Peace and Conflict Management Review

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Peace and Conflict Management Review

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Peace and Conflict Management Review
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WEB SITE : www.nur.ac.rw February March 2008 Report of the Intenational Conference on Transitions and Peace Processes in the Great Lakes Region, Kigali-Prime Holdings, 31May-15t June 2007 I CCM Peace and Conflict M a n a g e m ent Review

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Acronyms I Abbreviations APR AU Brig. Gen. EAC CCM CCM/NUR CDR CNDD : Armee Patriotique Rwandaise (Rwandan Patriotic Army) :African Union : Brigadier General : East African Community : Chama Cha Mapinduzi ( Tanzania ) : Center for Conflict Mana.gement/National. University of Rwanda : Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique (Coalition for the defense of the Republic) : Conseil National pour la Defense de la Democratie CNDD-FDD : Conseil National pour la Defense de la Democratie-Forces pour CNUR Comdt CPGL FAB FAR FDLR FNL FRODEBU GLR IC/GLR JAPCS Maj. Gen. MRND OUA PCM P ADRIGU la Defense de la Democ:r_-atie (National Council _for the Defense of Democracy -Forces for the Defense of Democracy) : Commission Nationale pour l'Unite et la Reconciliation (National Commission for Unity and Reconciliation) : Commandant : Communaute Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs (Economic Community of Great Lakes) : Forces Armees Burundaises (Burundian Army Forces) : Forces Armees Rwandaises (Rwandan Army Forces) : Force Democratique pour la Liberation du Rwanda (Democratic Force for the Liberation of Rwanda) : Front National de Liberation (National Liberation Front) : Front pour la Democratie au Burundi (Front for Democracy in Burundi) : Great Lakes Region : International Conference on the Great Lakes Region :Journal of African Peace and Conflict Studies : Major General : Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement (Revolutionary Movement for Developement) : Organisation of African Unity : Peace and Conflict Management Review : Peace and Development Research Institute of Goteborg University P ARMEHUTU: Parti pour !'Emancipation Hutu (Party for Hutu Emancipation) PNDRR : Programme National de Demobilisation et de Reinsertion (National Programme for Demobilisation and Reintegration) RCA : Republique Centre Africaine (Republic of Central Africa) ROC : Republique Democn1tique du Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo) 1 CCM Peace and Conflict Management Review

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RMA RPA RPF SIDA SSA ICTR Rwanda Military Academy Rwandan Patriotic Army Rwandan Patriotic Front : Swedish International Development Agency : Sub Saharan Africa : International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Table of Contents Acronyms I Abbreviiltions . ....... ........... . ................... ......... ... ...... ........... ................................................... ... ......... .... 2 Table of Conte nts ................ ...... ....... ........ ....... ............. ..... .................... ........ ............. .......................... ................. 3 Ed itorial .................... ........................ ............ ...................... .......... ........... .......... ... .......................... .... ....... : . ... .... ..... .4 About the Conference ......... .... ........... ......... ............... .................. ........... .... ... ..................... ..... .... ... .... ................... .5 S p eec h by Dr Vincent Biruta, President of the Senate at the opening ceremony of the Conference ....... ... ...... 6 THEME 1: TRANSITION AND PEACE BUILDING: THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK. ......................... S T ran s ition s and Peace Building in Africa's Great Lakes Region By Prof. Anastase SHYAKA .. ... ......... ... ......... 8 THEME II : HOME-GROWN MECHANISMS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE BUILDING .. ..... ... .... ...... ........... .......... ... .... ....... .................................................................................. IO Gacaca :Origin and Philosophy by Brig. Gen. Frank K. Rusagara, Comdt, RMA Nyakinama ....................... 10 Tr.Jnsitional Justice and Gacaca in Post -Genocide Rwanda: theory and practice, by Alice Urusaro Karezi ..... ......... ................................. ..... . ... .. ... .... ................ . ...... ....... ..... . .... .............. .............. ... 12 The Unity and Reconciliation process in Rwanda, by Fatuma Ndangiza ...................... .... .......... .... .............. ...... 13 THEME Ill: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM ... ........ .................... .. . . ................................... .. .......................... 15 Military integration disarmament and demobilisation. Military integration in Rwanda, by Maj. Gen. Karenzi Karake .... ................ ....... ..... ........ ....... ........ .... ............ ................. ... .... .... .... ...................... . 15 The demobili sa tion process in Burundi, by Col. lsa"ie NIYIB IZI... ...... ... .... ........... . . ..... ......... . .................. . ..... .... 14 THEME IV: ELECTIONS AND ELECTORAL PROCESSES ............................................................................. 19 Elections and challenges to the democratisation process in Tanzania. The interface between .1dministrative reforms and democratisation by Jonas Ewald ....................... ........ ....................... ...... .19 The elec tora l process in DRC. Case of the Northern Province, by TEGERA ..... ... . . . ............... ........................ .21 THEME V: REFUGEE QUESTION, IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP .................................... ........................ 23 The Quest io n of the Expulsion of Banyarwanda from Tanz.Jn ia, By Prof. Charles GASARASI . ..................... 23 THEME VI: UN/AU INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE GLR ....................................................... 26 The International Conference on the Great Lakes Re g ion, b y Dr. Amb. Richard SEZIBERA . ........ ...... ....... ... 26 Conference R esolutions ... ...... .......... ..... .......... ......................... ............................ .......... ................................... . ... . 28 APPENDICES: Conference Agenda and Participants .......................................................... ... ........ .. ..................... 29 Appen dix 1: Conference Agenda ................... ................................. .............. ........ ....... .................... .... ........ 29 Appendix 2: List of Participants .................................................................................... 31 ICCM Peace and Conflict ManaQement Review I 03

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Editorial It is with pleasure that I Wiite this editorial for this very first issue of Peace & Conflict Management (PCM) Review a new journal of the National University of Rwanda's Center for Conflict Management (CCM). Since its creation. CCM has contributed to conflict resolution and to the search for sustainable development not only in Rwanda but also in the Great Lakes This has been achieved through research. conferences. publications and community service. Thanks to CCM initiatives, NUR has become a vibrant peace research institution nationally and regionally. Since 2001. CCM has made 14 publications in the CCM Cahier. From 2008, starting with this issue. CCM will disseminate its research find ings through two journals: (i) Peace and Conflict Management Review for which we are happy to launch its publication and (ii) Journal of African Peace & Conflict Studies. an international indexed bi-annual journal. whose first issue is expected in coming months. The PCM Review contains summaries of presentations and recommendations of the International Conference on "Transitions and Peace Building in Africa s Great Lakes Region organized in Kigali, on 31 May 01 June 2007 by CCM in collaboration with PADRlGU (Peace and Development Research Institute) at Goteborg University (Sweden). It is with pride and satisfaction that we acknowledge and support the way this NUR c enter engages in critical thinking and policy research and formulation in the areas of Peace and Conflict transformation. We are confident that different stakeholders and policy makers at national regional lev04 I CCM els w ill find useful the resolutions made during this conference. In thi s way N U R is contributing to national d evelopment and peace cons oli dation in our reg ion. We seiz e this opportunity o f the l aunching of the first issue of this publication to express our gratitude to SIDA/SAREC that supporte d this conference and many othe r activities at CCM and NUR in general. I also wish to extend my thanks to all those academics and polic y makers who gav e presentations as well as those who actively p articipated in d e b a tes during this conference. Prof. Silas LWAKABAMBA Rector, National University of Rwanda Peace and Conflict Management Review

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PADRIGU a J IN COLLABORATION THE CENTElt FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT ( NUR I ctM COIIfEIIEIICE 0 WITH SIDA/ SAREC/ PADRIGU,ORGAIIZES AN REG10N TRANSITIONS AND PEACE PROCESSES IN THE DATES: lt/05/2007 / 06/2007 VBIUE: About the Conference The Center for Conflict Management (CCM) of the National University of Rwanda (NUR) organi z e d an international conference on Transitions and Peace Processes in the Great Lakes Region, in collaboration with the Peace and D e v e lopm ent Research Institute (P.ADRIGU) of the Goteborg University (Sweden) Held in Prime Holdings. Kigali, on 31 rst May -1 rst June 2007. This conference was supported by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). through the NUR -SIDA/SAREC Partnership. Participants and speakers were from Rwanda, DRC Burundi. Tanzania. Uganda. South Africa and Sweden. They comprised: Policy makers. members of the Diplomatic Corps, senior military officers. academics. researchers, civil society actors and the media. Dr Vincent Biruta. President of the Senate and Guest of Honour. officially opened the conference after a word of welcome by Prof. Silas Lwakabamba, the Rector of the NUR. who, by taking advantage of the opportunity underlined the contribution of the NUR to peace. development and the management of conflicts in Rwanda trough the CCM. Jonas Ewald, the representative of Goteborg University. emphasized the releyance of the cooperation between the I CCM CCM and PARDIGU and the impact of this partnership on research development in Rwanda as well as the importance o f peace and security to development. aspects in which PADRIGU is specialized. In his opening remarks. Dr Vincent Biruta briefly exposed the conflict and post-conflict situation in the Great Lake Region with a specific reference to the horrible 1994 genocide in Rwanda. and emphasized the need to develop habits of peaceful coexistence. He held that each country should set up mechanisms of dealing with conflicts as "there is no universal fornmla". The CCM Director, Prof. Anastase Shyaka exposed themes of the conference notably: Transition and peace building: the conceptual framework, Elections and Electoral Processes Refugee Question, Identity and Citizenship, Home-Grown Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution and Peace Building, Security Sector Reform.. UN I AU International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. He held that "unless these issues are _adequately addressed, durable peace will remain uncertain in the GLR". I Those PhD are: Allee &th Mutamba. Kayumba. Eugene Ntaganda. Ezechtr-1 Sentama. Thi'ogt>ne Bangwa n uh usa. Peace and Conflict Management Review I 05

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Presentations made during the two days conferSpeech by Dr Vincent Biruta, President of ence focused on the following issues: the Senate at the opening ceremony of the Electoral process in the Democratic republic of Conference Congo (DRC). Electoral process in Tanzania, M_ilitary integration in Rwanda. Demobilization process in Burundi, Reconciliation process in Rwanda, International Conference on the GLR. The question of expulsion of Banyarwanda in Tanzania Gacaca: origin and philosophy, The transitional justice and Gacaca in postgenocide Rwanda A part from the presentations. six CCM PhD students at PADRIGU 1 presented also partial findings of their work. After all presentations. the closing ceremony was presided over by the Minister of Education. Dr Jeanne d'Arc Mujawamariya. In this regard. she thanked all participants and speakers with a specific emphasis on the hardworking for peace and development in the GLR and the active role universities should play in that process. The following part of this report provides the integral speech by the President of the Senate. Dr Vincent Biruta. the summary of all presentations and conclusions and recommendations that were made by participants during the con ference. 06 I CCM Your Excellencies Ministers Honourable Members of Parlement. Ladies and Gentlemen the Representative s of the Diplomatic and Consular Sorps. University Rectors. Dear Participants from Burundi, DRC, Uganda. Sweden, Dear Professors. Dear Students. Representatives of the Civil Society. Dear Representatives. It is a great privilege for me to join in today to open this conference on such an extremely important theme Transitions and Peace Building in Africa I would like here to thank the Center for Conflict Management ' of the National University of Rwanda and the Peace and Development Research Institute (PADRIGU) of the Goteborg University (Sweden) for having Peace and Conflict Management Review

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organized this conference. I am also grateful to CCM for having thought of inviting speakers from various horizons. This reminds us that the search for peace is a collective endeavor and its consolidation requires effort from each of us. I believe this conference will constitute a framework for academicians and political actors from our respective countries to exchange experiences, to learn from one another with the purpose of promoting peace through adequate management of transitions. Your Excellencies Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear participants, The countries of the Great Lakes Region have experienced at various times very violent con flicts which have forced populations into exile, internal displacements within countries. It is evident that the end of a conflict can not coincide with a situation which is as normal as that preceding the conflict. It is exactly during this intermediate stage qualified as transition that it is necessary to try to put things back in order to iron out problems left by these conflicts. David Bloomfield describes this period so well: .. In the first years following a transition, postconflict societies have generally to function in an unstable environment by trying desperately to face the problems which ensue from violence and their settlement, while giving the new frail democratic structures sufficient time to fit into normality. It is a critical period for developing coexistence habits, building the legitimacy of the new regime on measures and obtained results responding to the general expectations of the new situation ". I CCM When Rwanda experienced the genocide in 1994, it was a new situation for the countiy . There was no recipe either in Mrtca or elsewhere, which we could copy and apply in our own transition. It was therefore imperative to innovate and often break off from the classic models of transition, be it in the area of justice. reconciliation and the political management of society. The South Mrican Archbishop, Desmond Tutu addressing the reconciliation aspect emphasizes the creative character of the solutions which must be implemented to manage transi.:. tions: "There is no practical route of reconcilia tion. There is no shortcut or simple prescription to heal wounds and divisions of a society after protracted violence ". This is to underscore that there is no ready-made formula to manage and succeed the transition. Every countiy has to make itself ideal mechanisms taking into account the context, the challenges to take up and the potential opportunities to seize. Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear participants, Conflicts result in a lot of humanitarian and political challenges which absolutely need managing in a specific way. I would mention the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, the disarmament and the demobilization of combatants as well as their reintegration in the regular army, the restoring of a reassuring social climate. Rwanda was full of innovations to manage the post-genocide period As an example, Gacaca. Jurisdictions which constitute a justice with multiple objectives including the reconciliation. the truth. and getting around the slowness of Peace and Conflict Manaoement Review I 07

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the conventional justice. Other innovations comprise the Committee of Mediators "Abunzi the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. the sensitization sessions lngando which were initially intended for the fm:mer combatants but were finally extended to the various categories of the population. I would not however fail to point out that some of these mechanisms have often been misun derstood by some of our foreign partners. as a result. I think. of their originality nature. It is therefore imperative and useful for us that the partners who assist us in our transition and peace building processes. invest more effort to understand the complexities and pecu liarities of the situations which we are brought to administer. the challenges we are to face, the limits of the classic schemas and the opportu nii.ies which are created by these innovative mechanisms. Ladies and Gentlemen. Dear participants. I hope that these two days will allow you to exchange on i.he various themes of the conference which address such issues as the post electoral process. military reintegration. citizenship. identity and the question of refugees. and the various mechanisms for managing transitions . Debates will be all the more enriching as this conference gathers speakers from i.he Great Lakes countries which have each its own experience which will benefit the other participants I would not end without thanking once again the organizers of this conference as well as the speakers who have accepted to come and share 08 I CCM their experiences with the other participants. I also thank all those who have contributed in one way or another to the success of this conference. To you all, I wish fruitful debates. It is on this remark that I officially open the International Conference on "Transitions and Peace Processe s in the Great Lakes Region". Thank you ****************************** THEME 1 : TRANSITION AND PEACE BUILDING: THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK Transitions and Peace Building in Mrica' s Great Lakes Region, By Prof Anastase SHYAKA This presentation focuses on the following points: Understanding I defining the concept of transition and its linkage i.o peace building. Overview of transitions which occurred in the Region since late 50's, emphasizing the impact Peace and Conflict Management Review

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of transitions' past failures on the conflict system formation in the region, Assessing ongoing transitions in the countries of the region (Rwanda. Burundi, DRC. and Uganda). Transition can be understood as a process of a change from an uncomfortable situation to more acceptable situation. Transition from war to absence of violence; from totalitarian regime to some sort of democracy; from unelected to legitimate democratic government. Traditionally. however. transition means a form of government. negotiated between political actors for a political management of a society in unstable situation. Transition is usually terminated by elections aiming at putting in place a post transitional government. Transitions can be therefore of different nature: political. social. economic. etc. Today. transitions are more complex than their classical meaning. The socio-political reality in post-conflict period shows that elections do not put an end to the transition. Countries still led by non conventional and transitional mechanisms and tools and fall therefore in the catego ry of "countries in transition". Since late 50's the four countries in the region had three critical transitions. unfortunately at the same time. recorded three critical failures. Burundi, DRC. Rwanda and Uganda passed from the colonial to independent state. However. like most of Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) states. all these 4 GL countries have failed that transition. The causes underlying that failure are mainly: ICCM The Hutu-Tutsi antagonism in Rwanda and Burundi, International interferences and ethnic antagonism in DRC, North-South cleavage and its corollaries in Uganda. These causes are today among the very fuelling factors of current conflicts. The second wave of transitions occurred in early 90's. All the 4 countries embarked on democratic change agenda: it was a transition attempt from the totalitarian regimes to democratic system of government. Once again, like many countries in the SSA. all the 4 GL countries have failed this transition. As a consequence. in all the 4 countries. socio-political crisis and violent conflicts have, since then. intensified. Up to date. they are struggling to overcome the legacy of that failure whose principal features are as follows: The legacy of Hutu Power in Rwanda. Hutu/Tutsi ideologies in Burundi. Chronic instability. rwandophobia and partial state dysfunction in DRC. The last wave of transition is more related to the region as a whole than to individual countries and refers to the 1994 genocide and the failure of countries in the region to control the regionalization of conflict. It also refers to the lack of real determination to build sustainable peace in the region. Since then. conflicts in respective countries have evolved in conflict system. which has continuously resisted or neutralized all peace initiatives. Today. Rwanda, Burundi, DRC and Uganda are in sort of transitions, different but with some common directions. They are emerging from armed violence and social disintegration. They Peace and Conflict Management Review I 09

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are struggling to achieve peace. democratic governance and socio-economic development. Schematically. the situation can be described as follows : Current Features of Transition in the GLR !Country jFrom tTo IBurunc!I rrhe Legacy ot !Soc i a l Identity Based on Cohesion an !Violence a n d Democratic Eilmocraey Government DR Congo The Lt'gacy ol State building, Partial State Stability. Failure. Social Just ice. Corruption. Poor Democracy Go vernance and and P e aceful !Armed Viol ence Coexistence Rwanda rrhe leg a cy ot Nation Genocide and Buildi ng. Po verty Social Cohesion and Development Uganda Identity Based Democratic Violence and Government Political and Human Uncertainty Security Sourc e : Compilation of the author The poli t ical management of transitions is the condition sine qua non for building sustainabl e peace. stability and development in societi e s exiting from violent conflicts. Unless such issues are adequatel y addressed. durable peace will remain uncertai n in the GLR. 10 I CCM THEME II: HOME-GROWN MECHANISMS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE BUILDING Gacaca : Origin et Philosophy by Brig. Gen. Frank K. Rusagara, Comdt, RMA Nyakinama For Rwandans. Rwanda is more lhan jus t ; 1 ge o g r aphic space. ll is a princ i ple. an ideal and a state of mind. At presen t Rwanda is made up of a legacy of common m emories and of a present characterize d by the duty to live togethe r. G acac a a s a conce p t and an institution. is part of the traditiona l system of conflict resolution. Its speci ficity is to be community-based and participatory. Based on unity of Rwanda n s Gacaca makes concrete the principle. shared by other peoples, according to which an individual has rights and responsibilities only as a member of his/her clan or his/her family. to the philosophy on which Gacaca is based, any offense tarnishes the image not only of the individual who committed it. but also the family to which he/she belongs. Gacaca is the space where offense can be mended. It is Peace and Conflict Manag ement Review

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steered by the elderly, heads of families or mediators representing the king. This traditional system of conflict resolution ensured cohesion of a pluralistic society based on unity and family and clan solidarity. It was the expression of the rwandanness" translated in this ideal of rf'storalive justice aimed at rebuilding lost dignity. It is the reason why Gacaca was chosen as .means of rebuilding the social fabric which was lorn apart by the 1994 genocide. Division Rwandans which peaked in the 1994 genocide started from the arrival of colonizers ( 1894). Sine<:> then three generations of Hwanclans have so far been living in racial and dhnicist indoctrination. This long duration explains the presence of those who still believe in the untruths which characterize this dis-course. Rae<:> and ethnicity are not genetic or physical data that can be objectified. They are social constructions which allow identifying the actors through cliches and stereotypes. The Belgian colonization and the Roman Catholic Church have created racism by applying an ideology based on the imposition of a foreign nature on Rwandan institutions found on the spot. The Tutsi was identified as a Caucasian. the Hutu as a Bantu Negroid and the Twa as a pygmy. This racial hypothesis was strengthened by the theory of immigration: the Tutsi pastoralists found the Hutu farmers there. who in turn found the Twa who are the first Rwanda occupants. Even though Hutu. Tutsi and Twa identities had existed before the colonization, they were not primary or closed identities which are found in the colonial discourse. Reference idenI CCM tity was the clan and all Rwandans (Hutu. Tutsi, Twa) found themselves belonging to the 18 clans living in the country. They were identified as Hutu. Tutsi and Twa according to their socioeconomic position and with regard to the central power. Belgians have created artificial divisions among Rwandans in reference to their own internal divisions (between the Flemish and the Walloon)to better dominate and exploit them according to the principle of divide and rule. Pre-existing relations between the Hutu. the Tutsi and the Twa have therefore been deeply modified by the colonial ideology and practice. By promoting the ideology which insists on differences and by creating racist institutions such as the Party for Hutu Emancipation (Parmehutu) or the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR). the 1st and 2nd Republic have extended and strengthened Eurocentric perceptions which tore apart social cohesion. The Tutsi were marginalized and discriminated. their rights defied with some complicity of the international community. It is the colonial legacy of division and bad governance which plunged the country into the disaster of the 1994 genocide-. The Rwandan genocide was an initiative of the State. based on a racist ideology against the Tutsi created by colonialism and ex-tended by the "Hutu revolution" of 1959, in a war context between the government army and that of RPF. The genocide took a toll of about a million of human lives and 130.000 suspects were arrested. The international community reacted by creating an International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). But this solution was insuffiPeace and Conflict Management Review I 11

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cient to deal with the big number of suspects. The organic law no 08/96 of 1996 filled in this gap by enforcing Gacaca Juridsclictions. This law established four categories on the basis of responsibilities: formal courts dealing with the first category of planners of the genocide, the other categories being within the competence of Gacaca jurisdictions. Current Gacaca jurisdictions which deal with genocide issues is inspired by traditional models of restorative justice. Like the latter. Gacaca aims both at punishing and integrating the culprit. judged by his neighbours who are members of his/her community. The specificity of Gacaca is that it is grassroots-based and that it is centred on community members and managed by the latter. It constitutes the bridge between the ancient and the new Rwanda. Gacaca is a strategy of conflict resolution whose results take time to be seen. This is due to the fact that changes resulting from popular approaches are quite slow. It is a sign of the revival of the Rwandan people from the aftermath of colonialism and genocide. Gacaca has six stages: to disclose the truth on .. historical wounds .. and the role of various actors dming the genocide (the victims, the survivors. the planners, the performers, the spectators). to dispense justice by establishing individual responsibilities not to fall into the usual trap of collective guilt, to fight against impunity institutionalized by the previous polit ical systems, to appropriate collectively the tragedy of the genocide and not to leave it to the victims and the survivors. to reconcile through community mediation and to promote socioeconomic and political developmC'nt. 12 I CCM Gacaca is a process of healing all Rwandans and rehabilitating the Rwandan Nation steered by 170.000 judges "Inyangamugayo" who, by the end of this process. will have acquired an unprecedented experience in resolving conflicts. This mass of actors elected by their respective communities on the basis of their integrity will strengthen democratization and good governance. ******************** Transitional Justice and Gacaca in PostGenocide Rwanda: theory and practice, by Alice Urusaro Karekezi The aim of this communication is to present the state of knowledge on Gacaca. 10 years after the consultations held at the Village Urugwiro which are at the origin of the option for Gacaca and 5 years after the launching of the experi mental phase. Gacaca has promoted practice and theoretical understanding of the transitional justice. The option for Gacaca has been criticized with various actors: academicians, historians. jurists, sociologists. international and national associations of human rights, Bar members. For these observers, Gacaca was an inappropriate solution. The debate concerned three proposals of models: labour division between international and national jurisdictions under the supervision of organizations for the defense of human rights. and truth and amnesty commissions. The fundamental debate behind these propos-Peace and Conflict Management Review

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als is how to reconcile reconciliation and justice. retributing justice and restorative justice: a justice which fights impunity and excess of justice which becomes revenge. At present. Gacaca is more and more accepted in academic debates and political analyses. Many studies have been dedicated to this issue: they have allowed to gain better understanding of the process. But there are still points to be cleared up and enough space was not given to the beneficiaries of Gacaca to voice their views. Besides. Gacaca was not studied in what it is; it was analysed from the pre-established models which separate the objectives of reconciliation and those of justice. Genocidal violence is what mostly interests international tribunals. truth commissions and individual psychology. Their approach privileges the crimes committed by those who have planned and orchestrated the genocidal acts: it fails to explain the popular violence and the creativity of local communities in the area of reconciliation and restorative justice. Gacaca originali ty is that it is situated in a local process: law on Gacaca grants judicial powers to local communities. The fundamental question is to know how these powers will be used. Gacaca promoted research on transitional justice both at the theoretical and practical level which aims at giving contextual and historic responses to the dilemmas caused by political violence. Post-war European experiences privi leged international tribunals (Nuremberg and Tokyo) "Other forms appeared during the cold war: revolutionary justice in Portugal. amnesty in Spain. In Latin America (Argentina. Chile. El I CCM Salvador. Guatemala. and Haiti) under the 3rd wave of democratization. the debate focused on punishment and forgiveness after massive violations of human rights. Eastern Europe carried out some selected lawsuits. In Rwanda. after the 1994 genocide, the question was to pursue at the same the ideal of reconciliation and of justice. Law on Gacaca aims at fostering the participation of the citizens in court decisions. reducing prison sentences for those who confess their crimes, encouraging confessions and compensation for the victims. classifying in 4 categories the crimes according to the level of responsibility and substituting detention. community service for Gains from Gacaca are unindeniable: accessibility of justice. ownership of conflict resolution by local communities. capacities of local leaders. opportunities of dialogue and cooperation. But there are also challenges and uncertainties which press heavily on Gacaca: the question of security of witnesses, social and psychological problems generated by the process. the interference of decision-makers at local and national level. The Gacaca positive impact can be handicapped by these negative dynamics which appear during its implementation process. ******************* The Process of Unity and Reconciliation in Rwanda, by Fatuma Ndangiza2 The objective of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) is to build a 2 Presented by Alex Mugabo. NURC. Peace and Conflict Management Review I 13

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united country in whic. h all Rwandans enjoy all the rights and play an active role in the gover nance and the development of their country. The Rwandan model of unity and reconciliation is based on a national vision, the constitution and positive cultural values to build citizen ship. good governance and economic development. In Rwanda, reconciliation has two dimensions: a political level and an individual and inter-personal level. The political dimension implies a holistic approach which takes into account the culture of inclusion. institutions which promote unity and conciliation. the rule of law right and good governance. The inter-personal dimension begins with one self: to accept the reality of the tragic past and to reach the personal transformation which leads to repentance, confession. forgiveness and to the restoration of broken relations. Memory the truth, justice, confession and forgiveness are at the heart of the process of reconciliation in Rwanda. NURC has exploited, in its approaches. the mechanisms which draw inspiration from by the local culture (home grown approaches). It is the case of ingando ", which comes from the verb kugandika which means interrupting activities to think and to find solutions of the challenges which arise. Ingando were used at various community levels and for various audiences: former ex-Far soldiers, released prisoners, the youth, women, students. lecturers and community leaders. Ingando were an opportunity lo discuss the causes of conflicts, the ways of solving and the establishment of unity and reconciliation. sustainable peace and economic prosperity. 14 I CCM The other local mechanisms used are: reconciliation mobilizers (abakangurambaga); festive gatherings of ubusabane organized by communities, the traditional Gacaca which has given rise to Gacaca jurisdictions which deals with genocide issues: ubudehe: a community approach of mutual support and solidarity which currently used to fight against the poverty: community dialogue: njyanama (advisory council). mediators (abunzi). etc. The main CNURC achievements in the political domain are: the obvious political will of the government to achieve national unity. the law against discrimination. repatriation and installation of the refugees. reintegration of the ex-combatants, implementation of good governance institutions. arrangements in the power sharing process at the level of the executive and of the legislative powers to favor inclusion and participation, the creation of a fund to support survivors with a contribution from the Budget. remembrance of the genocide and lhe establishment of a rule of law. etc ... At institutional level one can mention as important achievements. the dialogue on issues of national interest through debates. workshops and seminars, grassroots consultations and various evaluation reports. The Rwandan Diaspora has been regularly associated to national summits on unity and reconciliation which regularly assess the progress achieved. The level of understanding of the concept of unity and reconciliation Rwandans has increased. This could be seen through individual or community initiatives of reconciliation, reconciliation clubs in schools and a network of 3. 720 voluntary unity and Peace and Conflict Management Review

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reconciliation mobiliz ers. who are active at the level of communitie s. This dyna mi s m is a sign of ownership of the process of r ec oncili ation by grassroots communit i es, of confidence and h armony which characte riz e h ence forth the s ocial relations among Rwandans: 72 o/o of the popul ation are of the opinion that the situation in the country has m arke dl y im p rove d Finally. among other results there is room for s h a r ing ex p e ri e nces with del egatio n s and researchers from various countries, and the c reation of a Peace and Lead e r ship Ce n te r 56 o/o of the R w anda n popula tio n know very well acti v ities carri e d out by NURC. Exp e1iences gained by NURC have s h ow n that establishing c o nfidence and healing the trauma are the central aspects in the process of reconciliation. that the use of local cul ture was a determi n ing facto r. and that national unity and reconc ili a tio n concern various aspect s of political and soci oeconomic life, from whi c h it f oll ows that there is a need to adopt a holistic approach to facing these impe r atives. F inally. it is the s t rong will and the determination of the Rwandans to get up to their feet again after the genoc id e w hi c h are at the origin of the prog ress achieve d so far in the politi cal, s oci a l and economic domains. NURC does not i gnore the hug e challenges which remain: the compensation fund for genocide survivors. the livin g conditions of the lat ter. disclosing the truth in Gacaca jmisdictions and security of the victims and the witnesses, poverty and illiteracy insecurity in the region and the obstinacy of the genocidal ideology. Nevertheless NURC achievements are quite impressive. More particularly. it has managed I CCM to popula riz e concepts and practices of unity and r econciliation at community level by creating tools and modem institutions based on integ r a tiv e practices of R wanda n cultur e In future N URC should capitaliz e its successes by stre n gthening the c a pacities of c ommunities at all l eve l s so that they c o u ld undertake and realiz e r econciliation prog rams on by t hemselves. THEME III: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM Military Integration, disarmament and demobilisation. Military Integration in Rwanda, by Maj. Gen. Karenzi Karake History of military integration is as old as that of armed forces. Military integration is the result of the existence of segregation in armed forces or in society itself. It i s an a ffirmat i v e action which dissipates fear and frustration. guarantees individual and collective security and strengthens reconciliation and stability of a divided society Pre-colonial Rwanda had an inclusive army. composed of Hutus. Tutsis and Twas. It had the Peace and Conflict Management Review I 15

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mandate to protect and to expand the national territory. During the colonization era (18941959). the army became a tool in the service of the colonial administration to dominate and exploit the colonized. In 1959 was born an army which was ethnically homogeneous whose mission was to protect the Hutu power. In 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) launched a war of liberation against the government of the National Revolutionary Movement for the Development (MRND) and its armed forces (ex-RAF) because the situation had reached an impasse. notably :he question of the refugees. When RAF and the ruling class saw their power in danger. they prepared and executed the genocide against Tutsis in April, 1994. The genocide was stopped by the RPF army in July, 1994. All social and economic infrastructures had been destroyed and nothing was functioning. International aid organizations had followed the mass of refugees in the neighboring countries. There the international aid passed under the control of the genocidal forces who started to get organized, with the help of Zaire (current DRC) to attack Rwanda and to complete their genocidal Inside the country. the government of the national unity deployed all efforts to recon struct infrastructures and to set up the recon. ciliation process. The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). now the Rwandan Defense Forces ( RDF), played a central role in that recovery process. Rwandans' inclusive spirit was a strategy practiced by RPA in its war of liberation: this was done in order to both weaken the enemy and realize RPF political program. In the post-geno-16 I CCM cide context, there were new developments due to the multiple challenges which the country had to face, notably the challenge to reconcile the imperatives of justice and reconciliation as well as to ensure sustainable peace. For that purpose, it was necessary to involve political forces which until then were competing for the government of national unity and to integrate ex-RFA combatants in a new national army. The classic models which RPA could have applied are integration by consent which is part of the package of wider negotiated agreements between two belligerent parties under the mediation of a third part. the complete demobilization of soldiers from the defeated opposition decided by the government in power and the coercive model which implies the disarmament of factions in conflict under the supervision of an external intervention (e.g. UNO). Rwanda did not follow any of these models. It looked for a model which addresses its particular situation: its recent history and that of its armed forces. The Rwandan model is based on consent: former combatants are integrated in conformity of Arusha Accords (1993): the Protocole III provides for integration of RPA into RAF. It is the opposite which occurred: exRF A were integrated into RPA. Contrary to the classic model. here integration was a continuous process which took place before. during and after the cease-fire. The traditional concept of ingando, solidarity camps, was taken over and used. Traditionally ingando refers to the gatherjng of troops before the attack in a place where they given the last instructions and were re-organized. tasks and responsibilities were clearly specified. They were reminded that national interests were above individual interests. Peace and Conflict Management Review

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The objective of the current ingando is to allow participants, soldiers or civilians. to go beyond ,the feelings of fear and mutual suspicion and speak freely about. the conflict which opposes :them. to heal the wounds, to accept responsibilities in case harm was done. to demystifY the negative perceptions of one towards the other, to assume collectively the consequences of the common tragedy and agree on the common future. Ingando is based on the approach of problem resolution, which encourages the participants to analyze their conflict. its causes, and attitudes of one towards the other and post-conflict relationships. Within the framework of military integration, this methodology comprises four phases. The first phase allows RDF soldiers and ex-combatants to speak out about history and origin of the conflict. with the aim of removing barriers which prevented them from communicating. The second phase consists of appointing the former opponents to various posts. By working together they continue their discussions about the conflict and establish close relations. During the third stage, participants are encouraged to analyze the conflict as a common problem with shared losses and responsibilities. This is done not to utter blames but to analyze the conflict so as to prevent it from occurring again in future. During the fourth stage. ex-combatants appraise all the process. Ingando is the beginning of the resolution of the conflict. The challenge is to always b capable of ensuring an atmosphere which allows mutual respect, recognition of dignity and humanity of each participant. Between 1995 and 2002. 49.700 ex-combatants were integrated into RDF. while I CCM the latter was demobilizing 27.340 soldiers This process has continued up to date. The country has received dividends from the security climate as a result of this policy of military integration. It has allowed to efficiently fight against uprising of infiltrated elements by cutting ex-RAF and militias from their supply base, since integrated soldiers had become citizens who wanted to protect their families. Besides. these soldiers, once demobilized. transformed themselves into actors of economic development and reconciliation. Military integration is an important element in the process of reconciliation and restoration of sustainable peace. The success depends on the political and military leadership will, on its insertion at grassroots level and its ownership by communities. International partners will back up local initiatives but the latter do not belong to them. Finally, in the perspective of reconciliation. ex-combatants should also be considered as "victims" of the conflict and consequently losers as well. The experience of military integration carried out by RDF produced a new example of an integrated institution. It has allowed also to ensure security in_ the country and to propose a new model of the culture of unity and hope as opposed to the culture of hatred and despair. ************* The demobilization process in Burundi, by Col. Isate NIYIBIZI A historical reminder of the major events which occurred before this process is necessary to understand the national program for demobilization and reintegration (PNRR) in Burundi. Peace and Conflict Management Review I 17

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The victory of the Front for Democracy. in Burundi (FRODEBU) during the elections held in June 1933 was followed by the assassination of the elected President M. Ndadaye. That act was at the origin of the creation, early 1994, of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD) and the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD). The launching of demobilization operations started on 1st December 2004 after the Global Accord of Cease-fire which was signed between CNDD FDD and the transitional government on 16 Novembei 2003. Demobilization concerned both the Burundian Army Forces (FAB) and the combatants from Parties and armed political Movements. The cri teria which were considered were: voluntary service, physical condition, age, discipline, edu cation level, cost of defense and security corps. An organ in charge of socio-professional reinte gration of the demobilized had to be set up. And each demobilized person had to receive a demo bilization allowance. In total, 80,000 persons from the target groups were concerned plus 20,000 gardiens de la paix and 10,000 activist combatants. But. in reality, the total number of persons to be demobilized amounted to about 55.000. The fund had to be provided, in order of impor tance, by the Fiduciary Fund MDRP (1st donor) or the program for demobilization and reinte gration of ex-combatants from seven countries of the Great Lakes region (Angola, Burundi, Uganda, CAR, DRC. Congo, Rwanda), the World Bank and Germany. The total cost was estimat ed at US$ 84,4 millions : the average cost per beneficiary being 1,325 US$. 18 I CCM The process had to go through different phases: confinement, checking, registration, question naire on expectations, orientation before the departure, medical screening, voluntary screening for HIV I AIDS, distribution of depar ture package (9-month salary, the remaining 9 months to be paid in 3 installments after an interval of 3 months) and transport expenses to the provinces of destination. The guiding principles of reintegration are as follows : the adult demobilized receive the same level of assistance (about US$600) sup plied in kind. each ex-combatant chooses him/herself his/her location for reintegration and his/her activity. PNDRR provides special assistance for ex-child soldiers and handi capped ex-combatants. The programme foresees projects of general interest for resettlement communities. Five options were suggested: vocational training, formal education, income generating activities. entrepreneurship and employment promotion. In May 2007. the total number of the demobi lized amounted to 20,929 (out of 55,000 expect ed). The biggest number of them comes from FAB (7.347). CNDD-FDD (7.050) and the National Defense Forces (2.859). The gaps could be explained by three factors: the figures inflated by negotiating parties, on-going recruitment by some armed movements during the cantonment period and the difficulties of reintegration (income-generating activities being the only ones to offer real opportunities to the demobilized). Returning to civilian life for tens of thousands of combatants and militia men has undeniably improved security in the country. Displaced persons and refugees have progressively Peace and Conflict Management Review

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returned home. And the demobilized constitute, even though they are ill-prepare d for that. a labour forc e which cannot be neglect e d However the delay in effe ctiv e implementation of the cease-fire signed b e twe e n the government and Rwasa's FNL constitutes a real danger. The process of demobilization is still going on. It is the reason why it is difficult to appreciate all its results. Ho wever. the tendency shows cl en rly that economic objectives will not be achieve d in short or mid-term. On the other hll conducted within the framework of a single party system as well as in the multiparty sys tem. Parliamentary and presidential elections have been taking place since 1992. The quality of these e lections improved at every tenn. excE'pt in Zanzibar. For the observers. those of 2002 were free but not fair: in 2005 they were free and fair. From the changes that occurred. one could mention the number of voters which kept increasing (8.93 million in 1995. 10.09 million in 2000 and 16,42 million in 2005). what is a sign of a greater awareness for the political participation on the part of the population. Since 1995, the party in power, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has won elections with an ever more comfortable lead over the opposition (61,8% in 1995. 71,7% in 2000 and 80,3% in 2005). In 1995. the opposition had 46 seats: this number dropped to 26 in 2005. whose 19 were from Zanzibar islands and especially Pemba. The challenges faced by the process of Peace and Confl i ct Manaqement Rev i ew I 1 9

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democratization are the following: I. A weak opposition in terms of organizalion and capacities to develop p o 1 i t i c a 1 programs. Besides. opposition parties are torn apart by internal conflicts. 2. The legislation left by the single party was not amended to adapt itself to t h e multiparty system. A commission had recommended, in 1992, to draw up a new constitution and abrogate 40 laws considered as anti-democratic. This proposal was not followed. 3. Laws on media and civil society organizations are still being criticized because they facilitate the government to exercise much control on them and because they do harm to the freedom of press and meeting. 4. The uneven distribution of resources between CCM and the opposition. The opposition has a base and resources which are limited in terms of staff, organization and financial means, whereas CCM has its own base and income-generating activities which had been initiated during the era of the single party system. Its structures go down to the household level and operate in many places. The fact that this party has won parliamentary elections since 1995 allows it to have the biggest share of subsidies and strengthen its lead over the opposition. 5. The electoral system favors the under representation of the opposition. The adopted system which is "single-member constituencies with first-past-the post principle" establishes a strong link among the voters and their representatives. But it reduces the number of parliamentary seats of an already weak opposition. In the proportional system, it would have been difficult for the party in power: to have 2/3 of the seats required to introduce constitution-20 I CCM al changes. 6. The high cost of political commitment for the opposition. A staff member of the public sector is not authorized to be a candidate in the national elections. The candidate should resign with a big risk of not getting his/her work back in case of electoral defeat. Funds are channeled through the state structures controlled by CCM. The opposition has a lot of difficulties in recruiting qualified candidates. Even though it is not the role of the government to financially support the opposition. it has to create conditions which favor its emergence because democracy needs political parties which function. 7. The link between economic and administrative reforms of,the 90s and democratization was not taken into account. The reform of the public sector has handicapped some aspects of this process. It has strengthened exclusion and marginalization, while favoring a small number of persons to become richer. As for administrative reforms. they have allowed the technocrats to control the central government and the local governments. without the parliament and the other control mechanisms of the executive benefiting the same opportunities to strengthen their capacities. Tanzania has showed a fast economic growth since 2003, without a visible impact on the living conditions of the majority of the population. especially in the rural area. In this context. the democratization process remains fragile. The countries of the Great Lakes region can reach the results which Tanzania has managed to obtain in the area of political stability and economic development. Peace and Conflict Management Review

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The Electoral Process in DRC. The Case of the North-Kivu Province, by Aloys TEGERA The Congolese people voted on July 30 and 29 October 2006, an exercise which had been denied to them since 1965. The proclamation of the provisional results of the presidential elections in the evening of 20 August 2006 was followed wilh a pitched battle between the incumbent President Kabila's guard and Jean Pierre Bemba's private guard. The Congolese from Eastern Congo had massively voted for Joseph Kabila, whereas those from the West had decided to give him a rect card. The verdict of the polls was. in the final analysis. a draw since in spite of 44, 8 % for Kabila and 20% for Bemba. the counter was set on zero and the second ballot held on 29 October 2006 finally decided between the two candidates. Joseph Kabila emerged as the winner of the polls and the 3 -rd Republic was born. Since then, the democratic game has been launched with its rules. the major one being the power of the majority. that is the power of the big number. A question arises: to know how to fit the democratic logic with a Congo undermined by ethnic logic. To better grasp the new political situation in DRC. let's limit our analysis to the election of members of the North-Kivu Provincial Assembly and let's start by what seems to be a positive breakthrough. For 38 eligible seats by direct suffrage, the territory of Lubero had 7 seats. that of Beni 8 seats, the city of Beni had 2 and Butembo 3, what allowed the Nande community who live in these entities to be the majority. independently from the political tendency of the candidates. And as it was these electr-d representatives who I CCM had to co-opt 4 traditional chiefs to complete the Assembly, they had the means to strengthen this majority, what was eventually the case. In the end,and after the elections. this provincial Assembly of 42 representatives includes 25 Nandes and 10 Hutus. The other communities share out 7 seats, but most of them are simply absent; it is the case of the Tutsis, the Tembos. the Kumus, etc. The most demographically important two ethnic groups. the Nandes and the Hutus are going to function as the majority and as the opposition de facto, what does not exclude periods of negotiations of interests case by case, either in order to try to strengthen the community of origin, or to protect social cohesion in a province with fragile balances. The setting up of the provincial Assembly bureau and the indirect ballots (election of the senators and the province governors) showed to what extent ethnic groups negotiate their interests with subtlety, what sometimes opens up opportunities (or of opportunism?) for certain personal ambitions. In the new political configuration of provinces. Assembly representatives play a major role. Not only do they elect the governor and his/her deputy but they also ensure the control of the action of his team. with the possibility of dismissing the team by a vote of no confidence. The executive should therefore work under the supervision of the deliberative organ. what is in itself a revolution in the Congolese context where people in power always worked without any obligation of accountability, except towards those who had appointed to their posts. If provincial representatives fully assume their role. by refusing to become subservient to the government. the latter will be forced to work in the perspective of being accountable to someone. T:Pe post of President of the Provincial Assembly Peace and Conflict Management Review I 21

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takes on such a importance from the protocol point of view as he/she who occupies it is the second personality of the province after the governor. In the subtle political management of Nord Kivu, from this duality nature at the top, the provincial representatives have ventured a tacit principle according which the same ethnic community could not occupy the two posts. Beyond the setting up of the definitive bureau of the Assembly on January 14. 2007. it was therefore the attribution of the post of governor which was implicit in the negotiations. The protagonists in this game were obviously the Nandes and the Hutus because of their representativeness within the Assembly. And the two communities used the same stratagem: to access to the gouvernorship. it was necessary to support the candidate of the other community for the presidency of the Provincial Assembly. This can clearly be noticed through the scores attained by the competitors this post: the candidate Kaisavera Mbake, the Deputy Governor who is Nande. renowned to be so close to Serufuli, collected votes amounting globally to the Hutu electorate plus his own vote ( 11 in total) while his opponent Leon Bariyanga Rutuye. elected Rutshuru's Hutu, swiped all the Nande votes and their allies (30 in total) and won the post. The message was clear, the next governor of Nord-Kivu would be a Nande. This negotiation is in itself a positive breakthrough. On the one hand, the ethnic communities of the province, through their elected members, play the game of sharing responsibilities. On the other hand, there was this emancipation of some personalities, 22 I CCM notably two candidates for this pos1 of president of the Assembly, who found other motivations than ethnic affiliation for their action. It is maybe the first important step towards the passage of "ethnicism dictatorship" towards emancipation of individuals. and negotiation of interests, which are not simply ethnic. The reconstruction of Nord-Kivu is at such price. One could notice that the citizens did not use their quite new power by putting into place persons who would be indebted to them and would worry about their welfare. Generally. it is the manipulators of identity-based fears and the extremists who found favor with the electorate. That will certainly have a considerable incidence in the five years to come Nord Kivu province. The strengthening of local power through the provincial Assemblies and the provincial governments is a real opportunity offered by the current legislation. But how to take up this challenge of managing the province if some elected members have neither qualities nor competence required for this exercise? The ballot of July 30; 2007 was a penalty vote of Eastern Congo against RCD and of the West against Joseph Kabila on a background of a common denominator, the perception by the Congolese of the foreigner who came from another place. The vote of October 29, 2007 was a security vote, but given increasing insecurity in several provinces of the country. Joseph Kabila's victory has ever become more than an illusion. Peace and Conflict Management Review

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THEME V : REFUGEE QUESTION, IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP The Question of the Expulsion of Banyarwanda from Tanzania, by Prof.. Charles GASARASI T h e r e a r e s i x categories of B anyarwanda who seltl e d i n T anzania for differen t reasons : Some individua l f a milies which fle d the country after f a llin g out with tradition a l rule rs. p a rticul a rly chi efs. m ainly in the 1920s and 1930s. Pe o pl e who fled c ol o ni a l harshness e g. forced l abor. flogging taxes. etc. R e f ugees of 1959 thro u g h the 1960s and 1970s (20.000-30 .000) Most of these were p laced in form a l rural refugee settlements in Kagera. Tabora and Rukwa reg ions of Tanzania Economic mig r ants of the late l970s-earl y 1980s unde r the Habyarimana r egime. The massive wave of the 1994 refugees (460.000-750.000). Most of these were repatri atecr en masse" in 1996. T h e r e were r emnants after this mass r e patri ation and their numbe r s g r e w as new refugees fled Rwand a subseque n t ly Their numbe r s reached a hig h of 23.677 by the time thei r repatriation was completed i n 2003. T h e r e is a mixe d bag of other Banyarwanda who mi g r a t e d to T a nzania over the year s even befor e inde p endence for a variety o f reasons: women m arrie d t o T a nzania ns. agents of mis s ionmy est a bli shments. stude nts supporte d b y r elatives li ving in T a nzania small business p e o p l e. etc. Many in categories 1. 2 and 6 who had not been keenly followin g the evolut;o n of Tanzania's immiorati o n and ci tize nship laws complacently b I CCM b e li e v e d the y had automatica ll y acquire d T anzania n citiz enship by virtue o f t h eir preinde p endence arrival and settlement. They w e r e wrong Those in categories 3 and 4 who were around at the time of mass natura liz ation and could not get natura lization for a variety of reasons f e ll into illegality if t hey did not obtain resid e nce p ermits Those re fugees i n category 5 who d i d not repatriate as part of t h e organize d repatriation p r o g r a m s mounted between 1 996 and 2 0 0 3 and who have not obtained legal immigration p a p e r s have been rendere d ille gal immigrants since the tripartite signing of t h e 1951 Ref ugee Conven tion cessation clause in 2003. Since t h e days of refu g e e s ettleme nts i n the 1970s. some Tanzanian authoriti e s particula r ly Settlem e n t C ommandants began t o harass refu gees even thoug h at t h e time t hey had no illegal immig r a n t status. Suc h s eeming l y benig n isolated and jocular attitude s seem t o have sawed t h e seed of a more pronounce d antipathy against Banyarwanda particularly those o f Tu tsi descent. This antipathy h a s in more recent years bee n observed among a wider ci r cl e of the politicoadministrative clas s of Tanzania It has also occasionally surfaced among some ordi nary people in the form of bigotry. In recent y e ars. forma l round up operations aoainst real and alleged Ban yarwa nda illegal b immior a n t s have become frequent i n Ka gera b region where most of them reside. The l a s t operation (2006 ) was authorized by the Prime Minister himself. Peace and Confl i c t Mana g ement Review I 23

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Tanzania justifies its operations to crack on illegal immigrants on several grounds. The most common are: illegal immigrants (Banyarwanda being many in Kagera region) are major culprits in murders. armed robberies, cattle theft poaching of wild game, attacking vehicles on high ways. attacking villages and stealing foodstuffs, unlawful possession of anns and armaments. illicit trade in arms. and environmental overgrazing. degradation caused by Banyarwanda who have experienced the frequent round ups and subsequent repatria tion have expressed complaints and allegations. The most common are: confiscation of their herds by local authorities (immigration officials, police. and other predatory authorities) : confiscation of their money by the same: beatings: burning of their houses: asking them to give bribes in order to get legal immigration papers: tearing of their legitimate immigration papers if they don't accept to pay bribes: forcing them to leave their properties behind: causing family separation; blacklisting of those who submit complaints to the Sub-Joint Technical Committee; reluctance by Tanzanian authorities to expedite the processing and verification of legal immigration papers. and expulsion of some who fulfill immigration conditions. The benign anti-Tutsi/anti-Banyarwanda sentiment that began in Tanzania in the 1970s smoldered on slowly without any overt expression until the end of 1990 when the RPF launched the war of liberation. The war marked the beginning of a new political -ideological offensive <;>n the part of the Habyarimana regime through the agency of his sponsored collaborators mainly in Tanzania ap.d the DRC. 24 I CCM Some political genius invented the Himn Empire thesis and it spread like bush fire in the region and beyond. In Tanzania, the political "gurus" tried to illustrate the veracity of their unfounded Hima Empire thesis by falsifying the plight of Banyamulenge in the DRC as proof of the Hima Empire thesis. These political "gurus" told the people that Banyamulenge had withdrawn their allegiance from the state of the DRC and trans ferred it to their original Rwanda, soon to be an important pillar of the Hima /Tutsi Empire. In the midst of this propaganda, and insinuating that naturalized Banyarwanda, particularly the Tutsi, and Tanzanian nationals ofTutsi descent have no real allegiance to the Republic. they coined the term "the Bizima Karaha syndrome". This perception spread quickly clown to the grassroots. The Hima/Tutsi Empire campaign reached its xenophobic proportions in 1994 when the RPF took over Kigali. The propaganda worsened when Rwanda took part in the DRC war and succeeded. The Hima Empire thesis seemed to be a reality, and Banyarwanda began to be regarded as a real threat in the region. There are other factors that did fuel the drive to expel Banyarwanda during the period 2000-2006.Some laws and policies that had just been passed in Tanzania had inculcated new ways of thinking and responding to new needs and pri mities : the Land Act, 1999 and the Village Land Act,1999 both heightened people's consciousness and hunger for land: the Agricultural and Livestock Policy. 1997 which emphasizes environmental conservation in rural areas and the National Wildlife Policy. 1998, both were bound to bring Banyarwanda pastoralists and their grazing practices (including in game reserves) under close scrutiny. The Peace and Conflict Management Review

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economic malaise prevailing in Tanzania during the pei;od under discussion (rising costs of living. food shortages, droughts. etc.) fuelled intolerance of Banyarwanda perceived as illegal aliens. Both countries Tanzania and Rwanda handled the problem raised by the recurring rounding up and expulsion of Banyarwanda with a quiet diplomatic style: no public condemnations. no fonnal exchange of protest notes. no sanctions. no recall of ambassadors, etc. A multi-track diplomacy approach was developed. Lines of communication seem to have been kept open between the Heads of State (mutual state visits. US{; of special envoys. etc.) and these Heads of State kept themselves seized on the matter in other ways. Good Neighborliness meetings were frequently held between the Governors of the then Kibungo Province and Kagera Region with the occasional participation of the Governor of Umutara Province. The problem of repatriation was often negotiated at these meetings. Practical matters relating to resolving the problem were negotiated and implemented by task forces created by both sides. The work of these technical teams has helped to grease the wheel of diplomacy by performing tasks such as: sensitizing Banyarwanda to repatriate. registration and compilation of data relating to statistics of both persons and their properties, investigation of allegations of confiscated property and other abuses. designing and implementing workable logistics for the repatriation exercises. etc. The Teams' negotiating ability has also led to innovative forms of bilateral cooperation in the jCCM repatriation exercise. The round up operations, the expulsions and the alleged abuses in Kagera region, seem to have taken place without the full knowledge and oversight of national level authorities in Dar es Salaam. All that was needed was the collusion of the huge powers of the Regional and District Commissioners; the tremendous powers of police and immigration officers, the great influence of defense and security committees at all levels, and that of the local authorities and local politicians, to successfully pull off dangerous operations of verydubious legal credibility. The rounding up and expulsion of Banyarwanda from Tanzania seems to be nearing completion. Efforts made to resolve the problem are paying off. However. throughout Kagera region a new problem has been born. The same local leaders who were expelling Banyarwanda have now turned to campaigns against their repatriation. This is surprising but there is a logic to this move. The departure of poor illegal immigrants means loss of cheap labor: the departure of rich pastoralists means loss of handsome money contributions to local development projects. cheap milk and meat. etc.; the departure of both categories means loss of bribes income to corrupt local and other levels of leadership. But both countries have come a long way in succeeding to solve the Banyarwanda repatriation problem. They cannot fail to resolve this one. Peace and Co1=1flict Maf.l8gemeAt Review 1 '25

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THEME VI: UN/AU INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE GLR The Intemational Conference on the Great Lakes Region by Dr. Amb. Richard SEZIBERA On 15 October 2006. Heads o f state and g o vernme n t of the regi o n signed in N airobi, a Pact on s ecurity stability and deve lo p m e n t within the framework of the International Conference on the Gre a t Lakes region It was an important moment in the p ursuit of peace and development in this region whic h has b e e n so f a r marked b y conflicts. the victory of hope over pessimism Severa l groups of ci vil socie t y were invol ve d in the process whic h led first t o the Declaration of Dar es Salaam in 2004 then to the Pact itself. They incl ude women a n d y outh associations, members of parlia m ent. religio u s lead e rs, the handicapped. the media. etc. In Rwanda, the representatives of these groups wer e part of the national d e legation d uring the negotiations The pact i s consequ e ntly supportep b y large categorie s of t h e populations from the region. The idea of a n International Confe r e nce on t h e Gre a t Lakes region d a tes b ack from N o vembe r, 26 I CCM 1996. whe n with the r esolution no 3710 the S ecurity Council proposed h o lding a c onfe rence unde r the p atronage of UNO and OAU which would consider all the prob l e m s which this region is facing. The Security Council \:V
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finally retained: peace and security. democracy and good governance. economic and regional integration. social and humanitarian issues. Finally. the third difficulty concerned the participants. After several dialogues, two cate of participants emerged from discussions: seven countries (seven core countries) directly affected by the ramifications of the Rwandan crisis (Burundi, Rwanda, DRC, Uganda. Tanzania. Zambia and Kenya) and the co-opted countries (co-opted countries) which are neighbors of those of the previous category (Angola. Congo. RCA and Sudan). At the structural level. the preparatory phase knew a tension between the countries of the region which wanted to own this process and UNO who had given the idea of it. Finally the structures put into place (national coordinators. the joint secretariat UNO I OAU, regional meetings) allowed an interaction among the participants which decreased fear. hostility and mutual distrust which characterized their rela tions. At the political level. it is the vision which sug g<>sted establishing programs for the future of the region, instead of mulling over the past. in order to make it a zone of peace and prosperity. which was adopted and was followed in the documents. But that fact did not put an end to the differences of visions and interests. That was to be illustrated by the request made by the joint secretariat UNO I OAU to admit FDLR as an observer: a proposal which was rejected but which provoked indignation from Rwanda and other member countries The purpose of the Pact is to provide a legal for the relations between States ICCM members to which it applies. The ten protocols which were adopted at that occasion ware very much supported. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, in spite. of its controversial debuts, or maybe thanks to these. gives a solid base for the construction of peace in the Region. It is certain that once implemented, the impressive content of its Protocols and projects, in the four thematic fields of the Conference. would transform the region of persevering conflict into a place of shared prosperity and development. The Conference dedicates the double principle of ownership and crucial international partnership for the post-genocide reconstruction and development. An important number of the projects will be executed by or through the close cooperation with the existing Regional Communities. For that. its multilateral nature introduces an element of synergy with the existing groups without having to aggravate tensions. As regards Rwanda, the conference fills some gaps in the effort to approach the challenges of Peace, Security and Development in a holistic way. Whether this may remain on paper or serve as a real new direction towards a future of hope and prosperity for all, that depends to a large extent, on the efforts of the partnership forged during the preparatory phase. Its successes will also require an informed national and international leadership as well as the determination of a well-defined civil society Peace and Conflict Management Review I 27

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Conference Resolutions After the two days of deliberations. the participants put forward t h e following resolutions: Conflicts in the Africa's Grea t Lakes Region have been recurrent and endemic, mainly because policymakers and leadership in r espective countries hav e failed to effectively manage and peacefully exit from their transitions in late 50's and early 60' s and more recently in the 90's. In f orrried and effective management of transitions is a key requirement to achieve peace and development in the Great Lakes Region and even beyond: The participants commended the Center for Conflict Management. the National of Rwanda and thei r partners for organizing such an important conference on a critical theme for the region, and suggested t hat such conferences should be held a t least once in 6 months: The participants urged the leaders and policy makers in the region to continuously monitor and effectively manage transitional arrangements put in place by respEctive countries in order to achieve sustainable peace and develop ment: Participants also commended Rwanda for successful efforts made since 1994, in managing its transition from the legacy of genocide towards nation building: Participants also commended Rwanda for its innovative and visionary arrangements that are home grown based and urged Rwanda to make sure that such mechanisms (like Gacaca, Ingando, Abunzi) are successfully implemented in such a way that they bring about an environment conducive for peace, security, social cohe-28 I CCM sion and development in the society. Participants emphasized the importance o f c iti zenship in peacebuilding and urged countries in the region to c a r e fully manage their transitional arrangements so that the latte r do not undermine the citi zenship id eal which is the basis o f modern state building and d emocratic governance. Participants commended countries in the region for efforts made towards r egiona l inte g r ation, especially the revival the CEP G L ( CoTTUnunaut e Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs) and the e xtension of the EAC to Rwand a and Burundi. Referring t o the e xpulsion of p eople of "Rwandan ori gin" from T anzania, p articipa nts also expressed serious concerns about the "disintegration process" that is still going on in the region, whil e regional integr ation and globalization are the feature s of hope for a better Great Lakes Regioi-I and a b etter World: they urged regional l eaders to discourage such a negative process. Participants in addition urged d evelopment p artners and friends of the region to support the countries in the region in m aking their transitional r o a d successful. Peace and Conflict Management Review

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APPENDICES: Conference, Agenda and Participants Appendix 1: Conference Agenda DAY ONE: 31ST MAY 2007 SESSION I MC H h 3 0 0h00 9h00 9h00-10h00 I OhOOI Oh20 SESSION II Moderator I 01120I I hOO I I h00-13110 0 I :311001 41100 : Lunch SESSION III : OPENING CEREMONY : Suzan MUTONI, NUR : Arrival and r eg istr alio n of partic ipants : Arrival of Guest of Honor : Welcome note by the Rector. NUR Spee c h by SIDA SAREC Rep r esentative Official opening by Guest of Honor :Tea/Coffee Break : PRESENTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS : Amb. Joseph MUTABOBA, MININTER : Theme I: Transitions in the GLR: an introduction to the Conference Spe a k e r : Prof. Anast a se Shyaka "Managing transitions and Sustaining Peace in the GLR" : Theme II: Elections and Post Electoral Processes S p ea k e r : I Han. NGEZAYO. DRC "Ele ct oral process in DRC" 2. Dr. Evariste NGAYIMPENDA "Electi o n s au Burundi" Discussant : Mr Damien H abumuremyi. NEC Discussions & questions MODERATOR : Hon. Denis Polisi, AMANI RWANDA 14 hOO-16h00 : THEME III : Military integration, Disannament and Demobllisation S pea k e r : l. Maj. Gen Karenzi Karake I CCM "Milit ary integration in Rwanda" 2. Col. S y lvestr e KlBECERl. B urundi Proc e s s u s de demobilization au Burundi" Peace and Conflict Management Review 29

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I6h00-16h20 :Tea/ Coffee Beak 16h20-l 7h00 : Discussions &: questions DAY TWO: 1ST JUNE 2007 SESSION I 8 h 30-9h00 9h00-10h00 : Moderator: Prof. Paul Rutayisire, CCM/NUR : Registrati o n of participants : Theme IV: Home-Grown Mechanisms, Conflict Resolution &: Reconciliation Speakers: 1. Brig. Gen. Frank Rusagara. RMA/RDF "Gacaca: origins and philosophy" 2. Hon. Fatuma Ndangi za, NURC "Reconciliation process in Rwanda" 3. Mrs Alice Karekezi, CCM/NUR "Gacacajurisdictions" I Oh00-10h30 : Tea/Coff ee Beak I Oh30-l2h30 4. Governor of North Kivu, DRC "Transitions in RDC and pacific cohabitation of communities in North Kivu" Discussant :Dr Franr;ois Masabo, CCM/ NUR Questions &: Discussions 12h30-13h30 Lunch SESSION III: M oderator: Hon. Mao, Governor of GULU/Uganda 13h30-14h30 : Them e V: Citizenship, Identity and Refugee Question Speaker: 1 Prof. Charles Gasarasi, CCM/NUR "The Banyarwanda Refugee Question in Tanzania" 2. Prof. Oswald DRC "Prob l ematique de la Nationalites des Rwandophones apres les e lections generale s de 2006 en RDC Question &Discussions SESSION II I :Moderator: Dr. Evariste NGAYIMPENDA, Burundi 14h30-l6h00 :Theme VI: International Intervention.and the ICGLR: the way forward 3 0 I CC M S peaker: Amb. Dr Richard Sezibera, Office of the President Rwanda "ICGLR" Peace and Conflict M anageme nt Review

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Questions & Discussions Theme VII: Experiences from 3rd World countries Speakers: 1. l-Ion. Mao. Uganda "Peace process and pacification in Northern 2. PADRIGU l6h00-l6h20 :Tea/Coffee Break 16h20-l7h00 : CLOSING SESSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS *************************** Appendix 2: List of Participants N n NAMES INSTITUTION POSITION I BANGWANUBUSA Thcogene CCM/NlJH 2 BIRABONEYE Ncpo 'fVR Journalist 3 DUSABE Jane EPLM/UNR Administration Officer l EWALD JONAS PADRIGU Lawyer/GU 5 GAJ-IUNGU BUNINI PROF AM Delegate 6 GAKUBA AMUZA PDO Member 7 GASARASI Charles CCM/UNR Professor /Researcher 8 GATERA Maggy UNDP Head of Unit 9 HABUMUREMYI P Damien NEC Executive Secretary 10 HAVUGIMANA Eliezcr MVK Photograph II INGABIRE lmmaculee R. CIRGL 12 IYJ\MUREMYE Augustin PSD Political Bureau 13 KABA YIZA Franr;ols 14 KAGARAMA John UNR SIDA/SAREC Coordinator 15 KAITESI Usta UNR Had Public Law 16 1\AMEGEJE Consolatt> ORINFOR Journalist 17 KAMPAYANA Augustin M INAWC Director 18 KANAMUGIRE Faisal A SNJG Legal Officer 19 KANYANA Bernard K. ARfDR Executive Secretary 20 1\ARAKE KARENZI MOD Commander 21 KARARA Elam Primature 22 KAREMERA Pierre CDDR GENEVE SUISSE 23 KA YIG EMA Anicet Forum des Partis 24 KAYUMBA Christopher UNR/CCM Lecturer 25 KNERI IDOl Milao Tanzania Embassy 26 KUNG Benjamin OED 27 LUGONZO W. KENYA EMBASSY Officer 28 MAPENDO Clement SYMPOSIA KIGALI 29 MASABO Franr;ois CCM/NUR Lecturer 30 MAZIMPAKA EmmanuPI UN I LAC Law Department 31 MAZIMPAKA Magnus New Times Journalist 32 MBONYINKEBE Deo S. NUR Lecturer 33 MEISSUER IRIS OED-CPS Civil Peace Service 34 MUAKILUMA Isaac Tanzania Embassy 35 MUGABO Alex NURC Administration Officer 36 MUGENZI Martin CCM/NUR Lecturer 37 MUGORUKEYE Janet CCM/NUR 38 MUHIRWA Terence Radio SALUS Production 39 MUHONGERWA Ch1istinc Safer Rwanda Coordinator 40 MUKUNZI Sadiki 4 1 MULAMA Patrice HCP Executive Secretary 42 MUNYAKAZI Adeodatus TELEPHONE 08865527 08302018 08501899 08530335 08426286 08549958 08504883 08302652 08524171 08300242 08300206 08828112 08489003 08482566 08304794 08763404 08302322 08531973 08794554 08605108 08301923 08653121 08452630 08586083 08836260 08679540 08612305 08744857 08895784 08628629 08537310 08594704 5703234 08499815 I CCM Peace and Conflict Management Review I 31

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43 MURENZI J.M.V A.V.P.. 2nd Vice President 08539476 44 MURWANASHYAKA Justin CCM/UNR Assistant Researcher 08613184 45 MUSAYIDIRE Berthe ADPA Coordinator 08426867 46 MUTABARUKA Jean Jacques Plateforme de Ia societe civile Administration &Finance Officer 08506877 47 MUTAO Jean Bosco 48_ NDAYISENGA Felix Ambassy of Burundi Conseiller 08693950 49 NDIKULIYO Domitille CCM/NUR Secretary 08530993 50 NDUMAH. Embassy Of Kenya 08456478 51 NDUTIYE Florent Radio Contact FM Journalist 08452474 52 NGULINZIRA Abdul NUR Lecturer 0888485 53 NIBIZI lsaie Private Consultant 22779925604 54 NKUSI Laurent MININFOR Minister 55 NSHIMMMANA Alphonse CCM/NUR Assistant Researcher 08589268 56 NTAGANDA Eugene CCM/NUR Researcher 08598843 57 NTALINDWA Anthony NUR Head of Department 08302960 58 NYIRAMANA Devote ADPA Intern 08350093 59 NZEYIMANA Beatrice NUR UNR/KIGALI 08539131 60 POLISI Denis Rwanda Parliament Deputy Speaker 08300252 61 RURANGWA Joseph SYMPOSIA Translator 08521111 62 RUSAGARA Frank RMA/RDF Commandant 08304187 63 RUSH1NGABIGWI Jean Bosco NUR/EJC Deputy Director 08507766 64 RUTAYISIRE Paul CCM/NUR Professor /Researcher 08594305 65 RUTEMBESA Eugene UNR Dean Education 08426866 66 RUZINDANA Chantal UNR 67 RWIYEREKA NSANA SNJR Secretary General 08476379 68 SAFARI Ferdinand MOD Member 08302919 69 SENTAMA Ezechiel CCM Lecturer 08628881 70 SEZIBERA Richard Office of the President 08306030 71 SHY AKA Anastase CCM Director of CCM 08519236 72 SIBOMANA Martin MINALOC Kigali City Management 08646656 73 SIGWELA EZVA M. Embassy of South Africa Ambassador 08302934 74 TEGERA Aloys Pole Institute Manager 08513531 75 UMUHOZA Naomi UNR Lecturer 08556195 76 UWINGABIRE Pauline CCM Administration Officer 08561041 77 UYISENGA Charles Primature 08351427 78 WINAI GABRIELA Consultant 08304961 32 I CCM Peace and Conflict Management Review

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d'imprimer en Mars 20011 par Pallotti-Presse 863 Kigali

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ABOUTCCM 1. Vission and Mission The Center for Conflict Management (CCM) was created at the National University of Rwanda (NUR) in 1999 with the financial support from UNDP Its mandated and mission inspirec:i by: particular challenges within the post genocid context. CCM: the response to the research needs that inspire policies; opportunity to generate indigenous knowledge about roots of conflicts and conflict resolution strategies and durable peace construction 2. CCM's Structure Direction: Director & Deputy-Director 3 Research Units : Unit 1: Genocide Studies and Prevention Unit 2: Internal Processes of Socio-Political Development; Unit 3: Peace, Security and Governance Studies in the Great Lakes Region Out-reach program : Community Dialogue for Peace (CDP), supported by SIDA. started in 3 districts (Huye. Gisagara, Nyamagabe) Admnistration Unit Secretariat of Research I Publication Unit 3. Current Developments: Masters Programs in pipeline MAin Peace and Development Studies" in collaboration with PADRIGU (Sweden) fully funded by SIDA-SAREC to start in 2009. Development of a MA on Genocide Studies and in pipeline ICCM Editorial Committee for PCM Review Prof. Paul Rutayisire, Editor Miss Alida Furaha Umutoni, Associate Editor Mr. Justin Murwanashyaka, Secretary Peace and Conflict Management Review

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NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF RWANDA I CENTER f() Center fc r Conflict Managemen P.O BOX 264 ButarejRwanda Phone: (250) 55103160 Fax: (250) 530105 E -mail: ccm_nur(,nur.ac.rw Web site: www.nur.ac.rw T (CCJ\'1) INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON IC/GLR The Center for Conflict Management of the National Univeristy of Rwanda in collaboration with PADRIGU is organising an INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE GREAT LAKES REGION: PROGRESS, CHALLENGES and OPPORTUNITIES. Kigali, 18 March 2008


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