two years of ineffectual work, coupled with a paucity of support from the League, McDonald resigned on December 20, 1935. He called for the League and its constituent members to utilize their “moral authority” to pers uade the German Government, for the sake of “humanity an d of the principles of the public law of Europe,” t o end its policies which created international “unres t and perplexity” by the forced emigration of Jews and other refugees. He argued that proactive action mu st be taken and “considerations of diplomatic correctness must yield to those of common humanity. ” “League Aid Asked by McDonald to End Nazi Persecution,” New York Times December 30, 1935, 1, 12. 13 Gustave Ador to the League of Nations, “The Questio n of Russian Refugees, League of Nations Official J ournal Annex 2, 1921 (February 20, 1921): 228.


64 and Chaldean refugees and by 1924 the documents were accepted by more than fifty governments. 14 The Commission centrale pour l’tude de la condition des rfugis russes et armnians attempted to codify the rights of these refugees through international agreements but it was not until 1928 that the “Arrangement on Russian and Armenian Refugees” was adopted. This document allowed nations to grant non-statutory consent conceding the refugees the right to work, access to the judicial system and prot ection from deportation. 15 The 1933 Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees expanded the terms and scope of the 1928 agreement to include social welfare, educati on, and labor conditions. 16 The Great Depression, with its mass unemployment among native workers, created domestic hostility towards foreign laborers. Consequently, the host nations adopted policies of restriction, limitation of privileges and refoulement 17 Critically, the 14 “Circular Letter from the League of Nations Secreta ry-General August 14, 1928, Official Journal (1929): 323. The White Russians fleeing the Soviet takeover were granted by the League of Nations a special form of papers: the Nansen passport, named after Fridtjof Nansen. Nansen was appointed Leagu e High Commissioner for Refugees in 1922. This passp ort was granted to other stateless refugees and was recognized by 52 nations. Approximately 450,000 ha d been granted. 15 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 86. 16 Article 3 of the Convention pledged each signatory power “not to remove or keep from its territory by application of police measures, such as expulsio n or non-admittance at the frontier ( refoulement ), refugees who have been authorized to reside there r egularly,” unless they represented a threat to “nat ional security or public order.” Refugees must not be de nied entry “at the frontier of their countries of o rigin.” The “Contracting Parties” retained the right to uti lize necessary “internal measures” for those refuge es “expelled for reasons of national security or publi c order [who] are unable to leave its territory” or lack the necessary papers or official permission to relocate in another country. Nine nations, including the U nited Kingdom and France ratified the agreement but Brita in disavowed the right to deny entry at the border. Gilbert Jaeger, “On the History of the Internationa l Protection of Refugees,” International Review of the Red Cross (IRRC) 83, no. 843 (September 2001): 727-736. 17 Hathaway. The Rights of Refugees 88.


65 1933 Convention on Refugees restricted legal safeguards to earlier groups and individuals who had already been subsumed under the rubric of “refugee.” The flight of German Jews and non-Aryans from Hitler’s Germany, in essence, created a new class of stateless refugees who were devoid of legal status and protections, contradicting Nansen’s 1926 belief that the international refugee problem would remain limited in scope and soluble by international agreement. 18 By 1933 the willingness of host nations to accept additional refugees became increasingly constrained by domesti c economic and political conditions as well as rising nationalism. 19 The League, in a half-hearted attempt to solve this new refugee crisis, created the High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany under the chairmanship of James G. McDonald in October 1933 but, in contrast to the support offered to the Nansen Office High Commissioner for Russian Refugees, a ll funding for the new establishment had to be derived from private sources as a means of placating German hostility towards the League and its activities. 20 The checkered past of prior attempts at international cooperation for the resettlement of refugees led Franklin Roosevelt to believe that an organization s eparate and distinct from the League of Nations was necessary if a solution to the problem of German refugees was to be found. The High Commission for Refugees Coming from Germany encountered much resistance and many obstacles to the facilitat ion of immigration and did not achieve any meaningful results. The primary tasks of t he High Commissioners were to facilitate and coordinate the resettlement of stat eless refugees and 18 Marrus, The Unwanted 109. 19 Simpson, The Refugee Problem 139. 20 Louise Wilhelmine Holbom, Philip Chartrand and Rita Chartrand, Refugees: A Problem of Our Time vol. 1 (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1975), 14.


66 to conduct negotiations with foreign governments to provide temporary or permanent havens. Although James G. McDonald was named to this position by the League his salary and expenses were funded by non-governmental private Jewish organizations Secretary-General Joseph Avenol informed McDonald that the initial 25,000 Swiss f rancs provided by the League to the High Commission was to be regarded merely as a loan to fund and establish operations that would have to be repaid within one year. 21 In addition, McDonald would report directly to a special Governing Body composed of nations t hat were deemed likely to accept refugees rather than to the League Asse mbly as a whole. 22 With the exceptions of French Senator Henry Brenger, the American Joseph Chamberlain and the British Sir Robert Cecil the Governing Board was composed of low level professional diplomats assigned to the League in Geneva, who, according to Norman Bentwich, “knew little, cared little, and wanted to do as little as possi ble about the cause.” 23 The democratic European powers had, by this time, concluded that oversaturation mandated resettlement beyond the borders of Europe, funded by priva te sources. Brenger countered Chamberlain’s justification of the restric tive quota system of the United States by noting that “hard times were universal, so was the problem…Whereas, France was caring for nearly half the refugees, th e United 21 Claudena M. Skran, "Profiles of the First Two Commi ssioners" Journal of Refugee Studies 1, no. 3/4 (1988): 277-95. 22 Simpson, The Refugee Problem 216; Barbara McDonald Stewart, United States Government Policy on Refugees from Nazism, 1933-1940 (NY: Garland Publishing, 1962), 99. 23 Norman Bentwich, My 77 Years: An Account of My Life and Times, 18831960 (London: Routledge, 1962), 131.


67 States…had scarcely taken any.” 24 The Roosevelt Administration had announced, in March 1938, the consolidation of the annual German and Austrian immigration quota but would not liberalize it policies to admit larger numbers; a stance that would r esonate throughout the Evian Conference. Consequently, the Governing Board accomplished very little prompting McDonald to resign his position during December 1935. His resignation letter sever ely criticized the League for its “diplomatic correctness” that prevente d the rescue of Jews who faced “demoralization and exile.” “Common humanity,” he believed, expressed through the actions of the League Assembly, member states and global public opinion would “avert the existing and impending tragedies.” The separation of the High Commission from the body of the League had fatally weakened the effectivene ss of his office. 25 Therefore, the catastrophic conditions facing the refugees from Germany mandated “reconsideration by the League…of the entire situation…” 26 He acknowledged that the League and private relief organizations could “only mitigate a problem of growing gravity and complexity.” Since European nations would only accept limite d numbers of stateless refugees the solution of the problem could only be “tackled at i ts 24 Stewart, United States Government Policy, 120. 25 Norman Bentwich, The Refugees from Germany in S. Adler-Rudel, “The Evian Conference on the Refugee Question,” Year Book XIII of the Leo Baeck Institute (London: 1968), 268; “Letter of Resignation of James G. McDonald” December 27, 1935 C1538 20A-8 0732-22873, ix, League of Nations Archives cited in Richard Breitman, Barbara McDonald Steward and Severin Hochberg, Refugees and Rescue: The Diaries and Papers of James G. McDonald 1935-1945 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009), 102. Other entities such as the Nansen Office of th e League of Nations and the Migration Bureau of the International Labor League also encountered similar difficulties and lack of success. 26 James G. McDonald, The German Refugees and the League of Nations (London: Friends of Europe, 1936), 5-12.


68 source [meaning Germany] if disaster [was] to be avoided.” 27 It was necessary for the Reich, McDonald argued, to demonstrate “courage and generosity” by allowing their “non-Aryans” to maintain a “tolerable” existence whole awaiting emigr ation. In addition, Germany must provide the financial means (i.e., the release of suffici ent personal assets) to facilitate such a population transfer. Furthermore, the pot ential countries of resettlement should not “fear” calling upon Germany for a gre ater degree of cooperation in resolving the refugee problem by issuing a “general appeal” that s tems from “deep springs of pity” for the “sufferers” of persecution and the “indig nation that our common humanity should be so wronged.” 28 McDonald’s departure from the High Commission generated positive responses from the international press. The Washington Post described his action as “one of the most powerful indictments of the Nazi regime of terrorism yet given to the out side world.” The San Francisco Chronicle noted that the persecution of Jews was “nobody’s legal… [or] military business” but the “uncivilized” actions of Germany made it the “moral business of civilization.” The Nation observed that McDonald “resigned with a bang [with] reverberations…still sounding in every corner of the world with res ults that have only begun to be felt” and represented the “most effective act” of his offic ial tenure. “His mission was an honorable failure.” The Manchester Guardian ominously warned, however, that “for the Jews the Dark Ages have returned.” 29 27 “Letter of Resignation of James G. McDonald,” Decem ber 27, 1935, ix cited in Harriet Davis, Pioneers in World Order: An American Appraisal of t he League of Nations (NY: Columbia University Press, 1944), 228. 28 “Britain is Aroused by McDonald Plea,” New York Times December 31, 1935, 7. 29 Breitman et al, Refugees and Rescue 103-104. Washington Post San Francisco Chronicle and Manchester Guardian (December 31, 1935); The Nation (January 15, 1935).


69 McDonald’s relinquishment of his office “both shocked the League and shamed it into continuing the Nansen tradition of humanitarian assistance.” 30 The League membership was divided between those who wanted to dissolve the Nansen Office and end its refugee efforts and those who sought the creation of a new refugee body. M any States endeavored to avoid any action that would “prevent the eventual return of Germany to the League” or provoke the fears of the Soviet Regime that the Le ague was planning to continue the Nansen Office (which had provided passports for White Russians) despite its earlier decision to dissolve this organization in Dece mber 1938. 31 A Committee of Experts was established to examine the refugee problem as a whole and concluded that any project to promote mass resettlement of stateless migrants required cooperation between nations who belonged to or remained outside of the League. The Committee called for the merging of the Nansen Office and the High Commission for Refugees from Germany and the granting of a wider scope of author ity to the High Commissioner. In addition, the Committee believed nations needed to share the financial, political, legal and bureaucratic responsibilities among them selves coupled with a greater degree of cooperation with private organizations. However, the recommendations of the Committee of Experts were ignored. Instead, the acti vities of the High Commissioner were to be limited “to seeking the assistance of Gover nments” to resolve issues regarding the “legal status of refugees.” Changes to nationa l immigration 30 Skran, “Profiles,” 292-293. 31 Observations Prsentes par Sir Horace Rumbold (ann exe) Comit Pour L’Assistance Internationale aux Rfugies. Procs-Verbal (C.A.I.R./P.V.), December 18, 1935, League of Nati ons Archives R5633/21365/20038 cited in Philip Orchard, “A Right to Leave: Refugees; States, and International Society” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of British Columbia, 2008), 191.


70 quotas were to be avoided and the internal affairs of States continued to be regarde d as sacrosanct. Direct assistance to the involuntary exiles was to remain sole ly within the “province of the private organizations.” 32 The United Kingdom favored an international solution to the refugee crisis but disavowed the acceptance of any further obligati ons for the support and resettlement of refugees. 33 Moreover, the functions of the High Commission were to be restricted to “existing, not…potential refugees.” Othe rwise, greater numbers of Jews would be emboldened to leave Germany for other lands. 34 Sir Neill Malcolm proved to be less intimately involved with refugee matter s than had been his predecessor, McDonald. He was primarily concerned with issues of “ legal and political protection, on which he…effectively intervened with governments.” 35 Norman Bentwich, the Secretary of the Liaison Committee between private orga nizations and the High Commission, was unimpressed with Malcolm’s abilities and accomplishments. The High Commissioner was “devoid of initiatives and ideas [thinking] exclusively in terms of formalities and meetings.” His report s to the League were a “sad confession of inactivity.” 36 He did personally intervene, however, in the rescue of approximately five thousand refugees by 1938. 37 Sir Neill declined financial 32 Sir Neill Malcolm, Refugees Coming From Germany: Report submitted to t he Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations A.19.1936.XII. September 1, 1936 cited in E. Reut Nicolussi et al, Recueil des cours vol. 73 (The Hague, The Netherlands: Acadmie de Droit International de la Haye 1948), 39. 33 Orchard, “A Right to Leave,” 191. 34 British Foreign Office Memorandum on Report of Comm ittee on International Assistance to Refugees. January 16, 1938, PRO FO 371 W445-172-98 cited in O rchard, “A Right to Leave,” 192. 35 Simpson, Refugee Problem 216-218. 36 Stewart, United States Government Policy 232. 37 Orchard, “The Right to Leave,” 193.


71 support from private parties and, although he asked for advice from relief organizati ons (via the Liaison Committee), he was wont to ignore their recommendations. 38 The League granted a restricted number of Nansen passports to German refugees as outlined in the non-binding Provisional Agreement of 1936 (between the U.K., France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway and Denmark), but the Nansen Office itself woul d not cooperate with the Office of the High Commissioner in the handling and processing of these travel documents. 39 The League ultimately decided to combine the Nansen Office and the High Commission in 1938. Although the United Kingdom now favored the consolidation of the two organizations the Home Office was wary of the new entity pursuing an “ idealistic and adventurous policy” that could bring undue pressure upon “countries of temporary refuge.” 40 The Soviet Union dropped its opposition to the plan provided the organization would operate on a temporary basis separate from the League bureaucracy a nd any reference to Nansen in its title would be avoided. 41 The focus of the newly created High Commissioner of the League of Nations for Refugees would remain centered upon the legal and political safeguards offered to the refugees. The facilitation of emigration and 38 Stewart, United States Government Policy 231-232, 39 John George Stoessinger, The Refugee and the World Community (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956), 37-38 40 Cooper to Hayter, January 11, 1938, PRO FO 371/2252 5, W527/104/98 cited in Sherman Island Refuge 81. 41 Orchard, “A Right to Leave,” 194.


72 permanent resettlement necessitated some degree of cooperation between governments and private relief organizations. 42 The retiring Governor of the Indian province of Punjab, Sir Herbert Emerson, was appointed as the new High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany and, like McDonald and Malcolm, was limited in his authority and powers. 43 The League refused to provide any financial or legal support and he was barred from entering into any agreement regarding refugees while acting as the representative of the League of Nations. 44 The primary aim of the League was to streamline the emigration process, improve and simplify cooperation between relief organizations and governments and encourage resettlement of stateless refugees. Emerson was viewed by t he British Foreign Office as a dedicated bureaucrat who would focus on the machinery of immigrati on and not seek to “forge” his own refugee policies. 45 The U.S. State Department agreed to the appointment of Dr. Joseph Chamberlain, a protg of McDonald, to be the American representative on the new High Commiss ion but he would not receive any direct financial support from the Department. 46 However, it 42 Ibid. 43 Emerson became Director of the Intergovernmental Co mmittee upon George Rublee’s resignation in February 1939 and remained in this position until t he Committee’s dissolution on June 30, 1947. 43 Gil Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 32. 45 Marrus, The Unwanted 166. 46 Stewart, United States Government Policy 116. Other individuals had been considered for this position as well, including Admiral Mark Bristol, w ho had been involved in the issue of the Armenian Genocide and refugees following the end of the Grea t War and the occupation of Constantinople. He declined this appointment as the State Department r efused to pay for his traveling expenses. McDonald advised Cordell Hull on February 6, 1934, NARA 548. D 1/94: “…there is no provision under the laws for the issuance by the United States authorities of do cuments of Identity and Travel to aliens.” During the mid-portion of the 1920’s the State Department decl ared that “American Consular officers certainly can not


73 was predictable that “there was no hope” that such a consolidation of refugee office s would result in any meaningful accomplishments. The League leadership was politically conservative and averse to risk taking. In addition, the potential countries of permane nt refuge were limited in their willingness to admit involuntary exiles. 47 John George Stoessinger had observed that the League was a house “divided against itsel f,” with member states both supportive and opposed to international efforts at solving the refugee crisis. 48 Many members believed that their parochial interests would be threatened by any weakening or liberalization of their respective immigration polici es and quotas. 49 Ultimately, the reluctant efforts of the League High Commission would be re placed by those of Roosevelt’s Evian Conference and its creation, the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees from Germany. Pessimistic views soon arose regarding the likelihood of success of the upcoming refugee talks. Solomon Adler-Rudel commented on June 3, 1938 that the Evian Conference was a “total improvisation” due to the lack of a working agenda. Harol d Ginsburg, a representative of the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), was informed by be authorized to issue travel documents” to Armenia ns who had survived the Genocide but would accept Nansen Passports. Letter from the Acting Secretary of State to Drummond NARA 511.1 C1/7. The Department of State advised the League Secretary-Ge neral that the U.S would not become a signatory to the 1933 Refugee Convention, arguing that the “stat us of all persons coming to the United States of America is fully defined by existing legislation…” The State Department also opposed the issuance of Nansen-like travel documents for potential refugees still residing in their country of origin. Memoran dum from John Farr Simmons, Visa Division, March 3, 193 4. NARA, 548.D 1/100. McDonald, while High Commissioner, was informed by the Secretary of Stat e that U.S. immigration policies were inflexible an d application of the Likely to become a Public Charge clause (LPC) would block entry of the vast majorit y of German refugees unless they possessed sufficient mo nies. Hull to McDonald April 28, 1934, NARA D.1/127. 47 Marrus, The Unwanted 166. 48 Stoessinger, The Refugee, 32-33. 49 Loescher, The UNHCR 29.


74 the American delegates to Evian during a June 27 meeting of the Council of Germany Jewry held in London, that the United States wanted the meeting itself to set the agenda and procedures. Ginsburg advised the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem that the conference would fail due to lack of adequate preparatory planning. Eliahu Dobkin, the director of the Jewish Agency’s Immigration Department, addressed the Jew ish Agency Executive in Jerusalem and echoed Ginsburg’s sentiments. James G. McDonald, the head of the newly appointed President’s Advisory Committee, was also ill-informed reg arding the structure and functions of the meeting and was uncertain about the results to be expected from the Conference. 50 The United States had hoped to hold the conference in Geneva, Switzerland but the Swiss, wary of offending Germany, loyal to the Geneva based League of N ations and also conscious of its own restrictive immigration policies, declined. The Swiss also feared that they would be called upon to host any permanent refugee committee crea ted by the Evian Conference. 51 The French government, under Premier Lon Blum and the French Foreign Minister Joseph Paul Boncour, offered the “luxurious” Hotel Roya l, 50 Adler-Rudel/Correspondence, 171, 240, Minutes of th e Jewish Agency Executive meeting June 26, 1938, Adler-Rudel Diplomatische Politische Korrespondenz ll, 240 cited in Shabtai Beit-Zvi, Post-Uganda Zionism in the Crisis of the Holocaust vol. 1 (Tel Aviv: AAARGH Publishing House, 2004), 142. Dobkin (December 31, 1898-October 26, 1976) was a leading Zionist and signatory to the Israeli Declaration of Independence. Adler-Rudel was born in Czernowitz, Austria-Hungary (June 23, 1894-November 15, 1975) and worked as a social worker in Vienna and Berlin. He served as the executive secretary of the Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden and on the executive board of the Zionistische Vereinigung fuer Deutschland from 1933-36 when he immigrated to the United King dom and later resettled in Israel in 1949. Fred Grubel, ed., Catalog of the Archival Collections Leo Baeck Insti tute (Tbingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1990), 2. 51 Michael Mashberg, “American Diplomacy and the Jewis h Refugees, 1938-1939,” YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science 15 (1974), 346 ; “ Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland—Secon d World War “Switzerland and Refugees in the Nazi Era” (Ber n: 1999), 41 available from gier_Refugee.pdf ; Internet; accessed June 19, 2010.


75 located in the spa town of Evian-Les-Bains, “the gayest resort town” lying on the French shore of Lake Geneva, as the conference site. 52 The locale was described as a “pretty place, quiet and old-fashioned; its waters and baths have a high repute; its hotels are among the best in France, and its summer climate is perfect… [I]ts greate st attraction is the enchanting country with which it is surrounded.” 53 Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated, in his proposed agenda submitted to foreign governments and refugee organizations, that humanitarian concerns requi red “speedy cooperation if widespread suffering is to be averted.” 54 The two major provisions of the American invitation had, as noted earlier, specified that the cost of resettlement would be borne by “private organizations” and “no country would be expected or asked to receive a greater number of immigrants than is permitted b y its existing legislation.” 55 The focus of the proposed Committee’s work would be the resettlement of the “most urgent cases” as allowed by the “regulations of the receiving countries…” Each government was expected to provide “strictly confidential” 52 “Non-League Body Favored by U.S. to Handle All Ref ugee Problems,” Montreal Gazette July 6, 1938, 1. Joseph Paul-Boncour (August 4, 1873-March 28, 1972) served as Premier from December 18, 1932-January 28, 1933, the French Permanent Delegat e to the League from 1932-1936 and as Foreign Minister in several cabinets including Leon Blum an d Daladier. He later represented France at the San Francisco Conference on the United Nations and sign ed its Charter in 1945. 53 Sir Frederick Treves, The Lake of Geneva (London: Cassell and Company, LTD, 1922), 88. 54 The conference would be held between July 6-15, 193 8 but needed to end prior to the state visit of the King and Queen of England to France; Tampa Tribune March 25, 1938, 1, 9. Cordell Hull (October 2, 1871-July 23, 1955) was the longest serving Secreta ry of State (1933-1944) and received the Nobel Peac e Prize in 1945, acknowledging his efforts in the fou nding of the United Nations. He had served 11 term s in the House of Representatives 1907-1921 and 1923-193 1). 55 Department of State, Press Releases, XVIII, March 26, 1938. The financial resources of Jewish refugee relief organizations were already stretched to the limit by the time of the Anschluss It has been estimated that $50,000,000 had been expended betwee n 1933-1938 for the support and maintenance of refugees. Thus, the pecuniary burden placed upon p rivate non-governmental organizations created a maj or impediment to the success of any plan of resettleme nt adopted by the Evian Conference. Adler-Rudel, “T he Evian Conference,” 241.


76 information regarding its immigration policies and statutes as well as a “general statement” detailing the “number and type” of aliens it would accept. In addit ion, a mutually agreed upon “system of documentation” would be required for those migrants who lacked the “requisite documents.” Finally, a permanent organization was to be established “to formulate and to carry out, in cooperation with existing agencies, a long range program” that would lead to the resolution or the “alleviation of the [refuge e] problem in the larger sense.” Success, however, of such a construction depended upon fruitful negotiations with the German Government. 56 The convening of such a meeting may have served an unspoken purpose, i.e., the expression of international sympathy for the persecuted Jews of Germany but, as will be demonstrated, such consideration did not translate into tangible and significant actions. The Committee ultimat ely defined the forced migrs as “political refugees,” devoid of any specific rel igious or ethnic identity, who sought to leave or had already succeeded in departing the Reich. Undersecretary of State Sumner Wells cautioned the President to remain cognizant of domestic restrictionist opinion and to avoid any representation that im plied or overtly stated that the annual quota or immigration laws would be modified. 57 The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 marked the first American legislation that limit ed immigration into the United States and represented white opposition to the importati on of cheap labor. The closure of the American frontier in 1890, coupled with increasing mechanization and industrialization, reduced the need and demand for foreign labor. Congress in 1891 established the Office of the Superintendent of Immigration and 56 FRUS, 1938, vol. 1, 748. 57 Feingold, Politics of Rescue 29.


77 enacted a Federal program of comprehensive immigration reform that barred the entry of certain categories of aliens and provided for the deportation of those who had entered t he nation illegally. The Immigration Act of 1917 and its amendments created the Asi atic Barred Zone encompassing most of the Pacific islands and East Asia from w hich no immigrants would be allowed entry. Literacy tests were adopted and migrs could be excluded on the basis of economic, mental, physical and moral standards or on the basis of political ideologies. The 1921 Emergency Quota or National Origins Act limit ed immigration to three percent of a particular nationality based on the 1910 census or approximately 375,000 per year. This Act was driven by nativist fears of Easte rn and Southern European immigrants and of the “Red Scare” (the importation of Bolshevism) 58 The Johnson-Reed or National Origins Act of 1924 adjusted the quota to two percent of a nationality based on the 1890 U.S census. Initially 164,000 foreigners would be admitt ed per year but by 1927 annual immigration would be reduced to 150,000 per year with the greatest percentage allocated to the United Kingdom, Ireland, France and Germany. Limitations were not placed on Canada or Latin American but all Asians were denied entry and restrictions were placed on Southern and Eastern Europeans and Russians 58 James T. Kimer, “Landmarks in U.S. Immigration Poli cy” NACLA Report on the Americas 39, no. 1 (July/August 2005), 34. Eugenicists, who believed i n a biological racial hierarchy, helped formulate t he 1921 Act. They believed that “severe restriction o f immigration [was] essential to prevent the deteri oration of American civilization….The ‘melting pot’ theory [ was] a complete fallacy…because it suggest[ed] that impurities and baser qualities [were] eliminated by the intermingling of races, whereas they are likel y to be increased.” “Eugenicists Dread Tainted Aliens,” New York Times September 25, 1921, 1. For more information regarding this topic see the works of C harles B. Davenport, Director of the Eugenics Recor d Office, Dr. Henry Fairfield Osborn, Francis Galton and Madison Grant. See also, Edwin Black, War Against the Weak: Eugenics and America’s Campaign t o Create a Master Race (NY: Four Walls Eight Windows, 2003).


78 Preference and admission outside of the annual quota was granted to the parents, spouse and children of American citizens. 59 Table 4 describes the number of foreign born residing within the U.S. as a percentage of total population from the mid-Nineteenth to mid-Twentieth Centurie s and Table 5 lists the number of total immigrants during the a similar time fr ame. The latter highlights the significant drop in aliens admitted during the critical years of the 1930s and 1940. TABLE 4: Foreign Born in the United States, 1850-1940 Year Number (millions) Percentage 1850 2.2 9.7 1860 4.1 13.2 1870 5.6 14.0 1880 6.7 13.3 1890 9.2 14.7 1900 10.4 13.6 1910 13.6 14.7 1920 14.0 13.2 1930 14.3 11.6 1940 11.7 8.9 1950 10.4 6.9 Roger Daniels. Guarding the Golden Door 5. 59 Roger Daniels, Guarding the Golden Door: American Immigration Poli cy and Immigrants Since 1882 (NY: Hill and Wang, 2004), 49-57.


79 TABLE 5: Immigration 1851-1950 Years Numbers (millions) 1851-60 2.6 1861-70 2.3 1871-80 2.8 1881-90 5.2 1891-00 3.7 1901-10 8.8 1911-20 5.7 1921-30 4.1 1931-40 0.5 1941-50 1.0 Ibid. The Department of Labor under Frances Perkins controlled the processes of immigration and naturalization until 1940. She was the sole member of the Cabinet calling for a more tolerant immigration policy. Perkins argued that liberal ization of the quota system was “consistent with American traditions and policies to grant fr ee entry to refugees.” 60 She advocated for a Presidential Executive Order on April 18, 1933 that would suspend the Likely to become a Public Charge clause of the 1924 Immigration Act. This Hoover era provision was strictly interpreted and enforced by overse as U.S Consuls creating an under filling of the annual German and Austrian quotas. 61 Perkin’s efforts were bolstered by the finding of Circuit Court Judge Julian W. Mack, an immigration authority and a member of the American Jewish Congress, that Se ction 21 of the Immigration Act of 1917 allowed the posting of a financial bond guaranteeing th at an 60 Alan M. Kraut, Richard Breitman, and Thomas W. Imh oof, “The State Department, the Labor Department, and the German Jewish Immigration, 1930 -1940,” Journal of American Ethnic History (Spring 1984): 9. Perkins was the first woman appo inted to a Presidential cabinet and was named Secre tary of Labor in 1933. 61 Bat-Ami Zucker, “Frances Perkins and the German-Je wish Refugee, 1933-1940, ” American Jewish History 89, no. 1 (2001): 38.


80 immigrant would not end up on the dole. 62 This approach was opposed by Max Kohler, an immigration consultant to the American Jewish Committee, who asserted tha t if any German Jewish refugees became public charges the consequences would “queer all our efforts.” 63 The State Department also objected to this policy but a ruling by the Attorney General Homer Commings allowed its implementation. 64 Officials in the State Department Visa Division warned that the arrival of ships in New York Harbor “l aden with Jewish immigrants” would result in a communal backlash against Foggy Bott om and another cautioned that easing the entry of German refugees would result in the United States becoming “flood[ed]” with Jews. 65 Following the Anschluss Perkins called for a more liberal approach to the granting of visitors’ visas in cases where it w as clear that the foreigner could not return to Germany. The State Department responded that such a policy would lead to the “complete breakdown” of established immigration protocol. The annual “quota restriction would become a farce” with stateless refugees a cquiring “permanent admission…without immigration visas and without quota restrictions.” 66 Sumner Welles also believed that the stature and importance of an international conference was reflected by the rank of its attendees rather than a planned ag enda. 62 Ibid., 39-40. 63 Max Kohler to Eugene S. Benjamin, HIAS, December 12, 19 33, Cecilia Razovsky Papers, Box 1, AJHS. Ibid., 40. 64 Ibid., 43-44. 65 Fletcher to Hodgdon, January 8, 1934, 150/01 2168, NA. Ibid., 44. 66 Unknown author, U.S. State Department, Visa Divisio n, “Does the President Have Authority to Abolish or Waive the Requirement of Passports and V isas in the Case of German Religious, Racial or Political Refugees?” October 24, 1938, 811.111 Reg ulations/2176 , NA. Ibid., 54. Perkins was the fir st woman appointed to a Presidential cabinet and was n amed Secretary of Labor in 1933.


81 Consequently, he recommended that Roosevelt appoint Secretary of State Cordell Hul l, Welles, Assistant Secretary of State George Messersmith, and Secr etary of Commerce Frances Perkins to represent the United States at the international confere nce. Instead of following Welles’ counsel FDR selected 64 year old Myron C. Taylo r, the former CEO of U.S. Steel, to lead the delegation assisted by State Departm ent Divisional Assistant and disarmament expert Robert Pell and Foreign Service Officer, Class III George Brandt who were familiar with immigration issues. Taylor was granted the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and was elected by the Conferen ce’s delegations to the chairmanship of the meeting. 67 Some representatives interpreted the appointment of Taylor, rather than a professional diplomat, as a sign that the American Government lacked seriousness about the Conference and its work. It was reported that the attitude of the United Sta tes was “’one of helpfulness rather than direction.” Officials were quoted as saying Ame rica would facilitate the formulation of planning but did “not intend to be the final judges of whatever may be done”; an attitude that would elicit some “hesitation” in accept ing the French proposal that Taylor chair the conference. Taylor was apparently dis inclined to take the position and some American officials “hoped ‘it would not happen.’” 68 The President did accept Welles’ (and Feis’) recommendation regarding th e creation of a consultative body, the Presidential Advisory Committee on Politica l 67 Feingold Politics of Rescue 28. 68 Amsterdam Evening and Daily Democrat July 6, 1938, 1.


82 Refugees (PACPR). 69 Although inclusive of a number of Jewish leaders the composition of the membership embraced many who lacked a “particular commitment to the Je wish cause.” 70 Hamilton Fish Armstrong, who had succeeded McDonald to the presidency of the Foreign Policy Association, declined the chairmanship of the PACPR citing his greater interest and commitment to “international relations than relief or philanthropy as such.” 71 George Strausser Messersmith addressed the committee during its first f ull session on May 16, 1938 and warned its members not to expect any concrete results from either the Evian Conference or its creation, the Intergovernmental Committee f or Political Refugees from Germany. He presented his confidential sentiments that alth ough humanitarian rhetoric would be expressed the invited delegations and their respect ive governments were not “approaching the problem with enthusiasm and very few with the disposition to make sacrifices.” Their decision to attend the conference was m otivated in large part by a desire to avoid appearing as a bystander to Jewish persecutio n. Therefore, it was to be expected that the attendees would merely be offering “lip service ” to the idea of rescue coupled with “unwillingness” to liberalize their respective immi gration policies. Likewise, the range of actions open to the United States was severely constraine d by American immigration law and the quota system. Messersmith hoped that the “liber al 69 This advisory panel was constituted by Henry Morgen thau, Bernard Baruch, Dr. Stephen S. Boise, Rabbis Stephen Wise, Hamilton Fish Armstrong (edito r of Foreign Affairs ), Paul Baerwald (Chairman of the American Joint Distribution Committee), the Rev Samuel Calvert, Joseph P. Chamberlain, Basil Harris, Louis Kennedy, the Most Reverend Joseph F. Rummel, James M. Speers and James G. McDonald who would serve as chairman. 70 David Clay Large, And the World Closed Its Doors: The Story of One Fa mily Abandoned to the Holocaust (NY: Basic Books, 2003), 71. 71 Ibid., 71.


83 attitude” the American Government had displayed towards granting visas (combi ning and more completely filling the annual German and Austrian quotas) and the resettlem ent of refugees on U.S. soil would “serve as an example and incentive” to motivate other nations to follow a similar path. 72 Various motives have been offered to explain the presidential decision to convene the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees, also known as the Evia n Conference. FDR asked his Cabinet during a meeting on March 18: “America was a place of refuge for so many fine Germans in the period of 1848. Why couldn’t we offer them again a place of refuge at this time?” 73 The President would later assert that America had long served as the “traditional haven of refugee” for those faci ng persecution in foreign lands. Therefore, he believed, it was both appropriate and proper for the Administration to resume its “traditional role and take the lead in calli ng and conducting the Evian meeting.” 74 However, Roosevelt knew that the Depression had worsened during 1937-38 with higher levels of unemployment, estimated by the American Federation of Labor in 1938 to have reached a level of 11 million or roughly twenty percent of the available workforce. A 1938 Roper Poll revealed that only 4.9% favored liberalization of the annual quotas, 18.2% called for removal of all limits on 72 Ibid., 71-72. Messersmith had been appointed Cons ul-General in Berlin in 1930 but had been serving in the Foreign Service since 1914. 73 Ibid., 70. 74 Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Address of Franklin D. Roosev elt 1938 vol. 7, “The Continuing Struggle for Liberalism” (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), 170.


84 admission and 67.4% of respondents called for an end to immigration entirely. Twenty percent of American Jews, during July 1938, also favored a strict immigration pol icy. 75 Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes recorded in diary that during the March 18 Cabinet meeting the President suggested the Administration should “make it as ea sy as possible for political refugees” to enter the country while postponing any “fut ure determination” as to whether or not the migrs could remain under the existing quot a restrictions. Ickes believed that the provision of refuge, whether on a tempor ary or permanent basis, represented a “fine gesture” and he anticipated that the mig rs would become a “fine class of citizen,” similar to those who entered following th e Revolution of 1848. The Vice President doubted that Congress would allow any amendments to the immigration laws and believed that if a “secret” ballot were held, the Legi slature would ban all immigration. 76 Although the United States would take the initiative in the call and management of the Evian Conference FDR was reluctant to have America assume the leadership role and face the risk of having to commit the nation to receive the bulk of the stateless refugees. Echoing his March 1933 Inaugural Address the President repeated tha t the “policy of the Good Neighbor…can never be merely unilateral” but must be a part of a larger “bilateral [and] multilateral policy” in which any actions on the par t of the United States must be met with “certain fundamental reciprocal obligations.” 77 Unless it was 75 Large, And the World Closed its Doors 70. 76 Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes March 19, 1938, II, 342-343 cited in Breitman, Refugees and Refuge 125. 77 Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers 563-566. “Presidential Address in New York,” June 30, 1938. FDR expanded on this theme of the “Good Neig hbor Policy” in a message to Latin America: “Friendship among Nations, as among individuals, ca lls for constructive efforts to muster the forces o f


85 clearly demonstrated to the American public that the “good neighbor policy [was] responded to wholeheartedly by our neighbors,” warned Under-Secretary of Stat e Welles, it would be doubtful that the nation would “favor indefinitely a continuation…of any policy which prove[d] to be one-sided.” 78 Thus, it could be argued that the mere convocation of an international committee to deal with a humanitarian crisis met America’s moral obligation. The burden would clearly have to be shared on a global basis. Roosevelt, according to Barbara McDonald Stewart, argued that the German refugee crisis meant that “America could never return to the passive role she had been playing.” 79 Sidney Feingold believed that FDR was influenced by charitable ideals, especially for those “prominent refugees whose caliber impressed him and whos e personal misfortunes aroused his sympathy.” 80 This, of course, was more of a rhetorical question, since Roosevelt was well aware of the difficulties and risks inherent in any attempt to manipulate U.S. immigration laws. Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, who had promoted the idea of the conference to the President and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, envisaged the me eting as an opportunity “to get out in front” of liberal opinion, especially from such influential humanity in order that an atmosphere of close under standing and cooperation may be cultivated. It involves mutual obligations and responsibilities, f or it only by sympathetic respect for the rights of others and a scrupulous fulfillment of the corresponding o bligations by each member of the community that a t rue fraternity can be maintained.” “Address before the Pan American Union”, April 12, 1933 available from ; Internet; accessed August 24, 2010. 78 Welles Address to the Herald-Tribune Forum, October 26, 1938, The Public Papers and Address of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 7, 411-413. 79 Stewart. United States Policy 267. 80 Feingold, Politics 23.


86 columnists as Dorothy Thompson and “certain Congressmen with metropolitan constituencies” and attempt to “guide the pressure [to increase Jewish immig ration], to seize the [diplomatic and political] initiative before pressure built and to spre ad responsibility among the thirty two nations [which attended the conference] ins tead of us.” He was also concerned about a potential backlash from restrictionist forces opposed to any alteration in the immigration laws; a concern that was reflected i n the terms of the Evian invitation. 81 Welles may have been further motivated by humanitarian concerns after receiving a letter from Samuel Rosenman, the Jewish speechwriter of FDR, who was seeking aid for some German-Jewish friends. Welles expressed to a St ate Department subordinate, George Messersmith, on March 12, 1938, that it was “shocking” that immigration restrictions limited the granting of entry visas to Ger man Jewish refugees “solely because under present German law they have been convicted of Rassenschande [racial shame]. We should…correct this injustice.” 82 Messersmith observed in a memorandum sent to Hull and Welles that “in spite of the difficulties involved in doing anything constructive” for involuntary refugees the potential for positive action remained “good.” Mass resettlement could only be accomplished ove r a prolonged period of time and would require the “cooperative action” of a host of 81 National Archives 840.48 Division of European Affa irs, Memorandum on Refugee Problems, attached to the Division of American Republics, mem o of November 18, 1938 cited in Irving Abella and Harold Troper, None Is Too Many (NY: Random House, 1983), 16. Welles was the offic ial of the State Department closest to FDR. Dwork and Jan Pelt sugge sted Roosevelt was the initiator of the Evian Conference and that Dorothy Thompsons’ article had “pricked the conscience” of the President who, soon after reading a preliminary version of Thompson’s a rticle, publically announced his plan to call for a n international refugee conference. Dwork and Jan Pel t, Flight from the Reich 98. 82 Memo from Sumner Welles to George Messersmith, Marc h 12, 1938, Sumner Welles Papers in Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles: FDR’s Global Strategist A Biography (NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1977), 220.


87 countries that would be facilitated by the convening of such an international refuge e conference. 83 Roosevelt could adopt the visage of “international humanitarianism” while avoiding any changes to the annual quota or immigration laws and preserve the politica l support of those who opposed the admission of stateless migrs. 84 Gallup and other polls from June 1936 to January 1938 demonstrated that approximately sixty five percent of Americans were against Roosevelt seeking a third term; highlighting the potential political risks for the President. 85 Preemptive action to curtail forced expulsion, migration and the limitation of the conference to consideration of German and Austrian refugee s would, it was hoped, prevent the “dumping” of unwanted Jews from Rumania, Poland and Hungary; countries that were formulating their own anti-Semitic polic ies. Therefore, 83 Messersmith to Hull March 31, 1938. NARA RG 59 840 .8 Refugees/84.5 cited in Orchard, “The Right to Leave,” 200. 84 Breitman American Refugee Policy 230.The Immigration Restriction Act of 1924 estab lished the annual immigration quota system. The Act, suffused with racial undertones, aimed to limited entry of cheap foreign labor that would unfairly compete for employment with American workers. Aliens, once regarded as necessary elements for the development and exploitation of the American Continent, were no w viewed through a xenophobic nativist prism that fea red entry of foreign ideologies that threatened the democratic system. Roosevelt did receive pleas fro m local Jewish leaders for aid to Austrian and Germ an Jews and non-Aryan Christians. Rabbi Herbert S. Go ldstein, president of the Rabbinical Council of America, called on the President to “sound the note of humanitarianism as the voice of America to the German Government for justice and mercy to Catholic s and Jews…We do not presume to ask you to involve our beloved country in any political questi on [but] we believe that the elementary human right to live unfettered and unchallenged is the concern of all mankind.” The leaders of the European democraci es were “unable to speak in the same disinterested non -partisan manner as you can.” The fate of humanity depended upon the “compelling voice” of a statesman who would be the recipient of the “unquestioned confidence and support” of the international commun ity. Only FDR, Goldstein believed, held such influence and he called upon the White House to be the “instrument through which the Catholics, Jews a nd any other oppressed people may be allowed to live w ithout fear of being seized, humiliated and torture d…” “Roosevelt Urged to Intercede with Germany for Cath olics and Jews,” The Sentinel March 24, 1938, 31. 85 Time April 11, 1938, 11.


88 the refugees under consideration were euphemistically categorized as “ political refugees from Germany and Austria” and not as Jews. 86 Such a conference could also serve as a means of converting isolationist sentiments in the American public to “active opposition [to] international gangste rs” and reinforce America’s long-established image as a “haven for the politic ally oppressed.” 87 The mere convocation of such a meeting served to demonstrate American disapprova l of German anti-Semitic policies. 88 However, if the conference successfully created a mechanism that facilitated the orderly exodus of Jews from Germany then, it w as hoped, German “militancy” regarding Aryans and non-Aryans could be curtailed. 89 A Jewish advisor to FDR, Isador Lubin, believed that the decision to call the Evian Conference w as the result of pressure applied by Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, a Roosevelt friend and advis or, “for whom [Roosevelt] had a great deal of affection.” 90 FDR met with Wise, Bernard M. Baruch and Louis Kennedy during April 1938 and informed these Jewish leaders that the U.S. would have to “relax” the rules and regulations dealing with visa affidavits and “if we really want to be of help, we will have to permit the incoming of refugees without affidavits.” 91 Frances Perkins, U.S. Secretary of Labor, held that the President had been 86 Mashberg, “American Diplomacy,” 346. 87 Newsweek, April 4, 1938. 88 Michael Blakeney, Australia and the Jewish Refugees 1933-1948 (Sydney, Australia: Croom Helm, 1985), 127. 89 Tampa Tribune March 25, 1938, 1, 9. 90 Letter from Lubin to Feingold, September 26, 1963 i n Feingold, The Politics of Rescue 23. 91 Memo of conference with Roosevelt and State Departm ent, April 13, 1938, Robert Szold Papers, Box 25/File 16, Zionist Archives, New York, cited in He rbert Druks, The Uncertain Friendship: the U.S. and Israel from Roosevelt to Kennedy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 3.

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89 influenced by the opinion of social activist, Jane Addams, who contended immigration created future consumers who would strengthen the domestic economy. 92 Jewish Presidential advisor Ben Cohen assumed that if the conference ended in failure the n Nazi Germany could be blamed for creating and facilitating the international ref ugee problem. 93 Others believed that the consultation was part of a “subtle and far-reaching international campaign” to promote the benefits of democracy in a world in which totalitarianism appeared to be ascendant. In addition, any attempt to proffer ai d to “fearridden minorities abroad, be they Jewish or Christian, German, Italian, Russian or Spanish” would reap political benefits in an election year by touching “a responsi ve chord in a considerable group” of domestic voters bound by “ties of blood, of race, of religious or political philosophy.” 94 Some writers believed that the American initiative for the conference symbolized a return of an increasingly isolationist United St ates to the affairs of Europe and sent a “clear political warning” to Hitler and his G overnment. 95 Roosevelt’s involvement allowed the Administration to cast the United States in the iconic role of protector of human rights but at little cost to the Nation. Other nations were expected to share in the burden of resettlement. 96 92 Feingold, Politics of Rescue 23. 93 Herbert Pell to Moffat, September 10, 1938, Houghto n Library, Harvard, cited in Breitman, American Refugee Policy 61. 94 “Refugee Plan Pushes Ideal of Democracy,” Tampa Tribune March 27, 1938, 14. 95 Tribune de Genve (Paul de Bouchet), July 7, 1938 cited in Shlomo Kat z, “Public Opinion in Western Europe of the Evian Conference of July 1938,” Yad Vashem Studies 9 (1973): 110. 96 Ronald J. Berger, Fathoming the Holocaust: A Social Problems Approach (NY: Walter de Gruyter, Inc.: 2002), 96.

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90 Roosevelt initially believed and expressed during a press conference in Warm Springs, Georgia, that the forthcoming refugee conference should include addi tional groups facing persecution such as Spanish Loyalists, German Catholics and Lutherans and Trotskyites. However, the editors of Newsweek claimed that the most logical explanation for the President to extend the range of the conference was to avoid accusations of giving preference to Jews. They argued Roosevelt was more i nterested in “belaboring Hitler” than offering a workable solution to the refugee dilemm a. The State Department could have ordered the consulates to liberalize immigration requi rements to allow entry of German and Austrian Jews in numbers that could “not amount to much.” 97 Although the United States Government had called for an international conference to deal with the refugee problem the policies of the State Department acted to impede t he entry of German and Austrian refugees. Visitors’ visas would be denied to foreigners who were unable to enter under the quota system, who lacked an “unrelinquished domicile” i n and the means and ability to return to their country of origin. 98 A long standing anti-Jewish attitude or complacency towards anti-Semitism was prevalent among officials of the State Department which impacted upon their wi llingness to facilitate the entry of immigrants. For example, soon after the Nazi ascension to power in 1933 the U.S. Consul in Munich, Charles M. Hathaway, Jr., compared the German anti-Semitic program to the earlier actions of the infamous Spanish Inquisiti on under Torquemada. The German Government, like the Catholic hierarchy in Spain, viewed the 97 Newsweek April 4, 1938. 98 For a detailed analysis of U.S. immigration polici es regarding Jews from Germany see Bat-Ami Zucker, In Search of Refuge: Jews and US Consuls in Nazi Germany 1933-1941 (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2001).2000

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91 struggle to save “human souls” as a fight between good and evil in which “no quarter” could be offered. A “cancerous infection of the Jewish plague” maintained a “dange rous hold” upon the life and survival of modern day Germany. 99 The Consul-General in Hamburg believed that the new Reich would have a “salutary effect” on the “Comm unist plague” (with Marxism and Communism often linked to a Jewish worldwide conspirac y) that threatened international capitalism. 100 The State Department had recognized since 1933 that Jews within Germany were living under a perilous cloud. Berlin Consul General George Messersmith advised the President, via Under-Secretary of State William Phillips, that the offic ial sanctions and actions taken against the Jewish population were “being carried out daily in a more implacable and a more effective manner.” 101 A confidential German Ministry of the Interior memorandum dealing with the Jewish Question was sent from the U.S. Embass y in Berlin to the Department of State. The document asserted that the problem of the German Jews could only be resolved if they were “detach[ed] from the Reich; an a ction that could only be accomplished through a “systematically attacked final solut ion…We must build up the country without the Jews…” 102 The Roosevelt Administration at that time was less focused upon compassionate concerns than upon maintenance of 99 Charles M. Hathaway, Jr. to Cordell Hull, May 13, 1 933, Department of State 862.00/3013 quoted in Shlomo Shafir, “American Diplomats in Berlin (19331939) and their Attitude to the Nazi Persecution of the Jews,” Yad Vashem Studies 9 (1973): 75. 100 John E. Kehl to Hull, March 31, 1933, Department of State 862.4016/634. Ibid. 75. 101 Messersmith to Phillips, September 29, 1933, Depart ment of State 862.4016/1280 Ibid., 76-77. 102 Messersmith to Hull, September 21, 1933, Department of State 862.00/3097, 5. Ibid., 77.

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92 diplomatic harmony between the two nations, repayment of German reparations and w ar debts, expansion of commerce and disarmament issues. 103 FDR advised William E. Dodd, former professor of history at the University of Chicago and the newly appointed American Ambassador to Berlin (who was sympathe tic to the plight of Jews in Germany), that the United States could only act in the inte rests of American citizens in the Reich by attempting to “moderate the general per secution by unofficial and personal influence…” 104 Presidential advisor, Colonel Ed House, expressed to the new Ambassador words of sympathy and warning. The United State s should try to “ameliorate Jewish sufferings [which were] clearly wrong and terrible.” However, the Jews should not be allowed to once again “dominate the economic and intellectual life in Berlin…” 105 Dodd did, however, attempt to restrain German antiJewish policies by warning Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath that Ger many would suffer from international economic boycotts and negative public opinion “so long as eminent leaders like Hitler and Goebbels announce from platforms in Nurember g ‘that all Jews must be wiped off the earth.’” 106 Dodd expressed similar sentiments to Hitler who claimed that fifty nine percent of the “officials of [Soviet] Russia wer e Jews, responsible for the collapse of Czarist Russia, and who posed a threat to the survival of 103 Assistant Secretary of State Wilbur Carr memo May 3 1, 1933 of Department conference discussing American strategic interests. Wilbur J. Carr Paper s, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Box 10. I bid., 80. 104 William E. Dodd, Jr. and Martha Dodd, eds., Dodd’s Diary (NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1941), June 16, 1933, 5. 105 Charles Callan Tansill, Back Door to War (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952) 49 cited in John Weitz, Hitler’s Banker: Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht (NY: Little, Brown and Company, 1997), 233. 106 Dodd, Dodd’s Diary September 14, 1933, 37.

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93 Germany. The Fuehrer warned that if Jews continued their Marxist activit ies then he “shall make a complete end of all the Jews in Germany.” 107 Consequently, the consistent conflation of Jews and Communism in Hitler’s worldview led Dodd to warn the State Department to “keep this fear of Communism in mind” in the context of any officia l American criticism of German anti-Semitic policies. 108 Despite such admonitions Dodd became increasingly critical of German policies and actions. Following the Night of the Long Knives of June 30-July 1, 1934, during which a number of the leaders of the Brown Shirts or SA and conservative nationalists were arrested and murdered, the Ambassador stated that he had become repulsed b y the spectacle of the “country of Goethe and Beethoven revert[ing] to the barbarism of Stuart England and Bourbon France.” 109 Dodd criticized British and French policies of appeasement in 1937 and openly opposed any official American presence at the annual Nuremberg rally of the Nazi faithful; a declaration that engendered increasi ng German Governmental hostility towards the Ambassador. 110 The 1935 Nuremberg Racial Laws, as mentioned, were applied to both German and American Jews residing within the Reich. When Dodd suggested to the State Depart ment that the application of such restrictions to American citizens represented a violation of the bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights he was advised t hat the United States Government did not consider it feasible to issue a formal opinion on the 107 Dodd, Dodd’s Diary March 7, 1934, 89. 108 Dodd to Cordell Hull, March 12, 1934, Department of State 862.00/3419 cited in Shamir, “American Diplomats,” 85. 109 Dodd to Hull, July 14, 1934, Department of State 86 2.00/3307. Ibid., 87. 110 Ibid., 88.

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94 subject nor would it seek joint action with other Western Governments. 111 However, if a specific case involving an American Jew did arise Dodd was to informally call upon the German Government to protect the rights of all United States citizens; an appr oach that was variably effective. 112 These laws, he believed, were the harbinger of more severe restrictions against the Jews and did not represent “the last word…on this question.” 113 During 1937 the Third Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Berlin, Jacob D. Beam, predicted that Nazi attempts at forced migration as a means of resolving its Jewish Question would inevitably be unsuccessful due to lack of sufficient foreign exchange Consequently, the German Government would adopt such policies that would make Jewish life in Germany “uncomfortable, if not impossible” and would result in fal ling Jewish birth rates. Therefore, German Jews would “die out in the course of one or two generations.” The Embassy also believed that external diplomatic or economi c pressures were incapable of altering German anti-Semitic policies. Rather, “outs poken protests” would only result in “stiffening resistance” and any form of compromise was impossible as it would appear to be a form of “submission to foreign dictates.” 114 Dodd was eventually recalled from his post due to official German criticism a nd pressure from Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles and was replaced b y Hugh R. Wilson, a devoted anti-Communist, who possessed a more liberal, conciliatory and less critical view of Germany. Joseph Davies, one-time American Ambassador t o Moscow, 111 862.4016/1580 Dodd to Hull, November 15, 1935, FRUS 1935, II, 409-412. 112 862.4016/1580 Hull to Dodd, January 21, 1936, FRUS 1938, I, 194. 113 Dodd to Hull, September 17, 1935, FRUS 1935, II, 279. 114 Mayer to Hull, Report on National Socialist Interna l Policy, August 2, 1937, Department of State 862.00/3667. Ibid., 91.

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95 and potential candidate for the Berlin post, claimed that the President wanted to repl ace Dodd with a career diplomat who would represent, “in the narrowest and most formal sense,” the interests of the United States. 115 Moffat asserted, however, that FDR believed that only the avoidance of open criticism of the Nazi regime would offer any Ame rican Ambassador the “hope to influence events.” 116 The new Ambassador believed that the Jewish Question was the primary point of conflict that threatened the harmony of U.S.German relations. He feared that public reaction to the Anschluss and its aftermath would “maintain international exasperation against Germany at a high pitch.” 117 Nevertheless, Wilson convinced the President in 1938 to re-institute an American diplomatic presence at the annual Nuremberg Party rallies. 118 The State Department discounted Jewish criticism that such an attendance would be viewed by the Reich as acceptance of the “Nazi program of racial and minority persecution.” 119 Following the Munich Crisis Wilson attacked the negative attitude of the American press as a “hymn of hate [that ignored German] efforts…to build a better future.” 120 Wilson warned UnderSecretary Sumner Welles that Jews were fomenting a “hostile state of mind” that threatened to involve America in a Continental conflict over issues that did not “appeal to 115 Joseph Davies, Mission to Moscow (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1941), 255-256. 116 Moffat Diary, January 13, 1938 cited in Shafir, “Am erican Diplomats,” 93. 117 Wilson Diary, April 24, 1938, 66. Ibid., 95. 118 Ibid. 119 David Surowitz to Hull, August 25, 1938, and Moffat to Surowitz, September 8, 1938 in Charles C. Tansill, Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 193 3-1941 (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952), 387-388. Ibid., 95. 120 Draft of Letter from Wilson to Hull (not sent), Hug h Wilson, A Career Diplomat, The Third Chapter: The Third Reich 51-53. Ibid.

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96 the vast majority” of the public as a legitimate reason to go to war. 121 Wilson did support the convening of the Evian Conference as a means of “banish[ing] the hatred in which Germany was held abroad”; compassionate concerns were of secondary value. 122 Several days prior to the opening of the conference Roosevelt stated that he expected “deeds and not speeches.” He regarded the establishment of a permanent intergovernmental committee that would facilitate and oversee emigrat ion to be the ultimate goal of the meeting. 123 Peter Novick had argued that FDR sought to enlighten the American public—especially “nativists and isolationists”—that greate r involvement in European affairs enhanced American self-defense and did not represent “some globalist do-gooding.” Jewish affairs and problems would not be allowed to dictate or re direct American foreign policies. 124 Jewish attendee Solomon Adler-Rudel expressed similar sentiments believing that “inner political considerations” and calcul ations rather than issues of humanitarianism regarding the Jews motivated the President to conve ne the Evian Conference. The invitation itself served as a symbolic expression of the desire to help others while preserving morality. Although Jews accounted for ninety percent o f the real and potential refugees that fell under the scope of the assembly a deli berate choice was made to avoid direct referral to Jews, Hitler or Germany 125 121 Wilson to Welles, June 20, 1938 cited in Wilson A Career Diplomat 38-39. Ibid., 96. 122 Discussion with the Nazi Minister of Economic Affai rs Wilhelm Funk as related to Hull quoted in Wilson, A Career Diplomat 43-44. Ibid., 97. 123 Davar July 3, 1938 cited in Beit-zvi, Post-Uganda Zionism 143. 124 Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (NY: Mariner Books, 2000), 52. 125 Adler-Rudel, “Evian Conference,” 238-239

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97 George Rublee, who would be later selected to direct the permanent committee on refugees established in London, later expressed the opinion that Roosevelt’s prima ry incentive was to express “some sort of gesture” that could “assuage the [mor al] indignation” that resulted from the German persecution of Jews. The conference had minimal “hope of success” and primarily served as an “impressive protest.” 126 Foreign observers speculated on potential Presidential motivations in initiati ng the Conference. It perhaps served as an indirect means of re-connecting the Unite d States with European affairs. “By returning to the tradition and the methods utilized by President Wilson,” while America retained a status of neutrality durin g the Great War, FDR could assume the mantle of “defender of the victims” of Nazi persecution by involving America in the “humanitarian and juridical problems” of the Continent. 127 Collaboration between the United States, France and the United Kingdom represented “ a [form of] success” as it implied the future involvement of the American public wit h European issues and events. 128 The formulation of the Evian Conference not only served charitable purposes but it signaled American engagement in the refugee cr isis and demonstrated a commitment to battle for the “principles of law” in the enti re world. 129 The initiation of such a conference demonstrated that the refugee problem was not a n “internal German problem” or primarily a benevolent concern but represented an 126 George Rublee, The Reminiscences of George Rublee (NY: Columbia University Press, 1972), 284, 285 cited in Marc Eric McClure, Earnest Endeavors: The Life and Public Work of Geor ge Rublee (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 249. 127 L’Europe Nouvelle (Paris), July 23, 1938 cited in Katz, “Public Opini on,” 117. 128 Le Populaire (Paris) July 17, 1938. Ibid., 117. 129 Neue Zrcher Zeitung (Zurich) July 11, 1938. Ibid., 118.

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98 “international-political” issue that required a solution not based on “charity” but rather upon global cooperation. 130 Roosevelt, it was believed, regarded anti-Semitic persecution as a “Nazi germ” that posed a risk of a generalized, more widespread, infection. 131 The British Foreign Office commented that the willingness of the United St ates to participate in solving an international refugee crisis represented a mar ked departure from its “years of aloofness from the League of Nations refugee work” and, con sequently, was “unreservedly welcomed in Whitehall.” American participation provided an opportunity to diffuse the refugee problem around the world; an approach to which the League had proven inept and unsuccessful. 132 There were, however, dissident foreign voices who viewed the Conference with concern. British Foreign Office official Roger Makins believed that G ermany was attempting to utilize real or potential violence and suppression of its Jewish and non Aryan population as a form of blackmail which, with the constitution of an international refugee committee, would merely serve to “encourage” the Reich to forci bly expel those elements residing within Germany that it considered undesirable. Such actions and the potential for the democracies to accept refugees would lead, Makins feared, Pol and, Rumania and Hungary to pursue similar policies of persecution as a means of solving their own Jewish Question “through the good offices of the Committee.” Therefore, he concluded, “great caution” was needed in the formulation of the Committee and its 130 National Zeitung (Basel) July 7, 1938. Ibid., 119. 131 L’Oeuvre (Paris) June 26 and July 8, 1938. Ibid., 119. 132 Sherman, Island Refuge 96-97.

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99 function and scope lest the Eastern European countries would “make the refugee proble m even worse than it is at present.” 133 The British Government did adopt a policy of forced repatriation of refugees fr om East and Central Europe (other than Germany and Austria) arguing that such peopl es were not subject to the same degree of persecution of Jews and non-Aryans within the Reich. 134 Makins asserted that the Americans had not made adequate preparations for the conference and warned that the meeting could generate “wild and impracticable ” proposals. Consequently, the British needed to carefully construct the position they would adopt. In addition, he called for the Americans to allocate three quarters of the combined German and Austrian quotas for refugees. 135 Treasury officials were quick to comment that the use of governmental funding “was almost out of the question” while the Colonial Office noted that the Colonies “were not in a position to make a serious contribution” to the re-settlement issue. 136 Walter Adams, the General Secretary of the Academic Assistance Counci l (Society for the Protection of Science and Learning) and Secretary of t he Survey of Refugee Problems, also feared the ramifications of “ominous statements” iss ued by other Central and Eastern European countries vis--vis their own Jewish Problem. A Jewi sh 133 Memorandum March 25, 1938, Roger Makins, PRO, FP 37 1/2231 cited in Dwork and Jan Pelt, Flight from the Reich 99. 134 Louise London, “Jewish Refugees, Anglo-Jewry and Br itish Government Policy, 1930-1940,” cited in Cesarani, The Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry 171. 135 Memorandum, May 23, 1938, R. M. Makins “Internation al Assistance to Refugees,” PRO FO 371/21749 C5319/2289/18 cited in Sherman, Island Refuge 100. In addition to Lord Winterton and Roger Makins the British delegation included Under-Secret ary of State Sir John Shuckburgh, Director at the Colonial Office J.G. Hibbert and Director at the Ho me Office E.N. Cooper. 136 Ibid., 103.

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100 migration from Eastern Europe was already underway and if left unchecked it woul d devolve into a “refugee catastrophe” that was without parallel in contemporary history. Such a threat reflected the conundrum of the “German refugee problem; in itself a minor disaster, but in its implications it is terrifying.” 137 Sir John Simpson similarly argued that the “success” of German anti-Semitism and its policies of forced emigrat ion and economic disenfranchisement coupled with a sense of “impunity” had emboldened other nations to adopt similar strategies as a means of ridding themselves of “a popul ation labeled as ‘undesirable.’” 138 Myron C. Taylor held preliminary discussions in Europe with other diplomats, which established further ground rules for the discussion. The Evian Conference would be a “confidential meeting” of official representatives and not a public forum f or the airing of “all sorts of ideas.” Thus, only one public session would be held at the commencement of the summit in which “general statements may be made.” F urther deliberations would be conducted privately and at the conclusion of the conference a “formal declaration” would be released. It was necessary to terminate t he meeting by July 17 in order to accommodate the state visit of the King of England to Paris on July 19 which required the presence of many of the delegations. However, there was an “understanding” that the Committee could reconvene in Paris “if necessary.” 139 The original invitation to the Evian Conference was to have been limited to European nations (with Germany excluded) but the United Kingdom, fearing that too 137 Walter Adams. “Extent and Nature of the World Refu gee Problem,” T he Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 203 (May 1939): 35. 138 Simpson, The Refugee Problem 520. 139 FRUS 1938, I, 750-751.

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101 much emphasis would then be placed on Palestine (although it had a labor shortage due to Zionist development of the land and its resources) as a potential asylum, insist ed that non-European countries be invited as well. 140 The British accepted the invitation with the stipulation that Palestine would not be discussed at the conference and that the U.S. would guarantee that the U.K. would not be pressured to accept more Jewish refugees into Palestine. Conversely, Britain would not attempt to pressure the United Stat es into revising its immigration laws to accept more stateless refugees. Taylor, during a preliminary meeting with the British delegation, indicate d that Nahum Goldmann had approached him and discussed the potential role of Palestine as a place of permanent resettlement. Goldmann requested that Chaim Weizmann, the hea d of the Jewish Agency, meet with Taylor in private session to present the argume nt that Palestine offered the best haven for Jewish refugees. 141 However, Sir Michael Palairet, deputy head of the British delegation, declared that the British government “woul d naturally prefer that this meeting should not take place.” Taylor informed Gol dmann that there would be an “opportunity” for a confidential meeting with Weizmann but it would not be scheduled prior to the commencement of the Conference. Weizmann later noted: In those days before the war, our protests, when vo iced, were regarded as provocations; our very refusal to subscribe to o ur own death sentence became a public nuisance, and was taken in bad part. Alternating threats and appeals were addressed to u s to acquiesce in the surrender of Palestine. 142 140 Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of the War 19411945 (Boston, MA: HoughtonMifflin, 1959), 207-208. 141 Weizmann, as President of the Jewish Agency, was re garded by the League of Nations as the representative of the Jewish people before the Leag ue and the U.K. which had been granted the Mandate over Palestine. 142 Telegram from M. Taylor to Sumner Welles, photocopy Geoffrey Wigoder, ed., Encyclopaedia Judaica vol. VI, (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1970 ), 988; Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1949), 498.

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102 The U.S. State Department also agreed to avoid broaching the subject of Palestine. The Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Wallace Murr ay, advised the American Consul General in Jerusalem, Wadsworth, that it was highly likely that “various groups” would seek to influence the representatives of the foreign governme nts attending the Evian Conference to take up the issue of Jewish immigration into Pales tine. Such actions should be avoided as “Zionist and non-Zionist questions” would generate “bitter passions” that threatened the success of the meeting. 143 Following the announcement of the Evian Conference, Germany exerted pressure upon Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Hungary to hold a counter-conference which met in Bled, Yugoslavia during the latter half of August 1938. The conferees called for a further international meeting that would deal with the global as pects of the Jewish Question and emigration. However, the apparent impotency of the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees from Germany led th e Reich to abandon support for such a project. 144 The final list of invitees included Australia, the Argentine Republic, Belgi um, Bolivia, Brazil, United Kingdom, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Ireland, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Swede n, Switzerland, Uruguay, Venezuela and of course, the United States. Poland, Hungary, 143 Murray to Wallace, July 2, 1938, 867N.01/1106, FRUS, vol. 1, 752. 144 Joseph Tenenbaum, Race and Reich: The Story of an Epoch (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), 220.

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103 Rumania and the Union of South Africa sent unofficial observers. The United States, the United Kingdom and France dispatched selected representatives to serve as the ir delegations. The remaining attendees were drawn from diplomats assigned t o the League of Nations in Geneva or in other foreign capitals. Canada was a reluctant participant. Prime Minister Mackenzie King fe lt it would be “unwise” to abstain lest Canada “be classed only with Italy as refusi ng the invitation.” Further, such reticence would potentially offend the Jewish members of his politica l party who believed that a Canadian presence was essential even if “we could do nothing late r on.” 145 He regarded the Roosevelt invitation as a “very difficult question” which could result in the entry of refugee Jews. He believed that such admissions would cre ate an “internal problem” and that Canada could not afford to “play a role of the dog in the manger…with our great open spaces and small population.” Domestic stability wa s paramount and the intermingling of “foreign strains of blood” must be avoided or risk facing a domestic situation that paralleled the “Oriental problem.” Such re fugees, he feared, would spawn riots and internecine conflict between the Dominion Government and the Provinces. 146 King had earlier described to an American diplomat his recollections of a meeting with Hitler in Berlin in 1937. The Reich Chancellor he believed, could eventually be viewed as “one of the saviors of the world.” Hitler ha d 145 William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary for 1938 April 25, 1938, 307 available from 01059-119.02e.php?&page_id_nbr=18976&interval=20&&PHPSESSID=8qe 57287o5tfs49mreeinfmuh2 ; Internet; accessed June 11, 2010. 146 King Diary, March 29, 1938, file 21, 1 available fr om 01059-119.02e.php?&page_id_nbr=18919&interval=20&&PHPSESSID=d9o t3urcitbgv7jj76a9no8qp5 ; Internet; accessed June 11, 2010.

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104 such an opportunity at Nuremberg in 1935 but instead chose the road of “Force…Might and…Violence” as the method to reach his goals “which were, I believe, at heart the well-being of his fellow-man; not all fellow-men, but those of his own race.” 147 Secretary of State Cordell Hull opposed German participation in the conference due to his belief that a unified international position and solution was preferable to dire ct negotiations with the nation that was primarily responsible for the refugee cr isis in the first place. Portugal was not invited although its African colonies, Angola and Mozambique, were later regarded as potential sites of resettlement. Ir eland sent delegates although it too was not formally invited. 148 The Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Alexander Troyanovsky, viewed the conclave suspiciously, as a Western means t o support Trotskyites hostile to the Communist regime. 149 The League of Nations High Commissioner for German Refugees Sir Neill Malcolm was also in attendance. A variety of Christian, socialist and liberal humanitarian groups were present along w ith at least one hundred journalists and a number of political, scientific and artistic notables suc h as Pablo Casals, the Italian historian Ferrero, and the exiled Italian politi cians Nenni and Spora, the chair of the Pan-European Alliance and Count Condenhove-Kalergi. 150 A number of nations were excluded from the meeting and included Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and Spain. Italy was invited but 147 King Diary, September 15, 1938, in Abella & Troper, None Is Too Many 36-7. 148 Three Irish delegates attended including Francis Th omas Cremins, the Irish Permanent Delegate to the League of Nations; Assistant Secretary of the M inistry of Justice John Duff and Second Assistant Secretary in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce William Maguire. 149 Feingold, Politics of Rescue 27. 150 Beit-Zvi, Post-Ugandan Zionism 146-147.

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105 attendance was declined by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, C ount Galeazzo Ciano, who, while acknowledging humanitarian concerns cited political considerati ons. He believed that such a meeting could foment hostility against the Italian Government due to its own domestic problems with anti-Fascist political refugees and its cl ose diplomatic and economic ties with Germany. 151 Iceland and El Salvador also refused to participate. There were anxieties within the U.S. State Department that Eastern Europe an countries, such as Poland, Rumania and Hungary, were planning to expel their own Jews. 152 Such actions, it was believed, could dissuade other nations from liberalizing their respective immigration policies while promoting more “refugee dumping” into t he Western Hemisphere. The Polish Government noted that large numbers of Polish Jew s residing in Austria and other European countries were returning to Poland despite the high level of domestic anti-Semitism. The Polish Government enacted a new la w on March 31, 1938 which threatened to annul passports issued to Poles living abroad but it was directed primarily to the fifty thousand Polish Jews residing in Austria Anti-Jewish rioting, with the killing of two Jews and the wounding of more than one hundred along with the looting of hundreds of Jewish businesses, occurred in Warsaw on March 19. Crowds shouted “Down with the Jews!” and “To Madagascar with the Jews!” 153 151 Telegram from US Ambassador in Italy Phillips to Se cretary of State Rome, March 24, 1938, 840.48 Refugees/5, FRUS 1938, 741. 152 During the period 1938-1941 the Jewish population o f Hungary numbered approximately 800,000. Lszl Kontler, A History of Hungary: Millennium in Central Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 374. The Jewish population of Poland was estimated to be 3.5 million. Thompson, Refugees 98. 153 The proposal to resettle the Jews of Europe on Mada gascar, a French colonial possession off of the southeast coast of Africa, was raised at various ti mes following the conclusion of World War I: by the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Poland and Nazi Ge rmany. During 1937 the Polish Government

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106 Despite the efforts of the central government and local authorities to prevent antiSemitic violence the return of large numbers of Jews from Austria and other nat ions stimulated wide spread anti-Semitic sentiments and actions. The Camp for Nat ional Unity, established in March 1937, sought to unify the various Polish nationalist groups under the patronage of the political elite while promoting anti-Semitism and t he exclusion of Jews from Polish society. General Stanislaw Skwarczynski, the leader of the Camp, declared on February 21, 1938 that Jews represented an “obstacle to the normal evolution of the State” due to their loyalty to international Jewry; a state of aff airs that was bound to generate “hostile feelings” between the Christians and the Jews. Such a situation could only be resolved by a “radical decrease” in the size of the Jewish population utiliz ing a system of organized mass emigration to Palestine, Madagascar and other loca les. During May he called for the “Polonization” of the national economy as a means of counteri ng the Jewish threat. 154 Anti-Semitic actions in Poland, of course, antedated the Anschluss A petition to the Polish Government on July 9, 1937, signed by 130 Cincinnati multidenominational clergymen, was read into the House Congressional Record by Representative Herbert S. Bigelow (Ohio) accusing the Government for failing to protect its minorities as called for dispatched a three man team of investigators to ana lyze the island’s potential for mass resettlement. Adolf Eichmann submitted a report during early 1938 to hi gher S.S. officials on the same topic. Following t he Fall of France Hitler authorized the enactment of s uch a scheme but the failure to gain control of the sea from the British Royal Navy put an end to such plan ning. “Madagascar Plan” Shoah Resource Center available from ; Internet, accessed October 3, 2010. The Polish Government decision to annul the passports of expatriates residing in G reater Germany during October 1938 helped to set in motion the series of events that culminated in Kristallnacht 154 Schneiderman, ed., American Jewish Year Book Review of the Year 5698 40.

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107 by the Versailles Treaties. 155 The American Jewish Congress appealed to Secretary of State Hull on July 12, 1937 to intercede with the Polish authorities on behalf of Polish Jewry. The World Federation of Polish Jews and Rabbi Stephan S. Wise (on September 23, 1937) sent a request to the Warsaw Government via Count Jerzy Potocki, the Ambassador to the United States, appealing for protection of Jewish Polish citi zens against domestic violence. On September 24, 1937 the Federation of Polish Jews publicized a letter sent to Potocki criticizing renewed pogroms against its J ewish population. The Federation also sent a petition to Pierrepont Moffat, Chief of the Division of European Affairs in the State Department, calling for intercess ion by the American Government. He replied on October 6, 1937 that, while sympathetic, the United States Government could not interfere in the internal affairs of a forei gn nation unless American citizens or their interests were directly involved. Nonethel ess, the Jewish People’s Committee against Fascism and Anti-Semitism submitte d a similar 155 The minority treaties aimed to resolve problems inh erent in the redrawing of national boundaries and the principle of self-determination. The social, c ultural and linguistic character of minorities was to be protected under the auspices of the League of Natio ns promoting “harmony and tranquility in the same national community.” “A Re-Evaluation of the Versa illes Peace,” William R. Keylor Relevance 5, no. 3 (Fall 1996) available from ; Internet; accessed July 17, 2010. The Little Treaty of Versailles, or the Polish Mino rity Treaty, served as the template for a number of Minority Treaties signed between the lesser Europea n Powers and the League of Nations. The Polish Minority Treaty was signed on June 28, 1919 at Vers ailles and ratified by the Polish Parliament ( Sejm ) on July 31, 1919 and came into effect on January 10, 1 920. Article 2 called for the “total and complete protection of life and freedom for all people regar dless of their birth, nationality, language, race o r religion.” Article 7 asserted that “difference of religion, creed, or confession shall not prejudice any Polish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of ci vil or political rights, as for instance the admiss ion to public employment, functions and honors, or the exe rcise of professions and industries.” Such guarant ees were regarded as “obligations of international impo rtance” and were protected by the League to which minorities could register complaints. The Little o r Small Treaty of Versailles was subsequently renou nced by Poland in Geneva on September13, 1934. “Little Treaty of Versailles,” Elihu Lauterpacht, C.J. Greenwood, A.G. Oppenheimer, International Law Reports Cambridge University (2005) available from ersailles/the-treaty.html ; Internet; accessed July 17, 2010. There was also an air of hypocrisy attached to the Minority Treaties in that they did not apply to the Great Powers such as the United Kingdom, France, th e Soviet Union and Germany. The decline of the influence of the League of Nations through the 1930 ’s led to increased tendencies to ignore or the renouncement of the articles of these treaties whic h exacerbated the general refugee problem.

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108 memorandum and received a comparable response from the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, James Clement Dunn. 156 During October 1937 the Polish Government enacted a policy of “ghetto benches” in which Jewish students would be segregated from non-Jews in academic instituti ons. Many foreign and domestic critics assailed this new policy. The President of the American Federation of Teachers, Jerome Davis, representing 25,000 members condemned such an action as representing the “most serious possible violation of the solemn obligation assumed [by the Polish Government] towards [its] minority peopl es” and was an anathema to the American aid and support that restored Poland to independence, freeing it from the “yoke of centuries.” On December 6 and 16, 1937 respectively, the American Youth Congress (three million members) and the Ame rican division of the International League for Academic Freedom called on the Polish M inister of Education to disavow such discriminatory policies as “alien to the spirit of aca demic knowledge and of free cooperation in the pursuit of knowledge that is so essential to the world of scholarship.” The American Committee on Religious Rights and Minoritie s called on the Polish Government to end its anti-Semitic policies that were neithe r “just nor humane.” The Committee requested that the League of Nations and other governments provide “outlets for [Poland’s] surplus population.” The Institute for International Education warned on December 20, 1937 that the creation of “ghetto benches” represented the “beginning of the regimentation” of Polish academic life and 156 Schneiderman, ed., American Jewish Year Book Review of the Year 5698 99-100.

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109 served as a signpost on the road to totalitarianism. Similar sentiments were i ssued on December 27 by the American Writers’ Committee to Aid the Jews of Poland. 157 The international protests fell upon deaf ears. The Polish Parliament or Sejm in response to Jews returning from Austria and Germany, empowered the Minister of the Interior, via an edict issued on March 31, to nullify citizenship for certain categ ories of Poles (with Jews undoubtedly serving as the main focus). Those who had resided outside of Poland in Central and Eastern Europe for five or more years and adopted a “pass ive and indifferent attitude” towards the State, worked overseas to the detriment of the Polish Nation, fought in the Spanish Civil War on the Republican side or failed to return to Poland when summoned, would automatically lose their membership in the national body; an act affecting forty thousand Jews in Austria. The law was set to take effect in late October. 158 When the Evian Conference was formally announced Poland demanded that the scope of the meeting be extended to Polish Jews. Count Potocki approached the leadership of the American Jewish Committee and the Joint Distribution Committ ee 157 Ibid., 99-102, 238-241.. Two years of anti-Semitic violence in Poland culminated in major pogroms in Brzesc and Czestochowa in May and June 1937. Th e American section of the International League for Academic Freedom consisted of 994 teachers affiliat ed with 110 universities. The officers of the Leag ue included President Alvin Johnson, Vice-presidents D r. Albert Einstein, Dr. John Dewey, Dr. Wesley C. Mitchell and Secretary Dr. Horace M. Kallen. The o fficers of the American Committee on Religious Rights and Minorities included Honorary Chairman Dr Arthur J. Brown, Rev. Dr. John H. Lathrop, Chairman; Michael Williams and Carl Sherman, Vice-C hairmen and Linley V. Gordon, Secretary. The Institute for International Education, directed by Dr. Stephen Duggan, issued a memo signed by 179 non Jewish American academics, including five Nobel Pri ze winners (Arthur H. Compton, Robert A. Millikan, Thomas Hunt Morgan, William P. Murphy and Harold Ur ey) along with eight members of the Committee on International Relations of the American Associat ion of University Professors plus 59 presidents of colleges and universities and 107 professors and de ans. 33 authors signed the protest of the American Writer’s Committee to Aid the Jews of Poland and in cluded Van Wyck Brooks, Thornton Wilder, Archibald MacLeish, Lewis Mumford, Kyle Crichton, C lifford Odets, Genevieve Taggard and Vardis Fischer. 158 Miami Herald March 27, 1938, 5A; The Times March 30, 1938, 13.

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110 (JDC) on June 8, 1938 and called for the emigration of fifty thousand Polish Jews per year as a means of diminishing domestic anti-Semitism. 159 Poland (and Romania) did offer to attend the Evian Conference with the status of “refugee producer” nat ions and sought international cooperation to promote the exodus of their respective Jewish minorities. 160 Roosevelt attempted to placate the Polish Governments and dampen its calls for Jewish expulsion by offering Angola as a form of compensation. Confidential discussions were held with the Poles and the British Prime Minister Neville Cha mberlain and Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax. The Poles assured the American Presi dent that they would not publicly raise any territorial or political demands for this Portuguese African colony. Negotiations continued under the direction of the IGCR following the completion of the Evian Conference. 161 FDR ordered Taylor to support Angolan resettlement as a “Supplemental Jewish Homeland” and he emphasized the sig nificance of this project to the “solution of the Jewish problem” as well as his ardent belie f that “Angola offers the most favorable facilities for its creation.” It wa s possible that Roosevelt viewed such a scheme as a means of diverting pressure on the United St ates to accept Eastern European Jewish refugees while obtaining British support in ret urn for ignoring the potentialities of Palestine for resettlement. The Polish Governm ent also 159 Yehuda Bauer, My Brother’s Keeper: A History of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee 1929-1939 available from ust-whole-chapter-ENGL.html ; Internet; accessed May 2, 2010. 160 Skran, Refugees in Inter-War Europe 209. 161 Cables sent by Potocki to Beck cited in Emanuel Mel zer, “Poland, the United States, and the Emigration of East European Jewry—The Plan for a ‘S upplemental Jewish Homeland’ in Angola, 19381939,” Gal-Ed 11 (1989): 65, 81-85.

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111 viewed the Sinai Desert, Transjordan, Syria and Iraq as prospective areas o f Jewish colonization as well. 162 The American Minister to Rumania informed the State Department that the Rumanian Government hoped that the issue of the Jews of Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland would be placed on the agenda of the Evian Conference. The Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs intimated that his country would like to e xpel annually the number of Jews corresponding to the Jewish birth rate. 163 Sumner Welles warned it would be “unfortunate” if the creation of an international refugee c onference would be “construed as an encouragement of legislation or acts” that would foster furt her refugee problems. 164 Rabbi Stephen Wise echoed such sentiments in an interview in which he stated that the Evian Conference would not “sanction” the actions of any ot her nation engaging in forced emigration. In addition, he warned the governments of various Central and Eastern European nations that the United States Government would not “deal with the problem of their own so-called superfluous populations.” 165 The Roosevelt administration, therefore, planned to limit discussion at the refugee conference to strictly German and Austrian refugees. It also avoided a specific reference to Jew s, choosing instead the term “political refugees.” 166 162 Hull to Taylor, January 1939, FRUS 1939,” I, 66-69. 163 Gunther to Secretary of State, April 13, 1938, 840. 48 Refugees/15, FRUS vol. 1, 1938, 742-743. 164 Welles to Gunther April 16, 1938, 840.48 Refugees/1 65, FRUS vol. 1, 1938, 743. 165 “Urge American Aid to Open Palestine,” New York Ti mes, July 4, 1938, 13. 166 Diner, Beyond the Conceivable: Studies on Germany, Nazism, and the Holocaust (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), 89

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112 The right-wing Christian Front government of fifty-seven year old Rumanian poet and Premier Octavian Goga enacted anti-Semitic legislation, “followi ng closely the Hitler pattern,” that eliminated Jews from a variety of professions and occupations banned the use of Yiddish, barred the employment of Rumanian non-Jewish servants and closed all Jewish newspapers. 167 These anti-Semitic policies, he asserted, would continue regardless of who occupied the premiership. 168 He sought the denaturalization of Jews who had become Rumanian citizens after 1918. 169 Furthermore, Goga announced that his Government sought to expel five hundred thousand “vagabond” Jews (out of a total Jewish population of 1,000,000-1,500,000/19,000,000) who came into Rumania “allegedly…as refugees” and who lacked any rights to citizenship. Forty-four year old King Carol von Hohenzollern II declared that two hundred fifty thousand Jewish refugees from Galicia and Russia who had entered Rumania following the end of the Great War had arrived “illegally” and did not constitute “a good element” of the population. Such “invaders” were not protected by minority rights treaties and must be removed from the body politic. 170 Rumania would only serve as a temporary haven for these now stateless Jews and would offer “asylum [only] unt il 167 New Republic 93 no. 1209 (February 2, 1938): 350-351. 168 Tampa Tribune February 3, 1938, 1. 169 Goga was appointed by King Carol on December 28, 19 37 until his forced resignation on February 10, 1938. He was a high profile Rumanian anti-Semi te and leader of the avowedly anti-Jewish National Christian Party. The Party’s slogan was “Rumania f or Rumanians!” Minority rights had been guaranteed through the Treaty of St. Germain (1919). It was s uspected by the French and the British that Rumania under Goga, wanted to strengthen ties with Nazi Ger many. In support of Goga’s anti-Jewish policies th e official German news service raised the issue of mi nority rights for Germany in the Sudetenland and th e British suppression of the Boers and the Arabs in P alestine. Time 31, no. 3 (January 17, 1938): 26-27. 170 Time 31, no. 3 (January 17, 1938): 26-27.

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113 means of forcing them to leave…have been found.” 171 The law, however, was subsequently ruled unconstitutional by Rumanian courts. Eighty-two year old Alexander Cuza, Minister without Portfolio, announced plans for an international anti-Semitic conference in which the Jewish Question w ould be studied as a world-wide problem. The issue needed to be “confronted frankly and realistically” and the only workable solution was the creation of a “Jewish nation” in which the Jews could be concentrated in one location, left to “work out their own destiny.” Palestine would be excluded from consideration as it belonged to the Ara bs but Madagascar (located 240 miles off the coast of East Africa) offered prom ise as it was a possession of France which “soon must solve its own very acute Semitic problem.” 172 Sixty-eight year old Patriarch of the Rumanian National Orthodox Church Miron Christea (who later succeeded Goga as Premier) had earlier warned, duri ng August 1937, that Jews were the cause of an “epidemic of corruption and social unrest” that endangered the “spiritual treasures” of the Rumanian Nation. Defense against the thre ats of the Jews was both a “national and patriotic duty.” 173 In addition, he believed, the nation should be expunged of “these parasites who suck Rumanian and Christian blood.” 174 A number of anti-Jewish riots occurred during late 1937 and early 1938 in Bucharest and outlying 171 Adrien Thierry, French Minister, Romania, to the Fo reign Ministry, no. 46, December 31, 1938, MAE SDN I M 1818, 111-12 cited in Caron, Uneasy Asylum 173. 172 Tampa Tribune January 23, 1938, 6. 173 Schneiderman, ed., American Jewish Yearbook Review of the Year 5698 283. 174 Howard Morley Sachar, A History of the Jews in the Modern World (Vintage eBooks) available from 477&dq=%E2%80%9Cthese+parasites+who +suck+Rumanian+and+Christian+blood+%22Rumanian+Jews %22&hl=en&ei=DrpzTe2wPMS1tweO3JTL BA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CC4Q 6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=%E2%80%9Ct hese%20parasites%20who%20suck%20Rumanian%20and%20Ch ristian%20blood%20%22Rumanian%20J ews%22&f=false ; Internet; accessed March 6, 2011.

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114 areas, resulting in injury and death. Cuza informed a German newspaper on Februa ry 9, 1938 that the Government would resort to pogroms if the Western democracies failed to accept involuntary Jewish refugees. 175 Clear intimations of the precarious position of the Jews within Rumania led many to decide to leave the country but the question of where to re-settle remaining unsettled. American attempts were made to intercede on the behalf of the Rumanian Jews Senator James J. Davis (PA) introduced a resolution on January 3, 1938 calling on the President to inform the Senate of any anti-Semitic “edicts” enacted by t he Rumanian Government and to utilize his “good offices to obtain a peaceful settlement of proposed threats” to minority groups. 176 On January 6 Representative William Sirovich (NY) and January 25 Representative Hamilton Fish, Jr. (NY) announced similar resolutions calling on FDR to intervene “in the name of humanity against the shameful treatment” of Rumanian minorities and to sever diplomatic relations should the need arise. 177 The American Jewish Committee passed a resolution at its 31 st annual meeting condemning Rumania's violation of the Minorities Treaty signed after the end of the Grea t War. 178 The United Rumanian Jews of America endorsed a petition to King Carol, signed by Jewish and non-Jewish Rumanians, urging the Government to avoid any actions that would “remove the name of Rumania from the roster of enlightened and humane countries of 175 Schneiderman, ed., American Jewish Yearbook Review of the Year 5698 287-288, 296. 176 Ibid., 104. 177 “The Tragedy of Racial Minorities in Rumania: Exten sion of Remarks of Hon. William L. Sirovich of New York in the House of Representatives,” Congressional Record Appendix Seventy-Fifth Congress, Third Session, 99-103. 178 Schneiderman, ed., American Jewish Yearbook Review of the Year 5698 104.

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115 the world.” 179 On January 25 the Jewish Labor Committee held a mass protest rally in New York City and on January 28 the Executive Committee of the World Jewish Congress headed by Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, and the American Jewish Congress on the 30 th called upon the League to protect the rights of minorities within Rumania. 180 Secretary of State Hull, echoing earlier responses regarding the situa tion of Jews within Poland (and also about Greater Germany), announced on January 6 that the United States Government could not intervene in the internal affairs of another nation unless American interests were threatened. 181 The American Minister to Rumania, Franklin Mott Gunther, did, however, “unofficially” advise Goga on January 12 regarding negative American (especially Jewish) opinion towards Rumania and its policies to which the Prime Minister responded that such protests were “merely impudent! ” The Soviet Ambassador Mikhail Ostrovsky informed Goga that Rumanian policies had led his presence in Bucharest to be “no longer useful” and consequently, he was returning to Russia within ten days. The Rumanian Foreign Office replied publicly that the Government “would in no way object to the departure of the Soviet Ambassador at an even earlier date.” 182 The application of British, French and American diplomatic pressure, (as well as the failure of the law to denaturalize Jews, a faltering economy and concern s about the 179 “Rumanian Jews Here Appeal to King Carol,” New York Times January 17, 1938, 34. 180 Senator Charles L. McNary accused Rumania of viola ting the terms of the Minorities Treaty and submitted a petition from the Executive Committee o f the World Jewish Congress to the Council of the League of Nations, Congressional Record Appendix March 29, 1938, Third Session, vol. 10, 1220-1221 ; “Mayor Denounces Rumanian Policy,” New York Times January 25, 1938, 12. 181 Schneiderman, ed., American Jewish Yearbook Review of the Year 5698 104. 182 “Rumania ‘Impudent,’” Time January 24, 1938, 16.

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116 fascist Iron Guard), did have an effect: the dismissal of Goga by the King and his replacement by the Patriarch Christea who initially planned to carry out his pre decessor’s anti-Semitic program. 183 However, on February 22 King Carol announced a new constitution and the creation of a “royal dictatorship,” termed the “National Concentration Government,” which granted the monarch autocratic powers with whic h he pledged to guarantee “equality before the law to all people of other rac es which have lived for centuries on Rumanian soil.” 184 Cristea, who earlier had advocated antiSemitism, then promised the Jewish community the restoration of “spiritua l peace, unity and brotherhood.” 185 In addition, the King took steps to suppress the anti-Semitic Fascist Iron Guard and arrested its leader, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu. 186 Despite outward appearances journalist Dorothy Thompson claimed that King Carol did “not make a secret of his conviction that there are too many Jews in Rumania and that the world should help him get rid of at least a few hundred thousand of them.” 187 The Jews of Hungary also faced an increasingly precarious existence. Sti mulated by the anti-Semitic actions of the Reich many non-Jewish Hungarians ca lled for the limitation or the total exclusion of Jews from many professions and other occupati ons 183 “Rumania Hohenzollern Dictator,” Time February 21, 1938, 28. 184 “Rumanian King Sets Up Royal Dictatorship,” Tampa Tribune February 21, 1938, 1. Following the announcement of a new government and constitution K ing Carol held elections in which 5,413 voted orall y that they were opposed to the changes (and their na mes were recorded by officials) and 4,283,395 voted in support. The Interior Minister Armand Calinescu an nounced that “by a majority of 99.8% the people of Rumania overwhelmingly approved the personal dictat orship of King Carol II.” Time March 7, 1938. 185 Schneiderman, ed., American Jewish Yearbook Review of the Year 5698 297. 186 Ibid., 298. 187 Thompson, Refugees 65.

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117 and the establishment of quotas for Jewish entry into colleges and universities. 188 Klmn Darnyi, the pro-German Prime Minister, enacted measures aimed at excluding Jews from the national economy and cultural and social life while depriving them of Hungarian citizenship. The Prime Minister believed that Jews held a “strangl e hold” over the nation and a solution to this problem was urgently needed in order to provide employment for “Christian youth” while guaranteeing that the “sons of Hung arian peasantry” would have the opportunity for the “betterment of their social standing.” The Government announced in January 1938 that Jews living within the northeast provinces who could not prove Magyar descent from 1851 onwards would be denaturalized. Following the Polish model, the Government negated the citizenship of Jews living abroad. During February Finance Minister Fabinyi called for an end of Jewis h predominance in the trades. It was time, he believed, for the “Christian Hungar ian population…to conquer the positions” it voluntarily relinquished over many years. One month later the Minister of Education, Valentin Homan, declared that Jews could not be assimilated into the body politic due to their membership in a different “race.” I n April, Justice Minister Edmund von Micecz announced that Jewish interests were “diamet rically opposed” to Hungarian national interests. As in Germany anti-Jewish riots took pl ace and police raids were made into Jewish quarters and random arrests were made. The post-war nationalist Union of Hungarian Protectors of Race was established i n May 1938 led by the “White Terrorist” Ivan Hejjas who believed that the Jewish Que stion would 188 Minority rights in Hungary had been guaranteed by t he Treaty of Trianon signed in 1920.

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118 have been solved in 1919 if the country had resorted to a widespread policy of pogroms. 189 The threat of forced mass migration from Poland, Rumania and Hungary thus played a significant role in the conception of the Evian Conference. Fears of a fl ood of destitute refugees from the East helped to shape the terms of the official in vitation, the scope of the committee’s action and the deliberate decision to avoid any reference to the Jewish ethnicity of the real and potential refugees. Anti-Semitism woul d be conveniently subsumed under the rubric of “political” persecution paving the way for the Jews of Central Europe to merely play the role of spectator in a drama in which the centra l figure was increasingly desperate for salvation. The Evian Conference was seen by many as a beacon of light in an ever more dark and dangerous world but, as will be demonstrated, it proved for the majority in peril to be a road to nowhere. 189 Schneiderman, ed., American Jewish Year Book Review of the Year 5698 215-219.

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119 Chapter 4 “Firmly Fixed American Tradition” “It is a fantastic commentary on the inhumanity of our times that for thousands and thousands of people a piece of paper with a stamp on it is the d ifference between life and death.” 1 The revelation of the Evian Conference generated varying degre es of public and private support. On the same day as the State Department announcem ent of the proceeding the President declared that the primary American c ontribution to the immigration dilemma would be the consolidation of the annual German a nd Austrian quotas (open to both Christians and Jews) but he did not anticipate any change in immigration laws. 2 FDR knew that his administration faced political risk in promoting Jewish immigration into the U.S. and he attempted to downplay its f ocus on Jews by asserting that “a great many Christians, too, a very large numbe r” would benefit from the conference. 3 Roosevelt confided in Judge Irving Lehman, the brother of the New York Governor, that he hoped that “narrow isolationists” would not attack his conference 1 Dorothy Thompson on the importance of being granted an exit and entry visa. “Deathly Silence Teaching Guide: Bystander Psychol ogy” The Southern Institute for Education and Research available from on/ds9.html ; Internet; accessed October 4, 2009. 2 Press Conferences of FDR vol. 11-12, 1938 (NY: Da Capo Press, 1972), #445. 3 Daniel J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 161.

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120 proposal out of “purely partisan objectives.” 4 Lehman lauded the Chief Executive for his efforts and declared him to be the spokesman and moral voice for “thos e who are oppressed [and] deprived of freedom.” The Presidential action, Lehman believed, followed in the wake of time-honored American values and would “rouse the conscience of humanity [and] restore sanity to a world gone [mad]…As an Americ an and as a Jew I want to say, ‘Thank you.’” 5 The President responded that he believed the conference would engender “far-reaching consequences” for “political refugee s” but he regretted the inability of the United States to accept “more than a small proportion.” 6 The formation of the meeting carried on a “firmly fixed Americ an tradition” dating back to the days of the Pilgrims, Puritans, Huguenots and Ca tholics. The “new world has been and is a haven for the politically oppressed.” 7 New York City Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia was convinced that the clarion call of the Pres ident had “made a profound impression on the chancelleries of Europe. At least there [ was] one land that says ‘shame, shame, on your outrageous conduct!’” Women’s rights advoc ate, Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt, appealed to the Administration to dispatch naval vessels to Europe to transport involuntary migrs to the United States while carry ing, in the opposite direction, pro-Nazi sympathizers residing within America. 8 4 Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library (FDRL)/OF 3186, F DR to Lehman, March 28, 1938 cited in Feingold, Politics of Rescue 23. 5 Irving Lehman to FDR, March 28, 1938, FDRL, Offici al File 3186, Box 1, Political Refugees, January-May 1938 cited in Breitman Refugees and Rescue 123. 6 Ibid., FDR to Irving Lehman, March 30, 1938. 7 Tampa Tribune March 28, 1938, 3. 8 The Sentinel April 7, 1938, 34. Catt added: “Let the bands pl ay and the flags fly when the battleships come and go on this errand of mercy. The ships nee d not go empty across the Atlantic. Advertise wide ly and smartly from ocean to ocean to find those Germa ns who, according to Adolf Hitler, ‘have been

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121 Conservative Rabbi Simon Greenberg of the Har Zion Temple and President of the Rabbinical Assembly of America viewed the announcement of the conf erence as heartening to “every lover of liberty and human decency” regardle ss of the lack of any liberalization of immigration quotas. Elias Rex Jacobs (1892-1979), editor and publisher of the pro-Zionist Buffalo Jewish Review called upon Congress to “modify the Immigration Act” as “the number admissible under the present quota is much too limited.” Dr. Dan B. Brummett, editor of the Methodist Christian Advocate in Kansas City, envisaged the Evian Conference as a shining example of the “be st American traditions” of offering sanctuary to political and religious refuge es and urged liberalization of national immigration policy. Dr. William E. Gi lroy, editor of the 122 year old Congregational Christian Churches' The Advance, believed that United States’ immigration policy “ought to be subject to modification or…appeal to som e higher authority where consideration of justice and humanity are involved.” Dr. William Hiram Foulkes, the Moderator of the Presbyterian Church in the United Stat es, believed the convocation of the meeting harmonized with the “essential American s pirit” and together with Dr. Willard E. Shelton, the editor of The Christian Evangelist sought modification of the quota system. 9 captured by the idea of a community of the German p eople,’ and offer them all a free passage of return to the fatherland. The only reservations would be, fi rst, no passport to return, and second, the same fi nancial conditions the Germans have fixed for the Jews…The f unds so procured would apply on the costs of transportation. Such a plan would give happiness t o a great number of people and it would be a most commendable act of the only nation in the world who se specialty has been freedom for the oppressed.” 9 “Question of the Week: What should be the American policy toward oppressed minorities of foreign nations who look to this country as a haven of refu ge? Should the barriers set up under the immigrati on laws be lowered to help them find new homes here or should the present regulatory restrictions on entr y apply to them the same as every other alien?” The United States News April 4, 1938.

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122 Joseph Tenenbaum, one of the leaders of the American economic boycott against Germany, presciently warned that failure to act at the planned t alks would result in a “campaign of extermination of the six million Jews living under the shadow of Hitler.” 10 The Executive Council of Churches of Christ in America adopted a resolution on March 25 supportive of the Presidential invitation. “We rejoice in the ac tion of our State Department in appealing for international cooperation to provide a haven of relief” within the United States and abroad for “all refugees from Austria. We commend the cause of these new victims to the prayer and active support of the churches of America.” 11 Popular support was reflected in various newspapers. Foreign corre spondent, columnist and Pulitzer Prize winner Anne O’Hare McCormick descri bed the “heartbreaking” scenes of long lines of Jews seeking visas f rom U.S. Consulates abroad while “waiting in suspense” for the outcome of the Evian Confere nce. She believed that the issue facing America and the world was not how many “unem ployed” could be added to the national rolls of the unemployed. Rather, the world faced a fundamental “test of civilization.” Could America accept the moral guilt, McCormick asked, if Germany was allowed to continue with its blatant “policy of extermination” of the Jewish peopl e? 12 Some writers to the Editor shared the sentiments of Carrie Chapm an Catts and suggested that the United States expel Nazi sympathizers and r eplace them with antiNazis seeking to leave Germany. 13 British journalist Wickham Steed castigated Prime 10 Boycott: Nazi Goods and Services (March-April 1938), 3 cited in Spear, “The United States and the Persecution of German Jews,” 242. 11 Schneiderman, ed., American Jewish Year Book Review of the Year 5698 98. 12 Anne O’Hare McCormick, “Europe,” New York Times July 4, 1938, 12. 13 Washington Post March 30, 1938, 6.

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123 Minister Neville Chamberlain and Foreign Minister Lord Halif ax for not attending the meeting in France or issuing a statement condemning the “abominabl e persecution” of the Jews. Steed suggested that for every Jew “robbed” and expel led from the Reich “one Aryan German” should be sent back to Germany, “deducting from his w ealth the proportion needed to help the Jewish destitute.” How long, he asked, could Wes tern civilization sit back and watch the “greatest” atrocity of the century? 14 The Evian Conference was lauded as a testimonial of America’s tradition of providing a haven to the oppressed of the world and represented history’s first endeavor utilizing a “round-table conference of nations” to resolve a dilemma “as old as t he Caesars.” Many refugees seeking entry were seen as representing t he most desirable category of immigrants possessing intelligence and resourcefulness tha t would benefit the country. Thousands of refugees could be admitted “without changing anything—except for the better.” 15 The American Committee for the Protection of Minorities published an appeal in the press, supported by 125 notable citizens, calling upon the world’s citizenry to join together in a “great cooperative endeavor to ask the dictatorships to let the oppressed people go; to welcome these exiles in so far as it is possible; to respe ct their integrity and to protect their liberty.” 16 Correspondent Clarence Streit observed that the three major powers, the United States, Britain and France controlled “so larg e a share of 14 “Deport Aryans, Steel Advises,” The Southern Israelite July 8, 1938, 3. 15 The Lewiston Daily Sun July 6, 1938, 1. 16 “Democracies Urged to Succor Refugees,” New York Times April 11, 1938, 4.

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124 the less populated” regions of the world and its resources that the outcome and “fate” of the Evian Conference lay “virtually in their hands.” 17 A commentary in a Jewish newspaper predicted that “history will be made” at the commencement of the international council. Although the possibilities of rescue we re uncertain and it was doubtful that participating nations would significantly alt er their immigration restrictions, “the significance of the refugee conferen ce is profound when viewed in the light of the isolationist policies of the great, modern democracies.” The occasion “mark[ed] the re-entry of Democracy—as a way of life—into the mains tream of world political action”; a counterbalance to the “ideology of totalitarianis m.” Asking the ultimate question: “Where is the conscience of the world?” he believed the answer w ould be given at Evian. 18 Some heralded the Conference as the “voice of Democracy” overpowering the “angry roar of Fascism’s thunder” and represented the “firs t rebuke” of Nazi ideology on the “part of Democracy”; an “uncompromising and…vigorous” response. 19 FDR’s call for the conference represented, to one editorialist, the “stronges t kind of condemnation of Hiterlistic and other savage attacks upon human rights” and the “moral isolation” of those committing such “barbaric practices.” It als o demonstrated that America was fulfilling its humanitarian responsibilities and could no longe r be accused of “failing to act.” Optimistically, and perhaps unrealistically the writer predicted that “such spontaneous expressions [of support] by organized groups of all 17 Charles Streit, “U.S. Spurs Nations to Prompt Actio n at Refugee Parley,” New York Times July 7, 1938. 18 “Eyes on Evian, “The Southern Israelite July 1, 1938, 6. 19 “America’s Open Door,” The Southern Israelite April 1, 1938, 6.

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125 kinds [left] no doubt” that the American people favored the granting of “asylum…to as many as can possibly be provided with such means of escape…” 20 Roosevelt’s move was a “precedent-shattering move tantamount to a public rebuke” of the Reich’s rac ial policies. 21 The editorial board of The Crisis expressed dismay at the “crushing brutality” inflicted on the Jews in the Reich that was similar to the persecution faced by A fricanAmericans within the United States. The journal criticized those who had “expressed…sympathy” for foreign Jews while turning a blind eye to the plig ht of blacks living within the United States. However, “unlike the Jews in modern Germany, they know lynching” and view “with a twisted smile” white protests against Nazi ant iSemitism that ignored the plight of the “Negroes”: “raiding mobs in Dixie,” lim ited admissions to institutions of higher education, the observance of “rigid color lines” by white Christians and attempts to provide employment for European refugees while the black “knocks at the doors of a thousand businesses seeking employment in vain.” Nevertheless, The Crisis called upon all African-Americans to oppose “Hitler and all that he represents.” The primary institutional difference in the treatm ent of blacks within the United States and Jews living in Germany was the application of “every instrument of the state” against the Jewish minority. Jews faced government al censure while African-Americans faced institutional “indifference.” All bla cks should contest “Hitlerism” but American priorities should be directed towards a democratic institution that operated as a “reality for all minorities of whatever race, religi on and or color.” 20 A.A. Freedlander, “The American Refugee Move,” The Sentinel March 31, 1938, 4. 21 “U.S. Offers Plan for Refugees: Invites Twenty-Nine Countries to Form International Committee on Emigration,” The Sentinel March 31, 1938, 33.

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126 Secretary of the NAACP Walter White called upon “intelligent American N egro citizens” to demonstrate “contempt for and condemnation” of German anti-Jewish policies and warned that the failure of the white and black races and all religious denominat ions to oppose prejudice would result in the establishment within the States of the “horror that is Nazi Germany.” 22 “American Negroes,” the NAACP declared, hailed the actions of the Administration for its efforts to find sanctuary for Jewish refugees. 23 While many agreed with the premise of the conference there were groups and individuals who opposed any modification of the immigration quota or the concept of the conference itself. Such differences cut across religious and political lines. D r. Guy Emery Shipler, editor of the Episcopalian magazine The Churchman viewed the international gathering as representative of the “finest American tradition in a world shot through with fear and cursed with timid politicians” but opposed, along with Rev. R. I. Gannon, S.J. President of Fordham University, any revision of the quota system due to the high lev el of domestic unemployment. The Reverend Francis Talbot, editor of the Catholic weekly America, alleged modification of the annual quota would not be in the interest of the nation as it would be “folly for us to admit a greater influx of refugees with alie n ideologies who could not be absorbed without grave economic, political and social readjustments.” Dr. Samuel McCrea Cavert, General Secretary of The Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, supported the “overture” of the Administration but 22 Roy Wilkins “Negroes, Nazis and Jews,” The Crisis December 1938, 393; “Walter White Scores Persecution of Jews,” The Crisis 399-400 available from 393&dq=Jews&hl=en&ei=j1RJTImEJcH4 8Ab12vntDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=90& ved=0CL8EEOgBMFk4ZA#v=onepage&q =Jews&f=false ; Internet; accessed July 23, 2010. 23 A.A. Freedlander, “The American Refugee Move,” The Sentinel March 31, 1938, 4; “Negroes Urge Haven for Jews,” November 16, 1938, 8.

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127 believed that the current quota allotments were “sufficient” to meet the ne eds of a “substantial number” of involuntary refugees. William Green, President of the American Federation of Labor, believed that the United States “should take the lead” in the re fugee resettlement issue and cited America’s custom of offering succor to vic tims of political and religious persecution. It would be “cruel [and] illogical” and out of step with tim e honored “principles” if immigration was closed off entirely. However, curre nt domestic economic conditions mandated that the nation continue to follow the existing quota limitations. Dr. Hiram Wesley Evans, the Imperial Wizard of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, opposed any scheme to encourage additional immigration believing that the available openings would “most likely…be filled” by those refugees who met the mandated entry requirements. 24 Dr. Stephen S. Wise, president of the American Jewish Committee and Roosevelt confidante, did not believe Congress “should or would” change the existing quotas. He would accept the admission of a “rather limited number of children” but if there should develop a “conflict between our duty to those children and our duty to our country, speaking for myself as a citizen, I should say, of course, that our country comes first.” 25 Wise predicted in an address to a Detroit meeting of the Zionist Organiz ation of America (ZOA) that the conference would result in a “dismal failure” unle ss Britain altered its Palestine immigration policy. 26 Privately, he labeled Roosevelt's plan as a “gesture which meant little…One might have expected more from an administra tion that 24 “Question of the Week,” The United States News April 4, 1938. 25 Ibid. 26 “Urge American Aid to Open Palestine,” New York Times July 4, 1938, 13

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128 pretends pity.” 27 Publicly, he read to the conference a telegram received from FDR supportive of Zionist aspirations for Palestine in which the President stated tha t he had followed the “rehabilitation of the Jewish Homeland with deep interest” and hoped that “constructive action” on the part of the ZOA would lead to the “realization of a noble ideal.” 28 Despite such expressions of support, however, the Administration had ensured that during the Evian Conference Palestine would not be considered as an option for Jewish resettlement. Representative Samuel Dickstein, Democrat, NY, the Jewish Chairman of the House Committee on Immigration, stated that “under the existing conditions it woul d be unwise to tamper with the immigration or quota law.” Dr. J. D. Hertzler, Professor of Sociology at the University of Nebraska, supported an international refugee congr ess as a means of dispersing the refugees over a number of democratic nations while hig hlighting the political and cultural milieu that had created the crisis but he opposed any al teration of immigration quotas as detrimental to American employment. Dr. Cyrus Adler, president of the American Jewish Committee, resisted changes in the immigration laws “as it is not likely that any larger numbers would seek a dmission here than are now possible under the quotas.” 29 Adler and his colleagues preferred the time-honored “ sha-sha philosophy of Jewish polemics, which sought to turn away wrath 27 Sumner Welles to Harry Friedenwald, August 18, 1938 cited in Melvin I. Urofsky, A Voice that Spoke for Justice: The Life and Times of Stephen S. Wise (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1982), 305. Wise was a strong advocate of an econo mic boycott of the Reich. 28 The Jewish Criterion July 8, 1938, 4. 29 “Question of the Week,” The U.S. News April 4, 1938.

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129 with gentle words, to obscure the Jew from public gaze.” 30 Mrs. C. M. White of Ft. Dodge, Iowa, opposed the admission of agitators from Germany, Austria and Russia and wanted aid to be given to the American poor before admitting “Europe’s penniless …” 31 An opinion poll for March 1938, at the time of the Anschluss revealed that forty one percent of Americans believed that “Jews have too much power” in the United States; i.e., control of finance, commerce and entertainment. Twenty five perc ent of respondents supported the exclusion of Jews from “government and politics” and twenty percent favored the expulsion of Jews from the country. Nineteen percent were in support of an anti-Semitic campaign within the U.S. itself. 32 Sixty eight percent of respondents to a May poll opposed the admission of Austrian and German refugees. 33 A June Fortune magazine poll demonstrated that 67.4% of Americans believed that "with [economic] conditions as they are we should try to keep [refugees] out." 18.2% replied that "we should allow them to come but not ruin our immigration quotas" and only 4.9% favored increasing the annual allowance. The remainder was undecided. 34 A June Gallup poll demonstrated that seventy two percent of Americans believed “we should not a llow a 30 “How to Combat Anti-Semitism in America” (New York: 1937), 33, sponsored by the American Jewish Congress and Boycott: Nazi Goods and Services (March-April 1938), 3 cited in Jeffrey S. Gurlock, ed., America American Jews (NY: Routledge, 1998), 237, 242. The Sha-Sha philosophy, opposed by the more pro-active American Jewish Congress, was the b elief that if Jews pretended “that the Jew does not exist…he will not be missed; the anti-Semite, unable to find his victim, will simply forget about him.” Henry Popkin, “The Vanishing Jew of Our Popular Cul ture,” Commentary 14, no. 1 (July 1952), 46 cited in Edna Nahshon, ed., Jewish Theatre: A Global View (Leiden, The Netherlands, Koninklijke Brill, 2009) 207. 31 Boycott: Nazi Goods and Services (March-April 1938), 3 cited in Spear, “The United States and the Persecution of German Jews,” 242. 32 Charles H. Stembler, Jews in the Mind of America (NY: Basic Books, 1966), 121-131. 33 Edwin Harwood, “American Public Opinion and US Immi gration Policy,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (1986): 202. 34 Sanders, Shores of Refuge 438.

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130 larger number of Jewish exiles from Germany into the U.S.” and fifty two percent were opposed to contributing “money to help Jewish and Catholic exiles from Germany settl e in other lands.” 35 Eighty three percent stated in a 1939 poll that if they were elected to the Congress they would oppose any legislation that would allow “more European refugees ” to enter the country. 36 Roman Catholic Father Charles E. Coughlin, an initial FDR supporter but later a vocal, high profile and passionate foe of the Administration’s New Deal, was one of t he most outspoken anti-Semites of the 1930’s who actively made use of the press and broadcast media. His rhetoric increasingly conjoined economic turmoil and an unstabl e banking system with world Jewry and Communism. He called for the creation of a “corporative state” in America in which political parties would be abolished and ea ch social “class” would have its own Congressional representative. Selection of the President would be through a House vote rather than popular election. 37 Utilizing his magazine, Social Justice and his organization, The National Union for Social Justice, plus an association with the Christian Front, Coughlin maintained that he held “no animosity towards the Jews [but] did distinguish most carefully between good Jew s and bad Jews as well as I do between the good gentiles and bad gentiles.” He assert ed that his primary focus lay on the “atheistic Jew and gentile, the communistic Je w and gentile who have been responsible…for the discriminations and the persecutions inflicted upon the Jews as a body.” He believed that Jewish renunciation of and active opposition to 35 Robert Edwin Herzstein, Roosevelt and Hitler: Prelude to War (NY: Paragon House, 1989), 256. 36 Harwood, “American Public Opinion,” 202. 37 Daily Worker, March 14, 1938, 1. Coughlin (1891-1979) became a Ca tholic priest in 1923 and pastor of the Shrine of the Little Flower in Royal Oak, Mi chigan in 1926.

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131 communism (which he postulated was the source of Nazism) would lead Christians to “extend the right hand of sympathy towards the persecuted Jews in Germany.” 38 The Veterans of Foreign Wars adopted a resolution calling for a complete cessation of immigration into the United States for a period of ten years. Mrs. Wi lliam Baker, President General of the Daughters of the American Revolution, argued tha t the Federal Government should not “meddle in the affairs of other nations” and called for a more restrictive immigration policy and increased aid to American citize ns. 39 The American Legion Executive Committee opposed any move to liberalize the entry of “political and religious refugees” into the United States. Such action would be “inim ical to the welfare” of the nation. Although the Legion was sensitive to the predicame nt of the victims of German policies its responsibilities toward “our own citize ns under the present distressing circumstances compels consideration even to the excl usion of those in foreign countries, however sympathetic we may be to them in their present pli ght.” 40 Representative Edward T. Taylor (Dem., CO) demanded reassurances from the Administration that American involvement in the Evian Conference would not result i n an “invitation to use the United States as a dumping ground for all these people.” 41 Representative Martin Dies, Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, warned Secretary of State Cordell Hull that the Evian Conferenc e would result 38 Charles E. Coughlin, Am I an Anti-Semite? (Detroit: Condon Printing, 1939), 94-95, 104-6 cit ed in Robert H. Abzug, “Father Coughlin ‘From Am I an Ant i-Semite?’ December 18, 1938,” America Views the Holocaust 1933-1945: A Brief Documentary History (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1999), 77-82. 39 The United States News April 4, 1938. 40 “Legion Opposed to Quota Increase,” The Sentinel May 12, 1938, 35. 41 Manus I. Midlarsky, The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 244.

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132 in an inundation of the U.S. by “persecuted and jobless” European refugees and feared that there would be “little or no reciprocal action on the part of the other countries involved.” He also declared that the “first duty “of the American Government was t o the American people, especially the unemployed and “overburdened taxpayers.” Admitted aliens would either displace Americans from the workforce or would have to be maintained on the public dole. Consequently, he supported the use of private funds to promote resettlement in the underdeveloped and less inhabited regions of South America. 42 Representative Thomas J. Jenkins criticized Roosevelt for attempting to “embroi l us in European entanglements [by] asking the people of the United States to make a haven here for those who are undesirable to European dictators.” He warned that any refugee plan would “provide an opening for a more liberal immigration policy” and represented a presidential “visionary excursion into the warm fields of altr uism” while ignoring the “cold winds of poverty and penury” that affect the “ill-clothed, illhoused, and ill-fed” American citizens. He proposed that the European nations use the funds owed to the United States as war debt as the financial means of resettling r efugees in “some uncontested section of the world.” Entry of such aliens into the United States 42 “Relief of Political Refugees,” Rep. Martin Dies, Congressional Record Appendix March 28, 1938, Seventy-Fifth Congress, 3 rd sess., vol. 10, March 28, 1938 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1938), 1207. European restrictions on employment of aliens would result, he believed, in the further impoverishment of refugees who would seek admission into the U.S. Co nsequently, they needed to be diverted away from America and Dies called for re-settlement in Paragu ay and other under populated South American countries.

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133 would foster “enmity and suspicion” that would be disruptive to American society and life. 43 Democratic Senator Robert R. Reynolds, North Carolina, opposed any loosening or modification of U.S. immigration laws and blamed an “enormous alien influx” during the Great War and in the post-war period as being the root of widespread Americ an worker unemployment. “Excess alien baggage” had led to “burdensome taxation,” ris ing national debt, a budget deficit and the importation of “subversive” ideologies and activities. 44 Reynolds called for slashing the current immigration quotas by ninety percent for at least ten years until rampant American unemployment was re solved. Any aliens committing a crime within U.S. borders must be deported and non-citizens bar red from organizing or heading labor organizations. The Government for its part should cease employing noncitizens, all immigration laws should be rigidly enfor ced and America must be protected from the “importation of inferior human stock.” 45 Republican Congressman Karl Stefan criticized an amendment submitted to the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization that supported the Evian Conference, describing it as “the most dangerous piece of legislation” that r isked American involvement in “foreign entanglements.” The Evian Committee woul d serve as a replacement for the failed League of Nations transforming the United S tates into the 43 Rep. Thomas J. Jenkins, Congressional Record, Seventy-Fifth Congress, 3 rd sess., vol. 83, part 4, March 28, 1938 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1938), 4227 44 Sen. Robert R. Reynolds, “Displacement of Americans by Aliens,” Congressional Record Appendix Seventy-Fifth Congress, 3 rd sess., vol. 9, March 14, 1938 (Washington, D.C.: G PO, 1938), 989-990. 45 Sen. Robert R. Reynolds, “Deportation of Aliens,” Congressional Record Appendix Seventy-Fifth Congress, 3 rd sess., vol. 9, March 24, 1938 (Washington, D.C.: G PO,1938), 1170-1171. Reynolds (June 18, 1884-February 13, 1963) served in the Senate from 1 932-1945.

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134 “dumping ground” for all political refugees. He believed that such aliens a lready resident in the country should be deported. The United States should “clean our own house before meddling in foreign affairs.” Stefan also asserted that creation of the C ommittee was a ploy to create a highly paid ($17,500 per year or twenty percent of funds appropriated f or the U.S. delegation) Ambassadorship for Myron C. Taylor. Taylor’s role as the head of the American delegation could be filled, the Representative believed, by the curr ent Ambassador to France at no additional cost to the American taxpayer. South Dakota Republican Representative Francis H. Case echoed these sentiments by lab eling Taylor’s salary as exorbitant and called for a reduction to $7,500 with the difference used for “ the real purposes of the item.” Rep. Clinton A. Woodrum, on the other hand, argued that “no one would seriously contend” that Taylor, “the distinguished gentleman,” would “be attracted to [the chairmanship of the committee] because of the salary.” Hi s payment should be reflective of the “high rank” of his prospective position. 46 46 Joint Resolution, (H.J. Res. 637) for “relief of po litical refugees” submitted to Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Congressional Record Seventy-Fifth Congress, 3 rd sess., March 30, 1938, vol. 83, part 4, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1938), 441 8. Stefan (March 1, 1884-October 2, 1951) was born in Bohemia but immigrated with his family to Nebras ka in 1885 and was elected to Congress in 1935. Case (December 9, 1896-June 23, 1962) first entered the House in 1936 and was later elected to the Sen ate in 1951. The “Distribution of estimate for Internationa l Committee on Political Refugees” was broken down as follows: -Taylor salary: $17,500 per year. -Salaries for four clerks; average $2,100 per year. -Supplies and materials: $1,000. -Communication service: $5,000. -Travel expenses: steamship and railway: $20,500. -Freight on furniture, drayage, etc.: $700. -Printing of necessary materials and reports: $2,50 0. -Rent of office space (5 rooms, $6 per day for 365 days): $10,950. -Equipment for offices: $1,500. -Special and miscellaneous expenses, entertainment, rent of motor vehicles, unforeseen items, rent of office machines, etc.: $3,100. -Total of all expenses: $72,500.

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135 Michigan Representative Clare E. Hoffman, addressing the fifth Annual Nat ional Defense Meeting held in Philadelphia on March 29, attended by seventy-three patr iotic organizations, argued that America could no longer serve as the refuge of the “downtrodden and oppressed.” Rather, the alien posed an internal threat by spreading dissatisfaction, intolerance, Communism and calls for the “destruction of the only existing land of refuge”; acts facilitated by a President who had ignored hi storical lessons, abandoned campaign promises and who had “charted a course at the end of which lay dictatorship.” 47 One writer to the editor of a leading national newspaper voiced the concerns of many average Americans. The nation should provide assistance to citizens in need ra ther than extending “an invitation to feed and care for the agitators of Russia and Germ any and Austria.” 48 The Nation believed that any loosening of current American immigration laws would require an “unmistakable demonstration of [positive] public opinion” in order to persuade Washington politicians to confront an issue that was deemed “too hot to handle.” 49 Others continued the argument that FDR should aid America’s own impoverished and unemployed and not allow entry of thousands of foreign “unwanted citizens” in violation of immigration laws. 50 A writer to an African-American newspaper described the “colored people of the United States [as] among the most persecuted i n the world.” He believed that American attention should be diverted away from the plight of 47 Rep. Clare E. Hoffman, “The Enemy within Our House, ” Congressional Record Appendix SeventyFifth Congress, 3 rd sess., vol. 10, April 2, 1938 (Washington, D.C.: G PO, 1938), 1283-1285. 48 The United States News April 4, 1938. 49 The Nation, December 10, 1938, 609-610. 50 Washington Post March 30, 1938, 6.

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136 Jews in Germany and the excesses of Soviet Communism and re-directed towards domestic prejudice. “If America would realize the situation as it is over here and forget Europe, we, the colored people, would receive some justice.” 51 Foreign popular reaction was as mixed as the American to the announcement, planning and course of the Evian Conference. Jews, to some, were the innocent sufferers of “barbarous persecution and attacks” resulting from a “biological war of extermination.” 52 Jews who were forcibly returned to the Reich faced a “death sentence.” 53 Emile Borel contended that if a workable solution was unobtainable with Germany then the democratic nations must remain true to the tenets of the Dec laration of the Rights of Man and adopt a consistent approach and equitable cost sharing that would lead to a solution of the refugee dilemma. 54 George Bidault argued that the “enlightened nations” must provide assistance to the Jewish and non-Aryan refugees or risk dishonoring French principle, pride and the Christian ethic. 55 Swedish diplomat Olof Lamm called upon the United States to admit one hundred thousand Jewish refugees immediately “so that we can catch the refugees alive.” 56 The Times of London noted three 51 Letters to the Editor, “Attention, Uncle Sam,” The Afro-American July 23, 1938, 4. 52 De Volksgazet (Brussels), July 7, 1938 cited in Katz, “Public Opi nion,” 112. 53 Le Progs July 11, 1938. Ibid. 54 La Depche Toulouse, July 7, 1938. Ibid. 55 L’Aube Paris, July 8, 1938. Ibid. 56 Olof Lamm to Hendrik Van Loon, November 1, 1938, ci ted in Gurlock, America, American Jews 242. Flix Edouard Justin Emile Borel (January 7, 1871-F ebruary 3, 1956) was a mathematician and later a Republican-Socialist politician who served in the C hamber of Deputies and was later active in the Fren ch Resistance. George Bidault (b. 1899) aided the est ablishment of the left-wing newspaper L’Aube that was anti-Fascist and protested against anti-Semitism. He was opposed to the Munich Agreement, active in t he Resistance, served as Foreign Minister under the De Gaulle Provisional Government and later held the p ost of Prime Minister.

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137 weeks prior to the opening of the Evian Conference that the German police had arrest ed several thousand people, primarily Jews. These actions were designed to “frig hten those Jews who remain in Germany and thus confirm them in their desire to emigrate.” Simultaneously, it was a means of “exert[ing] pressure” upon the internationa l delegations soon to meet on the banks of Lake Geneva. 57 The “civilized nations” owed a “moral obligation” to aid and assist the forced migrs but faced the great difficulty of reconciling such obligations with “ practical considerations”: the costs of resettlement, effects upon local economies and jobs and the fact that the majority of refugees were Jews who were not “universally w elcome.” America, the editorialist believed, approached the Conference with “good intent ions” but was constrained by its existing immigration laws and quotas. The greatest benefit the United States could offer to enhance the likelihood of the meeting’s success was t o provide funding for resettlement and the creation of an “atmosphere of liberal mindedness” that would “stimulate” the other attendees to “generous action.” 58 The British journal The Round Table compared the German refugee problem with that of the Bulgarians and Greeks following the end of the Great War. None of the post war refugee problems was “capable of a single radical solution.” The Gree ks and Bulgarians were returning to their national homes whereas the German refug ees were being forcibly expelled and sent onto the world stage as a stateless alien. The fi rst refugee problem was one of “movements of concentration” while the latter was a 57 “Nazi Round-Up of Jews,” The Times June 17, 1938, 15 cited in Jonathan Frankel, ed., The Fate of the European Jews, 1939-1945: Continuity or Conting ency? (Oxford: University Press, 1997), 59. 58 The Glasgow Herald July 6, 1938, 12.

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138 movement of “dispersion.” Moreover, land was available to the Greek and Bulgarian refugees due to the evacuation of other peoples and most of the migrants were agricultural rather than urban workers. Outside of Zionist circles the concept of Jewish statehood was not envisaged as a rational solution by this and most other papers, the general public and governments. 59 During July, in the Portsmouth Evening News English philosopher Bertrand Russell called for aid to the displaced Jews. He believed that it was essent ial to exert “pressure [upon] our own Government to be hospitable to refugees and not too niggardly in granting them” entry and the right to re-establish a new life on British shor es. This prompted a response by the paper’s leading commentator, Raymond Burns, who believed that the refugee issue could only be solved if it was not tainted by “helpless emotionalism” which had the potential to create a “real anti-Semitic problem ” in the island nation. Britain, like France and the United States, Burns believed, could make t he “greatest contribution” to solving the problem of resettlement but all three wer e nearing the “saturation point.” Further Jewish immigration, he predicted, would generate “latent hostility to the newcomers” and could only result in a “sense of grievance” among the domestically unemployed natives. Significantly, such emotion was shared by the professional classes, including physicians who feared that foreign doctors woul d engage in a “cut-price racket.” Burns acknowledged that some form of resettlement w as necessary but “for the sake of the refugees [Jews] it must not mean Great Br itain.” Consequently, “extensive territory [such as East Africa and excluding Pales tine] must be delineated for mass colonization. The Bournemouth Daily Echo asserted that Britons 59 Round Table September 1938 cited in Katz, “Public Opinion,” 1 07.

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139 feared the “unrestricted entry” of all refugees: “Just as we don’t want too many Jews we don’t want too many Chinese or Frenchmen for that matter.” Ironically, less t han ten thousand refugees were in Britain in July 1938. 60 Lord Beaverbrook’s Daily Express vocalized its opposition to Jewish immigration in an editorial, “Shall All Come In?” Although the British public was moved by “s ome sad stories of the persecuted Jews” it was necessary to ask “where will i t end?” “Powerful agitation” was at play in the United Kingdom seeking the admissi on of all Jews “without question or discrimination.” Such a humanitarian policy would be “unwise” as it could “stir up” domestic factions that “batten on anti-Semitic pr opaganda.” Fearing that the nation would come under pressure to admit Jewish co-religionists from Eastern Europe the paper concluded that “because we DON’T want anti-Jewish upr oar we DO need to show common sense in not admitting all applicants.” 61 Beaverbrook’s other paper, the Sunday Express warned of the refugee Jewish threat to the domestic economy and professions. Jews were “overrunning the country ” seeking the right to practice in the law, medicine and dentistry. Consequently, the B ritish professional class was driven to “resent their living being taken from them b y immigrants from foreign countries, whether they be Jew or gentile.” Continental Jews had contributed to the rise of foreign anti-Semitism by being “too prosperous.” Aft er all, “half 60 Tony Kushner and Katharine Knox, Refugees in an Age of Genocide: Global, National, a nd Local Perspectives (NY: Frank Cass, 1999), 153, 401. Kushner noted t hat following the Russian Revolution of 1917 the British Government allowed the entry of 15 ,000 White Russians but barred the less “racially desirable” Jews and Armenians. 61 Daily Express (London), March 24, 1938 cited in Theodore S. Hame row, Why We Watched: Europe, America and the Holocaust (NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 104.

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140 the lawyers and doctors in Germany were Jews.” 62 The Socialist Medical Association in London warned that admission of German refugees would threaten the “dilution of our industry with non-Union, non-Socialist labor.” The Conservative Sunday Express editorialized that “just now there is a big influx of foreign Jews” into the United Kingdom who were “overrunning the country.” 63 An editorial in the Palestine Post forecast the inevitable failure of the Evian Conference. Although nations had voluntari ly offered support to the cause of the Chinese Nationalists and Spanish Republicans there remained a global “conspiracy of silence” towards tangible aid to the pers ecuted Jews of Germany. 64 Echoes of the L’Affaire Dreyfuss and the lack of a meaningful international response led commentator Victor Basch to lament that the “sentiment of human sol idarity 62 Sunday Express (London) March 24, 1938. Ibid., 106. Sir Samuel Hoa re, the British Home Secretary, and Lord Winterton met with delegates of the Royal Colleges of Physicians and Surgeons and the British Medical Association, the University of London and t he Society of Apothecaries and reassured them that only a “limited number” (50) of Austrian doctors, u ndergoing “careful selection” would be admitted to practice. A special committee composed of members of the British medical community would aid in this selection. “Austrian Doctors in Britain,” The Times July 5, 1938, 14. Dr. A. Welpy, the general secr etary of the Medical Practitioners Union, threatened that “much more drastic action will be taken—something to arouse the whole country,” such as a “stay-in-strik e” should Austrian physicians be allowed to practic e within the United Kingdom. He claimed that foreign doctors lacked the proper qualifications to take c are of local patients. “British Doctors Threaten Strik e,” California and Western Medicine 49, no. 2 (August 1938): 170. Similar concerns arose in Australia. Legislation was proposed to mandate completion of a five year medical course in Victoria or a nation that ha d signed a reciprocal agreement before alien physic ians would be allowed to practice independently. “Refug ee Doctors in Victoria; Proposed Restrictions,” The Times July 16, 1938, 12. The British Dental Associatio n followed the lead of the BMA and called for a limitation on the number of Austrian dentists (50) to be allowed entrance into the United Kingdom. A similar committee would be established to evaluate the qualifications of these migrs. The American Medical Association echoed sentiments similar to th eir British counterpart and believed that a strict ceiling needed to be placed on the number of refugee physic ians. Overall, the “situation is fraught with diff iculties arising from economic stress, chauvinistic prejudic es, fears that have been stimulated by propaganda, and other motivations.” Newsweek October 3, 1938, 30. 63 Laqueur, A History of Zionism 2. 64 The Palestine Post June 8, 1938, 8 cited in Abraham J. Edelheit, The Yishuv in the Shadow of the Holocaust: Zionist Politics and Rescue Aliya 1933-1939 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 190.

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141 no longer survives.” 65 Another French paper warned that failure to act in a meaningful manner would hurl the “humane principles” espoused in the Rights of Man into the “abyss.” 66 The Depression and its associated economic stresses were believed to foster the development of anti-Semitism for it was a “natural tendency” to blame a defe nseless population for “disagreeable conditions.” Such a worldview predicted the proliferat ion of Nazi anti-Jewish ideology as manifested by events in Poland, Rumania, Hungary a nd within some French political factions. 67 Hatred of Jews, some believed, was the genesis of the refugee crisis and the convocation of the Evian Conference was proof of its recognition by the international community. Its solution, however, depended upon the “Christian conscience” granting charity to the stateless; a humanitaria n act that could not cause any recipient nation to be harmed. 68 Some argued that the creation of a “class of unwanted people” was the natural consequence of political upheaval and cited earlier events such as the French and Rus sian Revolutions. 69 The “booming guns of August 1914” marked the end of relatively free transit across national borders and led to governments enacting stricter pas sport controls. 70 A unique species of humanity, “Homo Europaicus,” appeared on the world 65 L’Oeuvre (Victor Basch), June 26, 1938 cited in Katz, “Publi c Opinion,” 111. Victor Basch (18631944) was a Dreyfusard and a co-founder in 1898 of the League of Human Rig hts. He and his wife were murdered by the Vichy militia or Gestapo. 66 Le Progs Lyon, July 7, 1938. Ibid. 67 Le XXme Sicle Brussels, July 8, 1938. Ibid., 110. 68 The Spectator July 29, 1938. Ibid., 111. 69 Le XXme Sicle Brussels, July 7, 1938. Ibid., 108. 70 John C. Torpey, “Passports and the Development of I mmigration Controls in the North Atlantic World during the Long Nineteenth Century,” Andreas Fahmei r, Olivier Faron and Patrick Weill, eds., Migration

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142 scene, devoid of home, hearth and country. Democratic nations had become “inured to the sight of Jews and Aryans, Liberals and Communists—whether they were profess ors, traders, politicians, students, authors and priests—streaming out of Germany.” 71 A new political and social reality had been created. Time, some believed, was working against the resettlement of large numbers of Jews and a “catastrophe” could only be averted by the Reich taking positive actions that would assist resettlement. 72 Some papers warned that the forced emigration of Jews, especially those deprived of adequate funds, would foster the spread of anti-Semit ism within the receiving countries. No state, it was argued, could absorb Jewish re fugees without generating the “same kind of prejudice” that had led to such “extreme meas ures” within Germany. 73 Some attempted to place the roots of anti-Semitism within Jewry itself. The “victims” of Nazi persecution “were not so blameless as it wa s first thought.” Although acting in a fashion “contrary to ethical principles,” the Germans w ere compelled to take steps that would counter the perceived Jewish dominance of the professions, press and the economy. “’Some think that they have got too strong a control in the North Atlantic World: The Evolution of State Practices in Europe and the United States from the French Revolution to the Inter-War Period (New York: Bergahn Books, 2003), 73-91, 84. 71 The Economist July 9, 1938 cited in Katz, “Political Refugees,” 1 08. 72 Daily Telegraph and Morning Post (London), July 7, 1938 cited in Katz, “Public Opin ion,” 106. 73 Western Mail and South Wales News July 11, 1938. Ibid., 109.

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143 position for such a small minority.” Resentment and “opposition” to such control was a natural reaction which, under the proper circumstances and setting, could devolve into a “general attack” against the perceived oppressor. “’This is how pogroms occurred in Russia and Rumania.’” 74 The right wing anti-Semitic Argentine paper, La Fronda cautioned that the “waters of Evian bring typhus.” El Pueblo called for immigration restrictions that would protect Argentina from dangerous “physical, moral and ideological point[s] of view.” 75 The extreme French Right, like its American counterpart, sought to totally ban the admission of any political or religious refugees. Journalist Raymond Recouly commented in the Gringoire that official German anti-Semitism was an inhumane policy but nevertheless acceptance of persecuted Jews would result in a “violent reacti on” in France. Le Journal called for the internment of refugees within concentration camps and during the Anschluss Lucien Rebatet predicted that “sooner or later the concentration camp will become a necessity that remains open to the scum of the entire co ntinent.” Unless the French Government enacted strict controls on immigration the influx of a lien Jews would result in a “blind pogrom—brutal and liberating… [that would] take care of everything.” Maurice Ajam strongly supported immigration restrictions in a n issue of La Dpche de Toulouse ( The Dispatch from Toulouse ), a strong advocate of the Radical Party in the provinces. “Racism may be a folly” but it was essential for a “nation’s general well-being.” The resistance of Jews to assimilation into t he dominant culture 74 Gazette de Lausanne (Lausanne), July 11, 1938. Ibid., 108. 75 Ben-Dror, The Catholic Church 141.

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144 posed a threat to all of the “admirable mixed breeds” responsible for the uniqueness a nd “prodigiously interesting” aspects of the nation. 76 The French Catholic paper La Croix ( The Cross ) echoed the opinion of the French delegation to Evian that the admittance of two hundred thousand refugees following t he end of the Great War had brought France to the saturation point and could no longer accept forced migrs. While France had traditionally served as a “haven” for involuntary migrants further admissions would place the nation in “danger…of self-destr uction on the altar of love of its neighbor.” The totalitarian regimes had been “generous enoug h to make us a present of some of their bacteria,” i.e. Jews who were the purveyors of Mar xist dogma. Nonetheless, despite such potential perils, France could not ignore human suffering and owed a “duty to be upright and humane.” 77 Otherwise the nation would be complicit in the absolute “extermination” of an entire people. Others in the United Kingdom averred that inaction would “make cowards of us all." 78 76 “ Faisons le point,” Gringoire, October 13, 1938; "Des Centres spciaux de concentr ation pour les trangers indsirables", Le Journal Nov. 21, 1938; Lucien Rebatet, "Les Emigrs politiques en France: Peut-on viter le pogrom?" (“The migr Politics in France: Can We Avoid the Pogrom?”) Je Suis Partout March 4, 1938; Maurice Ajam, “Le Mlange des races,” La Dpche de Toulose August 29, 1938, 1 cited in Caron, Uneasy Asylum 276. Lucien Rebatet (1903-1972) was a French fascis t with pro-Nazi sympathies who wrote for the rightwing publication, Je Suis Partout ( I am Everywhere ). He was also a journalist, author and movie and film critic for Action Franaise During the occupation in 1942 he blamed French po liticians, military leaders and Jews for the fall of France (published in The Ruins or Les Decombres ). Robert Michael and Philip Rosen, Dictionary of Antisemitism from the Earliest Times to the Present (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2007), 381. Jews, represented in Rebatet’s wo rld view a form of vermine Solange Leibovici, “Pierre Drieu La Rochelle: Le roman de la haine,” cited in Roland A. Piorloot, Henk Hillenaar and Walter Schnau, eds., Fathers and Mothers in Literature: Psychoanalysis a nd Culture (Amsterdam: Rodopi B.V., 1994), 179. Following the end of the war Rebatet w as accused of collaboration with the Vichy Government and was described as a “true killer, a h unter-down of Jews, Resistance fighters, and Gaulli sts.” He was condemned to death but later received amnest y. George Steiner, George Steiner at the New Yorker (NY: New Directions Books, 2009), 207. 77 La Croix July 7, 1938 cited in Katz, “Public Opinion,” 114 78 The Economist July 10, 1938. Ibid., 114.

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145 Some foreign circles regarded Roosevelt’s initiative as a symbol of Amer ican responsibility or obligation to open its doors to would-be immigrants. The United States should provide a “fitting welcome” for Austrian and German Jews as it is “cle ar” that the geographic size and resources of America outstripped those of any Continental Eur opean power. The solution of the Jewish Question posed “manifold and grave difficulties.” It was unreasonable to expect that nations which did not participate in the persecution of its Jewish minority should bear any financial, economic or social burdens or responsi bilities for the maintenance and support of stateless refugees. 79 Some opposed the idea of mass Jewish migration and relocation and supported a policy of gradual infiltration or dispersal. It was preferable to place Je ws “in equal numbers everywhere” in order to avoid reaching a population threshold that threatened to incite anti-Semitism in the native population of the receiving countries. Consequent ly, Jews would remain a perpetual minority that would not generate fear within the domi nant majority. 80 “The troubles of the Jews” began when their “numbers or influence” exceeded a certain ceiling resulting in a negative “impact” upon the local residents of the country of resettlement. 81 It should be openly expressed, it was believed, that the mere presence of large groups of Jews would precipitate “difficult problems within c ertain countries” especially when their domestic influence was disproportionate t o their group size. 82 79 Le Temps (Paris), July 8, 1938. Ibid., 118. 80 Journal de Genve July 8, 1938. Ibid., 118. 81 The Tablet (London), July 9, 1938. Ibid., 119. 82 The Times July 6, 1938. Ibid., 120.

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146 Jews and Jewish groups around the world responded to Roosevelt’s invitation with expressions of appreciation and support. A joint cable, signed by noted philanthropist and the Pittsburgh owner of the Kaufman Department Stores, Edgar J. Kaufmann, was sent from the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewis h Congress, the B’nai B’rith and the Jewish Labor Committee to Myron Taylor wi shing the Conference success in achieving an “effective and speedy solution” of the refug ee crisis. 83 The German Jewish newspaper, Centralverein Zeitung ( C.V. Zeitung ), the official publication of the Centralverein deutscher Stastsbrger jdischen Glaubens (Central Union of German Citizens of Jewish Faith) posted a headline: “Are the Door s Opening?” Alfred Hirschberg, a liberal German attorney and editor-in-chie f, believed that deliverance lay just beyond the horizon. A CV Zeitung reporter, upon arrival in Geneva, became skeptical that the international gathering would bear any fruit. S uch pessimism was echoed by Der Schild ( The Shield ) which represented the National League of Jewish Frontline Veterans. The Jdische Rundschau ( Jewish Review ) of Robert Weltsch, on the other hand, alleged that the Evian Conference carried great symboli c value focusing international attention on the Jewish Question, “one of the great public problems of our time” which would be greatly aided by American leadership and participation. 84 83 The Pittsburgh Press July 8, 1938, 5. 84 Centralverein Zeitung, March 31, 1938; Alfred Hirschberg, “Thoughts for v ian Conference,” Centralverein Zeitung June 9, 1938; CV Zeitung June 23, 1938; Der Schild June 24, 1938; “Today vian Comes to a Close,” Jdische Rundschau July 15, 1938 cited in John V. H. Dippel, Bound Upon a Wheel of Fire: Why So Many German Jews Made the Tragic De cision to Remain in Nazi Germany (NY: Basic Books, 1996), 225-226, 232. The CV was founded in Germany during the late nineteenth c entury as a response to rising German anti-Semitism and listed 72,500 members in 1924. It became the most influential and largest German Jewish organization representing the liberal middle class and called fo r greater assimilation of Jews into German society an d culture and maintained an anti-Zionist stance unt il

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147 Banker Max Warburg opposed mass resettlement of Jewish refugees due to its potential for stimulating global anti-Semitism and supported a slower rate of evacuation lest rescue efforts “defeat its own ends.” He wanted the Intergovernmenta l Committee for Political Refugees to exert pressure on the German Foreign Ministry not to increase the pace of forced emigration. A more orderly system of departure could be fina nced by Jewish investment in German companies located abroad allowing, he believed, for Jew s to retain a viable amount of financial assets. By 1938 the Nazis, however, were no lon ger willing to allow direct transfer of Jewish assets as had been carried out unde r the earlier Ha’avarah plan and would later refuse to meet and negotiate with George Rublee, the Director of the IGCR. 85 Jewish Federations within Poland lauded Roosevelt for his plan to rescue refugees but Myron C. Taylor sought, prior to the opening of the Evian Conference, to evade any consideration of the Jewish Question in Poland by avoiding official discussions with Polish Zionists. 86 The Jewish Agency for Palestine hoped that the delegations would “emphatically protest” German anti-Semitism and adopt a “bolder immigrat ion policy” 1933. The organization began in 1893 but lost its autonomy following the 1938 Kristallnacht During 1936 the association was renamed the Jdischer Centralverein Hirschberg was later arrested and sent to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp but later was allowed to emigrate overseas. Katherine Morris, Odyssey of Exile: Jewish Women Flee the Nazis for B razil (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1996), 116. Robert Weltsch fled to Palestine in 19 38 and became a correspondent for Ha’aretz During the Nazi economic boycott of April 1, 1933 in which a y ellow star had to be prominently displayed on the outside of Jewish establishments, Weltsch wrote: “T his is a painful reminder to all those who betrayed their Judaism...The Jew who denies his Judaism is no bett er a citizen than his fellow who avows it openly... The Jew is marked a Jew. He gets the Yellow Badge...Thi s regulation is intended as a brand, a sign of cont empt. We will take it up and make it a badge of honor.” R obert Weltsch, “Wear It With Pride, The Yellow Badge,” Jdische Rundschau no. 27, April 4, 1933, available from /part1/doc14.html ; Internet; accessed March 12, 2009. 85 Dippel, Bound Upon a Wheel 226, 238. 86 Mashberg, “American Diplomacy,” 348.

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148 that would afford “immediate relief.” The Agency recognized, however, that t he numbers of immigrants that could be admitted into Palestine could not “be answered now with a ny degree of certainty.” 87 The World Jewish Congress viewed the convening of the Evian Conference as an historic event representing the “first attempt to evolve a c onstructive and all-inclusive solution of the refugee problem” and believed it represented the “ only hope” for hundreds of thousands of persecuted Jews. The Congress called upon the international missions to pressure the German Government into altering it s economic policies that place Jews into a “state of complete destitution.” The Evian Confe rence would be a futile exercise in diplomacy if it failed to “raise a firm protes t against this shocking system which tramples underfoot the fundamental principles of justice a nd humanity.” The World Congress also called for the inclusion of the Jews of Easter n Europe who also faced involuntary displacement. New territories for immigrati on should be sought in underdeveloped regions but would entail a slow and expensive process. Palestine, the World Congress held, could absorb an annual quota of sixty thousand to one hundred thousand refugees per year. Thus, it was necessary for the nations represented at the Evian Conference to convince the United Kingdom to honor its commitment to establish a Jewish National Home in Palestine as outlined in the 1917 Balfour Declaration. 88 87 “Memorandum of the Jewish Agency, Palestine, to th e Evian Conference” July 6, 1938 available from Terror/RefugeeP/Memoran1.html ; Internet; accessed May 15, 2010. 88 “Memorandum of the World Jewish Congress to the Evi an Conference” July 6, 1938, S7/693, World Jewish Congress Executive Committee Central Zionist Archive, Jerusalem available from Terror/RefugeeP/Memoran2.html ; Internet; accessed March 23, 2008.

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149 The editor of the Palestinian paper Ha’aretz Moshe Glickson, recorded that the Evian Conference had generated “immense esteem and admiration” for the Am erican President from the Jews of the Diasporsa. 89 Moshe Kleinman, the editorialist for Haolam expressed gratitude to FDR and acknowledged the “historic importance” of the gathe ring. He was concerned about the potential for “further dispersion [of Jews] instea d of the ingathering” into Palestine that was the dream of all Zionists; an ideal seve rely constrained by high costs, British immigration policies and Arab hostilities. 90 Dr. Mordechai Ehrenpreis, Chief Rabbi of Sweden, who went to the conference as an observer, was moved by a “sense of growing optimism… [F]rom afar there shone the thought of Evian as a star of hope.” The meeting could potentially reflect the “wor ld’s conscience.” Finally, he believed, the community of man had awakened to the evil tha t threatened Jewish existence in Central Europe. The very convening of the Evian Conference represented a “resonant act” which provided hope for a “downtrodden and oppressed” people.” 91 The Zionist Organization of America announced that a special edition of the Golden Book of the Jewish National Fund would be dedicated to Roosevelt with a citation acknowledging that his efforts on behalf of the Jewish people deserved to be “engraved in the hearts of the Jewish people.” 92 Palestine was, however, to remain the prime focus of Jewish transfer and the Jewish Agency drafted a memorandum call ing for 89 Ha’aretz July 8, 1938 cited in Beit-Zvi, Post-Ugandan Zionism 145. 90 Haolam July 7, 1938. Ibid., 152-153. 91 Dr. Mordechai Ehrenpreis, Between East and West (Av Oved: 1957), 223-224. Ibid., 144. 92 Davar July 5, 1938. Ibid., 145.

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150 resettlement within Palestine and Transjordan. British Zionists called upon the Home Government to immediately admit large numbers of German and Austrian Jews i nto the Mandate. When it became clear that Britain did not intend to alter its policy on immigration into Palestine and would not broach the subject at the Conference the Zionis t delegation at Evian announced that it would not be considered “worthwhile” for Chaim Weizmann to appear before a sub-committee “as one of fifty representatives of other private organizations.” 93 A number of private organizations dealing with the refugee problem submitted to the British Home Secretary a memorandum on June 15, 1938 regarding the treatment of migrs who had been allowed entry into the United Kingdom. A deputation, chaired by the Archbishop of Canterbury called upon the Government to exert the utmost degree of international cooperation at the conference. 94 It soon became clear at the Conference that territories with sizable M uslim minorities would be excluded from consideration as possible sanctuaries for st ateless Jews. The colonial powers feared that Muslim-Jewish discord would lead to instabil ity within their possessions. The importance of maintaining Arab support for Britai n in the Middle East and elsewhere was summarized in statements made by Prime M inister Neville Chamberlain on April 20, 1939 (before the issuance of the May White Paper severely curtailing Jewish immigration into Palestine): It was of “immense importance” strategically “to have the Moslem world with us…If we must offend one side, let us 93 Davar July 14, 1938. Ibid., 146. 94 Adler-Rudel, “The Evian Conference,” 240. The delegation included Lord Sempill, the Bishop of Chichester, Otto Schiff, Brigadier General Sir Wynd ham Deedes, Lord Cecil, Sir Frederick Kenyon, and A.G. Brotman and other experts.

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151 offend the Jews rather than the Arabs.” 95 Sir Herbert Emerson provided the British Government with a definition of “refugee” which would be utilized to control the numbers of Jews allowed via quota to enter Palestine. According to this definition a refugee was a person who had “fled his country” for another locale due to fears that “his life was in jeopardy.” Jews would not be considered refugees as long as they r emained within Germany proper, albeit “oppressed” and “pursued” by an intolerant government and society. They remained “responsible for their own fate.” Therefore, the resc ue work of Sir Herbert began only when the potential refugee crossed the frontier of the Re ich. 96 Some Jews, however, strongly doubted the success of the Conference. S.A. Whaley, the Jewish Principal Secretary of Finance in the United Kingdom, predic ted that the meeting would result in a “fiasco.” He noted that few governments were c urrently admitting significant numbers of refugees and were unlikely to alter their entry policies. He expected the uttering of “platonic sympathies” from the various delegati ons and believed that the creation of the Intergovernmental Committee for Politica l Refugees would not serve any “useful purpose” and, in fact, might interfere with the functions of the League’s High Commissioner. 97 The Dutch Committee for Jewish Refugees advised relief organizations within The Netherlands not to send memoranda or petitions to the meeting as it had been “earnestly advised by the Foreign Office and the [Mi nistry of] 95 Bat Ye’Or and Miriam Kochan, Islam and Dhimmitude: Where Civilizations Collide (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 2002), 355. 96 Meier Sompolinsky, Britain and the Holocaust: The Failure of Anglo-Jew ish Leadership? (Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 1999), 43. 97 S.D. Waley to Sir Frederick Phillips, memorandum, E vian Conference, June 17, 1938 cited in London, Whitehall 88.

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152 Justice, for highly commendable reasons that no petitions should be sent, particularly by Jews…either to the Dutch Government or to the Evian Conference.” 98 Roosevelt apparently believed, as stated in the official invitation, that the bul k of the refugee work would be carried out and financed by private organizations. Consequently, he called upon the leaders of these groups to meet with him in Washing ton on April 14 in order to create the Presidential Advisory Committee on Political R efugees (PACPR); a construction which was tasked to cooperate with and render assis tance to any rescue plans formulated by the international conference in Evian. The objectives, however, were not clearly defined and any financing was expected to be donated by nongovernmental sources. The majority of its membership was, significantly, non -Jewish. 99 James G. McDonald assumed the chairmanship during the first meeting on May 16, 1938 and Samuel Cavert became secretary. The committee set out to assess potentia l sites of resettlement and worked through the offices of the State Departme nt with Roosevelt assuming little or no personal involvement. Assistant Secretary of St ate George Messersmith cautioned against too much optimism. He advised the PACPR to “frankly face certain facts at the outset.” Although the various delegations were “deeply moved by humanitarian instincts” the American diplomat observed they were atte nding 98 David Cohen (head of the Committee) to D.M. Sluys, Secretary of the Union of Ashkenazi Communities, June 21, 1938, Archives of the Jewish Refugee Committee, file 5 cited in Michman, “The Committee,” 218. 99 FDRL/OF 3186, April 8, 1938, Invitation to White Ho use Meeting cited in Feingold, Politics of Rescue 25. The group included Joseph Chamberlain, Law P rofessor and Chairman of the National Coordinating Committee; Samuel Cavert of the Nation al Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.; Archbishop Joseph Rummel of New Orleans, chairman o f the Committee for Catholic Refugees from Germany; Louis Kennedy, president of the National C ouncil for Catholic Men; Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury; Bernard Baruch, presiden tial adviser; James G. McDonald, former League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany ; and later Rabbi Stephen Wise, president of the American Jewish Congress

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153 the congress with little “enthusiasm,” “much reserve” and minimal willi ngness to make national “sacrifices.” Messersmith expected the delegates to “render li p service” to the assistance of refugees while avoiding any modification of their immigrati on policies. Although the consolidation of the American quotas for Germans and Austrians offered “little positive action” he hoped that the “liberal attitude” adopted by the United St ates towards the involuntary migrs would “serve as an example and incentive to othe r countries” that would “go far towards relieving the situation.” 100 Messersmith’s sentiments proved to be quite accurate. The groundwork was laid both privately and publically for the approach that would be adopted during the oration of the conference. The importation of Jews created a potential risk to internal nati onal security and stability. Refugees posed a threat to the native work force and rais ed the specter of dependency upon the public coffers. Palestine could have offered potential rescue to some of the refugees but British foreign interests vis--vis the M uslim world trumped humanitarian concerns. Perhaps more importantly, the failure of the Je wish community to present a united front and to speak with one voice relegated the Centra l European Jews, the principal figures of the conference to the inconsequentiality of the sidelines; mere onlookers in the drama of life and death. 100 Minutes of the 1 st Meeting of the PACPR, May 16, 1938, YIVO, Joseph C hamberlain Papers, Box 3, Folder 58 cited in David Large, And the World Closed Its Doors 20-31.

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154 PART II HOPE ASCENDING Chapter 5 Day One “Actual Racial Problem” “Shall we refuse the unhappy fugitives from distres s that hospitality which the savages of the wilderness extended to our forefathers arriving in this land? Shall oppressed humanity find no asylum on this globe?” Thomas Jefferson 1 “A conference is a gathering of important people wh o singly can do nothing, but together can decide that nothing can be done.” Fred Allen 2 The original planning for the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees (IGCPR or more familiarly known as the Evian Conference) called for two public sessions, which were later extended to six. The expansion of the number of open sessions provided the envoys with an opportunity to indulge in lofty oratory that highlighted their humanitarian concerns while simultaneously explaining why the ir respective nations could not act. Only one private meeting, composed of all the delegations, was held. Two sub-committees, imbued with the spirit of the official invitation, would actually carry out the work of the conference. 1 Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address March 4, 1801. 2 Fred Allen available from nce%22 ; Internet; accessed July 23, 2010.

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155 The first, the Technical Sub-Committee, chaired by Judge Michael Hansson of Norway, was charged with the examination of the legal aspects of emigration. Eac h country would be asked to supply the particulars of their immigration laws and poli cies, an estimate of the number of refugees that would be allowed entry and the specifi cs regarding any required documentation. The panel would report their findings to the general conference. The Hansson Committee would be composed of delegates from t he United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, The Netherlands and Switzerl and, assisted by Sir Neill Malcolm; nations that had already expressed their resistance to accepting and subsidizing additional involuntary migrs. The response of this committee’s membership to its appointed task was “far from enthusiastic ” marked by poor attendance at its initial meeting. In fact, by the time of the fourth public s ession Chairman Hansson, frustrated by the panel’s lack of interest, was forced to a sk the delegations “to be good enough to send representatives to the second meeting of the Sub-Committee.” As will be noted later by the Chief Concierge of the Hotel Roya l the opportunities for entertainment and recreation in the vicinity of Evian and Lake Gen eva proved too difficult to resist. 3 The second working group, the Sub-Committee on the Reception of Those Concerned with the Relief of Political Refugees from Germany (including Aus tria), 3 Adler-Rudel, “Evian Conference,” 251-252. Judge M ichael Hansson assumed the office of President of the Nansen Office during January 1936 and direct ed the International Commission for the Assistance of Spanish Child Refugees during the Spanish Civil War He was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace on behalf of the Nansen Office on December 10, 1938. The Norwegian jurist declared that the “biggest soc ial question of our time” was the refugee problem and w arned that five million Jews were at risk of becomi ng homeless and stateless and called for international loans to assist all refugees. “Suggest Loan,” The Kingston Daily Freeman (Kingston, NY), December 18, 1938, 7 available fro m NY%20Daily%20Freeman/Kingston%20NY%20 Daily%20Freeman%201939%20Grayscale/Kingston%20NY%20 Daily%20Freeman%201939%20b%20Gr ayscale%20-%200126.pdf ; Internet; accessed August 7, 2010.

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156 chaired by the Australian Minister of Commerce, Lieutenant Colonel Thoma s W. White (who openly opposed immigration into Australia), included emissaries from Belgi um, the United Kingdom, United States, France, Mexico, Peru, Cuba, Nicaragua, Costa Ric a and Venezuela. Testimony would be restricted to those “organizations concerned wi th the relief of political refugees from Germany (including Austria)” and a me morandum would be submitted to the general meeting synopsizing the presentations. Thirty nine refugee organizations were in attendance at the Evian Conference but only twenty four were ultimately permitted to address the Sub-Committee li mited by severe time constraints. Each group would be allowed one spokesman who would be granted a maximum of ten minutes; later abbreviated to five minutes. 4 Although these Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO) were expected to finance any reset tlement project they were allowed to participate only in an unofficial capacity. 5 Four different strategies or themes resonated among these PVO’s: 1. Mass emigration to Palestine coupl ed with a relaxation of the British imposed quota; 2. Assimilation within lands of temporary hav en; 3. Resettlement in remote and underdeveloped territories and 4. Granting minority r ights to Jews in nations offering sanctuary. 6 The Jewish representatives were “marched in one at a time, like military defaulters brought up before their commanding officer ,” allowed to make their presentation and answer questions (if any were asked) and then “dismissed.” The hearing was handled by the chairman, T.W. White, with such 4 Proceedings of the Evian Conference July 7, 1938, 24; Breitman, American Refugee Policy 103. Out of the thirty nine refugee groups attending the mee ting twenty were Jewish; Anthony Read and David Fisher, Kristallnacht: The Nazi Night of Terror (NY: Random House, 1989), 231. 5 Resolution adopted by the Intergovernmental Commit tee (Evian) on July 14, 1938, Proceedings of the Intergovernmental Committee, 54. 6 Adler-Rudel, “Evian Conference,” 256.

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157 “exemplary efficiency and dispatch” that it was completed over the cours e of one afternoon. 7 Representatives of Austrian refugee organizations were barred from atte nding any of the meetings. Artur Rosenberg, representing the Federation of Austr ian Exiles, labeled such a restriction as “scandalous [as] the committee was calle d to discuss our own people.” 8 He had informed the American delegation that seventy-five percent of Austri an citizens would leave Greater Germany if allowed to retain sufficient fi nancial assets. A Nazi Government spokesman, however, branded such a claim as “too ridiculous for words” and cited the plebiscite of April 10, in which 99.75% of eligible Austrians supported the Anschluss. 9 The German authorities (possibly Artur Seyss-Inquart himself) sent two Au strian Jews, Professor Heinrich Neumann von Hethars, a noted otorhinolaryngologist and Dr. Joseph Loewenherz, head of the Jewish community in Vienna, to the meeting and were rumored to have been authorized to seek specific proposals that would increase the facility and rate of Jewish emigration. 10 It was reported that Neumann bore an unofficial plan from the Reich Government in which Germany sought the evacuation of forty thousand Austrian Jews by August 1; a request that Neumann claimed Brenger took “under advisement.” The physician claimed that his personal situation was “very very difficult” as he was required to return to Germany “with a definite number to be 7 David Vital, A People Apart: The Jews in Europe, 1789-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 886. 8 Washington Post July 7, 1938, 9. 9 “Incident Mars Calm,” New York Times July 7, 1938, 1. 10 The Times July 7, 1938, 16.

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158 evacuated, not promises of investigation by commissions, or offices.” 11 Neumann denied that he had been given concrete directives by the German Government to present to the delegations. Rather, he would simply be following recommendations offered by Naz i officials in Vienna. 12 Otto Hirsch of the National Representation of German Jews ( Reichsvertretung der Jden in Deutschland ), Michael Traub of the Palestine Office, Paul Eppstein, Zionist Seigfried Moses and Dr. Werner Rosenberg, who led a mission from the Hilfsverein der Jden in Deutschland attended the conference. 13 Lord Winterton, the head of the British delegation and later chairman of the permanent Intergovernmental Committee bas ed in London, met privately with the German Jewish mission during the beginning of the Conference. 14 Hirsch advised him of the importance of Jews being allowed to retain sufficient financial assets to facilitate resettlement and estim ated that approximately two hundred thousand Jews sought to leave the Reich. Hirsch intimated that the Nazi Government would negotiate with the Reichsvertretung upon the conclusion of the 11 “Public Sessions Tomorrow,” New York Times July 8, 1938, 7. Heinrich Neumann von Hethars (Ju ne 10, 1873-November 6, 1939) was the premier ear, nos e and throat specialist in Vienna prior to the onse t of the war and had served as a consultant to British K ing Edward during September 1936 and also the Duke of Windsor. 12 “Taylor Made Head of Refugee Parley,” New York Times July 8, 1938, 1. 13 The German Government allowed official Jewish deleg ations to attend the Evian Conference: the Reichsvertretung der Jden in Deutschland— National Representation of German Jews established on September 29, 1933 and led by Rabbi Leo Baeck and D r. Otto Hirsch (including Dr. Paul Eppstein and Michael Traub of the Palestine Office) and Dr. Wern er Rosenberg of the Aid Association of German Jews or Hilfsverein der Jden in Deutschland established in 1901 to aid Jews fleeing Eastern Eu rope. With the advent of Hitler its focus changed to aiding Jews s eeking to leave Germany). The Jewish Community in Vienna ( Israelitische Kultusgemeinde Wien) was represented by Prof. Dr. Heinrich Neumann, Dr. Joseph Loewenherz and a businessman, Bertold. J. Storfer. The two delegations jointly composed and submitted to the Conference a detailed statement outlining a pot ential scheme for orderly emigration from Germany a nd Austria. Storfer was later involved with the smugg ling of illegal immigrants into Palestine. 14 Edward Turnour, the 6 th Earl Winterton (April 4, 1883-August 22, 1962). W interton had been appointed the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in March 1938 and was the Cabinet official dealing with refugee matters.

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159 conference. The one remaining detail was the choice of destination and Palestine, Hi rsch believed, provided the best location. However, unbeknownst to him the British Government, through discussions with the Americans, sought to block discussion of the Mandate at the Conference. Winterton did allow that a limited number of Jews would be resettled in African colonial holdings but it was not possible to increase the number of visas for Palestine. 15 Myron C. Taylor met with Lord Winterton and Sir Charles Michael Palairet, K.C.M.G., (a Jesuit; Minister Plenipotentiary to Austria at the time of Anschluss ) during the evening of July 5 prior to the formal opening of the conference. The British, supportive of the work of the League’s High Commissioner for Refugees from Germ any, Major General Sir Neill Malcolm, would not agree to any measures that would lea d to a diminution of the League’s work. Taylor responded that the United States could and would not participate in the creation of any international refugee body that would s erve an “advisory” role to the High Commission but believed that the refugee organizat ions should serve complementary not subsidiary roles. He also acknowledged that it w as the bureaucracy of the Secretariat of the League, and not Secretary General Joseph Avenol, that maintained “hostil[ity] to the extreme” towards the Evian Conference and hoped for its failure. 16 A Major Abrams, an official involved with League refugee operations, was 15 Dippel, Bound Upon a Wheel 231. Hirsch (1885-1941) was arrested following Kristallnacht and sent to Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp for two weeks a nd rearrested in February 1941 and was dispatched to Mauthausen Concentration Camp where he died. Ep pstein assumed the role of Reich Union president following Hirsch’s demise. 16 Joseph Louis Anne Avenol (June 9, 1879-September 2, 1952). Avenol has been portrayed in James Barros, Betrayal From Within: Joseph Avenol, Secretary-Gene ral of the League of Nations, 1933-1940 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,1969) as an a rdent supporter of British and French attempts to appease Nazi Germany while, according to Lord Halif ax, seeking to “’protect the League of Nations fro m having to decide any questions of principle.’” Ave nol opposed criticism of Japanese aggression in

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160 distinctly antagonistic and engaged in “stirring up” opposition to the Conference especially among the Latin American delegations. 17 The British delegation eventually agreed to join their American counterparts in the establishment of an “informal drafting committee,” excluding the Lati n American nations, to produce a final resolution that would be presented to the heads of the various delegations. 18 Foreign Office Advisor Roger Makins believed that America, by necessity, must assume the leadership role in the Conference lest the “meeti ng…be chiefly occupied with passing the buck.” French Diplomat Pierre Bressy expres sed his Government’s opposition to locating the planned Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees in Paris maintaining that such a site would “attract und esirable elements” and risk jeopardizing cordial diplomatic relations with Germany. Taylor then outlined his conception of the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees (IGCPR) which “tremendously impressed” Winterton. T he American believed that Sir Neill Malcolm and Judge Michael Hansson of the Nansen Office possessed too much of a “pushing character” that would be disruptive to the efforts of t he Manchuria and the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and offered only a muted response to the German annexation of Austria and silence following the Naz i invasion of Poland. During May 1940 Sean Lester, the Irish Deputy Secretary General, express dismay at the “’dearth of [Avenol’s] leadership and inspiration…The office seemed without soul…’” availa ble from ; Internet; accessed August 9, 2010. 17 John Mendelsohn, ed., The Holocaust vol. 5 (NY: Garland Publishing, 1982), 250-251. 18 Yivo Annual of Jewish Social Science vol. 15, 1974, 351. U.K delegation included Edwar d Turnour, 6 th Earl Winterton, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancast er; Sir Charles Michael Palairet; Sir John Shuckburgh, Colonial Office Under-Secretary of Stat e; J.G. Hibbert, Director at Colonial Office; E.N. Cooper, Director at Home office and R.M. Makins. T his special group consisted of the 1 st Baron Sherfield Roger Mellor Makins (Foreign Office Assistant Advis or on League of Nations Questions) for the UK, Pierre Bressy (Minister Plenipotentiary, Deputy Dir ector of the International Unions at the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs) for France and Robert T. Pell (Div ision of European Affairs, State Department) for th e U.S.

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161 working group. Consequently, they were dropped from consideration of formal membership on the soon-to-be established committee. Winterton and Brenger then advised Taylor that he bore the primary responsibility to negotiate with the va rious delegations due to his role of Chairman and the “American initiative” that prompt ed the convening of the Conference. 19 U.S. Ambassador to Britain, Joseph Kennedy, was, however, skeptical of Taylor’s diplomatic qualifications and believed that he “not onl y [lacked] knowledge of the problem, but was making no attempt to get it up.” 20 Despite rather inauspicious beginnings the Evian Conference formally con vened on July 6, 1938 in the Grand Ballroom of the Hotel Royal with 140 representatives from thirty two countries. The meeting was scheduled to adjourn by July 17 to allow enough time for the delegates to reach Paris by July 19 when the King of England paid an offi cial visit. The Conference would resume in Paris if necessary. 21 A telegram, read into the official record, was sent on behalf of the members of the Evian Conference to the American President by Myron Taylor. The committee offered FDR it’s “gr atitude” for his attempt to devise a “practical solution” to the problem of forced emigration a nd was hopeful that a general “collaboration” of all parties would produce “successf ul results.” 22 19 “Report of Myron C. Taylor to the Secretary of Stat e in Washington about the Evian Conference, July 20, 1938,” Mendelsohn, The Holocaust, 249-64. 20 Sherman, Island Refuge 104. 21 Telegram from Ambassador Bullitt in France to Hull regarding discussions of Taylor with Brenger. 840.48 Refugees/413, June 27, 1938, FRUS vol. 1, 1938, 751. Beginning on May 30, 1938 a nu mber of police raids in Germany were carried out on restaur ants, cafes and other locales frequented by Jews. 397 Jews were arrested in Berlin “on political grounds” facing accusations of illegally removing possessio ns and finances out of the country. Similar raids occ urred several weeks later in other cities in German y as well as within Vienna. Some sources postulated tha t 2,000 arrests were made, timed to influence the upcoming proceedings at the Evian Conference. Schn eiderman, ed., American Jewish Year Book Review of the Year 5698 200-201. 22 “Proceedings of the Intergovernmental Committee,” Second Meeting, July 7, 1938, 17.

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162 Senator Henri Brenger, head of the French delegation, chairman of the French Senate’s Committee on Foreign Affairs and former member of the League of Nations High Commission for Refugees, served as temporary chairman, and welcomed the delegates. 23 He described France as a nation of “refuge” and thus was certain that the Conference would achieve something “new and practical” to resolve the refugee c risis. While “heartily welcome[ing]” the attending private organizations he descri bed the meeting as a simple “body” created by Roosevelt which would not serve as a “pl atform for declarations.” The American President’s goal was not to create any “innovations” but to bring together a committee composed of countries which would include non-members of the League. 24 Myron C. Taylor, head of the American mission, next approached the podium. He began by describing the “millions” of people who had been or were at potential r isk of being forcibly expelled from their country without consideration of the potential consequences. The fact that the world was in the grips of an economic depression wit h high unemployment, social unrest, a rising population and declining standards of living greatly complicated the search for a solution to the refugee problem. The cala mity could no longer be considered a “purely private concern” but required international coopera tion and action. A “major forced migration” was underway, affecting all races and cr eeds, professions and trades, forcing the nations of temporary and permanent refuge to rapidly 23 Henri Brenger (April 22, 1867-May 18, 1952) served as Ambassador to the U.S. from 1926-1927 and had held the post of Chairman of the Comit Gnral du Ptrol 24 “Proceedings, First Public Meeting, July 6, 1938, 11.

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163 devise a “long-range program of [a] comprehensive scale” that would solve the pr oblem of “political refugees.” 25 The “urgency” of the present situation led President Roosevelt to convene the Evian Conference. Taylor believed that the current humanitarian problem differe d from earlier migrations. 26 Instead, the modern world faced an “artificially stimulated” exodus generated by the policies of “some countries” (Germany was not specifica lly) that resulted in the creation of “great bodies of reluctant migrants who must be absorbe d in abnormal circumstances at a time of stress.” The scope of the problem was s o “vast and complex” that only international cooperation could create a mechanism that would lead t o a “practicable amelioration of the condition of the unfortunate human beings with whom we are concerned.” The only realistic goal of the initial Evian Conference, therefore, would be to establish the groundwork for the “machinery” of an intergovernmental body, preferably based in Paris that would over time devise a practical solution. While i deally all international refugee situations should be under the auspices of the League Assem bly necessity required focusing on the “most pressing” issue of “political refugees ” stemming from Germany and Austria. Therefore, the subjects of the committee would be l imited to migrants who sought to leave the Reich because of “their political opinions, religi ous beliefs or racial origins” and those who had already left and were residing in temporary havens. Significantly, Taylor never used the word “Jew.” Age would play a role in the 25 “Text of Taylor’s Address at Refugee Parley,” New York Times July 7, 1938, 9. 26 Ibid. Taylor categorized earlier periods of mass mi gration: the “hostile movement of whole peoples advancing as military or political waves” into regi ons that were already developed; “colonization movements” under the auspices of organized governme nts; the migrations of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries involving individuals and families as a c onsequences of “unsatisfactory economic and living conditions” in their nation of origin and the hope for a better life.

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164 ability of a Jew to leave Germany and the demographics and a breakdown by age in provide in table 6. Table 6: Demographics of Jewish Population in Germany as of January 1, 1938 Age Group Number Percent All ages 350,000 100.0 Under 20 54,300 16.0 20-44 106,700 30.0 45-50 37,100 11.0 Over 50 151,900 43.0 Statistics based on information supplied to the Evian Conference by the Central Organization of German Jewry. The predominance of older versus younger Jews w as due to emigration and falling birthrates. Arieh Tartakower, “The Jewish Refug ees,” 324. Taylor acknowledged the work of the League’s High Commission for Refugees from Germany (HCR) and the Nansen Office but it was the official Americ an view that these organizations should serve a complementary role to a new body that would be created by the Conference to deal with specific groups of refugees. Unlike the Br itish who wanted any permanent Intergovernmental Committee to be subsumed by the Lea gue, the Americans wanted the new organization to be independent, noting that the League had not demonstrated any “great interest” in the German and Austrian refugee pr oblem prior to the Roosevelt invitation and that it tended to limit “refugee work to juridical protection.” The United States believed that Germany would cooperate to a grea ter degree with a committee located outside of Geneva and membership on the committe e could more easily be restricted to receiving States. Taylor also called for a confidential exchange of information between the delegations regarding the “number and type” of refugees that would be acceptable to ea ch nation based on its current immigration and policies as well as identification of the

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165 territories on to which resettlement could occur. The issue of appropriate travel documents and finance would also have to be faced. Taylor emphasized the “liberality” of existing American immigration laws and highlighted the consolidation of the a nnual German and Austrian quotas allowing 27,370 to enter per year; an annual quota that had not been completely filled since 1915. 27 Significantly, the merging of the two quotas, which marked the extent of American rescue efforts at the meeting, allayed the fears of the other delegations that they would be subjected to American pressure to modify their respective immigration poli cies. Harold Troper and Irving Abella noted that the representatives were “stunned; t he nations of the world had been mobilized for this?” The council members issued a “collective sigh” but for the population at risk Taylor’s announcement denoted a “cruel letdown; for everyone [else] at Evian it was a reprieve.” 28 The American Chairman concluded by stating that the “forced and chaotic dumping of unfortunate people in large numbers” would exacerbate existing global 27 “Proceedings,” July 6, 1938, 11-13. A group of prom inent Englishmen, including the Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Noel-Buxton, Lord Cecil and Sir Wy ndham Deeds, recommended on July 27, 1937, that the British Foreign Office propose the creation of a permanent inter-governmental organization to deal with the problem of the German refugee that would replac e the League’s High Commission for German Refugees and the Nansen Office that were officially slated to close by the end of 1938. Support was offered by the High Commissioner Sir Neill Malcolm during September 1937 when he noted that “no appreciable progress has been made in the emigratio n and settlement of refugees.” Consequently, following the approval of the League Assembly in Oc tober 1937, an inter-governmental conference approved the February 1938 Convention concerning th e Status of Refugees coming from Germany; a measure that would grant refugees papers similar to the Nansen Passport. The refugee would also be granted the right to work ( permis de travail ) within the signatory nations of the U.K., France, Belgium, Spain, The Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, provide d they had maintained residence within the respective nation for at least three years, married a national or had a child who had been granted cit izenship of that country. The League Council called for the consolidation, on May 15, of the Nansen Office and High Commission for German Refugees under a single High Commissioner. However, the refugees generated by the Anschluss in March were not placed under the terms of this ne w convention until June 12. Schneiderman, ed., American Jewish Year Book Review of the Year 5698 343-345. 28 Irving Abella and Harold Troper, None is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe 193 3-1945 (NY: 1982), 31.

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166 “racial and religious problems” stimulating “economic retaliation” agai nst those nations responsible for involuntary emigration. The resultant “international mistrust and suspicion…and fear” would harm the policy of appeasement. The world faced “anarchy ” and the risk of war unless a workable solution was found to avert “catastrophic human suffering.” 29 The delegates spent two days deliberating the selection of the president of t he conference. The United States preferred a French representative. 30 However, France reflecting the British and French view of the need for the United States to a ssume the leading role, insisted upon an American and ultimately Myron C. Taylor, “who represented that very eminent personality, President Roosevelt,” was chosen. 31 Twentyfive official delegates spoke during the Evian Conference and, with few e xceptions, each resonated a common theme: each nation felt sympathetic to the plight of the refuge es but domestic economic, cultural, racial and ideological factors limited or preve nted the acceptance of forced emigrants. Lord Winterton acknowledged that the United Kingdom was anxious to find a workable solution to the refugee crisis but high levels of local unemployment and overpopulation precluded it from continuing its “traditional policy of offering asylum.” Safe haven could now only be granted “within narrow limits.” While attempts would be made to assimilate many of the Austrian and German refugees who had alread y gained entry into Britain His Majesty’s Government would study the prospects of admi ssion into 29 “Text of Taylor’s Address at Refugee Parley,” New York Times July 7, 1938, 9. 30 Clarence K. Streit, “Taylor Made Head of Refugee Pa rley,” New York Times July 8, 1938, 1. 31 “Proceedings,” July 7, 1938, 23.

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167 the Colonies and especially the East African territories. However, such proj ects could only benefit a restricted number of families as regional socioeconomic c oncerns, overpopulation, climate, racial and political differences imposed barriers to m ass immigration. He reassured the conference delegates that “His Majesty ’s Government does not despair that some of its colonial territories might provide a solution of the problem.” Winterton predicted that the task facing the international conference would be “immeasurably complicated” or potentially “insoluble” unless the Reich allowe d refugees to maintain assets sufficient enough to facilitate immigration and resett lement “with some prospects of success.” It was unrealistic, he believed, to expect any “thick ly populated” nation to accept individuals robbed of the “means of subsistence” prior to entry nor could private organizations be expected to bear the financial burden. He also warned that “ false expectations” would be raised by the belief that “pressure on minorities of ra ce and religion” could compel other nations to admit refugees. 32 Winterton carefully avoided any reference to Palestine in his opening remarks. Although Jews represented the majority of the involuntary refugees Winterton informed the Jewish representatives attending the Conference that they woul d not be considered as active participants in the meeting. Arthur Ruppin of the Jewish Age ncy for Palestine described Winterton as “a notorious opponent of Zionism and a friend of the Arabs.” Ruppin noted that Winterton received the Jewish representatives “exceedi ngly coldly” and was dismissive of their opinions regarding the issue of Jewish migrat ion from Central and Eastern Europe. The meeting, lasting only fifteen minutes, was a “slap on 32 ”Proceedings,” July 6, 1938, 13-15.

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168 the face” and Winterton emphasized that it “was not a conference…but an intergovernmental committee’s consultation [with] his intention being to make it clear to us that in fact we had no business to be here at all.” 33 MP Miss Eleanor Rathbone, during a House of Commons debate, also referred to the “pro-Arab sympathies of the Chance llor of the Duchy of Lancaster.” 34 Winterton served as Chairman of the Unofficial Committee to Defend Arab Interests in the House of Commons and was a friend of Iraqi Foreign Minister N uri Said. Winterton believed (along with others) in the necessity of Jews remaining a minority group, limited to forty percent of the total population, within Palestine coupled with a strict limitation or outright banning of land sales to Jews. Such a process, it was hoped, would allay Muslim fears, put an end to the Arab Revolt and pave the way for self-government. Said, however, would not accede to this plan. He envisaged the creation of an Arab confederation, linking Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq and possibly Syria. Restrictions on Jewish immigration into the Mandate would continue in order to maintai n the ratio of seven Arabs to four Jews, ensuring a permanent Muslim majority in P alestine. Thus, Palestinian Arab fears of Jewish economic and political domination would be eliminated. 35 33 Arthur Ruppin, Pirkei Hayyai: be-vinyan ha-arez ve-ha’am, iii (Tel Aviv, 1968), 302-303 cited in Vital, A People Apart, 881-889. 34 “Oral Answers to Questions—Refugees” House of Commo n Debates, June 27, 1938, House of Commons Debates, June 27, 1938, vol. 337, cc1516-7 available from ; Internet; accessed August 7, 2010. Eleanor Rathb one (May 12, 1872-January 2, 1946) was the Member of Pa rliament for the Combined English Universities and one of the first women to serve in the House. She was a social activist for feminine issues, independ ence of the British Colonies and became one of the most out spoken MP’s offering support for Jewish refugees. 35 Sanders, Shores of Refuge 439; Michael J. Cohen, Palestine: Retreat from the Mandate, The Making of British Policy 1936-45 (London: Paul Elek, 1978), 27, 197, fn101; Yehoshu a Porath, “Nuri al-Sa’id’s

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169 Unlimited Jewish migration into Palestine, however, was an entirely “unte nable” proposition due its territorial size, “special considerations” arising out of the British Mandate, “as well as the local situation [the Arabs], which cannot be ignored.” 36 The Arabs feared that the refusal of the democracies to accept a “relatively small number of refugees” could translate into a drastic demographic shift in Palestine s hould the Mandatory Power allow the entry of thousands of Jews; a move, of course, favored by th e Zionists as the “only answer to Hitler.” 37 61,000 Jewish refugees had entered Palestine in 1935 but the Royal or Peel Commission of 1937, investigating the possibilities of partitioning the Mandate, recommended that Jewish immigration be capped at 12,000 pe r annum. However, in that year only 10,500 actually landed. The admittance level rose i n 1939 to 16,400 but following the direction of the Woodhead Commission and the issuance of the White Paper of May 1939 British policy would only allow the resettlement of 75,000 over the next five years after which further Jewish immi gration would be terminated. By October 1936 the population of Palestine consisted of seven hundred thousand Arabs and four hundred thousand Jews. 38 Henri Brenger began his formal presentation by lauding France’s long histor y and tradition of offering asylum to refugees. He acknowledged, however, that curr ent Arab Unity Programme,” Middle Eastern Studies 20, no. 4 (October 1984):79-80. Echoing similar sentiments was Sheik Hafiz Wahba, the Saudi Ministe r to London, who warned Jews that peace in Palestine was dependent upon Jewish concessions to maintain permanent minority status. The Sentinel July 7, 1938, 3. 36 Sanders, Shores of Refuge 442. 37 Thomas Baylis, How Israel Was Won: A Concise History of the Arab-I sraeli Conflict (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1999), 32. 38 Geoffrey Wheatcroft, The Controversy of Zion: Jewish Nationalism, the Je wish State, and the Unresolved Jewish Dilemma (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1997), 209; Porath, “Nuri al-Said,” 79.

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170 domestic, economic, social and political considerations (the Anschluss, increasing persecution of Austrian Jews and concerns about forced emigration of Eastern Europe an Jews as well as national security—perceived threats of a resurrected and pow erful Germany and fears of admitting enemy aliens) had forced the French Government, under Premier Edouard Daladier, to adopt a policy of restricted immigration. The Third Republic had “already reached, if not already passed, the extreme point of satura tion.” Since the end of the Great War approximately two hundred thousand refugees (Nansen, Italian, Spanish and Central European) had already been admitted onto French soil of which twenty percent were Jewish. France, Brenger believed, was no longer capable of accepting further refugees. The nation also faced the difficulties of assi milating the three million aliens already resident within a country that had a population exceeding f orty million. 39 [See Appendix A for figures on Jews admitted into different countries, 19331945, as noted by different authors and Appendix B for number of officially recorded unassimilated political refugees within France 1922-1939.] 39 During the period between 1918-1933 France’s willin gness to accept refugees was motivated not only by humanitarian concerns but also as a means of rep lacing the laborers who had become the dead, missin g and wounded of the Great War. Both immigrants and displaced refugees would serve to restore and widen the scope of the nation’s economic, agricultural an d economic base as well as provide potential manpow er for the French armed services. A number of agreeme nts were initialed during the Inter-War period to import and employ foreign workers and included Pola nd, June 27, 1920; Czechoslovakia, January 15, 1921; Italy, May 21, 1921; Luxembourg, January 4, 1 923;Belgium, December 27, 1923; Austria, July 31, 1928; Greece, March 11, 1929 and Rumania, February 3, 1930. Gary S. Cross, “Toward Social Peace and Prosperity: The Politics of Immigration in France d uring the Era of World War I,” French Historical Studies 11, no. 4 (Fall 1980): 610, 622. A clear differe ntiation was not made between the status of refugee and immigrant as a variety of factors motivated tra nsnational movements and included domestic politica l instability or perceived threats to life and proper ty. There was the belief that political refugees w ould conflate their own security with that of France as compared with the motivations of immigrants who entered the country for different reasons. Refugee s were granted citizenship, identity papers and per mits to work in France but were excluded from voting. The French public remained supported of the entry of refugees until the domestic and international polit ical crisis shifted in the mid to late 1930s. The French Government claimed that during 1933-1936 180,000-25 0,000 refugees had been accepted but late 1930s sources maintain that the figure was as high as 400 ,000-600,000. Raymond Millet, Trois millions d’etrangers en France Les indesirables Les bienvenu s ( Paris: 1938) and Simpson, The Refugee Problem 333-334 cited in Maga “Closing the Door,” 425-426.

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171 The Evian Conference was not an “international conference,” Brenger advise d, but an “Intergovernmental Committee…not a forum for eloquent speeches… [but serving as] a center for the coordinated work of practical experts.” While pledging his country’s cooperation he warned that France had “already almost exhausted her own res ources” which, unfortunately, did not exceed “her zeal to serve the cause of humanity.” The French nation could not be expected to allow further entry of “homeless German wanderers.” 40 He, like the other European and United States delegates, expected that the “new countries” of Latin America should bear the brunt of resettlement. 41 Brenger, while acting as France’s representative to the League of Nations’ Hi gh Commission for Refugees (HCR), had already declared in December 1933 that France must function as a nation of transit or “way station” rather than serve the role of final destinati on. 42 The Chief of the Sret Jean Berthoin, argued that the economic depression had forced France to accept only those refugees who possessed transit visas for othe r states, proper documentation, sufficient funds or the requisite skills that would benef it the national economy or augment the “intellectual patrimony of our country.” “The pres ent state of saturation” prevented continuation of an open door immigration policy. Franc e could no longer accept the “’waste products of the entire Austrian or German immigration.” The Minister of the Interior Albert Sarraut and Berthoin order ed the border security forces to carry out the policy of “ refouler without mercy.” The unwanted would 40 “Proceedings,” July 6, 1938, 15-16. 41 St. Petersburg Times July 6 and 8, 1938. 42 Caron, Uneasy Asylum 15.

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172 be returned to Germany and Austria. 43 Such a policy represented, according to Vicki Caron, a “virtual death sentence to the right of asylum in France” and became the ba sis upon which French policy was framed at the Evian Conference. 44 Brenger’s views reverberated in moderate newspapers such as Le Temps which likewise declared that France was “saturated” with aliens and could only se rve as a point of transit. France needed to ensure that its “physical, moral and intellectua l equilibrium [was] not abruptly disrupted by a pronounced influx of elements too different and sometimes unassimilable.” 45 Such refugees were a threat to domestic employment, a potential source of crime, a burden to social services and “at times [they woul d] mar the physical appearance of our cities.” Therefore, a strategy of highly judicious immigration would need to be followed in view of “the numerical [dis]proportion between natives and foreigners,” while remaining cognizant of the declining birth rates among the French. “The unfortunate fact is that, alas, it is not the elites of Europe…who are flocking to us.” 46 Following the adoption of the Nuremberg Race Laws France enacted an officia l policy of impeding the entry of refugees and attempted to utilize the League Hi gh Commissioner as a means of removing those who had already found temporary sanct uary on French soil. 47 Minister of the Interior Sarraut announced in the Decree law of May 2, 43 “Note: a/s rfugis austrichiens. Runion du Comi te d’Evian,” June 13, 1938, Ministre des Affaires Etrangres (MAE), Paris, Socit des Nations (SDN), 1 M 1815, 156-161. Ibid., 184. 44 Ibid., 184 45 Le Problme des rfugis ,” editorial Le Temps, July 8, 1938, 1. Ibid., 278. 46 “ Les Etrangers en France ,” editorial, Le Temps May 16, 1938, 1. Ibid., 279. 47 Ibid., 39.

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173 1938 that the stability of the nation was threatened by the “ever-growing” numbe r of aliens residing on French soil. While claiming that the Republic would continue to honor its “traditional rules of French hospitality” the current situation mandated ena ctment of a careful screening process to separate “foreigner[s] of good faith” from t he “clandestine foreigners, irregular guests…unworthy of living on our soil.” Those selected f or entry would be welcomed but the “undesirables” would be forcibly expelled. 48 Edouard Daladier, at various times Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, and Gene ral Maurice Gamelin of the General Staff, called for enactment of stricter entry c riteria and the possible elimination of refugee admission altogether. Such aliens posed a threat to domestic labor and could represent a “Trojan Horse of spies and subversives” that abused France’s tradition of the “open door” while serving Nazi plans to destabilize t he French society and economy. 49 The Foreign Ministry declared that it was impossible to admit refugees in a “permanent capacity” but potentially could agree to allow resettlement in the French colonies. 50 Emile Roche, an influential spokesman for the Radical Party, stated in an editorial published in La Rpublique that high unemployment and oversaturation prohibited France from accepting any more aliens. He called upon the Government to promote emigration to French overseas holdings provided the project was infused with 48 Le Temps May 5, 1938. Ibid., 174. Aliens would have to be in possession of valid visas or identity cards or face fines or imprisonment and special pow ers of expulsion were granted to the prefects and police. 49 Daladier comments to the Second Session of the Inte r-ministerial Commission for German Refugees, October 16, 1933 and November 13, 1933, Serie Z-Europe 1930-1940, Allemagne (Questions religieuses), Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres no. 711cited in Maga, “Closing the Door,” 428. 50 Foreign Ministry (Europe) to the Ministry of Colon ies ( Direction politique ), June 17, 1938, MAE, SDN, I M 1815, 153-154. Caron, Uneasy Asylum 183.

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174 sufficient capital to “create employment opportunities, new markets or new t rade possibilities.” 51 The conservative paper, L’Ordre urged the French authorities to follow the British lead of offering refuge in their Empire. The daily suggested tha t a sizeable number of Jewish families could be relocated to Madagascar and such settlers “w ould soon discover the joy of living through work and love of a new country.” 52 However, the Minister of Colonies George Mandel, a Jew, warned on June 21 that any “Jewish colonization in our overseas domains” would result in “more numerous dangers than advantages.” 53 The spokesman for the Ministry of the Interior Bureau of Algerian Affairs ruled out re-settlement in this North African Colony due t o Arab hostilities coupled with the urban background of the refugees who may have become tainted with socialist or communist ideologies. In addition, the poor local economy and lack of employment would undoubtedly place the new arrivals on the public dole. 54 The right wing group L’Action franaise opposed any resettlement of Jews in the colonies. “It would be inadmissible to deliver up merchants, French colonists, as well as nati ves of 51 Emile Roche, “ Pour une ngociation ,” La Rpublique August 3, 1938, 1. Ibid, 219. 52 “La France doit fair un geste de solidarit en fav eur des juifs chasses d’Allegmagne,” L’Ordre November 19, 1938. Ibid., 220. 53 Minister of Colonies to the Foreign Ministry (Euro pe), June 21, 1938, MAE, SDN, I M 1815, 220221. Ibid., 183. Mandel warned George Bonnet on Ma y 25, 1938 that the Madagascar “affair” posed “ticklish political problems” for the Government. Transfer of Jews to another territory would give credence to the belief in the existence of a “Jewis h question.” France risked appearing to be in agre ement with certain foreign views that Jews were not “citi zens but…outsiders properly subject to a special st atute” and dependent upon the forbearance of the host nati on. Such acquiescence on the part of the French Government to such a view risked “encouraging the v ery persecutions and harsh measures that have helpe d provoke the exodus of Jewish populations.” In addi tion, Mandel argued, could not the country of origi n of the refugees (implying Germany) lay claim to any fu ture “large and prosperous communities” successfull y established by “Jewish colonists”? Mandel to Bonne t, May 25, 1938, French Foreign Ministry Archives cited in Michael R. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 62. 54 Minister of the Interior ( Direction du contrle de la comptabilit des affair es algriennes), 4me bureau to the Foreign Ministry (Europe), July 2, 1938, M AE, SDN, I M 1816, 25-26. Ibid., 183.

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175 Indochina or Madagascar, to the claws of German Jewish usurers.” 55 Roosevelt, however, had wanted the issue of colonial resettlement discussed at Evian and during June 1938 the State Department encouraged France to consider the possibilities of Madagascar The U.S. agreed not to raise this issue on the Evian Conference agenda due to Western European fears that such action would stimulate the forced emigration of Eastern European Jews. 56 American pressure to open up colonial holdings for refugees was, however, exerted upon the United Kingdom and France following the end of the conference. Taylor suggested, during September 1938, that France resettle thirty thousand re fugees from Central Europe in its overseas Empire over a period of five years. The Fre nch Government was expected to provide the land but the costs were to be borne by Jewish organizations. Undersecretary of State Welles continued to press this issue from midOctober, especially highlighting the prospects of Madagascar. 57 Ultimately, following Kristallnacht Prime Minister Daladier pledged to Welles that France would accept for ty thousand Jewish refugees in Madagascar while Foreign Minister George Bonnet promised that France would accept a limited number of Jewish refugees in its colonies as long as America and Britain acted in a similar manner. 58 Similar concerns and conditions affected other European nations who expected the nations of the Americas to accept the majority of the refugees due to their s maller 55 “Va-t-on ressusciter le projet d’migration juive aux colonies franaises?” Action franaise, November 27, 1948, Archives, Alliance Isralite Universelle (AIU), ms. 650, box 14 (47). Ibid., 220. 56 Roosevelt to Myron Taylor, January 14, 1939, 840.4 8 Refugees/1290B, FRUS, 1939,66-69 57 Ibid., 220. 58 Ibid., 221.

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176 populations and the availability of undeveloped lands. 59 The Dutch delegate, the Head of the Directorate of Legal Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, M.W .C. BeuckerAndreae, expressed his sympathy and acknowledged The Netherlands’ “ageold tradition [of] granting generous hospitality,” but he declared, the small nation had reached the saturation point and could no longer accept additional refugees except in extraordinary circumstances. 24,000-25,000 had already been admitted into a country with a population of nine million. The enactment of more stringent entrance policies was mandated, it was believed, by unfavorable economic conditions, fears of offending the Hitler regime and concerns of jeopardizing its policy of neutrality in the eve nt of war. The nation could only serve as a temporary way station on the route to other sites of permanent resettlement. Four hundred thousand Dutch citizens were unemployed leadi ng the authorities to encourage the emigration of its own nationals as a means of decr easing population density and joblessness. The Government would cooperate in the establishment of training centers for Jewish refugees to facilitate transmigration. In addition, its overseas colonial possessions were deemed unsuitable for the reset tlement of European Whites due to unfavorable climate. 60 Dutch borders were closed to German Jewish refugees by November 1938 and any refugees who had managed to gain entry would be arrested and interned in isolated special work camps. 61 The Belgian delegate, Robert de Foy, the director of the Belgian Sret de l’Etat highlighted Belgium's role in admitting and assimilating Russian and Arme nian 59 Report of Norman Bentwich, cited in Marrus, Unwanted 147; St. Petersburg Times July 7, 1938. 60 “Proceedings of the Evian Conference,” July 7, 1938 22. 61 “Jews on Knees Beg Netherlands Entry,” New York Times November 14, 1938, 7; “Escaped Germans Turned Back by Dutch,” The Times November 25, 1938, 13.

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177 refugees. Belgium had been a signatory to the Convention relating to the Internat ional Status of refugees (Geneva, October 18, 1933), The Provisional Arrangement Concerni ng the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany (Geneva, July 4, 1936) and had participated in (but not yet ratified) the creation of the Geneva Convention of Febr uary 10, 1938 that was to supplant the 1936 Arrangement. As a consequence, the Belgian Nation had received 8,800 Russian and assimilated refugees: 2,000 Germans, 800 Austrians, 3,000 Spanish children and 120 adults, 250 Italians and 80 Stateless refugees—totaling 15,050. The country was geographically small in size with a de nse population of 7,800,000 of whom 319,230 were aliens. Approximately 250,000 were unemployed. Although it was obvious that Belgium had responded in the “most loyal and generous manner” to the international agreements on refugees current conditions (German anti-Jewish policies, the need to maintain friendly relations wit h the Reich and threats of mass expulsions from Eastern European countries) prevented, “to her g reat regret,” the possibility of assuming “fresh international obligations” enta iling unknown consequences which might overwhelm “her practical possibilities.” Belgian acti ons were based on the proportionate responses of the other nations and the “hope that, with patience, openings may be found in overseas territories…” 62 Lt. Colonel Thomas Walter White, the head of the Australian delegation and chair of the Conference’s second sub-committee, acknowledged that Australia had 62 “Proceedings,” July 7, 1938, 18-19. Robert de Foy collaborated with the Germans before and during the Belgian occupation. General Eggert Reeder, the chief of the Wehrmacht in Brussels had informed Reinhard Heydrich, the head of the Reichssicherheidshauptamt (RHSA) or German State Security, in 1943 that “’De Foy had in the months preceding the invas ion closely collaborated with the RHSA and with Heydrich himself, to whom he had provided important material.’” Paul Belien “Belgian Authorities Destroy Holocaust Records,” August 31, 2006, The Brussels Journal available from ; Internet; accessed August 15, 2010.

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178 already accepted hundreds of Jewish refugees but his country could do no more. It would be unreasonable, he asserted, for a young nation such as his, with its majority root s derived from England, to accept an influx “of non-British subjects” that would be difficult to assimilate into the dominant culture. Significantly, he uttered a r efrain that resonated with many of the other delegations: It should be readily apparent that as Australia does not have a “real racial problem, we are not desirous of importing one” by supporting “any scheme of large-scale foreign migration.” Entry would be li mited to asylum seekers who would work within certain restricted livelihoods and trades t hat would not threaten the employment of Australian citizens. 63 Admission of large numbers of Jews, it was feared, would produce “enclaves” that would not be “easily assimi lable” into the national body and risked creation of local anti-Semitism. 64 The Sydney Truth an anti-Jewish immigration Labor newspaper, regarded the entry of “unwanted a nd unabsorbable Hebrews” as a threat to Australian “race, blood, and ideals.” 65 Alternatively, one editorialist regarded such an “undue suggestion of racial intolerance” as a “be trayal of our cherished traditions.” Acceptance of German and Austrian refugees would gr eatly benefit Australia by the infusion of “some of the best stock and finest minds of Europe.” 66 63 “Proceedings,” July 7, 1938, 19-20. Thomas W. Whit e (1887-1957) had been awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross during the Great War and served as a Federal Parliamentarian and Australian High Commissioner to Britain (1951-1956) and was kn ighted in 1952. He was the Australian Federal Minister for Trade and Customs and was in London wh en the invitation for the Evian Conference was issued. The Australian population in 1938 was appr oximately seven million. The nation occupied three million square miles of land. 64 “Jews Seeking to Enter Australia: 4,000 Application s,” The Times July 5, 1938, 13. 65 Sydney Truth October 16, 1938 cited in Blakeney, Australia and the Jewish Refugees 134. 66 Western Mail and South Wales News July 11, 1938 cited in Katz, “Public Opinion,” 108.

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179 White, however, enjoyed the backing of the Conservative Prime Minister Joseph Lyons who had stated that the Dominion had not yet reached the point of becoming overwhelmed by immigrants from the United Kingdom. Those “foreigners who were enterprising enough” and possessed assets that would assure self sufficie ncy as well as create jobs for Australian citizens “would be welcomed.” Nevertheless, th e Government would not grant any “special concessions” or join any “scheme” of mass resettl ement that would threaten domestic employment. Australia was sympathetic to the plig ht of the Jewish refugees but the Government could not allow a “large influx of aliens.” “Preference” would be granted to “suitable migrants of British stock.” 67 Minister of the Interior John McEwen believed that Jews represented a “highly intelligent” and successful class but their parochialism, religious and mari tal beliefs and separatist tendencies would interfere with successful integration. “D ifficulties” would undoubtedly arise wherever they constituted a significant percentage of the populati on. However, if a limited number of Jewish refugees was to be admitted preference should be given to those in “greater need” from Germany and Austria rather than migrs f rom Eastern Europe who had “practically formed a state within a state.” The Cabinet adopted a quota system during June 1938 that divided prospective refugees into the categories of “Jews,” “Christian non-Aryans” and “Arya ns.” 68 Such a program was extremely cumbersome as it required refugee applications to be sent to Canberra for review and approval before a response was sent back to Europe; a proce ss 67 Schneiderman, Review of the Year 5698 179. 68 Andrew Markus, “Jewish Migration to Australia 193849,” Journal of Australian Studies 13, (November 1983): 19.

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180 that would take a number of months. 69 This restrictive arrangement limited the number of landing permits granted German and Austrian Jews to three hundred per month. Paul Bartrop has argued that such restraint originated in an “anti-foreign and antiSemitic bias prevalent among some key personnel in the government departments.” 70 Blakeney, on the other hand, claimed that opposition to Jewish immigration, primarily those from Cent ral and Eastern Europe, was not primarily driven by anti-Semitic sentiments but rather by fears of its effect on unemployment, salaries, standards of living and working conditions. 71 Australia did agree during December 1938 to accept 15,000 immigrants or in the language of the day, “reffos” (refugees), over a period of three years but only 9,000 actually landed during 1933-1943. 72 Interestingly, some Australian Jewish leaders viewed their foreign co religionists with considerable narrow-mindededness and opposed the immigration of t heir German and Austrian brethren. Sir Samuel Cohen, the president of the Australian Jewi sh Welfare Society, stated during August 1938, that the thoughts of Australian Jews w ere 69 Samuel Pietsch, “Not ‘desirable’: Government Scape goating of Jewish Refugees,” Jubilee Conference of the Australasian Political Studies Association A ustralian National University, Canberra, October 20 02, 2 available from ; Internet; accessed October 3, 2010. 70 Paul Bartrop. Australia and the Holocaust, 1933-1945 (Kew, Victoria: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 1994), 129-130, 245. 71 Blakeney, Australia and the Jewish Refugees 63. 72 Blakeney, Australia and the Jewish Refugees, 147, 159; Caroline Moorehead, Human Cargo: A Journey Among Refugees (NY: Picador, 2006), 117. Prejudice against Jews extended into the war years. Facing fears of a German invasion of Palestine and Cyprus the British Government sought agreement with the Australian Prime Minister to accept 5,500 Briti sh subjects who faced possible evacuation. In respo nse, the Department of the Prime Minister queried the nu mber of Jews that would be included and the percentage that spoke English. By September 1941 the Australian Government agreed to accept until th e end of the war 2,000 British evacuees from the Pale stine Mandate provided they spoke English, were family members of British police officers or other governmental officials (especially if of the female gender) and were non-Jewish. Peter Y. Medding, ed. Values, Interests and Identity: Jews and Politics i n a Changing World Studies in Contemporary Jewry vol. 11 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 18 7.

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181 “British through and through.” The admission of “hordes” of European Jews would endanger the “freedom and civilization we are all privileged to enjoy…” 73 The Society sought to influence the Government to decrease the visa allotment by one-third. Superior airs and fears of inciting domestic anti-Semitism led the local Jewish c ommunity to caution new arrivals on their public behavior: Above all, do not speak German in the streets and i n the trams. Modulate your voices. Do not make yourself conspic uous anywhere by walking with a group of persons, all of whom are lo udly speaking a foreign language. Remember that the welfare of the old-established Jewish communities in Australia, as well as of ever y migrant, depends upon your personal behavior. Jews collectively are judged as individuals. You, personally, have a very grave re sponsibility. 74 The strategy of the Canadian Government was to prevent the entrance of foreign Jews. Immigration laws and guidelines would need to be suspended or revised to make special allowance for stateless refugees. Farmers and other agricul tural workers could be 73 Truth (Sydney), August 7, 1938 cited in B. Hooper, “Aust ralian Reaction to German Persecution of the Jews and Refugee Assimilation” (M.A. thesis, Department of History, Australian Nat ional University, 1972), 78. 74 “Jews’ Advice to Refugee: “Go to Country,’” The Sydney Morning Herald May 13, 1938, 17. During 1930 the Australian Government would allow the entr y of immigrants who possessed £500 or were dependents of aliens currently residing in the coun try. Following the enactment of the 1935 Nuremberg Laws prominent Australian Jews petitioned the Gover nment under Prime Minister Lyons to decrease the requiring landing fee to £50 if guaranteed by famil y or friends. The Australian Jewish Welfare Servic e (AJWS) was also created to facilitate and coordinat e the immigration process. The London based Austra lia House received 120 applications per day for immigra tion visas during March 1938 and the AJWS received 1,200 applications in the first week following the Anschluss An opinion poll taken at the time of the Evian Conference demonstrated that only seventeen percent of the population favored mass immigration of Jews Those resisting or opposed to enhanced entry were c oncerned about the limited assimilability of Jews i nto Australian society or the threat of Jewish control of certain aspects of the economy or professions. Strict limitations were placed on the number of Jewish ref ugee physicians allowed to practice in the country. Although the Lyons Government announced a policy of accepting 15,000 refugees over three years the nation was already accepting 5,100 per year (prior to December 1938); consequently, such a policy actu ally decreased the absolute number of refugees accepted. During the period of 1933-1939 only 7,000 Jews were resettled in Australia of which only 100 were Jewish children and adolescents. 570 British child ren, on the other hand, gained entry during 1940. Paul Bartrop, “Safe Haven: 2. Immigration and Settlement — Government Policy” available from earch_guides/guides/haven/pages/chapter2.htm ; Internet; accessed June 27, 2010.

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182 granted preferential treatment in the admission process. 75 The Prime Minister, William L. Mackenzie King, reacting to the U.S. announcement of the Evian Conference, feared tha t alien Jews would contaminate Canada's “bloodstream,” adversely affect nati onal unity and embolden the anti-Semitic separatists of the Quebecois Why create, he asked, an “internal problem” in the process of solving an “international one.” Canada had to be protected from the “unrest” of the Continent and avoid the “intermixture of foreign strains of blood.” Admission of stateless Jews would lead to “riots” and to strife be tween the central Government and the provinces. 76 The paper Le Devoir asked why Canada should admit Jewish refugees. “The Jewish shopkeeper on St Lawrence Bouleva rd does nothing to increase our natural resources.” French-Canadian Members of Parli ament opposed Jewish immigration. H.E. Brunelle, for example, accused Jews of creating “great difficulties” wherever they settled. Members of the St. Jean Baptiste S ociety, with the support of MP Wilfrid La Croix, presented a petition to Parliament vigorously object ing to “all immigration” and particularly the admittance of Jewish refugees Such opposition represented the “instinct of self preservation [of the Christian religion and F rench culture]. 77 75 The Canadian population in 1938 was approximately 1 0,000,000 in an area exceeding the size of the United States. 76 Mackenzie King Diary, March 29, 1938, 256. 77 Irving Abella & Harold Troper, None Is Too Many (Toronto: Lester & Orpen, 1982), 18. St. Jean Baptiste Society ( Socit Saint-Jean Baptiste) was a French Canadian patriotic society founded on June 24, 1834 by Ludger Duvernay who sought to instill Franc hophonic nationalism among the French speaking population. “St-Jean-Baptiste Society” The Canadia n Encyclopedia 2010 available from CE&Params=A1ARTA0007080 ; Internet; accessed August 15, 2010. Brunelle opposed Jewish immigration because of the “deplorable” state of “thousands of [his] fellow citizens.” He believed that “charity begins at home.” While having “no b rief against the Hebrew race [and] deep sympathy” for th ose facing persecution at the hands of the Nazis Je ws had been the “cause, justly or unjustly of great di fficulties in various countries” and since “history repeats itself” Canada must avoid creating its own Jewish p roblem. Hamerow, Why We Watched 157.

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183 The Nationalist Socialist Christian Party ( Parti National Social Chrtien ), led by Adrien Arcand, the publisher of Montreal’s Fascist paper Le Combat National and other anti-Semitic publications such as Le Miroir Le Goglu Le Fasciste Canadien L’Unit Nationale and Serviam joined with 1,500 blue shirted Fascists from eight Canadian provinces in Toronto’s Massey Hall on July 4 and created a new National Unity Par ty whose official slogan was “Canada for Canadians” and “King, country, Christi anity.” Fascism appeared to take root among the Quebecois due to lower economic standards of living when compared with the rest of the Nation. 78 Jews, Arcand maintained, were the root of “all the evils in the world” through the tentacles of their economic control. 79 He, like his German counterparts, called for an economic boycott of Jewish business es and establishments in order for French Canadians to regain control over the “commercial [activities] of their own nation.” It was essential for French Canadians t o “prosper in their own land rather than the Jews.” 80 Andr Laurendeau, of the paper L’Action nationale and Le Devoir warned, during a 1933 demonstration of the separatist and nationalist organization Jeune-Canada that Jews were on a “Messianic mission” to control the world; a claim remini scent of the oft cited and standard anti-Semitic fare, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion 81 Pierre 78 Canadian Jewish Congress Charities Committee Nation al Archives-Collection Guide available from uideA.htm ; Internet; accessed August 15, 2010; Life July 18, 1938, 9; Time July 18, 1938, 19. 79 Ottawa Citizen March 2, 1938, 13. 80 Jacques Langlais and David Rome, Jews & French Quebecers: Two Hundred Years of Shar ed History (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 19 91), 98. 81 Gerald Tulchinsky, Canada’s Jews: A People’s Journey (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 305. Jeune-Canada was founded in Montreal in 1932 and supported Fren ch Canadian nationalism. Initially composed of university students, such as Andr Laurendeau, Pierre Danserau and Grard Filion its

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184 Dagenais, the chief spokesman of Jeune-Canada declared that the soul of Canada was threatened by the “Jewish element,” an entity more “powerful than the voice of bl ood.” The Jewish “plutocracy” was influential enough to elicit “condolences” from Government officials against the Nazi treatment of German and Austrian Jew s but these same bureaucrats remained silent at the discriminatory treatment of F rench Canadians within their own country or the persecution of Catholics in Mexico, Spain and the Soviet Union. Similarly, Gilbert Manseau of Jeune-Canada claimed that Jews sought “special treatment” in Canada, seeking the status of an ethnic minority awarded the s ame national rights as other Canadians. Jews, he believed, could not be accorded such a status as the Constitution recognized only two national identities: British and French. 82 Charles Frederick Blair, the Director of the Immigration Branch of the Department of Mines and Resources, was convinced that the European refugee cris is would inundate Canada with stateless Jews destined to become permanent public cha rges. Citing the Government’s post-Great War policy of excluding homeless refugee s who were likely to “go on the rocks” and become dependent on government support Blair increased the landing fees from $5,000 to $15,000 and attached the stipulation that the migrs be farmers. 83 He advised the Prime Minister that Jewish pressure to enter Canada had reached new heights but he was proud to admit that after “thirty five years of platform supported the rights of French speaking Ca nadians and the preservation of Quebec’s Catholic, rural, agricultural and Francophile roots. “Jeune-C anada” The Canadian Encyclopedia available from CE&Params=A1ARTA0004127 ; Internet, accessed August 15, 2010. 82 “’Nefarious Power’ of Jewry Attacked,” The Montreal Gazette April 21, 1933, 10. 83 Blair to T.A. Crerar, March 28, 1938 cited in Gera ld E. Dirks, Canada’s Refugee Policy: Indifference or Opportunism? (Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1977), 5 6. See also Abella, None is Too Many 35.

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185 experience” Jewish immigration had never “been so carefully controlled.” 84 However, Blair predicted that a successful Evian Conference would in essence reward t he Germans by solving their Jewish Question and would undoubtedly encourage other Powers to follow similar policies which represented the “greatest danger” to Canada Encouraging the resettlement of refugees was “akin in a sense to the paying of ransom to C hinese bandits.” 85 Blair offered what he considered to be constructive criticism to the Jewish community. It “might be a very good thing,” he believed, if Jewry engaged in a peri od of “humiliation and prayer” during which they would come to terms with the “question of why they are so unpopular almost everywhere.” Christians should “frankly” expla in the reasons for their disapproval instead of engaging in anti-Semitism. Blair di d not doubt that the Jews would be as readily as accepted as “our Scandinavian friends” if the y successfully divested themselves of their negative “habits.” 86 Although Nazi anti-Semitic policies placed Jews at risk of “extinction” in Eur ope he did not imagine that admission to Canada would resolve the ubiquitous Jewish dilemma. 87 The Immigration Minister later opposed the landing of Jewish refugees from the ill-fated S.S. St. Louis during May 1939, believing that the granting of asylum would 84 Abella, None is Too Many 8. 85 Blair memorandum, April 19, 1938. Ibid. 20. 86 Blair to F.N. Sclanders, September 13, 1938. Ibid ., 9. 87 Blair to Judd, October, 1938. Ibid., 35.

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186 be followed by “shiploads” of other refugees. No nation could accept the number of real or potential forced migrs and the “line must be drawn somewhere.” 88 Likewise, Under-Secretary of State Dr. Oscar Douglas Skelton fear ed pressures from the Evian Conference would subject Canada to internal demands for the country to do something “for the Jews,” risk the generation of domestic anti-Semitis m and influence other nations (primarily Eastern Europe) to solve their own Jewish Question by f orcibly exiling Jews. 89 The ultimate and oftentimes pre-determined position of Canada and other nations was reflected in an undated and unsigned document filed among the records of the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa: We don’t want to take too many Jews, but, in the pr esent circumstances particularly, we don’t want to say so. Certainly, we don’t want to legiti mize the Aryan mythology by introducing any formal distinction for immigration purposes between Jews and non-Jews. The practical distinction, however, has to be drawn and should be drawn with discretion and sympathy by the competent Department without laying down any formal minute of policy on the matter. 90 Hume Wrong, the Canadian Envoy to the League of Nations, was selected by King to represent Canada at the Conference; an assignment he did not relish. Wrong advised Skelton that he expected the meeting to be a “most unpleasant affair” as i t sprung from one of Roosevelt’s “sudden generous impulses” and was not a “well thought out” 88 Blair to Skelton, June 8and June 16, 1939 cited in Irving Abella and Harold Troper, “’The Line Must Be Drawn Somewhere’: Canada and Jewish Refugees, 19 33-1939,” Paula Draper, Franca Iacovetta, Robert Ventres, eds., A Nation of Immigrants: Women, Workers and Communit ies in Canadian History (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 413. 89 Skelton to Mackenzie King, March 25, 1938 cited in Abella, None Is Too Many 17. Skelton was Undersecretary of State for External Affairs (appoi nted April 1, 1925 by King; anti-imperial and isolationist worldview) and former Professor of Pol itical and Economic Science and Dean of Arts at Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario. 90 Public Archives of Canada RG 25 D1, vol. 779, file 382, External Affairs memorandum cited in Paul R. Bartrop “Drawing the Line Somewhere: The Dominio ns and Refugee Immigration in the 1930s,” presented at ACSANA Canadian Studies Conference’88 Canberra, Australia, June 22-24, 1988, 9.

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187 concept. His participation represented, on the whole, an “unwelcome duty.” 91 He was instructed only to “listen, make notes and say as little as possible” while opposi ng any concrete solutions, “without seeming to be obstructionist.” 92 The Canadian delegate informed the members of the Evian Conference that his Government felt “sympathy and concern…for the victims of changes of regime a nd of racial and class conflict.” Canada had generously admitted more than ten thousand political refugees following the conclusion of the Great War but economic problems had severely impacted Canada’s capacity to absorb “considerable number[s]” of a dditional migrs. As a result, the Government was compelled to initiate a more restri ctive immigration policy. There were, however, “special administrative exempt ions” that the Dominion would, in concert with the other Powers, consider in the “most sympathetic and friendly manner which may be practicable in the circumstances.” Success of such a project depended upon Germany allowing retention of sufficient personal asset s to facilitate and fund resettlement. Jews possessing sufficient capita l to establish successful farms could be prioritized for admission. 93 Overall, Wrong viewed the preparations of the Committee as being “very amateurish” and warned the Prime Minister that prospects for a meaningf ul outcome were “gloomy… [as] there seems to have been no effective diplomatic or technic al 91 Public Archives of Canada RG 25 G1, vol. 1870, file 327c, part 1, Hume Wrong (Geneva) to Dr. O.D. Skelton (Ottawa), June 21, 1938 cited in Bartrop, “ Drawing the Line,” 6. 92 King to Wrong, Jun3 30, 1938 cited in Irving Abell a, and Franklin Bialystok, “Canada,” in David S. Wyman and Charles H. Rosenzveig, eds., The World Reacts to the Holocaust (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1996), 756 93 “Proceedings,” July 7, 1938, 20-21.

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188 preparations. I think the meeting should be as short as possible.” 94 He later advised King that there was “little chance” that “any clear conclusions” would resul t from the Conference. 95 Following the conclusion of the conference King remarked that the admission of Jews posed a greater national threat to the internal harmony of Canada than di d the Nazi or Fascist regimes. The Fuehrer and Il Duce, the Prime Minister believed, sought to provide “the masses of the people some opportunity for enjoyment, taste of art and the like.” “Dictatorial methods” were necessary to suppress those “privileged i nterests (presumably Jewish) that have previously monopolized it.” 96 Such a world view of Jewry was of course, in keeping with the widely held anti-Semitic belief in Jewish domi nation of society. Following Kristallnacht King expressed the opinion in his diary that the nation “must do her part” in offering refuge to “some” of the Jewish migrs; an act that would be “difficult politically.” King pledged to “fight for it as right and just, and Christian.” 97 In reality, however, Canada accepted only five thousand refugees, during 1933-1939, of which 3,500 were Jews. Most of these Jewish refugees were relocated from Bri tish internment camps as part of Canada's war effort to help house Austrian and German 94 Public Archives of Canada RG 76, vol. 432, file 644 452, part 1, Hume Wrong to W.L. Mackenzie King, July 9, 1938 and June 29, 1938 cited in Bartr op, “Drawing the Line,” 6. 95 Public Archives of Canada RG 76, vol. 432, file 644 452, part 1, Wrong to King, July 9, 1938. Ibid., 8 96 Mackenzie King Diary, May 10, 1938. 96 Ibid., November 13, 1938.

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189 “enemy aliens” that remained incarcerated until December 1943 when the camps w ere formally closed. 98 Citing his nation’s “traditional policy” towards immigration,” Tomas Le B reton, the Argentine delegate (concerned that the United States and Great Brita in were attempting to pressure Latin America into becoming the dumping ground for the refugees), acknowledged that his country had received the greatest number of Jew s, second only to the United States. However, if the factors of geographic size and native population were inserted into the equation then Argentina had accepted a far greater proportion of the forced migrs than did its North American counterpart. During 1935 for every forty eight Jewish refugees admitted into the U.S thirty two entere d Argentina; considering the fact that the American population was ten times that of his country Breton deemed the Argentine contribution to the refugee crisis to be particula rly “striking.” Taking into account South America as a whole Argentina had accepted more refugees than any other nation on the continent. Consequently, Le Breton believed that Argentina had satisfied its “duty of solidarity and collaboration” in the prese nt humanitarian crisis. Agricultural entrepreneurs and workers possessing c ertain technical skills were preferred candidates for entry but care had to be taken to avoid overwhel ming the domestic labor market. Argentina would carefully safeguard its national rig hts “in all matters relating to the manner in which, and the means by which, immigrants will be allowed to enter and establish themselves in our country…” 99 98 Paula Jean Draper, “Muses Behind Barbed Wire,” in The Muses 272-81 cited in Donna F. Ryan, The Holocaust and the Jews of Marseille (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1996) 135-137. 99 “Proceedings,” July 7, 1938, 21-22.

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190 However, by the time of the July conference the Argentine Government had enacted a variety of immigration barriers such as the requirement of a spec ial landing permit issued by the Central Immigration Department located in Buenos Aire s. This prerequisite was designed to guarantee the selected entry of refugees with agricultural backgrounds who possessed sufficient financial assets to re-establish themse lves in a new location despite the fact that the majority of the immigrants were middle-c lass Jews from urban areas. 5,178 Jews were admitted during 1937 but only 1,050 in 1938. 100 The Argentine reaction to the plight of Jewish refugees had been foretold by popular and national reaction to the Anschluss The Catholic press in Argentina denounced the German annexation of Austria. El Pueblo the Catholic newspaper of Buenos Aires, had viewed the earlier Dollfuss Government as the epitome of socia l dogma as espoused by Pope Leo XIII and Pius XI and viewed the Anschluss as an “Austrian tragedy” facilitated by international “collaboration” with the R eich. Little attention or sympathy was focused on the plight and potential fate of Austrian Jews or on German anti-Semitism. In fact, in January 1938, Gustavo Franceschi, the editor of Criterio expressed his support for an Ecuadoran edict that ordered the expulsion of all Jews from that country. The Jewish Question in Central Europe was, many Argenti ne Catholics and nationalists believed, the result of Jewish perfidy rather than ant i-Semitic governmental policies. The mass arrests of “the financiers of Vienna” were described, of whom the majority were highlighted as “Jews.” Jewish press attempts to counte r Nazi anti-Semitism were portrayed by Church spokesmen in Argentina as “an expre ssion of 100 Haim Avni, Argentina and the Jews: A History of Jewish Immigration (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1991) 143; William F. Perl, The Holocaust Conspiracy: An International Policy o f Genocide (NY: Shapolsky Publishers, Inc., 1989), 44. Each l anding permit would have to be studied and approved by representatives of the Ministries of Fo reign Relations, Agriculture and Interior.

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191 hatred” comparable to German “propaganda itself” and Franceschi made no dist inctions between the actions and reactions of the Nazis and Jews. Both groups, in his eyes, stood outside the blessings and protections of the Catholic Church. 101 The Foreign Minister, Jos Mara Cantilo, issued Directive 11 on July 12, 1938; a decree publicly taking effect on October 1 (but secretly invoked immediately), which specified that all immigration applications were to be examined by an advisor y committee composed of officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, I nterior and Agriculture. “Priority” was to be given to refugees "with the greatest c apacity for assimilation in order to meet our social, cultural and economic needs." Consuls would furnish the committee with detailed personal information, such as the reason for se eking entrance into Argentina. The board, upon approval of an application, would send the consul a landing permit. Persons submitting requests for relatives were r equired to provide proof of Argentine residency for two years and bear the cost of all proces sing fees. Tourists entering the country would be obliged to turn over their passports to immigration authorities and would be granted temporary tourist certificates of t hree months duration. 102 An addendum to the new immigration policy, Directive 8972, ended the landing exemptions previously granted first-class passengers arrivi ng via steamship. Previously it had been assumed that immigrants traveled only in second and third cl ass. These additional requirements would have the net effect of further decreasing the num ber 101 Graciela Ben-Dror, The Catholic Church and the Jews: Argentina, 1933-1 945 (Jerusalem, Israel: Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Anti-Semitism, 2008), 138-139. 102 Avni, Argentina and the Jews 143, 144.

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192 of refugees admitted into the country. 103 Security along the borders was to be enhanced to prevent the illegal entry of refugees. 104 Franceschi described the new enactment as a “fine immigration policy …for such a worthy government.” He argued in an article, “Once again the Jewish Problem,” that German anti-Semitism was an expression of loathing and arrogance; attitude s banned by the doctrine of the Church. Argentine anti-Semitism, on the other hand, was a matter of “self-defense” and despite domestic generosity a “Jewish problem” did exist within the Republic that would inevitably occur “wherever the Jews [became] a sizeable s ection of the population.” A significant Jewish presence risked the creation of a more hostile domestic anti-Semitism as well as calls for mass expulsion reminisce nt of Germany and Eastern Europe. He warned against international refugee conferences. In his opinion the Jewish issue represented a “national” as well as “a religious, social and economic question.” Refusal to accede to the goals of the Evian Conference represented “no m ore than a justified demand to seek a more just solution to this problem.” 105 Ultimately, between 1933 and 1945 approximately 40-45,000 Jewish refugees were allowed into Argentina. 106 Thirty five refugee ships were denied landing permits during 1938-1943 103 Ibid., 143. 104 Ronald C. Newton, The “Nazi Menace” in Argentina, 1931-1947 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 150-151. 105 Ben-Dror, The Catholic Church 140-141. 106 Ryan, The Holocaust and the Jews of Marseilles 136.

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193 but approximately 39,400 Jews entered Argentina during the war years primarily illegally via Paraguay and Bolivia. 107 Helio Lobo, the delegate from Brazil, indicated that Brazil had long held an “open door” immigration policy seeking the labor that would develop the country’s natural resources. During the period 1820-1930 more than four and a half million immigrants had been admitted primarily from Europe accounting for ten percent of the total population but current economic conditions mandated immigration restrictions to protect domestic employment. The ability of non-Latin refugees to assimilat e into the dominant culture and potential alterations in the racial composition of the nation were additional concerns. The Immigration Law of 1934 established a two percent year ly quota based on each nationality that had settled in Brazil over the previous fifty y ears and amounted to 42,000 per year; most of whom resided in the countryside working in the agricultural sector. Germans comprised the fourth largest migrant group prior t o World War I. The German and Austrian quotas respectively accounted for 3,099 and 1,655 immigrants annually. The Immigration Law of 1938 continued the two percent benchmark but allocated unused quotas to other nationalities whose yearly allotment had been exhausted. A similar recommendation would be made by the British to the U.S. but the State Department would decline. In addition, eighty percent of each quota had to be reserved for “agricultural immigrants or technical experts in agriculture.” Brazi l was, according to Lobo, ready to “respond to the noble appeal of the American Government” and would cooperate to the “limits of her immigration policy…for the sake of the lofty ideal which 107 “Argentina in World War II Timeline” available from html ; Internet; accessed December 26, 2009.

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194 all of us here have in mind.” 108 Taylor regarded Lobo as being “extraordinarily helpful” in influencing other Latin American nations to adopt a “reasonable point of view.” 109 It was pointed out, however, that the majority of German and Austrian refugees were urbanites and not farmers. During 1937 Brazil had admitted 2,003 stateless Jew s but only 530 in 1938. The Brazilian Government had agreed to the admission of nine thousand refugees over a three year period but with strict entry requirements: in addition to being true agriculturalists they had to possess $2,400 over and beyond the amount covering travel and resettlement expenses. 110 Approximately twenty five thousand Jews were granted legal admission into the country during1933-1942. 111 The July 7 session ended on a common theme. Citing economic, social, political, religious, and ethnic concerns each delegate expressed sympathy but offer ed a host of reasons why their respective nations could not provide refuge to stateless immig rants. Oftentimes their home governments were secretly working behind the scenes to c onstruct obstacles that would limit or block entry altogether. The Europeans and Americans expected the nations of Latin America to receive the bulk of the migrs. Equall y, these nations were resistant to accepting the role of dumping ground for a people that wa s considered less than desirable. Such rhetoric, gamesmanship and plotting would continue throughout and color the course of the remainder of the Evian Conference. The inherent 108 “Proceeding,” July 7, 1938, 17-18. 109 Telegram from Taylor to Cordell Hull, July 14, 1938 840.48 Refugees/513, FRUS 1938, vol. 1, 754. 110 Proceedings of the Evian Conference, July 7, 1938; “Political Refugee Problem Puzzles World Diplomats,” Meridian Record July 8, 1938, 3; New York Times August 6, 1938; Perl, The Holocaust Conspiracy 44; Gurlock, America, American Jews 236. 111 Benjamin Moser, Why This World: A Biography of Clarice Lispector (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 86-87.

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195 hypocrisy would become readily apparent to the victims, observers, the represent atives and the Nazis but such knowledge would not alter the journey and eventual outcome of a meeting that, from its inception, was destined to fail.

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196 Chapter 6 Day Four “Humanity Now Plunged into Despair” “I am my brother’s keeper and we are to be the benefactors of mankind and brothers to them all .” 1 The Chairman, Myron C. Taylor, expressed during the third public session on July 9, 1938 his “pleasure” over the initial delegation statements to the conference. Acknowledging the “economic and other difficulties” faced by the presenting nat ions their efforts had already provided “substantial contributions” to the work of the me eting. He was greatly encouraged by the “offers of cooperation so generously an d unanimously extended” and was heartened by their profound “earnestness.” 2 A telegram was received from FDR in which he wished “for all success to the committee in its work, which is of such importance, for a large part of humanity now plunged into despair.” 3 Cyril Blake Burdekin, a low-ranking diplomat in the New Zealand High Commissioners’ Office in London and delegate to the conference, expressed his nati on’s “sincere sympathy” with the lot of the involuntary refugees but suggested that any intimation that the island nation could accept more than a limited number of refugees 1 “Our Refugee Stand is Praised at Camp,” New York Times July 11, 1938, 15. Lt. Col. B.A. Tinter, Rabbi of Mt. Zion Congregation of New York City dur ing Jewish services at the Citizens Military Traini ng Camp at Plattsburg. 2 “Proceedings,” July 9, 1938, 24. 3 Ibid., 24.

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197 would “only be raising false hopes.” The decision to admit any alien would be based on the likelihood of becoming a public charge and the demonstrable ability to prove that they would become a “useful citizen.” 4 Immigrants from Britain or of British origin were preferred and Jews were viewed as particularly unwelcome aliens. Jews w ho were allowed admittance faced bigotry and mistrust due to their differing cul ture. Although thousands (perhaps as high as fifty thousand) of Jews filed visa applications only 1,100 were accepted. Jews were not officially regarded as refugees but as mi grs subject to the requirements and limitations of the Immigration Restriction Amendment A ct of 1931. 5 The Ministry of Customs was authorized to determine eligibility for entry based upon guarantees of employment, finances and the possession of such “knowledge and skills” which would facilitate absorption, promote the national economy and not pose any risk to the native population. Jewish refugees were advised by the New Zealand High Commissioner’s Office in London that officially the Government was not “encouragi ng immigration” of those lacking “British birth [or] parentage” and visas would be granted only in “very special cases.” The mid-1930’s Comptroller of Customs, Edwin Dudley Good, had declared that non-Jews represented the “more suitable type of immigrant.” 4 Ibid., 25. 5 Following an economic downturn in 1920 the New Zea land Government adopted a “White New Zealand” immigration policy which restricted entry to those who possessed a British background. Sanderson Beck, “New Zealand to 1950” available fro m ; Internet; accessed August 22, 2010; Ann Beagleho le, A Small Price to Pay: Refugees from Hitler in New Zealand 1936-1946 (Wellington, Allen & Unwin, 1988), 15. The policy would allow entry of immigrants who were born in th e United Kingdom or of British parentage and barred those who were naturalized British subjects, the of fspring of naturalized parents or who were an “abor iginal Native or the descendent of an aboriginal Native fr om any Protectorate, Colony or Dominion who lacked British birth or parentage. Overall, non-whites we re tacitly targeted for exclusion. Such categoriza tion was extended to Jews and other non-British Europeans as well. “1920 White New Zealand Policy Introduced” available from ; Internet; accessed August 22, 2010.

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198 Walter Nash, Labor Party Minister of Customs, warned that the assimilat ion of Jews into New Zealander society posed a “major difficulty” and risked generatin g domestic hostility. He feared that the urban, professional and trade backgrounds of these w ould-be immigrants would “beat us at our own game, especially the game of money making” and thus foster anti-Semitism. On other occasions, Nash stated Jews lacked the requis ite aptitude needed to survive on the island nation. European Jews represented too much of the “clerical type” rather than the “building operative type” that his country required. However, local trade unions objected to the admission of Jewish skilled and unskilled laborers who, they believed, would potentially compete for employment. The Fed eration of Labor called for preference to be given for non-Jewish forced migrs suc h as fellow unionists from the annexed Sudetenland and Austria. 6 The local Jewish community attempted to persuade the National Government to admit Jewish refugees on the basis of individuality and not “mass migration.” The “l ife history and capabilities” of each applicant would be “known and vouched for.” 7 A writer in the liberal publication Tomorrow called on the Government to admit German and Austrian refugees. Such an act, it was argued, to accept a finite but liberal num ber of victims of persecution would alter the entire mood of the Evian Conference. 8 6 Beaglehole, A Small Price to Pay 8-10, 14-17. 7 Statement by Rabbi Solomon Katz, Chairman, Welling ton Jewish Refugee Committee, New Zealand Jewish Review (October 1938): 17. 8 Tomorrow January 18, 1939, 170 cited in “The Response of the New Zealand Government to Jewish Refugees, 1933-1939” available from s%20website.doc ; Internet; accessed June 11, 2010; “Refugees from Nazism” Explore Te Ara: The Encyclopedia of New Zealand available from oples/HistoryOfImmigration/13/ENZResources/Standard/1/en ; Internet; accessed February 25, 2008. The Immigr ation Act was initially passed in 1920 and amended in 1931.

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199 Jsus Maria Yepes of Columbia asserted that the Evian Conference faced two major issues: the “question of principle” and the “question of fact.” The former ra ised the concern as to whether any nation can “arbitrarily withdraw” citizens hip from an entire group of people and create a “stateless” class dependent upon the charity and benefi cence of other nations. Such a process represented an “evil internal policy” that reduce d the Evian Conference to the role of a “modern Wailing Wall .” As long as this action was not confronted by the international community then “who knows how many” other groups faced oppression because of their religious or political beliefs. Unsolved and ignored the “bad example of the Old World” would be emulated globally creating a world that would “become uninhabitable.” Solution of this dilemma would require confronting the “cause s of the evil” and extirpation at its “roots.” Yepes suggested the creation of an investigative “legal sub-committee” that would analyze the “duty” of a sovereign government towards its own nationals and judge whether such people could be deprived of their citizenship without the automatic granti ng of another. The issue of suitable travel documents needed to be resolved and statele ss political refugees would have to be granted a form of legal status. The mutual cooperation and participation of the League of Nations, International Labor Off ice and the Academies and Institutes of International Law were critical t o such a process and the creation of a “draft resolution” that would reflect the opinion of the international community. Any State that failed to follow the precepts of such an opinion would risk exclusion from the “civilized world” and would be deemed to have become an “international outlaw.”

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200 The Columbian delegate cited the “Declaration of the International Rights of Man” which, with the Covenant of the League of Nations” and the “great principles of modern international law,” affirmed that every State bore an obligation to preser ve and protect the rights of personal liberty, property and life without regard to race, r eligion, gender or language. Article 5 avowed that a government could not arbitrarily wit hdraw citizenship from its nationals on the basis of religion, language or race. Such ide als were reiterated in Article 28 of the “Declaration of the Great Principles of I nternational Law,” written by the Chilean jurist, Alejandro Alvarez. 9 Despite lauding the nobility and loftiness of such idealism Yepes argued that the modern state needed to face the “question of fact.” Although a particular group of pe ople confronted a potentially catastrophic humanitarian crisis each nation needed t o remain cognizant of its own “particular circumstances” affecting its potenti al contribution to solving the problem of forced emigration. Despite Columbia's democratic tradit ions and “humanitarian feelings” the immigration of European aliens would have to be re stricted to “respectable agricultural workers who are prepared to come and work on the land” a nd the nation would not “accept [or] tolerate” refugees who entered under false pretens es. 9 L’Institut de Droit International adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man on Oct ober 12, 1929. The Declaration was drafted by Andre Mandelstam, a Russian jurist and former director of the legal off ice of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1917. Following the Bolshevik Revolution he fled to Par is where, while teaching international law, he founded the International Diplomatic Academy with Antoine Frangulis. During November 1928 they composed a re solution, adopted by the Academy that listed state obligations to its minorities. During 1929 the Int ernational Law Institute in New York City promulgat ed the Declaration that was outlined by Mandelstam and influenced by the policies of the Soviet Governmen t. Non-Governmental Organizations and academics suppor ted the Declaration during the 1930’s and called for the international application of its principles Judge Alejandro Alvarez (born February 9, 1868) was a diplomat and law professor. Alvarez and Dr. James B rown Scott founded the American Institute of International Law in 1912 and served as its first S ecretary General. He later served on the Internati onal Court of Justice after WWII.

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201 “Intellectuals or traders, middlemen of all kinds” could not be admitted as they w ould pose competition against native businesses, industries, commerce and the professions. Yepes concluded with a mild diplomatic rebuke to Brenger’s appeal to Latin America to admit the bulk of the refugees. The United Kingdom, France and The Netherlands could not claim that their abilities to absorb further refugees ha d reached the saturation point while they possessed territories in the New World. Brenger’ s appeal must also be applied to the nations of Western Europe. He concluded by stating: “ Messieurs les franais, Messieurs les anglais, Messieurs les hollandaise, it is for you to act first: it is to you that this appeal is addressed.” 10 Columbia required immigrants to convert to Roman Catholicism and by 1938 Columbia refused visas to any applicant who lacked a valid passport or who could not guarantee the ability to return home. Overall, during 1938 Columbia denied the entry of ten thousand German refugees although half had family or connections with friends within the country. 11 Fernando Garcia Oldini, the Chilean representative lauded the “humanitaria n motive” underlying the American convening of the Evian Conference. He believed, however, that it would be a futile and “risky” exercise to attempt to achieve an “immediate and complete solution” for the current refugee crisis due to its c omplexity and the diversity of its multifaceted components involving issues of territories a llotted for resettlement, transportation, financial support and social constructions. Unless t he 10 “Proceedings,” July 9, 1938, 25-27. Yepes served a s Legal Adviser to the Permanent Delegation to the League of Nations with the rank of Envoy Extrao rdinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. 11 Judith Liken Elkin, “The Reception of the Muses in the Circum-Caribbean,” The Muses, 291-302 cited in Ryan, The Holocaust and the Jews of Marseilles, 135-137.

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202 conference remained cognizant of its inherent limitations there was a dange r of creating “false hopes” and eventually “cruel disillusions.” Referring to the Confere nce of Migration for Colonizing Purposes convoked by the International Labor Office in G eneva Oldini warned that any potential emigration was intimately bound up with the issue s of “production and unemployment” and the exportation of “surplus production” which would result from the rapid expansion of the labor pool. Bearing in mind the domestic effects of the Great Depression he warned that Chile would cooperate in this “noble effort…to alleviate human suffering” as long as it did not compromise native product ivity and employment. The admission of any aliens would be based upon the “framework of existing legislation and regulations,” as outlined in the initial American invi tation. Each potential immigrant would be viewed as an individual case and consequently, Chile coul d not bind itself to any “formal obligations” or to “broad, general solutions” but would remain open to and provide the “most cordial consideration” to any plan outlined by the Committee and would study with the “utmost goodwill” any reasonable project t hat would diminish the suffering of a group of people that “evokes the anxiety and sympa thy of mankind.” 12 The Foreign Office did, however, enact new regulations limiting permanent residency to immigrants who were “farmers, capitalists, agri cultural colonists or industrialist…” 13 Dissenting domestic voices, such as Senate Deputy Jos Irarrazaval, called for “keeping the Chilean traditional door open to all political refugees.” He 12 “Proceedings,” July 9, 1938, 27-28. Garcia served as the Chilean Minister in Switzerland and as its representative to the International Labor Organizat ion with rank of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. 13 The Southern Israelite May 13, 1938, 1.

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203 believed that Jews should not be excluded from the country for “racial reasons” and that Chile would establish an “example” by receiving stateless Jews. 14 The Cuban representative, Dr. Juan Antiga Escobar, stated Cuba would not accept additional refugees beyond the quota allowed in its immigration laws but would agree to the “eventual admittance of capitalists who might contribute to the im provement of our nation’s economy.” 15 Tirso Dominguez, the House of Representatives delegate from the province of Santa Clara, introduced the Cuban Exclusion Act which barred immigrants from a variety of Eastern and Central European nations, Afric a, the Middle East and China. Refugees from Austria possessing German passports would be admi tted. Exceptions would be made for those emigrants who had been diplomatic representatives, lived previously in Cuba and owned local property, or aliens who possessed at least $25,000 to invest in the domestic economy provided they did not threaten native employment. Tourists would be required to post a $5,000 bond for a six month visa. 16 Cuba did, however, admit 12,000-20,000 German Jews between 1933-1944 due to a Government policy of engaging in the “lucrative business [of] selling trave l documents” and maintaining its consulates in Nazi-dominated Europe following the closure of U.S Consular offices. 17 The episode of the S.S. St. Louis in 1939 dampened the Jewish demand for visas. 14 ”Urges Chilean Open Door,” New York Times July 14, 1938, 12. 15 “Cuba Seeks Capitalists,” New York Times July 17, 1938, 23. Escobar served as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Switz erland and permanent Delegate to the League of Nations. 16 ”For Cuban Exclusion Act,” New York Times July 3, 1938, 11. 17 Ryan, The Holocaust & the Jews of Marseille, 136.

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204 The Ecuadoran envoy, Alejandro Gastel Concha, stated that his Government was “keenly interested” in taking part in Roosevelt’s “generous initiative” a nd would play its role within the confines of its immigration laws and domestic potentia l. He cited the 1935 admission and successful integration of displaced European professors but acknowledged that Ecuador was primarily an agricultural country and therefore, could not allow the entry of “too great an influx of intellectual workers.” Jewish re fugees could potentially be admitted but only if they agreed to enter industry and agriculture and not commerce and the liberal professions. Nevertheless, the Ecuadoran Government was prepared to do its part in this “humanitarian task” and give “favorable consideration” to any resolution adopted by the conference. 18 A number of projects to resettle refugee Jews within remote areas of Ecuador were proposed during the 1930’s but failed due to lack of Jewish enthusiasm and Ecuadoran public support. For example, in 1935 the Freeland League of Jewish Colonization established in Paris the Comit pour l’Etude de l’agriculture, l’Industrie de l’Immigration dans la Rpublique de l’Equateur (Committee for the Study of Agriculture, Industry and Immigration for the Republic of Ecuador) which rea ched an agreement with the Government to allot 1,250,000 acres of land in Ecuador and the Galapagos Islands for the colonization of fifty thousand families that would be mana ged by the Committee for a term of thirty years. Settlers were granted e xemption of taxes for three years, citizenship in one year, and release from custom duties and fre e rail transportation from the coast to the interior. President Federico Pez and his 18 “Proceedings,” July 9, 1938, 28. Concha served a s Secretary of the Permanent Delegation to the League of Nations and Consul-General in Geneva. Ec uador’s population in 1938 was approximately three million.

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205 Administration required the presentation of a detailed operations plan by May 1937 and the commitment of $8,000 and the settlement of a minimum of one hundred families. Analysis by resettlement experts confirmed the viability of such a plan a nd estimated that $360-465 per family would be required. However, Jewish relief organizations such as HICEM argued that the settlement sites were too remote and of inferior quali ty with a climate that was inhospitable for Central Europeans. HICEM also warned that the potential for resettlement within Ecuador was “practically nil” due to a low level of national economical development and salaries, limited opportunities for craftsme n and other artisans and professionals and a general state of political volatility The International Committee of Immigration in Ecuador responded to the criticis ms of HICEM by noting that the objections raised reflected conditions throughout all of the South American Republics. Consequently, this project was abandoned. 19 The American Joint Distribution Committee and HICEM engaged in other agricultural resettlement projects within Ecuador and sixty Jewish fami lies were 19 Daily Herald July 18, 1935 cited in Schneiderman, ed., American Jewish Year Book Review of the Year 5696, 241-242; Werner Loval, We Were Europeans: A Personal History of a Turbulen t Century (Jerusalem, Israel: Gefen Publishing House, Ltd., 2 010), 225; Michael Palomino, “Jews in Ecuador: Jewish Immigration in the National Socialist Period ,” 2008 available from EncJud_juden-in-Ecuador-ENGL.html ; Internet; accessed September 4, 2010; “Ecuador,” Jewish Vir tual Library available from /ejud_0002_0006_0_05541.html ; Internet; accessed September 4, 2010. HICEM was founded in 1927 and r esulting from the merger of HIAS (United States Hebrew Sheltering & Immigrant Aid Society, ICA (Jew ish Colonization Association based in Paris and functioning as a British charity), and EMIG-Direct (a refugee relocation program located in Berlin). The primary function of HICEM was to aid and facilitate the migration of Jews from Europe. Following the Nazi takeover in 1933 EMIG-Direct was closed. Duri ng the Second World War the British Government restricted the use of ICA funds outside of the coun try resulting in HIAS assuming the primary role. I n 1945 HICEM was ended and its programs were assumed by HIAS. “Aid and Rescue,” 2006, available from rescue.htm ; Internet; accessed August 23, 2010. The President, Dr. Jos Mara Velasco Ibarra propos ed a plan in July 1935 to admit fifty thousand fami lies of Jewish technicians and scientists forced out of Germany but the offer was revoked due to the retice nce of Jews to leave the Reich at that time as well as pro blems with organization and documentation. Loval, We Were Europeans 225.

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206 established on chicken farms in remote areas. However, local circumstances and the backgrounds of the colonists precluded success. Most of the settlers were non-fa rmers of middle class origin from urban environments and consequently, many sought to re-enter their pre-emigration professions and businesses. 20 This prompted the Government under Provisional President General Gil Alberto Enrquez Gallo to decree on January 19, 1938 that “hundreds” of refugee Jews who had entered under the guise of being agricultur alists but who had in reality intended to engage in business would be forcibly expelled. 21 “All alien Jewish traders” were given thirty days to commence farming or fa ce deportation. 22 This decree, however, was later repealed following negotiations between the Aus trian Jew Julius Rosenstock (selected by the Ecuadorian Government to manage the construction of the Sibambe-Quito railway) and Gallo. Overall, only 3,500-4,000 Jews primarily of German origin, entered Ecuador by 1945. 23 Francisco Garca Caldern Rey, the Peruvian delegate, pledged his nation’s cooperation and agreement to admit German refugees to the “extent of its possibil ities” as defined by its immigration laws. Peru had received a number of Jewish scientist s and academics who were “like leaven or ferment…of value to all nations.” The nati on was ready to accept agricultural workers and industrial technicians but could not admi t “traders or workmen” who potentially could disrupt domestic equilibrium and generate 20 Jacqueline, Shields, “The Virtual Jewish History To ur Ecuador,” 1998 available from ador.html ; Internet; accessed September 4, 2010; Loval, We Were Europeans 225. 21 The U.S. News January 24, 1938. 22 Newsweek January 31, 1938, 21. 23 “Ecuador,” Jewish Virtual Library; Maria-Luise Kreu ter, Wo liegt Ecuador? Exil in einem unbekannten Land 1938 bis zum Ende der fnfizer Jah re (Berlin: Metropol-Verl., 1995), 89.

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207 problems “similar to those which other countries have had to tackle.” Likewise, limitations on the entry of physicians and lawyers were necessary to prev ent the creation of an “intellectual proletariat” that would threaten the “unbridled power of [the P eruvian] upper class. 24 The national essence, based on a “Spanish nucleus” with its Latin and Catholic traditions, must be preserved. “An unorganized influx [of non-Catholic and non-Latin immigrants] would be dangerous” but the Government was willing to consider admissi on of aliens on an individual, case-by-case basis. Caldern recalled the changes in the immigration statutes of the United States. Prior to 1890 an open door admissions policy was followed but since that time the American Government adopted “farsighted” legislative changes in 1921 and 1924 which severely restricted the entry of ali ens. The primary motivation for such limitations was the preservation of the “Nordic heri tage and [the] Anglo-Saxon race” against the invasion and contamination of other peoples. Caldern cited The Passing of the Great Race by Madison Grant as supportive of such restrictions. 25 The peace of the Americas could only be guaranteed by avoiding the 24 “Proceedings,” July 9, 1938, 28. Calderon (April 8 1883-July 1, 1953) was a Peruvian writer who later served as Minister to Belgium. Gerhard Schoen berner, The Yellow Star: The Persecution of the Jews in Europe, 1933-1945 (Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press, 2004), 4. 25 Madison Grant was a prominent eugenicist of the ear ly Twentieth Century who postulated that biological differences separated the races into an inherent hierarchy. The interbreeding of the diffe rent races would result in “racial suicide” that would l ead to the demise of the superior white Anglo-Saxon culture and civilization. He warned that the offsp ring of miscegenation would “belong to the lower ty pe [of race and]” and predicted the “importance of transmi tting in unimpaired purity the blood inheritance of ages will be appreciated at its full value.” Grant’s vi ews and those of his co-travelers such as Charles D avenport and Harry Laughlin would lay the groundwork for the restrictive National Origins Act which established the annual immigration quota system which allocated visas on the basis of position in the hierarchy of the races. Calvin Coolidge, while Vice President, note d that “biological laws tell us that certain diverg ent people will not mix or blend.” “Eugenic Laws again st Race Mixing,” Image Archive on the American Eugenics Movement Dolan DNA Learning Center Cold Sp ring Harbor Laboratory available from text.html ; Internet; accessed September 4, 2010.

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208 creation of minorities of dissimilar origins which would promote “future confli cts.” Peru, like other nations faced with the potential role of providing haven to political refug ees, must shun a “too hasty mingling of elements” inimical to national “traditions and ambitions” that posed a danger to national and ethnic stability. He concluded by posi ting that a “Europe which is so disturbed must have at least one continent which is free fr om hatred and hysteria.” 26 One Peruvian newspaper viewed Jewish migrs as a threat to the “solid basis of our Ibero-American identity [and] our Catholic tradition” that mus t be avoided. 27 The delegation from Peru had also noted sarcastically that the United States had established the model to follow regarding its immigration policies: with “ca ution and wisdom.” 28 By 1939 approximately 600-2,500 refugee Jews had been admitted into Peru. 29 The Mexican delegate, Primo Villa Michel, declared that his Government wa s “deeply” appreciative of the “generous initiative” of FDR. Mexico had a long tra dition of offering “hospitality” and asylum to political refugees, especially thos e who were “afraid for their lives.” The Government was prepared to offer “full freedom and security” and would render assistance and provide the opportunity to work to involuntary emigrants within the bounds of Mexican “legal, social and economic possibilities.” S uch 26 “Proceedings,” July 9, 1938, 31-32. 27 David Michael Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depressio n and War, 1929-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 414. 28 Roy H. Schoeman, Salvation is from the Jews (John 4:22): the Role of Judaism in Salvation History from Abraham to the Second Coming (Ignatius Press: 2003), 244. 29 “Peru” Jewish Virtual Library 2008 available from /ejud_0002_0015_0_15634.html ; Internet; accessed September 4, 2010; William D. Rubenstein, The Myth of Rescue: Why the Democracies Could Not H ave Saved More Jews from the Nazis (NY: Rutledge, 1977), 38.

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209 action would occur at a “rate appropriate” to the “special conditions” existing w ithin its borders in order to avoid “undesirable results” for the State and aliens. The ongoing reforms within Mexican society and the economy necessarily placed limits on the numbers of immigrants that would be allowed entry or who could be successfully assimilated. Nevertheless, the Mexican Government was offering its cooper ation, “goodwill and sympathy.” The refugees, however, would have to possess sufficient finances to support themselves and avoid becoming public charges. It was understood that Jews not meeting these requirements would be barred from entry. 30 The Mexican Government, following negotiations with Jewish leaders, did agree to consider the legalization of all Jews who had entered Mexico over the previ ous five years and to allow entry of refugees from Germany and Austria who had r elatives or friends already resident within the country, provided the new arrivals possesse d sufficient assets to support themselves. There were, however, a number of obstacles including ant iSemitic diatribes in the local papers and a bill introduced into the Mexican Congress by Senator Loayza calling for the creation Jewish ghettos. In addition, there w ere economic conflicts between the Jewish owners of large textile concerns and native opera tors of smaller enterprises who feared bankruptcy by their bigger competitors. 31 By November 30 “Proceedings,” July 9, 1938, 28-29. 31 “Mexico and Jews in Tentative Accord,” New York Times July 10, 1938, 22. Primo Villa Michel served as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipot entiary in the Netherlands and in the same capacity in the U.K and Northern Ireland in 1937. The Yiddish newspaper, Der Weg reported that the Mexican Ministry of the Interior issued a decree on June 7 establishing criteria for the admission of Austrian Jews: 1. Refugees could not reside in Mexico City or any pro vincial capital unless they demonstrated possession at least one hundred thousand pesos for the national c apital or twenty thousand pesos for the provincial capitals; 2. Exclusion from working as hired labor; limited to establishing industrial, agricultural o r exporting enterprises; 3. Residency permits limited to one year with provision that the refugee must r eturn to Austria when favorable conditions return. Der Weg did, however, report that unofficial assurances ha d been made that refugees would be allowed entry into the country if they possessed 2,000-3,000 pesos an d supplied an affidavit certifying that they would no t seek positions in the Mexican labor force. Perma nent

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210 1938 the Mexican Government enacted additional and more restrictive entry requirements. The Secretary of the Interior, Ignacio Garcia Tellez, de creed the Republic would admit stateless refugees “only in exceptional cases of notorious benefit for the country…” Such “petitioners for admittance must affirm categorically t hat they have no racial prejudices and that they are prepared to form Mexican mestizo families [by marrying Indians]” and thus, facilitate the process of assimilation. Pref erential treatment would be granted to single males less than twenty five years of age. 32 Dr. Alfredo Carbonell Debali, the Uruguayan delegate, stated that his Government had given the “most sympathetic consideration to the generous [Ameri can] initiative” and like the other delegates, cited his nation’s humanitarian tradit ions towards immigrants but any consideration to admit refugees was contingent on Uruguay’s economy and the “urgent necessity for populating rural areas.” The country’s developmental priorities lay in the agricultural and stock-breeding sect or and consequently a background in these areas was a prerequisite for admission. The abi lity of the national government to provide for immigration and assimilation was limited a nd any necessary finances must be provided by private organizations in other countries. The Government was, however, “favorable to the realization of this generous and humanitarian work of international cooperation.” 33 residency would be awarded if they did not violate any immigration laws and remained within the countr y for five years. “Mexico Will Admit Austrian Refuge es,” The Southern Israelite June 17, 1938, 1. 32 Frank L. Kluckhohn, “Mexico Sends Back Germany Ref ugees,” New York Times November 2, 1938, 13. 33 “Proceedings,” July 9, 1938, 29-30. Carbonelli lat er served as Ambassador to the Holy See.

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211 The delegate from Paraguay, Garcia Calderon, said that his nation had “far too few inhabitants” in relation to its “vast territory of extraordinary ferti lity.” However, immigration would be limited solely to agriculturists. He also stated that his country would welcome farmers but would “place strict restrictions on lawyers, doctors and other professional emigrants.” 34 The Venezuelan delegate, Carlos Aristimuo Coll, likewise expressed his Government’s appreciation of the “humanitarian motives” of Roosevelt and highlight ed its national tradition of “hospitality.” Although it “eagerly accepted” the invi tation to participate in the Conference the Venezuelan Government recognized that it was hindered by “certain restrictions” that limited its ability to admit Germ an and Austrian political refugees. The nation’s absorptive capacity was constrained by immigration laws and the need to select the proper type of immigrant; i.e. agricultural laborers, w ho would not disturb the “demographic equilibrium essential to racial diversity.” Therefo re, refugees could only be admitted via a “rigorously selective” process. 35 Eventually, the requirement of converting to Catholicism would be added to the list of immigration requirements. Virgilio Trujillo Molina, representative of the Dominican Republic and brother of the dictator Rafal Leonidas Trujillo y Molina, described FDR’s invitat ion as a “happy idea” that deserved the “most sympathetic” reception by all of the “thoughtful a nd feeling” peoples of the world. The Conference was faced with the most “urgent a nd harrowing problem” which warranted a humane and just solution. Stateless and innocent 34 “Proceedings,” July 9, 1938, 31-32. 35 “Proceedings,” July 9, 1938, 30. Cull served as Env oy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in France.

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212 “modern nomads” deserved rescue and if the meeting was successful the name of Franklin Roosevelt would be “blessed by present and future generations.” The Dominican Republic (with a population of 1.5 million) was ready and willing to make its contribution by the awarding of especially “advantageous concessions” to German and Austrian refugees provided they were “agriculturists with an unimpeachable re cord” that met the requirements of national immigration laws. The Republic possessed ample and productive land, social stability and the Department of Agriculture would provide settl ers land, seed and technical support. “Recognized scientists,” who through their teaching skills rendered “valuable service” to the country, would also be considered as spec ial exceptions to immigration rules and regulations. Molina concluded with the hope that the Evian Conference would be “like a peaceful, limpid lake, whose health giving water s assuage the thirst and add to the fertility of the lands that border it.” 36 Generalissimo Trujillo viewed the Evian Conference as an opportunity to refurbish his reputation following an October 1937 conflict with Haiti in which 8,000-12,000 Haitians residing in the northwestern region of the Dominican Republic were massacred in order to “obliterate Haitian ethnicity” within its borders. 36 The dictator announced, during May 1938, that he had been the only one of his countrymen possessing the “inflexibility of will” to deal with the “Haitian question.” 37 By July Trujillo attempted to create a new international image by wrapping himself in the 36 “Proceedings,” July 9, 1938, 32. 36 A number of studies from 1937 to 1987 have suggest ed that the Haitian death toll was 500-37,000. 37 Legation report, May 19, 1938, 839.51/4604, RG 59, NA cited in Eric Paul Roorda, The Dictator Next Door: The Good Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo Reg ime in the Dominican Republic, 1930-1945 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 142.

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213 humanitarian sentiments of the Evian Conference and dispatched Virgilio Molina t o represent the Republic and to announce that their country was willing and ready to a dmit Jewish refugees. Such an offer was described as representing “one of the boldes t masterstrokes of modern press agentry.” 38 Trujillo had earlier been approached during 1937 by the American Jewish Congress for the same purpose. The Congress’ representative, Dr. Howard Blake, described the potential benefits that would a ccrue to the Dominican leader: “Trujillo, the Emancipator! Trujillo, the Liberator! ...Who would be the first to buy your tobacco? The Jews! Your coffee? The Jews! Everything that you can export? The everlastingly grateful Jew!” 39 Additional considerations drove Trujillo to offer refuge to German and Austri an refugees. The introduction of lighter skinned Central European immigrants and Spanis h Civil War refugees would allow the replacement of Haitian and West Indian wor kers and transform the racial demographics of his island nation while introducing outside ca pital 38 Marion A. Kaplan, “’A Very Modest Experiment—The J ewish Refugee Settlement in Sosua, 19401945,” The Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook 53 no. 1 (2008): 132. 39 Dr. Howard Blake to Trujillo, January 5, 1937, 839 .52 Jewish Colonization/1, RG 59, NA cited in Roorda, Dictator Next Door 143. Dominican General Gregorio Luperon (1839-189 7), cabinet minister and provisional president (1879-1880) promoted immigrat ion from Cuba and Puerto Rico and during 1882 unsuccessfully sought the resettlement of Russian J ews suffering Czarist pogroms. Letter to the centr al committee of the Alliance Isralite Universalle : “I have heard of the persecutions of the Jews in several European states and I venture to inform you that th ere is a country, the Dominican Republic, a vast an d fertile country which has every prospect for the fu ture. There your co-religionists will be received with open arms. It is not merely hospitality which I ta ke the liberty to offer in the name of my governmen t and people but also a secure citizenship (nationality) and land for farming purposes, land, which immediat ely after possession has been taken, will become the pr operty of the settlers…I know…the people in Santo Domingo…will rejoice in the arrival in their midst of brethren prepared to share their fate with them. ” Mark Wischnitzer “The Historical Background of the Settlement of Jewish Refugees in Santo Domingo,” Jewish Social Studies 4, no. 1 (January 1942): 48-50. Converted Jews had first come to the island of Hispaniola during the Spanish Inquisition but the f irst Sephardic Jews arrived in the Dominican Republ ic during the first twenty-five years of the Nineteent h Century and helped to develop a successful mercha nt class that benefited the local economy. Overall th e Republic had a long tradition of social and relig ious tolerance towards its Jewish minority.

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214 and technology into the economy. 40 The Roosevelt Administration was approached for aid in enacting laws that would, according to Cordell Hull, ease the entry of r eadily assimilable “neo-white” settlers. 41 Cooperation at the Evian council was also seen as a possible inducement to end United States control of Dominican customs and perhaps represented a form of penance for potentially jeopardizing Roosevelt’s Good Nei ghbor Policy (and American regional hegemony) towards the nations of Latin America 42 Trujillo was, after all, a dictator who obtained the reins of power in 1930 as the consequence of an eight year U.S. Marine Corps occupation of the island from 1916-1924. 43 Rumors of clandestine bribes and a desire to develop unpopulated land have also been suggested as motives for Trujillo’s willingness to admit Jewish ref ugees. 44 The Secretary of Legation Robert Mills McClintock clearly recognized that t he Dominican agreement to participate in the Evian Conference was primarily to “make a s how of cooperating in a policy” initiated by Roosevelt and supported by the American Government. 45 Despite such pretenses the President agreed to pursue the possibility that the Dominican Republic would provide a “supplemental Jewish homeland.” 46 40 Laurence Duggan, Chief of the State Department Lat in American Division, analysis of Dominican immigration policy, 29 January 1938, 839-51/4570, R G 59, NA. Ibid., 144; Kaplan, “A Very Modest Experiment,” 132. 41 Chief of Visa Division Avra Warren to Norweb, Apri l 29 and October 12, 1938, 839.55/75 and 87, RG 59, NA. Ibid., 144. See also Memo by Hull, July 27, 1938, 939. SS/85, Re 59, NA and Memo by Warren, May 2, 1939, 839.55/85, RG 59, NA. 42 A treaty was adopted between the Dominican Republi c and the U.S. in 1907 in which the War Department Bureau of Insular Affairs established an d controlled the General Receivership of Dominican Customs in which 55 percent of import duties were u tilized to finance the island’s national debt. Ibi d., 14. 43 Ibid., 2. 44 Ibid., 114. 45 “Outline of the Eighth Year, “November 7, 1938, 840 .48 Refugees/1046, RG 59, NA. Ibid., 144.

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215 Years later, Luis Hess, a German refugee who settled in Sosua and became the first Jew to marry a native Dominican and whose sister perished during the y ears of the Holocaust, did not comprehend the reasons for Trujillo’s offer of refuge. Jews wer e caught, he believed between the regime of Hitler, “the German racist [who] persecuted…and wanted to murder us” and Trujillo, “the Dominican racist” who offered salvation. The Jews of Sosua were placed in the “awkward position of having to be thankful to a dictator.” 47 Such principled reasoning for Hess in the end did not matter and he was grateful for his deliverance. In the end “if a murderer saves your li fe you still have to be grateful to the murderer.” 48 The project was studied by the Refugee Economic Corporation of New York with the assistance of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Political Ref ugees. Johns Hopkins University President Isaiah Bowman selected agricultural expert s to make an on-site survey and a positive report was published during early 1939. Financing was provided by the AgroJoint (composed of the American Jewish Joint Agricultural Corporation and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee; agreement s igned on September 29, 1939). 49 FDR issued his official endorsement describing the project as a 46 Welles to Roosevelt, January 12, 1939, OF 3186, FDR L. Ibid., 144. 47 Spiegel interview with Luis Hess on his 98th birthday, Spiegel Online Panorama, 26 December 2006.,151 8,456564,00.html cited in Kaplan “’A Very Modest Experiment,’” 133. Hess acted as interpreter for D ORSA during its negotiations with the Dominican Government and later directed a small school within Sosua. 48 Interview by Marion Kaplan with Luis Hess, May 25, 2006, Sosa. Ibid., 133. 49 Welles to Roosevelt, February 27, 1939, OF 3186, F DRL cited in Roorda, Dictator Next Door, 144. The American Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) pro vided funding for the support of overseas Jews. James Rosenberg headed the Agro-Joint which had ear lier resettled 250,000 Russian Jews in the Crimea and southern portions of the Ukraine. He establish ed DORSA with an Agro-Joint colleague, Dr. Joseph Rosen. See also Wischnitzer, “The Historical Backg round,” 46.

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216 “turning point” in Jewish refugee affairs. 50 During the initial meetings of the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees in London in August 1938 the figu re of one hundred thousand potential immigrants was raised by the Dominican Government but a later Brookings Institute study in 1942 concluded that resettlement of such a large number of refugees was not possible but by “proceeding gradually” a more rea listic number was 3,000-5,000. 51 A large contribution of Jewish money was required to ensure that the refugees would not become public charges. The Dominican Republic Subsidiary Association or Dorsa, a subsidiary of Agro-Joint established in the U.S., signed a contract with t he Trujillo Government in January 1940 in which one hundred refugees would be accepted. The first immigrant community was established in the district of Sosa in the northern province of Puerto Plata on a former United Fruit Company banana plantation which incorporated a 26,685 acre tract of land containing 4,950 acres of pasture, more than twenty buildings with limited electricity, water and roads and a large res erve of virgin forest. Its settler population (granted inalienable rights on January 30, 1940) number ed around five hundred Jewish and non-Jewish settlers by 1942. The American Joint Distribution Committee raised $1.423 million by the end of 1944. However, only limited numbers of refugees, totaling 640, who had to agree to become agricultural workers, wer e allowed into the country. Trujillo granted each Jew eighty acres of land, ten cows one 50 Wischnitzer, “The Historical Background,” 47. 51 “Refugee Settlements in the Dominican Republic. A S urvey Conducted under the Auspices of the Brookings Institution”, Washington, 1942, 341, cite d in Esco Foundation for Palestine, Inc., Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab, and British Policies vol. 1. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 19 47), 950. Molina served as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister P lenipotentiary in France and Belgium and was the brother of Rafael Trujillo.

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217 mule and a horse. When Trujillo later demanded ten times the amount originally paid in 1940 the JDC refused further payments. 52 Lon Laleau, the Foreign Minister of Haiti, made a similar offer in 1938 to admit fifty thousand refugees but was turned down by Sumner Welles and the Americ an Government. Haitian diplomats, however, did provide entry visas during 1937 to several hundred Jews before the onset of the war, saving the lives of approximately 100-300. Haitian President Stnio Vincent issued an edict on May 29, 1939 granting Haitian citizenship to refugees in abstentia (reminiscent of an earlier Britis h proposal to grant Palestinian citizenship to Jews in abstentia). One historic source had sugges ted that until 1938 the only requirement needed to enter Haiti was $100; later increased to $1,000-5,000 plus a government permit. Others claim, however, that the cost was much higher and the admittance of refuges was merely a scheme to generate foreign ex change for the national government. 53 Latin-American countries faced pressure from Germany not to allow entr y of German and Austrian Jews or risk economic retaliation. Brazil was alread y having domestic difficulties dealing with a large German minority in her territ ory. Profitable 52 “Proceedings,” July 11, 1938, 38-39; Yehuda Bauer, American Jewry and the Holocaust: the American Joint Distribution Committee 1939-1945 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1981), 200 201; “Sosua’s Beginnings: A Haven for Jews Fleeing Hitler,” November 5, 2008 available from can-haven-for-jews-fleeing-hitler/ ; Internet; accessed May 28, 2010; Wischnitzer “Historical Background,” 47-48. 53 Daniel Smajovits, “Jews and Haitians: A Forgotten H istory,” March 16, 2010, Jewish Tribune available from 003162781/Jews-and-Haitians-Aforgotten-history.html ; Internet; accessed June 26, 2010; Ariel Scheib, “ The Virtual Jewish History Tour Haiti” available from ti.html ; Internet; accessed June 25, 2010; “Port-au-Prince—Haiti A Nation that Saved Jews during Nazi Era,” March 26, 2010 available from ; Internet; accessed June 26, 2010; Janice Arnold, “Exhibit Highlights Haiti’s Heroism in Holocaust,” Canadian Jewish Congress, available fro m ; Internet; accessed June 26, 2010.

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218 barter agreements between the Latin American Republics and Germany wo uld be potentially at jeopardy despite the Reich’s needs for foreign raw material s and other commodities. Thus, these nations opposed any overt criticism of the anti-Semitic pol icies of Germany. The demographic composition of the refugees themselves served to put a brake on the willingness of Latin American to accept displaced aliens. Agricul tural workers and entrepreneurs were needed more than professionals, merchants or intellectuals. 54 Gustav Rasmussen, the Danish representative and member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, affirmed that despite the “best of good will” the nations of Europe could not solve the German and Austrian refugee crisis without the aid of “other contine nts.” Denmark, like the other states bordering Germany, already had to “bear their heavy part of the burden thrown on them by circumstances.” His nation was afflicted by wide spread unemployment and had served primarily as a country of “emigration.” Prior to t he outbreak of the Great War over eight thousand Danes left for the Western Hemispher e per year with the number falling to six thousand per year after peace was concl uded. However, during the most recent time period emigration had “virtually ceased enti rely.” Nonetheless, the Danish Government had admitted “very large numbers” of political refugees from Germany but was still willing to collaborate in finding a w orkable and realistic solution to a refugee problem which was “immense, difficult and com plicated but [not] insoluble.” 55 54 Feingold, Politics of Rescue 32. 55 “Proceedings,” July 9, 1938, 30.

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219 Chapter 7 “Great Human Tragedy” Once they had left their homeland they remained hom eless; once they had left their state they became stateless; once they had been deprived of th eir human rights they were rightless, the scum of the earth. Nothing which was being done, no mat ter how stupid, no matter how many people knew and foretold the consequences, could be undone or prevented. Every event had the finality of a last judgment, a judgment that was passed neit her by God nor by the devil, but looked rather like the expression of some unredeemably stupid fin ality. 1 The “Report of the Sub-Committee for the Reception of Organizations Concerned with the Relief of Political Refugees Coming from Germany (includi ng Austria)”, chaired by the Australian T.W. White, was submitted on July 9 and adopt ed on July 14, 1938. This panel held only one session commencing on July 8 at 2:30 p.m. Statements were heard from the League High Commissioner for Refugee s, Sir Neill Malcolm, and representatives from a variety of Jewish and non-Jewish relief organizations such as the International Christian Committee for Non-Aryans, J ewish Colonization Association and the American Joint Distribution Committee. 2 These groups, listed in their entirety in Appendix C, were allowed to offer limited testim ony, restricted 1 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (London, Allen & Unwin, 1967), 267. 2 Speakers included: Sir Neill Malcolm [League of Nat ions High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany], Professor Norman Bentwich of the Council for German Jewry, Lord Marley of the World Ort Union, Edouard Oungre of the Jewish Colonization As sociation, Mrs. Ormerod, the Rev. Father Odo, Walter Adams, Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Dr. Arthur Ruppin of the Jewish Agency, Dr. Steinberg, Mr. Georg Bernhard, Raoul Evrard, Rabbi Jonah Wise of the Joi nt Distribution Committee, Mr. Eppstein, Mr. Goodman, Mr. Brotman, Leo Lambert, Mr. Gourevitch, Mr. Marcovici, Benjamin Akzin, Dr. Brutzkus, Dr. Oskar Grun, Mr. Forcht and Madame Irene Harand.

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220 initially to ten minutes but later cut down to five minutes. Consequently, the advocates “all left the room disheartened and disillusioned.” 3 Catholic spokesmen claimed that five hundred thousand of their non-Aryan Christian brethren resided within the confines of Greater Germany and that t en thousand refugees were “dependent on the charity” of their co-religionists. Ca tholic committees in the United States, headed by Archbishop Joseph Rummel of New Orleans, and similar groups from Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland and Switzerland introduced a joint memorandum calling upon the Evian delegations to persuade Germany to end its pol icy of forced emigration or at a minimum to allow retention of sufficient monies to provide re-training, transportation and resettlement. “[A] clear reasser tion of the fundamental rights” of mankind was essential for it was the denial and denigration of such right s that fostered the “tragic problem” of involuntary refugees. 4 The British League of Nations Union introduced a statement acknowledging its prior attempts to unify projects of rescue under the auspices of the Geneva based body It did agree, however, that an organization independent of the League would be required to negotiate with the German Government and to persuade the United States and Brazil t o assume greater responsibility in reaching a solution; i.e., accept a great er percentage of stateless refugees. The British League called upon the Germans to esta blish a fund, whether by “barter, exchange or other methods” to broker the costs of resettlement A 3 Rudel-Adler, The Evian Conference 255. 4 Charles K. Streit, “Catholics Appeal to Refugee Pa rley,” New York Times July 9, 1938, 1. Monsignor Michael Ready, the General Secretary of the Nationa l Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC), attended the Evian Conference as the surrogate of Archbishop Rum mel.

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221 “planned” mass migration was preferable to a policy of infiltration which would encompass only small groups of migrants over a protracted time frame. 5 New York Rabbi Jonah B. Wise pledged the cooperation and financial support of the American Joint Distribution Committee and noted that millions of dollars had already been expended in Central Europe for refugee work. Dr. Arthur Ruppin of the Jewish Agency remarked that forty thousand Jewish refugees had been admitt ed into Palestine by the time of the Conference. Norman Bentwich of the London Council for German Jewry and Nahum Goldmann representing the World Jewish Congress called f or inclusion in the workings of the meeting the Jews of Poland, Rumania and Hungary. Goldmann anticipated the eventual migration of at least two hundred thousand Jews from Greater Germany in the near future. Mrs. Mary Ormerod, a London Quaker and secretary of the Coordinating Committee, reminded the delegates that the re fugee crisis was not solely a Jewish issue but included German Christians who were unable to suppor t Nazi policies and consequently became “refugees for conscience sake.” 6 “Short” analyses of the memoranda and public statements of these groups were constructed by the Conference Secretariat and submitted to the delegations as a whole. The sub-committee members heard “moving stories [of a] great human tragedy ” that 5 Ibid., 1. The British League of Nations Union’s fir st chairman was Lord Cecil and Lloyd George and Sir Edward Grey served as honorary presidents. 6 Ibid., 4. Reform Rabbi Jonah Bondi Wise (1881-1959) established a weekly radio program in 1934, the “Message of Israel,” and served as the national cha irman of the Joint Distribution Committee from 1931 1938. He became national chairman of the United Je wish Appeal in 1939 although he did not support Zionism. Bentwich (1883-1971) was an English Zioni st who served in 1920 as Attorney General in Palestine and chair of international relations at t he Hebrew University in Jerusalem. During 1933 he assumed the post of deputy to the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany. Nahum Goldmann (1905-1982) was a Zionist and Jewish leader who had served in the Jewish affairs section of the German Foreign Ministry during WWI. During the interwar period he belonged to a more radical Zionist faction opposed to the leadership o f Chaim Weizmann but following the assumption of power of Hitler in 1933 he became a Weizmann suppor ter. Ruppin (1876-1943), a Prussian born Jew and attorney, became a sociologist and director of agri cultural projects within Palestine.

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222 necessitated a rapid solution and mutual cooperation. Representations were made by Jewish, Catholic and other non-Aryan groups and were thematically divided into “f our main trends of thought.” The first called for an increase in Jewish immigr ation into Palestine by “substantially” increasing the annual quota allowed by the Ma ndate Power and noted that 45,000 German Jews had entered Palestine since the Nazi takeover of government in 1933. A second approach called for aid to refugees that would facilitate their assimilation into the dominant society of the nation “into which they are transplant ed.” Article 15 of the Geneva Convention of February 10, 1938, concerning the status of German refugees, called for the “contracting parties” involved in resettl ement to provide the structure and facilities for vocational training. In addition, the new immi grants would be dispersed throughout the country of reception to avoid urban concentrations that could generate “hostility” among the native population. 7 This Convention was applied to stateless German and Austrian refugees who were unable to obtain a Nansen passpor t and consequently were granted “certain privileges of sojourn and residence in signator y states,” suitable identification and travel documentation and protection against involuntary repatriation to Germany. Several organizations called for an immedi ate ratification of this Convention by its signatories and the widest degree of applic ation. The third opinion called for resettlement in isolated and underdeveloped regions to avoid “mingling with indigenous ethnical elements” and presumably avoid the risk of generating local anti-Semitism. The fourth suggestion requested the granting of all rights protecting minorities to refugees in “their present country of residence .” In addition, 7 As with the future planning of the agenda of the Ev ian Conference Latin American countries did not participate in the construction and drafting of the se League Conventions on Refugees.

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223 there were political views which called upon the countries of temporary haven to gra nt refugee Jews the rights of citizens while awaiting their ultimate em igration to a place of permanent abode. The degree of “wealth and social status” should not be used in a discriminatory fashion against refugees and priority of entry ought to be gr anted to those “political prisoners or individuals who had suffered because of their opinions.” The sub-committee concluded that the enactment of such diverse points of view would entail the transfer of “whole populations” and the allocation of “large sums of money” to relief organizations. It was believed, however, that Germany, should be approached to “make its contribution” for financing by allowing refugees to retain sufficient lev els of personal assets to make resettlement possible; an approach consistent with the origina l Evian Conference invitation that stated that any costs would not be borne by the nations receiving refugees. 8 Solomon Adler-Rudel, one of the representatives testifying before the White sub-committee, was critical of the improvised nature of these hearings: 8 “Appendix to the Report of the Sub-Committee for th e Reception of Organizations Concerned with the Relief of Political Refugees Coming from Germany (i ncluding Austria) cited in “Proceedings,” July 9, 1938, 59. See also John A. Scanlan, “A View from t he United States-Social, Economic, and Legal Change the Persistence of the State, and Immigration Polic y in the Coming Century,” available from lobal_legal_studies/vol2/scanlan.html ; Internet; accessed May 31, 2010. Article 15 of the February 10, 1938 Geneva Convention concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany, 4461 L.N.T.S. state d: “With a view to facilitating the emigration of refugees to overseas countries, each facility shall be granted to the refugees and to the organization s which deal with them for the establishment of schools for professional re-adaptation and technical training. ” Shauma Labman, “Looking Back, Moving Forward: The H istory and Future of Refugee Protection” available from e=1000&context=shauna_labman ; Internet; accessed May 31, 2010. This Convention u tilized the same definition of “refugees coming fro m Germany” as defined in the Provisional Arrangement of 1936. However, there was a very important qualifier amended to this definition: “Persons who leave Germany for reasons of purely personal convenience are not included in this definition.” Therefore, any individual who left the Reich for ot her reasons would be defined as refugees provided they had become disenfranchised from the nation of origi n and had essentially become stateless. Ivor C. Jacks on, The Refugee Concept in Group Situations (Cambridge, MA: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 21

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224 Nobody was prepared for it, neither the members of the Committee, nor the representatives of the various organizations wh o had to queue up at the door of the meeting room to be called in, one a fter the others, and to face the 11 members of the Subcommittee, [to] whom they were supposed to tell their tale within ten minutes at t he most. 9 The second technical sub-committee, chaired by Norwegian Judge Hansson, the director of the Nansen Office, began closed door hearings on the immigration la ws and practices of participating nations, the qualifications and numbers of refugee s that could be accepted and the issue of travel documentation and identification papers. The U.S. was represented by George Brandt and together with E.N. Cooper of the British H ome Office did the bulk of the work and prepared the final report. During Brandt’s July 8 presentation of American immigration policies he was “roundly attacked” by Sir Neill Malcolm who complained that if the United States was not prepared to modify its immigration laws rather than merely merging the annual German and Austri an quotas then the President should not have initiated an international refugee conference. Tayl or viewed Malcolm’s attitude throughout the Conference as one of “open hostility” and described the High Commissioner as a “semi-invalid” who performed his office for the League only when he could “spare time from his duties as head of the North Borneo Company.” Instead, he credited Malcolm’s Turkish assistant, Mr. Tevfik Eri m (a member of the Political Section of the League Secretariat) and Lord Duncannon with t he majority of the High Commission’s refugee work. Malcolm’s chief attribute, Taylor bel ieved, lay in his blind obedience to the dictates of the British Foreign Office and the League 9 Adler-Rudel, “Evian Conference,” 255. Solomon Adle r-Rudel was born in Czernowitz, AustriaHungary on June 23, 1894 and worked as a social wor ker in Vienna and Berlin. During 1933-1936 he served as executive secretary of the Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden and was an executive committee member of the Zionistische Vereinigung fuer Deutschland He immigrated to the United Kingdom in 1936 and to Israel in 1949. He served in a variety of p osts including the association of Jewish Refugees, the World Zionist Organization and the Leo Baeck Instit ute and died on November 14, 1975.

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225 Secretariat and his avoidance of independent action. Most private organizations, he w ent on, viewed Sir Neill as “pleasant but of little real value.” Judge Hansson likewi se was an “agreeable, pleasant spoken man” who was “completely ineffective” as Chairm an of the technical sub-committee. 10 The White Commission, with its abbreviated sessions and constrained testimonies clearly demonstrated that the central figures of the perform ance, the German and Austrian Jews, merely played marginalized roles on the world’s diploma tic stage. Britain would not modify its stance on Palestine. Most nations that had received refu gees preferred to be points of transit to other countries that were themselves res istant to Jewish immigration. In an age of rising ethnic nationalism and economic stress it was unlikely that alien Jews would be granted equal rights. Consequently, it became clearly evident that the strategy of mass resettlement was an unachievable goal espec ially when coupled with official German intransigence regarding release of seized funds. P rojects of resettlement in out of the way, less developed and underpopulated locales were increasingly considered by the Europeans and the Roosevelt Administration as suitable destinations for Jews. Such isolation, it was believed, would prevent the development of domestic anti-Semitism. These plans, however, would have to subsidized by non-governmental sources, would take years to develop and could incorporate only small numbers of individuals and families, leaving the remainder to face the whirlwind. 10 “Report of Myron C. Taylor to the Secretary of Sta te in Washington about the Evian Conference, July 20, 1938” cited in Mendelsohn, The Holocaust vol. 5, 249-264.

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226 Chapter 8 Day Six “Greatest Sympathy” The fourth public meeting began July 11 with statements from the remaining delegates which thematically resembled those of their predecessors. Gs ta Engzell, the Swedish representative and director of the legal department in the Foreign Mi nistry, acknowledged his nation’s “most liberal” admissions policy but noted that Sweden was not a state of immigration. As a consequence of local conditions the Government would have to deal with each refugee as an individual subject to vigorous screening criteria Engzell believed that success of the Evian Conference was dependent upon relocation outside the bounds of Europe. Although the majority of costs would have to be borne by private organizations governments needed to be prepared to make the necessary contributions to ensure success. He warned that the broader European Jewish Question posed the greatest danger and it is in this context that a more definitive solution mus t be found. Sweden shared the concern over the “unhappy and often tragic fate” of the refugees and hoped that the Conference would result in “positive and lasting result s.” 1. However, despite the expression of such humanitarian concerns Sweden (along with Switzerland and the United Kingdom) introduced visa controls during 1938 as a means of restricting the entry of Jews. “Political refugees” were viewed as a separate group from 1 “Proceedings,” July 11, 1938, 35.

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227 “racial persecutees” who were primarily Jewish and as a result Je ws were denied “political sanctuary.” 2 A joint declaration was introduced by Dr. Constantino Herdocia (Nicaraguan Minister to Great Britain and France), Professor Luis Dobles Segreda (C osta Rican Charg d’Affairs in Paris), Dr. Mauricio Rosal (Honduran Consul in Paris) and Dr. Ernesto Hoffman (Panamanian Consul-General in Geneva and Permanent Delegat e to the League of Nations) on behalf of their respective governments. They expressed their fullest cooperation and “moral support for the generous initiative” of FDR and the creation of the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees but their willingness to accept involuntary expatriates was dependent on similar action in the other st ates based on a percentage proportional to the “territorial extent” of each nation. Although “saturated with foreign elements” the absorption of aliens, they believed, provide d positive benefits to the development of these small countries. Limitations on national resources, however, tempered their “power of assimilation” and refugees would not be accepted beyond a reasonable quota. Any cost for resettlement must be borne by the refugees themselves as official funds were inadequate to meet the need. I n addition, any refugee “engaged in trade or intellectual work” would be barred from entry due to concerns about competition with the local community. 3 Gustavo A. Wiengreen, the Paraguayan delegate and Minister to Hungary, expressed the deepest pleasure and the “keenest sympathy” of his Government tha t led to 2 David Cesarani and Paul A. Levine eds., Bystanders to the Holocaust: a Re-Evaluation (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 19. Gsta Engzell ha s been credited with saving more Jewish lives durin g WWII than his compatriot, Raoul Wallenberg. “Teachi ng the Hero in Holocaust History: The Cases of Raoul Wallenberg and Gsta Engzell” by Paul Levine, October 14, 1999, available from evine.pdf ; Internet; accessed May 31, 2010. 3 “Proceedings,” July 11, 1938, 35-36.

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228 its willingness to participate in the Evian Conference. Paraguay possesse d an “immense territory of extraordinary fertility” but was “too thinly populated” and neede d the absorption of “industrious individuals” that could develop and exploit its natural resources. Nevertheless, the Decree-Law of March 20, 1937, limited admission t o agriculturists and related crafts; a restriction that essentially e liminated from consideration the bulk of Jewish refugees who were urban based and middle-class. 4 The Irish envoy and Permanent Delegate to the League of Nations, Francis Thomas Cremins, expressed the gratitude of his Government for being able to officia lly offer its heartfelt compassion for the refugees and hoped that significa nt outcomes would be achieved. Cremins and the Irish mission had been directed to avoid any financi al obligation without the express approval of the Minister of External Affairs Eam on de Valera. Consequently, Cremins declared that the Irish were content to have been i nvited but were not able to make a bona fide contribution to the problem at hand due to its small geographic size, a population numbering less than three million and an economy primarily based on agriculture. Since it was necessary for so many young Ir ish people to emigrate each year in search of employment (due to the lack of available la nd to settle and the slow expansion of domestic manufacturing) it was not possible to absorb stateless, unemployed and often destitute refugees. In addition, there was an overabundance of medical and other professionals which barred entry of aliens with similar intellectual and professional backgrounds. Cremins also believed tha t barely a fraction of the stateless refugees could be assimilated into the more highly industrialized nations. Thus, he argued, only sparsely settled and underdeveloped territories were 4 “Proceedings,” July 11, 1938, 36.

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229 suitable for mass migration. Since Ireland lacked colonies it was reluctant to recommend that other nations assume a burden that Eire could not share. The Irish Government did have the sincere faith that a feasible solution for the “mass of human suffering ” could be found but he warned that “the greater the hopes” offered by potential sites of res ettlement the “greater may be the pressure” exerted upon “these unfortunate creatures ” by those nations that sought to expel unwanted minorities. 5 Lon R. Thbaud, the Haitian Commercial Attach to France (with rank of Minister), declared that his country had limited ability to admit refugee s and would give preference to agriculturists or specialized technicians “of thoroughly healt hy stock,” who were easily absorbable into the local community and who possessed sufficient as sets. 6 The Swiss representative to the Evian Conference was the Chief of the Fede ral Police for Foreigners ( Eidgenssische Fremdenpolizei ), Heinrich Rothmund, who also held the position of Chief of Immigration from 1919-1954. He epitomized the insincerity and the duplicitous nature of the congress. Rothmund expressed the “greatest sympathy” for those forced to flee their homeland and acknowledged that the refugee crisis as a whole was of “particular interest” to his Government. Switzerland was a desi rable destination for refugees (along with France and Holland) due to its proximity to G ermany and Austria, its tradition of granting asylum, liberal constitutionalism and polit ical neutrality. He noted that aliens already comprised nine percent of the total popul ation in a country faced with high levels of unemployment. Domestic fears of being over run by stateless foreigners forced Switzerland to serve only as a nation of transit Jews were not 5 “Proceedings,” July 11, 1938, 36. See also Dermot Keogh, Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland: Refugees; Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust (Cork, Ireland: Cork University, 1998), 119-120. 6 “Proceedings,” July 11, 1938, 38-39.

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230 regarded by the Swiss Government as being “political refugees,” i.e., a g roup at risk of persecution due to political beliefs or activities. All other refugees would be gr anted a “temporary residence permit or a tolerance permit” which would allow suffi cient time to plan for and carry out a move to a more permanent haven. 7 Following the end of the Great War the Swiss Government introduced a “system of control” over the admission of aliens especially the Ostjuden the Eastern European and Russian Jews, who were viewed as a leftist threat to Swiss culture, ethnici ty and native employment. Such immigrants were deemed to be unassimilable into the dominant culture and posed a risk of Judaization. The Westjuden or Western Jews were viewed as being more easily absorbed but this attitude changed with the events in Germany and Austria. The 1930 census demonstrated that nine percent of the population (355,000 out of 4 million) were aliens of which three hundred thousand possessed residency permits which granted the right to work and change occupation or place of residence. However, contemporary events mandated “very stringent control” over the entry of future refugees. Rothmund acknowledged, during the period of April-September 1933, that ten thousand Jewish and non-Aryan refugees had been offered temporary asylum within the Swiss Cantonates. This number later diminished following the ret urn of some Jews to Germany or resettlement in other countries. By December 1933 approximately 2,500 Jewish and non-Jewish refugees were residing within Switze rland, decreasing to 1,500 by June 1935, following which the number increased to 3,400 on March 31, 1936 and 9,000 on December 31, 1937. 8 7 “Proceedings,” July 11, 1938, 37-38. 8 Tenenbaum, “The Crucial Year 1938,” 55-53.

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231 After the Anschluss the number of refugees rose to greater than ten thousand prompting the Swiss Government to increase border security and deportations. Bet ween March 12 and April 1 3,000-4,000 refugees from Austria entered Switzerland. Reportedly, one thousand refugees came into the the country illegally over a thre e week period in August of whom some were interned in a camp at Dupulsau and others forcibly returned to Germany. Increased security was enacted in the mountain passes and on t he Austrian border. Consequently, the total number of refugees declined but again spiked in 1940 following the German occupation of France. Switzerland could continue to honor its tradition of political asylum to refugees, Rothmund asserted, but current conditions mandated that the nation serve as a point of transit to other destinations rather t han a site of permanent resettlement. 9 The closure of frontiers abutting Austria forced Switzerland to introduce a system of visas for Austrian passports in order “to secure some control over immigration.” The Swiss Federal Council declared on March 28, 1938 that all Austrians seeking entry into Switzerland would require a travel permit. All refugees lacking proper documentation were barred admission on August 18 and from October 4 onwards all German non-Aryans required authorization as well. 10 By August an additional one thousand illegal refugees had crossed the Swiss frontier prompting Canton Chief s of Police to warn that future undocumented aliens faced deportation, stricter police controls 9 Ibid., 52. 10 Circular of the Swiss Police Department September 7 1938, Yad Vashem Archive, M 63/20 Federal Police and Justice Department, Department of Police Bern available from pdf ; Internet; accessed April 15, 2007.

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232 and a ban on “lucrative” employment due to the high Swiss unemployment rate. 11 Following Kristallnacht the Swiss Government, however, honored the appeal of the Swiss Committee for Aid to Children of Germany to admit a limited number of Je wish children on a temporary basis. 12 While ostensibly seeking an international solution to the refugee crisis Rothmund and the Swiss Government was secretly conspiring to stem the influx of Jewish refugees. He sought official German cooperation in halting Jewish immigra tion because of governmental fears that the Swiss population would fall victim to berfremdung (ethnic contamination) or Verjdung (Judaization). Germany had begun a policy of granting German passports to all former Austrian citizens as a me ans of ridding itself of its Jews. The specter of ever widening involuntary migration aros e with the Italian Government’s decision to deport all foreign Jews who had arrived afte r 1919 coupled with the closure of the French frontier to further refugees. In the backg round, of course, lay the countries of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary and Poland who also sought to solve their “Jewish Question” by forced emigration. 13 On June 24 Rothmund advised the German Legation in Bern that unrestricted admission of Austrian Jews would overwhelm Switzerland which had no more use for Jews than had Germany. Fearing that Switzerland would be inundated by Jews w ith the 11 “Swiss Explain Move in Curbing Refugees,” New York Times August 25, 1938, 8 12 “Swiss to Let 1,000 from Austria Stay,” New York Times August 18, 1938, 10. 13 Regula Ludi, “What is So Special about Switzerland ? Wartime Memory as a National Ideology in the Cold War Era,” in Richard Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteine r and Claudio Fogu, The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe (Durham, NC: Duke University Press), 235; Shaul Fe rrero, “Switzerland and the Refugees Fleeing Nazism: Documents on the German Jews Turned Back at the Basel Border in 1938-1939, ” 3 available from %20-%203212.pdf ; Internet; accessed January 27, 2011.

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233 collusion of the Viennese police and aware of the probable ineffectualness of the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees, Rothmund filed a complaint on August 10, 1938 with Under State Secretary Ernst Woermann, Director of the Politi cal Department of the German Foreign Ministry. He claimed that the entry of Jew s into the country has reached critical levels. Therefore, all Austrians seekin g entry into Switzerland would require a special visa. Otherwise, Switzerland would enact dra conian measures to prevent the continued dumping of Jewish refugees. Unless positive actions were undertaken by the German authorities the Swiss Government would abroga te the Swiss-German visa agreement. Rothmund agreed to limit any visa requireme nts to Jews coming from Austria or Germany provided their passports unmistakably identif ied the traveler as being Jewish. The Germans, in turn, called for similar designat ions to be applied to Swiss passports. The end result was the cancellation of all Jewish pass ports and their replacement by special documents marked by a red “J” [ Jude ], 3 cm. in height affixed to the upper left-hand corner of the first page, allowing Swiss border offi cials to more readily recognize the ethnicity of refugees. This policy went into e ffect approximately two weeks prior to Kristallnacht 14 Rothmund was described by Adler14 Tenenbaum, “The Crucial Year 1938,” 53-56; “Law on Passports of Jews October 5, 1938, 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt Part 1, 1342; Document 2120-PS, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression vol. IV (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946, ) 754-755; “The 1998 Wiesenthal Reports on Switzerland” available from ; Internet; accessed April 6, 2010; “The Politics of ‘Transmigration’: Why Jewish Refug ees had to Leave Switzerland from 1944-1954” by Simon Erlanger. Jewish Political Studies Review 18: 1-2 (Spring 2006) available from ; Internet; accessed June 30, 2010; Perl, The Holocaust Conspiracy 77-78; Doc. 5 on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 Washington 1963, Series D, Vol. V, in Adler-Rudel, The Evian Conference,” 251; “Very Impo rtant and Strictly Confidential Circular to the Swi ss Border Police” September 7, 1938, available from %20-%203273.pdf ; accessed June 19, 2010. The negotiations between the Swiss and German Gover nments remained a state secret until 1953 when captured German archives were released with the pub lication of the “Documents on German Foreign Policy” ( Akten zur deutschen auswrtigen Politik ). There is evidence that during the Great War the files of Jews seeking Swiss citizenship were specially marke d to identify the applicant as being Jewish and a s tamp

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234 Rudel as the “prime example of the kind of man” to which the destiny of the refugees was consigned. 15 Thus, while the Evian Conference was ostensibly convoked to aid the rescue of the victims of German persecution and potentially save lives, some members were actively moving to cut off all routes of escape. The road to salvation would, as time w ill reveal, become a possible route to extinction. The report of the Technical Sub-Committee and the closing comments of the delegations themselves would clearly demonstrate the ineffectualness and, perhaps, the detachment from reality of the Conference itself. configured as a Star of David was utilized by the F ederal Government in 1919. Furthermore, there are examples of documentation antedating Rothmund’s neg otiations with the Germans (1936-1938 and continuing into 1940) that were marked by officials (on the Federal and Canton level) by two forms of the “J” stamp. Commercial traveler identity cards for f oreigners and Jewish Swiss citizens were stamped wi th a red “Jew” next to the column for citizenship. Inde pendent Commission of Experts Switzerland—Second World War, eds. “Switzerland and Refugees in the Na zi Era” (Bern, Switzerland: 1999), 73, 74. 15 Adler-Rudel, “The Evian Conference,” 250.

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235 Chapter 9 Days Nine and Ten “Serious Spirit of Cooperation” The report of the Technical Sub-Committee under Judge Michael Hansson of Norway was submitted in private session on July 14. The committee was charged to he ar confidential disclosures of the immigration laws and policies of the particip ating governments and the number and category of refugees that were considered eligible for admission. A solution was needed to deal with the issue of “documentation” for statele ss immigrants. Meetings were held on July 8, 11and 13 The representatives arrived at a general consensus in which all of the governments acknowledged the “serious nature ” of the refugee crisis and the “urgent necessity for a solution.” The limits of cooper ation of each country, however, were framed by “their laws and individual situation” and t he background and qualifications of the prospective immigrant [and I would include, the terms of the official invitation]. The Hansson committee believed “prospects f or increased reception of refugees” were reasonably good dependent upon the relevant e ntry requirements. In addition, resettlement in overseas territories was being considered by certain powers but required detailed analysis and long-range planning. Countries bordering Germany and Austria could not be expected to admit more refugees until t hose who were granted temporary haven had moved on to other destinations. These nations of transit “may continue to make an important contribution” towards solving the crisis b y

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236 providing training facilities geared for the “re-adaptation of life” abroa d. The impoverishment of many of the refugees posed a “major obstacle” to successful immigration and resettlement. The issue of utilizing Nansen or Nansen-like pas sports was also considered. 1 The closing session of the Evian Conference convened on July 15. The Columbian representative, Jesus Yepes, introduced into the record a memorandum which reiterated that his country’s willingness to assist German and Austrian r efugees represented a “humanitarian effort inspired by lofty sentiments of intern ational fraternity.” He disavowed any Columbian attempt to interfere in the internal a ffairs of the Reich and any immigrants allowed entry into his nation would have to meet the legal migration requirements. 2 The Evian Conference Chairman, Myron C. Taylor, returned to the podium to offer his concluding remarks. He announced that the “serious spirit of cooperation” among the delegations had created the “machinery” that would lead to the long-term resolution of the international refugee crisis affecting Central Europe; an op eration and on-going project that would require uninterrupted effort so that the hope of an anguished mankind would not be “dispelled and their suffering embittered.” The Evian Conference was only the beginning of a process that would be continued by a permanent body, the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees from Germany. He wa rned that lack of resolve would result in “catastrophic human suffering” which could potentially provoke “far-reaching consequences in international unrest and strain.” An orderl y 1 “Annex II. Report of the Technical Sub-Committee,” “Proceedings,” July 14, 1938, 51-52. 2 J.M. Yepes, “Draft of the Resolution with which it Proposed to Conclude the Present Session of the Intergovernmental Committee at Evian,” “Proceedings July 14, 1938, 39-40.

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237 system of emigration, temporary transit and permanent resettlement would r eplace a “disorderly exodus” provided “the country of origin” [note that Germany is not specifically named] allowed the emigrants to retain a sufficient percenta ge (at least 25%) of their property and financial assets. Such cooperation from Germany was “imper ative” if other nations were to open their borders to stateless refugees. 3 Appendix D contains the official memorandum issued at the end of the conference in which the construction of a permanent committee in London is announced. As can be seen by the text the Evian Conference failed to reach any concrete plan and continued to talk in generalities and in terms of long-range goals, although the situation for Jews in Central Europe was ra pidly worsening. Some observers, however, noted that the seizure of Jewish assets and property represented more than “mere race hatred by Nazi leaders” but was driven lar gely by domestic “economic pressure”—trade deficits, lack of foreign exchange and hig h levels of national debt due to rearmament. The Reich, “feeling the pinch of lack took a convenient opportunity” to improve its financial condition and support for its “Hitlerite program.” 4 The Government seized and Aryanized one-third of the Jewish owned businesses in Austria and especially Vienna estimated to be worth £114,000,000 to £307,000,000. The confiscation program was scheduled to be completed by 1941. 5 3 ”Taylor’s Evian Speech,” New York Times July 16, 1938, 4. See also Taylor speech October 3, 1938 to the Foreign Policy Association; believed the val ue of Jewish property within the Reich was between $2,000,000-6,000,000. “Even the lower figure would be more than enough to re-establish the half-milli on persons elsewhere, were it possible to use it.” Th e accelerated rate of Aryanization and the events o f Kristallnacht drastically decreased the assets available to be u tilized for resettlement. Department of State Releases, XX, Nr. 47 (October 1938), 245-255 cited in Feingold, Politics of Rescue 39. 4 St. Petersburg Times July 13, 1938. 5 “Jewish Businesses in Austria: Transference to Ary ans,” The Times July 23, 1938, 11.

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238 British Ambassador to Berlin Neville Henderson believed that Jewish emigr ation from the Reich must necessarily be contingent upon the amount of capital and property the Jews could retain to aid their establishment of a new life abroad. He believed tha t such a connection would pressure the Germans into liberalizing their financial policies if they truly wanted to rid themselves of the Jews. Henderson, however, did ask Foreign Minister Ribbentrop if Germany would cooperate in an orderly resettlement of German and Austrian Jews by allowing retention of adequate funds but was given a negative response. 6 Similarly, the American Ambassador, Hugh Wilson, queried State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry Weizscker and was informed that “he should not entertain any hopes in that direction.” 7 The Earl of Plymouth, Parliamentary Undersecretary to the Foreign Office, and Lord Halifax had called upon Germ any to allow refugees to retain enough assets to allow resettlement. Otherwise, th e entire German and Austrian refugee problem would become inordinately complicated and potentially “insoluble.” 8 Lord Winterton opposed such a plan out of fear of antagonizing the Germans and jeopardizing any potential for Nazi cooperation as the Conferen ce was dealing with “questions of world-wide importance.” 9 FDR requested that the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain personally approach Hitler for gr eater “flexibility” 6 DGFP, D, v. July 8, 1938, no. 640, 894-95 and no. 641, 895 July 27, 1938 cited in Vital, A People Apart 884; Henderson to Halifax, July 4, 1938, FO 371/2 2529, W 8887/104/98 cited in Sherman, Island Refuge 113. 7 DGFP, D. v. July 8, 1938, no. 640, 894-895 cited in Vital, A People Apart 884. 8 Ferdinand Kuhn, “New Reich Talks in London Likely,” New York Times July 28, 1938, 8. 9 Winterton to Halifax, July 8, 1938, FO 371/22530, W 9531/104/98 cited in Sherman, Island Refuge 113.

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239 on the refugee problem but was turned down by Chamberlain who believed that “formal diplomatic channels” represented the proper approach. 10 Winterton, head of the British delegation, believed that the Conference had achieved “positive progress in the direction of enlarging the opportunities” for immigration that would be benefited by the future work of the IGCR. The results w ere “unanimous” and “most satisfactory” and represented the “first fruits of th e wise and courageous initiative” of FDR. The delegations had demonstrated “good will and a disposition” to liberalize their respective immigration policies allowing entry of a “great number” of refugees. 11 There were also signs, he believed, of a forthcoming willingness on the part of Germany to reach an accord on the issue of retained assets. Palestine, Winterton believed, was a “wholly untenable” solution to the refugee crisis due to its limited geographic size and “special considerations” that de rived from the Mandate granted to the United Kingdom by the League of Nations. The Peel or Royal Commission, calling for the partition of Palestine, was rejected as indefens ible and impracticable by the follow-up Woodhouse Commission. Jewish immigration could only be facilitated under “suitable conditions” which at present were limited by loc al events [the Arab revolt which began in 1936]. Thus, the British need to secure the good will of the Middle Eastern Arab States, along with other factors, forced the United K ingdom to 10 Public Papers of FDR vol. 11, 173, October 5, 1938 cited in Feingold Politics 240. Goering ordered the registration of all Jewish property as a means of expediting the process of Aryanization which represented the final action against Jewish-owned b usinesses and other enterprises. Jews at that time were only allowed to remove 3-5% of their possessions an d were subject to the pre-Nazi era Flight Tax. Oth er members of Parliament made similar appeals to Germa ny to release sufficient refugee funds and included the Bishop of Chichester, Viscount Samuel, Lord All en, Marquess of Reading, Lord Winterton and Lord Marley. The Times July 28, 1938, 8. 11 Statement prepared at F.O. for Lord Winterton's re port, July 19, 1938, FO371/22531, W 9747/104/98 cited in Sherman, Island Refuge 120.

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240 avoid discussion of Palestine during the Evian Conference. A definitive solution to the question of the Mandate awaited the outcome of the forthcoming London Conference regarding the potential division of Palestine into an Arab and Jewish State. Consequently, it was necessary to place “certain restrictions of a purely temporary [author’s italics] and exceptional character” on Jewish immigration in order to maintain the relative size of the two populations. 12 Since the Arabs refused to directly negotiate with Palestinian Jewry it is likely that the London Conference was viewed by His Majesty’s Government as a delaying tactic with little chance of succe ss. These restrictions eventually became formalized in the White Paper of 1939 i n which Jewish immigration was to be limited for five years and then ended. I n order to minimize the expected opposition from Palestinian and American Jews Britain did increase Jewish immigration into the United Kingdom until the beginning of the war. During this period fifty thousand Jewish refugees were admitted while the U .S. allowed entry to 57,000. 13 Winterton did warn, however, that other governments should not become involved in the internal affairs of Palestine for which Britain “as the mandatory power bore sole responsibility.” 14 He was prepared, on the other hand, to offer some degree of consolation to the increasingly desperate German and Austrian Jews: Kenya (and possibly Northern Rhodesia) could offer opportunities for “small-scale sett lement” 12 “Proceedings,” July 15, 1938, 42. 13 Arieh J. Kochavi Post-Holocaust Politics: Britain, the United States & Jewish Refugees, 1945-1948 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Pres s, 2001), 7. 14 Sherman, Island Refuge 116.

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241 but only gradually and without utilizing land that had been set aside for the native population. 15 Winterton hoped that the Evian Conference and the creation of the IGCR would alleviate the “sufferings” of the refugees and he complimented the “willing ness” of the delegations and their respective governments to “contribute, as far as their ci rcumstances permit, to this result.” 16 To some this tentative offer of East Africa as a place of refuge had an “excellent effect” and provided a “bright afterglow” to a meeting that ha d not been “notable for its optimism.” It represented the most “concrete” proposal to com e out of the meeting as most delegations were more concerned about reasons why ass istance could not be offered rather than the consideration of ways in which immigration could be facilitated. 17 The British Colonial Office, however, informed the Foreign Office that Kenya could only accommodate one hundred fifty refugees and the prospects for the remainder of the Colonies were limited. Taylor tried to obtain a full accounting of the Colonies’ potential for resettlement but to no avail. He received assurances tha t the Colonial Secretary was devoting his “constant attention” to the issue and that “ce rtain projects” besides Kenya were under review. The Dominions were equally evasive. 18 A Jewish periodical skeptically viewed any plans for resettling Jews i n distant lands: 15 “Proceedings,” July 15, 1938, 42. 16 “Proceedings,” July 15, 1938, 43. 17 Sherman, Island Refuge 120; “Home for Refugees,” The Glasgow Herald July 15, 1938, 32. 18 Sherman, Island Refuge, 131-132. An appendix was a ttached to the official record detailing the budget for and the relative national financial cont ributions to the support of the IGCR. As can be se en in Appendix A the amounts offered were limited conside ring the scale of the work that was to be undertake n by the permanent body.

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242 Powerful nations, enjoying sovereignty and freedom, have only their own countries to fall back upon. But Jewish refuge es have a choice of many lands to pick from. If one prefers the humid heat of the jungles of Guiana, he is welcome to it. If someone else’s taste runs to tsetse flies and similar blessings of East Africa, they ar e at his disposal. Verily, it is good to be a refugee. 19 Similar passionate sentiments were expressed by Ottawa merchant and Pr esident of the Canadian Zionist Organization Archibald J. Freiman on December 13, 1938 in response to the “Madagascar Plan,” espoused by a number of European nations and more recentl y by Reinhard Heydrich, the head of the S.S. Security Service: We don’t want the jungles of Africa—we are people, we are human beings. We don’t want to hurt anybody, but we have a right as human beings to be on this earth. We are not any better but certainly not any worse and you cannot show me a time in history when Jews acted towards nations as an alleged civilized nation is t reating the Jews in Germany. We don’t want the jungles of Africa, we w ant Palestine. 20 Henri Brenger concluded his remarks by expressing French contentment at hosting the Conference in such a “harmonious atmosphere” that Evian and its environs were able to provide. He also praised France’s long democratic and republic an traditions which infused the “moral and material tranquility” necessary for serious deli berations that sought to maintain international peace and the “freedom of all citizens of the world.” 21 Despite Brenger’s public optimism Daladier recognized that the Evian Conference was an exercise in futility and concluded that stricter controls on immigration needed to be instituted. He advised the Chamber of Deputies that the more recent 19 Alan Dowty, Closed Borders: The Contemporary Assault on Freedom of Movement (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), 93. 20 Valerie Knowles, First Person: A Biography of Cairine Wilson, Canada ’s First Woman Senator (Toronto, Canada: Dunburn Press, LTD., 1988), 209. 21 “Proceedings,” July 15, 1938, 44-45.

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243 refugees whose residency permits had expired would face deportation back to Ge rmany or arrest and imprisonment. Also, refugees who failed to obtain gainful employment faced similar consequences. Following Kristallnacht the Daladier Government issued a decree calling for the establishment of detention camps for illegal refugee s and for those who failed to meet the terms of the May 1938 decree. An additional edict, issued on April 12, 1939, called for obligatory labor and military service for political refu gees who had resided within France for more than two months. The border security police were empowered to block the entry of any refugee that was considered unfit for mili tary service or hard labor. 22 Following the closing of the Evian Conference the U.S. Government dispatched officials to ascertain the current situation of “potential refugees” wit hin Greater Germany. State Department Counsel George Brandt visited Vienna, Berlin, Stuttgart and Hamburg. The purpose of the “Brandt Mission” was to obtain data from “American sources” regarding the nature and number of people seeking to leave Germany under the auspi ces of the IGCR and a report was to be submitted in London by August 7. 23 By July 18 the American Consul General in Berlin announced that further applications for visas int o the U.S. would no longer be accepted due to heavy demand. Ten thousand files involving fifteen thousand refugees were already under review. More than sixty thousand requests had already been submitted for an annual quota of approximately 27,370. The State 22 Taylor to FDR report “The Tragic Position of the Je wish Refugees in France,” December 1938 and the new decree-laws April-August1939 cited in Maga, “Cl osing the Door,” 438-439. 23 St. Petersburg Times July 16, 1938. Brandt served as a Turkish langua ge officer for the State Department in Constantinople and Cairo and had a nu mber of consular assignments. He served as the Assistant Chief of the Visa Office from 1924-1928 a nd aided the House Committee on Immigration in the writing of the Immigration Act of 1924. He served as a technical advisor to the Evian Conference and IGCR and in 1938-39 served as an immigration adviso r in the Philippine Islands.

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244 Department allocated the majority of the allotment to the four Consulates in Ge rmany: Stuttgart, 11,000; Vienna, 6,000; and 3,000 respectively for Berlin and Hamburg. The remaining four thousand were released to worldwide U.S. Consulates. 24 Desperate German Jews, in the meantime, searched through the New York City and Chicago phone books searching for possible American relatives. “They copy the names and a ddresses of American Jews to whom they hope they are related.” 25 The State Department announced that an immense amount of red tape preparatory work dealing with the financial and political aspects of immigra tion into the U. S. would be necessary before German and Austrian Jews could embark on the “exodus” to America and other destinations and might require five to ten years bef ore the project could be completed. 26 The Protestant writer Jochen Klemmer perceptively observed in his diary on August 23, 1938 that the failure of the Evian Conference placed the German Jews in a “far more tragic” position in the hands of their Nazi tormentor s. 27 Once again, the immediacy of the human tragedy that was playing out within Greater Germany and its implications was lost on the delegations and their re spective governments. Rescue required prompt and bold action rather than a contemplative, limited and drawn out affair. Failure to resolve the Jewish Question reinforc ed the hardliners. Palestine represented the best, although imperfect, solution but Briti sh resistance and Jewish disunity barred the Wandering Jew from the Promised Land. 24 “US Stops Jews in Reich from Seeking Visas: Over 6 0,000 Have Sought to Emigrate on Quota of 27,000,” Washington Post July 19, 1938, 3. 25 “Reich Jews Hunt Kinfolk in American Directories,” New York Times July 31, 1938, 29. 26 “Red Tape Slows Up German Refugees Movement to U.S. ,” Tampa Tribune July 25, 1938, 7. 27 Jacques Semelin. Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide (NY: Columbia University Press, 2007), 130.

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245 Chapter 10 Palestine “Waste of Time” Arthur Ruppin, a prominent economist and sociologist, met with other Zionist immigration experts to discuss the implications of the Evian Conference. He noted t hat Palestine had a limited potential to absorb refugees. Since the British opposed i ncreasing Jewish colonization he recommended that Jews move to other areas first in order t o expedite their flight from Germany and Austria. Jewish resettlement Ruppin believed, should be viewed in a “more general perspective” with Palestine serving in a “c entral” but not exclusive role. He urged Zionists, who would be attending the conference, to present an appearance of solidarity and work towards such a goal while offering the delegates “sound economic and political solutions.” 1 Yitzhak Gruenbaum took a contrary view during a session of the Jewish Agency Executive and stated that if other territories were deemed acceptable t hen Palestine would lose its centrality in the Zionist paradigm. Consequently, Zionists needed to uphol d the dogma that only Palestine was suitable for Jewish resettlement. David B en-Gurion agreed with Gruenbaum and felt that acceptance of Ruppin’s idea would diminish 1 Beit-Zvi, Post-Uganda Zionism 180f. (Hebrew) cited in Diner, Beyond the Conceivable 89-92; Menachem Mor, ed. Eretz, Israel, Israel and the Jewish Diaspora: Mut ual Relations (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1988), 182, 183. The Palestinian newspaper Ha’aretz reported in June 1938 that an estimated eight to nine thousand Jews were unemployed within the Mandate. Broken down by locale three to four thousand were jobless in Tel A viv, 1,500-2,000 in Haifa, six hundred in Jerusalem and in the agricultural settlements more than 2,500. The Sentinel June 23, 1938, 3.

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246 pressure on the British to open up the Mandate for migration while potentially inter fering with Zionism’s assertion to a historic right to the land of Palestine. Although Ben -Gurion knew the territory was not ready to accept large numbers of refugees, he co ntinued to demand a linkage of refugee relocation to Palestine. He anticipated, however, t hat the on-going Arab Revolt and its continuing unrest and violence would lessen the prospects for mass Jewish immigration. Consequently, the future Israeli Prime Minist er argued that the primary goal of the Zionist representatives should be to diminish the harm the Conference might create to the prospect of a future Jewish Homeland. Only the preeminent leaders, such as Ruppin, Weizmann and Menachem Ussishkin, should be sent to Evian, to defend against potential adversity. 2 Ben-Gurion warned that the “more we say about the terrible distress of the Jewish masses in Germany, Poland, and Rum ania the more damage we shall inflict [on our own position] in the current negotiations [on the future of Palestine]. 3 Ussishkin demanded that the Zionist delegation focus solely on Palestine as the site of refuge as “all the other countries of immigration ar e of no interest to us.” 4 The realization that the issue of Palestine would be excluded from discussion dissuaded many of the leading Zionist leaders, with the exception of Ruppin, from 2 Mor, Eretz Israel 183. Gruenbaum was active in the Polish Al Hamishmar radical Zionist faction but immigrated to Palestine in 1933. He was appointed a member of the Jewish Agency Board of Directors and the World Zionist Organization. Ruppin, the Ch airman of the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews Mr. Kurt Blumenfeld, Dr. Siegfried Mose s and Dr. Max Kreutzberger for the Organization of Jewish Settlers from Germany based in Tel-Aviv, Mr. Zalman Rubashov representing the Hebrew paper Davar Tel-Aviv, and Golda Meier attended as an unoffici al Palestinian delegation. 3 Jewish Agency Executive session in Jerusalem, June 26, 1938, Ben-Gurion in the chair. Central Zionist Archives, Hahanhala ha-zionit Protokol, no. 55, vol. xxviii, fos, 6053-61, cited in Vital, A People Apart, 89-92. 4 Shulamit olko Germans, Jews and Antisemites: Trials in Emancipati on (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 60.

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247 attending the meeting. Chaim Weizmann believed that under such circumstances his presence would have been a “waste of time.” He advised Rabbi Stephan Wise that the “scope of the Conference was so narrowed down that it would have been out of place for me to swell the numbers of the Jewish representatives already filling the corridors” of the Hotel Royal. In addition, other prominent international Jewish leaders stayed aw ay from the Conference. 5 The Pro-Palestinian Federation of American in a vain attempt wired Myron C. Taylor imploring him to influence the British to allow an “open-door” policy of Jew ish immigration into Palestine as “clearly stipulated” in the Mandate awarde d the United Kingdom. Signatories of the cable included the president of the organization, Rev. Charles Edward Russell, President of the AFL William Green, President of C ity College Frederick B. Robinson, New York Senator Robert F. Wagner and John Haynes Holmes of the Community Church of New York City. 6 On the other hand there were voices opposed to any role of Palestine as a sanctuary for Jewish refugees. The British Delegate to the League of N ations’ Mandate Commission testified that British policy “was, and must be, wholly unaffected b y the 5 Mor, Eretz Israel, 183. See also Weizmann to Jacobus Kann, July 3, 19 38, no. 357, 409 in Weizmann, Letters, xviii cited in Vital, A People Apart 890; Chaim Weizmann and Barnet Mitvinoff, The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann: December 1931-April 1952 series B, vol. 2 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1984), 314; The Jewish leaders wh o decided not to attend the Evian Conference includ ed the Chief Rabbi of Great Britain, the Grand Rabbin of France, Stephen Wise of the American Jewish Congress, Cyrus Adler of the American Jewish Commit tee, members of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, and prominent individuals such as Einstein, L ouis Brandeis and the Baron de Rothschild 6 “Palestine Open Door Urged,” New York Times July 11, 1938, 7. Reverend Charles Edward Russell founded the Pro-Palestine Federation of America in Chicago in January 1930 as a means of promoting cordial Christian-Jewish relations and combating pr ejudice and included many leading Christian theologians.

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248 situation of the German Jews.” 7 Palestinian Christian churches favored restraining Jewish immigration due to a desire to appease the Arabs in their congregations to avert any “decline in the importance of Christian influence and institutions in the Holy Land” and to continue “missionary work” and other projects. They believed partition would interfere with their proselytizing and other Christian Church activities. The Anglican Bishop of Jerusalem and other clerics believed that the Mandate could not accommodate further Jewish immigration as a means of solving the refugee crisis and bla med the entry of Jews during 1935 as the cause of the Arab Revolt. Since that time, the Bishop claimed, “Palestine had known no peace.” 8 The Roman Catholic Church was opposed both to the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and any Jewish immigration into the Holy Land. Archbishop Amleto Giovanni Cicognani, a special representative of Pope Pius XI to Washington, informed Myron C. Taylor (June 22, 1943), during his role of special American Emissary to the Vati can, that while it was historically true that the land had at one time been occupied by Jews there were no historical precedents for the resettlement of a people to an area they had departed 1,900 years earlier. If the goal was the creation of a “Hebrew Home” then there were 7 Daily Telegraph October 31, 1933 cited in Andrew Sharf, The British Press and Jews under Nazi Rule (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), 183. 8 Consul General in Jerusalem George Wadsworth to Hu ll, October 26, 1938, 867.01/1295, FRUS vol.11, Britain, The Commonwealth, Europe, Near Eas t and Africa, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 969-974. The dispatch incl uded an “open letter” published in The Times, September 22, 1938, which was signed by Christian c lergy in Jerusalem calling for protection of the Churches’ interests in Palestine as well opposition to partition and continued Jewish immigration. Th ere arguments centered upon four basic themes: 1. Pales tine is too small of an area to “solve the European Jewish problem” and any solution should not be at t he “expense” of Christians or the “Arabs of Palesti ne.” 2. The Jewish (and Zionist) “claim to Palestine on the basis of prophecy is declared in the New Testam ent to have been abrogated.” 3. The Balfour Declaration of 1917 made conflicting promises and was too “vague in its form of expression.” 4. Palestine is the seat of three major religions; not just Jewish and Muslim. This dispatch also included demographic in formation regarding the Christian population of Palestine and made reference to fears of anti-Chris tian repercussions should Jewish immigration increa se or partition occur.

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249 more “fitting” locations which would avert “grave [and] new territorial problem s.” An editorialist had written in the aftermath of Kristallnacht that the issue of Jewish suffering and Palestine was purely “sentimental and coincidental.” Despite the needs of humanitarianism British commitments in Palestine could not remain open ended or be “influenced by the malefactions of certain European States” towards their Je wish population. 9 9 Jerusalem Post July 6, 1999, 6.

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250 PART III HOPES DASHED Chapter 11 “Unique Opportunity to Study Jewish Question” World appeasement…was obviously the great objective towards which the great powers of the world today must strive. 1 Overall, the Evian Conference failed to generate any positive, significant a nd concrete results. It afforded a “unique opportunity to discuss the Jewish Question” on a n international stage and was the only conference held prior to the onset of World War I I to assist the targets of “racialist persecution.” 2 Its ineffectualness led to marked increases in the global barriers to immigration and the sympathetic but shallow rhetoric ex pressed by the Conference’s delegates emboldened the Nazis, accelerating the dec line of the status of Jews and non-Aryans within Greater Germany and culminated in the pogrom of November 1938. Although the meeting was the result of a Presidential initiative it was apparent to some observers that the United States’ approach involved the provision of “helpfulness rather than direction.” Although American officials endeavored to f acilitate the construction of plans “we do not intend to be the final judges of whatever may be done.” 3 1 Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles to Italian A mbassador February 1, 1938. 2 Katz, “Public Opinion,”105. 3 “Want to Quit Austria,” The Pueblo Indicator July 16, 1938, 2.

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251 Many governments recognized early on that the “existing legislation” acknowledged by Secretary of State Cordell Hull in the American invitation pl aced stringent limitations on the numbers of Jews that would ultimately be allowed ent ry from Germany and Austria. Taylor warned during his opening address that “some mill ions of people….are actually or potentially without a country.” 4 The problem was greatly compounded by the efforts of certain Eastern European nations that sought to rid themselves of their own Jewish populations. In addition, the failure to formulate spec ific details and proposals prior to the American announcement and official invitation imbued the Evian Conference with an air of superficiality, haste and insincerity. Na tions bordering Germany and Austria feared inundation with refugees and claimed tha t they had already become oversaturated with unwanted aliens. Some States grante d transit visas to refugees hoping to pass them on to another country while others used the local police or military to seal the borders to prevent further migration. The sheer ma gnitude of the European refugee problem may have overwhelmed the abilities of the delega tes and their respective governments to act in a positive and effectual manner. One European expert observed that “every Jew east, north and south of Switzerland” was potentially a refugee, numbering 5,000,000-6,000,000, exclusive of the USSR. The League’s Nansen Office was still confronted with refugees stemming from the Great War and had “500,000 homeless on its hands.” In addition, there was the problem of non-fascist Italians and displaced Spaniards. 5 4 Ruth Gay, The Jews of Germany: A Historical Portrait (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 270. 5 “Refugee Parley at Evian,” St. Petersburg Times July 13, 1938, 4.

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252 The refugee problem became more complex on July 14 when the Benito Mussolini Government issued a ten point racial doctrine, constructed by Fascist university professors in the report “Fascism and the Problems of Race,” that was similar in content to the Nazi Aryan world view. The new Italian canon proclaimed the biologi c superiority of Aryans and claimed the right to declare that the Italian non-J ewish “race” was itself Aryan. A “pure Italian race now exists” and the “conception of ra cialism in Italy must be essentially Italian and Aryan-Nordic in trend.” It was t ime, the authors believed, for the Italian people to proclaim their racial consciousness. 6 Il Duce asserted that it was necessary for the Fascist Party to deal with the “racial probl em” confronting the nation that threatened the “health of the race that will make history.” T he press called for stricter legislation which would avoid the “catastrophic plague of the cro ssbred, the creation…of a hybrid race” that would promote “disintegration and revolt,” Communi sm and Masonry. For Italy to assume its rightful place in the sun the people needed to have a “strong pride [and] a clear omnipresent knowledge of the race.” However, unlike their German Aryan brethren Fascists believed that “to discriminate is not to per secute” but the proportion of Jews to true Italians would have to be strictly controlled. 7 The Jewish or half-Jewish population in 1933 was estimated to be 57,000 out of a total population of 45,000,000. 8 6 Schneiderman, ed., American Jewish Committee Annual Report 1939-1940 629. 7 Tampa Daily Times July 14, 1938, 5; “To Discriminate Is Not to Persec ute,” Corriere Della Sera (Milan), August 5, 1938 available from st/defendrace_italy.html ; Internet; accessed June 18, 2010; 8 Schneiderman, ed., American Jewish Committee Annual Report 1939-1940 629-630..

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253 Some sources suggested that this racial doctrine was issued at that partic ular time as a means of deflecting German and Austrian Jews away from seeking r efuge in Italy, increasing ties of solidarity with the Reich and minimizing the influenc e of Palestinian Jews in the Mediterranean while currying favor with the Arab wor ld. 9 The anti-Semitic wing of the Fascist Party demanded the exclusion of Jews from the arts and sciences, education and other occupations “influencing national thought,” the aboli tion of intermarriage and discharge from the military; a policy move mimicking that of its German ally. 10 Pope Pius XI publically contested this new racial dogma. Although he did not mention the Jews specifically the Pontiff stated the Church did not want to “separate anything in the human family” and asked why Italy now felt compel led to emulate Nazi Germany. 11 Mussolini responded to the Papal criticism by asserting that on the “question of race also we will march straight ahead. To say that Fascism has imitated anyone or anything is simply absurd.” 12 The convening of the Evian Conference was considered a “laudable” exercise but “informed quarters” did not have “high hopes” for any positive outcomes. Despite an abundance of “high sounding resolutions” there were “too many concrete obstacles” lying in the way of practical solutions. The agreement of the various democraci es to attend the meeting was viewed as a “tribute” to the prestige of the American President; a convocation at which the “democracies could not well afford to absent themselves.” 9 Time July 18, 1938, 22. 10 “Italian Press Campaigns for Anti-Jew Move,” Tampa Tribune July 27, 1938, 13. 11 “Pope Attacks Italian Trend against Jews,” Tampa Tribune July 30, 1938, 18. 12 “Pope Scorned by Mussolini on Race,” Tampa Tribune July 31, 1938, 1.

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254 Consequently, the United States was expected to absorb the majority of the refu gees although Congressional opposition was expected. 13 Various observers noted that “even when the Government representatives had already gathered at Evian there was very little information forthcoming” regarding the planned agenda, its scope and its specific goals. 14 The Times correspondents reported none of the delegations had brought to the table any “tangible contribution” to the problem of mass resettlement but would only deal with individual cases within the context of their national immigration laws and policies. 15 However, at the conclusion of the meeting the paper’s opinion had changed. The assembly had performed its tasks “admirably” and the creation of the Intergovernmental Committee for Politic al Refugees would convert a “haphazard flight” of impoverished Jews (assuming German cooperation) into an “orderly exodus.” Each delegation offered the “prospect” that a greater degree of flexibility would be applied towards immigration and, as a consequence, it was anticipated that “200,000” refugees could be resettled. 16 Although Roosevelt had ordered, following the Anschluss the consolidation of the annual German and Austrian immigration quotas the “excessive formalism” of the State Department and strict consular interpretations of the Likely to be come a Public Charge clause (LPC) significantly restricted the admission of refugee s from the Reich. As a result, during 1933-1938 no more than 27,000 German refugees or 20% of the 13 The Evening Independent (Alan Barth) July 12, 1938, 4, 5. 14 Board of Deputies of British Jews Archives, file E3 /282/1, “Inter-Governmental Conference on Refugees Held at Evian, 6 July, 1938,” unsigned rep ort cited in Bartrop “Drawing the Line,” 5. 15 “The Refugee Problem: Discussions at Evian,” The Times July 8, 1938, 15. 16 “Results at Evian,” The Times July 16, 1938, 13.

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255 130,000 slots allocated to the German quota actually entered the United States. 17 The German allotment for was 25,957 but only 12,532 visas were issued and 13,425 remained unused (51%). The annual Austrian quota in the same year was 1,413 with 424 issued and 989 unused (62%). The amalgamation of both groups generated 27,370 annual visas but merely 12,956 were issued and 14,414 remained unused (52%). Appendix E provides a global breakdown of the 1937 Jewish population and Tables 2 and 5 provide information regarding Jewish emigration from Greater Germany and Austri a. The number of potential refugees, however, surpassed the quantity of annual visas available for a number of years. By June 30, 1937 applications submitted to American Consulates in Germany and Austria had exceeded one hundred thousand and was expected to rise following the Anschluss Many candidates were excluded due to bureaucratic technicalities that would require amending the immigration law. P otential immigrants had to provide proof of employment or an attestation that they would not become public charges. Confirmation of good conduct had to be provided by the Gestapo in addition to all of the necessary documents needed to leave Germany by a specif ied 17 Adler-Rudel, “The Evian Conference,” 237. The LPC clause, enacted by Herbert Hoover’s Executive Order of September 8, 1930, barred immigrants who w ere expected to end up on the public dole. The American immigration service assignment of quota nu mbers was based on the migrs place of birth. It was estimated that only twenty or thirty percent of the two hundred thousand Jews residing in Austria at the time of the Anschluss were actually born within the territorial bounds of post-WWI and pre-Anschluss Austria. Consequently, under a strict interpretatio n of birthplace by the State Department it was esti mated that seventy to eighty percent of refugees (althoug h born within the Austrian part of the former Austr oHungarian Empire, would be considered non-Austrian and hence, barred from inclusion in the combined German and Austrian quotas. “Merged Quota Hits Exo dus of Austrians,” The Southern Israelite April 15, 1938, 1; “Post-War Map Changes May Block Exodus of Austrian Jews to America,” The Sentinel April 14, 1938, 43. The number of Jewish refugees was al so affected by an unwillingness or inability of man y German Jews to leave their homeland due to an under estimation of the risks posed by Hitler and his reg ime and a desire to retain their identity as Germans. The Racial Laws of 1935 and a steadily declining st atus within the Reich brought many Jews to face the real ity of the situation and the need to flee the count ry.

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256 date (sponsor, visa, exit permit, proof of payment of the Flight Tax and after the pogrom of November 1938 the Atonement Tax, and train or boat tickets.) 18 Dennis Laffer has argued that the summit’s sole function was to serve as a “politically expedient means of avoiding action to assist the Jews.” This proj ect was constructed in such a manner as to guarantee ultimate failure. 19 It has also been categorized as a “public relations exercise” designed to express a sense of civilized outrage or moral duty to those individuals rendered stateless and penniless while sidestepping any changes in American immigration quotas or laws. 20 The hollow oratory of the delegations and their respective governments demonstrated t hat the “universe of obligation” was fulfilled only in words and not in deeds. 21 Guy S. GoodwinGill has argued that the “processes of appeasement in international relati ons” would have been harmed if the conference had not ended in inaction. 22 Likewise, Robert Michael claimed that FDR’s primary motivation was to “assuage” the American Jewi sh 18 Foreign Policy Bulletin April 1, 1938, vol. XVII, no. 23, 3; Eve Nussbaum S oumerai and Carol D. Schulz, A Voice from the Holocaust (West Haven, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003), 48. 19 Dennis R. Laffer, “Evian Conference,” History in Dispute: The Holocaust 1933-1945 vol. 11 (Farmington Hills, MI: St. James Press, 2003), 56. 20 Howard Adelman, “From Refugees to Forced Migration: the UNHCR and Human Security,” The International Migration Review 35, no. 1 (2001):7. Similar sentiments were echoe d by Naomi Shepherd, A Refugee from Darkness: Wilfrid Israel and the Rescu e of the Jews (NY: Pantheon Books, 1984), 133. 21 Helen Fein, “Genocide and Other State Murders in th e Twentieth Century,” October 24, 1995, 14 available from -10-24-02/fein.pdf ; Internet; accessed October 4, 2010. 22 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, “Different Types of Forced Mig ration Movements as an International and National Problem,” 19 in Goran Rystad, ed., In the Uprooted: Forced Migration as an Internation al Problem in the Post-War Era (Lund, Sweden: Lund University Press, 1990), 15-4 5 cited in David F. Good and Ruth Wodad, eds., From World War to Waldheim: Culture and Politics in Austria and the United States (NY: Berghan Books, 1999), 93.

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257 community’s call for aid to their European co-religionists while simultane ously guaranteeing that “no effective help” would be provided. 23 The invitation to attend the meeting specified that participating nations woul d not have to modify their respective immigration laws and quotas and any financial c ost would have to be borne by private relief organizations, although it was clear that only governments possessed sufficient monies to facilitate resettlement. The re fusal of the United Kingdom and the United States to alter their immigration laws led “i nterested and disinterested spectators alike” to view the conference as an “exercise i n Anglo-American collaborative hypocrisy.” 24 Louise London asserted that the United Kingdom chose the path of “caution and pragmatism, subordinating humanitarianism to Britain's national interest.” Solution of the refugee crisis posed greater risks than benefits to B ritish interests, especially in the Middle East. 25 Henri Brenger, the head of the French delegation, concluded that the Evian Conference did not serve any significant purpose. It was not an international asse mbly, a legislature or a “platform for declarations.” The delegates were “simply a body” which Roosevelt “desired to create between America and the other continents.” 26 The French Premier, Edouard Daladier, confided in Neville Chamberlain that FDR was ac ting merely 23 Robert Michael, A Concise History of American Anti-Semitism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 181. 24 Ronnie S. Landau, The Nazi Holocaust (London: Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 1994), 138. 25 London, Whitehall and the Jews 1 26 “Proceedings,” July 6, 1938, 11.

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258 to appease American public opinion. 27 Italian Fascist editor Virginio Gayda, writing for the Giornale d’Italia concluded that the Evian Conference “failed to deliver any tangible results” and despite the many declarations of “good intentions…nobody…want[ed] the Jews.” He criticized the American President for “never overlook[ing] an occa sion for filling the world with some resounding verbal gesture.” Since each country pref erred some other nation to accept the refugees “the merry game of passing responsibi lity along continues uninterruptedly.” 28 The British weekly paper, Observer warned that the “further accretion of, say 100,000” Jews into the country risked the “danger” of fomenting “anti-Jewish feeling…” The refugee problem would be insoluble “unless every great country [took] her proportionate share.” 29 Sir Neill Malcolm succeeded James G. McDonald as the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany in February 1936. 30 Although he was authorized “to undertake consultations by the most suitable method” with nations of potential resettlement he soon realized [an analysis supported by many privat e 27 British Documents 3 rd Series, III, pp. 294-296, November 24, 1938, Nevil le Chamberlain-Edouard Daladier conversations cited in Feingold Politics of Rescue 29. 28 “Concern for Jews in Held Insincere,” New York Times November 22, 1938, 4. 29 Observer July 31, 1938 cited in Hamerow, Why We Watched 103, 104. 30 The High Commissioner for Political Refugees from Germany was established by the League in 1933 with James G. McDonald as its first commissioner; a post he held from 1933-1935. Due to official Germ an protests the Commissioner was based in Lausanne rat her than at the League itself in Geneva. McDonald sought to extend the term of the Nansen Passport sy stem but was blocked by the French and British as t hey pursued a policy of appeasement with Germany. McDo nald, during his tenure as High Commissioner, successfully found refuge for approximately 60,000 refugees. Under Sir Neill Malcolm the League adopted an “Arrangement” in July 1936 allowing memb er states to issue travel documents to Germans and other stateless refugees leaving the Reich. Jews r epresented the greatest percentage following the enactment of the Nuremberg Racial Laws of 1935. Co nsequently, the Convention on the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany” was formally adopted in February 1938 and was eventually extended to Austria and Czechoslovakia. John C. Torpey The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citize nship, and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 138

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259 organizations] that there was “very little chance” for mass resettlement abroad; a view reinforced by the statements of the delegations at Evian. Consequently, Malcolm concluded that any “large-scale scheme of migration” [Jew or Christian non-A ryan] attempted during a time of high unemployment “could only arouse hostility” by cr eating an “alien element inside the State concerned.” Therefore, any relocati on of refugees must be made on an individual basis via a “process of infiltration” that would foster assimilation aided by the appropriate private organizations. Successful res ettlement, in turn, depended upon the provision of land, specialized training and sufficient financing. Private organizations, however, lacked sufficient funds to carry out such work singlehandedly and required governmental contributions. Although the High Commissioner believed that the Evian Conference offered “a very great opportunit y” backed by the “enormous prestige” of Roosevelt and European nations he believed that the project was doomed to failure unless suitable places of resettlement were provided. 31 Such reticence, German Nazis noted, provided “courage” to lesser nations to voice “their reluctance to permit new Jewish emigration.” 32 Erika Mann and Eric Estorick observed that the most “outstanding” consequence of the Conference was a general conse nsus that “something should be done” but in the absence of an official and government willing to “assume the burden of action, nothing was done.” 33 FDR selected Myron C. Taylor, a personal friend, Quaker and a retired Chairman of U.S. Steel, to head the American delegation. Despite his lofty titl e of 31 “Proceedings,” July 9, 1938, 32-35. 32 “No One Wants to Have Them,” Voelkischer Beobachter July 13, 1938. 33 Mann and Estorick, “Political Refugees,” 151.

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260 Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary the appointment of a non-diplomat implied a lack of seriousness about the conference and its potential work. 34 Taylor and his British counterparts agreed in advance that Palestine would be excluded from consideration as a possible haven. 35 The issue of forced Jewish emigration from Poland, Rumania and Hungary was avoided by limiting discussion to refugees from Germ any and Austria. Prospects for resettlement in British African holdings were al so downplayed. Lord Winterton, in his opening speech on July 6, 1938, noted that the tropical climate with its adverse effects on whites, population densities and local political conside rations would limit immigration to a relative handful; mass re-settlement was a f utile undertaking. 36 The Roosevelt administration, despite its call for a refugee conference, did not attempt to garner public or political support for opening the gates. He avoided open discussion of the issue knowing that the Great Depression, unemployment, fear of al iens, nativism, isolationism and anti-Semitism were significant factors that prom oted antiimmigrant attitudes. Roosevelt was not willing to expend political capital in pr omoting this issue. 37 34 Welles had recommended to FDR and Hull that the U.S delegation be led by Hull, accompanied by Sec. of Labor Francis Perkins, George Messersmith, the head of the Foreign Service Personnel Board and himself; FDR chose Myron C. Taylor, James G. McDona ld, presidential advisor on refugee affairs, George L. Warren, executive secretary of the Committee on Political Refugees, plus State Department technical assistants Robert Pell (Divisional Assistant in the Department of State) and George Brandt (Foreign Se rvice Officer, Class III) who were familiar with immigrat ion issues—however, none of these delegates were particularly influential politically. 35 Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murr ay) to Consul General Wadsworth in Jerusalem, 867N.01/1106, July 2, 1938, FRUS vol. 1, 752. 36 “Problem of Refugees,” The Times July 7, 1938, 15. 37 Laffer. “Evian Conference”, 57.

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261 Jewish groups themselves could not agree on a cohesive policy towards immigration and instead offered a variety of proposals calling for increase d or decreased admissions into Palestine, vocational and retraining programs to facilitate a ssimilation into the population of a new country and establishment of Jewish settlements in out of the way and undeveloped regions. Those opposed to forced immigration sought the preservation of their minority rights in the country of origin. 38 In addition the Zionist and non-Zionist leadership failed to send a unified high-level representation to the conference. Such discord, in the opinion of Nahum Goldman, would ultimately harm the Jewish cause and represented a source of disgrace and derision. 39 Goldmann wanted Rabbi Stephen Wise to attend in his capacity as president of the World Jewish Congress along with Chaim Weizmann, arguing that they could “authoritatively command the be st hearing for the general Jewish case.” 40 There were some within the American Jewish community who decried the lack of a strong Jewish leadership. Acknowledging the past efforts of Louis D. Bra ndeis and 38 Such disharmony among the various Jewish factions was not lost on the German National Socialists. “It was proven also that the Jewish organizations r epresented at Evian were not of one opinion regardi ng the goals. For example, the so-called World Jewish Congress is mostly interested in protesting agains t the German racial laws that have stimulated interest al l over the world. In contrast, the Zionists wish t o exploit the departure of the Jewish masses from European co untries as an argument to have more enter Palestine The development of the Evian Conference so far is v ery embarrassing for the Marxists, because accordin g to them, it leads to an international legalization of German anti-Semitic policy.” “No One Wants to Ha ve Them,” Voelkischer Beobachter July 13, 1938. 39 Meyer W. Weisgal, ed., Chaim Weizmann: Statesman, Scientist, Builder of th e Jewish Commonwealth (NY, Dial Press, 1944), 304-328; Vital. A People Apart 886; Breitman, American Refugee Policy 103.The Jewish Agency Executive (JAE) had proposed a delega tion consisting of Menahem M. Ussishkin and Arthur Ruppin representing the JAE; Nahum Goldmann representing the London Executive and American Zionist interests and Georg Landauer or Henrietta S zold representing Youth Aliya. Goldmann became a member of the London JAE in 1935 although based in Geneva and his work with the World Jewish Congress led to his involvement with American Zioni st leaders and organizations. 40 Cable from Nahum Goldmann to Sumner Welles, May 27, 1938 and from Welles to James G. McDonald, May 29, 1938; in Urofsky, A Voice that Spoke 305.

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262 Julian Mack critic Ludwig Lewisohn argued that the “disease of the assim ilatory theory of emancipation” had hindered Jewish attempts at self-preservation. As a conse quence, “our ablest men are alienated even in this disastrous age” and behave as if the y “were not Jews.” Those “few able and well-known Jews who have identified themselves with the ir people” were absent when decisive and practical leadership was needed. Jewish sur vival, he claimed, depended upon an end to the “ravages” of this affliction. 41 Jews came before the Conference representing divergent interests and gr oups; Zionists versus anti-Zionists, Orthodox versus Reformed. The Congress Bulletin of the American Jewish Congress described the situation as a “spectacle of Jewish di scord and disruption.” 42 Some of the Jewish leaders, especially those of German background in the United States and Great Britain, deliberately avoided an outspoken stance agai nst Jewish persecution out of “fear of stirring up an anti-Semitic backlash” within Germa ny and preferred to negotiate out of the limelight. 43 The American Jewish Committee, a group 41 Ludwig Lewisohn, “The World’s Window,” The Sentinel July 7, 1938, 5. Ludwig Lewisohn, a German-born literary and drama critic, novelist and Zionist, derided the Jewish lack of unity, the internecine conflict between pro-Zionists and antiZionists and the seeming lack of awareness of reali ty. “Everyone is awake. Everyone is determined to defe nd with his very blood his life, his way of life, h is freedom, his people, the future of posterity. Ever yone except the Jews…That people stands as it were dazed, stupefied, arguing, arguing, proliferating d ull edgeless words…” British resistance to Jewish immigration into Palestine could be surmounted by t he “moral pressure of world-Jewry,” especially thos e of America. The Jewish communities of the United S tates, however, were fragmented, “disgracefully divided into factions [American Jewish Committee ve rsus the American Jewish Congress, for example], disgracefully hindered by die-hards in high places, by snobs, by self-opinionated men with ugly, hard, vain little minds…” Such disharmony prevented Jews from “ris[ing] as one people inspired by one faith and one hope and one goal, intent upon one eternally li berating act…” The British Colonial Office would not be influenced by a “people divided against itself, a g roup shot through and through with slavishness of s pirit, a group in which treachery is rampant—treachery out o f small phantastic fears and unworthy self-seeking and a detestable desire not to lose an argument…” L udwig Lewisohn, “What is Wrong?” The Sentinel March 31, 1938, 5. 42 Bryan Mark Rigg, Rescued from the Reich: How One of Hitler’s Soldier s Saved the Lubavitcher Rebbe (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 63. 43 Naomi Shepherd, Wilfrid Israel: German Jewry's Secret Ambassador, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1984), 133-34 cited in Breitman, American Refugee Policy 60

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263 that was “old, elitist [and] given to private persuasion,” was engaged in a running “fe ud” with the more confrontational American Jewish Congress. 44 Chaim Weizmann believed that behinds the scenes actions, performed “privately and separately” with t he various delegations in their respective capitals, would be more likely to lead to positive results than an international congress at Evian. The exclusion of Palestine from the agend a convinced him as well that he would not be granted a “serious hearing,” thus constit uting “’a waste of time.’" 45 To Zionist historians the “appearance of the Jews at the Evian Conference wa s that of paupers.” Jews did not come as a “united nation but [as] a homeless group of lobbyists.” The leadership of the London-based Jewish Agency suggested that the Bri tish Council for German Jews [and possibly other organizations] formulate a joint delegati on; a project dismissed by the Council, in part out of fear of creating in actuality “an international Jewry.” 46 There was also concern among the assorted Jewish leaderships that any testimony or evidence presented to the Conference sub-committees w ould be “heard [but] would not be seriously listened to.” 47 The American Jewish Congress reported that the “disintegration and rivalry” between the various Jewish facti ons 44 Jessie H Stiller, George S. Messersmith, Diplomat of Democracy (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 123. 45 Vital. A People Apart 890. 46 Second report of Nahum Goldmann from Evian, CZA, Fi le S25/978 and Rosenblitt’s letter to Ruppin, CZA, File S7/693, Goldman letter from Evian, CVA, F ile S25/978 and Rosenblitt’s letter to Ruppin, CZA, File S7/93 cited in Beit-zvi, Post-Ugandan Zionism 147-48. The belief that a secret Jewish cabal controlled governments and the economy was long the mainstay of anti-Semitic beliefs and found, perhap s, its greatest expression in the infamous “Protocols of the Elders of Zion.” 47 Vital, A People Apart 894.

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264 provided “a spectacle of Jewish discord and disruption.” The New York Jewish paper regarded the entire state of affairs as a “disgrace.” 48 A number of major Jewish organizations did, however, make an attempt to present a unified front at Evian. The Council for German Jewry, HICEM, Joint For eign Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jewry, Anglo-Jewish Assoc iation, German Aid Committee, and Agudas Israel World Organization submitted a coll ective memorandum (composed by Solomon Adler-Rudel serving on the Zionist Actions Committee) to the Conference. The communication was endorsed by the Jewish Agency of Palestine which chose to submit a separate note dealing specifically w ith Mandate affairs. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee also express ed its support but directed its delegate to the conference, Dr. Jonah B. Wise, to offer a separate m emo. The collaborative text addressed the technical issues of resettlement organization and financing and was non-ideologically based. It was estimated t hat two hundred million dollars were required to remove five hundred thousand Jews from Germany, with additional funding needed for relocation in agricultural colonies. Ei ghty million dollars were needed for the evacuation and retraining of Jews younger than forty years of age. The associated groups concluded that German cooperation, coupled wi th the release of a sufficient level of Jewish assets, was essential for a methodical and structured emigration system. However, a special clause (XII) speci fically dealt with Palestine as a site of resettlement. The rate of immigration would be dependent upon the 48 “David S. Wyman, Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis 1938-19 41 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1968), 49.

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265 economic absorptive capacity of the Mandate. Such a focus on Palestine gained the support of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Joint Distribution Committee. The principal figures of the larger organizations attempted to prevent the appearance of smaller Jewish groups before the Conference as a means of c reating the faade of joint action. Professor Benjamin Akzin criticized the leadership of some of the more prominent Jewish associations, especially Norman Bentwich, for acting as if they were the official spokesmen of the collective Jewish people. Such individuals, Akzin believed, were “extremely displeased” with the attendance of the lesser bl ocs at the Conference who were regarded as interlopers or “minor leaguers” and did not wa rrant time to present their case before the technical sub-committee. The self el ected elite believed that only one, two or three representatives should appear before the conferen ce “in the name of all the Jewish federations” prompting Akzin and others to protest in the “name of democracy” The subsequent internecine conflict led the directorate of the Evian Conference to permit all representatives of Jewish organizations to speak but “wha t took place was a tragicomedy, with plenty of the comedy element.” Each organization was allotted only five to ten minutes; a clear sign that “the committee did not take it seriously.” 48 The decision of the White sub-committee to significantly curtail presentation time essentially negated the efforts of the attendant organizati ons. Twenty four groups who had hoped to offer evidence in support of their cause were limited to minutes resulting in confusion and disarray. 49 48 Recorded interview between Prof. Benjamin Akzin an d Beit-Zvi, September 7, 1972 cited in Beit-Zvi, “Post-Ugandan Zionism,” 149. 49 Adler-Rudel, “The Evian Conference,” 239; “Nations Gathered at Evian for First Refugee Parley,” The Southern Israelite July 8, 1938, 8. Adler-Rudel’s description of the event captures the tenor of the

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266 The private organizations, Jewish and non-Jewish, presented five major suggestions to resolve the refugee crisis: 1. Application of pressure upon His Ma jesty’s Government to open the gates of Palestine to Jewish settlement. 2. Negotiations wi th the Reich to increase the amount of personal finances and assets that could be removed by the migrs which at that time was limited to five percent of their holdings. 3. Establishment of an international loan to subsidize resettlement of forced ref ugees. 4. Negotiate with governments to liberalize immigration without revision of curr ent “quotas and regulations.” 5. Grant permanent residency status and work permits to refugees i n countries of temporary haven. As demonstrated, all of these suggested measures w ere either ineffectual or ignored. 50 Solomon Adler-Rudel recalled that standing before the White sub-Committee wa s an entirely “humiliating experience” due to lack of preparation on the part of the E vian Conference representatives themselves as well as the witnesses appeari ng before the panel, “none of whom were accustomed to “any kind of interrogation procedure in front of a Committee.” The speakers felt themselves to be “on trial” and were dec idedly handicapped with the lack of time to adequately and clearly make their case. Consequently, “all left the room disheartened and disillusioned.” 51 Years later, Dr. Nahum Goldmann laid some of the blame on “too many organizations [that] applied and conference: “The reception of the delegation repres entatives was a truly melancholy affair. The deleg ation spokesmen stood by the door of the meeting room. E veryone who entered was given 3-4 minutes to make his presentation. No questions were asked. The fi rst few had their remarks translated into English o r French; for those who followed even this gesture of courtesy was omitted. Spokesmen found themselves back in the waiting room before they even grasped t hat they had already appeared before the committee. Adler-Rudel correspondence, 194 cited in Beit-Zvi, “Post-Ugandan Zionism,” 149. 50 “Nations Gathered at Evian for First Refugee Parley ,” The Southern Israelite July 8, 1938, 8. 51 Adler-Rudel, “The Evian Conference,” 255.

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267 wanted to be heard, so there was no united front, and the goyim said, ‘To hell with all of them!’” 52 Ernst Marcus observed that the Jewish representatives lacked the requisite economic “knowledge nor knew the means for the realization of projects.” Consequently, the “undue haste” with which Jews had to present their case, constrai ned by a limited time frame and practical experience, heralded the “traged y… [that] was nearing its clear peak, the annihilation. The gates had already been closed be fore us.” 53 The Jewish leadership in the United Kingdom, Central and Eastern Europe and the Americas was divided over Zionism and the issue of Palestine. The non-Zionist s argued that Jews did not represent a specific nationality and consequently should not be granted the status of a State but rather a protectorate. They believed the Mandat e, however, should not place any limitations upon Jewish immigration. The Zionists, such as Chaim Weizmann, opposed the diversion of Diaspora resources from Palestine despit e progressive British restrictions on Jewish immigration. David Ben-Gurion ma intained that Palestine must remain the central focus of Jewish rescue. Advising th e Zionist Executive in a December 11, 1938 letter he asserted that: …if the Jews are faced with a choice between the ref ugee problem and rescuing Jews from concentration camps on the one h and, and aid for the national museum in Palestine on the other, the Jewish sense of pity will prevail and our people’s entire strength will be directed at aid for the refugees in the various countries. Zionism will vanish from the agenda and … also from Jewish public opinion. We are risking Zionism’s very existence if we allow the refugee pr oblem to be separated from the Palestine problem. 54 52 Beit-Zvi, “Post-Ugandan Zionism,” 150. 53 Ernst Marcus, “The German Foreign Office and the Pa lestine Question, 1933-1939,” Yad Vashem Studies 2 (1958), 194. 54 Yigal Elam, Introduction to Zionist History (Tel Aviv: 1972), 125-127; Tony Greenstein, “Zioni sm and the Holocaust,” (June 2006) available from st/greenstein/zionism2.htm#n46 ; Internet; accessed May 14, 2010.

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268 Christopher Sykes has argued that the Zionists viewed the Evian Conference with “hostile indifference” and that any success would have lessened the pressur e to grant Jews a National Homeland and diminished the “heightened enthusiasm of Jews with Palestine. This was the last thing the Zionist leaders wished for…” 55 Noah Lucas agreed that the failure of the Evian Conference was not a setback for the Zionist movem ent. Rather, its success would “have eased the pressure in Palestine.” 56 Zionists, according to Henry Mentor, executive vice-president of the United Jewish Appeal, did not envision the rescue and Aliyah [emigration of Jews to Palestine] of all Central European Jews but called for “selectivity.” Young men and women, with training in agriculture or other beneficial industries and who were prepared for the rigors of life in a deve loping Palestine, were the ideal candidates for resettlement. Mentor warned t hat “there could be no more deadly ammunition provided to the enemies of Zionism” than the inundation of Palestine with “very old people or with undesirables.” Until Palestine had reach ed a suitable level of development only 30,000-60,000 Jews could be admitted per year. 57 55 Christopher Sykes, Crossroads to Israel 1917-1948 (London: 1973), 188-191. 56 Noah Lucas, The Modern History of Israel (Praeger: NY, 1975), 458fn. 57 Ben Hecht, Perfidy (NY: Julian Messner, 1961), fn 7, 255 cited in Gr eenstein, “Zionism”. Ben Hecht (February 28, 1894-April 18, 1964) was a noted play wright, novelist, screenwriter, director and produc er who became an active Zionist. Hecht described the bitterness and frustration of Jews unable to escape the Reich in a rhyme included in an ad in the September 14, 1943 New York Times entitled the “Ballad of the Doomed Jews of Europe”: “Four Million Jews waiting for death./ Oh hang and burn, but--quiet, Jews/ Don’t be bothersome; save your breath/ The world i s busy with other news/ Four Million murders are quite a smear/ Even our State Department views/ Th e slaughter with much disfavor here/ But then—it’s busy with other news. "Oh World be patient--it will take / Some time befo re the murder crews / Are done. By Christmas you can make / Your Peace on Earth wit hout the Jews.” Ted Gottfried, Displaced Persons: The Liberation and Abuse of Holocaust Survivors (Brookfield, CT: Twenty-First Century Books, 2001), 58;“A Child of the Century” by Ben Hecht available from tm ; Internet; accessed August 4, 2010; “Christmas Without Jews: A Holocaust Controversy” by Rafael Me doff ( December 2003) available from stmas.php ; Internet; accessed August 4, 2010.

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269 Various members of the Anglo-British Jewish elite, such as Anthony de Rothschild, Neville Laski, Robert Waley-Cohen, Lord Bearsted and others were more concerned about maintaining their social positions within British society and espec ially to avoid the proverbial charges of dual loyalties. 58 Otto Schiff (1875-1952), was a banker of German background, who became president of the Jews’ Temporary Shelter, a major communal organization providing services to refugees. Schiff had received the Order of the British Empire (OBE) for his work with Belgian refugees during the Gre at War. He founded the Jewish Refugees Committee (later renamed the German Jewish Aid Committee in 1938). Schiff, along with Lionel Cohen, Neville Laski and Leonard Montefiore present ed to the British Cabinet, during April 1933, a personal financial pledge that guaranteed German Jewish refugees admitted into the U.K. would not become public charges. Consequently, the Cabinet authorized a very liberal interpretation of the immigra tion requirements while viewing Britain as a way station on the road to overseas r esettlement. As a result, approximately thirty thousand Jews entered the island nation by the e nd of 1938. By December 1939 these guarantors and other members of the local Jewish community had contributed £3,000,000. 58 Weizmann opposed any fund raising program that div erted funds away from Palestine and hoped to see 500,000 Jews resettled in the Mandate before hi s death. Conservative non-Zionist Jewish leaders in the UK and France, such as Lionel and Anthony de Rothsc hild, Sir Robert Waley-Cohen and Baron Robert de Rothschild tended, according to James G. McDonald, League High Commissioner for Political Refugees from 1933-1935 and later chair of the President’s A dvisory Committee on Political Refugees, gave limit ed support to resettlement of German Jews and underest imated the plight of the German Jewish community. The Baron viewed German Jews as more German than Je wish and was concerned about the number of refugees already admitted into France. Laski was p resident of the Board of Deputies of British Jews a nd official spokesman on foreign affairs of the Britis h Jewish community.

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270 The fiscal backers of the pledge were concerned not only about the number of the refugees but also their class, background, age and national origin. Immig rants older than forty five years were excluded as their prospects of overseas reloca tion were considered limited. Following the Anschluss Schiff encouraged the Home Office to require visas for German and Austrian refugees in order to control the quantity and quality of the J ewish immigrants entering Britain. The visa was necessary, according to a de legation of the British Jews Board of Deputies (of which Schiff was a member), because of the difficulties entailed in removing a refugee once they had successfully lande d in Britain. Sir Samuel Hoare of the Home Office concurred and warned that a deluge of the inappropriate type of migrant would pose a significant risk of inciting anti-Semi tism among the British natives and the creation of a domestic Jewish Question; a posit ion in which the Board of Deputies delegation stood in full agreement. 59 Dr. Nahum Goldmann, who attended the Evian Conference with Dr. Arthur Ruppin, was a member of the unofficial Zionist delegation. Commenting in 1972 and a year later in his memoirs he described the meeting as a “shame and scandal for the entire progressive world.” 60 The Conference was a “wretched and tragicomic spectacle” and from the outset it was clear that the democratic nations would fail to provide meanin gful and substantive aid to the refugees while substituting warm words of sympathy for 59 Vivian David Lipman, A History of the Jews in Britain Since 1858 (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1990), 196; Bernard Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 82; Norman Bentwich, Wanderer between Two Worlds (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner: 1941), 175; PRO HO 213/42: Minutes of meeting, Apr il 1, 1938, 3 cited in Geoffrey Alderman, Modern British Jewry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 275-278. 61 Nahum Goldmann radio broadcast on Israeli Army Radi o on January 16, 1972, “Friends Talk about Arthur Ruppin” in Beit-Zvi, Post-Uganda Zionism 139.

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271 tangible humanitarian actions. 61 Ruppin noted that it was clearly obvious that the gates would be closed to all but a few refugees. However, to the press Ruppin described the Evian Conference as the “first silver lining in the dark clouds” that hovered over the Jewish world and he anticipated that the IGCR would play a “big role in the emigr ation problem.” 62 Bentwich described the Conference’s final report as “flat, like the mineral water of the place” and the exclusion of Palestine from consideration was “stult ifying.” 63 The American Hebrew concluded that the “hopes” and aspirations of the real and potential forced migrs was “rapidly sinking” due to the failure of the Conf erence to achieve meaningful results. 64 Professor Arye Tartakower, historian and sociologist and a senior member of the World Jewish Congress, attended the Evian Conference as the representative of a Polish emigration society and described the results as a “dismal failure.” 65 The “insulting episode of the civilized world’s reaction” to German “criminal atrocities” would forever be a stain on the collective memory of mankind. 66 Historian Joseph Tenenbaum attributed the “gloomy failure” of the refugee conference to the plain realit y that “no country wanted to open its gates to Jews.” He observed that the “flow of oratory and the hustling and bustling at special committee meetings did not obscure the paucity of 61 Nahum Goldmann, Memoirs (Jerusalem: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), 158. 62 Arthur Ruppin, Chapters of My Life in the Building of the Land and the Nation, 1920-1942 ( Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1968), 301. 63 Bentwich, My Seventy Seven Years 148. 64 Contemporary Jewish Record vol. 1 (July 1938), 22 cited in Gurlock, America, American Jews 229. 65 Interview with Dr. Tartakower, Department for Oral Documentation, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University, Tape No. 1820 in Beit-Zvi Post-Uganda Zionism 139. 66 AryeTartakower, Jewish Settlement in the Diaspora (Tel Aviv: M. Newman, 1958), 268. Ibid., 139.

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272 concrete proposals…” 67 Haganah historian Dr. Yehuda Slutsky described the “highsounding, emotional declarations” of the conference delegates but noted that when face d with the need to create a rational and workable plan to resettle refugees the representatives became universally “evasive.” 68 Solomon Adler-Rudel concluded that the sole accomplishment of the international meeting was the creation of the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees based in London that ultima tely proved to be totally ineffectual. “It offered small comfort to the refugees the potential refugees and the Jews in general, and was a cruel disappointment to the Jew ish representatives who came to Evian.” 69 One Jewish delegate summed up the sense of futility represented by the Conference: “When the old trees of Evian cast their evening sha dows over Lake Geneva and the bright lights of the Casino shone ac ross the serene waters, I was overcome with grief and despair over the situation….All our work would soon be ended by a policy of sauve-qui peut [“Every man for himself”]. The course which the Evian Confe rence was taking...was a tragedy whose certain end was destru ction. The gates had been closed before us.” 70 Editorialist William Zukerman observed (two weeks prior to the opening session) that the fate of the Jewish people appeared to hang in the balance at Evian but reports emanating from the Jewish European press were, for a variety of re asons, “almost [too] pathetic” to read and were the potential harbinger of possible failure. The Evian 67 Tenenbaum, “The Crucial Year,” 46. 68 Yehuda Slutsky, History of the Haganah vol. 2, 283 cited in Beit-Zvi, Post-Uganda Zionism 139. 69 Adler-Rudel, “The Evian Conference,” 259. 70 Nora Levin. The Holocaust: The Destruction of European Jewry 1933-1945 (NY: The Schocken Books, 1973), 77.

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273 Conference represented the first international conclave of governments to conf ront a predominantly Jewish refugee crisis which acquired the veneer of a “matter of great importance.” Secondly, to Eastern and Western European Jews the United States maintained its image as the “golden land of hope, freedom and equal opportunities…” America was the “embodiment of the conscience of humanity…actuated by pity and true idealism” and endowed with faithfulness and morality. Such sentiments infused a “peculiar luster” on the Evian Conference. The writer warned that the “great hopes” held by Jews for a positive outcome, guided by the wise counsel of the United States, w ould end in a disappointment reminiscent of the weaknesses of President Wilson and the Par is Peace Conference. Thirdly, the refugee Jews of Europe were being influence d not by logic or practicality but by emotion which was destined to end in “disillusionme nt.” Fourth, little was known about the planned agenda for the Conference or its “terms of reference,” scope or possible solutions. It was clear that Jews represented the c rux of the refugee problem but preliminary discussions appeared to ignore such a connection. T he necessary planning and preparatory work did not appear to “well-informed circles ” to have been “efficiently done.” Practical groundwork and action was called for ra ther than the issuance of “mere appeals” for assistance. Fifth, would those nations who we re responsible for creating the refugee crisis be confronted? If agreements were made with Germany to facilitate the removal of its unwanted Jews would it stimulate pogroms and similar actions in Hungary, Poland and Rumania? Finally, it appeared that many of the attendees were lacking the “good-will which [such a] gigantic task require s” and were motivated by the fact that it was the United States that had issued the invitations for the Conference. Many European Governments viewed the American plan with great

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274 skepticism as a shallow expression of an “idealistic gesture.” The appointment of Lord Winterton, an “outspoken anti-Semite” to represent the British delegation represe nted the “best illustration of [the] lack of sympathy with the spirit of the conference …” Zukerman concluded that the Evian Conference would “open auspiciously” but “complete failure” could only be averted by the application of “American coura ge, youth and sincerity…” 71 Overall, the Evian Conference provided little comfort to the involuntary refugees and represented a “cruel” disillusionment to Jewish representat ives and their sympathizers who attended the meeting. 72 Hannah Rosen, a young German Jewish woman widowed at an early age, managed to acquire a visa admitting her into the Unit ed States. She noted in her diary, following the conclusion of the conference on July 16 tha t Jewish hopes had been raised by the President “making it seem as if something would be done. However, nothing was accomplished. Was it all for show?” After the equally ineffectual Bermuda Conference in April 1943 Rosen observed that, as with its E vian predecessor, the American Government had once again chosen the path of “all words and no action.” 73 Beit-zvi regarded the conferences failure as symbolic of the Christian world’s “indifference” and “hypocrisy” to the fate of the Jewish people. 74 71 William Zukermam, “Is the Evian Conference Doomed t o Failure? Hopes and Fears for the Refugee Parley,” The Jewish Criterion July 15, 1938, 12, 16, 17 available from _1938_092_010_07151938&layout=vol0/part0/copy0 &file=0012 ; Internet; accessed July 15, 2010. 72 Walter Laqueur and Judith Tydor Baumel, The Holocaust Encyclopedia (Willard, Ohio: R.R. Donnelley & Sons, 2001), 174. 73 Elizabeth S. Rothschild, “The Diary of Hannah Rosen : Europe’s Jews and America’s Response, 19371945” available from ; Internet; accessed June 26, 2010. 74 Beit-Zvi, Post -Ugandan Zionism 138.

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275 A Belgian paper described the conclusion of the Evian Conference as a “gloomy experience” for the many real and potential refugees who looked towards Lake Ge neva for solace and rescue. Despite the eloquent oratory and lofty idealism and the adopti on of some “proposals devoid of all merit” nothing of “practical” significance to al leviate the sufferings and uncertainties of unwilling refugees was enacted. The part icipating nations were driven and guided by their “foreign policy needs” and not the requirements of a persecuted people. The only true success of the meeting, the paper believed, was the cooperation of the United States with the European democratic States. 75 Alan Dowty concluded that the Evian Conference clearly demonstrated that the “final lifeline—the right to flee—no longer existed” while Ya’acov Liberm an believed that the failure of the democracies to allow the Jews to be “immediately r esettled” (an unlikely possibility considering the domestic economic, social and political condit ions of the time) would culminate in Jews of Central Europe being exterminated. 76 Dr. Oscar Jszi asserted that the problem of German and Austrian political refugee s (inclusive of Jews) represented a microcosm within the greater global problem of real an d potential refugees who had or may be forced to flee from the “intolerance of the Franc o dictatorship” and the expansion of Nazi influence over the nations of Central and Easte rn Europe. Any new mass migration, he believed, would create “a problem of such magnitude” that it would defy resolution by the “normal methods of statecraft [tha t had 75 Le Peuple (Brussels), July 16, 1938 cited in Katz, “Public Op inions,” 124. 76 Dowty, Closed Borders 94; Ya’acov Liberman, My China: Jewish Life in the Orient, 1900-1950 (Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House, 1998), 99.

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276 proven to be] pathetically inadequate.” Ominously and presciently he warned, “O nly the catastrophic techniques of war and civil war would remain.” 77 Robert Gellately maintained that Germany could not be swayed by issues of morality and “far from shaming the Nazis into relenting” the Evian Conferenc e and its evident impotency merely encouraged the regime to adopt more radical approaches to solving the Jewish Question. 78 Norman Neimark described the Conference as a “tragic failure” and concluded that any “protestations” regarding the difficulties or undesirability of accepting stateless refugees was underpinned by a global anti-Semit ism that “played a central role” in the ultimate failure of the Conference. 79 Rabbi Jonah B. Wise, the National Chairman of the Joint Distribution Committee and private observer at the proceedings of the Evian Conference, however, lauded the actions of Myron C. Taylor. Despite the reticence of the various delega tions to agree to modification of their respective immigration laws and policies Wi se opposed any lessening of American immigration requirements for German and Austri an refugees. If the aid provided by the JDC and other relief organizations for those “escaping oppression…interfere[d] with helping Americans, then we wouldn’t do it.” He noted that the JDC provided more aid funding for use within the United States than for foreign relief. 80 77 Oscar Jszi, “Political Refugees” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Soc ial Science 203, Refugees (May 1939): 93. 78 Robert Gellately, Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler: The Age of Social Catast rophe (NY: Vintage Books, 2008), 323. 79 Norman M. Neimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Cent ury Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 68. 80 “Our Needy First, J.B. Wise Asserts,” New York Times July 21, 1938, 10.

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277 The American Jewish Committee (AJC) viewed the Evian Conference as the “most important step” taken towards solving the refugee crisis. Both the Pre sident and Myron C. Taylor were owed the “gratitude of all lovers of humanity for their e fforts to make the conference a success.” Although the sole accomplishment of the Conferenc e was the establishment of the Intergovernmental Committee for Political R efugees the discussions between the delegates was “heartening” as an “expression of hum an principles.” While expressing gratitude for the conflation of the German and Aus trian quotas by the American Government the American Jewish Year Book (AJYB) criticized the “disinclination of other countries” to accept increased numbers of refugee s. The AJC observed that the number of emigrants leaving the United States during 1931-1937 exceeded the number of immigrants by eighty thousand and cited a speech given by Lord Winterton on January 26, 1939 that German and Austrian refugees had created new industries employing 15,000 out of work Britons. 81 By 1941, however, during the early years of the European War, the AJC had to admit that the IGCR had accomplished litt le of note. 82 The Evian Conference also avoided any direct criticism of Nazi “policy towar ds the Jews, however uncivilized and deplorable.” 83 There were a number of reasons for 81 Schneiderman, ed., The American Jewish Committee Thirty-Second Annual Report 1939 635-636, available from _9_AJCAnnuaReport.pdf ; Internet; accessed June 11,2010. 82 Schneiderman, ed., The American Jewish Committee Thirty-Fourth Annual Report 1941 744, available from _10_AJCAnnualReport.pdf ; Internet; accessed June 11, 2010; American Jewish Year Book vol. 61 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1960), 194. 83 Henderson to Halifax, July 4, 1938, FO 371/22549, W 8887/104/98 cited in Sherman, Island Refuge 113.

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278 this reticence to chastise the Reich including complicated business and econom ic relationships (especially in Latin America) and fears of jeopardizing the sought after policy of continental appeasement. Many Latin American Governments were “ dubious on the basic principle” that regimes engaged in forced emigration were “oblig ed” to allow refugees the retention of personal assets. Such a principle represented “ undue interference” in the internal affairs of a State and might result in an undesi rable precedent that could be utilized against Latin American countries in the future. 5384 Taylor informed Secretary of State Hull that many of the Latin American nations, especi ally Columbia, Venezuela, Central American Republics, Uruguay and Chile, threatened to vote ag ainst the final resolution of the Conference if it adopted any overt criticism of Germ any. Taylor was told with “great frankness” that threats by Germany against j oint commercial and compensation agreements precluded taking such a moral stand. Consequently, the text of the final resolution avoided any censure of the Reich or calls upon Germany to allow refugees to retain sufficient assets for resettlement. 85 In addition, German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop had warned that if the Evian Conference engaged in any anti-German propaganda then the Reich would be forced to retaliate against its German Jewish population. 86 Despite such dire threats Chaim Weizmann recalled the “elegant parties” held by Ribbentrop in the Germa n 84 “Reich Power Felt at Refugee Parley,” New York Times July 14, 1938, 15. 85 840.48 Refugees/513: Telegram Taylor to Hull Evian, July 14, 1938, 840.48 Refugees/513, FRUS vol. 1, 754-757. Von Ribbentrop was German Ambassador t o Britain from 1936 to 1938. In February 1938 he became Germany's Foreign Minister. The American Go vernment was also concerned that overt criticism of the Nazi regime and its anti-Jewish policies cou ld prompt Germany to default on its financial oblig ations to the Dawes and Young Plan. Spear, “The United Sta tes and the Persecution of the Jews,” 215. 86 Shepherd, Wilfrid Israel, 133-134.

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279 Embassy and how the elite of “British society was falling over itself to at tend.” An invitation to such a fte was a mark of “social distinction” and despite the spill ing of “Jewish blood which stained the hands of the hosts” the guests chose to ignore the victims’ lamentations “to heaven.” Weizmann warned Anthony Eden that the “fire f rom the synagogues” could easily spread from Germany and ignite Westminster Abbey and other Anglican churches. If a State was able to decimate an innocent minority purely on the basis of its religion and ethnicity, without any repercussions from the other Pow ers, then Europe as a whole faced the “beginning of anarchy” and the ultimate collaps e of human civilization. Nations that chose the role of bystanders would eventually “be visited by severe punishment.” 87 Adler-Rudel noted that no matter how egregious Nazi behavior became foreign leaders were not prevented from “shaking hands or dining w ith Nazi leaders.” Sir George Ogilivie-Forbes, however, writing from Berl in, judged the Germans to be “unfit for decent international society” for their harsh trea tment of Jews, non-Aryans and political prisoners. 88 Lord Winteron believed that vilification of the Reich would jeopardize any chance of German cooperation and noted that the British had successfully blocked an American attempt to formulate some “clause of a denunciatory character t owards the German Government.” 89 Correspondent William Shirer doubted that the Evian Conference would achieve any positive results as the Americans, British and Fre nch 87 Weizmann, Trial and Error 498. 88 Adler-Rudel, “The Evian Conference,” 235. 89 Landau, Nazi Holocaust 138.

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280 appeared “anxious not to do anything to offend Hitler…the man who was responsible for their problem.” 90 David Vital concluded that reticence to discuss the underlying causes of involuntary emigration, that is, German anti-Semitic policies, essentially provided “an offer of assistance” to the Hitler regime in its ongoing efforts to rende r Germany jdenrein 91 There were governments within and outside of Europe, it was believed, who placed greater import on the preservation of “proper” diplomatic relations wit h Germany than on the “lives of individual refugees, however numerous…” The protection of human rights was subservient to the needs and interests of the State. 92 A Swiss paper argued that the international delegates were dealing “purely and simply [wi th] a human problem…of secondary importance—and on no account” should the quest for a solution to the refugee crisis harm “normal international relationships.” It would be qui te “unfortunate,” another Swiss paper believed, if the proceedings of the Evian Confere nce were perceived to be “directed against Germany.” The sole focus of the me eting had to be the resolution of the refugee problem and the abatement of the difficulties of the countries bordering Germany. Since the Reich and its policies were the genesi s of the refugee issue overt censure needed to be avoided to facilitate “behind the sc enes” [German] cooperation. 93 Harry Schneiderman, editor of the American Jewish Yearbook (1920-1949), however, alleged that the Evian Conference had brought Germany and its 90 William Shirer, Berlin Diary: The Journal of a Foreign Corresponden t 1934-1941 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1941), 101, 119-120 91 Vital. A People Apart 884. 91 L’Impartial (La Chaux de Fonds, Switzerland) July 11, 1938 ci ted in Katz, “Public Opinion,” 117. 93 L’Impartial July 11, 1938, Journal de Genve July 8, 1938 cited in Katz, “Public Opinion,” 114, 115.

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281 anti-Semitic policies before the “bar of civilized world opinion, but although condemnation was decisive and unqualified” it failed to stop or reduce the depredations of a criminal government which appears to have neither conscience nor regard for wor ld opinion.” 94 Representatives to the conference “manipulated the Intergovernmenta l Committee largely for their own ends, especially to deflect humanitarian pr essure” from their respective countries. 95 Simultaneously they expressed “warm words of idealism” awhile offering “few encouraging practical suggestions.” 96 Country after country expressed their “platonic sympathies” for the plight of the refugees but pres ented a variety of explanations as to why they could not provide any meaningful refuge. 97 Most of the Evian delegates were drawn from embassy staff or were foreign minis try senior officials; no heads of state attended—representative selections that prevent ed the immediate enactment of any decisive policy measures. In addition, each dele gation avoided “precise commitments” to accept specified numbers of refugees. The Fr ench representatives sidestepped any consideration of resettlement in colonial poss essions and along with the British prevented inclusion of the Eastern European Jewish Question in the conference agenda. 98 94 Schneiderman, ed., Review of the Year 1938-1939 American Jewish Committee, 3. 95 Tommie Sjoberg, The Powers and the Persecuted: The Refugee Problem and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (Lund: Lund University Press, 1991), 5 cited in Lon don, Whitehall and the Jews 5. 96 St. Petersburg Times July 8, 1938. 97 S.D. Waley to Sir Frederick Phillips, memorandum, E vian Conference, June 17, 1938cited in London, Whitehall and the Jews 88. 98 Foreign Ministry, “ Note de la sous-direction des Affaires Administrati ves et des Unions Internationales: Le comit d’Evian et la question d es rfugis isralites allemands ,”, November 21, 1938, DDF 2me sries, tome XIII, doc. no. 348, 680-88 cite d in Caron, Uneasy Asylum 185.

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282 The unwillingness of the participating nations to commit to accept meaningful numbers of involuntary migrs posed the greatest “stumbling block” in the search f or a workable solution. The representatives’ speech-making “left little doubt” that most countries would not open their doors to immigration. 99 One paper editorialized that “if this is coming to the help of refugees, then what would the nations do if they meant to desert them?” 100 Time noted that the site of the conference, Evian, was the source of “still and unexciting table water [but] after a week of many warm words of idealism [and] few practical suggestions” the meeting “took on some of the same characteristic s.” 101 The correspondent for Newsweek observed that during his opening remarks Taylor acknowledged the refugee situation had reached a critical stage in which go vernments “’must act and act promptly’” and did so by “promptly…slamming their doors a gainst Jewish refugees.” 102 A reporter for Life magazine offered a critical opinion of the Conference. “Diplomatic gatherings are notable for their inhuman superiority to r eality” and the current assembly is no exception. Lord Winterton’s “hypocritical maunderi ngs widened the eyes even of the other delegates.” 103 Charles Streit, correspondent for the New York Times described the atmosphere at Evian as a “none too trustful poker game”, especially between the U.S., U.K. and France, in which each party opposed increasing it own level of immigration and wa nted 99 St. Petersburg Times July 8, 1938. 100 Daily Herald August 26, 1938 cited in Sharf, The British Press 171 101 Time July 18, 1938, 16. 102 Newsweek July 18, 1938, 13. 103 Life August 8, 1938, 22.

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283 to pass on the burden to the other. The United States represented the “chief motive power” while the “chief brake” was provided by the United Kingdom. Consequently, a n “air of inhospitality” pervaded the conference. The Conference was a call for de mocratic societies to stand up for and protect “the individual against being punished for his opinions or [the Jewish blood of] his parents.” It was obvious early on that the delegates “lost sight” of this purpose from the “start. These poor people and these great princi ples seem so far away from the Hotel Royal tonight.” 104 The New York Herald Tribune commented that the Conference was “not exactly a pretty spectacle” that got “nowhere with great dignity but a high rate of speed.” 105 The New Republic observed that the delegates were annoyed with the Nazis not only because of the humanitarian conc erns but because their respective countries were faced with an “awkward problem of absorption.” 106 The Richmond News Leader predicted that the American response to the refugee crisis would be muted with the Government content to issue “friendly ges tures and kind words.” 107 Deborah Lipstadt noted that while many American papers criticized the lack of an adequate response during the Conference (both from the U.S. and other nations) they favored the “idea of a conference because it guaranteed no incre ase in immigration.” Thus, the “failure of Evian was the failure of the rest of the w orld to 104 Clarence K. Streit, “32 Nations Gather to Help Refu gees,” New York Times July 6, 1938, 1; Montreal Gazette July 6, 1938, 1, 9. 105 New York Herald Tribune July 12, 1938 cited in Deborah E. Lipstadt, Beyond Belief: The American Press & the Coming of the Holocaust 1933-1945 (NY: The Free Press, 1986), 95. 106 New Republic July 20, 1938, 291-292. Ibid., 95. 107 Richmond News Leader July 13, 1938. Ibid., 96.

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284 shoulder its share of the problem.” 108 “Humanitarianism,” according to the Philadelphia Record sustained a “new blow” as the conference failed to rescue the “unhappy exile s” of Europe. 109 Gerald Gross described the German and Austrian Jews and non-Aryans as “pathetic pawns” for whom the Evian Conference was convened. The meeting had been a “disappointment if not altogether a surprise” to the refugees and their support ers for no sooner had the opening session begun delegates arose to say “We feel sorry for the refugees and potential refugees but…” 110 The Daily Herald asked “if this is coming to the help of the refugees, then what would the nations do if they meant to desert them?” 111 Former High Commissioner and chair of the President’s Committee for Polit ical Refugees James G. McDonald claimed in 1944 that the “international organizations have almost never faced the realities of the tragedy” of the refugee crisis but instead engaged in “face saving maneuvers while millions of innocent men and women have been needlessly sacrificed.” 112 Sumner Welles himself noted, following World War II, that the Evian Conference could have resulted in an “outstanding humanitarian achievement” ha d not the American Government “permitted the committee to become a nullity.” 113 Cordell Hull, with convenient hindsight, forgot the terms of the invitation which placed 108 Ibid., 97. 109 Ibid., 97. 110 Gerald Gross, “Yes, But Attitude Perils Progress a t World Refugee Conference,” Washington Post July 10, 1938, B7. 111 Daily Herald August 26, 1938 cited in Scharf, British Press 171. 112 James G. McDonald to Ben Cohen, November 30, 1944, McDonald MSS cited in Leonard Dinnerstein, America and the Survivors of the Holocaust (NY: Columbia University Press, 1982), 4. 113 Sumner Welles, Where Are We Headed? (NY, Harper and Brothers, 1946) cited in David S. Wyman, Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis 1938-19 41 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1968), 51.

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285 significant obstacles in the paths of the refugees and claimed that the Admini stration had called for the conference “lest these victims of persecution be extermina ted.” 114 Theodore C. Achilles, a State Department official and member of the U.S. delega tion, attributed the failure of the meeting to the simple fact that “nobody wants any more Jews.” 115 Yepes, the Columbian delegate, compared the character of the Evian Conference to that of a “modern wailing wall.” 116 New York department store Ira Hirschmann, who attended the conference as an observer, left early after be coming convinced that the senselessness and indolence of the meeting was a “faade behind which the civilized governments could hide their inability to act.” 117 A German plan to ransom forty thousand Jews ($200-400/head and evacuated by August 1) as a means of raising foreign capital was conveyed unofficially by an eminent Jewish Viennese physician, Dr. Heinrich von Neumann, but failed due to moral objections to “head money” and resistance of potential countries of refuge to alloc ate the necessary funds. 118 Brenger met with Neumann and would take his plan “under 114 Cordell Hull, Memoirs (NY: Macmillan Company, 1948) vol. 1, 578 cited in Arnold A. Offner, American Appeasement: United States Foreign Policy and Germany, 1933-1938 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), 88. 115 Peter Wyden, Stella (NY: Anchor Books, 1992), 63. 116 “Proceedings,” July 9, 1938, 25. 117 Ira Hirschman, Lifeline to a Promised Land (NY: Vanguard Press, 1946), 102 cited in Feingold, Politics of Rescue 33. 118 Wyden, Stella 63. Dr. Neumann gained prominence after treating the Duke of Windsor for an ear problem and later served as the central figure of a novel about the conference, The Mission written by Hans Habe in 1966. Von Neumann’s professional rela tionship with FDR advisor Bernard Baruch resulted in the granting of an entry visa outside of the ann ual quota to the doctor and his family as well as a possible meeting with Myron Taylor at the Evian Conference. The rescue of Von Neumann represented the system of Protektion in which the elite would act to rescue individuals of note. The famous Viennese psychiatrist, Dr. Sigmund Freud, represented another example of s uch salvation, aided by British Dr. Ernest Jones, t he British Home Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare and U.S. Am bassador to France William C. Bullitt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull and FDR himself. Wyden, Stella 64.

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286 advisement” while Taylor promised but never scheduled an appointment. 119 He did have a discussion with Lord Winterton regarding the situation of Jews in Vienna and afterwards informed the press that he was “morally sure” that if havens we re found for a significant number of Jews then the German Government would allow the migrants to retain twenty percent of their assets. 120 The doctor was not allowed to testify before the White sub-committee and remarked that his personal position was extremely pr ecarious as he must return to Germany “with a definite number to be evacuated, not promises of investigation by commissions, committees or officers.” 121 Neumann reportedly had informed Taylor that he had been instructed by the Nazis to relay the warning tha t if a ransom plan was not agreed upon forty thousand Austrian Jews would be sent to concentration camps. Taylor, according to one investigator, established a sub-comm ittee to investigate the proposal, chaired by the Columbian delegate, which failed to ac hieve any concrete results. The role of Neumann, if any, remains unclear and controvers ial although reports of his efforts were reported in the New York Times of July 7-9 and the London Daily Express on July 12. 122 The Times considered it “noteworthy” that Neumann and Loewenherz were in attendance at the Conference and it appeare d that they were “authorized to obtain specific proposals for a more widely open door on the part of 119 “Taylor Made Head of Refugee Parley,” New York Times July 8, 1938, 7. 120 Charles K. Streit, “Catholics Appeal to Refugee Pa rley,” New York Times July 9, 1938, 1. 121 “Taylor Made Head of Refugee Parley,” New York Times July 8, 1938, 7. 122 Yehuda Bauer, Jews for Sale?: Nazi-Jewish Negotiations 1933-1945 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 32.

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287 the receiving countries” but it was anticipated that their efforts would prove t o be unsuccessful. 123 Golda (Myerson) Meir, an unofficial Jewish observer of the meeting for the Histadrut labor union, was not allowed to address the delegates and regarded the event as a “terrible experience” as delegate after delegate rose to express sympathy while offering reasons why their respective governments could not aid the refugees. She did not believe that “anyone who didn’t live through it can understand what I felt at Evian —a mixture of sorrow, rage, frustration and horror.” Meir wanted to chastise the representatives: “Don’t you know these so-called numbers are human beings” w ho were destined to become prisoners of concentration camps or condemned to wander the “world like lepers” unless rescue was provided. 124 Perhaps more importantly she concluded that even “a world which was not…anti-Semitic” could tolerate a situation in which Jew ry was “victimized.” 125 Norman Bentwich commented that the convocation of the Evian Conference aroused “exaggerated hope” but its accomplishments resulted in “exaggerated disappointment.” 126 Pincus Rutenberg warned James MacDonald that the failure of the Evian Conference to achieve meaningful results, coupled with the growing Jewish Questi on within Eastern Europe, Italy and Czechoslovakia, proved that Palestine represe nted the 123 “Help for the Refugees: Proposals at Evian,” The Times, July 7, 1938, 16. 124 Golda Meir, My Life (NY: G. P. Putnam & Sons, 1975), 127, 158; Born Go lda Mabovitch (May 3, 1898-December 8, 1978) and known as Golda Meyerson from 1917-1956, she later served as the fourth Prime Minister of Israel. 125 Julie Nixon Eisenhower, Special People (NY: Ballantine, 1977), 10. 126 Norman Bentwich, “The Destruction of the Jewish Com munity, 1938-1942,”cited in Josef Frankel, The Jews of Austria, 430.

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288 only place of refuge for displaced Jews. It might be necessary to “sacr ifice the old[er] generation” in order to rescue the “still remaining two to three million of young…and they can be brought only to Palestine.” 127 Some observers did view the Evian Conference in a positive light. One Times correspondent concluded that the meeting had “done its work admirably” creating “machinery” that would convert disorderly migration into an methodical process provided the German Government would demonstrate liberality in the release of blocked Reichsmarks The writer also optimistically believed that each delegation “held out the prospect” of relaxing their respective immigration laws allowing the ent ry and resettlement of two hundred thousand forced migrs. 128 The Evian Conference represented a “bulwark against despair” for “800,000 to 1,000,000” Austrians and Germans endangered by German policies It offered hope to the “potential mi grants and political refugees” facing displacement in Eastern Europe, Spain, Italy, t he Soviet Union and the Near East. 129 Although the human tragedy that was playing out within Central Europe and other regions reflected the “moral deterioration of an era” the Evian Conference “projected a swift gleam on light across a desolate continent.” The establishment of the IGCR, with the support and leadership of the American Governme nt, symbolized hope as it represented the “first organizational united front of the democracies.” Success, however, in the long-term required German agreement to a llow 127 Minutes of Pincus Rutenberg and Ramsay MacDonald co nversations, October 5, 1938, Robert Szold Papers, Box 25, File 16, Zionist Archives, New York in Druks, The Uncertain Friendship 26. Rutenberg was a Russian who had served in the Tsarist army an d later was Chief of Police in the Kerensky Government. 128 The Times July 16, 1938, 13. 129 Foreign Policy Bulletin 37, July 22, 1938, 1-2.

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289 refugees to retain sufficient resources to aid their resettlement. The Conference marked the beginning of “active aid” to the stateless refugees; assistance tha t was expected to continue and grow. 130 Henri Brenger, the French representative to Evian and the IGCR foresaw a “happy augury for the future,” claiming that the United States had agreed to pa rticipate for the first time in “intergovernmental action” outside of its own borders. 131 He ignored previous American involvement in the Washington Naval Conferences, Kellogg-Briand Pact and cooperation with the International Red Cross and the International Labor Organization. British Viscount Samuel believed that the primary importance of t he Evian Conference had been its demonstration that the problem of Central European refugees was not merely an internal domestic problem for Germany but posed a threat to al l countries that would be impacted by an impoverished “flood of humanity.” The creation of the IGCR was a “wise conclusion” of the Conference but its success depended upon adequate funding for resettlement; monies that had to be released by the German 130 The Nation July 23, 1938, 79. 131 Time July 25, 1938. Although later redacted from the of ficial record Brenger stated: “Perhaps I ought to whisper it but it is a fact that for the f irst time, the United States of America has agreed to participate in intergovernmental action for a work which reaches beyond the confines of its own countr y. I see in this a happy augury for the future.” The Time article took a more pessimistic view of the Evian Conference: “At Evian last week the British slamme d the door of Palestine against any larger admissio ns of Jewish refugees, intimated cautiously that a few might be welcomed in Kenya, ‘but no mass migration .’ Definitely the Evian Conference failed to discover any lands willing at this moment to accept the bulk of Europe’s frantic, hard-pressed political refuges, a lthough Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Mexico and Canada opened the door to refugee agricultural workers. T he face-saving Refugee Organization created last we ek seemed destined to engage in endless bickering with Germany, chiefly on the issue of whether or not expelled Jews ought to be permitted to take most of their property with them when forced to emigrate. At present, under various pretexts, they are plucked p ractically as clean as dress fowl before they are l et out of the Reich.”

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290 Government. 132 [See Appendix C for the formal statement released at end of the Evian Conference.] One Jewish editorialist commented that although the Evian Conference appeare d to be “doomed to failure” he optimistically believed that the “significance of t he parley itself and the broader picture obtained of the refugee problem [was] of inestima ble value. From this beginning (even though it may amount to a baby-step along a road which calls for giant strides) will of necessity come drastic changes in immigrat ion regulations.” 133 The Jewish Chronicle was bolstered by Taylor’s belief that the Conference represented only the beginning of a long process that would eventually provide positive results. The meeting got off to a “dismal start,” the paper believed, but ended with a “mood of qualified optimism.” 134 The National Zeitung declared that “active aid to the refugees has only just begun and will go ahead steadily” in close harmony with the “central t heme of the energetic speeches with which the French and British representatives close d the conference sessions.” 135 Rabbi Jonah B. Wise praised the initiative of Roosevelt and the chairmanship of Taylor for averting the “failure” that was predicted by “cynical observe rs.” The Conference marked the ascendency of the world’s democracies away from thei r policies of offering “humiliating deference to world tyrants.” The meeting was a “hi storic” occasion in which the threat against human rights by the “brutalitarian theory of 132 The Times July 28, 1938, 8. 133 “Are Refugees People?” The Southern Israelite July 15, 1938, 2. 134 “The Refugees: Evian ‘Only A Beginning,’” The Jewish Chronicle July 22, 1938 available from ; accessed October 10, 2009. 135 National Zeitung (Basel), 1938 cited in Katz, “Public Opinion,” 123.

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291 government” was faced with the United States offering “manna from heaven ” to the global democracies. The conference, Wise believed, “served principally to sound a not e of humanity and protest” against the political and racial policies of dictatori al regimes. “It was remarkable” that thirty two countries “practically agre ed that the [refugee] problem was one of humanity and not the concern of a few groups of people.” 136 The Rabbi’s optimistic opinion was not shared, however, by all in the Jewish press who recognized that Central European Jewry had been effectively abandoned by those who walked the halls of power. The Evian Conference effectively buried the hopes of thousands upon thousands of unh appy victims of totalitarianism. There was no obituary for the ill -fated parley, no taps sounded at dusk. The press for the most part maint ained a stoical silence. Only the refugees who for a day saw the b right bubble of hope in intergovernmental action mourned the death of de mocracy’s first significant effort in behalf of disfranchised human ity. Their heads bowed in despair, they marched in spirit behind the somber bier of the conference. A world that had failed to hear their cries of pain could not bear their funeral lamentations… …The fact remains that the Evian Conference was a cr ashing failure, as final in its failure as the Disarmament Conference, the Conference to end Japan’s dismemberment of China…and most other in ternational parleys. Thirty-two nations came together, it is t rue, but how many could have refused the invitation of a democracy as powerful as America? That these nations were for the most part more interested in running the gamut of amenities with other countries than in opening their doors to refugees was demonstrated clearly en ough during the sessions at Evian. The presence of delegates from countries anxious to dump surplus Jewish populations upon the Conference ’s lap scarcely gave the proceedings an air of success…. Sifted down, there is little left that is valid but the moral tone of the Conference and the fact that machinery has been set in order for a permanent refugee committee. It is all very well for Dr. Wise to wax optimistic over the Conference but to call it a success is like putting rouge on a corpse. It is small comfort to the thousands whose hopes were dashed by the Conference to be told that is moral tone was important. Nor w ill the totalitarian states be greatly moved by the moral implications o r be greatly alarmed by the proposed August session in London… There are times which call for more realistic appro aches to world problems than Dr. Wise’s Pollyanna utterances in re gard to the Evian Conference. Better to look the failure boldly in the face in order to 136 “Evian Conference Hailed by J.B. Wise,” New York Times July 24, 1938, 19.

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292 determine a course of action than to confuse the vi tal problem of refugee settlement with saccharine sentiment. 137 The futility and hypocrisy of the Evian Conference was, however, readily recognized by the German Government and press and would play a significant role in future events. Failure of the Evian Conference and the reluctance of countries of potential refuge to accept increased numbers of refugees reinforced Germ any’s belief that international pressure would not be applied to force changes in Nazi policies. Dr. Alfr ed Rosenberg warned that the Jewish Question was not limited to the confines of Greater Germany “for what broke out in Germany stands before the doors of a few other countries and whether the solution can be restrained as it was in Germany is very questionable.” He believed that Madagascar represented a suitable destina tion due to its size, climate and French suzerainty since it was France that had begun “the emancipation of the Jews and still does everything for them today.” 138 The major result of the Evian Conference, Rosenberg believed, was the creation of a “mammoth executive” base d in London that had “failed to make any positive proposition.” The supposedly sympathetic democracies had “shed many tears over Jewish misery” in Greater Germa ny but had failed to offer any “radical cure” for the problem. Consequently, an area la rge and isolated enough to house all of the world’s Jewish population, subsidized by “Jewish millionaires and billionaires” and placed under the authority of “administrators trained in police work,” would provide a solution to the international dilemma rather than engagi ng 137 “Lament for the Dead,” The Southern Israelite July 29, 1938, 2. 138 “Nazi Leader Warns Nation,” New York Times July 8, 1938, 7.

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293 in the “political baiting and economic boycott against Germany.” 139 Jews should be resettled not in their own State, such as Palestine, but rather in a “Jewish Re serve.” 140 Hitler remarked that he expected and hoped that the Western democracies that held “such deep sympathy for these criminals will at least be generous e nough to convert this sympathy into practical aid” and offered to place “all these crimina ls at the disposal of other countries…even on luxury ships.” 141 He criticized the West for its complaint of the “boundless cruelty” of German anti-Jewish policies and noted their failure to offer “helpful activity…[O]n the contrary, these countries with icy coldness assure d us that obviously there was no place for Jews in their territory…So no help is given, but moral ity is saved.” 142 Das Schwarze Korps the official organ of the S.S., noted that the Reich a offered to the world a “well assorted stock of Jewish lawyers, well-preserve d and well rested women doctors, specialists for skin and social disease” and a “conside rable rebate” for Jewish business owners, wholesalers and salesmen. 143 The S. D. analyzed the events and accomplishments of the Evian Conference. The text of the final resolution establishing the London based committee demonstrat ed that a “practical and concrete” solution to the Jewish Question was “not possible” a t that time. The statements and qualifications offered by the various delegates conf irmed that 139 International Military Tribunal vol. XLI (Exhibit Streicher-8), 545-7 cited in Tene nbaum, Race and Reich 240-241. 140 Gerard Reitlinger, The Final Solution: The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe 1939-1945 (NY: Beechhurst Press, 1953), 21-22 141 “Hitler is Pleased to Get Rid of Foes,” New York Times March 27, 1938, 25. 142 Lyn H. Harper, ed. The Speeches of Adolf Hitler April 1922-August 1939 (Oxford: Oxford Press, 1942), 719-720. 143 Time April 4, 1938, 11-12.

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294 German “initiative” no longer determined foreign emigration policies becaus e there existed among the attendees an “extensive aversion” to admit Jewish refugees either due to “social considerations” or reflective of an “unexpressed racial abhorren ce.” Future German emigration policies were now greatly influenced by the actions of the IGCR but since the Reich rejected any outside interference in domestic internal af fairs and had already refused to allow Jews to increase the amount of capital removed f rom the country it was to be expected that over time the rate and numbers of Jews emigrating from Germany would progressively diminish. Thus, until the IGCR was operative it was “urgent” for the Government to persuade “as many Jews to emigrate under exis ting conditions.” However, it was crucial that sufficient foreign currency be provided t o facilitate this migration. 144 Germany could not believe and mocked FDR’s “appeal to the nature of the world as long as the United States maintains racial quotas for immigrants.” 145 “We see that one likes to pity the Jews as long as one can use this pity for a wicked agi tation against Germany, but that no state is prepared to fight the cultural disgrace of c entral Europe by accepting a few thousand Jews. Thus, the conference serves to justify Germany’s policy against Jewry.” 146 “It appears astounding that these countries seem in no way particularly anxious to make use of this element themselves, now that the 144 “The SD on the Outcome of the Evian Conference Repo rt of SD II 112” Yad Vashem Archive, 0.51/OSO/37 Berlin, July 29, 1938 available from %20-%203528.pdf ; accessed June 5, 2010. 145 Volkischer Beobachter April 26, 1938. 146 Danziger Vorposten cited in Perl, Holocaust Conspiracy 41.

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295 opportunity offers.” 147 “Aside from the purely administrative creation of a committee that will maintain contact between the interested governments…the results of this c onference are very meager.” 148 “If the Jews of Germany are so dear to their hearts, they can certainly have them.” 149 It was considered remarkable that the Australian delegate, Minister for Trade and Customs, Thomas White, feared that Jewish immigrati on would “endanger his own race.” 150 The Conference’s primary purpose was to garner votes for Roosevelt in the upcoming national elections and to generate “anti-Fascist currents” and anti-German propaganda. 151 The Berlin Der Weltkampf noted in 1939 that Germany openly admitted that it did not want any Jews to reside within its borders while the democratic nations continued to maintain that they were “willing to receive them—then leave the guest out in the cold. Aren’t we savages better men after all?” 152 Ominously and reflective of a hardening Nazi policy towards its Jews, Das Schwarze Korps called for the economic dislocation and ghettoization of Jews within Germany. Destitute Jews, confined to limited living space, would consequently pose a 147 Diplomatische Politische Korrespondenz cited in “Germans Belittle Results,” New York Times July 13, 1938, 12. 148 “No One Wants to Have Them,” Voelkischer Beobachter July 13, 1938 available from st/evian2.html ; Internet; accessed June 24, 2008. 149 Muncher Nachrichten in Alfred A. Hsler, The Lifeboat is Full (NY: Funk & Wagnalls, 1969), 28-29 cited in Abraham J. and Hershel Edelheit, History of the Holocaust: A Handbook and Dictionary (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 129. 150 Heinz Boberach, ed., Meldungen aus dem Reich: Die geheimen Lageberichte des Sicherheitsdientses der SS 1938-1945 vol. 2 (Herrsching, 1984), 23 cited in Friedlnde r, Nazi Germany and the Jews vol. 1, 219. 151 Der Angriff cited in the Washington Post July 15, 1938, 16. Der Angriff ( The Attack ) was a NSDAP Berlin newspaper established by the future Minister of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, in 1927. 152 Der Weltkampf cited in Ninette Kelly and Michael J. Trebilcock, The Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian Immigration Policy (London, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 200 0), 252.

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296 risk of bolshevism or of becoming an underworld of “politico-criminal subhumans”; a possibility that the Reich would not tolerate. Thus, the Government would be forced to deal with the Jewish criminal element in the same manner in which “we exter minate criminals generally—by fire and sword.” 153 The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed its diplomats abroad that the emigration of one hundred thousand Jews had fostered anti-Jewish sentiments in other countries. Continued forced deportations, especially of impoverished Jews, would increase the resistance of the citiz ens of receiving nations to further acceptance of Jews and would, therefore, provide sy mpathy and support for official German anti-Semitic actions. 154 The failure of the Evian Conference thus marked a significant turning point i n the fate of Central European Jewry. Following the closure of the Conference Y ugoslavia and Hungary closed its borders to Jewish refugees and Italy announced its own prog ram of anti-Semitic decrees. Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium also bolst ered security along its borders as well. 155 Yitzhak Arad maintained that the failure of the Conference placed the fate of German and Austrian Jews “completely in the hands” of the Nazi regime; a fai lure that was fully utilized for the use of anti-Jewish and anti-democratic propaganda and justification for more radical measures. It was not a coincidence, Arad and ot hers believed that Kristallnacht (and the tragedy of the S.S. St. Louis ) occurred a few months 153 Otto D. Tolischus, “Fire and Sword New Nazi Threat, ” New York Times November 23, 1938, 1, 8. 154 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Offic e, 1946) Vol. 6, 87ff in Ervin Straub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and othe r Group Violence (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 155-156. 155 Marrus, The Unwanted 169.

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297 later. 156 Skran asserted that the Anschluss coupled with the failure of the Evian Conference and the November 1938 pogrom transformed a “manageable refugee flow into an uncontrollable flood”; a situation worsened by the expropriatory practice s of the Nazis conjoined with rising nationalism and increasingly restrictive immigr ation policies within many Continental powers. 157 Expressions of international sympathy without meaningful actions demonstrated to the Nazi leadership that Western rhetoric woul d not interfere with the German handling of the Jewish Question. Prior to Evian Jews fac ed increasing levels of discrimination and economic and civil disenfranchisem ents but the post-Evian period was marked by mass deportations, forced relocations and wide-r anging pogroms on a nationwide scale. The Nazis realized that little interference could be expected from the democratic nations in their drive to make Greater Germany jdenrein The Reich Government was determined to become free of its internal Jewish menace but its conflicting policies of forced emigration coupled with economic marginalization raised formidable and often insurmountable obstacles to over seas resettlement. Lack of meaningful cooperation with the newly created Inte rgovernmental Committee for Political Refugees aggravated the situation. Thus, the Sicherheitsdienst or Security Service noted that the current rate of Jewish emigration would prevent rapid resolution of the Jewish Question. 158 Consequently, a more radical and aggressive policy 156 Yitzhak Arad, Reuven Dafni, Gideon Greif and Yehudi t Levin, eds., The Pictorial History of the Holocaust (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1990), 314. 157 Skran, Refugees in Inter-War Europe 53. 158 Karl A. Schleues, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz: Nazi Policy toward G erman Jews, 1933-1939 (Urbana, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1970), 65

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298 would be required. Following Evian greater legal and social proscriptions were e nacted against the Jews coupled with increasingly dire threats. Hitler advised the Czech Foreign Minister on January 21, 1939, that the “Jews among us will be annihilated. “The Jews had not carried out 9 th November 1938 [assassination of a German diplomat in Paris that precipitated Kristallnacht ] in vain; this day will be avenged.” 159 Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, in “The Jewish Question as a Factor of Foreign Policy in 1938,” declared that a more radical approa ch must be taken against German Jews. The greater the destitution the “more burdensom e” forced migrants will become to a host country. Consequently, domestic anti-Semit ism will be promoted; a measure that would benefit the “propaganda interests” of the Reic h. Germany recognized that “the emigration problem is…for all practical purpos es insoluble.” Nevertheless, the German Government would “take the initiative” and ut ilize whatever “measures” were necessary to resolve the problem and rid itsel f of the unwanted Jews. However, and most importantly, “for Germany, the Jewish question will not have found its final solution [author’s italics] even when the last Jews will have left Germany.” 160 The Fuehrer expanded on these threats, raising the specter of exterminat ion in an address to the Reichstag on January 30, 1939; a speech that was widely carried in the international press that offered both the carrot and the stick: 159 “ Aufzeichnung des Legationstats Hewel ,” January 21, 1939 in James Marshall-Cornwell et a l, eds., Akten zur deutschen auswrtigen Amtes (Baden-Baden, 1051-95), Series D. IV, 167-71cited in Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich in Power 1933-1939 (NY: Penguin Press, 2005), 604. 160 Circular letter of the German Foreign Office to Ger man representatives abroad, dated January 25, 1939 cited in Tenenbaum, Race and Reich 224.

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299 …Should not the outside world be most grateful to us for setting free these glorious bearers of culture and placing them at its disposal? In accordance with its own statements, how is the outs ide world to justify its refusal to grant refuge in its various countrie s to these most valuable members of the human race? For how will it rationalize imposing the members of this race on the Germans of all people? How will the states so infa tuated with these “splendid people” explain why they are suddenly tak ing refuge in all sorts of pretenses just in order to deny asylum to these people? I believe the earlier this problem is resolved, the better. For Europe cannot find peace before it has dealt properly with the Jewish question. It is possible that the necessity of resolving this problem sooner or later should bring about agreement in Europe…There is more than enough room for settlement on this earth…. I have a prophet very often in my lifetime, and thi s earned me mostly ridicule. In the time of my struggle for power, it was primarily the Jewish people who mocked by prophecy that one day I would assume leadership of this Germany, of this state, and of t he entire Volk, and that I would press for a resolution of the Jewish q uestion. The resounding laughter of the Jews in Germany then may well stick in their throats today, I suspect. Once again I will be a prophet: should the internat ional Jewry of finance succeed, both within and beyond Europe, in plunging mankind into yet another world war, then the result will no t be a Bolshevization of the earth and the victory of Jewry, but the anni hilation ( Vernichtung ) of the Jewish race in Europe. 161 Following confirmation of the reports of mass murder coming out of occupied Europe Freda Kirchey, editor and publisher of The Nation criticized the inaction of the democracies that had led to such destruction. “If we had behaved like humane and generous people instead of complacent, cowardly ones,” she claimed, “the two mill ion Jews living today in the earth of Poland and Hitler’s other crowded graveyards would be alive and safe…We had it in our power to rescue this doomed people and we did not lift a hand to do it—or perhaps would be fairer to say that we lifted just one cautious hand, 161 Max Domarus, Patrick Romane, ed., The Essential Hitler Speeches and Commentary (Wauconda, IL: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, Inc., 2007), 398-399.

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300 encased in a tight-fitting glove of quotas and visas and affidavits, and a thick lay er of prejudice.” Immigration quotas could have been suspended for the duration of the Hitler regime. Enough funds could have been raised to provide for the destitute refugee car ried by foreign ships to distant shores. The solemn “resolutions” of the Evian Conference could have become a “reality instead of a hollow gesture.” International acc ords could have been reached enabling the absorption of forced migrs based on the respective “size and wealth” of recipient nations. If the United States had shown the way t hen it was highly likely that “no nation would have refused its cooperation. But nothing was done…” 162 162 Freda Kirchey, “While the Jews Die,” The Nation March 13, 1943, 366-367.

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301 Chapter 12 Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees “Face Saving Organization” The sole accomplishment of the Evian Conference was the creation of the London-based Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees Coming from Germany. The IGCR differed from earlier refugee organizations in that it enjoyed greater support from the United States Government and it represented the “first all-democ racy world body ever established.” Its full time director was to be an “eminent A merican” endowed with a greater range of authority and a “freer hand” than had been granted the League’s High Commissioner for Refugees. Countries that created refuge es were excluded from membership. Additionally, at least in the American view, it would off er the opportunity to deal with other groups of refugees. It would consist of a chairman, four vice-chairmen and a director (Winterton as chairman; Taylor as vice-chair ). The IGCR, like its League predecessor, pursued a limited mission: to persuade nati ons to offer realistic opportunities for permanent resettlement and to negotiate wi th and convince the German Government involuntary refugees should be allowed to retain sufficient financial assets to reestablish themselves in a new life. 1 Committee members would be drawn from the United States, United Kingdom, France, Argentina and Brazil 1 Marrus. The Unwanted 171, 182. The League never engaged in negotiatio ns with the Reich leadership.

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302 coupled with the possibility of establishing satellite offices in European c apitals. 2 The chosen director was seventy-year old attorney George Rublee, a Roosevelt friend a nd former classmate at Groton Academy. However, with little funding and authorit y its list of accomplishments by the outbreak of war on September 1, 1939 was minimal. 3 [Appendix F demonstrates the limited finances available to the IGCR and the all ocation of expenses among member nations.] Its first meeting was scheduled for Augus t 3. The Americans preferred that this permanent committee be based in Paris but official French opposition led to its location in the United Kingdom. The French Foreig n Ministry feared that the committee’s refugee operations, based in the capit al, would result in the proliferation of “every ethnic, religious, or political organization that concerns itself with every minority and political opposition group.” Governmental attempts to eradicate the “activities of irresponsible foreign bodies” within France would “thus be annihilated.” Furthermore, involvement with the problem of German and Austrian refugees would complicate French foreign affairs and policies. The Ministr y asked if it was in the interest of the Republic to assume the role of refuge for “all the mi sfits” and people whom “Germany considers its natural enemy.” Such humanitarianism could permanently create an air of “cultural and racial antagonism” between the two neighbors. 4 2 Clarence K. Streit, “Refugee Meeting Adopts Resolu tion,” New York Times July 15, 1938, 7; St. Petersburg Times July 9, 1938. 3 By August 1939, on the brink of the Polish-German war, the IGCR possessed a total bank balance of $9,672. Sean Malloy and Doug Lorimer, eds., The Palestinian Struggle, Zionism and Anti-Semitism (Chippendale, NSW, Australia: Resistance Books, 200 2), 42. 4 Foreign Ministry Report, “Programme de la reunion du Comit Intergouvernemental d’Evian,” June 24, 1938, MAE SDN I M 1815, 211-218, Foreign Minist ry, “Note pour le Ministre,” June 29, 1938, MAE SDN I M 1815, 253-58 cited in Caron, Uneasy Asylum 186.

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303 This committee was to operate separately from the League of Nations Hi gh Commission for Refugees from Germany with which the German Government refus ed to cooperate and did not recognize. Both the Nansen Office headed by Judge Michael Hansson and the League Commission for Refugees led by Sir Neill Malcolm wer e due to be closed in December 1938 and it was anticipated that the League Assembly, schedul ed to meet in September, would combine the two offices under a new High Commissioner. 5 The French Foreign Minister, George Bonnet, held a meeting with his German counterpart, Joachim von Ribbentrop [duly reported to Hitler] on December 7, 1938, in which Bonnet stated that France did not want to receive any more German Jews. He called upon the Reich to “take some sort of measures” to prevent further entry of involuntary migrs into the Third Republic. Additionally, the Government sought to ship ten thousand Jews already residing within France to other locations such as the island of Madagascar off the east coast of Africa. Ribbentrop replied to Bonne t that Germany also desired to be rid of its Jews but the problem “lay in the fact that no country wished to receive them.” 6 Bonnet assured Ribbentrop that France had no desire to interfere with the internal affairs of Germany but the forced expulsion of Jew s and nonAryans, stripped of sufficient financial assets to reestablish themselves was adversely affecting the willingness of countries of potential resettlement to acce pt refugees who most likely would become public charges. The Reich Foreign Minister did agree, however, that a German knowledgeable about the Jewish Question in Germany could 5 The Times July 14, 1938, 16. 6 Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), Series D, IV, 451-452.

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304 meet in an unofficial capacity with a representative of the IGCR to stud y the issue of Jewish resettlement. 7 Critics of the IGCR viewed it as a “face-saving refugee organization” that would be relegated to “endless bickering” with member States and with the Germa n Government, especially over the issue of the retention of personal property and as sets. Currently, the forced migrs were “plucked practically as clean as dr essed fowl” before being allowed to leave Greater Germany. 8 Following the conclusion of the Evian Conference Taylor did suggest to Secretary Hull that the United States openly proclaim its willingness to a ccept a significant proportion of the six hundred thousand Germans and Austrians who were expected to become involuntary migrants within the next five years. Without such a declaration, Taylor warned, the “other countries of settlement will clai m that they are not obligated to commit themselves and we shall have no plan to present to the German Government.” Hull was faced with two possible dilemmas: such an American invi tation could prove too successful and incur the wrath of an increasingly restrictionist Cong ress that could interfere with other items on FDR’s political agenda. In addition, rela xation of immigration barriers could incite large-scale forced emigration from the East. Hull 7 “Memorandum by the Foreign Minister” to Hitler, RM 266, Paris, doc. 372, December 9, 1938, DGFP, series D, vol. 4, 481-482 cited in Caron, Uneasy Asylum 487. Ribbentrop did express to Bonnet that German Jews were “without exception pickpockets, mu rderers and thieves. The property they possessed had been acquired illegally. The German Government had therefore decided to assimilate them with the criminal elements of the population.” Their “illeg ally” obtained property would be seized by the Stat e and Jews would be isolated in ghettoes “frequented by t he criminal classes” and be subject to “policeobservation like other criminals.” The Reich could not prevent “these criminals [from escaping] to ot her countries which seemed so anxious to have them.” H owever, they would be prevented from retaining “the property which had resulted from their illegal oper ations…” Documents on German Foreign Policy (DGFP) D/IV, No. 372 cited in Michael Bloch, Ribbentrop (NY: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1992), 206. 8 Time July 25, 1938.

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305 advised the U.S. Ambassador to Poland that American “efforts on behalf of German refugees” must not promote the persecution and expulsion of the “unwanted sections” of other national groups and the “dumping of these people into the hands of international charity.” 9 Dr. Nahum Goldmann viewed this new standing committee as potentially useful if the British would allow increased immigration into Palestine. Therefore, he concluded, the continuity of a close working relationship was a critical task for Jewi sh organizations. 10 Likewise, Dr. Arthur Ruppin believed that the creation of the IGCR was a “positive” step provided the London-based international committee was “blessed w ith a gifted director.” 11 Zalman Rubashov, a correspondent for Davar attending the Evian Conference, commended both the United States and France for creating a “thir d way” that would permit negotiations between the Reich and Jews that would ultimately be nefit Zionist goals. 12 The Zionist leadership, however, was not interested in rescuing Jewish refugees if it was not tied to increased immigration into Palestine. Wit hout such a connection “all Zionists wanted was to shrug off the entire matter with all pos sible speed.” 13 The French under Brenger, during the August 3, 1938 meeting in London, continued to maintain that France had “reached the saturation point” vis--vis 9 Thomas Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People ( Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1980), 708 cited in Frank W. Brecher, Reluctant Ally: United States Foreign Policy toward the Jews from Wilson to Roosevelt (NY: Greenwood Press, 1991), 63. 10 CZA, File S25/9778 cited in Beit-Zvi, “Post-Holoca ust Zionism,” 151. 11 A. Ruppin, Chapters of My Life, 303. Ibid., 152. 12 “Listener,” Davar, July 22, 1938. Ibid., 152. 13 Ibid., 152.

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306 immigration and any further admittance of refugees would result in a “rupture to the equilibrium of her social body… The absorptive capabilities of every people has a limit. This limit has long been exceeded in France. She said so at Evian; she repeats it in London.” 14 Two years prior to the accession of Hitler to power the Weimar Government enacted an emigration tax in an attempt to limit removal of foreign currency In 1933 emigrants from Germany retained seventy five percent of the value of their assets. This percentage was later decreased to fifteen percent and by 1938 it was reduced to fi ve percent; a policy that severely impacted on the willingness of potential rec eiving nations to accept penniless refugees. German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop war ned that the refugee problem was an “internal German problem that was not subject t o discussion.” The release of adequate amounts of Jewish monies “could not be expected of Germany” and any cooperation with the Evian conferees “was out of the question for Germany.” Permanent Foreign Secretary Baron Ernst von Weizscker infor med Ribbentrop that both the American and British Ambassadors were seeking a meeting of George Rublee with German officials. Such an appointment was necessary if the IGCR was to “prove its worth.” Germany would undoubtedly be requested to released increased amounts of foreign currency and personal assets; an action that “for obvi ous reasons” the Reich cannot provide. Such a refusal on the German side would provide an opportunity for adverse Western propaganda, namely, that it was “German obstinacy ” 14 “ Au Comit Intergouvernemental des rfugis ,” Le Temps August 4, 1938, 5 cited in Caron, Uneasy Asylum 186.

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307 that was the genesis of the “misery of the Jews.” Thus, Rublee could not be allowed t o travel to Berlin merely for the prospect of “making Germany the scapegoat .” 15 Eventually it was the foreign economic concerns arising in the wake of Kristallnacht that led Hermann Goering, the director of the Four Year Plan, to convince Hitler to authorize Hjalmar Schacht, the President of the Reichsbank to meet in London with Rublee, Lord Bearsted and Lord Winterton. The plan offered by Schacht calle d for the freezing of Jewish assets within Germany as security for an internat ional loan that would be called due in twenty to twenty five years. Jewish monies would be held in blocked accounts within Germany out of which twenty five percent would be recoverable by Jews via the purchase and foreign sale of German export goods (with the balance seized by the German Government). The plan favored one hundred fifty thousand men and women, between fifteen and forty five years of age, who were able to work to support themselves and two hundred fifty thousand dependents. The two hundred thousand elderly (those over forty five) and those too infirm to migrate would be maintained by communal funds and would live undisturbed unless another assassination of a Nazi was carried out by a Jew. 16 Jewish holdings were estimated to have a value of at least 1.5 billion Reichmarks that could be utilized to generate enough foreign currency to fund an orderly migration over the course of three to five years. Emigration of wag e earners would be diffused over three to five years and dependents would be allowed to emigrate when assured of support abroad. A German official would coordinate 15 Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, 3496/EO19935-36, Circular of the State Secretary Berlin, July 8, 1938, 83-29 8/7 No. 640; Case XI, N G 1522-23 cited in Reitlinger, The Final Solution 19. 16 See Table 6 for breakdown of Jewish population demo graphics as of January 1, 1938.

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308 resettlement with Jewish relief and communal organizations aided by refuge e experts. Passport and identity papers would be provided, training facilities would be establis hed within Germany and concentration camp inmates would be released once emigration began. Schacht, on his return to Germany met with Hitler on January 2, 1939, and was appointed special representative for Jewish emigration. The Foreign Office wa s ordered to end its opposition to the IGCR and negotiations were transferred to Berlin. The IGCR still faced the difficulties of finding places of final resettlement a nd private sources for the short term costs of migration. Schacht’s discharge from his post, following an argument with Hitler on January 20, temporarily ended any possibility of negotiat ions but contact with Rublee was resumed by Helmuth Wohlthat, the director of Foreign Cr edits Control Office. Negotiations foundered, however, on the issue of Jewish assets. Hitl er ultimately allowed resumption of talks which resulted in an economic arrangeme nt similar in many respects to the earlier Ha’avarah plan which coupled German exports with sufficient assets to facilitate emigration to Palestine. Although the Rublee-Schacht and Rublee-Wohlthat plans were viewed by some as a form of blackmail that would lead to the impoverishment of German Jewry (and perhaps similar demands and actions on the part of Poland, Rumanian and Hungary) the IGCR feared outright refusal would convince the German Government that solution of the Jewish Question could not be solved via international agreement but would require more stringent solutions. 17 Under-Secretary Sumner Welles criticized the plan as a form 17 Eric Estorick, “The Evian Conference and the Interg overnmental Committee,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science vol. 203, Refugees (May, 1939): 139-141.

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309 of extortion: Germany expected “the world to pay a ransom for the release of hostages” while trading “human misery for increased exports.” 18 Rublee was advised by the State Department that such an agreement could threaten American foreign trade a nd markets and it was averse to any linkage of the financing of Jewish resettlement w ith increased sales of German products. Welles warned, however, that rejection of the deal could provoke further anti-Jewish violence. He favored the creation of a private economic foundation under the rubric of the London based IGCR. The frozen assets of the migrs would be used to purchase German goods needed to foster and support resettlement as well as for the care and maintenance of Jews who had to remain in the Reich. The Under-Secretary believed that this arrangement would be more beneficial to G ermany than the Rublee-Schacht plan. 19 George Messersmith opposed the linkage of population transfer and German trade. Acceptance of such an “insidious doctrine” of a “lim ited trade agreement” with the Reich would not “help the conservative elements [or] im prove the prospects for a more reasonable regime.” 20 18 FRUS vol. 1, 1938, 876-877 cited in Spear, “The United States and the Persecution of Jews,” 234. Some of the Jewish press supported the payment of r ansom regardless of its questionable morality. “Th ere is little doubt [based on earlier arrangements with and proposals from the Reich] that today a ransom of sufficient financial persuasion” would result in Je ws being allowed to retain a greater percentage of their assets. “We favor such a ransom scheme, though we are aware that world opinion is strongly against it That opinion holds that to ransom the refugees by g ranting Germany monetary or trade favors is to endo rse her totalitarian policy.” However, in reality, the positions adopted by the Democracies vis--vis Ger many had “from the beginning of National Socialism…been a n endorsement and that as long as ‘human dumping’ remains Germany’s policy and as long as ot her nations are compelled to give haven to the homeless and disfranchised, that endorsement contin ues to be articulated…” “The Kidnapper Wants Ransom,” The Southern Israelite August 12, 1938, 6. 19 Spear, “The United States and the Persecution of Ge rman Jews,” 234. 20 Hull to Joseph P. Kennedy (Messersmith to Rublee), September1 9, 1938, FRUS, vol. 1 (1938), 78890; Messersmith to Daniel N. Heineman, November 7, 1938, Messersmith Papers, 1938, box 1, folder E cited in Shlomo Shafir, “George S. Messersmith: An Anti-Nazi Diplomat’s View of the German-Jewish Crisis,” Jewish Social Studies 35 no. 1 (January, 1973): 40.

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310 The IGCR accepted the Schacht plan on December 28, 1938 as a starting point for further negotiations by Rublee in Berlin. The Committee announced on Februar y 14 that an agreement had been reached based on Schacht’s scheme but it eliminated the conflation of a Jewish loan and increased German export trade. Instead, twenty fi ve percent of Jewish wealth within Germany would be utilized to create a trust t o fund transportation and the purchase of necessary supplies and equipment from Germany. T he expense of ultimate resettlement would be provided by a private foundation as envisi oned by Welles. The German Government agreed to establish training centers for t he first wave of emigrants and to grant the right to work to those remaining behind. The implementation of this plan was, from the Reich’s view, contingent on the agreement of other nations to provide havens of resettlement. The IGCR officially signed off on Germany’s demands on March 1, 1939. 21 In the end, resistance of the harder line Nazis and the reluctance of the democratic nations to open their borders to involuntary refugees prevented implementation of such a project and helped to set the stage for the November 1938 pogrom, Kristallnacht The advent of war effectively ended any chance of large-scale migration. Schacht did claim during the International Military Tribunal in Nur emberg that if his plan had been adopted by December 1938 (while it had Hitler’s support) then “not a single German Jew would have lost his life.” 22 21 Spear, “The U.S. and the Persecution of German Jew s,” 234-235; Ferdinand Kuhn, “Orderly Migration of Germany’s Jews Envisaged in Plan,” New York Times February 14, 1939, 1, 12. 22 International Military Tribunal, XXII, 395 (Final S peech, Schacht) cited in Reitlinger, The Final Solution 20.

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311 Ultimately, the activities of the IGCR and its two directors, Rublee and his successor Sir Herbert Emerson, were relegated to the realm of “diplomatic representations” dealing with the permanent placement of refugees residing in t emporary havens. Limited public awareness of the “gravity” of the Jewish situation withi n territories controlled by Germany (before and after the start of hostil ities) and the outbreak of the war itself essentially ended any chance of achieving a r ealistic solution to the German and Austrian (and Czech) refugee crisis. 23 A fundamental question remains: was there any chance for success of the Evia n Conference and its offspring, the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees from Germany? Lord Winterton succinctly summarized the basic flaws of the meeting during a Parliamentary debate on April 6, 1939, but continued to avoid any linkage with Palestine: The whole Evian Committee without exception [was] n ot prepared to admit the principle that they are either under a mo ral obligation or that it is practically possible from the point of public support in their respective countries to admit financial liability f or the transfer and upkeep in the countries or for the permanent settle ment of refugees. Every one of these 32 Governments [was] faced with unemployment difficulties. Every one of them is frightened of t he possible growth of an anti-Semitic and anti-foreign feeling if it is f elt that more is being done for foreigners than for their own people. The re [was] no chance of getting an alteration in that principle. The last thing that would induce the Reich Governme nt to be reasonable about the amount of property taken by Je ws out of Germany would be for the Evian Governments to assume liabil ity for the transfer and maintenance of these people… 24 23 Jacques Vernant, The Refugee in the Post-War World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1953), 27. 21 Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates 345: 3082, 3084 cited in Hamerow, Why We Watched 110.

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312 PART IV APPRAISALS Chapter 13 “No Confidence in the Idea” “Strife and desolation and destruction are in thei r paths. They violate the boundaries of nations, and the way of peace they know not. They assault r eligion and set at naught ancient covenants of justice and right. Human brotherhood is become a m ockery, and there is neither truth, pity, nor freedom in the land.” 1 Conflicting appraisals of the response of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, his Administration, Congress, the American people and their foreign democratic counte rparts to the great European humanitarian crises of the 1930s and early 1940s have arisen i n the historiography of the Holocaust era. Director of the IGCR, George Rublee, rem ained highly skeptical of the Evian Conference’s chances for success. The meeting w as called for too quickly by Roosevelt with inadequate planning and most attendees “came reluctantly and with no confidence in the idea.” Taylor competently kept the delegations “together” while obtaining agreement to create a permanent bo dy “but that is all.” Rublee complained that the American Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Joseph P. Kennedy, appeared disinterested in the workings of the permanent committee and never offered “me any real support or assistance” while the President “was not seriously [personally] interested.” Rublee advised Hull that he believed Germany was w illing to 1 The Times July 18, 1938, 9. Special prayer offered by the Ch ief Rabbi of Britain, Dr. J. H. Hertz, describing the “spirit of perverseness” which had o vertaken Germany and its leadership.

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313 negotiate but the British and French, fearful of the IGCR’s success, were “re luctant” for him to hold discussions with the Germans. 2 The Conference did not get off to a “good start” due to the lack of the “fullest and most adequate preparation.” To enter into an international congress with the “hope” of achieving positive results represented the “best way of courting failure .” If the United States had presented concrete proposals, rather than highlighting an alread y existing immigration quota, then “some result might have been easily achieved.” It wa s the economic concerns and the fear of creating “anti-Jewish centers” among th eir respective populations that led the delegations and their governments to “hedge” their proposals while seeking the “absolute minimum of practical measures.” 3 The British consideration of Kenya and the establishment of the IGCR were viewed by some as insignific ant accomplishments when viewed in the context of an international conference in which t he “greater part of the non-Fascist world” was seated. Proper planning and consultat ion might have led the various powers to ponder the issue with greater clarity crea ting the potential for collective action. The Evian Conference was convened “too precipitous ly” and demonstrated that “good intentions are no substitute for well-laid plans.” 4 R.A. Butler, Parliamentary Undersecretary for the British Foreign Offic e, warned an interdepartmental meeting prior to the Conference that the “whole scheme woul d fall 2 George Rublee to Hand, August 29, 1938, HLS-Hand, box 107, folder 6; Rublee, “Reminiscences of George Rublee,” (NY: Columbia University Oral Histo ry Research Office, 1972) 284 cited in McClure, Earnest Endeavors 254; FRUS vol.11, 796-798. 3 “Evian Refugee Conference: Proposed London Commiss ion,” The Times July 9, 1938, 11. 4 “Home for Refugees,” The Glasgow Herald July 15, 1938, 32.

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314 through” due to lack of adequate funding. 5 Helen Fein had argued that the limitation of American action to the consolidation of the German and Austrian annual quotas implied that the Conference was a simple “exercise in Anglo-American col laborative hypocrisy.” 6 Harold Ginsburg, the representative of the Joint Distribution Committee noted, during a June 27, 1938 meeting of the Council for German Jewry, that conversations held with members of the American delegation to the Evian Conference led him to belie ve that the conferees themselves would determine both the goals of and the methodologies adopted by the meeting. The U.S. delegation preferred that sessions be held in privat e, while seeking “unofficial agreements” that would avoid contentious subjects such as the Jewish problem in Eastern Europe. Dr. Jonas Wise noted that the Presidential Advisory Committee for Political Refugees, established by Roosevelt, was constitut ed without a dialogue with relevant Jewish organizations. In addition, with the exception of Secr etary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau and Bernard Baruch, all of the original select ees were Christians. Consequently, to those who were monitoring the progress of the Conference it became readily apparent that “no constructive plan” had been formulated prior to the convening of the meeting and therefore, it represented “little more than a feeble improvisation.” 7 Ismar Elbogen and Moses Hadas viewed the Evian Conference as symbolic of the “complete hopelessness” of the democratic nations of Europe whose representat ives 5 “Record of Interdepartmental Meeting on June 30, 1 938,” PRO FO 371/22538, W8713/104/98, f. 281 cited in London, Whitehall 90. 6 Helen Fein, Accounting for Genocide (NY: The Free Press, 1979), 167. 7 Adler-Rudel, “The Evian Conference,” 240.

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315 were limited to “handsome speeches” but unable to devise any “constructive mea sures” providing the Nazis and their Fascist counterparts the opportunity to “gloat…over thei r fecklessness.” 8 Hannah Arendt concluded that it was “obvious” to the delegates at Evian that the entirety of German and Austrian Jewry were “potentially stateles s”; a conclusion that would be shared and acted upon by other nations seeking to “rid” themselves of unwanted minorities. 9 James MacGregor Burns perceived Roosevelt as a flawed individual afflicted by a “derangement of ends and means,” struggling to follow the proper moral course while seeking to retain and acquire pure political power. 10 Arthur Morse, David Wyman, Henry Feingold and Saul Friedman have argued that America, influenced by anti-Semitism, economic and social nativism, anti-alien and antiimmigrant prejudices, fear of the introduction of dangerous foreign ideologies, isolationism r esulting from the Great War and the effects of the Depression, had offered little more tha n public expressions of sympathy to the victims of Nazi persecution while maintaining ba rriers to immigration. The downward spiral of these persecuted minorities’ existenc e could potentially have been altered, they claimed, if the democratic nations of the world had reacted in a more positive, forceful and charitable manner. Instead the response w as muted, generally ineffectual and often contradictory. 11 8 Ismar Elbogen and Moses Hadas, A Century of Jewish Life (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1946), 662. 9 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism seventh edition (NY: Meridian Books, 1962), 282. 10 James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom (NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 609. 11 Arthur D. Morse. While Six Million Died A Chronicle of American Apat hy (NY: The Overlook Press, 1967); David Wyman, Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938-1 941 (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press); Saul Friedman, No Haven for the Oppressed: United States Policy Towards Jewish Refugees, 1938-1945 (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1973).

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316 Henry Feingold accused the Roosevelt Administration of “indifference and e ven complicity in the Final Solution.” 12 The State Department’s approach, Feingold claimed, was one of waiting while all would-be refugees “clamoring to come to the U.S. w ould be converted into silent corpses,” while at the same time rescue of European Jews was not a priority of their American co-religionists. 13 He also was critical of the American Jewish leadership believing that they operated under a critical delusion that there existed in the Gentile world “a spirit of civilization whose moral concern could be mobilized to save the Jews.” 14 However, it was important, he believed, to remain cognizant of the world view held by many Americans at the time; to evaluate Americans “as they w ere” rather than “how they should have been.” 15 Saul Friedman has condemned the Western Democracies for its “complicity” during the Holocaust while “perfidy ” and the “yoke of shame” have stained the accomplishments of FDR and his subordinates. 16 Herbert Druks accused both Roosevelt Administration and the British of engaging in policies that prevented rescue of endangered Jews and facilitate d their “slaughter” by the Germans and their accomplices. 17 Konnilyn Feig theorized that if the United States and the other democracies had maintained a “passive” attitude to wards German anti-Jewish policies then a greater number of Jews would have been rescued for 12 Feingold, Politics of Rescue x. 13 Ibid., 61, 166, 299, 300. 14 Henry L. Feingold, “Who Shall Bear Guilt for the Ho locaust: The Human Dilemma,” American Jewish History vol. 68 no. 3 (March: 1979): 279. 14 Henry L. Feingold, Bearing Witness How America and Its Jews Responded to the Holocaust (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 27 3. 16 Friedman, No Haven 7, 14, 231, 234. 17 Herbert Druks, The Failure to Rescue (NY: Robert Speller & Sons, 1977), 98.

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317 it was the formal discussion of altering national immigration quotas at Evian tha t doomed the conference to failure. 18 Similarly, Gil Loescher alleged that the discussion of the Jewish Question at the international level “reflected and subsequently streng thened the restrictive attitudes and policies” of government and the public. 19 Morty Penkower argued that nations outside of the German sphere of influence “abdicated [their] mor al responsibility” and became “accomplices” to ultimate genocide. 20 Michael Marrus believed that most of the representatives agreed with the “mean spirited” Cana dian Minister Frederick Blair that a line in the sand had to be drawn against any w eakening of national immigration restrictions. Such resilience would compel the Reich to “ solve their Jewish question internally.” 21 Jonathan D. Sarna portrayed the Roosevelt initiative as a “politics of gestures” introduced with an invitation that was designed to be “carefully hedged.” The overt refusal of the United States to expand its immigration allowance for Germa ny and Austria forecast the meeting’s failure. FDR and his Administration’s gr eat interest in colonization schemes in remote and underdeveloped sites (Philippine Islands, Brit ish Guiana, Alaska, Lower California, Angola, Ethiopia, Australia and the Domini can Republic) represented a hidden “form of group dissolution”; a project that was unlikely to generate much Jewish support or enthusiasm. Such proposals “served as psychological compensation for the inhospitality of the United States” and did receive support from 18 Konnilyn G. Feig, Hitler’s Death Camps: The Sanity of Madness (NY: Holmes & Meier, 1981), 412. 19 Gil Loescher, The UNHCR 32. 20 Monty Noam Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable: Free World Diplomacy and the Holocaust (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1988), vii. 21 Michael Marrus, The Unwanted 172.

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318 groups of middle-class Jews such as the American Jewish Congress and B’nai B’rith. B’nai B’rith in 1935, for example, had suggested Birobidzhan as a potential haven for Polish Jews. 22 The Jewish Labor Committee and the Workmen’s Circle, however, opposed such plans recognizing the intrinsic difficulties that stood in the way of the fruition of these schemes. Philosophically they believed in the inherent rights of Jew s to remain within the bounds of their native country and the right of free emigration to any destination including Palestine; rights that obviated the need for colonization. The Yiddishe Welt published in Cleveland on February 4, 1937, commented that many plans were being conceived for Jewish colonization. “All they amount to is a finger pointe d to a spot on the map. When, however, we say Palestine, that has a meaning and a certainty.” 23 British historian Martin Gilbert criticized the Evian Conference for a dopting a non-hostile “neutral stance” that, due to its ultimate failure, would “cost a m ultitude of lives.” 24 Rafael Medoff highlighted the failure of the American Jewish leadership, w ho were on “vacation” or “lunching at the regular hour at their favorite restaur ant,” instead of assuming a more proactive role. 25 He also believed that Roosevelt conceived the 22 Birobidzhan was an attempt to establish a semi-auto nomous socialist Jewish settlement in the Far East of the U.S.S.R. Henry Srebrnik, “Red Star over Biro bidzhan: Canadian Jewish Communists and the ‘Jewish Autonomous Region’ in the Soviet Union,” Labour 44 (Fall 1999): 129-147. 23 Jonathan D. Sarna, The American Jewish Experience (NY: Holmes & Meier, 1986), 245. 24 Martin Gilbert, The Holocaust: The Jewish Tragedy (London: Collins, 1986), 65. 25 Rafael Medoff, The Deafening Silence (NY: Shapolsky Publishers, 1988), 11, 12, 13, 154.

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319 summit as a means of deflecting any domestic call for action by preempti vely taking the “wind out of his critic’s sails.” 26 Yehuda Bauer contended that the President wanted to aid the refugees but at minimal cost to the United States: no financial expenditures and maintenance of the current quota system. He believed that an “alliance system,” composed of the dem ocratic nations, could successfully negotiate with Germany enabling refugees to r etain sufficient capital to facilitate their immigration and integration into new countries wi th more than eighty percent heading for destinations other than America. If successful in this endeavor the President would “score” points with domestic liberals, placate America n Jews and create a “united front” against the Reich on an issue that was very “sensitive .” The achievement of such a goal required the construction of a new international refuge e organization that was distinct from the ineffectual League of Nations. 27 Patrick Maney concluded that the chief characteristic of Roosevelt lay in his “extraordinary sunny disposition and abiding sense that all was right with the world.” His positive outlook helped to maintain the morale of his fellow Americans and the persecuted and dispossessed of humanity. However, he viewed such a character trai t as a “relatively unimportant leadership quality” out of touch with the gravity of gl obal problems. Luck played a role as seen in the consequences of the Pearl Harbor atta ck which provided the means for the United States to enter the war while simultaneousl y dealing the isolationist movement a decisive blow. Among the Presidents, Maney 26 Rafael Medoff, Jewish Americans and Political Participation: A Ref erence Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2002), 112. 27 Bauer, Jews for Sale? 30.

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320 concluded, FDR was not a “man for all seasons.” 28 Herbert Druks observed that Roosevelt had expressed his support for Zionism and the establishment of a Jewish Sta te within Palestine but did not actively proceed to achieve such a goal and failed to adequately aid and abet the resettlement of Jewish refugees “in Palesti ne or anywhere else.” His primary focus remained on “geopolitical” concerns rather than on “humanity.” 29 William Lasser regarded the Evian Conference as a mere “gesture” on the part of the Roosevelt Administration due to the nature of the terms framing the officia l invitation. The exclusion of German attendance prevented the development of an opportunity to conduct negotiations with the Nazi Government. 30 Debrah Dwork and Robert Jan van Pelt contended the Evian Conference was a political and public relati ons scheme designed to preserve America’s reputation as the refuge for the hopel ess and persecuted but without taking any constructive actions or bearing any cost. The refusal of FDR to call for changes in global immigration laws and the allocation of adequat e funds to facilitate emigration and resettlement doomed the conference to becomi ng a “dismal failure and a grave disappointment” that provided “tacit international approval” to keep the gates closed. 31 Michael Marrus claimed that the sympathetic but empty rhetoric expressed at the Evian Conference “simply underscored” the re luctance or outright refusal of the Western democracies to accept stateless Jews. Whi le delegate after 28 Patrick Maney, The Roosevelt Presence (New York: Twayne, 1992), 1, 139, 203. 29 Druks, The Uncertain Friendship vii 30 William Lasser. Benjamin V. Cohen: Architect of the New Deal (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 2002), 203. 31 Debrah Dwork and Robert Jan van Pelt, Holocaust: A History 124.

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321 delegate rationalized why his nation could not act they simultaneously “congratul a[ted] themselves on how much had already been accomplished for refugees.” 32 Thomas C. Howard and William D. Pederson regarded it as “astonishing” that Roosevelt called for a refugee conference as legislative limits made t he Administration “virtually powerless to act.” The United States’ sole contribution was to combi ne the annual German and Austrian quotas while framing the official invitation in a manner tha t did not require the invitees to liberalize their own domestic regulations. Consequentl y, Taylor and the American delegation lacked any “bargaining power.” The ult imate letdown of the meeting was a “foregone conclusion.” 33 Francis Nicosia claimed that the inherent “contradictions in the policies” of the attendees predicted failure. Count ries of potential refuge called for German collaboration in the “speedy and orderl y emigration” of German and Austrian Jews coupled with retention of sufficient personal asset s to facilitate resettlement while simultaneously maintaining or increas ing national barriers to immigration. 34 Caroline Moorehead regarded the Evian Conference as a “shameful milestone in the history of refugee affairs.” Its sole success was the establishment of a “feeble intergovernmental committee on refugees” that could not engage in successful negotiations with the German Government. Nor could pressure be brought to bear on Great Britain (the Mandatory Power) over Palestine, to allow increased lev els of Jewish 32 Marrus. The Unwanted 170-172. 33 Thomas C. Howard and William D. Pederson, eds., Fra nklin D. Roosevelt and the Formation of the Modern World (NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2003), 196. 34 Francis R. Nicosia, The Third Reich & the Palestine Question (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 157.

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322 immigration. The net result of the “world’s evident indifference” to the fate of stateless refugees was to encourage the Reich to adopt a harsher and more extreme anti-Je wish policy that would culminate in the pogrom of November 1938 and other acts of violence. 35 Alan Dowty maintained that the agreement of international representations t o attend the meeting was accomplished “only by promising” that participating nations would not have to permit the admission of refugees. The primary goal of the United States in calling for the conference in the first place was “precisely to head off” any pressure that would require America to liberalize its immigration policie s. 36 David Ticenor and John Hippel claimed that the Evian Conference was predestined to fail f rom the outset due to terms of the official invitation that participating nations we re not expected to accept involuntary religious and political refugees. 37 Abraham Edelheit regarded the meeting as an “empty gesture” of a “half-hearted” effo rt on the part of Roosevelt that demonstrated that a “policy of doing nothing was counterproductive.” 38 David Vital deemed the assembly a “singularly futile, dishonest and to some extent [a] cruel exercise” that resulted in two major accomplishments: the open expression of “the universal refusal” to permit mass Jewish migration as a f orm of rescue and secondly, the confirmation of the “now general disposition” to exclude Jews from the “international political arena,” marking a reversal of Jewish Emancipation a nd integration 35 Moorehead. Human Cargo 34 36 Dowty, Closed Borders 89. 37 Tichenor, Dividing Lines 161; Dippel, Bound Upon a Wheel 225. 38 Edleheit, The Yishuv 186, 190.

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323 into Christian society. 39 Shlomo Katz described the Evian Conference as the “Jewish Munich” in which the human rights of Jews as individuals and as a collective were sacrificed by the League of Nations and by the world’s democracies. It wa s the “weakness of public opinion,” he believed, that helped to pave the way for the ultimate Nazi policy for the “solution of the Jewish problem.” 40 The gains of the Jewish Emancipation of the Nineteenth Century in Central Europe were reversed and Germ an and Austrian Jews were cast adrift, subject to the whims and policies of an openly hos tile government and ideology. David Cesarani and Sarah Kavanaugh argued that the failure of the American Administration to alter its immigration policies set off a “chain reaction” in which the other nations either refused to liberalize or adopted a more restricti ve policy on immigration. Thus, from the viewpoint of the stateless refugees it would have been better if the “conference had not been held at all.” 41 Rafael Medoff observed that Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, in fact, had frequently and unsuccessfully implored FDR to publicly criticize the Reich and its anti-Je wish policies. Wise acknowledged, on October 18, 1933, that “we have had nothing but indifference and unconcern [from the Administration] up to this time.” James D. McDonald had expressed to the President during early 1933 that “it would be very desirable” if the C hief Executive engaged in “frank speaking” with Hitler. In response, Roosevelt claim ed that “he had a plan in mind to appeal over the head of Hitler to the German people.” FDR also advised Henry Morgenthau, Jr. and the brother of the New York State Governor, 39 Vital. A People Apart 890-891. 40 Katz, “Public Opinion,”105, 126. 41 David Cesarani and Sarah Kavanaugh, Holocaust: Critical Concepts in Historical Studies vol. 3, (NY: Routledge, 2004), 19.

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324 Judge Irving Lehman (September 14, 1933), that he intended to address the general topic of human rights violations within the Reich while excluding specific references to the Jews. The U.S. Ambassador in Berlin, William E. Dodd, questioned the President about official American policy regarding German anti-Semitism and was advi sed that the Nazi treatment of Jews was an internal “affair” outside the purview of the Unite d States Government except when it impacted upon the Jewish-Americans “who happen to be made victims.” 42 FDR utilized the media as a means of disseminating “stories, nearly alw ays favorable,” that were assured of nationwide front page coverage that would overpower the “adverse editorials” in many newspapers and dominate the front pages to the “exasperation of his many enemies.” 43 The President skillfully utilized the proverbial bloody pulpit, provided by his Presidential News Conferences and his fire side chat s, to generate a “supply of news” that would overshadow other press stories. 44 He could also utilize reporters’ questions as a means of promoting and framing the polici es of the 42 Rafael Medoff, Blowing the Whistle on Genocide: Josiah E. Dubois, Jr., and the Struggle for a U.S. Response to the Holocaust (W. Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2009), 5, 6. Roosevelt was criticized, following the call for the Evian Confer ence, for his failure to openly chastise Hitler and his policies. Oswald Garrison Villard, the treasurer o f the American Guild for German Cultural Freedom, praised the Administration for its “noble action” f or leading the way to rescuing the refugees of Germ any and Austria. However, it has “not spoken out stron gly enough.” While FDR discussed the quarantining of those nations that threatened international peace a nd issued “other veiled references or generalizatio ns in regard to the dictators [still he] has not called the devil by his right name, as did John Hay when S ecretary of State and Theodore Roosevelt when President…in in viting a delegation of American Jews to the White House at the time of the Russian pogroms at Kishin ev and telling the world just what the two highest officials in our Government felt about those horror s. Those pogroms were merciful compared to the horribly slow, cruel tortures of the concentration camps of today and of the robbing, maltreating and degrading of hundreds of thousands of people.” “Th omas Mann Advocates Reich Refugee Exhibit,” The Sentinel May 19, 1938, 34. 43 John Williams Tebell and Sarah Miles Watts, The Press and the Presidency: From George Washington to Ronald Reagan (NY: Oxford University Press, 1995), 438, 444. 44 Graham White. FDR and the Press (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1979), 23-24.

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325 Administration and was not averse to providing journalists with questions on topics he wished to discuss. 45 Roosevelt also realized that he possessed the power to promote, divert or suppress the reaction of the media and the public to a daily event or public policy. 46 Steven Casey maintained that FDR was particularly influenced by the “shi fting attitudes of opinion makers,” especially those of “journalists, editors and commenta tors” who opposed liberalization of the quota laws or immigration in general. 47 A correspondent of the time observed that the President had the ability to quickly asce rtain the “mood of the country” and the relative importance of “current events, trends [and] problems” from the manner in which in which press questions were framed and the “tone” used in their construction. 48 Roosevelt also utilized the Division of Press Intelligence during 1933-1939. This agency monitored and analyzed the reporting and editorializing of approximately four hundred newspapers, providing the White House with a daily “intelligence report.” 49 A 1995 analysis of the themes of the President’s first 45 Elmer Cornwell, Jr., Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1966), 156-157. 46 White, FDR and the Press 22; Richard W. Steele, Propaganda in an Open Society: The Roosevelt Administration and the Media, 1933-1941 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), 37; Betty H. Winfield, FDR and the News Media (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 237. 47 Steven Casey, Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American P ublic Opinion, and the War against Nazi Germany (NY: Oxford University Press, 2001), 69. 48 White, FDR and the Press 22. 49 Laurel Leff, “News of the Holocaust: Why FDR Didn’t Tell and the Press Didn’t Ask,” Hakirah: A Journal of Jewish and Ethnic Studies 2006, 11available from 20Holocaust%20Why%20FDR%20Didn't%20Tell%20and%20the%20Press%20 Didn't%20Ask.pdf ; Internet; accessed October 3, 2010. The Office of Press Intelligence was established in August 1933 and on July 10, 1935 it was placed under the authority of the National Emer gency Council. The Reorganization Plan No. 11 transferred the agency to the Office of Government Reports where it remained in operation until Execut ive Order 9182 of June 13, 1942 moved it to the Bureau of Special Services in the Office of War Informatio n.

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326 seven State of the Union addresses concluded that Roosevelt responded to past “coverag e in the newspapers more than he influenced subsequent coverage”; a trend that continued during the wartime years. 50 Overall, the President maintained a significant level of public silence over t he fate of Jews in Central Europe. During 1933 eight-two press conferences were h eld in which the subject of Jews arose on only one occasion when a reporter inquired if Roosevelt had been asked by Jewish and other refugee organizations to develop policies opposing the persecution of minorities within the Reich. FDR noted that a “good many of these [entreaties] have come in” but were all transmitted to the State Depa rtment. The next reference to the Jews in a Presidential news conference would only take pl ace five years and 348 conferences later on September 2, 1938 when he was asked if he had an opinion on the Italian plan to deport 22,000 foreign Jews; FDR responded “no.” During Kristallnacht and its aftermath the President was questioned during seven press conferences about the situation of the Jews within Greater Germany. He offere d only one definitive statement: the Labor Department had been instructed to extend the dura tion of 15,000 German and Austrian tourist visas but he qualified this action by noting that they were “not all Jews by any means.” 51 Roosevelt’s awareness of domestic isolationism and The Office of War Information was closed by Executi ve Order 9608 of August 31, 1945 and the Bureau of Special Services was once again transferred to the Bureau of the Budget. Finally, the Division of Pre ss Intelligence was assigned to the Office of Governme nt Records that was reestablished with Executive Order 9809 of December 12, 1946. National Archives and Records Administration The United States Government Manual, 2009-2010 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), 662. 50 Thomas J. Johnson, Wayne Wanta, John T. Byrd and Ci ndy Lee, “Exploring FDR’s Relationship with the Press: A Historical Agenda-Setting Study,” Political Communication 12 (1995): 196. 51 Complete Presidential Press Conferences vol. 20, 52-7; vol. 11, 248-9; vol. 12, 41, 69, 2 24, 228-9, 238-41, 247, 257, 280-1, 286.

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327 anti-Semitic undercurrents may have led him to avoid explicit references to J ews. During the 998 press conferences held over the course of his multiple terms in office FDR f ailed to deliver the “appeal to the German people” that he had earlier promised to McDonal d in 1933. 52 Henry Feingold has argued that Roosevelt’s decision to call for the Evian Conference was puzzling as the Administration was “virtually powerless to act” in view of the restrictions placed on immigration then in effect and the possibility of fur ther limitations being enacted by Congress. In addition, FDR had appeared “content” t o place the refugee issue solely under the purview of the State Department. He sought to “r emain above” any political discord generated by the immigration problem while “occas ionally [making] an inquiry or a suggestion.” Thus, Foggy Bottom would absorb “much of the pressure and ire” that would and should have aimed directly at the President. Util izing such a strategy Roosevelt was able to preserve his “benevolent image” especi ally among Jewish Americans. 53 New York Governor Herbert H. Lehman called upon FDR to alter immigration policies during 1936 but Roosevelt replied that officials of the State Department a nd its Consulates abroad were doing everything in their power to “carry out the immigr ation duties placed upon them in a considerate and humane manner.” 54 Although the President directed the American Consular Service to interpret the LPC clause as libe rally as possible Immigration and Naturalization officials were instructed to consi der such 52 Medoff, Blowing the Whistle 5-6. 53 Feingold, Politics of Rescue 18, 75. 54 FDR to Herbert Lehman, July 2, 1936 cited in Edgar B. Nixon, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs vol. III: September 1935-January 1937 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 342.

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328 refugees “dispassionately, in spite of the tragic circumstances surrounding t heir plight.” Visitors’ visas would be granted only if the alien had a permanent residence in their country of origin (an impossibility in Nazi Germany when the policy of forced emigration was adopted) and documentation of the means to return home as well as a certificate of good character and behavior to be obtained from the local German a nd Austrian police. 55 Having achieved “almost nothing of substance” Frank Brecher has argued that the creation of the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees from G ermany merely served to extend the longevity of the Evian Conference “under a new name” t hat would serve as a “face-saving device” for the Roosevelt Administration. None of t he participating countries was committed to any particular plan of action and the official financing of the IGCR would be limited with the bulk provided by private Jewish and non-Jewish sources. 56 Jewish Congressmen also lacked the will to pursue modification of the immigration laws. Representatives Emanuel Celler (NY), Adolph Sabath (Ill inois) and four others approached George Messersmith on April 17, 1938 regarding the facilitati on of refugee immigration and the consolidation of unused national quotas. They were warned that such actions could prompt a nativist reaction and a call for more rest rictive 55 Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, History of the Immigration and Naturalization Servi ce 96 th Congress, 2 nd Session, Committee Print, December 1980, 43; Franc es Perkins to Cornelia Bryce Pinchot, December 21, 1939, Frances Perkins papers, 1939 Cor respondence File, General Records of the Labor Department, Record Group 174, National Archives, Wa shington, D.C. cited in Tichenor, Dividing Lines 161-162. 56 Brecher, Reluctant Ally 63.

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329 laws from the House and Senate by inciting the “temper of Congress.” 57 Consequently, the Congressmen agreed and pledged themselves to discourage any such new legis lation. Messersmith himself was pessimistic over the prospects of the Evian Conferenc e believing that Germany intended to utilize the refugee crisis as a means of pressuring the United States into bilateral trade talks or provide other forms of assistanc e to aid the German economy. Any financial aid, he believed, would be diverted into German rearmament. Consequently, he opposed the creation of the IGCR due to its goal of entering into negotiations with the Reich and would have “counseled against its formation.” 58 Along with Assistant Secretary of State Robert Walton Moore and the Chief of the European Division of the State Department Jay Pierrepont Moffat he believed that more could be accomplished via the League’s International Labor Organization rather than the establishment of a new committee. 59 Messersmith was also concerned about overtures from Poland regarding the emigration of its own Jewish population and he concluded that “humanitarianism was encouraging brutality.” He opposed any alteration of the annual immigration quot as, viewing the Jewish refugees “less as innocent victims” than the unknowing means of introducing “Nazi subversion” that would threaten domestic social and economic stability. The diplomat did fear that if the Conference was successful then A merica faced a potential inundation of refugees which he strove to prevent. He complained that Jewis h professors, academics and other professionals seeking entry visas were se nding him the 57 Stiller, George S. Messersmith 123. 58 Ibid., 125. 59 March 18, 23, and 25, 1938, Moffat Diary, Moffat P apers cited in Shafir, “George S. Messersmith,” 39.

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330 “most extraordinary letters” that inflicted upon him the “rude[st] shocks.” The wr iters, he claimed, were resentful that the U.S was not providing “on a golden platter a posit ion which native-born Americans would be glad to get at the end of a long and hard fought career.” America, Messersmith believed, would still belong to the “native-b orn…” 60 Myron Taylor, acting as the American representative to the Inter-gover nmental Committee for Political Refugees, reassured a radio listening audience fol lowing Kristallnacht that America would not be flooded by refugees. “On the contrary, our entire program is based on the existing immigration laws of all the countries concerned, and I am confident that within that framework our problems can be solved.” 61 Thus, once again as with the Evian Conference, the United States would not, despite its expresse d sympathies, willingly offer refuge to the victims of Nazi persecution, providi ng a basis upon which foreign governments could maintain their own restrictive immigration policies. The pogrom, however, had led Taylor to believe that an orderly plan of emigration carried out over a number of years was now a more difficult and perhaps impossible goal. The humanitarian situation had assumed a greater degree of urg ency but its solution remained constrained by the problem of finding havens for 400,000-500,000 refugees, a lack of sufficient funds for resettlement and the need for the cooper ation of the German Government. Representative Hamilton Fish, in an address on “America’ s Answer to Religious and Racial Hatred” broadcast following Taylor’s speec h, stated he would support a motion in Congress to appropriate $10,000,000-20,000,000 to transport 60 Ibid., 124. See also Messersmith (GSM) to Hull, Ma rch 31, 1938, 840.48/84 ; Messersmith to Welles, April 7, 1938, 150.01/34; Hull to Messersmi th, April 17, 1938 cited in Wyman, Paper Walls 61 “U.S. Will Not Be ‘Flooded” With Jews, Myron Taylo r Says,” Tampa Tribune November 26, 1938, 2.

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331 and resettle the refugees but with the caveat that Palestine, rather than ot her locations such as the former German African colonies, British Guiana or Alaska, would be the best locale. 62 A variety of geographic regions around the world were proposed as potential sites of resettlement, in some cases generating surveys and schemes that w ere limited in scope and slow to develop. The Alaskan Plan, for example, was proposed by the Alaska Development Committee in 1938 to create semi-autonomous Jewish colonies of unspecified size but met local political and popular resistance. 63 David Wyman claimed that Roosevelt, during the critical years of 1938-1945, displayed “a pattern of decreasing sensitivity towards the plight of the Eur opean Jews” due to domestic and foreign priorities that were of greater significance to A merican interests. 64 Presidential historian Doris Kearns Goodwin has argued that FDR was sympathetic to the situation of the German Jews but was unwilling to expend political capital by confronting the anti-immigration and anti-Semitic sentiments of the American public or powerful members of Congress. 65 The First Lady, Eleanor, noted in This I Remember “While I often felt strongly on various subjects, Franklin frequently refrained from causes in which he believed, because of political realities.” 66 62 “Refugee Aid Plans Mapped by Taylor,” New York Times November 26, 1938, 2. 63 Edelheit, History of Zionism 502-507. Other proposed sites included: Angola, A rgentina, Baja, British Guiana, Ecuador, French Guiana, Madagascar, Kimberly in Australia, New Caledonia, New Hebrides, Peru and Surinam. 64 Wyman, Paper Wall vii-viii. 65 Doris Kearns Goodwin, No Ordinary Time: Franklin a nd Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 102. 66 Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remember (Westport, CT: G reenwood Press, 1975), 161.

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332 The failure of the Administration to speak out in favor of increased entry into the United States and the unwillingness of the various delegations and their respecti ve governments to offer refuge was seen by the Nazis as vindication and support of their anti-Semitic policies. The Evian Conference symbolized the “Jewish Munich” whi ch reflected attempts to both appease and dodge confrontations with Germany. 67 Klaus P. Fischer equated the response of the democracies to the plight of the Jews with the abandonment of Czechoslovakia over the Sudetenland issue. Both events represented “western appeasement of Hitler [with] the western powers [negotiating ] over the heads the Czechs, ignoring and selling out their vital interests.” Similarly, they “negotiated over the heads of the Jews by ignoring the deadly threat they faced from the Nazis.” The Evian Conference itself represented, Fischer believed, another example of “w estern collaborative hypocrisy” that supported Hitler’s image of democratic decade nce and weakness. 68 FDR did not actively support the 1939 Wagner-Rogers bill and opposed settlement in Alaska but, like the British with their eye on British Guiana and Af rica, adopted “a strategy that would avoid both political conflict at home and confrontations with London” while proposing “visionary and grandiose resettlement schemes” in Latin 67 Leonard Baker, Days of Sorrow and Pain: Leo Baeck and the Berlin Jews (NY: Macmillan, 1978), 226-227 cited in Piers Brendon, The Dark Valley A Panorama of the 1930’s (NY: Vintage Books, 2002), 515. Following Kristallnacht FDR removed references to Nazi Germany and its lead ership from a speech of outspoken Nazi critic, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, in order to avoid incitement of the Germans. Tampa Tribune November 15, 1938, 1, 2 In contrast, Fiorello L a Guardia, Mayor of New York City, ordered the police to provide a detail compos ed primarily of Jews led by Police Captain Max Finklestein to protect the German Consulate. Tampa Tribune November 17, 1938, 1. 68 Klaus P. Fischer, The History of an Obsession: German Judeophobia and the Holocaust ((NY: Continuum, 2001), 276-277.

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333 America and Africa. 69 Others have argued that the failure of the Evian Conference was a blow to the concept of universal human rights and “sanctioned the belief in the inequalit y of humankind.” 70 Some authors have speculated that the Jewish background of Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s wife, Frances Witz, influenced his decision to limit aid to Jew s seeking to escape from the Reich and not to pressure the British to allow greater Jew ish immigration into Palestine. Although Frances was an Episcopalian her father, Irwin Witz was an Austrian Jewish immigrant. Soon after Hull’s appointment to the State Departm ent antiSemitic magazine articles claimed that this represented another exam ple of a Jewish conspiracy to take over control of the Federal Government. Irwin Gellman, a H ull biographer, claimed that the Secretary hid his wife’s Jewish roots in order t o avoid any controversy that would threaten a potential bid for the Presidency. He “feared tha t [his wife’s] Jewish connection” opened him to criticism from American anti-Semi tes that he was favoring Jewish “causes” which could translate into the loss of potential votes Prior to his decision to run for a third term Roosevelt was supportive of a Hull run for the White House. However, in August 1939 he informed Democratic Senator Burton Wheeler (Montana) that the issue of the Frances’ heritage “would be raised” by the opposition against Hull. 71 Such sentiments were echoed by the notorious German antiSemite Julius Streicher in his magazine Der Sturmer #23/1944, in which the Secretary of 69 Feingold, Bearing Witness 178. 70 Naomi Kramer and Ronald Headland, The Fallacy of Race and the Shoah ( Ottawa, Ont.: University of Ottawa Press, 1998), xvi. 71 “Senator Allen’s ‘Jewish Problem,’” The David S. Wy man Institute for Holocaust Studies, March 3, 2010 available from tor-allen.php ; Internet; accessed March 3, 2010.

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334 State was accused of being one of the leading “Jewish lackeys” in America who controlled U.S. foreign policy. He believed that Hull harbored “concealed Jewish bl ood that enabled him to overcome his horror when he married the baptized full Jewess Frances Witz” who was utilizing the “protocols of the 1897 World Jewish Congress in Basel” to enable Jewish “world domination.” 72 Others have provided the counterargument that Roosevelt and his Administration did everything that was possible within the context and constraints of their time. The President faced criticism over the recession of 1937 and risi ng unemployment (15% of the workforce), the high level appointments of a small number of Jews (which led to his economic plans being labeled the “Jew Deal”), his failed at tempt to pack the Supreme Court with additional Justices, the need for political support from Congressional Congressmen (especially Southern Democrats) who opposed increa sing and preferred further restrictions on immigration, fallout from his Quarantine s peech and the lowest popularity rating since taking office in 1933. 73 Faced with an increasingly hostile and recalcitrant legislature FDR “felt obliged to husband his waning infl uence” on Capitol Hill for higher priorities: Congressional allocations for military rearmament and 72 “What is Americanism?” by Julius Streicher, German Propaganda Archive available from ; Internet; accessed March 3, 2010. 73 U.S. unemployment figures: 1930: 8.9% 1932: 27% 1933: 25.2% 1935: 20.3% 1937: 14.5% 1939: 20.1% “Open Knowledge—Americans Did Not Like Immigrant Je ws,” June 16, 2006 available from ; Internet; accessed February 17, 2008; “Deathly S ilence Teaching Guide: Bystander Psychology,” The Southern Institute for Education and Research available fro m on/ds9.html ; internet; accessed 0ctober 4, 2009.

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335 new domestic programs. Emphasis on increased Jewish immigration could precipit ate greater confrontations and a potential backlash in Congress from anti-immigr ationists, although Roosevelt was not worried about losing Jewish electoral support. 74 John Stoessinger argued that Roosevelt and his Administration had taken “a determined s tep” to aid the Jews of Germany. However, despite the “prodding” of the President and the Department of State, it was the Congress that was responsible for not liberaliz ing American immigration laws that ensured the failure of the Evian Conference. 75 Breitman and Kraut asserted that “bureaucratic indifference to moral or humanitarian concerns” was a “more significant obstacle to an active refuge policy” than the anti-S emitic and anti-immigrant sentiments of Government officials. Contradictory national priorities coupled with limited latitude of domestic political action prohibited the Administr ation from exceeding the restrictions placed on the quota system. The magnitude and the ability to secure rescue of Jews was quite inadequate, they admit, but they concl uded that “British and American inaction…represented a fundamental failure of west ern civilized values.” 76 Joseph C. Harsch claimed that FDR had recognized international political constraints would prevent the Evian Conference from adopting a program of mass migration over a short time frame. Rather, he envisaged the creation of a per manent international organization that would be mandated to accomplish the limited goals tha t 74 Brecher, Reluctant Ally 61. 75 Stoessinger, The Refugee 40. Prior to the onset of WWII Stoessinger and hi s family fled from Austria to Czechoslovakia and eventually received a visa fr om Japanese Consul Chiune Sugihara escaping to Shanghai and Kobe. 76 Breitman and Kraut, American Refugee Policy, 2.

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336 were practicable under the “circumstances of the time”: locating sites for mass resettlement of refugee Jews and constructive negotiations with the Reich tha t would culminate in an orderly plan of emigration. Harsch concluded that the Conference “di d both.” 77 Leonard Dinnerstein noted that Roosevelt represented during the latter part of the 1930s the “only friend” of the Jewish people among the leaders of the world. Unfortunately for the Jews, however, such friendship occurred during a time in whic h the “most inhumane anti-Semitic episodes” in global history were occurring wit h disconcerting and troubling regularity. The President always aware of his poli tical priorities was in “tune with public sentiments” and would avoid taking any pro-acti ve stance on immigration in the face of an “obstructionist Congress.” 78 Jeffrey Gurlock believed the President analyzed the refugee issue in the “context” of domestic politics, an arena which he understood and could potentially manipulate. He recognized that in the setting of national economic distress the majority of the American public coul d not understand nor support the admission of large numbers of refugees who potentially would be competing for hearth, home and jobs. Selecting carefully the issues upon which he was willing to expend political capital he regarded the question of Jewish refugees more like “the fox than the lion… [settling] for a politics of gesture.” It was this slight of symbolic hand that provided the “key to the mystery” of Evian in which the terms of the invitation were “carefully hedged” ensuring the ultimate failure of the meeting. FDR’s 77 Joseph C. Harsch, At the Hinge of History: A Reporter’s Story (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1993), 26. 78 Leonard Dinnerstein, Anti-Semitism in America (NY: Oxford University Press, 1994), 104.

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337 enthusiasm for colonization schemes merely represented further attempts at the “politics of gesture.” 79 The Franklin D. Roosevelt Museum, Hyde Park, New York, had included in its core exhibit a panel describing the President’s response to the Holocaust: During the 1930s, as many European Jews were lookin g for a safe haven from official anti-Semitism, members of the S tate Department enforced the bloodless immigration laws with cold r igidity. Yet even Roosevelt's bitterest critics concede that nothing he could have done-including bombing the rails leading to Auschwitz in 1944--would have saved significant numbers from annihilation, let al one dissuaded the Nazis from doing what they were so intent on doing. Twenty-five Holocaust historians have criticized this statement on the gr ounds that it assigns the primary responsibility for underfilling the annual immigr ation quota to the State Department, essentially absolving the President of any personal accountability. The actions of Varian Fry and his associates in France (rescued 2,000 Jews in Vi chy, 1940-1941), Raoul Wallenberg (Swedish diplomat who saved thousands in Hungary 1944) and the U.S. War Refugee Board (established in January 1944, primarily funded by American Jews and helped to end deportation of Hungarian Jews from Budapest to Auschwitz) and others demonstrated that interventions to save lives, both before and afte r the onset of hostilities, was potentially possible. Roosevelt’s critics clai m he could have offered temporary shelter in the U.S. for the duration of the war, pressured the Briti sh to alter their restrictive stance on Jewish immigration into Palestine or c ould have provided greater funding to the IGCR and the War Refugee Board. 80 79 Gurlock, America, American Jews and the Holocaust, 267. 80 “Roosevelt Museum Distorts FDR’s Holocaust Record” by Rafael Medoff, April 2005 available from php ; Internet; accessed June 12, 2010.

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338 Robert Rosen declared the President “never left anyone in doubt about his position” on the German persecution of Jews and non-Aryans but “it is only in retrospec t that many have ignored this record.” Roosevelt, according to the author, came out “eloquently and forcefully” against Nazi policies and persecutions and during the late 1930s focused primarily on the Jews. 81 Rosen’s critics, however, maintain the Administration remained “silent” about anti-Jewish actions for most of the dec ade. During eighty one Presidential Press Conferences held during 1933 the issue of German anti-Semitism was raised only once and not by FDR. It would take five more yea rs and 348 further press conferences before the subject was broached again (on the part of a reporter and not the President). During a September 2, 1938 meeting with reporters t he President was asked to comment on the Fascist Italian order to deport 22,000 Jews. FDR’s response: “No.” Rosen also claimed that Roosevelt “provid[ed] as much reli ef” to Jewish refugees as were permissible under the existing immigration laws His detractors responded by noting the number of quota spots filled during that period: 5.3% in 1933, 13.7% in 1934, 20.2% in 1935, 24.3% in 1936, 42.1% in 1937 and 65.3% in 1938. If the quotas had been filled to the maximum then a total of 154,220 refugees would have been admitted compared with the actual figure of 46,771 due to Consulate and State Department intransigence. 82 81 Robert N. Rosen, Saving the Jews: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Holo caust (NY: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2006) xiv-xv; 440, 450. 82 Laurel Leff and Rafael Medoff, “Whitewashing FDR’s Holocaust Record: An Analysis of Robert N. Rosen’s Saving the Jews: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Holo caust New Documents Shed More Light on FDR’s Holocaust Failure,” April 2004, available fro m ; Internet; accessed June 12, 2010. By mid-1939 40 0,000 had emigrated from the Reich of whom 73,322 found permanent residence in the U.S., 70,000 in Palestine, and 50,000 in Latin America an d 12,000 within the British Dominions. 200,000 remai ned in sites of temporary refuge in Europe. 104,09 8 Germans entered the United States via the quota by the end of the 1941 fiscal year of which 75-85% wer e

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339 Conrad Black, one of Roosevelt’s latest biographers, concluded the President should not be “censored” for not adopting a more outspoken platform against anti-Semitism because his “paramount duty” to the nation was to bolster American economic and military power “in order to exercise a decisive influence on the Manichean st ruggle between good and evil political forces” then raging in Europe. 83 William Perl viewed Roosevelt primarily as a “shrewd and ruthless” poli tician determined not to endanger a “fragile coalition” in Congress by supporting humani tarian causes laden with emotional and political overtones. The President was poised on the brink of launching a campaign for an unprecedented third term and was concerned about issues of American rearmament and isolationism. The convening of an internationa l conference dealing with Jewish and non-Aryan potential and real refugees couple d with a promise not to tamper with American immigration laws appeared to be the safest course to follow and would “divert pressure for a change in legislation.” Myron C. Taylor was chosen by Roosevelt over career diplomats to lead the American delegation because of his “pragmatism” and could not be accused of being on a “fancy love-everybody dream trip.” Taylor would demonstrate that matterof-factness during his opening remarks received by the delegations and public in “hushed silence.” He expounded with “blatant bluntness,” devoid of any attempt to “veil [his statements ] in diplomatic phraseology…” The only humane “trimmings” referred to the perilous situation of the “unfortunate human beings” who were “coming within the scope of thi s Jewish in practice or by ethnicity. American Jewish Year Book XL, 1938, 96-97. See also “Exile Haven Here Rivals Palestine,” New York Times October 29, 1939, 26 and Donald Peterson Kent, The Refugee Intellectual (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), 12. 83 Black, Franklin Delano Roosevelt 496.

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340 conference.” The term “Jews” was substituted by “political emigrants” an d Taylor made it absolutely clear that the United States would not pursue any changes in its i mmigration laws or assume any financial burdens nor did it expect any other nation to do otherwis e. The listening audience could not misinterpret the “full impact” of these words and t he effect it would undoubtedly have on the other representatives and their respective governments. Lord Winterton expressed similar sentiments and dealt a “second blow” against a successful conference essentially “condemning hundreds of thousands to death.” 84 William D. Rubinstein concluded that large-scale rescue of Jews during the Holocaust was not possible “given what was actually known…what was actually proposed and what was realistically possible” and labeled any criticism of Roose velt and the Allies as “inaccurate and misleading, their arguments illogical and ahis torical.” He described governmental refugee policies during 1933-1940 as “remarkably ge nerous.” 85 William J. vanden Heuven, president of the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute, had written that American Jews at that time “knew that they never ha d a better friend, a more sympathetic leader in the White House [who] opened the offices of government as never before to Jews.” Roosevelt had to contend with a divided and economically troubled nation, filled with “profound isolationist sentiments” and “disillusion” with involvement in European affairs after the Great War. The P resident, he maintained, needed to focus on the Hitlerian threat, called for the quarantine of aggr essor 84 Perl, The Holocaust Conspiracy 38-40, 44, 46. 85 William D. Rubinstein, The Myth of Rescue: Why the Democracies Could Not H ave Saved More Jews from the Nazis (NY: Rutledge, 1997), X.

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341 nations, and, recognizing that he lacked the ability to order an increase in the immigra tion quotas, “constantly [sought] havens for refugees in other countries.” 86 Jonathan Alter concluded that FDR was “not entirely negligent” in the intensit y of his efforts to aid European Jews. An isolationist and restrictionist public limi ted Roosevelt's options but he did sound the clarion of warning about the Nazi threat early on and “sponsored international conferences on refugees (Evian 1938 and the even more ineffectual Bermuda Conference of 1943). 87 Frank Caestecker and Bob Moore regarded the American effort as a historic “landmark” in the search for a workabl e policy for international refugees. The Evian Conference marked the first attempt of the Uni ted States Government to formulate and lead refugee policies outside the efforts of the ineffectual League and its High Commissioner for Refugees. Despite its ult imate failure in identifying sites of resettlement and of concluding successful negotiation s with the German Government over the issue of funding these authors regarded the creation of the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees as the “only concrete result” of the Conference. 88 Mark Rozell and William D. Pederson concluded that the President’s success in treading the minefield of politics and achieving his desired goals was due to a “measure 86 William J. vanden Heuvel, “America and the Holocaus t” available from &clientid=11005 ; Internet; accessed April 20, 2008. 87 Jonathan Alter, The Defining Moment: FDR’s Hundred Days and the Tri umph of Hope (NY: Simon & Schuster, 2008), 333-334. 88 Frank Caestecker and Bob Moore, Refugees from Nazi Germany and the Liberal European States (Oxford: Berghahn, 2010), 35.

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342 of classical Western prudence” artfully co-mingled with “idealism and pr agmatism.” 89 Jack Fischel claimed that Roosevelt did not identify the refugees as Jews due t o domestic concerns of stimulating domestic anti-Semitism as heralded by Father Coughlin, Gerald L.K. Smith, Gerald Winrod and the German-American Bund. Any open display of sympathy or support for Jews would open the President to such diatribes as being the father of the “Jew Deal.” 90 Saul Friedman argued that any support for pro-Jewish immigration measures would have caused FDR to suffer “politically” due to his increasing unpopularity in opinion polls. 91 George L. Warren, former Director of the International Migration Servi ce, member of the President’s Advisory Committee on Political Refugees and la ter advisor to Myron Taylor at the Evian Conference, believed FDR called for the July 1938 meeting as a means of responding to the Anschluss because “he didn’t know what else to do.” Faced with a potentially hostile Congress and restrictive immigration laws Roos evelt was “terribly embarrassed” for having convened the conference. Short of maximiz ing the existing German and Austrian quota there was little he could do to increase immi gration into the country. The Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, established at E vian to negotiate financial arrangements with Germany that would facilitate e migration and resettlement, was a “futile effort by George Rublee… [t]hat failed com pletely.” He offered a number of reasons for the Conference’s failure: the Depression with its attendant unemployment; migrations from the countryside into the cities was oc curring 89 Mark J. Rozell and William D. Pederson, FDR and the Modern Presidency: Leadership and Legac y (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 159-160. 90 Jack R. Fischel, The Holocaust (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), 28. 91 Friedman, No Haven 90.

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343 throughout Latin America; an American Congress increasingly hostile to im migration; the insincere and superficial efforts of Britain to offer land for re-sett lement in its colonial holdings and the generalized feeling “that the only thing to do was to colonize [Jews ] in agriculture” despite the obvious disconnect between the economic, social and technological backgrounds of Central European middle-class and urbanized Jews. 92 Following Kristallnacht however, the President did step forward to offer refuge to 12,000-15,000 German and Austrian refugees who were within the United States on six-month visitor visas. The German Government had issued a decree that would annul the visitors’ passports (Jews and non-Jews) on December 30, 1938. Consequently, he directed Secretary of Labor Francis Perkins, to extend the visas in order to avoi d the forced deportation of the refugees to the Reich; an act that would be both “cruel and inhuman[e]” due to the likelihood of persecution, arrest and imprisonment in concentration camps. Citing an earlier precedent of allowing Russian refugee s to remain in the United States following the Bolshevik Revolution, he believed Congress would not object to the visa extensions and that immigration law did not prevent the President f rom taking such action. 93 Representative Martin Dies, Chairman of the House Committee Investigating Un-American Activities, objected to the extension of the visit ors’ visas, 92 “Oral History Interview with George L. Warren,” No vember 10, 1972 by Richard D. McKinzie, Harry S. Truman Library available from ; Internet; accessed March 6, 2010. See Table 4 which provides an occup ational breakdown of the German Jewish population in 1933 cited in Arieh Tartakower, “The Jewish Refu gees: A Sociological Survey,” Jewish Social Studies vol. 4, no. 4 (October 1942), 333. 93 Tampa Daily Times November 18, 1938, 1, 14; Press Conference #501, November 18, 1938, Complete Presidential Press Conferences of FDR vol. 12 (NY: Da Capo Press, 1972) 239-240.

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344 arguing that it violated the “spirit of the [immigration] law [which state d] visitors’ permits are granted for temporary purposes.” 94 The President was seeking, according to Robert Dallek, to improve America’s defenses and create a united front against the threat of Nazism. Consequently, “a fight on the later Wagner-Rogers bill [and Jewish immigration in general] woul d have crippled his main objective.” 95 His strongest supporters in Congress were Southern Democrats who opposed any liberalization of the immigration laws. They had voted 127:0 for the 1924 Immigration Act and 106:3 to revise the Neutrality Act in 1939. After the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, Eleanor Roosevelt called on the President to “raise the immigration quotas and persuade the State Department to relax t he restrictions on admitting Jews.” He cautioned that any attempt to admit refugees, especia lly Jews, would cost him the support of Southern Democrats who chaired many important Senate and House committees. They would “bolt the party” and block every piece of legisla tion needed to keep this country from collapsing.” The President concluded that “preparati on for war is my ‘must’ legislation and I would lose that ability if the party w ere split...Ultimately, we must be prepared to mobilize if we are to survive.” Edwin “P a” Watson, the Presidential Press Secretary, recollected that FDR’s lack of support for the 1939 Wagner-Rogers bill “doomed the bill and it died in committee.” However, the children under consideration in the 1940 Henning bill were “English and Christians, not 94 Tampa Daily Times November 19, 1938, 1, 10; 95 Verne W. Newton, ed., FDR and the Holocaust (NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 17.

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345 Jews. The patriotic organizations sure won’t object to this one. It should make things a hell of a lot easier.” 96 Finally, Haskel Lookstein has argued that “divisiveness” in the American Jew ish community and reticence to respond “to the indifference of America” out of fear of generating increased anti-Semitism and more restrictive immigrat ion laws led many American Jews to assume the role of “bystander” to the inherent dangers of the German anti-Nazi policies. Such hesitancy was evident during the course of the Evian Conference and in later attempts to admit Jewish refugees. A clear divisi on existed between Jews who believed rescue depended upon adopting a more public and vocal stance and strategy and those who maintained that back room diplomacy and political maneuvering was the only realistic tactic for Jews to follow. For example the American Jewish committee maintained a low profile during the Congressional hearings on the Wagner-Rogers bill. The Congress Bulletin of the American Jewish Congress noted that Jews needed to observe “a great deal of necessary caution” while the hear ings were underway but this “cautious restraint” could be eased once the bill left committee However, a forceful campaign was not mounted by the Jewish leaders and community out of fear of inciting calls for greater immigration restrictions. This lack of significant visible Jewish support for their co-religionists was used by nativist a dversaries of the bill (and others who were against any increased immigration) as justification for opposition. 97 96 Carl L. Steinhouse, Barred: The Shameful Refusal of FDR’s State Departm ent to Save Tens of Thousands of Europe’s Jews from Extermination (Bloomington, IN: Author House, 2007), 18-20, 69-7 0 97 Haskel Lookstein, Were We Our Brother’s Keepers? The Public Response of American Jews to the Holocaust 1938-1944 (NY: Hartmore House, 1985), 22, 183.

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346 Chapter 14 Ominous Tidings Conclusions: The “Unintended Signal” The Holocaust was certainly a Jewish tragedy. But i t was not only a Jewish tragedy. It was also a Christian tragedy, a tragedy for Western civilizati on, and a tragedy for all humankind. 1 Although the democracies cannot be blamed for the Holocaust it was evidently clear that the resistance of the Evian Conference attendees and their res pective governments to accept the stateless refugees would lead to drastic conseque nces. The failure of the Talks marked a “turning point” towards a more radical solution in N azi Jewish policies. It was obvious to contemporaries that Jews could no longer remain within the Reich and that the “need for rescue was painfully clear” but any “opport unity was lost” by October 1941. 2 Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis warned in October 1938 that Jews faced an existential threat and that unless “we do not move mountains” the Jews of Germany were doomed to the same fate as the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire during the Great War. 3 A memorandum was dispatched from the State Department to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin formally advising the German Government that the Evian Confe rence had resulted in the creation of the Inter-Governmental Committee whose stated purpos e 1 Wyman, Abandonment, xvi. 2 Wyman, Paper Walls vii-viii. 3 Yair Auron, Zionism and the Armenian Genocide: The Banality of Indifference (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 28.

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347 was to facilitate the resettlement of those “individuals emigrating on ac count of their political opinions, religious beliefs or racial origin.” The purview of this Commit tee was limited to the enablement of a “practical and orderly solution” to the refugee cris is. Significantly, the IGCR (and by inference, the U.S. Government) would avoid “an y criticism or [potential] interference” with Germany’s inherent “enti re right” to enact “measures” dealing with the “political opinions, the religious beliefs and the r acial organization of its citizens.” However, German internal policies had generat ed a “wave of immigration” creating “serious problems” for the nations of temporary a nd permanent resettlement. Consequently, Germany must engage in “consultation” and provide dat a regarding the “volume and rate of exodus” and the amount of monies that each refugee would retain. Otherwise, it would be impossible to create an “orderly, permanent [ plan for] large scale settlement…” The IGCR had embarked on a “survey” of sites of potential resettlement but the “final attitude of the receiving countries” w as dependent on the outcome of negotiations between the Committee and the Reich. 4 Martin Gilbert had claimed that this October 1938 memorandum, sent one month before Kristallnacht supplied Hitler with additional “gratuitous support” in that none of the Committee’s democratic members contested the right of the Reich Government to treat the Ge rman Jewish Question as anything but an internal affair. Significantly, the “le ssons of Evian, as learnt by the Nazi leadership” may have led to a “decisive” change in anti -Jewish policies from forced emigration to physical destruction. 5 4 “Note by the American Department of State to the G erman Foreign Ministry on the Evian Conference,” October 26, 1938 cited in Mendelsohn, The Holocaust vol. 5, 145-147. 5 Martin Gilbert, Exile and Return: The Struggle for a Jewish Homelan d (NY: Lippincott, 1978), 203, 214.

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348 John C. Torpey had argued that the reluctance or outright refusal of nations to admit German Jewish refugees, which could have provided a means of resolving the Jewish Question within the Reich, may “ultimately have helped to push the Nazis tow ard extermination as the ‘final solution’ of the ‘Jewish problem.’” 6 Gerald Sorin observed that the Conference failed to produce any declaratory statement criticiz ing the Reich for its primary responsibility in creating the refugee problem or its persec utory policies. The adoption of the role of international bystander resulted in an “unintentional signal” t o the Nazis that external pressure would not be applied against the methodology utilized b y the Reich in solving the “Jewish problem.” 7 Ernst Marcus asserted that within Germany the failure of the Evian Conference had the result that the Party and the Gestapo, which had been kept under restrain…until then, gain ed the upper hand over those who preferred orderly emigration to the outbreak of chaos within the Jewish community. There is an immutable connection between the…Evian Conference and the even ts of November [1938 which represented] nothing but an attempt by the extremis t wing of the Party to solve the Jewish problem in their own way. Auschwitz, Treblinka, etc. were the next stages. 8 Ernest G. Heppner also had argued that the impotency of the Evian Conference granted license to Hitler to pursue a more radical solution of the Jewish Question. T he 6 John C.Torpey, Invention of the Passport 135-136. 7 Gerald Sorin, Tradition Transformed: The Jewish Experience in Ame rica (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins, Press, 1997), 188. Gregory H. Stanton, Pr esident, Genocide Watch, has argued that genocides do not arise spontaneously, but develop through a seri es of stages. Intervention at any one of these lev els had the potential to avert or mitigate genocide. These phases included: classification, symbolization, dehumanization, organization, polarization, prepara tion, extermination and denial. The years leading up to and including the Holocaust conform to these stages Gregory H. Stanton, “The 8 Stages of Genocide” available from fgenocide.html ; Internet; accessed June 25, 2009. 8 Ernst Marcus, “The German Foreign Office and the Pa lestine Question,” Yad Vashem Studies 194 in Herbert Rosenkranz, “The Anschluss and the Tragedy of Austrian Jewry 1938-1945,” fn. 1, 430 cited in Josef Frankel, The Jews of Austria, Essays on their Life, History and Destruction (London: Valentine, Mitchell, 1967), 531.

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349 reluctance or outright refusal of the invitees to admit refugee Jews demonstrat ed to the Nazi regime that “political considerations were paramount” in the democrac ies and that Jews were regarded as a class outside the customary protections offered to political refugees. Thus, the Jewish destiny was foretold by international “politic s.” 9 As earlier noted, the November 24, 1938 issue of Das Schwarze Korps (“The Black Corps”) the official publication of the SS, described how the progressive impoverishment of Jews would force Jews into a life of crime. “If things were to develop in this way we would be faced with the harsh necessity of having to exterminate the Jewish underground i n the same manner as we are used to exterminating criminals in our Order State : with fire and sword. The result would be the actual and definite end of Jewry in Germany-its comple te destruction.” 10 The Polish Government concluded from the limited focus of the Evian Conference (German and Austrian Jews only) that only those nations that utilize d force and intimidation would be granted a “measure of international attention.” 11 Consequently, the influential Camp of National Unity ( Obz Zjednoczenia Nrodowego or OZN) initiated in 1939 a “more aggressive attitude” toward Poland’s Jewish population which was viewed as a dangerous internal foe. 12 While such warnings were clear the 9 Ernest G. Heppner, Shanghai Refuge: A Memoir of the World War II Jewis h Ghetto (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), 19. 10 Holocaust, (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1974), 23, 99, 100. 11 Edward G. Wynot Jr., “’A Necessary Cruelty”: The E mergence of Official Anti-Semitism in Poland, 1936-1939,” The American Historical Review 76, no. 4 (October 1971): 1056-57. 12 E. Melzer, “Mifleget haShilton OZON veh a Yehudim be-Polin 1937-1939,” 412-13 cited in David Engel, In the Shadow of Auschwitz: The Polish Government-i n-Exile and the Jews (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 45.

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350 rescue of Jews was a low priority on the global and American scene. As will be demonstrated in a future monograph the outcomes of the Wagner-Rogers bill of 1939 and the Hennings Bill of 1940 placed greater value on the lives of some children compared t o others. Although Myron C. Taylor asserted that forced migration was creating “catastrophic human suffering” that threatened “general unrest,” the true sent iments or apathy of many towards the Nazi persecution of Jewish and non-Aryan minorities coul d, perhaps, be best expressed in the recollections of Ren Richier, the Chief Concie rge of the Hotel Royal, site of the conference in Evian: Very important people were here and all the delegat es had a nice time. They took pleasure cruises on the lake. They gamble d at night at the casino. They took mineral baths and massages at the Etablissement Thermal Some of them took the excursion to Chamonix to go summer skiing. Some went riding: we have, you know, one of the finest stables in France. But, of course, it is difficult to sit i ndoors hearing speeches when all the pleasures that Evian offers are outsid e." 13 Eventually the echoes of the ill-fated Evian Conference struck a positive but limited chord in international relations and humanitarianism as reflected in t he comments of Vice President Walter Mondale when the United States was seeking a sol ution to the problem of the boat people of Southeast Asia fleeing Communist rule. Mondale stated: Some tragedies defy the imagination. Some misery s o surpasses the grasp of reason that language itself breaks beneath the strain. Instead, we grasp for metaphors. Instead, we speak the inau dible dialect of the human heart. Today we confront such a tragedy. In virtually all the world’s languages, desperate new expressions have been born “A barbed-wire bondage,” “an archipelago of despair,” “a flood tid e of human misery”… 13 “Text of Taylor’s Address at Refuge Parley,” New York Times July 7, 1938, 9; Peggy Mann, “When the World Passed by on the Other Side,’ Manchester Guardian Weekly, May 7, 1978, interview with Ren Richier.

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351 “The boat people.” “The land people.” The phrases are new, but unfortunately their precedent in the annals of sham e is not. Forty-one years ago this very week, another international con ference on Lake Geneva concluded its deliberations. Thirty-two “na tions of asylum” convened at Evian to save the doomed Jews of Nazi G ermany and Austria. On the eve of the conference, Hitler flun g the challenge in the world’s face. He said, “I can only hope that the o ther world, which has such deep sympathy for these criminals, will at lea st be generous enough to convert the sympathy into practical aid.” We have heard such a similar argument about the plight of the ref ugees in Indochina. At Evian, they began with high hopes. But they fai led the test of civilization. The civilized world hid in a cloak of legalisms… As the delegates left Evian, Hitler again goaded “t he other world” for “oozing sympathy for the poor, tormented people, bu t remained hard and obdurate when it comes to helping them.”… Let us not re-enact their error. Let us not be hei rs to their shame. To alleviate the tragedy in Southeast Asia, we all have a part to play. The United States is committed to doing its share…[a nd] have already welcomed over 200,000 Indochinese…[and we] are prepa ring to welcome another 168,000 refugees in the coming year …But the growing exodus from Indochina still outstrips inter national efforts. We must all work together, or the suffering will mount … [and] we will inherit the scorn of Evian…Let us renounce that leg acy of shame…We face a world problem. Let us fashion a world solut ion. History will not forgive us if we fail. History wi ll not forget us if we succeed. 14 14 “The Best Speech I Ever Wrote” by Marty Kaplan, Jul y 30, 2009, available from he_best_speech_i_ever_wrote_20090730/ ; Internet; accessed July 30, 2010. Mondale’s speech, “Evian and Geneva,” was read on July 21, 1979

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352 REFERENCES PRIMARY SOURCES Books Bentwich, Norman. Wanderer between Two Worlds London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner: 1941. Coughlin, Charles. E. Am I an Anti-Semite? Detroit: Condon Printing, 1939. Davies, Joseph. Mission to Moscow NY: Simon and Schuster, 1941. Goering, Hermann. Germany Reborn Strand, W.C.2, UK: Elkin Mathews & Marrot LTD, 1934. Harper, Lyn H. The Speeches of Adolf Hitler April 1922-August 1939 Oxford: Oxford Press, 1942. McDonald, James G. The German Refugees and the League of Nations London: Friends of Europe, 1936. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Vol. III. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946. Noakes, Jeremy and Geoffrey Pridham, eds. Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945 London: Cape Publishing, 1974. Press Conferences of FDR Vol. 11-12, 1938.NY: Da Capo Press, 1972. Roosevelt, Franklin D. The Public Papers and Address of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Volume 7 The Continuing Struggle for Liberalism, 1938 New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941. Simpson, Sir John Hope. The Refugee Problem: Report of a Survey London: Oxford University Press, 1939. Thompson, Dorothy. Refugees: Anarchy or Organization? New York: Random House, 1938.

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353 Treves, Sir Frederick. The Lake of Geneva London: Cassell and Company, LTD, 1922. Weizmann, Chaim and Barnet Mitvinoff. The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann: December 1931-April 1952 Series B, vol. 2. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1984. Documents British Foreign Office Memorandum on Report of Committee on International Ass istance to Refugees. January 16, 1938. PRO FO 371 W445-172-98. “Circular Letter from the League of Nations Secretary-General A ugust 14, 1928, Official Journal (1929): 323. Congressional Record Appendix Congressional Record Department of State, Press Releases Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 Series D, IV. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951. Foreign Office Minute, “The Refugee Question” August 1, 1938. PRO FO 371/22532 W11768/104/98. Foreign Relations of the United States. Gustave Ador to the League of Nations, “The Question of Russian Refugees, “Leag ue of Nations Official J ournal Annex 2, 1921 (February 20, 1921): 228. “Law on Passports of Jews October 5, 1938, 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt Part 11342, Document 2120-PS, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Vol. IV, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946, 754-755. “Law to Remove the Distress of the People and the State (The Enabling Act),” r eprinted in U.S. Department of State, Division of European Affairs, National Socialism. Basic Principles, their Application by the Nazi Party’s Foreign Organizations, and the Use of Germans Abroad for Nazi Aims Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1943, Appendix, Document 11, 217-18. League of Nations, International Assistance to Refugees: Report submitted to the twentieth ordinary session of the Assembly of the League of Nations. A.18.1939.XII July 24, 1938.

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354 “Letter of Resignation of James G. McDonald” December 27, 1935 C1538 20A-8073222873, ix, League of Nations Archives. Makins, “Refugees—Memorandum on the Refugee Question,” September 1, 1935September 1, 1936 PRO FO 371 W10548/172/98. “Note by the American Department of State to the German Foreign Ministr y on the Evian Conference”, October 26, 1938 cited in John Mendelsohn, ed. The Holocaust. Vol 5 Jewish Emigration from 1933 to the Evian Conference of 1938 145-147. Observations Prsentes par Sir Horace Rumbold (annexe) Comit Pour L’Assi stance Internationale aux Rfugies. Procs-Verbal (C.A.I.R./P.V.) December 18, 1935. R5633/21365/20038 League of Nations Archives. Proceedings of the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees, Evia n, France, July 6-15, 1938 and Record of the Plenary Meetings of the Committee, Resolutions and Reports. Sir Neill Malcolm, Refugees Coming From Germany: Report submitted to the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations A.19.1936.XII. 1 September 1936. Sir Neill Malcolm, “Refugees Coming from Germany: Report submitted to t he Nineteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations.” A.25.1938.XII 22 August 1938, League of Nations Archives. The United States Government Manual, 2009-2010 National Archives and Records Administration. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009. Internet “Address before the Pan American Union.” Franklin D. Roosevelt. April 12, 1933 available from ; Internet; accessed August 24, 2010. American Jewish Yearbook Review of the Year 1938-1939 available from ; Internet; accessed May 14, 2010. Canadian Jewish Congress Charities National Archives-Collection Guide avai lable from ; Internet; accessed August 15, 2010. “German Jewish Response to the Nuremberg Laws (September 24, 1935) available fr om

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381 “The Response of the New Zealand Government to Jewish Refugees, 1933-1939” available from ; Internet; accessed June 11, 2010. “The Sad Voyage of the St. Louis Anti-Semitism Rampant in Canada in the 1930s” October 7, 2009 available from ; Internet; accessed June 11, 2010. “The Transfer Agreement and the Boycott Movement: A Jewish Dilemma on the Eve of the Holocaust” by Yf’aat Weiss, Shoah Resource Center, available from ; Internet; accessed October 7, 2010. “The Trial of Adolf Eichmann Session 18 (Part 5 of 6)” available from transcripts/Sessions/Session018-05.html ; Internet; accessed March 12, 2010. “The Virtual Jewish History Tour Ecuador” by Jacqueline Shields, 1998, available f rom ; Internet; accessed September 4, 2010. “The Virtual Jewish History Tour Haiti” by Ariel Scheib available from ; Internet; accessed June 25, 2010. Weltsch, Robert. “Wear It With Pride, The Yellow Badge,” Jdische Rundschau no. 27, April 4, 1933, available from ; Internet; accessed March 12, 2009. “Whitewashing FDR’s Holocaust Record: An Analysis of Robert N. Rosen’s Saving the Jews: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Holocaust New Documents Shed More Light on FDR’s Holocaust Failure” by Laurel Leff and Rafael Medoff, April 2004, avai lable from ; Internet; accessed June 12, 2010. “Zionism and the Holocaust,” by Tony Greenstein (June 2006) available from onism2.htm#n46 ;Internet; accessed May 14, 2010. Journals Adelman, Howard. “From Refugees to Forced Migration: the UNHCR and Human Security” The International Migration Review 35, no. 1 (2001): 7-32.

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382 Adler-Rudel, S. “The Evian Conference on the Refugee Question.” Year Book XIII of the Leo Baeck Institute (London: 1968): 235-273. Bartop, Paul M. “Drawing the Line Somewhere: The Dominions and Refugee Immigration in the 1930s” Paper presented at ACSANA Canadian Studies Conference’88 Canberra, Australia June 22-24, 1988. Boylston, Frances. “The Dominican Republic.” Inroads no. 13 (Summer 2003): 110-121. Burgess, Greg. “France and the German Refugee Crisis of 1933.” French History. 16, no. 2 (June 1, 2002): 203-229. Cross, Gary S. “Toward Social Peace and Prosperity: The Politics of Imm igration in France During the Era of World War I.” French Historical Studies 11, no. 4 (Fall 1980): 610-632. Feingold, Henry L. “Who Shall Bear Guilt for the Holocaust: The Human Dilemm a,” American Jewish History vol. 68 no. 3 (March: 1979): 261-282. Frankel, Josef. The Jews of Austria, Essays on their Life, History and Destruction. London: Valentine, Mitchell, 1967. Grobman, Alex. “A Closer Look at the Use of Statistics by Some Critics of the Abandonment of the Jews.” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 40, no. 4 (2003): 381-385. Harwood, Edwin. “American Public Opinion and US Immigration Policy.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 487 (1986): 201-212. Holmes Colin. “The Myth of Fairness: Racial Violence in Britain 1911-1919.” History Today 35, no. 10 (October 1, 1985): 41-45. Horne, Fiona. “Explaining British Refugee Policy, March 1938-July 1940.” Masters of Arts in History Thesis, University of Canterbury, New Zealand (March 2008): 1-106. Jaeger, Gilbert, “On the History of the International Protection of Refu gees,” International Review of the Red Cross 83, no. 843 (September 2001): 727-736. Johnson, Thomas J., Wayne Wanta, John T. Byrd and Cindy Lee. “Exploring FDR’s Relationship with the Press: A Historical Agenda-Setting Study.” Political Communication 12 (1995): 157-172. Kaplan, Marian A. “’A Very Modest Experiment”—The Jewish Refugee Settlement in Sosua, 1940-1945” The Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook 53 no. 1 (2008): 127-155. Katz, Shlomo Z. “Public Opinion in Western Europe and the Evian Conference of July

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383 1938.” Yad Vashem Studies 9 (1973): 105-132. Kimer, James T. “Landmarks in U.S. Immigration Policy.” NACLA Report on the Americas 39, no. 1 (July/August 2005): 34-35. Kirchwey, Freda. “While the Jews Die,” The Nation (March 13, 1943): 366-367. Kraut, Alan M., Richard Breitman, and Thomas W. Imhoof. “The State Department, t he Labor Department, and the German Jewish Immigration, 1930-1940.” Journal of American Ethnic History (Spring 1984): 5-38. Luxner, Larry. “Moving Memorial to Jewish Settlers” Americas 56, no. 5, (SeptemberOctober 2004): 5. Maga, Timothy P. “Closing the Door: The French Government and Refugee Policy, 1933-1939.” French Historical Studies 12, no. 3 (Spring 1982): 424-442. Marcus, Ernst. “The German Foreign Office and the Palestine Question in the Per iod 1933-1939.” Yad Vashem Studies 2 (1958), 179-204. Markus, Andrew. “Jewish Migration to Australia 1938-49” Journal of Australian Studies 13 (November 1983): 19. Mashberg, Michael. “American Diplomacy and the Jewish Refugees, 1938-1939,” Yivo Annual of Jewish Social Science 15 (1974): 339-365. Melzer, Emanuel, “Poland, the United States, and the Emigration of East European Jewry—The Plan for a ‘Supplemental Jewish Homeland’ in Angola, 1938-1939,” Gal-Ed 11 (1989): 65, 81-85. Michman, Dan. “The Committee for Jewish Refugees in Holland (1933-1940).” Yad Vashem Studies 14 (1981): 205-232. Porath, Yehoshua. “Nuri al-Sa’id’s Arab Unity Programme.” Middle Eastern Studies 20, no.4 (October 1984): 76-98. Romain, Gemma. “The Anschluss: the British Response to the Refugee Crisis.” The Journal of Holocaust Education 8, no. 3 (Winter 1999): 87-102. Roorda, Eric Paul. “Genocide Next Door: The Good Neighbor Policy, the Trujillo Regime and the Haitian Massacre of 1937” Diplomatic History Vol. 20, No. 3 (Summer 1996): 301-319. Skran, Claudena. "Profiles of the First Two Commissioners." Journal of Refugee Studies 1, no. 3/4 (1988): 277-95.

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384 Shafir, Shlomo. “George S. Messersmith: An Anti-Nazi Diplomat’s View of t he GermanJewish Crisis” Jewish Social Studies vol. 35, no. 1 (January, 1973): 32-41. ________. “American Diplomats in Berlin (1933-1939).” Yad Vashem Studies 9 (1973): 71-104 Spear, Sheldon. “The United States and the Persecution of the Jews in Germany, 19331939.” Jewish Social Studies 30, no. 4 (October, 1968): 215-242 Leo Spitzer, “Rootless Nostalgia: Vienna in La Paz, La Paz in Elsewhere,” Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies 10.3 (2001): 6-17. Srebrnik, Henry. “Red Star over Birobidzhan: Canadian Jewish Communists and the ‘Jewish Autonomous Region’ in the Soviet Union,” Labour 44 (Fall 1999): 129-147. Tartakower, Arieh. “The Jewish Refugees: A Sociological Survey.” Jewish Social Studies vol. 4, no. 4 (October, 1942): 311-348. Tenenbaum, Joseph. “The Crucial Year 1938.” Yad Vashem Studies 2 (1958): 49-77. Wischnitzer, Mark. “The Historical Background of the Settlement of Jewish R efugees in Santo Domingo.” Jewish Social Studies 4 no. 1 (January 1942): 45-58. Zucker, Bat-Ami. “Frances Perkins and the German-Jewish Refugee, 1933-1940. ” American Jewish History 89, no. 1 (2001): 35-59.

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386 APPENDIX A Country-by-country breakdown of Jewish refugee immigration, using wid ely accepted history texts concerning refugees from Nazism: Reception of Jewish refugees, 1933-1945 1 United States Abella: (14) (1933-45) 200,000 Bauer: (15) (1933-39) 85,000 Marrus: (16) (1940-45) 116,000 (Together, the figures of Bauer and Marrus cover the period of 1933-1945 and add up to 201,000.) Tartakower: (17) (1933-43) 190,000 (Add 10,399 for 1944 and 1945, (18) and the 874 who were brought to Oswego, thus giving a total for 1933-45 of 201,273.) Wyman: (19) (1933-45) 250,518 (Wyman's figure is given as the maximum possible estimate for all refugees from Nazism. Deduct from that ten percent for the number who were non-Jewish political refugees, and another 15,000 for those who entered by 1941 with visitor visas and by 1945 had been readmitted as permanent quota immigrants and were thus included in the 250,518 figure. Accordingly, the maximum number is 210,466.) Palestine Bauer: (1933-39) 80,000 Marrus: (1940-45) 58,000 (Together, the figures of Bauer and Marrus cover the entire period of 1933-45 and add up to 138,000.) Marrus (1933-37) 43,000 Ofer: (20) (1938-39) 40,000 1 Alex Grobman, “A Closer Look at the Use of Statis tics by Some Critics of the Abandonment of the Jews,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 40, no. 4, 2003, 381.

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387 Marrus (1940-45) 58,000 (Together, the figures of Marrus and Ofer cover the entire period of 1933-45 and add up to 141,000.) Tartakower: (1933-43) 120,000 Marrus: (1944) 14,000 (Together, the figures of Tartakower and Marrus add up to 134,000. However, Marrus's calculation for 1944 includes only those Jews who entered via Turkey and is thus an underestimate; furthermore, he does not provide a figure for 1945 alone.) Abella: (1933-45) 125,000 Latin America Bauer: (1933-39) 85,000 Abella: (1933-45) 77,000 (This figure is based on Argentina and Brazil only.) Tartakower: (1933-43) 128,000 Great Britain Abella: (1933-45) 70,000 Breitman: (21) (1933-45) 70,000 Tartakower: (1933-43) 65,000 Marrus: (1933-39) 56,000 Sherman: (22) (1933-39) 56,000 Canada Abella: (1933-45) 5,000 Tartakower: (1933-43) 8,000 Australia Abella: (1933-45) 15,000 Tartakower: (1933-43) 9,000 Switzerland Marrus: (1933-45) 22,000 Wyman: (23) (1933-44) 27,000 Tartakower: (1933-43) 16,000 Shanghai

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388 Bauer: (1933-39) 18,000 Wyman: (1938-40) 18,000 Marrus: (1933-39) 17,000 Tartakower: (1933-43) 25,000 Sweden Wyman: (24) (1943-45) 12,000 Although there are several possible choices for each country, using an approximate average for each, and taking into account that some additional thousands of Jewish refugees were taken into other countries, including South Africa, Japan, Spain, and Portugal, a reasonable summary would conclude that the number of Jewish refugees taken in between 1933 and 1945 by the United States and the rest of the world was as follows: United States 200,000 Palestine 138,000 Latin America 85,000 Great Britain 70,000 Canada 5,000 Australia 15,000 Switzerland 22,000 Shanghai [China] 18,000 Sweden 12,000 TOTAL 565,000 United States: 200,000 (35%) Rest of the world: 365,000 (65%)

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389 APPENDIX B ESTIMATED NUMBER OF UNASSIMILATED REFUGEES POLITICAL REFUGEES OFFICIALLY RECORDED IN FRANCE 1922-1939 1 NATIONALITY 1922 1924 1930 1933-34 1935-38 Russians 67-75,000 150-250,000 50,000 100120,000 Armenians 35-40,000 Spaniards 300,000 Germans 46,000 37-40,000 Italians 50,000 10,000 1 Sir John Hope Simpson, The Refugee Problem Report Tables LXII, LXIII, LXIV, LXV, LXVI and 119-20, 328-329, 333-334 in Maga, French Historical Studies “The French Government and Refugee Policy”, p. 427.

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390 APPENDIX C LIST OF JEWISH AND NON-JEWISH RELIEF ORGANIZATION TESTIFYING BEFORE THE EVIAN CONFERENCE 1 International Christian Committee for Non-Aryans (London); Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews, Chairman Dr. Arthur Ruppin (London); Jewish Colonization Association, O.E. d’Avigdor Goldsmid (Paris); German Jewish Aid Committee, Otto M. Schiff (London); Society for the Protection of Science and Learning (London); Comit d’aide et d’assistance aux victemes de l’anti-smitisme en Allemag ne (Paris); Comit d’assitance aux rfugis (Paris); Comite voor Bijzondere Joodsche Belangen (Amsterdam); Centre Suisse pour l’aide aux rfugis (Basle); Comit central tchcoslovaque pour les rfugis provenant d’Allemagne (Prague); Fdration internationale des migrs d’Allemagne (Paris); International Migration Service (Geneva); International Student Service (Geneva); Comit international pour le placement des intellectuals rfugis (Geneva); The Joint Foreign Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Anglo-Jewish Association, Neville Laski and Leonard G. Montefiore (London); Agudas Isral World Organization, J. Rosenheim (London); American Joint Distribution Committee; endorsed joint memorandum but instructed their representative, Rabbi Jonah B. Wise to submit separate statem ent (Paris); Council for German Jewry, Lord Herbert Samuel (London); HICEM ( Association des Emigrs Hias-Ica ), James Bernstein (Paris); Notgemeinschaft Deutsche der Wissenschaftler im Ausland (London); The Society of Friends (German Emergency Committee) (London); Bureau international pour le respect du droit d’aisle et l’aide aux rfugis politiques (Paris); World Jewish Congress (Paris); New Zionist Organization (London); Emigration Advisory Committee (London); 1 Erika Mann and Eric Estorick, “Private and Governme ntal Aid of Refugees,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 123, Refugees (May, 1939), 150-151; Proceedings o f the Intergovernmental Committee, 49.

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391 Alliance isralite universelle (Paris); Comit pour le dveloppement de la grande colonization juive (Zurich); Internationale ouvri et socialiste (Paris-Brussels); Comit Catholiques Amricains, anglais, Belge, Franais, Nerlandais et Suisse pour l’aide aux migrs ; ‘Freeland’ Association (London); ‘Ort’ (Paris); Centre de recherches de solutions au problme juif (Paris); League of Nations Union (London); Jewish Agency for Palestine; endorsed joint and submitted separate memorandum to White Sub-committee regarding resettlement in Palestine (London); Comit pour la defense des droits des Isralites en Europe centrale et orientale (Paris); Union des Socits ‘Os’ (Paris); Royal Institute of International Affairs (London); Fdration des migrs d’Autriche (Paris); Socit d’migration et de colonization juive ‘Emcol’ (Paris); Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland Dr. Otto Hirsch, Dr. Paul Epstein, Michael Traub (Palestine Office) and Dr. Werner Rosenberg ( Hilfsverein der Juden in Deutschland ) Juedische Kultusgemeinde Wien Prof. Dr. Heinrich Neuman, Dr. Joseph Loewenherz and Kommerzialrat B.J. Storfer; Organization of Jewish Settlers from Germany, Mr. Kurt Blumenfeld, Dr. Siegfried Moses and Dr. Max Kreutzberger (Tel Aviv); General Federation of Jewish Labor, Golda Meirson (Tel Aviv); Palestine paper Davar Mr. Zalman Rubashov (Tel Aviv)

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392 APPENDIX D Decisions taken at the Evian Conference on Jewish Refugees, July 1938 1 The Intergovernmental Committee Adopted by the Committee on July 14th, 1938 "Having met at Evian, France, from July 6th to July 13th, 1938: 1. Considering that the question of involuntary emigration has assumed major proportions and that the fate of the unfortunate people affected has become a problem for intergovernmental deliberation; 2. Aware that the involuntary emigration of large numbers of people, of different cr eeds, economic conditions, professions and trades, from the country or countries where they have been established, is disturbing to the general economy, since these persons are obliged to seek refuge, either temporarily or permanently, in other countries at a time when there is serious unemployment; that, in consequence, countries of refuge and settlement are faced with problems, not only of an economic and social nature, but also of public order, and that there is a severe strain on the administrative facilities and absorptive capacities of the receiving countries; 3. Aware, moreover, that the involuntary emigration of people in large numbers has become so great that it renders racial and religious problems more acute, incr eases international unrest, and may hinder seriously the processes of appeasement in international relations; 4. Believing that it is essential that a long-range program should be envisaged, whe reby assistance to involuntary emigrants, actual and potential, may be coordinated w ithin the framework of existing migration laws and practices of Governments; 5. Considering that if countries of refuge or settlement are to cooperate in findi ng an orderly solution of the problem before the Committee they should have the collaboration of the country of origin and are therefore persuaded that it will make its contribut ion by enabling involuntary emigrants to take with them their property and possessions and emigrate in an orderly manner; 1 Proceedings of the Intergovernmental Committee, Evi an, July 6th to 15th, 1938...Record of the Plenary Meetings of the Committee. Resolutions and Reports, London, July 1938.

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393 6. Welcoming heartily the initiative taken by the President of the United Stat es of America in calling the Intergovernmental Meeting at Evian for the prima ry purpose of facilitating involuntary emigration from Germany (including Austria), and expressing profound appreciation to the French Government for its courtesy in receiving the Intergovernmental Meeting at Evian; 7. Bearing in mind the resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Nations on May 14th, 1938, concerning international assistance to refugees: Recommends: 8. a) That the persons coming within the scope of the activity of the Intergovernm ental Committee shall be 1) persons who have not already left their country of origin (Germany, including Austria), but who must emigrate on account of their politica l opinion, religious beliefs or racial origin, and 2) persons as defined in 1) who have already left their country of origin and who have not yet established themse lves permanently elsewhere; b) That the Governments participating in the Intergovernmental Committee shall continue to furnish the Committee for its strictly confidential information, with 1) deta ils regarding such immigrants as each Government may be prepared to receive under its ex isting laws and practices and 2) details of these laws and practices; c) That in view of the fact that the countries of refuge and settlement are ent itled to take into account the economic and social adaptability of immigrants, these should in man y cases be required to accept, at least for a time, changed conditions of living in the countries of settlement; d) That the Governments of the countries of refuge and settlement should not assume any obligations for the financing of involuntary emigration; e) That, with regard to the documents required by the countries of refuge and set tlement, the Governments represented on the Intergovernmental Committee should consider the adoption of the following provision: In those individual immigration cases in which the usually required documents emana ting from foreign official sources are found not to be available, there should be accepted s uch other documents serving the purpose of the requirements of law as may be availabl e to the immigrant, and that, as regards the document which may be issued to an involuntary emigrant by the country of his foreign residence to serve the purpose of a pass port, note be taken of the several international agreements providing for the issue of a trave l document serving the purpose of a passport and of the advantage of their wide application; f) That there should meet at London an Intergovernmental Committee consisting of such representatives as the Governments participating in the Evian Meeting may desire to

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394 designate. This Committee shall continue and develop the work of the Intergovernment al Meeting at Evian and shall be constituted and shall function in the following manner: There shall be a Chairman of this Committee and four Vice-Chairmen; there sha ll be a director of authority, appointed by the Intergovernmental Committee, who shall be guided by it in his actions. He shall undertake negotiations to improve the present conditions of exodus and to replace them by conditions of orderly emigration. He shall approach the Governments of the countries of refuge and settlement with a view t o developing opportunities for permanent settlement. The Intergovernmental Comm ittee, recognizing the value of the work of the existing refugee services of the Le ague of Nations and of the studies of migration made by the International Labor Office, s hall cooperate fully with these organizations, and the Intergovernmental Committe e at London shall consider the means by which the cooperation of the Committee and the director with these organizations shall be established. The Intergovernment al Committee, at its forthcoming meeting at London, will consider the scale on which its expense s shall be apportioned among the participating Governments; 9. That the Intergovernmental Committee in its continued form shall hold a first m eeting at London on August 3rd, 1938."

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395 APPENDIX E JEWISH POPULATION OF THE WORLD AT END OF 1937 1 (In thousands) America 5,375 Europe 9,970 Africa 655 Asia 725 -------Total 16,725 United States 4,800 Argentine 170 Brazil 55 Uruguay 25 Mexico 20 Cuba 10 Chile 10 Other 15 -------America 5,375 British Isles 340 France 270 Holland 115 Belgium 70 Scandinavia 20 -------Western Europe 815 Germany 365 Czechoslovakia 360 Austria 150 Italy 55 Switzerland 20 -------Central Europe 950 Poland 3,275 U.S.S.R. (incl. Asia) 3,130 Rumania 800 Hungary 440 Lithuania 160 Latvia 95 Greece 75 Yugoslavia 75 Turkey (incl. Asia) 75 Bulgaria 50 -------Eastern Europe 8,175 Minor European Countries 30 French Morocco 175 Algiers 130 South Africa 95 Tunis 70 Egypt 70 Abyssinia 50 Libya 25 Spanish Morocco 25 Other 15 -------Africa 655 Palestine 420 Iraq 100 Iran 50 Yemen 50 Australia 25 India 25 Japan and China 20 Syria and Lebanon 15 New Zealand 5 Other 15 -------Asia (and Oceania) 725 1 Estimates of Jewish Agency for Palestine, prepared by Dr. Arthur Ruppin for the Evian Conference adjusted for U. S. A. and Abyssinia in accord with American Jewish Yearbook 1944-45

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396 APPENDIX F PROPOSALS BY THE BUREAU REGARDING THE EXPENSES OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE AND THEIR ALLOCATION 1 Adopted by the Committee on July 14 th 1938 If, as at present anticipated, the Evian session of the Intergovernmental Commi ttee closes this week, the costs incurred which have been advanced by the French Government can now be estimated to amount altogether to 16,000 Swiss francs. In detail this amount can be roughly subdivided as follows: Allowances paid to the League of Nations Secretariat for the staff put at t he disposal of the Intergovernmental Committee……………………………………12,000 Swiss francs. Paper, stencils and roneo ink……………………………………… …..1,500 “ “ Miscellaneous expenses (telephone and telegraph communications, liaison by motor-c ar between Evian and Geneva, etc.)………………………………………………………… …………… 500 “ “ Minutes of plenary meetings and reports of the two Sub-Committees…2,000 Swiss fr ancs Total 16,000 “ “ In the invitation sent by the United States Government to the States attending t he Intergovernmental Committee at Evian, it was suggested that these costs should be equitably apportioned. The Secretary-General accordingly suggests the appli cation of the League of Nations scale of allocation of expenditure; thus, each country in the Intergovernmental Committee would assume responsibility for the same number of units of expenditure as that allotted to it at the present time by the League Secre tariat at Geneva. 1 Proceedings of the Evian Conference

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397 The following table shows in Swiss francs the contribution which each member of the Intergovernmental Committee would thus be asked to make. Units Swiss Francs USA 108 3,024 Argentine Republic 23 644 Australia 23 644 Belgium 1 9 532 Bolivia 2 56 United Kingdom 108 3,024 Brazil 23 644 Canada 35 980 Chile 8 224 Columbia 5 140 Costa Rica 1 28 Cuba 5 14 0 Denmark 12 336 Denmark 12 336 Dominican Republic 1 28 Ecuador 1 28 France 80 2,240 Guatemala 0.5 14 Haiti 1 28 Honduras 0.5 14 Ireland 10 280 Mexico 13 364 Nicaragua 0.5 14 Norway 9 252 New Zealand 8 224 Panama 1 28 Paraguay 0.5 14 Netherlands 24 672 Peru 5 140 Sweden 19 532 Switzerland 17 476 Uruguay 4 112 Venezuela 4 112 Total 571 15,988

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR Dennis Ross Laffer was born in Detroit, Michigan and attended Michiga n State University and was awarded a BachelorÂ’s in Science degree with high honors in 1972. He was a member of the HonorÂ’s College and was inducted into Phi B eta Kappa, Phi Eta Sigma and Phi Kappa Phi. He attended the University Of Michi gan School Of Medicine and received a Doctor of Medicine Degree in 1976. His internship i n General Surgery and residency in Internal Medicine was spent at William Bea umont Hospital in Royal Oak, Michigan. He accepted a gastroenterology fellowship at the Cleveland Clinic Foundation in Cleveland, Ohio and completed his specialty training in 1982 and then relocated to Tampa, Florida where he entered private practice, m arried and had two daughters. He is a Fellow of the American College of Gastro enterology, a member of the American College of Physicians and former Chief of Gastroenterol ogy at Tampa General Hospital and St. JosephÂ’s Hospital. Dr. Laffer has had a long interest in history, especially in the area of the Holocaust and genocide. He is a founding member of the Florida Holocaust Museum in St. Petersburg, Florida. His interest in the topic of the Evian Conference was s timulated by his involvement in the museum and resulted in the publication of an article on the topic in 2003 in History in Dispute, The Holocaust 1933-1945 An unexpected case of cancer led to his decision to enter the MasterÂ’s of History Program at the University of South Florida which furthered his concentration on the Holocaust and genocide. He has

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had several opportunities to address the Southeast United States chapter of the We stern Front Association on the topic of the origins of the Armenian Genocide and has lectured about the Evian Conference, the Wagner-Rogers Bill and the Hennings Bill at the Fl orida Holocaust Museum. He was inducted into the USF Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta and currently travels the State of Florida on behalf of the American Cancer Soc iety discussing colon cancer screening. His illness forced him to close his solo medical practi ce but he is now employed by a local hospital on an outpatient basis. He plans to pursue a Ph.D. in history.


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