Re-Islamization in Higher Education from Above and Below:
The University of South Florida and Its Global Contexts

by

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of the requirements for the degree of
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Dedication

This work is dedicated to the memory of the late Dr. George H. Mayer, USF Professor of History who died in 1999 at the age of 78. In his final month of life, George expressed a wish that I would write about the changes in higher education over the past thirty years. This thesis attempts that but only tacitly. The knowledge of American intellectual history and ideas that he passed on to me during undergraduate school is infused throughout this work. Like the hero in a novel on George’s recommended fiction list, *The Glass Bead Game*, George was a true master of the game yet understood the fragility of the enterprise. He therefore expressed measured criticism of it. Not a day passes in my life that I do not shed a tear for his departure from this world.
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I would like to express my sincerest gratitude for all those people who have endured with me since the 2001 fall semester when consideration of this thesis topic began. Most of them know me well enough to appreciate the shift in consciousness within me that this work produced. These professors, colleagues, friends, and loved ones in Florida, the United States, and around the world are also fully aware of the risk to life and property that this work might and did engender, especially after the summer of 2005 when the first full draft was delivered to my examining committee. From that point onward, the actions of a few people on campus apparently proved some of the findings, although those individuals apparently did not recognize that themselves. Fortunately, with the support of a loving husband, Dr. Raymond E. Wonder, and the assistance of Dr. Arthur Shapiro, Dr. Steven B. Permuth, Dr. Abdelwahab Hechiche, Dr. W.S. Lang, Dr. Howard Johnston, Dr. Erwin V. Johanningmeier, and Dr. Brent Wiseman, civility, due process, thesis governance policy, academic freedom, and civil liberty prevailed for both the committee members and me. I want to thank everyone who did for suffering with me as I refrained from sensationalizing my case in the media and bringing an already wounded institution I love so much to the point of political convulsion. The emotional and financial toll has been tremendous. I hope they will stand with me in the future, as I continue to follow the logic of inquiry wherever it may lead.
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Terri K. Wonder  

ABSTRACT  

This study explores Islamism’s interplay with higher education as the movement advances an agenda for worldwide reformation. Over an eighty-year period, Islamism has appropriated higher education institutions, professional associations, on- and off-campus organizations, and publications as a primary means to achieve its utopian objective of the Nizam Islami, or “Islamic Order.” Findings show how the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt developed a Weberian bureaucratic organizational and administrative structure to exert influence not only in Egypt but also the world. A Qutb-inspired “hijra” of Muslim Brothers in universities proved itself adroit at filling macro-and micro-level policy vacuums in Soviet-aligned post-colonial societies, marginalizing traditional forms of Islamic faith. However, the movement was as likely to establish itself in other types of authoritarian states that alternately tried to appease and suppress the movement. The Islamist “hijra” came to North America in the 1960’s, founding the Muslim Students Association and the Islamic Society of North America. Then, early leaders in those groups taught and studied at The University of South Florida (USF) in Tampa, Florida. Following the “successful” paradigm of the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamism’s academic leaders brought to USF a program called “Islamization of society and knowledge”—
disguised in the more benign term “civilizational dialogue”—which regards higher education as but another territory of reformation and conquest, or the dar al-harb. USF never addressed that aspect of re-Islamization from below (denoting quiet subversion of society) as a serious, possible academic freedom problem involving the politicization of USF’s research and teaching mission. Re-Islamization from above (denoting violent destabilization of society) was debated, however, in a media campaign of Islamist dissembling that divided the university and its community for over a decade.

Because of the stated hostility of Islamist education theory and practice to the academic enterprise, itself founded upon Enlightenment values of free inquiry, the study recommends that USF re-investigate the case about Sami Al-Arian, who was convicted in 2006 of providing services to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, in part, by using the university as a front for his cause.
Chapter One

Introduction

Section I:

Mass Social Movements in Higher Education

Social psychologists, political scientists, historians, and higher education experts discuss within their own professional disciplines the impact of mass social movements in higher education. In this introduction, the researcher considers those fields of study in order to provide an interdisciplinary foundation for the study of the mass social movement known as “Islamism”--which an array of international scholars argue is either totalitarian or on the way to becoming totalitarian. The interdisciplinary approach also seeks answers as to how and why Islamism intersects with higher education institutions throughout the world and at The University of South Florida (USF). As is widely known and as shall be discussed in this thesis, some university professors, students, and former students at USF from 1986 to 2007 have been accused, indicted, deported, and sentenced variously for materially supporting and conspiring to commit terrorist acts overseas and possibly within U.S. territory. Undisputed evidence brought forward in the proceedings of one trial associated with some of those USF professors and students, *U.S.A. v. Al-Arian* (2006), indicates that at times university personnel and resources were appropriated in furtherance of such activity. And in September 2007, two USF engineering students from Egypt were
arrested for transporting explosives across state lines. One of them had posted
previously a personal video on YouTube demonstrating how to use a toy as a remote
detonator for those mujahideen, or “holy warriors,” who wanted to save themselves
for “martyrdom for another day” (qtd. in Silvestrini, September 14, 2007).

As described in Chapter 3, the researcher immerses the analysis in what some
scholars call “New Historicism,” a form of textual criticism which arose in the 1970s
in reaction to an earlier analytical approach called “New Criticism,” which itself posits
case or textual analysis in a vacuum, ruling out potential psychological, intellectual,
ideological, institutional, and historical context. While the British theoretician I.A.
Richards is sometimes called the “father” of the earlier New Criticism, the researcher
suggests that his works such as The Meaning of Meaning (1923, with C.K. Ogden)
and Practical Criticism (1929) actually render him a father of New Historicism, for
Richards advocates interpretation of not a single case (or “text”) in and of itself, but
rather of a single case (or “text”) as a product of other types of circumstances. He
called this approach to interpretation “theory of context.”

The researcher submits here that a case involving a major public research
university with an internationalized mission and people in it who are predisposed
toward what Kuhn (1962) calls ideological “paradigms” of their academic disciplines
are better understood through the New Historical method, attributed to the French
scholar Michel Foucault. New Historicism, despite criticisms that the method is
“unscientific” or lacks “systematic rigor,” allows a researcher to traverse where many
other methods do not: into the history of ideas and ideologies and how and who
attempts to institutionalize them. In addition and as a result, in this study the method
allows for a direct challenge to widely held assumptions about the Islamist movement at USF. The process of contextualization in the findings belies a common defense on the part of some university officials: that public concern about USF’s possible role in facilitating terrorism through the repeated admission of faculty and students from overseas is unwarranted. For example, a recent USF spokesperson stated, “We’re educators, not investigators” and that the continued arrests and convictions of people working or studying at USF are “isolated incidents” (qtd. in Silvestrini and Altman, 2007). To the contrary, the findings of this study suggest that these incidents are not “isolated.”

An unfortunate reality to be sure and as the findings of this study bear witness, the USF case about terrorist operatives having inserted themselves in the university and its service area to advance their cause is consistent with approximately eighty years of activity on behalf of a worldwide socio-religious movement that enjoins support by intellectuals and intellectual ideas disseminated on university campuses. Moreover, the findings show that the organizational environment of universities is vital toward advancing that movement’s unlimited aims objectives of what the movement calls and what is called hereinafter “Islamization” or “re-Islamization of society and knowledge.”

That stated, this study never advances a position that USF and other people in it have engaged willfully in any malfeasance. Indeed, the study could not because no hard evidence has been found to substantiate such an argument. Neither does this study suggest that solution to “re-Islamization in higher education”—which the researcher does conclude is inimical to the purpose of higher education—_involves_
censorship of intellectuals and exclusion of protected classes based on what people believe or where they were born.

*Islamism and Totalitarianism*

In this inquiry, the term “Islamism” and the adjectival and nominal variants “Islamist” are not equated with the terms “Islam,” “Islamic,” or “Muslim,” which refer respectively to a faith and not a political ideology supported by a religious, ultra-national mass movement. A theoretical understanding of that movement, which appropriates the accoutrements of higher education in the service of its objectives of worldwide societal reformation rests in Herbert Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) and his colleague Hannah Arendt (1948/1951/1966/1968/1976/1979/1994) who studied the social psychology of mass movements and group behavior at The University of Chicago in the middle part of the Twentieth Century. From Blumer’s corpus of research, one learns that a salient feature of mass movements is “social contagion” or a “non-rational dissemination of a mood, impulse, or form of conduct” (pp. 175-176) that requires “an appealing setting” (p. 194) like a university for the purpose of cultivating a semblance of legitimacy in that sanctioned forum (p. 194). From the latter scholar’s corpus of research, one learns that in an appealing educational setting, an ultra-national mass movement causes the loss of distinction between research and propaganda in the service of its utopian goals (pp. 453). In addition, both Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) and Arendt (1948/1951/1966/1968/1976/1979/1994) recognize that, indeed, ideological mass movements with a codified educational reform program are created and later cultivated in universities.
Predating those Western scholars from the Twentieth Century is the historiography of Ibn Khaldun (1377/1969), a Tunisian scholar and diplomat who describes the conditions that caused the decline of ancient Islamic civilization. First, Khaldun (1377/1969), a forerunner to modern social psychology, writes about what he calls “group feeling” by Arab leaders who lose their questioning spirit and resort to political violence after they have established themselves in a new region through Islamic conquest. Second, he writes of an intellectual coup in the ancient Islamic universities by a religious orthodoxy called the School of Recent Scholars, who caused a contraction of civilizational progress by merging matters of faith and reason (Khaldun, 1377/1969).

Those few who have studied him regard Khaldun as one of the most influential thinkers to have ever appeared on the world stage, despite that his work fell out of favor in Islamic civilization almost as soon as it had appeared, and again later when liberal Arab-Muslim intellectuals in the Middle East attempt to revive it in the 1930’s (Enan, 1993). The following statement is a typical assessment:

Herein lies, no doubt, his most original contribution, though his keen mind opened new paths in many directions. In seeking for the causes of the rise and fall of political governments, he realized that they could not be looked for solely in the motives and ambitions, the aims and purposes, the strength of will and the intellectual power of individuals. He observed that their influence was determined, not only by the character of the groups to which they belonged, but also by the general social conditions. This led him to consider the factors that influenced and shaped these social conditions. He recognized that they were due to ethnic and racial characteristics. But he perceived likewise that these peculiarities were themselves traceable to the physical environment, climate, water, soil, location, and food. . . . Hence the widening of the scope of history, and the broadening of the historian’s task. History becomes the science of human society. It is sociology. (Enan, 1993: p. 165-166).
Islamism’s Borrowing of Totalitarian Symbols and Strategies

What “totalitarian” signifies, then, is that Islamism is a worldwide social movement like Fascism or Communism conceived by a handful of “Islamist” leaders whose quest for power through actions of free will are justified as God’s will. Evidence thereunto, as explained throughout this chapter exposition, is very clear in that when Islamists are asked to compare their religious beliefs to other beliefs, they cite capitalism and Communism--and not other traditional world religions (Pipes, 1997a).

Another comparative example rests in the Islamist borrowing of Communist symbols and strategies, such as those depicted in a work about education and social reform by Ali Shari’ati, an Iranian Islamist who conceives of a utopian system of education by an elite group of intellects to purge the Muslim mind of “Westoxication” and to instill in it “the right path” (1986, p.51). That work, entitled *What is to Be Done: The Enlightened Thinkers and an Islamic Renaissance*, bears great similarity in name, vision, and scope to another work penned by Russian intellectual Vladimir Ilich Lenin, *What is to Be Done* (1902), which formulates the Bolshevik doctrine that trade union organizers were insufficient to lead the Communist revolution because they were too busy working to take up the task; and that therefore the task fell to intellectuals because they possessed both “the time and the theoretical equipment for such a mission” (R. Pipes, 2001: p.31). The similarity should not surprise us, for Muraweic (2006) explicates in his work *Pandora’s Boxes: The Mind of Jihad II* that Shari’ati had translated the works of the Communist International’s leading intellectuals into Arabic and Farsi when Shari’ati was a student in France.
Islamism’s borrowing from other totalitarian ideologies extends as far back as the 1920’s with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Jamaat-E-Islami in Pakistan, both of which are now international mass movements with grassroots-level institutions in Europe and North America. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-E-Islami refer to themselves as political parties, although the former is banned in Egypt and the latter operates legally in Pakistan. As is shown throughout this thesis, Islamism’s antidemocratic nature has been a hard pill for academics to swallow, so much so that international affairs scholar Walid Phares asks in his most recent book, published after the findings of this work were finished: “Why is it that the vast literature of the modern West, particularly since the 1970’s, denies the totalitarian nature of jihadism? (2007, p. 68)”--jihadism being the violent offshoot of an overarching Islamist mass movement.

Despite avoidance of the topic by leading Middle East and Islamic studies scholars, since the 1920’s the major leader-theoreticians of Islamism have cross-pollinated their ideas, turning a faith into a puritanical ideology. Among the more influential of those theoreticians has been Mawlana Maududi, a Pakistani scholar who advanced in 1939 the concept of Islam as a revolutionary “political party”:

It must be evident to you from this discussion that the objective of the Islamic jihad is to eliminate the rule of a non-Islamic system and establish in its stead an Islamic system of state rule. Islam does not intend to confine this revolution to a single state or a few countries; the aim is to bring about a universal revolution... to effect a world revolution... Truth cannot be confined within geographical borders... No portion of mankind should be deprived of Truth... [As such] Islamic jihad is both offensive and defensive. It is defensive because the Muslim Party assaults the rule of the opposing ideology and it is defensive because the Muslim Party is constrained to capture state power in order to arrest the principles of Islam in space-time forces. (“A World Revolution” qtd. in Laqueur, 2006: p. 398)
Another book by Maududi, *Understanding Islam*, is disseminated in North American mosques. While devoid of strong political statements in other essays like the one above, even milder appeals to potential converts do not rule out “Islamic jihad,” which for the Islamist movement is not a mere spiritual exercise aimed at deflating individual ego. Another document showcased as undisputed evidence in a HAMAS terrorism financing trial in Texas, *U.S.A v. Holy Land Foundation* (2007), declares the strategic bonds between Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-E-Islami organizations in North America as being part of “civilization-jihadist process” toward future theocratic rule.

In this thesis the terms “Islamism” and “Islamist” are not meant in the pejorative sense; indeed, the following pages show that they are terms commonly accepted by Islamists themselves and many other scholars and independent investigators. Moreover, the term “totalitarian” is not intended pejoratively; to the contrary, the term comes from political science and denotes a type of social reform movement in which all aspects of life, from the personal to the political to the religious, are subsumed under the banner of the state, a centralized power as such, in which state actors who hold power neither recognize nor tolerate parties of differing political opinion (Sabine, 1937/1950/1959; R. Pipes, 2001). Ergo, “totalitarianism” denotes belief in such a social system.

In addition to expectations that people under their rule follow the “straight” or “right path,” totalitarian leaders and followers characteristically maintain beliefs that if their way of life is good for their society, then it must be good for all societies. So it follows logically that their movements lay claim to an ultranationalist agenda often
based on the restoration of their group perceptions of past imperial grandeur (see Tibi, 1998; Kepel, 2002 for worldwide examples of this behavior), which leaders propound through legal channels of social education, along with subversive activity, terrorism, and militarism (Sabine, 1937/1950/1959; R. Pipes, 2001). Moreover, R. Pipes (2001), a Baird Professor of History, Emeritus, at The Harvard University, and expert witness in 1992 in the Russian Constitutional Court’s trial against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, also illustrates that totalitarianism differs from other social systems in that “law is not a means of protecting the individual but is a mechanism of governance” (p.105) that enjoys a “political monopoly” underpinned by “the assistance of a security police” (p.105).

Islamism, the Social Psychology of Mass Movements, and Problems in Higher Education

From social psychology, theorists and practitioners such as Sigmund Freud, Carl G. Jung, Herbert Blumer, Hannah Arendt, and others have described mass social movements and their affinity for higher education, not always in noble terms. Freud, for example, laments in Civilization and its Discontents (1930) the trend of educational institutions to obscure the darker nature of social groups and whole civilizations in the process of preparing young people for life and work. In addition, Jung (1936, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1973), in his various letters and essays on German socialism, notes how German society welcomed Nazism into the German universities where anti-Semitic bias and ultranationalist folk ideology in the social sciences influenced German society’s mass preparation for Jewish persecution and unchecked military aggression across the European continent. In addition, another work by Mark
Walker (1995) illustrates how “the step-by-step ‘coordination’ of every aspect of German society which followed Hitler’s appointment as German Chancellor” culminated in the purging of all civil servant-professors who opposed the new government and “also purged German physics of ‘non-Aryans and leftist scientists’” (p.2). Moreover, the German government sought control over “all future university appointments, scientific publication, and funding of research” (p.2).

By the middle of the Twentieth Century, the problem of mass social movements in Western society apparently led Blumer (1946/1951/1963) to articulate a theory of collective behavior for mass social groups, who, in part, blur the boundaries between propaganda and other forms of discourse while also using social institutions such as, and in concert with, higher education to advance their causes. Also, Ted Robert Gurr (1990/1998) notes the correlation between universities and violent radical social groups. Furthermore, Hendershott (2002) observes how more recent rejections of hierarchies in the academy, along with the value of honoring “claims of multiculturalism and diversity” (p.154), cause educators to refrain politely from making judgments about the behavior of non-Western social groups both in education and in society, in general, even when those groups maintain subversive agendas. Finally, scholars who study the religious underpinnings of Islamism and Islamic terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, also note the interplay between Islamism and higher education, although the role of higher education is seldom the direct thesis of their inquiries (Piscatori, 1993; Mendelsohn, 1993; Tibi, 1993; Tehranian, 1993a; Rugh, 1993; Ramadan, 1993; Keddie & Monian, 1993; Kramer, 1993, 1990/1998;
Hoveyda, 1998; Duran, qtd. in Emerson, 2002; Jurgensmeyer, 2002; Pipes, 2002; Berman, 2003).

Of that latter list of aforementioned scholars, Khalid Duran (2002) has perhaps the most unique and forceful thoughts about the intersection between higher education and Islamism. In an interview with Steven Emerson, an expert in the field of international terrorism and a critically acclaimed investigative journalist, Duran (2002) discusses one of his earlier works, *The Role of Political Islam* (1978), written when he was a scholar at the German Middle East Institute. In that prescient 1978 work, Duran studied how the revenue from Saudi Arabian oil wealth was spreading a divisive form of Islamic fundamentalism in the Muslim world, in part, through the Saudi support of Islamic academies and think-tanks that would attach themselves to universities for purposes of achieving legitimacy and mass promotion of puritanical religious doctrine. According to Frank Viviano (2003), evidence suggests that the Saudi government engaged in this part of the so-called “Islamization” process at the expense of not expanding its own educational system. For example, the national library in Riyadh holds 500,000 books, or “one-tenth of the holdings of the main public library in Cincinnati, Ohio” (p.40).

Duran (2002) recognizes that contemporary Islamic fundamentalism, or the religious doctrine that underpins the mass social movement of Islamism, started in the 1930’s in Egypt and was the direct result of diplomatic alliances among various Arab religious and political leaders and Nazi Germany’s leadership, who also had staged a “revolt against modernity” and provided Arab leaders with their own advice about social reform through mass re-education (qtd. in Emerson, 2002: p.172). “In Italy and
Germany you had the brownshirts and the blackshirts. In Egypt you had the
greenshirts, which was the Muslim Brotherhood. It failed in Europe but survived in
Egypt and spread to other parts of the Islamic world” (p.172).

Middle East and international affairs scholar Abdelwahab Hechiche suggests
that the ideological transmission of twentieth-century Islamic fundamentalism, the
religious foundation of Islamism, also has occurred through Egypt’s exporting of
teachers and professors to other Middle Eastern and North African countries (October
2002, personal communication). However, the use of teachers and professors may not
represent the only means for the direct transmission of Islamist doctrine. Pressure from
external advocacy groups on higher education institutions also might influence the
aforementioned trend. For example, a recent WorldNetDaily report states that the
United Muslims Association of Florida (UMA), Tampa Bay chapter, which “closely
aligns itself with the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and other
Islamist organizations” announced that USF included two new courses on Islam for
the spring 2004 term (“Islamists Police the Classroom,” Jan. 2, 2004). In its
announcement, the UMA expressed concern for the content of those courses by
“having some Muslim students in the classroom” because the UMA wants “to make
sure that these professors, of course all in good faith, insha’Allah, portray Islam
correctly” (qtd. in “Islamists Police the Classroom, Jan. 2, 2004). Middle East historian
Daniel Pipes, in that same article, calls this common practice on behalf of Islamist
groups, “incipient dhimmitude” (discussed further below), “a state in which (among
other features) non-Muslims dare not say anything critical about Islam and Muslims”
In addition to the educational role of Saudi Arabian doctrine and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood in spreading Islamic fundamentalism to other parts of the Islamic world, Duran (2002) discusses the professional attraction of university-trained engineers to Islamism. “There’s even a joke about it in Arabic. . . . In Egypt they always say the Muslim Brotherhood is really the Engineering Brotherhood” (p.172). According to Duran (2002), some of that attraction involves the nature of engineering education:

Engineers don’t exercise their fantasy and imagination. Everything is precise and mathematical. They don’t study what we call “the humanities.” Consequently when it comes to issues that involve religion and personal emotion, they tend to see things in very stark terms. (p.172-173)

The dogmatism of those Islamist leaders stands in sharp contrast to the views of Islamic scholars like the aforementioned Khalid Duran, who practices a more poetical form of traditional Islam owing to his scholarship in the Islamic world’s great seats of religious study, for, as Bassam Tibi (1998), Abdelwahab Meddeb (2003), and Daniel Pipes (1997a) note, the “political imams” of Islamism tend to be self-taught and therefore unschooled in the richness of Islamic scholasticism and textual exegesis.

The discourse of political science and history also details directly the intersection between mass social movements and higher education. In that respect, the political theories of George H. Sabine (1937/1950/1959) and of Richard Pipes (2001) are highly relevant for their discussions about the role of higher education in the expansion of twentieth-century totalitarianism, an idea that Middle East historian Daniel Pipes (1997b, 2002), who has published nineteen books about Islamic and Middle East history, reiterates when he describes the “Western Mind of Radical
Islam,” which he regards as the previous century’s third totalitarian mass social movement, a point that, admittedly, other notable scholars such as Leon T. Hadar (1992/1995), Edward Said (1978, 2001), Noam Chomsky (2001), Esposito (1992, 2002), and Scranton (2002) deny in that they view Islamism as a kind of nationalist liberation theology with benign intentions, as opposed to being a pathological mass social movement with layers of leadership and intricate networks of institutional support groups, covert terror groups, and surveillance apparatuses in nations where the movement exists (Berman, 2003). Finally, another scholar, Meddeb (2003) suggests that higher education reform could help in reversing the Islamist ferment, which he understands, too, as an international mass movement conceived by people with graduate degrees and that starts on university campuses in the Middle East and other parts of the world.

Leading academics and higher education experts also study and criticize the presence of mass movements in colleges and universities. Perhaps the most well-reasoned and yet unabashedly critical is Edward Shils (1997) who asks his audience to recall the intrusion of German socialism in German higher education when that audience considers the advent of mass social movements that maintain as part of their core doctrine for curriculum theory and practice “egalitarian ideals and social justice” (p.206). Shils (1997) states therein that German universities found appealing the new socialism that had arisen in their society for the advancement of those same social values. In addition, Shils (1997) asserts that politicization of universities through the support of terrorist social groups also violates the traditional ethos of the academy. Donald E. Walker (1979) also discusses mass social movements that fomented student
disturbances in the 1960’s and 1970’s, asserting that “militant third-sector groups” such as ethnic social groups and the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) represent a dilemma for universities because they “provide stimulation from the periphery” (p.35); yet, because they may “threaten political convulsion” (p.84), the university is a kind of Trojan horse for them.

In contrast to Shils (1997) and Walker (1979), other higher education experts regard mass social movements and groups with either less skepticism (Graff & Ratcliff, 1997; Musil, 1997; Johnston & Spalding, 1997; Yamane, 2001) or greater reverence (Rozak, 1968/1969/1995; Cohen, 2001; Margolis, 2001; Margolis, Soldantenko, Acker, & Gair, 2001; Soldantenko, 2001; Mattson, 2002; Miller, 1987/1994) than those educators (Walker, 1979; Shils, 1997) who perhaps possess a living memory of Nazism and Stalinism—militant ideologies in which all human activity, public and private, was subsumed by the state—or who might have studied those earlier social movements as part of their academic careers. Despite the history of totalitarianism, which characteristically insinuates itself into higher education for the purpose of reforming societies intellectually, culturally and politically, later generations of higher education experts often state that ideological conflict over diversity and multiculturalism in the curriculum (e.g., the potential for excessive politicization of research and teaching), two goals that frequently coincide with contemporary social movements in higher education, can be elided altogether or overcome through serious efforts at strategic planning and the inclusion of a broad array of internal and external cultural groups and other constituencies in the planning.
process (Garcia & Ratcliff, 1997; Musil, 1997; Johnston & Spalding, 1997; Stark & Lattuca, 1997).

Arguably, that kind of inclusion among constituencies can be realized but perhaps only when the major actors among those constituencies welcome social assimilation and critical interaction in the university milieu. Marty and Appleby (1993) in the seminal, multivolume work of sociology researched through The University of Chicago, *Fundamentalisms*, assert that Islamist groups, ultimately, do not welcome assimilation and criticism. To that extent, the leaders of Islamist groups and their followers may not respect inter-group cooperation and the spirit of criticism in higher education.

Indeed, an unwillingness to compromise to the point of exacting violence to achieve objectives on the part of “militant third-sector groups” maintains important parallels in higher education history, as exemplified by the student- and faculty-led “revolutions” in the United States several decades ago (Miller, 1987/1994). Miller (1987/1994) writes with affirmative nostalgia for the SDS in “The 1960’s in the 1990’s” and laments that the “revolution” is “far from finished” in a chapter justification of “the Movement’s” “radicalism” and “terrorism” (p.8):

But listening to a song like “Sympathy for the Devil” and pondering, too, the sometimes frightening nihilism that was an essential facet of the student movement that my book describes, I cannot help thinking that our culture, like our political life, would be richer if we would stop trying to run away from the recklessly questing spirit that informed the artworks and activism of that era. (p.8)

In addition to expressing kindred ideological values based on communitarian concepts of social justice, however, higher education’s “anarchic” organizational style
(Birnbaum, 1988) and “pluralistic” ethos of academic governance (Walker, 1979) also may represent a kind of fresh territory for Islamism, a social movement with overtones of religious fundamentalism (Marty & Appleby, 1993). Indeed, that Islamists seek to reinvent the societies in which they live by turning them into Islamic caliphates is abundantly clear from the record Islamists themselves have created (Marty & Appleby, 1993; Pipes, 2002; Trifkovic, 2003). Supporting such scholarship is another original document commanding public attention: The Akram Document (1992) is another strategic plan for the Muslim Brotherhood’s stated conquest of North America similar to the group’s earlier Muslim Brotherhood Project (1982), noted above. The Akram Document was revealed in summer 2007 as undisputed factual evidence in a federal terrorism financing trial in Texas against a charity called the Holy Land Foundation. Written by a Muslim Brotherhood leader named Mohammed Akram, the document details how grassroots Islamic organizations can act as “beehives” to wage information warfare in non-Muslim institutions, including the academic kind.

Arguably, the United States and its education system maintain a strong history of that kind of reinvention by social movements marked by dominant religious features. Here, the famous sermon by Massachusetts Bay Colony leader, John Winthrop, seems most pertinent. Seeing the North American continent as a place to establish a theocratic community for seventeenth-century “Puritans” who would later establish our nation’s first universities, Winthrop, from the decks of the Mayflower, viewed the New World as “a great shining city on the hill” for his people to reinvent in accordance with their religion. In comparison, Meddeb (2003) in The Malady of Islam
follows that argument about Islamism in his assessment of why it has found a niche in the United States. Meddeb (2003) charges that Islamism has found a home in the United States because both are characteristically religious fundamentalist, which for fundamentalists, by default, means reinventing social systems, including educational ones, according to a divinely-inspired plan of human existence (Marty & Appleby, 1993).

Problem Statement

Leading scholars in the field of Middle Eastern studies, especially through its professional group, The Middle Eastern Studies Association (MESA), have not studied the interplay of Islamism, if viewed as a totalitarian mass social movement, with higher education. By “interplay,” this inquiry means the ideologies, strategies, and legacies of direct and indirect action associated with Islamist movements as those movements interact with higher education. In short, that interplay may be referred to as “re-Islamization from above and below.” The term “re-Islamization” refers to a mid-twentieth-century intellectual trend in the Middle East that contradicted an earlier one known as “de-Islamization” in which modernizing societies began separating sacred and profane spheres of life (Duran & Hechiche, 2002). The terms “from above” and “from below” also require some definition, owing inspiration to Tibi’s (1998) and Kepel’s (2002) histories of the Islamist movement. “From above” is a term employed in political and military science to denote dramatic, direct action aimed at preparing a society for the ultimate objective of wholesale governance change—the creation of a new socio-political order. “From below” is a term employed in political and military science to denote indirect action, especially through covert propaganda campaigns and
institutional subversion, aimed at preparing a society for wholesale governance
(1998) and Kepel (2002) imply, where there manifests the “above” strategy, there
manifests the “below” kind, as well.

In addition to the absence of inquiry in Middle East studies, experts in the field
of higher education have not studied Islamism’s interplay with higher education,
which ostensibly could lay out baseline information about the characteristics and
substantive causes and conditions that involve Islamism in higher education. While
this study considers terrorism or political violence as a potential characteristic of the
Islamist movement, coverage in this analysis extends to the mass movement’s non-
violent characteristics.

While radical Islamic fundamentalism, or Islamism, has been studied widely in
the academy, the tendency of the most publicized and, arguably, the most influential
of intellectuals is to palliate its more inimical aspects (e.g., intellectual persecution,
religious persecution, rarefaction of knowledge), favoring it as a revolutionary
liberation theology that champions the self-determination of oppressed cultures (see,
*inter alia*, Said, 1978, 2001; Chomsky, 2001; Esposito, 2002). That view represents a
core element of post-colonialism and anti-Western resistance theory fashionable in

Outside the academy’s orthodox point-of-view, however, are many scholars
throughout the world who do regard Islamism as a totalitarian threat, or at least as a
mass social movement with hegemonic objectives that destabilizes societies and
discriminates against women, secularists, humanists, Westerners, Jews, Christians,
non-Arab minorities, and liberal Muslims (Tibi, 1998; Duran & Hechiche, 2001; Kramer, 2001; Pipes, 2002; Ye’or, 2002; Meddeb, 2003; Warraq, 2003; Phares, 2007). What that may signify, in effect, then, is that few in the academy, owing to professional views that might cause them to look positively or naively toward mass social movements in education, simply have not conceived that there may be a difference between Islam, the religious faith of millions of Muslims around the world, and Islamism, a violent, repressive political ideology with aspirations of global hegemony (Fregosi, 1998; Tibi, 1998; Duran & Hechiche, 2001; Pipes, 2002; Ye’or, 2002; Meddeb, 2003; Warraq, 2003) that deliberately uses higher education to advance itself ideologically and strategically. Therefore, and arguably, when such a political ideology establishes itself within a higher education institution, few in that institution possess the kind of specialized knowledge or critical judgment that would provide cause for concern, or even the moral resolve to question the propriety of that movement on a university campus.

The problem of Islamism in higher education is apparently worldwide, existing not only in universities in the Middle East but also in North American universities, most notably at The University of South Florida (USF), in Tampa, Florida, where between 1986 and 2007 two highly publicized cases with apparent connections to each other have come to light.

The Al-Arian Case

The first case surrounds the 1986 hiring of computer engineering professor Dr. Sami Al-Arian, a Palestinian born in Kuwait and self-described “enlightened Islamist” (qtd. in Time, 2002). Al-Arian was initiated into the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood
when he was a boy (Waller, 2002). He arrived in the U.S. in 1975 on an Egyptian passport under the auspices of a U.S. F-1 visa for foreign national students. By 1982, as is stated on the website www.FreeSamiAl-Arian.org, Al-Arian co-founded the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), which according to undisputed trial evidence in *U.S.A v. Holy Land Foundation* (2007) is one of many arms of the Muslim Brotherhood in North America. ISNA evolved out of the Muslim Students Association-National (MSA). Hired at USF in 1986, the Southwest Florida Muslim Students Association (MSA-USF) was created as a non-profit entity several months before Al-Arian’s first semester of teaching at USF (see www.Sunbiz.org). Al-Arian became MSA-USF’s faculty advisor and remained in that position until his indictment in 2003 by the federal government on terrorism and criminal racketeering charges.

During his imprisonment, Al-Arian was fired by university president Dr. Judy L. Genshaft. In 2006, Al-Arian plead guilty to a criminal charges of providing services to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) before and after the organization had been declared a foreign terrorist organization in 1995. He also plead guilty to lying to the media about, among other things, his knowledge that another visiting professor he helped instill at USF in the early 1990s, Dr. Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, was a leader in the PIJ.

Findings of fact in the trial *U.S.A. v. Al-Arian* (2006) also reveal that some of that conspiracy occurred on the USF campus through the establishment of a front organization, World Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE), attached to the university in the form of a legal partnership for the purpose of directing communications on behalf of a criminal enterprise, the PIJ. As is detailed in Chapter 5 findings about the USF case,
one of several Islamic scholars whom Al-Arian arranged to come to the United States and lecture for USF-WISE was Khurshid Ahmad, one of the aforementioned Malwana Maududi’s earliest disciples in Pakistan. Ahmad is considered one of the Islamist movement’s leading “activist-intellectuals” propounding “revolutionary jihad” (Esposito and Voll, 2002).

Of the case against Al-Arian, terrorism expert Steven Emerson (1998), in consideration of his and other media investigations resulting in the government’s occasional declassification of information to the public, writes:

> Beyond the issue of how a terrorist front could operate undetected for nearly five years, an interesting question raised was to what degree was The University of South Florida complicit in the creation of a terrorist cell? According to documents collected by federal authorities and interviews with various university officials, mounting evidence suggests that university officials closed their eyes to the warnings and indications that a terrorist cell was operating with the university imprimatur. (p.40)

Of that alleged terrorist cell operating at USF, Emerson (1998) further states that it “succeeded, in large part, in establishing [its] support infrastructure because [it] networked together with other militant Islamic groups” in a “pan-Islamic militant partnership” most readily seen in the first World Trade Center bombing, “a collaboration from five different radical Islamic organizations—the Gama Islamiya, Islamic Jihad, al-Fuqra, Sudanese National Islamic Front, and Hamas” (p.41).

*The Mohamed and Megahed Case*

The second case involving alleged terrorism connections to USF involves two students, Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohamed (24 or 26 years old) and Youssef Samir Megahed (21 years old), who were arrested in South Carolina in August 2007. Initially, they were pulled over by local law enforcement for speeding. Having
engaged in some activity that law enforcement found suspicious, suddenly closing a laptop computer upon approach and not providing plausible answers for their traveling on remote country roads near a military facility, the students consented to a search of their car. Trunks contents revealed what law enforcement regarded as bomb-making material and a can of gasoline, or what the students and their attorneys regard as homemade fireworks. The bomb-making material, or homemade fireworks, included over twenty feet of detonating cord. By early September 2007, after several weeks of detention in South Carolina, and following raids at a storage facility and a private home in a subdivision that includes Al-Arian’s mosque and some mosque board members, the students were extradited to Tampa, Florida, where Mohamed was charged with teaching and demonstrating how to manufacture and use an explosive device “in furtherance of an activity that constitutes a crime of violence” under United States terrorism codes (*U.S.A. v. Mohamed and Megahed*, 2007). In addition, both students were charged with transporting interstate commerce explosive materials without a license. Previously at least one of them had been arrested in Tampa for shooting at squirrels in a city park.

Like Al-Arian, both students arrived legally in the United States with Egyptian passports. One of the students, Mohamed, had obtained at least an undergraduate degree in engineering from Cairo University, a well-known educational haven for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. As Al-Arian was a professor of engineering at USF, Mohamed and Megahed were engineering students there. Like Al-Arian, they or their relatives possibly had established corporate entities for technology in the state of Florida (e.g., General Trade and Technology and NetSynergy). Like Al-Arian, they
were associated with the MSA at USF. Like Al-Arian, they were associated with a
board member, Noor Salhab, of Al-Arian’s former mosque and school, the Islamic
Academy of Florida (IAF). The IAF itself was cited in undisputed trial evidence in
*U.S.A. v. Al-Arian* as part of the enterprise Al-Arian created to provide services to the
PIJ.

For himself and his family, Noor Salhab denies any knowledge of
Al-Arian’s crimes or of those alleged by students Mohamed and Megahed, one of
whom had rented a house at 12402 Pampas Place, owned by Salhab. The government
has not accused or charged Salhab with any crimes. Salhab’s house, however, already
had been known to government investigators as a kind of “safe-house” for PIJ
operatives at USF and the nearby Temple Terrace subdivision. Sami Al-Arian
reportedly had lied about his having used the residence an off-campus office for WISE
after neighbors had complained about the high volume of traffic associated with it. At
that time in the early 1990s, the house had been occupied or its address had been used,
variously, by Dr. Ramadan Shallah (USF visiting professor and second General-
Secretary of the PIJ), Dr. Hussam Jubara (USF graduate student of engineering,
University of Central Florida visiting professor, and U.S.-deported HAMAS
operative), and Dr. Samir M. Benmakhlof (engineer and former business partner of
Al-Arian in General Trade and Technology).

**Purpose of the Study**

Specialization in area studies programs like Middle East and higher education
seldom advance conceptual research models that triangulate their and other multiple
fields of theoretical expertise and practice from across academic disciplines in order to
create new knowledge out of existing knowledge. Seldom do they enrich that same interdisciplinary content with current case study observation. In this study, the researcher consulted numerous works by the world’s foremost authorities and publishing houses in Middle East and higher education studies, concluding that experts in both areas have not explored directly Islamism’s interplay with higher education to advance Islamism’s agenda for worldwide reformation.

Thus, the purpose of this study was to explore that interplay. Therefore, the researcher situated the case of alleged Islamist international terrorism and related matters at USF in a global context, comparing and contrasting conditions and characteristics involving Islamism and USF with similar problems in other parts of the world. At the same time, however, the study triangulated extant theory and research from social psychology, political science, and history about the collective behavior and characteristics of mass movements, their leaders, and their followers. According to Walker (1979), a university chancellor and sociologist, the collective nature of mass social movements is more responsible for the problem of mass movements in higher education than are the characteristics and conditions of higher education itself in drawing mass movements to it. Walker (1979) does state, however, that the democratic nature of the university offers a loophole of which mass social movements take advantage. Within that overarching context, the case involving Islamism at USF, 1986-2007, became an important example for that comparison-contrast analysis.

The interdisciplinary framework of this study and international scope coincide with USF’s Strategic Plan, 2007-2012. The plan holds that the university should align “with local, state, national, and global needs.” In turn, the plan states that alignment
should come, in major part, through “integrated and synergistic interdisciplinary research across disciplinary, departmental, college, and campus boundaries.” The researcher, together with the support of her thesis committee hailing from three different departments, two colleges, two different campuses, and three different regions in the world--North America, Europe, and North Africa—achieves precisely that. In addition, external validation for the study came from subject matter experts not from the United States but also from Canada, France, and Sweden. Two of the study’s external validators, while living in European countries, are natives of Egypt and Morocco.

Research Questions

Out of the aforementioned strands of discussion about the problem’s hypothetical conditions and characteristics, the researcher established two overarching research questions for the study:

1. What are the conditions and characteristics of Islamism’s interplay in higher education in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Levant, Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan?
2. What are the conditions and characteristics of Islamism’s interplay with USF and its service area, 1986-2007?

In this study, interplay is defined as the contours of interrelating ideologies, strategies, and legacies of direct and indirect action undertaken by the Islamist movement in the university milieu and its surrounding environment. In short, it connotes a decades-old process that Kepel (2002), in his work The Trail of Political Islam, calls “re-Islamization from above and below.” That interplay involves a range of temporal developments manifesting as conditions upon which the Islamist movement exacted its influence in host societies, and out of those conditions arise the Islamist
movement’s characteristics. In this analysis, we examine those conditions and characteristics as they pertain to matters of higher education. In this inquiry “conditions” signify things that give rise to the occurrence of the Islamist movement in higher education institutions in a particular place and time. “Characteristics” refers to certain features that are typical of the Islamist movement in higher education institutions in a particular place and time. As will be shown, sometimes a condition in one place represents a characteristic in another.

Method

This study employs a method of historiography, New Historicism, involving Foucault’s (1969, 1971, 1974) theory of institutions to investigate Islamism’s interplay with higher education, culminating in a study of the movement and its leadership at USF. The method’s philosophical base being postmodernist in origin, Foucault’s theory of institutions accepts Derrida’s (1966/1967) arguments that language, or signification, is not transcendental, and is, to the contrary, quite arbitrary and sometimes coerced in institutional settings regarding meaning, which happens through a process of signification, or free play, or interplay. In short, things signify other things but they do not “mean” other things in a transcendental sense. Writing about the history of sexuality and penal systems, Foucault (1969, 1971, 1974) employs Derrida’s deconstruction of what Derrida calls “the transcendental signified” and shows how institutions and sub-institutions engage in an interplay of linguistic signification and other practices in order to consolidate power and knowledge, imposing limitations on discourse through structures of institutional thought.
The study of intellectual history and ideologies is integral to the New Historical method. In the study of organizations, institutional analysis focuses “on the multiplicity of factors involved in describing organizational life and events” (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998: p. 43). Hence, in their drawing upon Foucault’s theory, Said (1978, 1983), White (1974), Leitch (1992), Czarniawska (1997), and Meddeb (2003) variously employ Foucault’s theory to culture, academic disciplines, literature, organizations, and Islamism, respectively. Those “institutions” are each involved in a signification process with other “sub-institutions,” such that critics of those “institutions” and “sub-institutions” may interpret the signification process by analyzing, inter alia, ideological habits of mind, basic assumptions (and reactions to challenges of those basic assumptions), actions, archives, pedagogy, taboos, publishing records, religious texts, and judicial texts. In turn, authors, or people who signify, lose control over the meaning of their “institutions” and “sub-institutions.” At the same time, critics can, as White (1974) states, “re-familiarize us with events which have been forgotten through either accident, neglect, or repression” by “looking at the ways in which events evolved,” “providing more information about them,” and showing how their developments “conform to or deny other [signifying] story types” (pp.399-400).

In this analysis, a four-year process of coding for thematic association reveals an interplay of ideologies, strategies, and legacies of direct and indirect action diffused across geographical space and time, with higher education representing organizational territory upon which the Islamist movement and its leaders exacts their plans for ultra-nationalist conquest. By coding, this inquiry means the “simultaneous collection and
analysis of data” that is compared and contrasted to the point that “interrelated concepts” are “refined and integrated into the theoretical framework” of the study (Charmaz, 2000: p. 509). This coding process proved to be well-suited for an inquiry that draws from multiple academic fields of study because “it accounts for variation” and permits modification of “established analyses as conditions in the research changed or as further data were gathered” (p. 510-511).

Coding of the data also involved textual analysis of the Islamist movement’s discourse on three interrelated levels identified by Johnston in *Methods of Social Movement Research* (2002): world-historical (e.g., the discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood and its leadership), organizational (e.g., the educational discourse of the International Institute of Islamic Thought), and individual (e.g., the discourse of Sami al-Arian). As the researcher amassed and analyzed evidence over the past three years, the aforementioned research questions were reframed into their current form for the purposes of systematically presenting the findings in later chapters. Eventually, the coding method led to the classification of conditions and characteristics essential to Islamism’s interplay in higher education, the contours of which are presented in rich detail in Chapters Four and Five.

Section II:

An Extended Discussion of Major Strands of Ideas for Answering the Research Questions

Broadly considered, the discourse of scholars and other experts on Islamic studies and higher education studies suggests that Islamism maintains an affinity for
higher education, and, conversely, that higher education maintains an affinity for
Islamism. In that respect, the symbiosis between the two institutions echoes similar
relationships between external social groups and higher education in the 1960’s and
1970’s. Writing about the relationship, for example, Walker, in a discussion about
campus disruption in the work *The Effective Administrator* (1979) suggests that
“militant third-sector groups” influencing campus decision-making owe that ability to
“their nature more than from the character of the university” (p.35), excepting that
“the democratic nature of the university welcomes those groups” (p.35). In tacit
support of Walker’s (1979) organizational observation, Egyptian American newspaper
publisher Seif Ashmawi states that “radical Islamist groups have taken over
mainstream Islamic institutions in the United States” (qtd. in Emerson, 1998: p. 36-37).
However, “Unfortunately, Americans are a naïve people, refusing to believe that
foreign extremists would actually lie to them” (qtd. in Emerson, 1998: pp. 36-37). By
coincidence to this study of a mass social movement in higher education, Walker
(1979) refers to campus conflict influenced by “militant third-sector groups” as “holy
war” (p.78-84). Walker (1979) qualifies the term in his description of the political
model of governance as “the process whereby complex issues of the head are
translated into simple issues of the heart for large numbers of people” (p.78).

By comparison, a similar process took place in 2006 in European and Islamic
countries around the world as mass protests, embassy sieges, and boycotts by religious
leaders and their followers objected, six months after the fact, to the publication of
satirical cartoon portrayals of Muhammad, Islam’s final and most revered prophet. In
this section, as throughout this entire inquiry, a reader paying attention to those current
events will come to a deepened understanding of the pre-modern Islamic traditions that fuel the cartoon riots, in which militant Muslims living in liberal-democratic European societies expect that those societies not criticize Muslim things, lest they experience mass Muslim uprisings instigated by local religious leaders and civil rights advocates. Hence, this interdisciplinary study about a worldwide mass movement attempts to examine what Walker (1979) calls “complex matters of the head” (p. 35) as opposed to “simple matters of the heart” (p. 35).

The aforementioned “affinity” between Islamism and higher education also compares to R. Pipes’ (2001) observation of the role of intellectuals in the advancement of Communism: “Most European Communists and sympathizers were not oblivious to the odious aspects of Communist rule, but they rationalized them in various ways: by blaming extraneous causes, such as the legacy of tsarism and the hostility of the ‘capitalist’ West” (p.97). Moreover, R. Pipes (2001) shows that in “northern Europe and in the United States, where neither socialism nor Communism had much of a following, Moscow won useful allies among liberals and ‘fellow travelers,’ mostly intellectuals who, without joining the party, promoted its objectives” (p.98). “They were of the greatest importance to it,” R. Pipes (2001) writes, “because, unlike party members, who were suspected of speaking at the party’s command, they expressed personal convictions” (p.98). These intellectuals are what Bolshevik party stylist and leader Lenin (1902) refers to as “useful idiots” in the work What is to Be Done? (p. 52). According to R. Pipes (2001), the role of intellectuals in furthering Communism inside and outside higher education is one that would be repeated in various other countries such as, inter alia, in Germany, Italy, Japan, China, and Cuba.
Ellen Earle Chaffee and Sarah Williams Jacobson (1997) suggest that institutional cultures and subcultures, ostensibly including Walker’s (1979) “militant third-sector groups,” may be studied through analysis of their “basic assumptions,” “basic values,” “norms of behavior,” and “artifacts” (p.234). In this extended background section the researcher delineates the terms of that scholarship involving mass social movements and higher education. That scholarship signifies what William Cohen (1997) calls the post-Cold War academy’s “recognition” of the “significance and power of expertise based in institutions in other countries” such as area studies programs that have shifted out of their “orientalist [sic] guise” of Western values (p.550).

In context, the researcher notes that conflicting discourse about Islamism, let alone Islamism’s affinity for higher education, is extraordinarily contentious in the manner that Becher (1989/1993/1996) describes as that rare but “blazing row,” a kind of warfare among “academic tribes and territories,” that academics engage in when trying to protect their scholarly reputations that imbue their personal identities. On one side of the debate are those who espouse anti-Western resistance theory and post-colonial theory (Qutb, 1953; Said, 1978, 2001; Hiltermann, 1991; Esposito, 1991, 2002; Cantori & Lowrie, 1992; Abu Amr, 1994; Chomsky, 2002; Honderich, 2002). Those voices often adhere to the adage that “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”1 On the other side of the debate are those scholars (Duran, 1978; Lewis, 1993; Pipes, 1996, 1997b, 2002, 2003; Kramer, 2001; Tibi, 2001; Duran & Hechiche, 2002; Dershowitz, 2002; Chesler, 2003; Meddeb, 2003; Berman, 2003; Sharansky, 2003; Ye’or, 1998, 2002) who hold that leading Middle East scholars have
obviated facts about Islamism’s socially and intellectually totalitarian features in which all aspects of private life and of religion are subsumed by the state (Sabine, 1937/1950/1959). Some of those scholars argue that Middle East studies, as an area of academic study, has failed in its obligations of research, publication, and education, attributing that failure to theoretical shifts in the discipline that have rarefied knowledge (Lewis, 1993; Kramer, 2001).

Section III:

Limitations

Answering the research questions presented above involves the collection, study, and synthesis of a vast range of scholarly and archival sources, which is why the researcher began the public archives, events, and documents collection of her inquiry six years ago. The researcher did not locate USF Board of Trustees archives in university library Special Collections; however, USF presidential archives were studied at length.

At that time, the USF-WISE case resurfaced during what the researcher refers to as its second historical phase, September 2001 to May 2006. The USF case’s third historical phase, from 2006 to the present, is in-progress but involves Islamism at USF after Al-Arian’s conviction, which prevents his return to the university and its service area. The on-going developments about the alleged pipe-bomber students likely will consume attention in this third phase, whose facts are not entirely clear.

As this study is historical in nature, involving interpretive methods detailed in Chapter Three, interviews with stakeholders represented a problem for the study given
the polarization of political camps at USF regarding the USF-WISE controversy. When approached, most constituents never responded substantively except to repeat statements previously stated in the media. Therefore, the researcher conducted the study with the supposition that any substantive information could not be obtained through interviews. The study compensates for lack of interviews with the collection of un-refuted media statements that extend as far back as 1991 and of original documents that amplify insight about the case.

Another reason for not interviewing is that the USF case has been embroiled in legal battles involving Al-Arian’s arrest and indictment for terrorism, visa fraud, and criminal racketeering and his firing from his professional position at USF. Some people involved with the case have been reluctant to say anything that might be self-incriminatory or that might implicate others in criminal or professional malfeasance. Some have feared professional reprisals by their colleagues in the academy; some, the nation’s Attorney General; and others, Islamists. However, constituents’ statements reported in the media and other collected institutional documents were fruitful in conveying a range of basic assumptions and ideological habits of minds regarding the Al-Arian imbroglio.

In addition, all research, no matter however careful, maintains some element of scholarly bias. In this inquiry, the researcher admits her own bias in that part of it stems from her role as a participant-observer of the USF case. Here, the researcher admits to the following:

- Strong positions on academic freedom doctrine as applying to all professors, students, and institutions in the world; from her
• Strong objections to intellectual persecution in the world and also from acts of Islamic terrorism, including the singling out, maiming, and murder of intellectuals and students by various Islamist “activist-intellectuals” in this study;

• Strong objections to academic freedom denials and censorship practices observed as a study-abroad student in Egypt at The American University at Cairo in 1998.

• Strong support of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948*

Such limitations by no means discredit the value of this study, however. Indeed, they might enrich its value. Destruction of source material and stakeholders’ unwillingness to be interviewed may be considered, arguably, as supportive to the observation that Islamism is a totalitarian mass social movement that self-justifies censorship and historical negationism (Ye’or, 2002). The volume of scholarly sources, archival data, and other information presented in rich description and based on five years of systematic information collection and analysis of the topic amply and empirically presents the defining features of Islamism in higher education. The contours of those features have been illustrated in this first chapter and resonate throughout this inquiry’s forthcoming chapters about the re-Islamization of higher education and the history of Islamism at USF, re-Islamization’s most salient North American higher education case to date.

While the inquiry may not be generalizable to all higher education institutions in the United States or around the globe, its illustration of key concepts and events nonetheless present themselves profoundly and relevantly to higher education
institutions involved administratively or as a matter of curriculum, teaching, and research in issues of international terrorism and Islamic studies. In that sense, each university must decide for itself to what extent, if any, it has become a receptive haven for a subculture of global jihadists bent on destroying the ideals of higher education as we know and love them.

Section IV:

Definition of Terms

*academic freedom*: the freedom of professors, students, and higher education institutions to create and disseminate knowledge in a manner that is free from politicization or other pressures from organized groups; the concept carries many meanings, therefore, that shift according to different historical circumstances and contexts; thus, the concept maintains a tension between its historical re-definitions and its invocation as a universal ideal, which in turn signifies that efforts to resolve tension by insisting on one “true” definition is to “engage in dogmatism that can only disarm the concept it purports to defend” (Scott, 1996: p. 165). (adapted from *The Random House College Dictionary*, 1988, and Scott, 1996); the AAUP 1940 definition further elucidates that “freedom in research is fundamental to the advancement of truth” (see full AAUP statement in Chapter Two).

**ayatollah**: a title in the religious hierarchy of Islamic religious scholars of the Shiite sect conferred by their demonstration of highly advanced knowledge of Islamic law. (from Random House, 1988; Tibi, 1998)

**Critical Theory**: a neo-Marxist social theory made popular in the 1960’s by Herbert Marcuse, in which rigorous explanations of the causes of oppression are attributed exclusively to Western ideology, science, and capitalism. (adapted from The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1999)

**dar al-harb**: “domain of war,” or the non-Muslim world where Islamic law does not rule. (from Ye’or, 2002)

**dar al-Islam**: “domain of Islam,” or the Muslim world where Islamic law rules. (from Ye’or, 2002)

**dhimma**: originally a protection pact or treaty granted by the Prophet Muhamad to the Jewish and Christian populations he subjected. (from Ye’or, 2002)

**dhimmi**: indigenous Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians who—subjected to Islamic law after the Arab and Turkish conquest—both benefited from the dhimma yet were limited by it. (from Ye’or, 2002)

**dhimmitude**: a term used to describe the subservient condition of a people who live under the Islamic beliefs, customs, and laws of a Muslim minority. (from Ye’or, 2002)

**Enlightenment**: a late eighteenth-century international movement in thought that had enormous social, political, and religious ramifications, laying the groundwork for various intellectual foundations involving a scientific worldview and liberal-democratic society; key intellectual propositions involve actions prompted by traditional authority (religious or political) as being not free, universality of human
rationality (requiring only education for the development of that rationality), human beings as having the right to shape their own individual destinies (as opposed to having traditional authority shape individual destinies), and that with application of reasoning the true forms of things could be answered. (adapted from The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1995/1999)

fatwa: legal opinion issued by a jurisconsult based on the Qur’an and the Sunna. (from Ye’or, 2002)

fundamentalism: a mode of belief found in most major world religions that stresses the infallibility of their religious texts in all matters of faith and doctrine, accepting those texts as literal historical record. (adapted from The Random House College Dictionary, 1988, and Fundamentalisms, 1993)

Gaza: a seaport adjacent to southwest Israel and a territory under the administration of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. (from Random House, 1988; Kepel, 2002)

higher education: postsecondary school education, provided by colleges, graduate schools, and professional schools (adapted from Random House, 1988)

historical negationsim: a term used to describe the omission or glossing over of historical events for the purpose of “sweetening” the historical record, especially for political purposes that blur the traditional purposes of scholarship to create and disseminate knowledge. (from Ye’or, 2002)

ideological politics: a form of politics that arose in the Twentieth Century which holds that politics should be conducted based on a comprehensive set of ideological, social, or religious considerations that override all other considerations, while infusing those considerations into every aspect of human life; also called “alienative politics”
because of the propensity to distrust the central institutional systems of the prevailing society and to engage in extra-constitutional conduct (from Shils, 1997)

ideology: the body of doctrine, myth, and symbol of a social movement, institution, class, or large group with reference to a cultural or political plan along with the devices for putting it into operation, usually visionary or impractical in theory. (from Random House, 1988; see also, Shils, 1997)

imam: the religious and political head of a Muslim community, the equivalent of a mayor; also a spiritual authority. (from Ye’or, 2002)

Islam: the religious faith of Muslims, as set forth in the Qur’an, which teaches that Allah is the only God and that Muhammad is his prophet; the whole body of Muslim believers, their civilization, and the countries in which theirs is the dominant religion. (from Random House, 1988; see also, el Fadl, 2005)


Islamization: a self-defined term of Islamists to denote their ideological vision of history in which the dar al-Islam and dar al-harb are subsumed under Islamic law; it is a process achieved primarily through “above and below” actions in social, educational, political, and religious institutions throughout the world. (adapted from Kepel, 2002; Tibi, 1998; Ye’or, 2002)

jihad: holy war against non-Muslims; its aims, strategies, and tactics make up a theological-legal doctrine; also applied to a person’s inner struggle to fulfill the commandments of Allah. (from Ye’or, 2002)
martyr: a person who chooses to suffer death rather than renounce his religion; or who sacrifices himself on behalf of any belief, principle, or cause; a person who seeks sympathy or attention by feigning or exaggerating pain, deprivation, or suffering.

(from Random House, 1988; see also, El Fadl, 2005)

Middle East: loosely the area from Libya to Afghanistan, usually including Egypt, Sudan, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and the countries of the Arabian Peninsula. (from Random House, 1988; Kepel, 2002)

militant Islam: a term synonymous with “political Islam,” “Islamic fundamentalism,” and “Islamism.” (adapted from Kepel, 2002; Meddeb, 2003; Pipes, 2002; and Ye’or, 2002)

mufti: the religious head and legal advisor of an Islamic community. (from Random House, 1988; see also El Fadl, 2005)


Occidentalism: a term that denotes Islamism’s and the academy’s propensity to minimize the more shameful aspects of Islamic history. (see reference to “historical negationism” above)

Orientalism: the knowledge and study of Oriental, or Eastern, languages and peoples; the term became a pejorative with the publication of Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978); (adapted from Random House, 1988, Kramer, 2001, and Lewis, 1993)

political imam: a term used to distinguish Islamic religious leaders who were educated outside of traditional Islamic religious universities from those who were educated inside those seats of Islamic learning. (Kepel, 2002; Tibi, 1998)
**political Islam**: synonymous with “militant Islam,” “Islamic fundamentalism,” and “Islamism.” (see references for “militant Islam” above)

**Qur’an**: the primary sacred text of Islam, believed to have been dictated to Prophet Muhammad by the angel Gabriel and regarded by Muslims as the foundation of their religion, law, culture, and politics. (from Random House, 1988; El Fadl, 2005)

**re-Islamization**: a term used by Meddeb (2003) to show that Islamists seek to purge civilization, through its social, educational, political, and religious institutions of ideas and people who do not embody the *dar al-Islam*, as that domain is interpreted by Islamists; Meddeb (2003) regards this process as one that inhibits intellectual enrichment for both Muslims and non-Muslims; Meddeb (2003) refuses the term “Islamization” because Islam has always existed in global institutions, a fact which refutes the Islamist myth of exclusion and oppression (adapted from Meddeb, 2003)

**ressentiment**: or “resentment”; a French term borrowed from Nietzsche’s *The Genealogy of Morals* used to describe the psychology of social groups and their members who feel displeasure or indignation over a preceding action or injury; in turn, that mode of thinking leads to cultural nihilism in which groups and their members seek to destroy life and its scientific and cultural achievements (adapted from Meddeb, 2003, and *The Genealogy of Morals*, 1887)

**shari’a**: Islamic sacred law, based mainly on the Qur’an and Sunna. (from Ye’or, 2002)

**sheikh**: the head of an Islamic religious community. (from Random House, 1988)

**shura**: the Arabic term for “consultation,” as, for example, by a body of religious leaders who makes decisions for the *ummah.*
Sunna: the received words and deeds attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. (from Ye’or, 2002)

terrorism: activities that involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State within, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; those acts appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by assassination or kidnapping, and occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend the national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum. (from the United States Criminal Code 18, section 2331 (1))


Tunisia: a French republic in North Africa, on the Mediterranean Sea, that was a French protectorate until 1956 (from Random House, 1988; Kepel, 2002)

university: a term associated with “higher education” (see above) that denotes an institution of higher learning, comprising a college of liberal arts, a program of graduate studies, and various professional schools, and sanctioned to confer undergraduate and graduate degrees (adapted from Random House, 1988)
Wahhabism: a branch of Islamic fundamentalist theology that is considered the state religion of Saudi Arabia but is practiced throughout the world; scholars consider it a prime motivation for religious terrorism committed by many Islamic groups throughout the world, but Al-Qaeda specifically. (Bergen, 2002; Kepel, 2002; Meddeb, 2003; Pipes, 2002; Rashid, 2002; Ye’or, 2002)

West Bank: an area in the Middle East between the west bank of the Jordan River and the east frontier of Israel. (from Random House, 1988; Kepel, 2002)

Section V:
Significance of the Study

In 2002, a pro-Palestinian activist was hired as a professor at Columbia University as an endowed Edward Said Chair of Arab Studies (Kramer, Sept.9, 2003). Martin Kramer, a Middle East historian who calls for reform of Middle East studies in the work *Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle East Studies in America* (2001), has challenged Columbia University, a federal- and state-funded private institution, to declare the sources of its fellowship monies for the post (Kramer, Sept.9, 2003). “And on the list that I have seen,” writes Kramer, “there is a foreign government, which I find positively alarming” (Kramer, para.7, Sept.9, 2003).

Amid the dialectic between Kramer and Columbia University rests the background of USF-WISE, whose funds for the Islamic studies institute on campus were channeled from Saudi Arabia to the IIIT in Herndon, Virginia, to WISE in Tampa, Florida, and through USF administrative, faculty, and student payrolls. The federal government has indicted many of the professors affiliated with WISE or who
taught at WISE or who knew WISE board members on fifty-two counts of criminal activity related to “Islamization from above” activities in the Middle East, namely suicide bombings responsible for the murders of two U.S.-American study-abroad students in Israel. One of them, Al-Arian, confessed and was convicted for facilitating such acts through services he provided to the PIJ.

Thus, one matter of significance involves the question of the politicization of think-tanks and university programs. Think-tank criticism is usually directed toward those having a conservative board of directors affiliated with private, for-profit enterprise, or for the contingent use of university programs for non-academic ends. In the USF case, criticism is directed toward a think-tank supported by an Islamist ideology that espouses violent and intimidating action from “above” and non-violent action from “below.” The flow of money is not for-profit but rather in not for-profit, through foreign and domestic charities affiliated with terrorism financing. This study therefore raises the bar on questions of accountability related both to moral turpitude and to the rarefaction of knowledge on the part of university employees.

At the same time, the inquiry shows how Islamists feel self-justified in using higher education toward their larger objectives, given their religious interpretations and practices of *jihad*, *dhimmitude*, and *adab*, which provide Islamists with religious justification for their actions (Ye’or, 2002). Therefore, this study transcends the legal terms of the case, repositioning the case in historical and scholastic terms, thereby deepening the academy’s awareness of its salience as a case the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) defines as “the most important case of academic freedom in the twenty-first century.”
This study is also significant because USF posits itself in its mission as a Research I institution interested in serving a global society, so the question arises whether the creation and dissemination of an ideology like Islamism, which, arguably, is totalitarian in nature and in action, helps USF to advance that part of its mission.

Another aspect of the university’s mission is to promote cultural tolerance and diversity. Again, the presence of Islamism in a think-tank on campus, in university courses, and in student activities calls those two concepts into question because of Islamism’s outstanding thought and practice of \textit{jihad}, \textit{dhimmitude}, and \textit{adab}, which oppose cultural tolerance, diversity, free inquiry (Ye’or, 2002).

In addition, this study has significance in terms of academic freedom in matters of making trustworthy faculty appointments, as well as decisions about the expansion and philosophical nature of the university curriculum and research, and where the line between disseminating knowledge versus propaganda is drawn. In turn, this study possesses significance in terms of whether, when, and to what extent external constituents, governing boards, and administrators have a voice in accountability regarding faculty appointments, curriculum decisions, and the potential safety of students in Middle Eastern study abroad programs.

Moreover, this study has significance in that it is the first of its kind to investigate whether Islamists use higher education in other parts of the world for the purpose of advancing a political agenda of religious, social, and thought reform. Therein, this study places the USF case in the distinct Islamic contexts of \textit{jihad}, \textit{dhimmitude}, and \textit{adab}, scholastic hallmarks of the process of “Islamization from above and below.” Incorporating the Islamist context into the controversy
distinguishes this critical analysis of the USF case from past critical analyses, which focus exclusively on government-defined terms of international terrorism and the acceptability of those terms.

This study also possesses significance in that it is the first recorded history of Islamism at USF from 1986-2007 that details the controversy over the partnership agreement between USF-WISE and the various USF-WISE professors who maintained associations with the leaders of Islamist terrorist groups from various countries in the world. Prior to this study, the most extended independent chronicle of the USF case could be found in a chapter entitled “Jihad in the Academy” in Steven Emerson’s investigative work *American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us* (2001). As for non-independent chronicles about the case, the only other extant one is “Report to Betty Castor: On Matters Concerning WISE” (1996), written by a Tampa attorney and former Florida Bar Association president, William Reece Smith, Jr., and commissioned by the then USF president, Betty Castor. Numerous other essays and articles about the USF experience, polemical or not, have appeared in the world media.

Finally, this study is significant in that it builds upon extant theory from social psychology about mass social movements, religious fundamentalism, and terrorism, in particular, and in terms of the thesis that higher education is an integral component of the Islamist movement. As such, this study provides scholars with a synthesis of accounts by Middle East and Islamic scholars who have written about radical Islam’s “Western mind,” the prevalence of people with graduate degrees in Islamism’s ranks,
the ideological takeover of professional and students’ unions, and the use of higher education institutions for “above” and “below” purposes.

Section VI:
Chapter Summary

In rich form and content, the researcher has set the stage in this chapter for a study of the mass social movement Islamism, typing the movement as being totalitarian in kind and laying the groundwork of extant research for that movement’s presence in higher education in the world and at USF. The chapter also contrasts the “totalitarian” qualification with an opposing one that is much more accepted in the academy, which is that Islamism is a liberation theology with benign, democratic intentions. In keeping with sociological theory about the collective behavior of social groups, Islamism is defined as having a program entitled “Islamization,” referred to in this inquiry as “re-Islamization,” and as having the ability to spread itself in a manner that sociologists classify as a “contagion.” Because the movement is one of total social reform, Islamism by nature seeks education institutions as a means to achieve its objectives in the societies where it exists. The scholarship studied for this research proposal ranges far afield from social psychology to political science to history to higher education in attempt to show how Islamism and higher education might maintain various characteristics and substantive conditions that, in turn, allow for their mutual coalescence. The problem identified in this chapter to which the research questions are tailored is simply that no previous research in Middle East studies or in higher education has directly explored the points of intersection between Islamism and ...
higher education. This establishes the purpose of this research, namely exploring that intersection by means of the two stated research questions. In context, the case of alleged terrorism at USF, adjudicated in federal court in May-December 2005, after which a confession by Al-Arian of conspiracy to commit terrorism was negotiated in April 2006, is situated in a comparative global context about what is known about Islamism in higher education. In that respect, the case at USF is taken out of its narrower context of legal concerns involving criminal law, contract law, and academic freedom customs and usage and placed in a greater one involving cultural, religious, historical, and political ferments taking place in a global setting.

1 Despite current trends in the academy and by Islamists and sympathetic persons, Geneva Conventions for warfare are very clear in drawing distinctions between the term “terrorist” and “freedom fighter,” or “terrorism” and “freedom fighting.” Among the major differences, for example, is that freedom fighters wear insignia or uniforms that clearly identify them and their purposes at a distance, so that they cannot be mistaken as innocent civilians. In addition, their vehicles carry similar, highly visible insignia and they do not quarter their militia and accoutrements among civilian populations or in religious institutions, using them as human shields. For detailed descriptions and case law about those and other distinctions see Franck and Glennon (1993), Foreign Relations and National Security Law: Cases, Materials and Simulations.
Chapter Two

Review of the Literature

Introduction

In this second chapter, the researcher draws upon the works of theorists and practitioners as diverse as Sigmund Freud, Hannah Arendt, and Herbert Blumer who, write, *inter alia*, about the psychological motivation and behavior of organizations, institutions, mass social groups, and whole civilizations that sometimes are overtaken by “social contagion” (Blumer, 1939/1946/1951/1955: p.175). While Blumer’s research on types of mass movements represents the theoretical mainstay of the social psychology of this inquiry, the presentation starts with his Western antecedents in the field whose foundations rest within the International Psychoanalytic Movement. However, after a review of Blumer, the chapter backtracks by about 600 years in a discussion of Ibn Khaldun, a fourteenth-century statesman, philosopher, historian and sociologist born in Tunis whose observations of Islamic “group feeling” both predate and support contemporary social psychology on the same subject matter. This chapter also offers a review of scholarship about the social psychology of Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic terrorism, which is necessary toward further understanding of the mass social movement studied in this inquiry.

Toward those purposes, the review considers psychoanalytic and non-psychoanalytic theories about totalitarian mass social movements and civilizations. In context, the review shows how the language of social psychology
supports the observations of Pipes (1996, 1997a, 1997b), Duran and Hechiche (2001), Ye’or (2002), and Meddeb (2003) when they variously write about the totalitarian characteristics of Islamism. Within this chapter, therefore, the reader may gain a deepened understanding of Islamism as a transnational reformist mass social movement and what may propel it to advance its cause in and through higher education channels.

In addition, this review presents another strand of discourse about higher education administration and organizational theory and practice, which, in addition to the discourse on the social psychology of Islamism, also may shed light on why Islamists are attracted to higher education. In that section of the review, the researcher considers a range of works that involve variously organizational models of governance and their implications, social movements in higher education, curriculum theory and practice, and matters of internationalization and globalization.

Section I:
Psychoanalytic Social Psychology of Civilizations and Totalitarian Mass Social Movements

Social Contagion: Prefatory Remarks

This first section offers a complementary perspective to the dominant discourses in the human sciences (e.g., sociology and industrial and organizational psychology [I/O]), which may limit our understanding of social phenomena through the customary scientific models those disciplines commonly use for defining social life. The perspective in this case is psychoanalysis, whose discourse proffers unique
glimpses into the nature of, *inter alia*, group cultures, leadership roles, and followership roles.

In contrast to the scientific method establishing causality by gathering tangible facts from the external world, psychoanalysis is largely a hermeneutic discipline “about mental phenomena tied to language with all the opportunities for expression and imprecision that [mental phenomena] implies” (Eisold, 1995). Lear (1995) argues further that psychoanalysis’ inability to validate causal claims is a sign of its success as an interpretive science:

> Psychoanalysis is an extension of our ordinary psychological ways of interpreting people in terms of their beliefs, desires, hopes, and fears. The extension is important because psychoanalysis attributes to people other forms of motivation—in particular wish and fantasy—which attempt to account for outbreaks of irrationality and other puzzling human behavior. (qtd. in Gabriel, 2000: p. 50)

In turn, some of that research may have bearing on the characteristics of the Islamist movement and the significance of its presence in higher education, as those characteristics were introduced in the previous chapter. Moreover, a merger of the psychoanalytical and the sociological allows the reader to appreciate more fully those points at which deep-level human emotions may intersect with certain developments in organizational arenas, social institutions, and societies. That is a point made abundantly clear in the discussions below about Freud and Jung’s contributions to the study of German socialism. Both psychologists establish that whole societies may suffer from psychological afflictions, especially when their leaders impose limits on human consciousness by imposing repressive laws that merge all aspects of public and private life and by instilling nihilistic cultural norms on their citizens.
A literature review about the social psychology of institutions, mass social movements, societies, and civilization must begin with the Viennese psychiatrist Sigmund Freud and his school, the International Psychoanalytic Movement. Freud and one of his disciples, Carl G. Jung, must be considered among the most influential minds from the Twentieth Century, whether one agrees with their assumptions or not. Freud’s referential structures of the human psyche, *id*, *ego*, and *superego*, of the *conscious* and *unconscious* mind, of *Eros* and *Thanatos*, and of *repression* permeate human discourse, as do Jung’s, who opened up a line of psychological inquiry through his study of *archetypes* and the *Self* which he argued were products of the unconscious mind as signified through dreams, art, cultural artifacts, social institutions, and other forms of human action. Both Freud and Jung argue that individuals and groups can become mentally ill. Freud utilizes the descriptive term *complex* to illustrate his observations; however, Jung employs the term *archetype*, such as when a person or group became overly identified with a single one so as to develop an individual or mass *psychosis*.

In this sub-section, the researcher first summarizes two of Freud’s works, the first, an essay entitled “Thoughts for a Time on War and Death” (1915), and the second, his final work *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930). After those summaries, the review discusses the influence of Freud on American social psychology after World War II, in particular his influence on that generation often referred to as “baby boomers” whose professional presence has impacted greatly American politics and higher education. For that part of the review, the researcher relies on the primary sources of Herbert Marcuse (1960, 1962, 1964, 1969), in addition to Richard King’s
seminal study *The Party of Eros: Radical Social Thought and the Realm of Freedom* (1971). Thereafter, the researcher concludes this subsection with a discussion about Jung’s essays on Nazism, “Wotan” (1936), and the “collective guilt” of post-World War II Germany, “After the Catastrophe” (1945), “The Fight with the Shadow” (1946a), and “Epilogue to ‘Essays on Contemporary Events’” (1946b).

*Sigmund Freud, Death Instinct, and Society*

King (1971) writes that “common sense and even a slight knowledge of the way ideas are transformed by diffusion through space and time reveals that there are many Freuds and many ways his teachings can be applied to social analysis, an area in which Freud was only tangentially interested” (p. 1). While Freud was most preoccupied with the psychoanalysis of individuals, he did contribute to social psychology through some concepts formulated in two works “Thoughts for a Time of War and Death” (1915) and *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930). Both works were written in Vienna, so Freud positions himself in each as a direct observer of German militarism and its rigid, nihilistic, and anti-Semitic design that transformed an entire way of life in Europe. In other words, he writes during a period in which Europe was experiencing another major shift in social consciousness characterized by civil wars raging across the continent.

In addition to that general background, Freud had worked with shell-shocked neurotics in the Vienna General Hospital whose dreams led him to modify previous his positions that dreams were mere wish fulfillment, and a product of the id, his term for the pleasure principal in the human psyche that seeks self-preservation only (King, 1972). Instead, he added a new premise to his theory of
dreams as a consequence of studying shell-shocked people: dreams have a self-
punishing component pointing to the opposite of self-preservation, the death instinct
(Freud, 1930; King, 1972). Freud posited the death instinct, Thanatos, as opposite to
the life instinct, Eros, and its presence in the human psyche was observable through
the dreams of war veterans who in their dreams relived and attempted to master the
battles that had created their neuroses (Freud, 1930).

In “Thoughts for a Time of War and Death” (1915) Freud expresses an obvious
sense of personal alienation resulting from Europe’s most recent immersion into war.
In this essay, he states that he feels “helpless in a world that has grown strange” (p.
273) and then proceeds with a lament about the many “civilized men” who have
proven themselves to be “cultural hypocrites” (p. 289). However, in turn, Europe’s
bellicose setting confirms to him that the nature of humanity rested upon humanity’s
“primitive,” “instinctual impulses” (p. 289) which sometimes fail in keeping
“egoistic” (p. 289) ones in check, thereby creating uncivilized states of affairs in
society. A general sense of agreement among intellectual historians suggests that this
essay represents a turning point in Freud’s thought in that his concerns about
“instinctual impulses,” which in this case are those which drive humanity to commit
nihilistic acts, which Freud represents in later papers as, Thanatos, which works
against the life-affirming aspect of Eros (King, 1972).

In light of the earlier essay that led Freud to reconsider his theory of dreams and
devote new attention to the formulation of the concepts of Eros and Thanatos,
Civilization and Its Discontents (1930) takes up the same themes not in a formal
analysis of history but as a means to explain humanity’s hunger for power,
aggression, and war. The work is dense but its thesis may be described succinctly as a claim that individual frustrations and anxieties are institutionalized in civilizations. In this work, *Eros* and *Thanatos* do not work independently of each other but are mixed together, as witnessed in individuals through their dreams or actual acts involving sadism and masochism. However, because individuals have developed at later stages of life a *superego*, or conscience, the sexual aggression played out between *Eros* and *Thanatos* is repressed in individuals but is sometimes diverted outward into society itself in attempts by individuals to release their sense of guilt (Freud, 1930). Freud ends his final work with a gloomy conclusion about why civilization will always be “discontent”: if *Eros* is kept strong and unrepressed, then *Thanatos* can be held in check; however, no work gets done and civilization fails to progress; yet, if *Eros* is kept weak and work gets done, then *Thanatos* and guilt from the superego take over and threaten civilization with destruction instead of the individual himself (Freud, 1930). While Freud concludes that there is little hope for the double-bind of civilization itself, he does believe that individuals can help themselves through psychoanalysis to master their own *Thanatos* made manifest through their repression of *libido* by their *superegos*, and by balancing *id*, *ego*, and *superego* (Freud, 1930).

*Freud’s Influence on American Social Psychology: Herbert Marcuse*

The previous understanding of Freud’s work is helpful to understand his influence on American social thought after World War II because the next social theorist examined herein, Herbert Marcuse, exerted great impact on the intellectual ferment of the post-war generation of children born in the 1940’s and 1950’s and their
attitudes social institutions such as politics and education (King, 1972). Marcuse positions his arguments in Freudian terms. In that respect, Freud did not directly influence the so-called “baby boomers” inasmuch as he influenced those who recast his terms to support some of the various social visions of what would become the “New Left.” What Marcuse does with Freud’s canon is take what he wants from it and leaves the rest, and what they take from Freud is libido and Eros, positing their relevance above all other matters (e.g., id, ego, superego) in terms of how and where to find happiness. Moreover, and this represents the core of King’s (1972) thesis in The Party of Eros, Marcuse then positions libido and Eros within neo-Marxist frameworks.

Marcuse is considered in this section because of the psychoanalytic basis of his assumptions. However, his thought could have been justified in this chapter’s section on higher education theory and practice because, as shall be explicated in the next paragraphs, his writings have influenced the American academy philosophically and methodologically, in terms of research and teaching and in terms of drafting and interpreting institutional law and policy. For example, the Critical Theory that Marcuse brought with him from Frankfurt after his self-exile from Germany to the United States in the 1930’s has spawned a branch of legal study in U.S. law schools called Critical Legal Theory, a sub-field of Critical Race Theory. These theories are cited throughout one of higher education’s most widely acclaimed textbooks for qualitative research, The Handbook of Qualitative Research, by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (2000). Despite the attention and support that those theories receive, they are not above scholarly reproach, as Henry Louis Gates, Jr.’s, essay

Like all philosophers, Herbert Marcuse asks questions about the nature of freedom and how social systems either attain or fail to attain it. What he proposes throughout his writings are two-tiered standards of liberty and political violence based on “oppressor” versus “oppressed” cultural scenarios. In addition, Marcuse resists specifically what he refers to as “Western” versions of knowledge, science, and technology. To appreciate Marcuse’s two-tiered standards of liberty and violence, the reader must first understand that late in his career Marcuse adopted aspects of Freud’s mythically-derived concepts of Eros and Thanatos, which, in Eros and Civilization (1962), Marcuse merged with interpretations of Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche to show how mankind could be liberated in a synthesis of sensuality and reason (King, 1972), which he called the “logos of gratification” (Marcuse, 1962: 101). Of interest here is that Marcuse takes from Freud only what pleases him. He bypasses the rest, discounting Freud’s acknowledgment that man is as much guided by self-consciousness--because man is, after all, a social being--as he is guided by instinct. In addition, in his critique of Marcuse, King (1972) details Erich Fromm’s attack on Marcuse, Fromm being a former colleague of Marcuse in Europe. Fromm countered that Marcuse had “fallen victim to the ideology of consumption,” that his “advocacy of unlimited sexual satisfaction [was actually] a characteristic trait of twentieth century capitalism, the need for mass consumption” (qtd. in King, p.135). As King (1972) remarks, in the early sixties Marcuse’s earlier “homo laborans” had given way to “homo ludens” (p.136).
For mankind to achieve this state of free play, Marcuse proposes in subsequent works a specific means to that end while blaming mankind’s lack of freedom on Western rule of law protecting individual rights and private enterprise. King calls Marcuse’s attack on liberalism and capitalism “a radically pessimistic critique of the social and ideological structures inherent to” Western societies (King, 1972:139). In *One-Dimensional Man*, Marcuse calls this problem “total administration” (1968, p.98) in which Western knowledge and technology exists as “a form of social control and domination” (p.101) under the guise of scientific objectivity. For Marcuse, nothing short of a revolution “from above and below” would cure mankind of its repressive ways, which in turn prevent mankind from becoming the “homo ludens” described in *Eros and Civilization*.

King (1972) points out, however, that the anti-historicism of Marcuse’s thesis does not account for several centuries of liberalism and capitalism which arguably have made mankind freer than it had been under pre-modern authoritarian rule of men. Despite history, however, in *One-Dimensional Man* and in *A Critique of Pure Tolerance* (1966) Marcuse advances the following prescription for curing the West of its hegemonic sins. He claims that the positive exercise of civil rights and the “negative tolerance” of reactionary views and actions only serve the interests of the “total administration” of liberal democratic societies; therefore, “selective tolerance” should be granted to the counter-hegemonic actions of “oppressed” people who maintain a “natural right of resistance” (1966, p.116). Moreover, Marcuse proffers that the use of “undemocratic means [ostensibly by suppressing the speech of majority groups and committing criminalized acts of violence] by a minority in the
maturity of their faculties” was justified by “rational and objective standards” (p.117). He called this program “progress in the consciousness of freedom” (p.112). While Marcuse (1966) advocates the use of political violence, he states that such violence should be used only as a means of eliminating cultural repression in the future. If violence is used for ends other than those that would lift repression, then he argues that the replacement regime has engaged in illegitimate practice of power (Marcuse, 1966). That latter point, the researcher adds, is one that revolutionaries and advocates of revolutionaries tend to overlook when they invoke Marcusian principles to justify the actions of so-called “resistance” movements that justify further repression after they have achieved power.

King (1972) notes the sense of “elitist volunteerism” inherent in Marcuse’s two-tiered standards of liberty and violence, which “joined with the belief that the masses were locked into a deterministic situation” (p.150), having no other options but to commit terrorist acts against perceived oppressors. To take Marcuse’s thesis about liberation from Western strictures to its logical conclusion, the researcher submits that when an aggrieved group enacts “selective tolerance” it rationalizes inciteful speech and terrorism as defenses against perceived oppression; yet at the same time it considers society’s countermeasures (e.g., limitations on inciteful speech or declarations of national security) not as reasonable acts of self-defense but rather as unreasonable discriminatory offenses.

Marcuse is also the theoretical precursor of hate speech codes on university campuses, a matter which Alan Charles Kors and Harvey A. Silvergate take up in “Marcuse’s Revenge” (1998). They show how most infringements on free speech in
today’s academy come not from right-wing conservatives outside higher education but from the left-wing liberal factions inside who enact speech codes designed to protect the self-esteem of minority groups. This is the branch of legal theory referred to above and in Denzin and Lincoln (2000) as Critical Legal Theory. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., (1996) expresses misgivings about Critical Legal Theory in an essay in The Future of Academic Freedom (1996) by showing though historical-legal analysis that the purpose of U.S. law is not protect the self-esteem of groups of people who regard themselves as “historically marginalized” or “oppressed” by defining mere speech actions as “racist” or “defamatory” (pp. 119-157). Decrying the vocabulary of Critical Race and Legal theorists, Gates, Jr., states, “The grip of this vocabulary has tended to foreclose the more sophisticated and multivariate models of political economy we so desperately need” (p. 155).

Marcuse’s impact also resonates in recent permutations of hidden curriculum theory. For example, various essays in The Hidden Curriculum in Higher Education (2001), edited by Eric Margolis, indicate that a less politicized earlier definition of the “hidden curriculum” by Benson Snyder (1971) has morphed into a decidedly counter-hegemonic acceptance of a curriculum by academics who generalize that Western knowledge and society are responsible for all the problems of the developing world and of “oppressed” people in the industrialized world.

In essence, what these latter-day theorists practice is Marcuse’s challenge to educators to “enforce . . . the systematic withdrawal of tolerance toward regressive and repressive opinions and movements” through “propaganda of the deed and word” (A Critique of Pure Tolerance, 1966: 118). For Marcuse, and those in American
higher education influenced by him, higher education reform has always been a key battleground of social reform, a prospect which invites the attenuation of knowledge inasmuch as it invites expansion.

Carl Jung and Twentieth-century Totalitarianism

Carl G. Jung, the Swiss psychologist who would for a time serve as president of the International Society for Psychoanalysis, writes in one of his many letters that charges of anti-Semitism could not be laid at his door. “You know well enough how very much I take the human being as a personality and how I continually endeavour to lift him out of his collective condition and make him an individual” (Letters, 1973: 162). Jung’s concerns about the relational tensions between individuals and their societies was therefore of great concern to him, and as such he wrote extensively in his letters and in essays about the perils of totalitarian social movements that had ravaged Europe and Russia in the first half of the Twentieth Century. Unlike Freud, Jung dealt in metaphysical issues with his patients and did not rule out soul and spirituality as part of the process of human development he called individuation, a personal journey people take throughout their lives, to greater or lesser extents, of which Jung believed involved the making of a unified Self in which people did not become dominated by particular archetypes as signifying a particular aspect of their whole psyche. Jung believed, moreover, that when people became dominated by particular archetypes, as exemplified by thoughts and actions in their conscious lives, various forms of psychopathology would develop, among them psychosis and neurosis.
Given that individuals could experience those conditions, Jung also believed that so could whole societies become entrenched in archetypal collective delusions, such that by 1939, he had already diagnosed German militarism as a mass psychosis that had rendered Germany pathologically sick (Letters, 1973: 276). By that time Jung had called into question the totalitarian collective mind of the Third Reich, wondering if the German people knew how they had lost their national honor: “The situation is completely opaque because of the inhuman terror the whole population is kept under” (p. 276). Elsewhere in his letters to other colleagues and friends, Jung discusses the devastation of London and France, referring to the German assault as “Nietzschean insanity” (p. 290). Moreover, Jung writes about the atrocities of Jewish concentration camps for which the world would become aware in the mid-1940’s, as a sign of Germany’s “collective guilt” to which German people should “admit” and “not foist it on others” (p. 372).

Jung’s Essays about a Nation Overtaken by its Shadow

In Why the Nations Rage: Killing in the Name of God (2002), Christopher Catherwood advances the term “palingenetics” to describe religious nationalism, in which “a strong, myth-based ultra-nationalism seizes both the leadership and the popular imagination” (p. 94). While most readers might regard Nazism as a secular ideology, Catherwood (2002) draws upon lesser-known aspects of Nazi history to illustrate its strong palingenetic nature. If one accepts Catherwood’s (2002) thesis, then the discussion in the previous chapter about diplomatic and military alliances between Nazis and Arab spiritual leaders in the 1940’s makes sense not only in terms of their common Jewish hatred but also in terms of their common religious
nationalisms. Arguably, anyone familiar with U.S.-American neo-Nazi churches such as The Church of the Creator and Christian Identity will appreciate Catherwood’s (2003) thesis. Of note, too, in this literature review is Catherwood’s commentary on Jung’s essay “Wotan” (1936) to describe Nazi palingenetics, although Jung’s essay is merely a side-note in a chapter about the Nazi Party’s use of “powerful symbols” such as the swastika, or “ever-turning wheel of Christ,” to stir up “strongly atavistic folk memories” (p. 95); the establishment of the German National Church as the result of Heinrich Himmler’s interest in Nordic mysticism and pre-Christian Teutonic religions; and Adolf Hitler’s “messianic caesaropropism” (pp. 96-97).

The Repression of a Pre-Christian Archetype

Jung’s thesis in “Wotan” (1936) is simply that Christianity divided the barbarian tribes of Germany into two halves in which a dark side was repressed so that a light side could be domesticated and made fit for civilization. Nevertheless, this shadow aspect of the German collective unconscious periodically manifests itself because “whenever life proceeds one-sidedly in any given direction, the self-regulation of the organism produces in the unconscious an accumulation of all those factors which play too small a part in the individual’s conscious existence” (p. 15). The repression of the Wotan archetype in the German psyche, Jung contends, led to the mass psychosis of a German society that, after World War I, instead of taking responsibility for itself, chose to blame and repudiate external enemies for its own economic depression in the 1930’s. “We are always convinced,” Jung (1936) writes, “that the modern world is a reasonable world, basing our opinion on economic, political, and psychological factors. But we, . . . laying aside our well-meaning, all-
too-human reasonableness, may burden God or the gods with the responsibility of contemporary events, we would find Wotan quite suitable as a causal hypothesis. . . . In fact, I venture the heretical suggestion that the unfathomable depths of Wotan’s character explain more of National Socialism than all three reasonable factors put together” (p. 184).

So, who or what is Wotan? Using Nietzschean categories, Jung (1936) describes him as a god of “storm and frenzy” (p. 184), of “berserkers, who found their vocation as the Blackshirts of mythical kings” (p. 185), of ergriffener, or “seizure” and “possession” (p. 185), and of “the elemental Dionysus breaking into the Apollonian order” (p. 187). Among ancient German people, Jung (1936) asserts that those powers were personified as Wotan, who, as happens in individuals when confronted with new situations that they cannot be dealt with in ways familiar to them, nihilistically takes over society when met with repeated political impasses.

*The Collective Guilt of German Socialism*

In later essays such as “After the Catastrophe” (1945) and “The Fight with the Shadow” (1946), Jung used the term “collective guilt” to describe the psychological condition of Germany in the aftermath of having unleashed the fury of Wotan on all of Europe. If Nazi Germay’s alliance with non-European leaders from the Arab world is of any consequence (Fregosi, 1998), then one could extend the argument about Wotan’s influence to include the Middle East. Jung (1945, 1946) clarifies that when he speaks of Germany’s social pathology, or collective guilt, he is not speaking in terms of “cold-blooded superiority” (1945, p. 195) or in any legal or moral sense. “A medical diagnosis is not an accusation, and an illness is not a disgrace but a
misfortune” Jung (1947) writes. Moreover, Jung (1945) states that collective guilt is a “tragic fate” that “hits everybody, just and unjust alike, everybody who was anywhere near the place where the terrible thing happened” (p. 197). Jung (1945) does not mean, however, that collective guilt should be turned into individual guilt without giving the individual a hearing; yet at the same time he asserts that if the German is to get along with the rest of the world, then he “must be conscious that in the eyes of Europeans he is a guilty man” (p. 197). Furthermore, Jung (1945) states of the mythical nature of collective guilt:

It may be objected that the whole concept of psychological collective guilt is a prejudice and a sweepingly unfair condemnation. Of course it is, but that is precisely what constitutes the irrational nature of collective guilt: it cares nothing for the just and unjust, it is a dark cloud that rises up from the scene of an unexpiated crime. It is a psychic phenomenon, and it is therefore no condemnation of the German people to say that they are collectively guilty, but simply a statement of fact. (p. 198)

Setting the atrocities of the Nazi concentration camps aside, Jung (1947) implicates the establishment of the German totalitarianism as the source of the nation’s collective guilt in which people lost their instinct for self-preservation and became dependent on their state and their leader, a phenomenon that gave them “a false feeling of security” (p. 201). Of that road to perdition that happened in the 1930’s that eventually led to what Jung characterizes as the German people’s mass psychosis, Jung (1945) writes that “the steady growth of the Welfare State is no doubt a very fine thing from one point of view, but from another it is a doubtful blessing, as it robs people of their individual responsibility and turns them into infants and sheep” (p. 201). The implication therein is that had the German people not become enamored by German socialism, their individual moral mechanisms about what was right for
their country and the world might have prevented the nihilistic frenzy that did occur. “The citizen’s instinct for self-preservation should be safe-guarded at all costs, for, once a man is cut off from the nourishing roots of instinct, he becomes the shuttlecock of every wind that blows,” Jung (1947) writes. “He is then no better than a sick animal, demoralized and degenerate, and nothing short of a catastrophe can bring him back to health” (p. 201). In short, the palingenetic nature of German socialism had rendered all German people completely uncritical of themselves and they began projecting their own problems as a people onto other nations, ethnic groups, and religions.

The cure for this collective guilt, or “fight with the shadow,” then, rests with helping the collectively guilty to rid themselves of their complexes manifest by the domination of a collective archetype and helping those collectively guilty to become aware of the problem such that they will begin the process of collective reform (Jung, 1946). He also advised that collectively guilty people should beware of “aggressive defense” (1947, p. 240), or excuse-making for past actions. In addition, Jung (1946) held out hope in Western democracies that encourage internal dissension among individuals, as opposed to “the State” which should not be expected to accomplish what individuals should accomplish for themselves, with “powerful organizations where the individual dwindles to a mere cipher” (p. 226). Finally, Jung (1947) claimed that healing would not only be a political enterprise for Germany but also a spiritual one, of which Germany had many gifts, albeit overshadowed by Germany’s shadow nature: “We should therefore help and support this side of her nature by all the means within our power”
The same argument could be made, too, for Islam as it tries to preserve itself from the destructive natures of its own shadow, Islamism.

Section II:
Non-Psychoanalytic Social Psychology of Mass Movements, Islamic Fundamentalism and Islamic Terrorism

The Non-Psychoanalytic Frame: Prefatory Remarks

This section involves literature about Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic terrorism in non-psychoanalytic frameworks of theory and practice. Most of the works illustrated come from sources in sociology and its subfield of social psychology; however, a few derive from the observations of political scientists familiar with Middle East affairs and culture who nonetheless have drafted essays highly social psychological in intent. From the non-psychoanalytic perspective on the psychology of social groups in general, this section starts with some basic principles about collective group behavior by Herbert Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955). Then the section proceeds to Arendt’s (1948/1951/1968/1976/1979/1994) seminal insights into the collective behavior of totalitarian movements. After Arendt, the researcher delves into the intellectual thought of Ibn Khaldun, a fourteenth-century philosopher, Islamic scholastic, historian, social psychologist, and statesman whose work The Muqaddimah (1377/1969) classifies observations of Islamic culture and society in manner familiar to modern sociology and its sub-field social psychology. Then, the section proceeds with an overview of chapter essays about Islamic fundamentalism in theory and practice as posited in the multivolume work Fundamentalisms (1993), a recent and seminal work of research commissioned through The University of
Chicago. Thereafter, the section reviews literature from books previously noted above, such as *Origins of Terrorism* (1990/1998), plus several others new to the discussion, all of which have chapters most relevant to the discussion of Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic terrorism and how those two “–isms” signify the program defined in Chapter One as the “Islamization of society and knowledge from above and below.”

*Blumer’s General Contributions to the Study of Collective Groups and Their Institutions*

Herbert Blumer, first a sociologist at The University of Chicago and later distinguished chairperson of sociology at The University of California at Berkeley, is most responsible in Western scholarship for advancing a theory of collective behavior developed initially in the 1940’s and refined through the 1960’s. The term “collective behavior” refers to a range of topics from crowd behavior to reform movements. Because collective group behavior involves human emotion and cognition, the term obviously deserves classification as an aspect of social psychology. Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) defines collective behavior as the “way in which a new social order arises [under] the emergence of new forms of collective behavior” (p. 169).

Blumer’s (1930/1946/1951/1955) discussions about elementary collective groupings and social movements are of chief interest in terms of this inquiry because they enrich the reader’s understanding of Islamism in social psychological terms that compliment other ideas advanced previously in this chapter and in Chapter One.

Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) employs the term “circular reaction” to show how collective behavior, in its most elementary form, develops when the emotions of one person stimulate the emotions of another, resulting in a process of
“interstimulation” (p. 170), in which leaders and followers fuel each others’ behavior to the extent that where the behavior of the mass arises becomes unclear and takes on a life of its own.

Circular reaction plays a role in many types of situations Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) catalogues, one of which is reminiscent of Meddeb’s (2003) description of Islamism as a mania and a sickness and of psychoanalysis’ descriptions of conspiracism, scapegoating, and totalitarianism as, variously, collective delusions and mass psychoses. Social contagion, Blumer (1946/1951/1963) defines as an “intense,” “widespread” form of excitement characterized further as a “nonrational dissemination of a mood, impulse, or form of conduct” (pp. 175-176). Another one of its characteristics is “the development of rapport” in which “unreflective responsiveness of individuals . . . becomes pronounced” (p. 176). Arguably, that trait signifies Meddeb’s (2003) criticism of Islamism as anti-intellectual and of the typical Muslim as a “person of the ‘no.’” In addition, people who may start out as mere bystanders become more and “more inclined to engage in it” as their ability to resist the contagion lessens and as they lose their sense of independent judgment (Blumer, 1946/1951/1963). These aspects of social contagion are most profound in the early stages of the condition but “always continue to operate, though in a more minimal way, for a long time” (p. 177).

Another type of collective grouping Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) is the “mass,” which is “represented by people who participate in mass behavior” such as a “national event” (p. 185). Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) rules out physical proximity as part of mass behavior, with the mass group consisting of “anonymous
individuals” who are “loosely organized” (p. 186). If a sufficient amount of individual lines of action emerges through mass behavior, “the influence of the mass may become enormous, as is shown by the far-reaching effects on institutions ensuing from shifts in the selective interest in the mass” (p. 187).

When mass behavior becomes organized into a social movement its “whole nature changes in acquiring a structure, a program, a defining culture, traditions, prescribed rules, an in-group attitude, and a we-consciousness” (p. 187). A social movement consists of “collective enterprises to establish a new order of life” (p. 199).

Mass social movements also possess other traits vital to their continued development: agitation, an esprit de corps, morale-building, ideological formation, and operating tactics (Blumer, 1939/1946/1951/1955). Specifically, however, Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) would classify Islamism as a religious nationalist movement in which “the past of the people is glorified” and is “intimately associated . . . with a feeling of inferiority” (p. 219).

Mass social groups often use propaganda to induce others to support their views and collective action (Blumer, 1939/1946/1951/1955). Propaganda has certain traits that distinguish it from other forms of discourse. For example, it purposefully neglects “fair consideration of opposing views”; its “means are subservient to its dominant end”; and “operates to mold opinions and judgments not on the basis of the merits of an issue, but chiefly upon emotional attitudes and feelings” (p. 193). Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) states further that propaganda requires an “appealing setting” such as a university where an ideological program can be cultivated (p. 194). Part of
the dissemination of the ideological program involves, as Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) states, utilizing “the emotional attitudes and prejudices which people already have” (p. 195).

*Hannah Arendt and the Collective Behavior of Totalitarian Movements*

Several of Arendt’s observations in the seminal study *The Origins of Totalitarianism* assist in providing a basis for understanding Islamism’s interplay in higher education, especially in terms of the movement’s potential to subvert education with monolithic political doctrine and to commit terrorism. The first observation of interest, the creation of criminal and non-criminal front groups, interrelates to Blumer’s assertion that mass movements require an appealing setting toward cultivating a semblance of legitimacy in a sanctioned forum (e.g., a university). Front groups, through the manipulation of the media and education with quasi-scientific propaganda, serve in the “decomposition of the status quo” of “actively existing institutions” (p. 371). Second, Arendt writes that these front organizations possess an undeniably “paramilitary character” that “must be understood in connection with other professional party organizations, such as those for teachers, lawyers, physicians, students, university professors, technicians, and workers. All these were primarily duplicates of existing nontotalitarian professional societies” (p. 371).

The second observation of interest to this study is the front organizations’ maintenance of fellow-travelers in the movement, not only as a means to generate membership but also as a “decisive force in itself” (p. 365). These sub-groupings of sympathizers (e.g., for legal help, financial help) are essential for a number of
reasons: they enlarge the movement while also limiting the number of party members, and they form a protective wall of deceit around the party members that shields the members from criticism and acts as a bridge between the radical world-historical view of the members and the normal outside world. This shield that front groups provide permits a “lying fictitiousness” about their “semblance of normalcy” to take hold in the mindset of the movement’s members (p. 366) The build-up of front organizations, Arendt states, should be considered far more frightening to the societies in which those organizations take hold than “the physical liquidation of opponents” (p. 364).

Finally, Arendt writes about the role of education in totalitarian movements. Education, too, becomes a milieu for the subversion of that status quo, with terrorism being the other side of the coin. In context, Arendt discusses totalitarianism’s penchant for dressing up educational propaganda in quasi-scientific terms. Furthermore, she observes the subtext of anti-semitism and scapegoating in that educational discourse, a characteristic studied by later social psychologists such as Girard (1977), Graumann and Moscovici (1987), Billig (1987), Groh (1987), Poliakov (1987), Zukier (1987), Pruitt (1987), Post (1990/1998), Reich (1990/1998), an Beck (1999).

Arendt states that even in education systems “fake departments” exist as “instruments of destruction” as people in the educational environment are intellectually prepared to accept the movement’s “strategy of consistent lying to deceive the non-initiated external masses” (p. 376). “Without [the arrangement of fake departments],’ Arendt writes, “the lies of the leader would not work [because he
relies on the feigned objectivity of his educational program in the quest for power]. . .

. The gullibility of sympathizers makes lies less credible to the outside world, while at the same time the graduated cynicism of membership and elite formations eliminates the danger that the leader will ever be forced by the weight of his own propaganda to make good his own statements and feigned respectability” (p. 384). Finally, Arendt writes, “This technique of duplication was as ingenious and irresistible as the deterioration of professional standards [in higher education] was swift and radical” (p. 372).

Ibn Khaldun’s Contributions to Social Psychology: “Group Feeling” Predating Blumer by Six Hundred Years

As the introduction to The Muqaddimah (1377/1989) states, Ibn Khaldun was born of an aristocratic family in Tunis in 1332 that possessed “prominence in the political leadership of Moorish Spain” (Dawood, 1967/1969/1989: p. vii). One can only describe his education as classical, blending Islamic studies with that of the Greeks. Areas of major application involved the study of Arab mysticism and Moorish Aristotelianism (p. vii). Having read The Muqadimmah, the researcher notes the influences Arab mysticism in that the work intermittently refers to Sufism and means of achieving atonement not by the literal study of religious texts but, inter alia, by attending to one’s intuition and divination of dreams. In addition, the Aristotelian influence asserts itself in The Muqadimmah through its highly disciplined method of assigning names for things and for classifying things.

Khaldun’s (1377/1989) mysticism and classical European influence pits his intellectualism against that of contemporary Islamic fundamentalists who reject cooperation with Western forms of knowledge acquisition. Indeed, Khaldun devotes an
entire chapter to education, its purposes and means. His thought differs immensely from that of the works by the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT, 1984) and those endorsed by American Islamic studies expert Esposito, in addition to Shari’ati (1986) and Choudhury (1997). Whereas the latter two contemporary Islamist educators seek to merge divine knowledge with other forms of knowledge, Khaldun (1377/1989) claims that in education the two are separate. For example, of medicine and Islam, he asserts:

The medicine in religious tradition is of the Bedouin type. It is in no way part of divine revelation. Such medical matters were merely part of Arab custom and happened to be mentioned in connection with circumstances of the Prophet, like other things that were customary in his generation. They were not mentioned in order to imply that that particular way of practicing medicine is stipulated by the religious law. He was not sent to teach us medicine or any other religious matter. (p. 386)

In all other areas of fields of study, Khaldun (1377/1989) conveys distinctions between religious knowledge and other forms of knowledge. In addition, he has much to say about the fundamentalists, or “orthodox” Islamic scholastics, of his day, who disavow “speculative theology” and Qur’anic “ambiguity” (p. 353):

Scholars always assumed the correctness of the articles of faith and paraded proofs and arguments in their defense. . . . [However,] the problems of theology have been confused with those of philosophy. This has gone so far that the one discipline is no longer distinguishable from the other. (p. 353)

Khaldun (1377/1989)’s historiography is presciently social psychological in that his manner of historiography examines the nature of civilization, its achievements, gainful occupations, sciences, crafts, education, and its causes and conditions. He also discusses the climate and geographical areas where civilization prospers and their influence on human character; and he discusses Bedouin civilization, the caliphate, government authority, and economies. The historiography culminates in a profoundly
humanistic discussion about “man’s ability to think, which distinguishes human beings from animals and which enables them to obtain their livelihood, to co-operate to this end with their fellow men” (p. 333). “God thus caused all animals to obey man and to be in the grasp of his power,” Khaldun (1377/1989) writes. “Through his ability to think, God gave man superiority over many of his creatures” (p. 333).

That introduction to The Muqadimmah’s last chapter bespeaks of man’s capacity for reasoning beyond religious knowledge and in a manner that supports creative knowledge in the advancement of civilization. Because, however, Khaldun (1377/1989) was writing during a time when Islamic civilization had begun its slow decline (Dawood, 1967/1969/1989; Enan, 1993), one can appreciate Khaldun’s (1377/1989) critique of the decay of Islamic world as hinging upon the retrenchment of creative thought on the part of the religious orthodoxy of the Islamic state during his time. Dawood (1967/1969/1989) argues that there is an element of pessimism that runs throughout the work in that respect and it is unfortunate for Islam that Khaldun’s intellectual contributions fell into obscurity after his death.

One of Khaldun’s more prescient terms is “group feeling,” a major descriptor in The Muqadimmah (1377/1989). It prefigures contemporary terms defined elsewhere in this chapter, groupthink and groupism. In that respect, Khaldun (1377/1989) shares Blumer’s (1946/1951/1963) concerns for the collective behavior of social groups. Khaldun’s (1377/1989) observations of “group feeling” in Islamic societies are worth looking at because they are trans-temporal ones that may inform the reader about the collective behavior Islamist social groups. Khaldun (1377/1989) defines group feeling as follows:
Respect for blood ties is something natural among men, with the rarest exceptions. It leads to affections for one’s relations and blood relatives, the feeling that no harm ought to befall them or any destruction come upon them. One feels shame when one’s relatives are treated unjustly or attacked, and one wishes to intervene between them and whatever peril or destruction threatens them. This is a natural urge in man, for as long as there have been human beings.” (p. 98)

Elsewhere in the work, Khaldun (1377/1989) expresses that group feeling forms the basis of leadership and followership among people of common descent, with those people claiming superiority. “Once group feeling has established superiority over the people who share in it, it will, by nature, seek superiority over people who have other group feelings unrelated to the first” (p. 108) Khaldun (1377/1989) further submits. The researcher observes thereunto that this process signifies, ostensibly, re-Islamization’s trans-temporal cultural influence in which all other groups subsumed under the banner of Islamism. Khaldun (1377/1989) notes a problem, however, with the advancement of dynasties through group feeling in that the sharing of wealth among leaders and followers leads to tribal members being concerned only with material acquisition, “satisfied only with an easy, restful life in the shadow of the ruling dynasty” (p. 109). This custom, he notes, is responsible for the demise of the caliphate, whose “sedentary culture” led to a loss of Muslim identity as more and more groups were subsumed under one name (p. 181).

In addition to luxury, political persecution also results in the decline of civilization “when the people who share in the group feeling of the dynasty are humiliated . . . because members of the ruler’s family . . . are more humiliated than anyone else” (p. 246). What Khaldun (1377/1989) illustrates next is that a kind of paranoia sets in, with rulers destroying their enemies through “propaganda” and
violence” (pp. 248-249). Without group feeling, however, “no religious and political propaganda can be successful” (p. 249) when “senility befalls a dynasty” (p. 292). The result is a vacuum of power in which other people, “prone to seek superiority and domination” (p. 293), form new groups and continue persecuting each other through “assassination and exile” (p. 250).

Interestingly, a reading of The Muqaddimah shows that Khaldun (1377/1969) does not equate holy war, or jihad, with the aforementioned form of political violence and persecution. One recognizes the difference in that Khaldun (1377/1969) does describe holy war in other sections of The Muqaddimah, wherein he defines holy war as both an inner spiritual struggle and as a form of religious defense. As Khaldun (1377/1969) is extraordinarily diligent in his Aristotelian method of classifying and re-stating key terms as part of his classification of things, one would expect that if he thought political assassination and persecution resulting from Islamic civilization’s decline exemplified holy war, he would label those actions as such.

In context to Khaldun’s (1377/1969) “group feeling,” one is reminded of Bion’s (1959) basic assumptions groups in which over-identification of leaders and followers in the group leads to a loss of self-consciousness and individual identity, which in turn results in a lack of group self-criticism and inability to learn new ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving. Such a process, whether one calls it “group feeling” or “groupthink,” the researcher discerns, appears to mirror the Islamist worldview and actions that spring from that worldview in that Islamists refuse personal responsibility for the demise of their civilization by casting blame on other out-groups, while
simultaneously reinterpreting political violence rooted in hatred and paranoia as legitimate self-defense incumbent on all Muslims.

“Fundamentalisms”: Socio-religious Perspectives on Sacred Terror and Islamism

Introduction: A Sacred Cosmos, Scandalous Code, and Defiant Society

Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (1993) examine Islamic fundamentalism as a means to understand the strategies and impact of Islamic fundamentalists in many nations. The authors of this chapter introduction to the multivolume work *Fundamentalisms* (1993) state that Islamic fundamentalists have “sought to influence the course of developments in politics, law, constitutionalism, and economic planning” since the 1970’s (p. 2), and have attempted to “reorder scientific inquiry, to reclaim the patterns of traditional family life and interpersonal relations, and to reshape educational and communications systems” (p. 2). They conclude that one of the major implications of the research commissioned through The University of Chicago’s Fundamentalism Project is that Islamic fundamentalism is of greater concern at the level of “society,” as opposed to the level of the “state” (p. 2). To greater or lesser extents, Marty and Appleby (1993) show that all fundamentalist religions exert those tendencies but that social costs differ among religions. Marty and Appleby (1993) further characterize Islamic fundamentalism, as they do other types that arose in the Twentieth Century, as “a habit of mind, found within religious communities and paradigmatically embodied in certain representative individuals and movements” (p. 3).

In addition, Marty and Appleby (1993) convey about fundamentalism:

It manifests itself as a strategy, or a set of strategies, by which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or group. Feeling this identity to be at risk in the contemporary era, these believers fortify it by a selective retrieval of doctrines, beliefs, and practices from a sacred past.
Moreover, fundamentalists present the retrieved fundamentals alongside unprecedented claims and doctrinal innovations. Instead, religious identity thus renewed becomes the exclusive and absolute basis for a re-created political and social order that is oriented toward the future rather than the past. (p. 3)

Marty and Appleby (1993) further conclude that the chiliastic vision of fundamentalists of any stripe, Islamic or otherwise, hinges itself on two commitments among believers: “the unfolding eschatological drama” through submission to all things divine and “self-preservation” by “neutralizing the threatening ‘Other’” (p. 3). Impact thus involves proximity of fundamentalists to non-fundamentalists and their reformist relationship to the state or non-fundamentalist social institutions (Marty & Appleby, 1993). “Schools, daycare centers, seminaries, and colleges are the local chapters of fundamentalist movements,” Marty and Appleby (1993) assert. “But these movements transcend localities by virtue of the regional or universal appeal of the message and through the homogenization and marketing of that message via communications technologies that fundamentalists of every sort have harnessed to their various ends” (p. 11).

“Accounting for Islamic Fundamentalisms”

James Piscatori (1993) does not deny that contemporary Islam takes on rich and varied forms in every society where Islam exists. In this respect, he agrees with the assertions of the so-called leading “apologists” in academe discussed in Chapter One, Edward Said and John L. Esposito. However, Piscatori (1993) details that whether Sunni, Shi’ite, Arab, African, or Central Asian, “several general patterns arise from the empirical details” and “shed light” on how “Islamic fundamentalist movements originate and evolve and what impact they possess” (p. 361). In addition, Piscatori
(1993) states that the Islamist movement itself does not maintain in its specific localities common catalysts often implicated in the media and as assumed in the dominant discourse of Middle Eastern studies scholarship. Esposito (2002) quotes Piscatori’s (1993) assertions about differences among Islamist groups but he neglects Piscatori’s (1993) assertions about overarching commonalities among those groups that cause Piscatori (1993) to question claims about the causes and conditions of Islamist movements commonly advanced by Esposito (2002).

For example, social and economic disequilibrium, opposition to state authority, colonialism, and capitalism are not always the likely factors implicated in the rise of Islamic fundamentalism (Piscatori, 1993). For example, Piscatori (1993) writes that the leaders both religious and political fail to deal effectively with modernization in their societies (Piscatori, 1993).

In addition, Piscatori (1993) states that religious authority has become fragmented in modern Muslim societies, a circumstance leading to the proliferation of Islamist leaders and groups who compete with traditional leaders for authority. Of interest to Piscatori (1993) here is that religious leaders like Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, in exile from Egypt can “exercise considerable influence over adherents of radical groups [like Islamic Jihad] in Egypt” (p. 362), meaning that Islamist groups are more ultra-national than they are local, a point which Esposito (2002) disputes when he discusses the possible “threat” of Islamic fundamentalism to peace among nations. Piscatori (1993) observes that the perception of a decline in the legitimacy of established political and religious institutions conveys a strong association with the rise of Islamist movements, whose highly educated intellectuals claim the right to interpret
the proverbial “true Islam.” In addition to Sheikh Rahman, who presently is in U.S. federal prison for conspiracy to blow up various New York City landmarks, as someone who maintains influence across national borders, Piscatori (1993) cites Rashid Al-Ghannushi of Tunisia’s Islamic Tendency Movement and Abassi Madani of Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front, both of whom hold PhD’s in education and exert a “mixture of traditional and modern educational practices” (p. 363).

At the heart of those intellectuals’ Islamist doctrines is the idea that Islam must be defended against assault from within and without, preserving the religion from pluralism, mainly--and quite ironically--by borrowing totalitarian ideas and methods from Ba’ath and Communist parties in Middle Eastern and African societies (Piscatori, 1993). Elsewhere, Piscatori (1993) clarifies that in some Islamist movements the tendency is to re-Islamize society and knowledge from “above” in direct revolutionary action against a state, the Islamic Jihad in the West Bank and Gaza being the example Piscatori (1993) uses; or from “below,” the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as another example (Piscatori, 1993). However, most movements involve a blend of “above” and “below” type activity (Piscatori, 1993).

Piscatori (1993) devotes the remainder of his essay to the Islamic Jihad, especially its Palestinian faction, which adopted “above” type tactics when some of the group’s founding members, mostly Palestinian and Egyptian students and professors in Cairo in the 1970’s, became disillusioned by the lack of progress by the Muslim Brotherhood, which did not engage in so-called “direct action” against its perceived oppressors in traditional religion or in the government itself. Prior to that time, the Muslim Brotherhood maintained factions who operated from “below” not only in
Egypt but also in the Palestinian territories, which Israel had seized along with the Sinai peninsula in 1967. As a group, the Islamic Jihad became the Muslim Brotherhood’s militant offshoot, although it did not reject “below” activities associated with social, educational, and charitable groups (Piscatori, 1993). In fact, the Islamic Jihad relied on charismatic religious leaders to infiltrate, first and foremost, the majority of mosques in the West Bank and Gaza; and second, to gain control of the Islamic University’s administrative and student bodies (Piscatori, 1993).

Piscatori (1993) compares the successes of middle and upper class Islamist student elections to that of Islamists in non-educational forums in the Palestinian territories, showing how the higher percentages in collegiate forums belies the idea that “Islamic radicalism is a barometer of the economic and social frustration of the most disadvantaged people in society” (p. 416). Piscatori (1993) thus characterizes the Islamic Jihad as a movement founded by elites, “armed Islam and political legitimacy without the masses” (p. 416) that is “not a mass movement but a nebulous circle of small groups organized loosely around and by ‘guides’ and a common ideology” (p. 416). Conceived by Palestinians in Egypt, it migrated to Gaza and the West Bank through the actions of two people, Fathi Shiqaqi, a medical doctor, and Abd Al-Aziz Al-Awda, a professor at the Islamic University, whose proselytizing nearby the Islamic University in 1987 touched off the first Palestinian intifada, or “uprising” (Piscatori, 1993). Interestingly, too, is that although the Islamic Jihad stems from Sunni Islam the terror group receives ideological and intellectual support from the shi’a Iranian government and Iranian intellectuals, including a writer cited in Chapter One, Ali Shari’ati.
“Religious Fundamentalism and the Sciences”

Everett Mendelsohn (1993) discusses in his chapter essay on religious fundamentalism and society the sense of competition that religious fundamentalism engages in with modern science and technology. This essay deals primarily with Christian and Islamic fundamentalist groups who adopt similar habits of mind when pitting themselves against modern science and technology. In reading this essay, one finds it easy to appreciate why the Islamist movement itself has gained sympathy from left-wing social groups who adopt Marcusian, anti-Western scientific doctrines.

Contrary to popular thinking, fundamentalists are not anti-science or anti-technology; rather they possess “outright admiration of the products of modern science and technology, especially those deemed useful for the program of recasting modernity into an anti-secularist mode” (Mendelsohn, 1993: p. 25). Mendelsohn (1993) notes in particular how some fundamentalist intellectuals make “broad claims about their own special qualifications to serve as arbiters of scientific research and the application of technologies (p. 24). In support, these fundamentalists will claim that modern science has its roots in their particular religion’s golden age; thus, their current agenda to take back something they once owned but had lost due to no fault of their own (Mendelsohn, 1993). Typically, blame for that theft is laid upon the Enlightenment, which divided the sacred and the secular, resulting in a schism between religion and science (Mendelsohn, 1993).

Another product of the Enlightenment that fundamentalists disavow is the change in the definitions of “freedom” and “progress” into non-religious forms (Mendelsohn, 1993). In public statements, for example, fundamentalists will assert that
they value human freedom and progress; and if they are not questioned further about what they mean by those terms, one is tempted to assume that their definitions match the terms of modern, mass society. However, fundamentalists regard themselves as defenders of “authentic” freedom and progress, which means that those terms are posited in terms of fundamentalists’ knowledge of God’s will, which is divine, perfect, and not open to multiple interpretation” (Mendelsohn, 1993). Thus, when fundamentalists talk of liberty, they mean the liberty of all people who accept their version of faith and knowledge of God’s will. Liberty is not the pluralist liberty for all people espoused in documents like the U.S. Constitution; it is the distinctly pre-modern kind of Christian liberty of 1620 Massachusetts Bay or of the Islamic liberty that Ye’or (2002) speaks of in Islam and Dhimmitude. Mendelsohn (1993) concludes by discussing the myriad subculture of research institutes, publishing houses, and professional affiliations that fundamentalists establish and the challenges that fundamentalists make in challenging courts and legislatures to grant them their religious rights.

“Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalists”

Bassam Tibi (1993) focuses specifically on the worldview of Sunni Arab fundamentalist intellectuals who publish about the “de-Westernization of knowledge” (p. 74). Using postmodernist terms, Sunni Arab fundamentalists protest Western cultural hegemony but regard Western science and technology favorably. Tibi (1993) points out in particular that Sunni Arab fundamentalists disavow the Cartesian principle of “doubt and conjecture” as being essential to well-founded epistemology. Therefore, these Islamic fundamentalists reason that the only true knowledge is
knowledge based upon the revelations of the Qur’an, which is not subject to revision (Tibi, 1993). Islamic fundamentalists also deny conflict between their religion and science, so long as hierarchies of knowledge are employed in the reasoning process with Islam being the pinnacle of reasoning (Tibi, 1993). In that sense, understanding God and the problems of the Muslim community are essential to learning; but the pursuit of these things is “subservient to Qur’anic values and ethics” (Tibi, 1993, p. 75). Tibi (1993) continues that the Enlightenment view that “transrational revelation” is an impediment to the acquisition of knowledge by “Muslim fundamentalists” because they hold that “the progress of science in Islamic society is not how far can that society liberate itself from the clutches of its religion, but how more truly Islamic can it make its educational program” (p. 77). Hence, Tibi (1993) refers to Islamic methodology as part of an overall “medieval-modern worldview” that causes “Sunni fundamentalist ideologues” to restrict their focus on “education rather than on research or on methods of scientific inquiry in the process of techno-scientific development” (p. 84). Hence, students are relegated to “memorizing scientific findings” but “not learning how to collect data or conduct experiments” (p. 84). Therefore, Tibi (1993) concludes that Islamic fundamentalism’s most major impact on education rests in its ability to stifle human creativity because, after all, in the Sunni Arab worldview, only God can create.

Furthermore, Tibi (1993) notes that this conflict is at the heart of most intellectual censorship, intimidation, and charges of blasphemy in the Middle East that gained momentum after 1969, when Islamism gained ascendancy throughout the region. Prior to 1969, Tibi (1993) laments, it was possible for “free-minded secular
intellectuals to protest the oppression of” their colleagues (p. 78). Those free-minded types argued that censure “lent credence to a stereotype of Arabs as people who reject intellectual freedom and who despise human reason” (p. 78). “The imprint of Islamic fundamentalism has become the salient feature of public life in the Middle East,” Tibi (1993) observes. “Islamic fundamentalist thoughts, based on the foundational principles [noted above], has become a widespread intellectual approach to all major issues, including the question of the appropriation of modern science and technology” (p. 78), such that Islamic fundamentalists do not argue that Islam is compatible with science and technology but is the ultimate source of science and technology (p. 78).

“Fundamentalist Impact on Education and the Media”

Majid Tehranian (1993a) illustrates that religious fundamentalism of any kind is characterized by anti-secularism, anti-intellectualism, and anti-modernism. The first trait is a revolt against Enlightenment assumptions about secular humanism; the second, against upper middle and upper class populations by marginalized or suppressed people; and the third, against the results of modernity and secular rationality. Tehranian (1993a) states that the first and third traits are most prevalent in Third World societies or among indigenous cultures in which the native religion (e.g., Islam) is associated with a past history of glory and independence. In such cases, national liberation movements tied to religion become translated into reactions against foreign influences (Tehranian, 1993a). As reactionary movements fundamentalist eventually rely on education and media to reform society:

To restore spirituality and decency, fundamentalist movements all seem to turn to education and media for a new socialization, recruitment, and organization of their members. In fact, both traditional and modern networks of communication in the religious institutions, schools, and media have served as indispensable
tools in the formation and dissemination of fundamentalist messages. . . . In the Islamic world, the fundamentalist movements have availed themselves of the traditional educational, cultural, and communication channels in conjunction with the micromedia (telephones, cassette recorders, copying machines, and mimeographs to launch effective campaigns for the dissemination of their ideologies and theologies). (pp. 316-317).

Tehranian (1993a) observes that phenomenon in Israel, Egypt, and Iran, where micromedia use through “mosques and school networks” transmits “fundamentalist education and propaganda” toward re-Islamization programs (p. 317). Writes Tehranian (1993a), the same methods have been used by others such as planned uprisings “among the West Bank Palestinians, the Jewish fundamentalists in Israel, and the Sunni fundamentalist groups in Israel” (p. 317). In Islamic radicalism, this strategy toward social and political reform is partly a means toward administering a cure for modernity in which a vanguard of true believers “organized as a counter-society” call for the “total control” of education and media through revolutionary militancy (p. 317). In addition, “whenever and wherever the fundamentalist groups have some measure of political power and access, they use the regular commercial and government media and school systems,” (Tehranian, 1993a, p. 317).

Tehranian (1993a) asserts that fundamentalist groups of all stripes variously employ different strategies to achieve their objectives, depending on the types of societies and governments within which they operate: Wahhabi fundamentalists in Saudi Arabia align with the state in state schools, state media, and state religious networks as a means to conserve tradition; separatist Sunni Egyptian types focus on underground activities, alternative schooling, and underground micromedia as a means to avoid contamination; reformist types as in other Egyptian groups rely on alternative curricula and media networks to engage in accommodationist approaches to reform;
and revolutionary militant groups like those in Lebanon, West Bank, and Iran utilize propaganda, agitation, terror, and violence toward educational and media overhaul. Tehranian’s (1993a) analysis of the uses of media omits mentioning of the use of the Internet by Islamist groups for their transnational machinations as a mass movement of social reform. This is an area that, ten years after the publication of this essay, requires some attention, especially given the totalitarian nature of Islamism, replete with its hegemonic aspirations.

“Reshaping Personal Relations in Egypt”

Andrea B. Rugh (1993) draws upon answers by religious authorities in Egyptian newspapers and their statements on television to show how personal relations in Egypt have changed as the result of the re-Islamization process that began in the 1970’s. Therein, she notes that members of the militant groups in Egypt tend to be “young people from the lower middle classes, often students—especially those who temporarily or permanently reside away from their families and study in the elite faculties of medicine and engineering” (p. 153). Rugh’s (1993) observations of Egyptian culture indicate that those youth measure themselves in terms of Western lifestyle and values, rejecting modernity by seeking “indigenous solutions to local social ills” (p. 153). A major problem that Rugh (1993) notes in terms of the education of those youth is that their high school preparation and their desired fields of undergraduate study, science and math, do not “afford them much opportunity for criticism and evaluation” (p. 153). Those same students, moreover, are taught by rote, “a method which prepares students to accept without question the literal messages of religion” (p. 153). Such general problems, in turn, predicate the success of radical
Islam in its re-Islamization of Egyptian society in their ability to use underground and mainstream educational modes and media to indoctrinate young Egyptians and, hence, to gradually change culture from within and by non-violent means (Rugh, 1993).

“Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups”

Abdel Azim Ramadan (1993) divides fundamentalism in Egypt into two types, the radical Islamic trend and the traditional Islamic trend. Takfir groups represent the former; and the Muslim Brotherhood, the latter. Both groups adopt the concepts of *jahiliyya* (pre-Islamic idolatrous society), *al-hakimiyya* (God’s sovereignty), and *al-takfir* (branding with atheism) and dedicate themselves to Islamic law in Egypt. However, they maintain different strategies to achieve that goal.

Ramadan (1993) provides some historical context for the manner in which these two groups have transformed Egyptian society through educational channels. He notes that during Egypt’s modernization period that began in the Nineteenth Century, the country had adopted Western models wherein traditional mosque schools were transformed into schools for the study of sciences and languages (Ramadan, 1993). Intellectuals in during that early period of modernization argued that the caliphate was not a legitimate form of government and had no basis in the Qur’an or other religious texts. Through education, Egyptian intellectuals of the day taught about the decline of the conditions of Muslims and called for “the adoption of new beliefs alien to Islam’s first principles which had paralyzed Muslims, preventing them catching up with the modern age” (p. 153). By the 1920’s, Egyptian women had stopped wearing the veil and practices such as Islamic law and polygamy were being criticized.
However, the Muslim Brotherhood was created in 1927 by an elementary school teacher, Hassan Al-Banna, who challenged modernization by “defending Islam” (p. 154). Al-Banna’s new movement represented the earliest phase of the current re-Islamization movement in Egypt, focusing mainly on obscenity and apostasy. By May 1933, the Muslim Brotherhood had become so successful in reaching masses of Egyptians through schools and mosques and other outreach programs that it could sustain its own newspaper (Ramadan, 1993). As a religious society, it had a missionary element that stretched into the Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and the Maghreb. The establishment of an Islamic government was its ultimate goal. Al-Banna preached through mosques and educational networks that lack of involvement in politics was “Islamic crime” and brought that message to “secular universities and the educated classes influenced by Western culture” (p. 156).

The rise of communism in Egypt vexed the Muslim Brotherhood, whose members were convinced that Egypt was regressing (Ramadan, 1993). Egyptian governments in the 1950’s and 1960’s suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood, imprisoning many, including Sayyid Qutb, who would be executed in 1965 but whose writings would inspire the radical Takfir organizations that emerged in the 1970’s. These were secret organizations whose core members comprised, surprisingly, not only native Egyptians but also Palestinians, all of whom were associated with student organizations on Egyptian university campuses. These students in the early 1970’s were dedicated to the use of force to achieve the earlier stated goals of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ramadan, 1993). Some of the more prominent organizations included the Military Technical College Organization, the Society of the Muslims, and the Jihad.
Group. Members of these groups over a period of years spoke in mosques, clubs, schools, and universities and by establishing themselves in those places began the re-Islamization process from “above” by forcing conformity on others through intimidation practices and violent clashes with local political orders. At the same time, however, other members of the Takfir groups and the Muslim Brotherhood initiated a process of infiltrating traditional educational, social, and political institutions in which they demanded application of Islamic law and conformity of mind and practice among believers (Ramadan, 1993).

“Hizbullah: The Calculus of Jihad”

Martin Kramer (1993) states that Hizbullah, or “the Party of God” maintains an annual budget of slightly less than half of the University of Chicago and “owes its reputation almost solely to its mastery of violence—a violence legitimated in the name of Islam” (p. 539). In addition, Kramer (1993) states that another factor to the group’s remarkable hold in Lebanon invokes the fact that Syria allows the Republic of Iran to run without question a line of infrastructural, human, and financial support to Lebanon’s terrorist group through Syrian borders. Within this discussion rests the obvious point that governments play a key role in furthering the objectives of terrorist groups. In addition, as with other Islamist groups, Hizbullah’s leadership is comprised of a “disgruntled mass” of students first educated in the theological schools of Iran in the early 1970’s who pioneered the concept of “martyrdom” or suicide bombings (Kramer, 1993: p. 543). Despite the media attention given to Hizbullah and its later imitators in the Palestinian territories, Kramer (1993) disputes these groups’ achievement through suicide attacks, stating that as of 1991, none of these groups had
anything “to show for” their violence and would have to adjust to new phases and tactics if they hoped to succeed (p. 552).

“Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases”

Ted Robert Gurr (1990/1998) establishes a thesis that likely would not sit well with some people who are not terrorists but who maintain philosophical and legal sympathies with accused terrorists or with political and humanitarian causes. His thesis rests on three main points of argument: 1) political terrorist campaigns emerge out of larger political conflicts, albeit in “distorted form”; 2) relationships between violent activists and their “community of support” aid understanding “the onset, persistence, and decline of terrorist movements”; 3) ideologies, psychologies, and social dynamics of terror groups cannot be understood well without looking at terror groups’ affiliation with other institutions and the larger public (p. 86).

Gurr (1990/1998) states that one of two conditions must be met in democratic societies for terrorist groups to develop: radicalization or reaction. The former term refers to a process by which a moderate group, when it fails to make enough progress toward satisfaction of its goals, becomes discouraged and turns to violent activism. The latter term refers to a term that from the outset turns to violent activism in response to a social change or a government policy that threatens their group identity or values. Gurr (1990/1998) states that most elements of society in American and European democracies do not support violent activism; however, he notes that pockets of support for such militancy can be found in and near universities. Studies in German universities, for example, show that while only five percent of West Germany’s
population sympathizes with violent actions, the figure is much higher in the milieu of universities (Gurr, 1990/1998).

The remainder of the essay involves the association of young intellectuals and violent activism, whose activities can be eroded in a combination of backlash, reform, and deterrence but not by just one of those measures. For example, reforming a government policy will not satisfy ideologically motivated people because they tendentially disavow political compromise and only accept compromise for short-term and not long-term reasons. In addition, deterrence may be necessary but also may give violent activists more justification to commit violence and stir up support from groups who are non-violent. Backlash, Gurr (1990/1998) contends, is the most crucial of the three measures undertaken by democracies to reduce terrorism: “ill-conceived acts of terrorism can and do extend and solidify public antipathy for the terrorists and, by extension, their objectives” because those acts do not correspond to majority community norms (p. 102).

“The Moral Logic of Hizballah”

Hizballah, like many Islamist groups in the Middle East, is backed financially by the Republic of Iran (Kramer, 1990/1998). Its name literally means the “Party of God,” and, like many Islamist groups, inserts itself into a place in a “seesaw struggle for ungoverned land,” in this case, Lebanon (Kramer, 1990/1998). Martin Kramer (1990/1998) discusses the ideology of Hizballah and how that ideology helps the group suspend its moral logic. In addition, Kramer also describes other Islamist groups aligned with Hizballah in Lebanon, such as the Islamic Jihad, who took on a special interest in ridding Lebanon of foreign influences at The American University at Beruit.
Kramer (1990/1998) asserts that intelligence sources “regard Islamic Jihad as a group of clandestine cells run by several of Hizballah’s military commanders, in most instances in collaboration with Iran” but the Islamic Jihad is more shadowy than Hizballah, so “a precise reconstruction of the group’s methods or affiliations” is not possible (p. 136). Nevertheless, Islamic Jihad, working with Hizballah or independently, took credit for suicide bombings against U.S. Americans and a wave of kidnapping against foreign nationals in Lebanon, including university presidents and professors (Kramer, 1990/1998).

The basis of Hizballah’s party platform is like that of all other Islamist groups throughout the world, to reform society through the establishment of a pure Islamic state based on the interpretation of Islamic law through an elite group of people who consult with each about conflict resolution and social propriety (Kramer, 1990/1998). The rationale for this purpose is also like that of all other Islamist groups, Islam has been corrupted by Muslim capitulation to Western culture and government (Kramer, 1990/1998). If all individual states can reform as pure Islamic states, then in the future all nations can unite as part of a worldwide Islamic hegemony, in full restoration of Islam’s lost pride and its divine right to succeed other world religions and secular governments (Kramer 1990/1998).

Like other Islamist parties Hizballah has a structured organizational model with leadership in various factions in Lebanon who designate ambassadors to Iran, but despite that the group tries to be as secret as possible about its machinations (Kramer, 1990/1998). In addition to its internal government and established militia ranks, the party maintains tight connections with non-members in Lebanese villages who are part
of intraclan alliances, replicating loyalty through their common respect for their common religious leaders. Of special note is that before returning to Iran and eventually overthrowing the Shah of Iran in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini lived among his Shi’ite Lebanese brothers in Lebanon (Kramer, 1990/1998). Thus, the level of indoctrination in this Islamist group extends back generations before Hizballah became prominent in the late 1970’s (Kramer, 1990/1998). Like all Islamist groups, Hizballah did not spring up overnight.

Like the Islamic Jihad, Hizballah leaders are very intelligent and most have college educations through graduate school; many are bona fide academics or founders of Islamic academies (Kramer, 1990/1998). The leaders of these groups defend each other when they are accused of terrorist acts. Kramer (1990/1998) observes specifically of their moral logic in this respect that the leaders maintain an “oppressed versus oppressor” mentality about political conflict and regularly employ those exact terms in media statements, media being a favorite form of propagandizing about “self defense” by both groups. However, those terms are not tied to the secular Marxist rhetoric for which they are customarily associated with; instead the terms are tied to religious doctrine that allow leaders and followers, through the media, to transform “apparent crimes into sacred deeds” (p. 137) as “military operations against imperialist enemies” (p. 137) committed by restless youth dependent on and indoctrinated by religious leaders.

When questioned about the propriety of political violence through acts of “martyrdom,” for example, one Hizballah religious leader states that “these initiatives must be placed in their context,” such that if the aim is “religious war” by making a
“political impact on an enemy,” then human “sacrifice” is acceptable “jihad” (p. 145). Kramer (1990/1998) further notes that through Hizballah statements tied to the rhetoric of religious justification by the imams in Lebanese villages, the “Islamic Jihad need give little or no account for itself, and it has generally preferred not to do so” (p. 137). Kramer (1990/1998) thus shows in his explication of Hizballah’s arguments in support of Islamic Jihad’s kidnappings and suicide attacks how Islamist groups distort morality and law as they take advantage of a society mired in “collective distress” (p. 137). Hizballah and Islamic Jihad’s presence also extended over into Lebanese university systems, where when kidnappings and assassinations were not sufficient to purge universities of foreign influence, slower measures of re-Islamization were taken, the mainstay being the preaching of the Islamist version of Islam’s message to university students (Kramer, 1990/1998: p. 153).

“The Western Mind of Radical Islam”

Daniel Pipes (1997) contends most directly one of the great paradoxes of Islamism, that, as the movement rejects the West, its leadership is nonetheless highly Westernized and highly credentialed. This is a cultural trait shared by virtually all Islamist leaders. In context, Pipes (1997) cites the most notable to have emerged on the Islamist scene in the past two decades: Fathi Al-Shiqqi, assassinated leader of the PIJ and MD who admitted to having wept bitterly over Oedipus Rex; Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, a PhD in economics who taught political science at USF and successor to Shiqqi in the PIJ; Hasan Al-Turabi, PhD and ruler of the Sudan; Abbasi Madani, PhD in education and leader of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front; Rashid Al-Ghannoushi, PhD who was convicted in absentia of seditious conspiracy in Tunisia;
Musa Muhamammad Abu Marzuk, PhD in engineering and head of HAMAS in Virginia; and Layth Shubaylat, PhD and president of the Jordanian Engineer’s Association. These are Islamists who live and operate in the West, Pipes (1997) notes, but the same pattern unfolds in other parts of the world, too. “So much knowledge of the West,” Pipes (1997) asserts, “demonstrates that fundamentalists are not peasants living in the unchanging countryside but modern, thoroughly urbanized individuals, many of them university graduates” (p. 110).

Among the other aspects of the Westernization of Islamists that Pipes (1997) observes is that they are “distant from their own culture” and have no working knowledge of traditional Islam (p. 112). Instead, the Islamist version of Islam flows from the political discourse of ideological founding fathers like Qutb, whose thought is described more fully in Chapter One, and the so-called “political imams” (Tibi, 1998) throughout the world who are not trained in Islam’s seats of religious learning. This represents one aspect of the anti-intellectualism that Meddeb (2003) describes in The Malady of Islam. Instead of knowing Islamic traditions, Islamists take what they want from it piecemeal in order to serve their militant agenda and simultaneously blame the West when their plans for industrialization fall short (Pipes, 1997).

In addition, Islamists have adopted for their religious leadership an organizational structure like the Christian church; whereas in traditional Islam decisions were reached in “an unstructured and consensual way” as opposed to through a top-down manner of control (p. 114). Moreover, Islamists have adopted what they refer to as their own brand of feminism, in which wearing the veil facilitates a career and allows women to be looked at as a human and not as an object of pleasure (Pipes,
Furthermore, Islamists are Westernized in their success in turning their religion into a political ideology in which the religion represents, first and foremost, a means to achieving political and economic power with state interests taking priority over all other aspects of life and faith. Pipes (1997) writes to that effect, “Hitler, Stalin, and Mao subordinated religion to the state, so why not Khomeini? His edict subordinated Islam to the state. Khomeini may have looked medieval but he was a man of his times, deeply affected by totalitarian ideas emanating from the West” (p. 118).

While one might consider Pipes’ observations that Islamist have no working knowledge of their own culture a sweeping generalization because it would be impossible to interview all Islamists, one must accept his observations as typical of Islamists, because Pipes has been studying Islamists and Islamism for over thirty years and his analysis is supported by other leading scholars such as Tibi (1998), Duran & Hechiche (2001), Kepel (2002), and Meddeb (2003).

In this section, the researcher presented an array of literature about scapegoating, conspiracy, terrorism, and Islamic militancy that might enable a deeper appreciation for what Walker (1979) calls “militant third-sector” groups in higher education. The section ranged widely from psychoanalytic to non-psychoanalytic perspectives, covering scholarship from Europe, the Middle East and the United States.
Section III:
Organizational and Administrative Theory and Practice in Higher Education

The Role of Higher Education in Attracting Islamism: Prefatory Remarks

As has been suggested in the preceding pages, while Islamism, as a totalitarian mass social movement, requires higher education to achieve its objective of re-Islamizing society and knowledge from above and below, higher education possesses certain characteristics stemming from its organizational and administrative functioning and purposes that ostensibly render it available to Islamism’s influence. In addition, changes in the intellectual character of higher education since the mid-1960’s, as discussed above in terms of the New Left’s recasting of Freud’s concepts of Eros and Thanatos, may also play a role in that attraction. This final section of the literature review examines more deeply organizational and administrative theory and practice in higher education that may enable Islamism’s interplay with higher education.

This section is arranged according to two major divisions. The first involves works about organizational and administrative theory and practice in higher education (Walker, 1979; Birnbaum, 1988; Becher 1989/1993/1996; and Shils, 1997), with additional emphasis on the American Association of University Professors’ 1940 Statement on Academic Freedom. The section also examines epistemological conflict in Middle East studies related to Shils’ (1997) observations. The second showcases works about contemporary issues in curriculum planning and change (Chaffee and Jacobsen, 1997; Cohen, 1997; El-Khawas, 1997; Gaff and Ratcliff, 1997; Hurtado and Dey, 1997; Johnston and Spalding, 1997; Musil, 1997; Stark and Lattuca, 1997; Margolis, 2001). Many of the authors cited in the second part of this section are far
more accepting of the changes in the university after World War II, perhaps because they are of a younger generation that does not maintain a living memory of the war itself or perhaps because they support the idealism of inclusion in the curriculum, cherishing that most noble value above all others.

Organizational and Administrative Theory and Practice in Higher Education

An early but seminal work about higher education organization and administration is Donald E. Walker’s *The Effective Administrator* (1979). Arguably one of the most pragmatic and practical works in the field of higher education organization and administration, the book is penned by a sociologist who is at one and the same time a former university president and university system chancellor, and who also happens to be the son of an academic administrator. Two chapters by Walker (1979), “Understanding the Peculiar Nature of Colleges and Universities” and “Exerting Leadership in an Active-Reactive Environment” seem of particular importance to this inquiry about Islamism’s influence on higher education and on how higher education may attract Islamism.

In the first chapter in question, Walker (1979) candidly discusses the classic tensions between faculty and administrators, outlining certain principles of the political model of governance valued by faculty and sometimes infringed by administrators in their managerial roles. In another essay entitled “The President as the Ethical Leader of the Campus” (1982), Walker refers to those tensions as being between the “sacerdotal” and “secular” points-of-view, or the “professional” and “managerial.”

The political model holds that universities function as pluralistic democracies (Walker, 1979). Given that perspective of governance, Walker (1979) writes that if
“there is an issue at hand that the faculty cares deeply about and you can’t persuade them, you certainly can’t bulldoze them” (p.10). “This principle is sometimes raised to the level of conscious ideology but more frequently it simply functions as an unconscious set of assumptions like those held by the muscle-view subscribers,” Walker (1979, p.10) further allows. Quoting a university system chancellor, Walker (1979) lauds the nobility of a university functioning as a political state but suggests that “its existence as carrying out the will of a constituent population [by consent of the governed and not a representative form] simply does not provide for accountability” (pp.10-13). Finally, Walker (1979) asserts that deviations in a faculty and student body’s willingness to support presidential authority on some issues hinges upon whether or not previous trust among administrators is high.

In that same chapter on university governance, Walker (1979) also discusses the moral quality of decision making that stems from the idea that a university is a political democracy. In that respect, Walker observes several assumptions such as the individual being more important than procedures, decisions being reached at the lowest possible level having the most validity, and the concept of the moral veto which sometimes transcends majority rule. Of the latter, Walker (1979) asserts that if “a person can argue with real feeling and conviction that what is being done is wrong in principle, it’s the rare academic community that will not stop and listen” (p.25). “The struggle for interpretation and credibility is then on,” Walker (1979, p.25) asserts, and the “problem will be negotiated as a political-moral issue rather than as an administrative or a statistical one” (p.25). Walker gives the following hypothetical example to support his point:
Let us say that a proposal comes before the university community to train the military officers of a nation suspected of totalitarianism. In defense of the proposal, someone argues that “at least we as a democratic society will have some influence on the future lives of the citizens of this nation if we offer such a program.” A clear but not overwhelming majority of the faculty and student senate vote approval. But a group of strongly convinced members of the student body and the faculty oppose the action on moral grounds: “How can this university lend its support to the maintenance of a totalitarian regime?” (p.25).

In such a case, the moral veto has been exercised and thus “the stage for ‘holy war’ has been set” (p.25.). Nonetheless, despite the timeless possibility of the moral veto, “it is an action always running against the tide” and unless “a campus is very disorganized, it cannot be effective on every occasion” (pp.25-26).

Finally, Walker describes the role of “third-sector groups” (e.g., women’s rights groups, ethnic groups) that influence campus organizational and administrative decision making. Their presence, Walker (1979) avers, is paradoxical in that on one hand, they laudably “provide stimulation from the periphery, which can be immensely helpful to a university in maintaining a tender growing edge responsive to the needs of a changing society”; yet, on the other hand, they may result in “a cannibalism of leadership, characteristic of militant third-sector groups, [which] derives from their nature more than from the character of the university” (p.35). Walker (1979) observes that while such groups may cause trouble for a campus, the democratic nature of the university welcomes those groups, so therefore some administrators and other constituents may perceive them as using the university as kind of Trojan horse that causes disruption to the smooth functioning of the institution. In the next chapter entitled “Mastering the Political Realities of the Campus,” Walker (1979) has a suggestion for the so-called “holy war” that usually is engendered by coalitions of “third-sector” groups: “the threat of political convulsion on troubled campuses should
focus attention administratively on the perpetual need to deal with low-grade infections that keep elevated the temperature of the campus” (p.84). Of course, it need be mentioned here that Walker’s use of the term “holy war” is used in a sociological sense to imply how “complex matters of the head” become “translated into simple matters of the heart” for campus constituents. In other words, it is not a political or theological reference to Islamism.

Robert Birnbaum in *How Colleges Work* (1988) discusses the higher education as a kind of “cybernetic organization” for the purpose of understanding the problematic nature of university governance. Birnbaum (1988), the director of the National Center for Postsecondary Education and Finance and former college administrator, regards the university as an organization comprised of institutions and sub-institutions, external and internal to the campus, which interact with each other, which gives the university an anarchic character as opposed to that of a smooth-functioning bureaucracy. As does Walker (1979), Birnbaum takes note of the classic tensions between professional and managerial roles on campus, but extends the discussion to include conflict with trustees who have fiduciary responsibility to the campus.

The tensions, however, spill over into the ideological and political, Birnbaum (1988) asserts: “In terms of political party affiliation and ideology, and attitudes about higher education, the trustees are more conservative than the faculty” (p.6). However, because of the vastness of the university as an anarchic system, replete with institutions and sub-institutions in the university’s external and internal environment, “university executives and faculty form separated and isolated conclaves in which they are likely to communicate only with people similar to themselves” (p.7). Elsewhere, Birnbaum
(1988) states that a large institution “may become like an academic holding company, presiding over a federation of quasi-autonomous subunits. Unable to influence the larger institution, faculty retreat into the small subunit for which they feel affinity and from which they can defend their influence and status” (p.17). One significant result of this phenomenon, Birnbaum (1988) suggests, is that faculty and administrators become embroiled in “disruptive conflict” and “mutual scapegoating” which, in turn, leads to increased pressure by outside agencies to diminish university authority and to demand accountability (p.16).

Finally, Birnbaum (1988) describes a salient characteristic of university decision making, the so-called “garbage-can” style, typical of an anarchic organization. Essentially, the garbage-can approach works as follows: someone or group with an agenda creates a committee, then other people or groups who have their own agendas believe that their agendas maintain an affinity with the former committee and so they take measures to coalesce with that former committee, resulting in what Birnbaum (1988) calls a “tight-coupling” among different campus groups. Furthermore, Birnbaum (1988) notes three possible consequences of the garbage-can approach to achieving one’s agenda in an anarchic organization: “resolution, flight, or oversight.” Of the first consequences, resolution of a problem is the least likely, whereas flight from a severance of the original tight coupling or oversight from people in other areas being so unaware of problems elsewhere in the organization represent more likely possibilities (Birnbaum, 1988).

Tony Becher (1989/1993/1996) in *Academic Tribes and Territories* contends that the organization of a university cannot be fully appreciated unless one explores the
relationship between “particular groups of academics organize their professional lives” and the “intellectual tasks on which they are engaged” (p.1). As such, Becher (1989/1993/1996) studies academic cultures and the nature of knowledge, so in essence, the author describes the academy’s tendency toward disciplinary specialization and how people in those areas of specialization perceive their professional roles and “the rules that govern their behavior” (p.1-2).

Faculty, Becher (1989/1993/1996) notes, become engrossed with their fields of specialization because specialization represents a “rapid and effective way to enhancing their reputations” and so they guard their territories zealously when confronted with reaction to their new ideas (pp.70-71). In fields of the so-called soft-sciences that “lack strong paradigms, Becher (1989/1993/1996) observes another phenomenon, “a wish to keep the institution decentralized and thus relatively egalitarian” (p.73). Along with that matter, Becher (1989/1993/1996) observes that in terms of the external environment and its overarching ideological assumptions, the fields of specialization in the academy exhibit marked tendencies to resist those assumptions because of their ideal to remain “untouched by outside influences” (p.134). In fact, Becher (1989/1993/1996) states that about the only external actors or groups that an area of specialization on a campus will not resist are those that are like them, in the form of other departments in other universities or who are part of professional associations that maintain similar ideological assumptions and common causes.

Becher (1989/1993/1996) also devotes a major section in his work to the nature of controversy in the tribal atmosphere of the university. Because, as he contends, a
faculty member’s personal identity strongly hinges upon the ideology of his or her discipline, whenever that person perceives a threat to his or her discipline, the threat tacitly doubles as a threat to the person’s personal identity (Becher 1989/1993/1996). “Good blazing rows,” the writer asserts, are especially pronounced with passions “running deep” when “people’s ideological identities are at stake” (p.98). Nevertheless, Becher (1989/1993/1996) notes that in most academic writing the opposite occurs, suggesting a tendency for “deliberate avoidance” or “damping down of critical comment in academic writing,” as most academics “tend to withdraw from controversial situations” and ideological disagreements in their fields (p.99). Herein, Becher (1989/1993/1996) states that a consequence is that when conflict does erupt among members of the academy, they will often resort to “fiddly disagreements rather than major issues” (p.100). Finally, Becher (1989/1993/1996) states that the irony to this phenomenon in the academy is that “the reluctance to say what one thinks, the refusal to join in or contest the debate, is the direct antithesis of the view with which this discussion began: that free communication is the essence of intellectual progress” (p.101).

*The Calling of Education* (1997) is a collection of essays written by the late Edward Shils, a professor of history who taught variously at The University of Chicago and Cambridge. As the book’s forward by Joseph Epstein (1997) states, Shils’ perspective on the academic calling was “formed by a wide historical reading and common sense,” which later in his career caused him to become concerned about the erosion of the academic ethic’s tradition resulting from what Shils (1997) refers to throughout his essays as “intellectual antinomianism” traced directly to the
politicization of the higher education’s faculty and students who saw the university more as a means to achieve social objectives as opposed to the advancement of the intellectual character. Shils (1997) does not directly define “intellectual antinomianism.” However, his discussion tacitly indicts the anti-West/Critical Theory ferment on campuses after World War II (see aforementioned chapter notes on the hidden curriculum of Herbert Marcuse), which gave rise to a revision of academic freedom doctrine. With some distant recall to general education in colonial American history and theology taught by the late Professor Emeritus, George H. Mayer, University of South Florida, one may define “intellectual antinomianism” as a belief and trend among academics characterized by a prevailing supposition that they are not bound by the moral or institutional laws of the university or society, and that having received an academic appointment places academics in a state of unconditional grace that frees them from the need to observe moral or institutional laws of the university or society. Those academics thus practice an intellectual version of what is known in Lutheran doctrine as “justification by faith” alone that negates the practice “good works.”

The educational development Shils (1997) refers to so often in his essays is commonly known as social reconstructionism, a philosophy of education which holds that the purpose of education is to address social questions in order to help humans resist oppression as students develop what is known in reconstructionist parlance as “critical consciousness” (see, for example, Curriculum for Utopia, by Stanley, 2002, an outgrowth of Marcuse’s Critical Theory). However, “because Edward Shils loved the university so ardently, he greatly disliked [reconstructionist] inroads, not to say
onslaughts, against those whose ultimate affect could only be to diminish it,” Epstein (1997, p.vii) avers. Indeed, Shils’ concerns led him to serve as chief advisor to The University of Chicago’s President Edward Levi (Epstein, 1997) and, reportedly by those who observed the university’s student upheavals of the late 1960’s, Chicago’s great institution of higher learning “came away with its integrity less battered from those events than did Berkeley, Columbia, Harvard, Michigan, and nearly every other major American center of higher learning” (p.vii). For this reason, Shils’ historical insights regarding higher education organization and administration are worth pondering in this review. His views serve therefore as a bridge between this section and the next, which more directly involves discussion about current issues regarding curriculum planning and change.

One of the salient themes in Shils’ (1997) collected essays involves the history of espionage and subversion in higher education, the matter for him being a subtext to other concerns about the relationship between the university and its external social world. His insights are most varied and rich in that respect. Shils (1997) notes that changes after World War II that culminated in the expansion of the numbers and different kinds of people in the university brought with them “the brushing of universities by Soviet espionage” (p.38). “The implication of a small number of university teachers in espionage, and the rumors and accusations of the connections of larger numbers in such activities as well as the conviction that universities held the keys to a happier, more prosperous future made newspapers begin to attend more seriously to the activities of universities,” states Shils (1997, p.38). Furthermore, he states that the student disturbances of the 1960’s and 1970’s exacerbated the
university’s newfound role as a source of “dramatic news” (p.38), the most profound consequence of that being that publicity “extended the student disturbances nationally and internationally” (p.38).

However, Shils (1997) does not limit discussion of that desire for either activism or publicity to just students. Administrators, for fiduciary reasons, and professors, for their personal causes and their work, also court publicity (Shils, 1997). In addition, Shils (1997) notes that “aggrieved members of the universities turn to the press . . . to remedy the wrongs which they think they have suffered” (p.39).

Elsewhere, Shils (1997) laments “intellectual antinomianism” because it signifies a failure on behalf of professors and students to appreciate the significance of their fields of study. He observes thereunto that that change rests mostly with newer generations to higher education who are increasingly led “to think that their subjects as generally practiced over the past several generations are just ‘ideologies’ supporting the ‘ruling classes’ and serving as instruments of ‘imperialism’ and ‘colonialism’” (p.46). Such professors, Shils (1997) observes, “have sought the admiration of their more antinomian students by denouncing their subjects and disciplines in class” (p.46).

Because the university has been pulled into “the increased political interest and activity of academics,” the pressure of social movements brings renewed obligations on behalf of those academics with respect to their distinguishing between knowledge and ideological doctrine, Shils (1997, p.103) writes. In context, Shils (1997) has much to write about what professors owe and do not owe their societies. He is clear, for example, in stating that professors are not above the law of a nation, even though academic freedom buffers professors from being fired for exercising first amendment
rights. Therein, he laments that so many post-world War II academics have forgotten that distinction. For example, Shils (1997) states that in the United States, where professors are not employed as civil servants, *per se*:

No oaths of loyalty are exacted in such circumstances. [However,] this does not mean that the university teacher is exempted from the obligation of a minimal loyalty. The obligation is however that of any citizen and not that of a university teacher in particular. The obligation to abstain from subversive activities is the obligation of the citizen, just as is the obligation to abstain from criminal activities. Neither the right to academic freedom nor the autonomy of the university implies any privilege of academics to engage in subversive activities. . . . Academic freedom in the sense of the freedom to perform the academic activities of teaching and research does not confer the freedom of subversion or terrorist activities any more than being a citizen confers such rights in the civil sphere. The autonomy of universities does not confer on individual university teachers immunities which no one else in society legally enjoys. . . . [Therefore] if an academic is active politically, he should not use his office or other university premises for that activity, nor should he use his university address for any correspondence which is part of that activity.”

Later, Shils (1997) reiterates:

There is another set of activities which are to be protected from sanctions by the guarantee of the freedom of academics. This is the right of academics to the performance of legal political actions, to be members of or otherwise associated with legal political parties or societies; to participate in the activities of these bodies as freely as any other citizen in a liberal democratic society. Political activities such as the practice of terrorism, kidnapping, or assassination are not to be protected by the invocation of the principle of academic freedom, any more than they are assured by the right of political freedom of any citizen, academic or nonacademic”

In addition, Shils (1997) suggests that academics’ civil freedom does not “extend to the conduct of political propaganda in teaching,” which is easy to distinguish in hard sciences but less easy in political science, anthropology, economics, and sociology, whose “subject matters overlaps with the objects of political activity”

Of that kind of “antinomianism” that Shils (1997) suggests has found its way into higher education, he states, too, that “it has objectives very different from those
which the American Association of University Professors once sought to protect” (p.177). In *The Calling if Education*, Shils (1997) characterizes this problem as paradoxical because it arose with the growth of social sciences after World War II, which was a gift of sorts to the academy, but in return for that gift, the academy came to view the government and its society with mistrust:

The rise in social sciences in the universities coincided with a period of increasingly disapproving judgment of contemporary American society by journalists, artists, and writers. They were joined by a number of social scientists who were a small sector of the academic profession, but they received a disproportionate amount of attention. . . . Populistic radicals were few in American universities before the Great Depression of 1929. Marxists radicals were practically nonexistent. . . . To summarize the contradiction: there was growing up a belief [after World War II] in the rightfulness of government ubiquity and omniprovidence, alongside the other halfheartedness about the legitimacy of the political realm. Thus, unlike the ancient Jews facing an utterly alien Caesar from whom they expected nothing, from whom they received nothing, to whom they owed only tribute and submission, and whose representatives were scarce and not usually visible among them, the American academic lives in a society permeated by Caesar. . . . The American academic lives in a society with a powerful center from which he cannot and would not detach himself. But he is distrustful of it. (p.199-200)

In terms of mass movements in higher education that exhibit this dilemma, Shils (1997) is most critical of those “whose present efforts to penetrate into the universities are made in the name of egalitarian ideals and of social justice” (p.206). Subverting the ideal to pursue truth and learning to those other ends for Shils (1997) represents a politicization of universities that is worse than McCarthyism, and he uses the example of the professoriate in 1930’s Germany to make his case:

In National Socialist Germany, many professors welcomed the new regime in 1933, which aside from its other monstrosities, did enduring damage to the still then great German universities. The Office of Civil Rights and related bodies are not to be compared in wickedness with the National Socialists, but the movement of the professors who went out of their way to welcome them was
similar in its implications for universities to that of our professors, some of
them—like the much worse German professors—very eminent” (p.206).

Shils (1997) then laments the results of defining faculty appointments and determining
the nature of curriculum along the lines of social engineering from within the
university, which he believes cause great acrimony among colleagues and other
constituents:

The fact remains that misappointments, whether out of sloth, friendship,
political partisanship, political ideals, or intimidation, do harm to universities.
They do harm which lasts for a long time, longer than the villainous harassment
of Joseph McCarthy, his predecessors or accomplices. (p.208)

Thereafter, Shils (1997) again faults the disturbances of the 1960’s and 1970’s for that
trend, stating that while the disturbances were usually blamed on student activists, the
“most active were encouraged by some of their teachers” and “once the agitation
became very audible and the disruption became tangible, university staffs were
distracted by acrimonious conflicts” resulting in further cleavages between faculty and
administrators in which matters of social engineering exacerbates the “us versus them”
mentality and is used as a “pretext for starting a furor against the administration”
(p.209). In later pages, Shils (1997) regrets such “anarchistic” (p.282) developments,
which coincide with the erosion of trust and accusation against “Western civilization as
‘sexist, racist, and imperialist’” (p.282).

Given Shils’ (1997) assertions that 1960’s “intellectual antinomianism”
contradicts the AAUP’s original definition of what the organization saw as the purpose
of the academic ethic coinciding with higher education’s role in society, that AAUP
definition is worth repeating here:

Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good and not to
further the interest of either the individual teacher or the institution as a whole.
The common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition. Academic freedom is essential to these purposes and applies to both teaching and research. (www.higher-ed.org/resources/AAUP_1940stat.htm)

In contemporary polemical parlance, “intellectual antinomianism” is referred to polemically as “political correctness” or “political correctitude,” terms the researcher prefers not to use when understanding the larger epistemological ferment in the academy that Shils (1997) critiques. That ferment has resulted in criticism of the evolution of Middle East studies by Bernard Lewis (1993), Bat Ye’or (1998), Bassam Tibi (1998), Martin Kramer (2001), and Phyllis Chesler (2004). Each scholar discusses problems associated with the advent of postcolonial and anti-Western resistance theories as those theories pertain to the study of Middle Eastern and Islamic societies in which the feelings of aggrieved groups are placed willfully above academic freedom doctrine, to the extent that history is distorted or even negated.

The British Middle East historian Bernard Lewis (1993) discusses higher education’s concerns for not wanting to stereotype Muslims. Lewis (1993) states that those concerns correlate to a form of mediaeval Islamic etiquette called *adab*, in which non-Muslims must not speak or write in a manner that might offend Muslims or defame their religion. Lewis (1993) suggests that the study of Islam and Muslims in the past thirty years has caused the negation of certain aspects of Islamic history because of the trend to avoid stereotyping or making utterances that might fan the flames of prejudice. Lewis (1993) states further that theorists in Middle East studies who are concerned about appearances of Anglo- or Eurocentric bias sometimes “shirk the difficult issues and subjects that some people would place under some sort of taboo” (pp. 78-79). Another area of concern to Lewis (1993) is that traditional
academic criteria for making professional appointments are replaced by a single criterion that a person’s personal heritage qualifies him or her for a position.

Ye’or (1998) amplifies Lewis’ (1993) concerns about negating history based on the academy’s polite tradition of writing about non-European cultures in purely favorable terms. She writes that “much-used arguments of Western culpability and the victimization of Muslim populations are generously developed in explaining Muslim hostility toward the West” (p. 315). This intellectual output in the publishing record she calls “apologetic literature” (p. 315) which maintains a “thematic structure” of representing jihad as peaceful conquest “generally welcomed by vanquished populations,” omitting Muslim methods of conquest such as “pillage, enslavement, deportation, massacres,” “masking the processes which transformed majorities into minorities, constantly at the risk of extinction,” “obligatory self-incrimination for the Crusades, the Inquisition, imperialism, colonialism, Israel, and other intrusions into the dar al-Islam,” and “servile criticism of the rational tools of historical knowledge, created by earlier European historians and historians” (pp. 315-316).

In addition to Lewis (1993) and Ye’or (1998), Tibi (1998) compares the academy’s apologetics for Islamism to those of the “Mandarins” in Europe. He, too, situates the problem in higher education’s trend to de-Westernizing society and knowledge. Of that trend, Tibi (1998) finds the postmodernism’s support of the Islamist movement paradoxical because postmodernism denies transcendental meaning, whereas Islamism does not.

Kramer’s (2001) seminal work on the failures of Middle East studies in American education went to press prior to the September 11 attacks but achieved
commendation for its insights into the question everyone had asked in the months afterward: What went wrong? Not only had America’s intelligence community failed to predict, but also so had America’s Middle East studies association. The discipline had come under attack, as its freshest body experts “disguised the vice of politicization as the virtue of commitment, and replaced proficiency with ideology” (p. 22). The locus of the problem, Kramer (2001) traces back to the publication of Edward Said’s 1978 work *Orientalism*, which came during a time of economic retrenchment in Middle East studies (p. 31). “Said,” Kramer (2001) writes, “was perfectly positioned [sic] to legitimize at least some of the contentions of ‘critical scholarship’ of the Left” (p. 32). In addition:

Said--like the practitioners of “critical scholarship”—had nothing to say about Islam [in his critique of the West]: his academic generation drew upon the experiences of the 1960’s and 1970’s. They were products of late-Cold War third worldism, which they had worked into an epistemology and which could be summarized in three words: resistance, revolution, and liberation. (p. 44).

In essence, Kramer (2001) had recognized that the social psychology of Herbert Marcuse, explicated in the earliest section of this literature review, had become the bedrock theory for Middle East studies and the “difficult job for accounting for Islamist deeds . . . became another opportunity for the repetitive and ritual denunciation of Western prejudice against Islam” (p. 45).

Finally, Chesler (2004), a women’s studies professor and UN activist for women’s rights, states that postcolonial theory has morphed into a shrewd cover for what she calls the Twenty-first Century’s “new anti-Semitism.” To qualify, she writes, “Because the charges of Apartheid Zionism are being leveled by those who champion
the uprising of the oppressed, what they say, by definition, presumably cannot be racist” (p. 88).

Contemporary Issues Regarding Curriculum Planning and Change

Ellen Earle Chaffee and Sarah Williams Jacobson write in an essay entitled “Creating and Changing Institutional Cultures” (1997) that “organizational culture is the dominant pattern of basic assumptions and shared meaning that shapes what participants see and do” (p.231). Within that “dominant pattern,” however, are subcultures that variously “complement and contradict each other” (p.231). Typical of most higher education institutions rest cultural values such as “faculty autonomy, intellectual integrity, and respect for the scientific method of inquiry” (p.231); however, those values of a “shared vision” are sometimes contravened by “diverse subcultures” within institutions (p.233). Chaffee and Jacobson (1997) suggest that one may study institutional cultures and subcultures on “at least four levels”: by their patterns of “basic assumptions”; “basic values”; “norms of behavior”; and “artifacts” (p.234). “Mindsets,” they contend are not “universally shared” regarding what and how to teach and learn (p.234). As is the case in society outside higher education, campus groups that “have a common history and have been relatively stable over a period of time tend to have ‘strong’ cultures, in that the underlying assumptions, values, and reinforcing artifacts are widely shared by most participants” and therefore “when challenged, groups tend to defend their cultural convictions mightily” (p.235).

Furthermore, Chaffee and Jacobson (1997) state the following:

Under threat, [sic] these patterns of behavior may be triggered and accentuated, leading participants in a given cultural group to act in seemingly irrational or pathological ways characterized by defensiveness, anger, emotional outbursts, and psychological withdrawal. (p.235)
In prestigious universities, the writers state, too, that collegial cultures run strong and remain “intransigent to those who would change it”; however, even less prestigious universities, where faculty are in the process of trying “to prove their worth in the disciplinary community” perceived threats “may lead to defensiveness, overreaction, and heightened devotion to protecting the discipline” (p.237). Often, that defensiveness is directed toward administrators, Chaffee and Jacobson (1997) aver, and in support, they cite a study that shows “as many as 64 percent of presidents and chancellors lack the professional confidence and support of their faculties” (p.239). Chafee and Jacobson (19970 conclude, in their discussion of culture, subcultures, and conflict that the only means to bridging divides and achieving positive change is to “solicit widespread involvement and ownership in shaping the institution’s future” (p.244).

Elaine El-Khawas writes in “The Role of Intermediary Organizations” (1997) writes that “little attention” has been devoted to “the dynamics of intermediary organizations, whether in their internal conflicts and challenges or in the way they affect other actors” (p.67). Her contribution is thus to provide a model for examining intermediary organizations and their relationship to higher education institutions. By “intermediary organizations,” El-Khawas (1997) refers to local groups like the chamber of commerce or national organizations like the AFL-CIO or religious groups like the B’nai B’rith. Also, the term refers to accrediting bodies and other institutions that carryout inspection roles, as well as professional membership organizations (El-Khawas, 1997). While each kind of organization is unique in its mission, they all have in common a “collective” desire to “address the common needs or interests” informed by their group (p.67). In terms of their differences, El-Khawas (1997) places
intermediary organizations on a continuum of source of authority. In her model, some are aligned closely with government and others with academe (El-Khawas, 1997). The model El-Khawas describes is very helpful for appreciating the intersection of roles between domestic external and internal constituencies on campus but does not extend to the role of international intermediary groups that may also influence the curriculum.

In “Social Forces Shaping the Curriculum,” Mildred Gaff and James L. Ratcliff (1997) describe the tensions between higher education’s conservative nature, as lauded in particular by Walker (1979) and Shils (1997) in the previous section, and higher education’s more recent call for orienting the curriculum toward social change and its impact. Their concern, generally, is “what students need to know in a global society” (p.119) and how certain “influences” “impinge on the curriculum” (p.119). Among those influences, Gaff and Ratcliff (1997) cite demographic changes, political influences, economic influences, and technology. As examples of impact on the curriculum, Gaff and Ratcliff (1997) provide various examples such as the expansion of race, ethnic, culture, and gender studies programs that “are challenging the root of the established system that shapes undergraduate curricula” (p. 120). Hence, the writers predict that multiculturalism and diversity issues will continue to impact and cause conflict in higher education not only because of domestic concerns that grew out of the Civil Rights movement of the 1960’s but also because “increased globalization of our society in interdependence among countries has renewed interest in the study of non-Western cultures and foreign languages” (p.120). In context, political influences follow, with Gaff and Ratcliff claiming narrowly that “the politics of the Reagan era
and by the Republican revolution . . . called for the return to the traditional curriculum” (p.121).

This aspect of globalization is also taken up in other discourse about curriculum planning and change. For example, Joan S. Stark and Lisa R. Latucca (1997) state that the “recent development of multicultural programs has helped to emphasize the importance of contemplating religion, history, philosophy, sociology, psychology, and political science as understood in non-Western nations” (p. 349), a point which has bearing on how universities plan for internationalizing their curricula, as discussed below. In addition, Sylvia Hurtado and Eric L. Dey (1997), in their discussion about institutional responsiveness to major social movements influencing higher education meant to “accommodate diverse students and faculty” (p. 405), state that “the inclusion of new groups often focus on dualistic notions of diversity” with groups claiming grievances of discrimination and lack of inclusion “seeking and receiving support as part of the campus’s expanding definition of multiculturalism” (p.406). “Not only are there more groups to consider, but [sic] we must also understand the nature of external pressures that support their inclusion and consider the groups as part of the campus community when determining how to implement diversity goals” (p. 406).

Joseph S. Johnston and Jane R. Spalding discuss in “Internationalizing the Curriculum” (1997) how “international education has emerged as a leading imperative of curriculum reform for the 1990’s and the beginning of the twenty-first century” (p. 416). However, the push for internationalization is not without its problems for the process is “a disorderly development, lacking clear definitions, boundaries or framework” (qtd. in Johnston & Spalding, 1997: 416). The arguments in favor of
internationalization are varied, the writers state, from economic advantages to cultural appreciation and involve foreign students and scholars exchange programs and also study abroad programs (Johnston & Spalding, 1997).

Because reforming a curriculum for internationalization involves unique challenges such as tensions that may erupt when “faculty members in traditional fields regard these explicitly international or global fields as lacking in rigor or prone to ideological bias” (Johnston & Spalding, 1997: 422), the writers adjure institutions to not internationalize their programs in an *ad hoc* manner (Johnston & Spalding, 1997). David William Cohen (1997) in another essay about globalization and scholarship isolates three changes in the nature of such scholarship coinciding with the end of the Cold War: “a reconfiguration of academic disciplines” given the “disappearance of socialist states and socialist ideology”; “recognition” of the “significance and power of expertise based in institutions in other countries” such as area studies programs that have shifted out of their “orientalist guise” of Western values; and a “reluctant acknowledgment of the power of expertise” lying outside the university whether in the United States or abroad” (p. 550).

Caryn McTighe Musil, in “Diversity and Educational Integrity” (1997) also discusses the interplay between multiculturalism and higher education, rejecting the melting pot metaphor of the American nation: “History suggests, however, that the reputed neutral identity, is not neutral at all. It is, in practice, a gendered and racialized identity, deeply layered with religious, ethnic, and cultural values. Quoting passages from Bloom’s *The Closing of the American Mind* (1987), Musil (1997) suggests that his resistance to diversity is “cannibalistic” (p.191), making Bloom’s arguments appear
racist, when in fact he objects to racial separatism and states, rather, that “human beings are all pretty much alike, and that friendship is another aspect of equal opportunity” (Bloom, 1987: p. 91). Bloom’s overall context aside, however, Musil (1997) argues that curriculum change for multiculturalism after the 1960’s has brought “dazzling intellectual innovations, innovative experiments in making higher education more democratic, and a new vision of community grounded not only in recognition of differences but also in commitments to shared obligations” (p. 120).

For Musil (1997) diversity is not divisive, as Shils (1997) suggests, but is “potentially unifying” (Musil, 1997: 192). Like Shils (1997), Musil does state that it was not the so-called “culture wars” that brought about the change in higher education but rather World War II did. Unlike Shils (1997), however, Musil (1997) is far more laudatory toward what Shils calls “antinomianism,” speaking of this new wave of campus activism in positive terms:

Instead of trusting the authorities quietly and without hesitation, generation after generation of students grew increasingly wary of what the authorities presented as facts. Generating knowledge themselves, students began to participate in teach-ins, start alternative student papers, and become chief inquisitors themselves of historical claims, foreign policy decisions, and reports from the battlefield. . . . They learned about military ties to research funding in universities, which had long existed but had been hidden or glossed over. . . . Like many of the black students, the anti-war students were often militant, insisting that they be heard and demanding new political power within the institution” (p.195).

Accepting of the militancy of the 1960’s and 1970’s, Musil (1997) supports the overturning of assumptions about the value of Western knowledge, stating that the “new scholarship on diversity, coupled with other intellectual movements in the last quarter century, has made it all but impossible to hold such views and still have intellectual integrity” (p. 199).
The anti-Western flavor of antinomianism that Shils (1997) states represents a threat to the academic ethic is lauded in the self-styled “resistance” education described in various chapters in the work *The Hidden Curriculum in Higher Education* (2001), which the authors state “hides in plain sight” (p. 1). Relying upon a curious amalgam of medieval and neo-Marxist terms, the work’s first chapter states that one may critique the college curriculum by examining it for “evidence of wrongdoing,” which for authors Eric Margolis, Michael Soldantenko, Sandra Acker, and Marina Gair (2001) means conducting “fruitful work” in the “secret garden of the curriculum where sexuality, power, and knowledge lie coiled liked serpents” (p. 3). “Moreover,” they state, “at least in the West, knowledge is guilty knowledge” (p. 3). Thus, the university curriculum requires educational resistance and reform in “the curricula of class consciousness, whiteness, patriarchy, heterosexuality, and of the West” (p. 3).

Another chapter in the same work suggests that the only problem for resistance curriculum that “hides in plain sight” is “the management of disruptive elements” (Soldantenko, 2001: p. 193). In context, Soldantenko (2001) provides an enlightening analysis of the purpose of the “antinomian” violation of the traditional mission of higher education that Shils (1997) characterizes in his essays:

Students of color transformed the university curriculum by institutionalizing ethnic studies in the late 1960’s. . . . Students assumed that these courses could subvert the intellectual colonial apparatus. In these classes, students of color would learn who they were; recapture their culture and history; learn about oppressive colonial, class, or national systems of control; and, most importantly, develop a political ideology and organization to fight these systems of oppression. (p. 193)

In context, Soldantenko (2001) analyzes the rise and fall of a Chicano studies program that was demanded by students at The University of California at Berkeley. It
was the product of a “political manifesto based on the demand for self-determination” (p. 204). In other words, “Chicano power could be achieved through the political application of university resources – channeled through Chicano studies and other campus programs” (p. 204). The Chicano activists outside the university, in concert with activists inside the university, “proposed [in El Plan] that Chicano(as) build institutions within the academy under Chicano control in order to wage the wider struggle for self-determination” (p. 204). In addition:

Through institutions Chicano power would be realized on campus and university services could be directed to the Chicano(a) community (Chicano Coordinating Council on Higher Education, 1970, 13). To secure the autonomy of these institutions, El Plan proposed to integrate students, staff, and community with faculty to govern these programs. This balance, it was assumed, could mitigate the rise of Chicano(a) faculty’s self-interest or interference from administration. Simultaneously, collective leadership could assure that courses, while fulfilling an academic role, would prepare students for political and social responsibilities. (p. 206)

One of the products of the Chicano studies program was the culmination of a strike at the university that “problematized academic knowledge” (p. 205) by “non-Chicano social scientists” as de-valuing Chicano “self-consciousness” (p. 206). The Chicano studies program and its coalition of other institutions was established at Berkeley but later dissolved. To that extent, Soldantenko (2001) regrets that the university program’s “larger goal of community liberation was lost” (p. 206) because, as Soldantenko (2001) writes, it “fell into the hands of faculty who had little choice but to follow academic procedures” (p. 206) because the eventual “compromise for an ethnic studies department necessarily deemphasized the activist agenda that had been part of the Third World strikes” (p. 206). In addition, Soldantenko (2001) claims that the program also failed because at that time, the early 1970’s, “theoretical
alternatives” such as “colonial theory and Marxism” has not yet achieved legitimacy in the hidden curriculum of higher education, which demanded assimilation and not separatism into the greater curriculum at Berkeley (pp. 210-211).

Section V:
Chapter Summary

The discourse of social psychology supports referentially Duran and Hechiche (2001), Ye’or (2002), and Meddeb (2003) when they write about the inimical nature of the mass social movement of Islamism, which possesses traits remarkably similar to twentieth-century totalitarian movements like Nazism and Communism. Arguably, both psychoanalytic and non-psychoanalytic varieties of social psychology provide valuable insight into the causes, conditions, and impact of totalitarian mass social movements (Freud, 1915, 1930; Jung, 1936, 1945, 1946a, 1946b; Tibi, 1993; Pipes, 1997; Hoveyda, 1998). Indeed, one needs to look no further than Sabine (1937/1950/1959) to discern the structural similarities, echoed by so many writers in this chapter:

According to the theory of totalitarianism, therefore, government was not only absolute in its exercise but unlimited in its application. Nothing lay outside its province. . . . Education became its tool and in principle religion was also, though neither fascism nor national socialism succeeded in getting more than unwilling acquiescence from the churches. (p. 898)

Islamism, of course, differs from Sabine’s (1937/1950/1959) commentary in that it has successfully subordinated religion to the state in many parts of the world, rather than allowing religion to be a private matter for which the state does not attempt to force conformity among believers.
On the other hand, the discourse of Walker (1979), Birnbaum (1988), Becher (1989/1993/1996), and Shils (1997) in the strand of literature about higher education organization and administration theory and practice also suggests that while Islamism may seek higher education to achieve its various objectives as a mass social movement, higher education maintains various objectives and characteristics that Islamists find attractive. Indeed, multiculturalism, diversity, and internationalization goals may render higher education vulnerable as contemporary higher education experts (Chaffee & Jacobson, 1997; Cohen, 1997; El-Khawas, 1997; Gaff & Ratcliff, 1997; Hurtado & Dey, 1997; Johnston & Spalding, 1997; Musil, 1997; Stark & Latuca, 1997; Margolis, 2001) consider the positive and most noble aspects of those institutional goals, but not their potential to foment “espionage” and “intellectual antinomianism” that is of concern to Shils (1997). Moreover, the description of the intentions and actions of the Chicano social movement and its academic program established at The University of California at Berkeley in the 1970’s, as described by Soldantenko (2001), indicates that the USF-WISE curriculum, as part of the Islamist mass social movement’s objectives for self-determination against Western civilization, may have an historical corollary in higher education.

Ostensibly, such knowledge should give pause to higher education constituents because totalitarian social movements perennially have proven themselves hostile to the purposes and values of higher education: the creation and dissemination of knowledge, intellectual freedom, multiculturalism, and civil rights. That is a point underscored by Gurr (1990/1998), Kramer (1990/1998), Keddie and Monian (1993), Kramer (1993), Mendelsohn (1993), Ramadan (1993), Rugh (1993), Teheranian
(1993a, 1993b), Tibi (1993), Laqueur (1997), and Hoveyda (1998). Illustration of findings related to the global and local re-Islamization of higher education also may deepen awareness of that problem.


In terms of the influence of some social psychology on American thought, the writings of Marcuse (1962, 1966, 1968) resonate highly with some higher education faculty in their defense of political violence and intellectual repression by “resistance” movements against the West and its institutions. Lewis (1993), Ye’or (1998), Tibi (1998), Kramer (2001), and Chesler (2004) each challenge Marcusian de-Westernizing theory in Middle East studies teaching and research. Marcuse’s thought also has made an impact on higher education in the areas of law and policy in the form of Critical Race and Legal Theory (Gates, Jr., 1996; Kors & Silvergate, 1998; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000) and in the area of curriculum and instruction in the form of hidden curriculum theory (Margolis, 2001; Soldantenko, 2001).

Hendershott (2002) illustrates in The Politics of Deviance that postmodernist rejections of hierarchies has resulted in a general unwillingness in the academy to
define a society or a culture or institutions therein as “deviant.” Citing common
discourse in the academy about so-called “Islamic” culture, which might be better
described as “Islamist” if one considers those adjectives’ distinguishing nuances,
Hendershott (2000) states, using the collective “we”:

Our unwillingness to make judgments about the behavior of others—no matter
how reprehensible—coupled with the requirement to honor claims of
multiculturalism and diversity—however divisive and morally questionable—
had weakened our resistance and lowered our defenses. We knew about the
treatment of women in Afghanistan, for instance, who under Taliban rule were
prohibited from working, attending school, or leaving their homes without their
husbands or a male relative escort. We knew that these women could be beaten
on the street by male strangers for some supposed infraction of a medieval
behavioral code. Yet we said, this was simply “their way,” which, by
postmodern principles, could be no worse than “our way.” The cruelest and
most repressive practices of Islamic fundamentalists were viewed as matters of
culture and tradition, not for us in the West to judge. (p. 154-155)

With Hendershott’s (2002) observations in mind, the researcher has presented
in this literature review an extended discussion about the social psychology of
institutions, organizations, mass movements, and whole societies by drawing upon both
psychoanalytic and non-psychoanalytic discourse.

As Jung (1946) reminds us in his description of collective guilt, however,
“social contagion” is not a moral assertion of one person or group’s superiority over
another; it is merely a statement of fact arrived at using the referential knowledge
passed on to us through various fields of study. Contradicting the claims of so-called
“apologists for militant Islam,” this literature review arguably presents further evidence
that institutions, groups, cultures, societies, and nations where Islamism finds itself
may become victims of that “totalitarian” “contagion” that Meddeb (2003) so
evocatively describes in The Malady of Islam.
As investigated in the next chapters detailing the researcher’s findings about Islamism’s global (e.g., the Middle East, Tunisia, and Algeria) and local (i.e., USF) referents, the Islamist worldview, its leader-follower characteristics, and its motives and actions maintain remarkable transnational consistency, indicating that a vast global network of Islamist leaders and followers has been operating since the 1970’s, employing both “above” and “below” type methods to achieve their utopian goal to bring the world under the banner of “one Islam.” Specifically, this literature review shows that higher education is a key social institution for Islamist activity in nations where Islamism exists (Rapoport, 1990/1999; Marty & Appleby, 1993; Keddie & Monian, 1993; Kramer, 1993; Mendelsohn, 1993; Merari, 1990/1998; Ramadan, 1993; Rugh, 1993; Piscatorri, 1993; Tehranian, 1993a, 1993b; Tibi, 1993; Pipes, 1997; Hoveyda, 1998; Laqueur, 1999).
Chapter Three
Methodology

Section I:
Introduction

This chapter reiterates the purpose of the study *Re-Islamization in Higher Education from Above and Below: The University of South Florida and Its Global Contexts* in which the case involving Islamist international terrorism at USF and its service area is examined in terms of similar problems of university infiltration in other parts of the world, namely Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Levant, Tunisia, Algeria, and the Sudan.

The body of this chapter (“Section II: Purpose of the Study”) starts with a reiteration of the research questions and definition of their terms. Within this qualitative study, the chapter’s main section also describes the inquiry’s wide range of “population samples,” or “texts.”

From there, the section turns to a series of sub-sections and sub-subsections detailing the study’s methods of analysis: case study and historical textual analysis resulting in data coding. Therein, the chapter contextualizes the findings in terms of three levels of textual analysis identified by Johnston (2002) in *Methods of Social Movement Research* which are conveyed by the Islamist movement, spanning
approximately eighty years of discourse by the movement’s highly educated leaders, followers, and uninitiated sympathetic masses.

Moreover, the study accepted and utilized a constructivist historical framework for viewing Islamism’s stated “interplay” with higher education called a “theory of institutions” authored by the French philosopher Michel Foucault (1969, 1971, 1974) and described herein. Combined with case study and historical textual analysis resulting in data coding, this theory sometimes called “New Historicism” proves useful in that it describes and analyzes the Islamist movement’s process of finding avenues within the higher education milieu to impose restrictions, or taboos, on what its leaders and followers believe are unacceptable discourse. In turn, the movement arrives at its own educational program called “Islamization of society and knowledge,” precisely aimed at the subversion of Western-style research universities and the minds of those university constituents. While the Foucauldian method is often called “New Historicism,” it is not “new.” Scholars perennially have employed the study of intellectual history embedded in Foucault’s theory of institutions to the study of texts. In the early part of the Twentieth Century, for example, I.A. Richards (1923) in Britain had codified a reminiscent “theory of context” to the study of literary texts.

Using case study and historical methods to analyze texts and code data, matrix charts (Tables 1 and 2) and extended explications of each of those charts are included in the thesis, each of which illuminates the researcher’s coding structure and method. In addition, the chapter explains the study’s methods of data collection for archival documents, historical research (both global and local), and observation of institutional events, also in relationship to the coding structure and method.
Section II then enjoins an extended section on the process of external validation of the study’s findings to which this study was subjected. The findings were received positively by a majority of constituents, including international scholars from France, Switzerland, and Canada, outside the doctoral thesis committee. These constituents over a long period of time and through their readings of different drafts or listening to presentations based on those drafts, allowed for generous critique and further coding of the study’s findings.

Following those sub-sections is a discussion of the study’s reliability and validity, contextualized with the aforementioned material on method, data collection, and external validation.

Section II:
Purpose of the Study

Specialization in area studies programs such as Middle East and higher education seldom advance conceptual research models that triangulate their multiple fields of theoretical expertise and practice from across academic disciplines in order to create new knowledge out of preexisting knowledge, and then enrich that same discourse with current case study observation. In this study, the researcher consulted hundreds of works by the foremost authorities and publishing houses in Middle East and higher education studies, concluding that experts in Middle East studies and in higher education studies have not explored how Islamism intersects with higher education to advance Islamism’s agenda for worldwide reformation.
Thus, the purpose of this study was to examine the interplay between the Islamist mass movement and higher education. Therein, the researcher situated the case of alleged Islamist international terrorism and related matters at USF in a global context, comparing and contrasting higher education’s characteristics and conditions involving Islamism and USF with similar problems in other parts of the world. At the same time, however, the study investigated extant theory and research from social psychology, political science, and history about the collective behavior and characteristics of mass movements, their leaders, and their followers. According to Walker (1979), a university chancellor and sociologist, the collective nature of mass social movements is more responsible for problems associated with mass movements in higher education than are the characteristics and conditions of higher education itself in drawing mass movements to it. Walker (1979) does state, however, that the democratic nature of the university offers a loophole into which mass social movements take advantage. Within that overarching context, the case involving Islamism at USF, 1986-2007, became an important example for that comparison-contrast analysis.

The interdisciplinary framework of this study and international scope coincide with the mission, objectives, and goals of USF’s Strategic Plan, 2007-2012. The plan holds that the university should align “with local, state, national, and global needs.” In turn, the plan states that alignment should come, in major part, through “integrated and synergistic interdisciplinary research across disciplinary, departmental, college, and campus boundaries.” The researcher, together with the support of her thesis committee hailing from three different departments, two colleges, two different campuses, and
three different regions in the world--North America, Europe, and North Africa—achieves precisely that. In addition, external validation for the study came from subject matter experts not from the United States but also from Canada, France, and Sweden. Two of the study’s external validators, while living in European countries, are natives of Egypt and Morocco.

*Types of Scholarship Represented in This Inquiry*

Because this is an unusual study involving interdisciplinary scholarship with an internationalist scope, one would be remiss if one were to proceed without some reflection on how we view scholarship and on types of scholarship in America.

The American academy always has been and always should be a place where many different kinds of scholarship have existed and should exist. Universities in any nation are, in part, products of their national ethos. So, as is the national ethos of America one of rough-and-tumble political conflict, so should be the tensions among the American academy’s different kinds of scholarship. Conflicting points-of-view about the nature of scholarship, or questions about what is “scholarly,” produce ambiguity and even anxiety among scholars. In the past thirty years, a scholarship that avows the “politics of self-representation,” which holds that researchers must politely refrain from criticizing members of self-described “oppressed” groups, has prevailed in the area of qualitative analysis in the social sciences. When confronted with scholarship apparently opposed to their Marcusian trinity of “race, class, and gender” doctrine, those researchers may accuse their competitors as being “unscholarly” or even “racist,” for by default competing intellectual views cause uncertainty in the academic enterprise. However, a sense of uncertainty sometimes is no hindrance and
can be a great motivator. For example, some of the greatest works of literary criticism, such as Northrop Frye’s *Anatomy of Criticism* (1952), were born during a period of time when the study of English and literary texts was not yet recognized as a bone fide academic discipline because its methods of analysis did not seem “scientific.”

Frye was among the first theorists in the Twentieth Century to offer typologies of literary things, calling the approach “anatomical,” which provided the appearance of scientific rigor, despite that when all was stripped away it was still the reader as researcher who was producing the outcome of the research, as earlier the Heisenberg Principle in modern physics had proven. The researcher also notes from her days as a master’s student of English, requiring two courses in the history of criticism--which proved to be the study of philosophy and intellectual history--that the period which saw the professionalization of the academic discipline of English also saw rapid development of critical theories now acceptable throughout the social sciences. English departments never have had reservations about borrowing from other academic disciplines, and those of us having spent our formative academic years in English departments see no reason that methods common to literary criticism cannot be applied across academic disciplines.

Ernest L. Boyer (1990) offers a typology of the kinds of scholarship in the American academy. One type he calls “the scholarship of discovery” which holds that “no tenets in the academy are held in higher regard than the commitment to knowledge for its own sake, to freedom of inquiry and to following, in a disciplined fashion, an investigation wherever it may lead” (p.17). While this inquiry is non-conformist when compared to other forms of qualitative research at USF, such as those rooted in
anthropological methods and the “politics of self-representation,” this study did follow the logic of its own inquiry--that of a less fashionable examination of a mass social movement--where it did lead.

Another type Boyer calls “the scholarship of application,” which applies discovery to specific problems for individuals and institutions. In other words, the quest for knowledge is the quest for advancing the public good. Again, this study involved applied scholarship in the sense that it illustrated how a local problem at a doctoral research university in Tampa, Florida, could be part of a broader global phenomenon in other universities. The final section of this chapter suggests ways to ameliorate that same problem.

Yet another type Boyer calls “the scholarship of teaching” which holds in Aristotelian fashion that “teaching is the highest form of understanding” (p.23). In part as a means of external validation, the researcher presented her findings to a range of on- and off-campus constituents. The boundaries between teaching and research therein were held to be very fluid, therefore, with oral presentation of data about the subject matter leading to the refinement of the final research manuscript.

Finally, the last type of scholarship Boyer calls “the scholarship of integration.” Integrative scholarship, the researcher now suggests is that which is particular toward the attainment of a degree in interdisciplinary studies; for with integration “researchers give meaning to isolated facts, putting them in perspective, making connections across the disciplines, illuminating data in a revealing way, and often educating non-specialists, too” (p.18). The nature of integrative scholarship also involves “doing research at the boundaries where the disciplines converge” and “fitting one’s own
research or other’s research into larger intellectual patterns” (p.18). Integrative scholarship necessitates high application of the researcher’s own powers of critical interpretation, leading from the provision of simple data to knowledge and sometimes, as Boyer suggests, “even wisdom” (p.21).

Integrative scholarship is that which this inquiry most represents, for the inquiry triangulated academic theory and research from ancient, modernist, and postmodernist scholarship and across the academic disciplines of Middle East studies, sociology, psychology, and education. The spirit of integration in this inquiry also extended to the inclusion of American, European, and Islamic sources. In fact, even the external validation process involved many scholars from private and public colleges and universities in the United States, Canada, France, and Sweden.

Research Questions

Out of the aforementioned strands of discussion about the problem’s hypothetical characteristics and conditions, the researcher established two overarching research questions for the study:

1. What are the conditions and characteristics of Islamism’s interplay in higher education in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Levant, Algeria, Tunisia, and Sudan?
2. What are the conditions and characteristics of Islamism’s interplay with USF and its service area, 1986-2007?

In this study, interplay is defined as the contours of interrelating ideologies, strategies, and legacies of direct and indirect action undertaken by the Islamist movement in the university milieu and its surrounding environment. In short, it connotes a decades-old process that Kepel (2002), in his work The Trail of Political
Islam, calls “re-Islamization from above and below.” That interplay involves a range of temporal developments manifesting as conditions upon which the Islamist movement exacted its influence in host societies, and out of those conditions arise the Islamist movement’s characteristics. In this analysis, we examine those conditions and characteristics as they pertain to matters of higher education. In this inquiry “conditions” signify things that give rise to the occurrence of the Islamist movement in higher education institutions in a particular place and time. “Characteristics” refers to certain features that are typical of the Islamist movement in higher education institutions in a particular place and time. As will be shown, sometimes a condition in one place represents a characteristic in another.

Population Samples

As defined further below, Islamism and higher education represent an “institution” and “sub-institution,” respectively, which interact with each other to “collect and allocate power.” Unto that purpose, the one interacting “institution” relies on educational accoutrements such as think-tanks, academic journals, charitable organizations, books about “Islamization,” manifestos of HAMAS and Islamic Jihad, the writings of leaders and followers, leaflets passed out by religious student groups, Palestinian universities, websites, on- and off-campus demonstrations, lectures sponsored by student groups, statements made by administrators and professors, statements made by other stakeholders, government affidavits, and the tran-shistorical actions of Islamist groups. This list—identified here as a “population sample”—expanded to include approximately ten years worth of media stories in Tampa Bay.
newspapers, which were worthwhile in revealing the basic assumptions of internal and external constituents through their interrelating levels of discourse.

Methods of Analysis

Textual Analysis: Three Interrelated Levels of Social Movement Discourse

Coding of the data (defined below) involved textual analysis of the Islamist movement’s discourse on three interrelated levels identified by Johnston in *Methods of Social Movement Research* (2002):

- *World-historical* discourse that is definitive of a mass social movement (e.g., the discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood)
- *Organizational* discourse that is produced by specific leaders for a social movement organization but that draws upon the aforementioned broader discourse (e.g., the educational discourse of the International Institute of Islamic Thought)
- *Individual* discourse that is produced by participants and activists (e.g., the discourse of Sami al-Arian, other “activist intellectuals” and others who are not members, per se, but who are sympathetic to the movement).

Johnston (2002) states that the three levels are nested one within the other because the more general levels of mass social movement texts are produced by individuals; therefore, detailed information, or *micro-data*, about the individuals who produce those texts becomes an important feature of the study. In this study, for example, the educational theory of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (i.e., *organizational* discourse) was written by one of Islamism’s earliest leaders in North
America, the late Ismail Al-Faruqi (i.e., a producer of individual discourse that was transformed into texts for his social movement organization). Al-Faruqi was a former professor at Temple University who founded the institute in the early 1970s (i.e., micro-data). That data maintains referential connections to The University of South Florida which in 1992 established a partnership with another Islamic organization, World Islamic Studies Enterprise, that received funding and direction from the organization founded by Al-Faruqi, the International Institute of Islamic Thought.

By “textual analysis,” which is synonymous with “discourse analysis,” the researcher refers to the study of spoken and written records and events that are stored, produced, shared, or used in various socially organized ways (Patton 2002). Selection of those texts hinges upon their being representative of the three levels of discourse described above, world-historical, organizational, and individual (Johnston, 2002). The most salient finding in terms of that aspect of the analytic process was the strategic goal of the Islamist movement, no matter which locale studied, to assume total control of society, in robust part, through the subversion of higher education systems through intimidation, overt and covert forms of censorship, and a codified program called “Islamization of society and knowledge” by sponsoring endowments and partnerships with secular, Western-style research universities. This study discerned that goal of the Islamist movement by examining most notably the interrelated discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood, the International Institute of Islamic Thought, and Sami Al-Arian and his associates throughout the world and across time and space.
Examples of World-Historical Discourse in the Study’s Findings

An important example of the Muslim Brotherhood’s world-historical discourse is the international mass social movement’s famous credo “The Koran is my Constitution,” which dates back to the founding of the organization in the mid-1920s as part of the group’s reaction to a modernizing influence in the Islamic world called “de-Islamization.” Other examples of world-historical discourse included in this study were found in the anti-Semitic utterances of the Muslim Brotherhood after the organization had aligned itself with the Nazis during World War II, with the hope that strategic support from the Axis powers would enable the overthrow of the Egyptian government under King Farouk. At that time, the Salafist doctrine of the Muslim Brotherhood had adopted tropes associated with Fascist ideology. Later, as Fascism fell out of favor in the world, the Muslim Brotherhood changed altered its lexicon with Marxist tropes found in the writings of the group’s leading theoretician, Sayyid Qutb.

Examples of Organizational Discourse in the Study’s Findings

The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), a known Muslim Brotherhood front (see Katz 2002), was the primary funding source of a partnership that developed between the University of South Florida (USF) and a think-tank, World Islamic Studies Enterprise (WISE), whose chief executive officer was also USF engineering professor Sami Al-Arian. Texts found in university archives illustrate that the organizational discourse of the IIIT, at minimum, had the potential to become part of USF’s social sciences “hidden curriculum” as the result of the USF-WISE partnership agreement. Those texts were a thirty-two page brochure given to
faculty and administrators adjudicating the potential merits of the partnership and also a textbook, *Islamization of the Disciplines*, accepted into USF library general collections in 1992. Each delineates the strategic purposes of the IIIT to subvert secular research institutions in the West through a process called “Islamization of society and knowledge.”

While they may not have known about the IIIT textbook found in the USF Tampa library, USF faculty and administrators were presented with the brochure by WISE associates Dr. Bashir Nafi and Dr. Khalil Shikaki. The brochure details higher educational purposes such as the need “to control dissension within the ranks” and “to reconstruct Muslim thought.” Such was the *organizational discourse* that had found its way onto the USF campus at or about the same time that key USF faculty and WISE leaders were lobbying for the partnership agreement—and at a time when the university was restructuring to become a top-tier doctoral research institution under Carnegie classification.

*Examples of Individual Discourse in the Study’s Findings*

Numerous media reports about former USF professor Sami Al-Arian’s Islamic fundraising events indicate that he, too, incorporated the *world-historical* and *organizational* discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood into impassioned off-campus speeches, alongside leaders from many of the Islamist movement’s other terrorist organizations (see Emerson, 1994, 2002). Therein, his and others’ *individual* discourse interrelates to the other two types. In this study, that *individual discourse* was found in a publication called *Inquiry*, which advertised in each issue that it was “an intellectual view of the Muslim and a Muslim view to the intellect.” The
magazine always contained a full-page IIIT advertisement next to its table of contents page, which featured interviews with and articles about some of the same Muslim “activist intellectuals” who were invited to USF-WISE roundtable meetings. Those texts further elucidated the mindset of the Islamist movement and its hostile attitude toward Western higher education. Perhaps the most telling example came from an article about Muslim Brother and Islamic Tendency movement leader Rashid Al-Ghannoushi whose individual discourse denounced some three hundred years of world history, or the Reformation, because it resulted in “scientific invention” and “granted tolerance toward Jews.”

Later, after WISE was exposed as a front for another Muslim Brotherhood militant offshoot, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), its CEO, Al-Arian, would defend repeatedly in the local press that Al-Ghannoushi and other Islamist colleagues invited to USF were “respected intellectuals” who sought “civilizational dialogue” with the West. As this study pointed out in its second findings chapter about the USF case, “civilizational dialogue” is a trope, according to the corpus of research of Bat Ye’or (2004), more commonly found in European diplomatic and cultural contexts, as part of a European-Middle Eastern agreement with roots traceable to the influence of Tarik Ramadan, the grandson of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan Al-Banna.

To the researcher’s knowledge, no one who has reported previously on Al-Arian’s individual use of the Muslim Brotherhood’s world-historical or organizational discourse has remarked upon the underlying significance tied to additional micro-data: Sami Al-Arian had been indoctrinated into the Muslim Brotherhood when he was a boy in Kuwait (see Waller, 2004); thus, the former
engineering professor’s lowest common denominator of organizational allegiance is not to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) but to the Muslim Brotherhood. As is commonly known among those who study Islamism, the majority of those organizations represented at Al-Arian’s Islamic Committee for Palestine (ICP) conferences were, like the PIJ, offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood, which stated on its website that it “graduates” members to other organizations (see www.ikwhanweb.org). Therefore, at ICP, Al-Arian was not speaking to mere members of regional Islamist terrorist organizations; he was speaking to highly esteemed initiates in a very elite and secretive organization that, as the totalitarian movement theorist Hannah Arendt might concur, “hides in plain sight” (p. 366).

The significance of all these facts, if considered on the basis of what they have in common, implies therefore that it was not merely the PIJ that sought infiltration of USF for the purpose of using the university as a front to commit “re-Islamization from above” in the form of direct, immediate, violent action in Israel. Indeed, for both government and non-government constituents in USF’s service area to remain focused on the PIJ is to obviate a far more intriguing point of analysis: According to the logic of the nested levels of world-historical, organizational, and individual discourse revealed in the narratives of this study’s two findings chapters, it was the Muslim Brotherhood that sought infiltration of USF, but for the purposes of “re-Islamization from below.”
The Study’s Historiography: Textual Analysis Based on the Assumptions of Foucault, Richards, and Derrida

Coding of collected and studied information (described further below) in this study also employed a method of historiography involving Foucault’s (1969, 1974) theory of institutions to investigate Islamism’s interplay with higher education, culminating in a study of the movement and its leadership at USF. The research notes here that Foucault (1969, 1971, 1974) never articulated a specific historiographical method. In addition, he did not espouse a particular political point-of-view, although most scholars who adopt his concepts have been of Marcusian, or what is more often defined as neo-Marxist, or “progressive” political persuasion. As is apparent in research anthologies such as The Handbook of Qualitative Research (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000), scholars have employed post-modernist theories like Critical Legal Theory, an offshoot of Critical Theory, which Marcuse brought to the American Academy from Germany in the 1930s, to “put forward a constructive conception of a new legal and social order” (p.264) that challenges the legitimacy of Western legal systems and liberal values such as academic freedom.

Foucault’s arrival on the American methodological scene in the 1970’s overturned decades of modernist practice known as New Criticism in the study of literature, which advocated “close readings” of texts. While articulated in decidedly postmodernist terms identified further below, Foucault’s emphasis on intellectual, political, and social history was not without its modernist antecedents. Among those was I.A. Richards, who in the early Twentieth Century had developed a “theory of context” in The Meaning of Meaning (1923, with C.K. Ogden) and Practical
Criticism (1929). Richards argued that in order to understand a single text, a critic had to understand that text’s relationship to other things. In other words, a critic had to know how a particular text alludes to other texts, sources, and ideas. Foucauldian scholars have corresponding terms for Richards’ earlier “theory of context.” They articulate that texts are “referential” and “intertextual” (Cuddon, 1991; Preminger and Brogan, 1993). These terms are detailed further below.

In all likelihood, Foucault would have regarded a codified method and particular political theory as anathema to his decidedly constructivist social theory in which textual meaning is not fixed but, rather, is located in specific organizational contexts and hinges upon the shared meanings uttered among individuals in specific contexts. Hence, a term like “civilizational dialogue,” if we do not ask the person who utters this term to qualify it further, may imply superficially a meaning congruent with our own organizational values. However, if we probe a term’s meaning further, we may realize that the term is rooted in that person’s possible contempt for and potential to undermine our organizational values. In practice, therefore, the researcher who accepts Foucault’s theory of institutions is left to intuit the French philosopher’s conceptual framework within a situational context. In this thesis that context is the interplay between Islamism and higher education, the former being the “institution” for this organizational analysis that exacts its “will to power” on the latter “sub-institution.” Perhaps what Foucault had implied by the term “sub-institution” was that it had the potential to become “subordinate” to the institution seeking what Foucault called throughout his works as a collective “will to truth.”
Particularly in North American scholarship (e.g., Said, 1978; Leitch, 1992) and as mentioned above, Foucault’s theory of institutions is grafted to Marcusian suppositions about so-called “dominant,” “culturally hegemonic,” “imperialist,” or even “racist” institutions identified as “capitalism,” “individualism,” “the West,” “Western government,” “Western society,” “the state,” “the military-industrial complex,” “the establishment,” and so on. This inquiry deviates, however, showing that Foucault’s theory of institutions can apply equally to “non-dominant,” communitarian, anti-Western, non-state actors who also aspire to Foucault’s “will to power.” Reminiscent of the late nineteenth-century philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, that “will to power” re-identified in Foucault’s works signifies the driving force behind Nazi Germany’s seizure of total control over the vanquished German population that was mired in cultural *ressentiment* following the Treaty of Versailles. That consolidation of power, as is commonly accepted among intellectual historians, began inside Germany’s revered universities which were purged of taboo discourse that might contradict the pan-Aryan aspirations of an elite Nazi establishment.

Its philosophical base being postmodernist in origin, Foucault’s theory of institutions accepts Derrida’s (1966/1967) arguments that language, or signification, is not transcendental, and is, to the contrary, quite arbitrary and sometimes coerced in institutional settings. The process holds that things signify other things but they do not “mean” other things in a transcendental sense because no transcendental corollary to the language we produce exists. Institutions, institutional discourse, and other types of texts, according to Derridian argumentation are not isolated phenomena; they are referential systems of signs in which the “meanings of one kind of discourse are
overlaid with meanings from another kind” (Cuddon, 1991: p. 192). While we may use words to describe our research, we may acknowledge the absence of Words, or what Derrida called throughout his written corpus, the “transcendental signified.”

That layering of signs challenges an assumption in the Western rational tradition, mimesis, which dates back to Plato. Mimesis holds that a text (or any kind of utterance, symbol, or sign) “reflects a given reality” (p.923). The postmodernist model suggests that no Platonic mirror of reality exists. Meaning has no central origin, no author. It is “de-centered” (Derrida, 1966, p. 101) possessing boundless references without an “absolute referent” (p.101). In turn, the intertextuality of meaning denies assumptions that authors have any kind of control, or authority, over the meaning of the texts they produce. The significance of textual production thus expands as researchers are free to “open up infinite and random connections between texts” (Preminger and Brogan, 1993: p. 606).

Derrida’s arguments in 1966 caused Foucault to ask later “What is an author?” in a 1969 paper of the same name. In that paper, Foucault diminishes authorial significance: “an author is a variable that accompanies only certain texts to the exclusion of others” (p. 142). His purpose is to “circulate discourse within a society” (p. 142) and to lay claim to certain “property rights” (p. 143). An author is not a “transcendental entity” (p. 143) or an “index of truthfulness” (p.143). As authors may represent anyone involved in a spoken or written utterance, Foucault’s argument extends to research subjects involved in similar acts. By default, that same argumentation calls into question the validity of case study methods that try to recreate an event as it really happened by holistically reclaiming the voices of people
involved in that case. Must we accept what their voices as “indexes of truthfulness” and not probe any deeper, lest we risk offending them? Or do we question their authorial claims and seek instead the paradoxes and contradictions in their discourse?

Within Foucault’s framework, who is speaking matters less than what is spoken. To study texts, Foucault recommends “genealogy” which holds that researchers “chart” between the “unauthorized relationships between authors and texts” (Preminger and Brogan, 1993: p. 606; italics added). Within that framework researchers may expose the ideological pedigree among authors and among institutions that produce discourse across space and time. As Foucault recapitulates from his earlier work *The Order of Things* (1969), more important to research are the ideological relationships that inform the concepts in their various works, the web of institutions in either the denial or validation of their works, and the interdependent relationships among primary and secondary texts (*The Discourse on Language*, 1969).

The interplay among such things produce a rarefaction of knowledge among authoritative communities vested in maintaining their positions of power by “imposing a certain number of rules upon those individuals [within their communities], thus denying access to everyone else” (p. 155). These institutions thus have a totalizing effect through their appropriation of rituals and “fellowship of discourse” (p. 156). Foucault’s arguments question this “will toward truth” (p. 153) in which discourse communities lose their capacity to create new knowledge. Seeking to maintain power through their monopolies of knowledge, these “institutions” impose their institutional will on “sub-institutions” (p. 160). Instead of producing new
knowledge, they replicate mere doctrine. For others wishing to belong in those communities, “The sole requisite is adherence to the same truths and the acceptance of a certain rule of conformity with validated discourse” (p. 156).

“Will to Truth and Power” Located in the Research Study

Foucault’s (1969, 1974) emphasis on how institutions and sub-institutions engage in interplay of linguistic signification and other practices in order to consolidate power and knowledge is, of course, constructivist in nature. The institutional practices he describes also signify the very essence of the USF-WISE partnership, for which a brochure given to key university faculty and administrators stated that the partnership’s funding source, The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), stated that it sought the “reconstruction of Muslim thought” through partnership with Western, secular research universities. Inasmuch as universities provide values loopholes in the form of their democratic spirit for Islamists to exploit, the source of that exploitation is Islamism and not higher education; and so it is Islamism as an overarching Foucauldian “institution” that acts upon and tries to subvert higher education, a “sub-institution.”

In the study of organizations, institutional analysis remedies “will to truth” (Foucault, 1971: p. 161) by focusing “on the multiplicity of factors involved in describing organizational life and events” (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998: p. 43). The role of research changes dramatically in Foucault’s genealogical framework. He suggests that research should “investigate taboo systems” (p. 160) of thought, which “are not always to be found where we imagine them to be” (p. 160) but are held
responsible for the attenuation of knowledge through a kind of institutionalized censorship.

In their drawing upon Foucault’s ideas, Said (1978, 1983), White (1974), Leitch (1992), Czarniawska (1997), and Meddeb (2003) variously employ Foucault’s ideas to culture, academic disciplines, literature, organizations, and Islamism, respectively. Those “institutions” are each involved in a signification process with other “sub-institutions,” such that critics of those “institutions” and “sub-institutions” may interpret the signification process by analyzing, inter alia, ideological habits of mind, basic assumptions (and reactions to challenges of those basic assumptions), actions, archives, pedagogy, taboos, publishing records, religious texts, and judicial texts. In turn, authors, or people who signify, lose control over the meaning of their “institutions” and “sub-institutions.” At the same time, critics can, as White (1974) states, “re-familiarize us with events which have been forgotten through either accident, neglect, or repression” by “looking at the ways in which events evolved,” “providing more information about them,” and showing how their developments “conform to or deny other [signifying] story types” (pp.399-400).

In this inquiry--and in a Foucauldian sense--the political ideology of Islamism represents an “institution” and is proven through the analysis of a wide range of information collected to exact demands on a “sub-institution,” higher education, for the purpose of consolidating power and knowledge, or, in other words, to further the advancement of Islamism in higher education. As an ideology, Islamism is comprised of “a set of beliefs that are used to justify a group or society or challenge a given socio-political order and are used to interpret the political world” (McAdam,
McCarthy, and Zald, 2006; p. 262). As such, it is a more logically codified system of beliefs than it is a system of “cultural frames” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 2006; p. 262). One may therefore view the process of re-Islamization--signifying Islamism’s program to impose its ideological model on higher education--as a kind of intellectual coup-making in which the Islamist movement exacts its own “will to truth” on an institution it regards as territory for conquest, the dar al-harb, or “domain of war.”

Examples of that process were found in the original documents analysis of the educational theory of IIIT. In addition, other examples were found in original documents analysis of IIIT educational practice found in the Tampa-based magazine, Inquiry, whose editor-in-chief, Sami Al-Arian, published articles drafted by himself and other Islamists seeking control of governments in various world locales, including North America, by infiltrating education systems with the stated goal of reforming those systems for the purpose of “Islamizing society and knowledge.” That activity signifies what the inquiry defines in the initial section above as “re-Islamization from below.” It is not to be confused with “re-Islamization from above,” or political violence that Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and its various international offshoots like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Algerian Islamic Front (AIG), Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI), and the Sudanese Liberation Front (SLF) reserve for later use, after they have determined that society has been won over and a Qutb-inspired “phase of power” can begin.

The inquiry does illustrate, however, that terrorism, or political violence, is also waged against and through higher education systems--and by the same Islamist groups or people responsible for educational subversion. As the findings convey, that
two-fold strategy of re-Islamization in higher education found in higher education systems supports other empirical observations by scholars like Ye’or (1998), Pipes (2002), Duran and Hechiche (2002), and Tibi (2002) who argue that Islamism is a totalitarian movement. As the late Hannah Arendt’s seminal work on *The Origins of Totalitarianism* shows about Nazism and Communism, this inquiry illustrates, too, that for Islamism “terror and propaganda”—including educational propaganda—signify two sides of the same coin. Because Islamism is categorically a totalitarian movement that knows no geographical divisions and whose highest aspiration is total control of humanity itself, that movement, by its very nature, shuns dissent, intellectually intimidates, maims and murders, and represses information that portrays its darker realities. To survive past its first generation, the movement requires the co-opting of sympathetic intellectuals, Muslims and non-Muslims, who are not movement members but who provide the movement with a semblance of legitimacy.

*Other Findings on the Inquiry’s Excursion into “Taboo Discourse”*

Taboos on acceptable and unacceptable discourse run strong within the Islamist movement, which couches its objections in terms that hold special appeal to libertarian-leaning academics, neo-Marxists, progressives, civil libertarians and religious rights advocates from other faiths. This inquiry parses out the nuances of that aspect of Islamism’s agenda by studying the history of the movement in overseas locales in the first findings chapter (“Re-Islamization in Higher Education in Selected Middle Eastern and African Countries”) and then by illustrating a similar history in the second findings chapter about USF (“Toward Local Confirmation of a Global Narrative: Islamism Comes to USF and Its Service Community”).
Texts analyzed in this inquiry are cited elsewhere in this chapter as types of “population samples.” In addition, the analysis of texts in this inquiry involves interpretive understanding, or hermeneutical skill, vital to placing texts in historical and cultural contexts (Patton, 2002). Moreover, textual analysis carries with it an assumption that the researcher himself or herself acts as a research instrument involved in “constructing the reality” of the inquiry’s findings (Patton, 2002: p. 115), a constructivist viewpoint. Thus, researchers possess “different backgrounds,” they use “different methods,” and they have “different purposes” that underscore how they “develop different types of reactions, focus on different aspects of the setting, and develop somewhat different scenarios” (p. 115). In other words, interpretation involves selection or choice, or, as Patton (2002) suggests, the conveyance of meaning from “some perspective, a certain standpoint, a praxis, or a situational context” (p. 115).

In this inquiry, the researcher drew from multiple fields of inquiry (e.g., sociology, political science, Middle East studies, higher education studies) to contextualize the problem of Islamism in higher education as an ultra-nationalist totalitarian movement with probable, militant “from above and below” objectives. The approach was undertaken and approved in the research proposal ratified by the thesis committee in 2003. Given that contextualization, the inquiry ruled out major discussion of other problems associated with the Islamist movement (e.g., the Arab-Israeli war, Islamism’s relationship with the Nation of Islam and its offshoot groups in North America, and questions of identity among Muslims living in non-Muslim societies) that are outside the bounds of the research questions. Moreover, the
approach ratified in 2003 was one that would challenge orthodox assumptions about Islamism in Middle East studies, whose most major voices disavow the terms “terrorism” and “totalitarianism,” claiming that Islamism is a highly misunderstood movement inappropriately maligned variously by “racist” U.S., Israeli, and Western governments and their ignorant populaces (see, for example, the late Edward Said’s *Covering Islam*, 1981/1997)

The distinguished Islamic historian Bernard Lewis in the essay “In Defense of History” discusses problems that confront researchers as they define their topics and contextualize their analyses. “Any starting point is necessarily in some degree artificial,” Lewis (2004, p. 389) writes. In addition, he states that analytic results are “to some extent predetermined by the accessibility of evidence” (p. 390). Generally, Lewis accepts that precondition for research in the social sciences; however, he identifies a problem in the study of the Middle East and Islamic history: “amnesia sustained by concealment” (p. 390). Synonymous with this problem, is the phenomenon Lewis (2004) calls “the unconscious forgetting of disagreeable episodes” and “the deliberate suppression of shameful memories” (p. 390).

As a distinguished scholar now in his late eighties who has witnessed the changes in how the Middle East and Islam are studied, Lewis notes that no matter which epistemological point-of-view scholars assume, there have been certain topics that have been off limits to graduate students and other researchers in the field. Among them are the topics of slavery and the subjugation of religious and ethnic minorities in lands governed under *sharia*, or Islamic law. For example, Lewis observes that “there are societies in which slavery has been a fact of life, in some of
them very recently, in some even to the present day. But the subject is taboo. Not long ago a graduate student who wanted to work on slavery in the medieval middle East was strongly advised, not by any Middle Eastern authority but by a grant-giving body in [the United States], to choose some ‘less provocative’ subject” (p. 390). Lewis regrets such discouragement of research, not because he is hostile toward Middle Eastern people or Islam, but because “to study the history of the Middle East without slavery would be as meaningful as to study the history of the American South or the Roman Empire without slavery” (p. 390). However, Lewis (2004) further states that most Middle Eastern history books avoid or “gloss over” (p. 390) topics like slavery or the subjugation of religious minorities under Islamic law. Furthermore, the “amnesia” described in Lewis’s essay is sometimes supported through acts of “coercion,” “intimidation,” and “pressure” by “colleagues, neighbors and friends, which make it difficult or even painful to express opinions that go against what is currently acceptable or fashionable” in academic study (p. 391).

Lewis (2004) is not the first academic to note this problem, which Patton (2002), in his analysis of Thomas Kuhn’s *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1970), suggests is endemic to the social sciences. Patton (2002) writes:

> Before Kuhn, most people thought that science progressed through heroic individual discoveries that contributed to an accumulating body of knowledge that got closer and closer to the way the world really worked. In contrast, Kuhn argued that tightly organized communities of specialists were the central forces in scientific development. Ideas that seemed to derive from brilliant individual scientific minds were actually shaped by and dependent on paradigms of knowledge that were socially constructed through group consensus. Rather than seeing scientific inquiry as progressing steadily toward truth about nature, he suggested that science is best seen as a series of power struggles between adherents of different scientific worldviews. (p. 99)
And so we return full circle to Derrida (1966/1967) who, in his famous work *Of Grammatology*, proved that all language is arbitrary, referential, and that the “transcendental signified” does not exist. In other words, there may exist a thing we call a “horse,” which possesses certain physiological characteristics, but there is no such thing as “horseytude.” Or, in other words, that thing we identify as “horse” is not called “horse” on the basis of some transcendent condition giving rise to “horse.”

Of course, Derrida and his postmodernist counterpart in France, Foucault, have been accused of nihilism and their ideas have been used to undermine traditional notions of academic freedom, leading to the politicization of the soft sciences in particular. Any serious study of their works, however, should dispel such accusations. Neither Derrida nor Foucault advocated a specific political model in their works. Only later did other scholars rely on Derrida’s and Foucault’s de-centering of truth in their competition for intellectual legitimacy in the academy. Derrida himself was an Algerian Jew who protested his 1942 exclusion from his high school by French administrators in the Vichy government (Norris, Beardsworth, Dillon, and Zehfuss, 2007). He chose to skip school for an entire year rather than attend a Jewish school (Norris, Beardsworth, Dillon, and Zehfuss, 2007). While teaching at the University of Tunis, Foucault himself maintained tenuous political relationships with Marxists who later would co-opt his theories for their own political purposes (Didier, 1991). In France, prior to his service in Tunis, he had broken with other academics who insisted on supporting Soviet Communism, despite reports emanating from Russia that Stalin’s experiment was not an agent of democratic reform (Didier, 1991).
Derrida’s logic is thus the essence of constructivist thought: Language is arbitrary, but communities of scholars or organizations usually accept agreed upon terms to classify their observations. However, sometimes conflict arises within those same collective groups when individuals in those groups knock the usual way of knowing certain things out of alignment. So at best, in the social sciences, there are linguistic communities that Kuhn compares to ideological revolutionary communities. According to Kuhnian theory, “Communities of scientists, like ideological and religious communities, were organized by certain traditions that periodically came under strain when new problems arose that couldn’t be explained by old beliefs” (Patton, 2002: p. 99).

Derrida (1966/1967) would in turn influence the epistemological position of Michel Foucault (1969, 1971, 1974) and other theorists noted throughout this chapter who write about the nature of institutions and social movements to control language and, by default, human beings for the purpose of consolidating power. Hence, the problem also realizes itself in the academic world of research and teaching. Patton (2002) states that, according to Kuhn, “new explanations and ideas compete until old ideas are discarded or revised, sometimes sweepingly. But the competition is not just intellectual. Power is involved. The leaders of scientific communities wield power in support of their positions just as political leaders do” (p. 99). And so it appears that researchers can be as driven by their philosophical and scientific worldviews as can be and are their research subjects.

In his critique of the current prevailing epistemological orthodoxy in the Middle East Studies Association (MESA), Martin Kramer (2001) describes the
Kuhnian “revolution” that took place in the field of study in the late 1970’s as an “intellectual insurgency” (p. 122) of self-incriminating, *d’ rigueur* theoretical commitments (e.g., neo-Marxist theory) that paradoxically emanate out of the Western tradition and later subsumed in the lexicon of pro-Islamist faculties. That particular ideological ferment in the study of the Middle East and Islam prevailed over the empiricism of traditional “Orientalist” scholarship following the publication of Edward Said’s book *Orientalism* in 1978. The new scholarship, occasionally referred to as “Occidentalism” in the book of the same name (Buruma & Margalit, 2004), is presupposed by an epistemological point-of-view that researches the world as some scholars want the world to be and not how it is. Lewis (2004) characterizes the ferment as “a mood of disillusionment and hostility” in which academics have grown accustomed to accusing the West of “sexism, racism, and imperialism, institutionalized in patriarchy and slavery, tyranny and exploitation” (p. 324). “To these charges,” Lewis (2004) writes, “we have no option but to plead guilty—not as Americans, nor yet as Westerners, but simply as human beings, as members of the human race” (p. 324). Lewis also asks his reader the following:

Is racism, then, the main grievance? Certainly the word figures prominently in publicity addressed to Western, Eastern European, and some Third World audiences. [It] has become a generalized and meaningless term of abuse. (p. 325).

In his analysis of MESA and other foundations for the study of the Middle East and Islam, Kramer (2001) suggests that those scholars who have “retreated ever more deeply into their own secluded world, with its rigid etiquette of theory and its peculiar mannerisms of political posturing . . . [should] initiate a collective soul searching” (p. 124). Furthermore, Kramer (2001) claims that the orthodox scholars
who presently control MESA and most of the nation’s federally funded National Resource Centers have become over-identified with their research subjects. Yet, in the end, Kramer (2001) doubts that future breakthroughs in the field will come from MESA and Middle East studies foundations. Instead, he suggests, “the breakthroughs will come from individual scholars laboring in the margins” (p. 124). In terms of this inquiry, which defines the topic of study as an Islamist mass movement that interacts with higher education institutions as part of an overall strategic agenda for worldwide reform, the researcher notes that it, too, is circumscribed as “taboo” subject matter typically considered “off limits” to both graduate students and their professors.

Coding of Collected and Studied Information into a Finished Work

In this analysis, a three-year process of “coding” collected information for thematic association reveals an interplay of ideologies, strategies, and legacies of direct and indirect action diffused across geographical space and time, with higher education representing organizational territory upon which the Islamist movement and its leaders exact their plans for ultra-nationalist conquest. By “coding,” this inquiry means the “simultaneous collection and analysis of data” that is compared and contrasted to the point that “interrelated concepts” are “refined and integrated into the theoretical framework” of the study (Charmaz, 2000: p. 509).

This coding process proved to be well-suited for an inquiry that draws from multiple academic fields of study because “it accounts for variation” and permits modification of “established analyses as conditions in the research changed or as further data were gathered” (p. 510-511). Furthermore, the coding process involves what Patton (2002) calls “inductive analysis and creative synthesis” oriented toward
“exploration and discovery” that “begin with specific observations and build toward general patterns” (p. 55). “Categories or dimensions of analysis emerge from open-ended observations,” Patton (2002) writes, “as the inquirer comes to understand patterns that exist in the phenomenon being investigated” (p. 56).

**Coding and the Study’s Thematic Findings of Characteristics and Conditions of Islamism’s Interplay in Higher Education**

The inquiry’s thematic patterns—ideologies, strategies, and legacies of direct and indirect action—involved their further categorization in Chapters 4 and 5 as the **conditions** and **characteristics** typical of the Islamist movement’s interplay in higher education systems in the various locales studied. Some of those thematic patterns manifest as ideologies (e.g., Salafism’s syncretic merger with Fascism and Marxism); others, as strategies (e.g., codified educational theory); and others, as legacies (e.g., “Campus Holy War”). As detailed further below, external validation by a range of scholars but especially by Dr. Michael Buonanno and Dr. Mohamed Ibn Guadi assisted the researcher in parsing out those patterns and further categorizing them as **conditions** and **characteristics** vital toward the ability Islamism to advance its overarching objective of world-wide reformation. The results are presented in narrative form in sub-sections in each of those chapters; however, they are also included in the thesis in the form of matrix charts (Tables 1 and 2) to illustrate the results of the coding process. Each chart is explained in the paragraphs that follow. Some of the indicators signify the movement’s ideologies; some, the movement’s strategies; and others, the movement’s legacies.
Explication of Coded Findings: Table 1, “Conditions of Islamism’s Interplay in Higher Education in Selected locales and at USF and Its Service Area”

Titled “Conditions for Islamism’s Interplay in Higher Education in Selected Locales and at USF and Its Service Area,” Table 1 on page 162 depicts six major conditions that were revealed across time and space as Islamism spread in mass universities starting in Egypt and then to Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, West Bank, Gaza, Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan (see Chapter 4 narratives). The same chart also depicts conditions vital to Islamism’s advancement in the Tampa Bay region in the southeastern United States, again with a mass university acting as a kind of territory for Islamist conquest (see Chapter 5 narratives). In that sense, one may view the Islamic term “dar al-harb,” or “the domain of war,” not only as a country to be infiltrated and conquered but also as a concept that that could apply more broadly to infrastructure (e.g., a university) and the accoutrements associated with that infrastructure (e.g., personnel, students, academic departments, student groups, curriculum).

Whereas the study’s selected locales (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, West Bank, Gaza, Tunisia, Algeria, and Sudan) are presented vertically to the left of the matrix chart in Table 1, its six coded categories (A-F) appear horizontally at the top of the chart. A matrix indicator log appears below the chart, with coded items paralleling the sub-sections in Chapters 4 and 5. Wherever an “X” appears on the chart, there existed strong evidence of a particular condition from the range of
Table 1

Conditions for Islamism's Interplay in Higher Education in Selected Locales and at USF and Its Service Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locale</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon, West Bank, Gaza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tampa Bay</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Matrix Indicator Log

A: Fall of Ottoman Caliphate Engenders Rise of Muslim Brotherhood Movement Seeking to Revive Islam's Political Dimension
B: Salafist Doctrine of Muslim Brotherhood Exposed to Fascism and/or Other De-Westerning Intellectual Trends
C: Government Attempts at Appeasement and Repression Embolden Further the Islamist Movement
D: Transnational Influence of Muslim Brother Professors and Students to Other Locales Broadens Range of Influence
E: Expansion of University Mission and/or Educational Policy Changes Contributing to Islamist Advance
F: Epistemological Development of "Civilizational Dialogue" Concept Reaches Intellectual Mind of Internationalizing USF Community

Note: Absence of an "X" for any of the matrix boxes results from not enough information found in the range of population samples identified as "texts" or "discourse" in Chapter Three.
population samples identified in the study as “texts” or “discourse,” two terms which are further defined below. As the note below the chart states, absence of an “X” signifies that not enough information was found during the data collection and study for the researcher to convey confidently the presence of a condition. Conditions identified in the analysis and in Table 1 are as follows:

- **A**: Fall of Ottoman Caliphate Engenders Rise of Muslim Brotherhood Seeking to Revive Islam’s Political Dimension
- **B**: Salafist Doctrine of Muslim Brotherhood Exposed to Fascism and/or Other De-Westernizing Intellectual Trends
- **C**: Government Attempts at Appeasement and Repression Embolden Further the Islamist Movement
- **D**: Transnational Influence of Muslim Brother Professors and Students to Other Locales Broadens Range of Influence
- **E**: Expansion of University Mission and/or Educational Policy Changes Contributing to Islamist Advance
- **F**: Epistemological Development of “Civilizational Dialogue” Concept Reaches Intellectual Mind of Internationalizing USF Community

Because the study involved tracing the development of the Islamist movement as it developed across time and space, beginning in the 1920’s as Hassan Al-Banna and early members of the Muslim Brotherhood reacted to Kemal Ataturk’s dissolution of the Ottoman caliphate after World War I, conditions A-C were by and large limited to Egypt, as that country’s educated elite formed the early vanguard of the movement during its first few decades. Attempts at appeasement by King Farouk and President...
Nasser allowed the group to organize quickly and to move into bold phases of civil
service infiltration, followed soon thereafter by bold displays of propagandizing and
terrorism designed to destabilize the state, paving the way for militant overthrow of
the Egyptian government. While many Muslim Brothers, including the group’s
leaders, were jailed and executed during a series of attempts by Farouk and Nasser to
 crush the movement, other leaders and initiates fled to neighboring countries to
escape repression. Being highly educated, many Muslim Brothers went on to pursue
academic careers in neighboring locales, which welcomed the talent of these Egyptian
foreign nationals into their university systems (see matrix indicator D).

Indicator D proved to be the indicator most associated with the Islamist
movement’s advance in higher education in the selected locales, with all four of five
locales exhibiting the trend, whose causality is traceable to A-C. The researcher notes
that it remains to be seen whether the deportation of Tampa Bay’s “Unindicted Co-
Conspirator” Mazen Al-Najjar, who completed his engineering PhD at USF, and the
eventual deportation of confessed and convicted conspirator Sami Al-Arian, who was
an engineering faculty member at USF, will allow for a continuation of the trend of
Muslim Brotherhood leaders migrating from one locality to another, finding
employment in universities, and influencing initiated and uninitiated masses within
those universities, their nearby mosques, and external organizational networks
interacting with them and their campuses. Al-Arian’s wife and youngest children
relocated to Cairo, Egypt, from Tampa, in 2007. Al-Arian, when and if he is
deported—he could still face charges regarding another case in Herndon, Virginia—
would likely return to Egypt to be with them.
Other individuals who were at one time employed at USF or were on the staff of the World Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE) think-tank at the time it had partnered with USF vacated Tampa Bay soon after the USF-WISE partnership was exposed as a terrorist financing front. One of the two, Bashir Nafi, an indicted but un-prosecuted conspirator in the Tampa trial, is presently an educator in a mass university in the United Kingdom. In addition, one of the people he and his cohorts at USF-WISE had invited to lecture at USF, Rashid Al-Ghannoushi, has escaped prosecution for seditious conspiracy in Tunisia by self-exiling in the United Kingdom. He, too, is an academic in the UK’s higher education system.

Explication of Coded Findings: Table 2, “Characteristics of Islamism’s Interplay in Higher Education in Selected Locales and at USF and Its Service Area

Titled “Characteristics of Islamism’s Advancement in Higher Education in Selected Locales and at USF and Its Service Area,” Table 2 on page 167 depicts five major characteristics that were revealed across time and space in the same locales identified in Table 1 and narrated in Chapters 4 and 5. The matrix chart’s axes are the same, with locales situated on the vertical axis to the left of the chart; and matrix indicators, on the horizontal axis to the top. Likewise, the table’s matrix indicator log appears below the chart, with coded items paralleling the sub-sections in Chapters 4 and 5. For an “X” to appear on the chart, strong evidence of a particular characteristic had to exist in the “texts” or “discourse” studied.

Characteristics identified in the analysis and in Table 2 on its horizontal axis are as follows:
• **A**: External & Internal Organizational Networks run by Educated Elites Interacting w/Universities to Re-Islamize Society and Knowledge

• **B**: Codified Education Theory to Promote Monolithic Worldview of Islam to Subvert Universities and Surrounding Society

• **C**: “Campus Holy War” & Other Related Problems Associated w/Universities and Interactive Organizations As Part of Re-Islamization Program

• **D**: Transnational Influence of Islamism and Its *Esprit d’ Corps* to Other Locales Broadens Influence of the Movement

• **E**: Intended Islamist “Hidden Curriculum” at USF w/Strong Linkages to Codified Education Theory of Muslim Brotherhood Think-Tank

A few blank areas are found on the Table 2 matrix chart, their absences expressed in coded indicators *D* and *E* on the horizontal axis. The researcher predicts that further study would reveal their presence, given the presence of coded indicators *A*-*C* for all five locales. Indicator *D* is also curious because it doubles as a condition in the narrative findings (see Table 1). The reason for the indicator appearing as both a condition and a characteristic results from the migration of professors and students to and from more than one locale. Therefore, they appear in both chapter findings of the study and in several different sub-sections of those same findings. For example, the PIJ was founded in Egypt, and not in the Palestinian territories of West Bank and Gaza. Like most other Sunni Arab mass movements, it is an offshoot of the
Table 2

Characteristics of Islamism in Higher Education in Selected Locales and at USF and Its Service Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locale</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon, West Bank, Gaza</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tampa Bay</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Matrix Indicator Log

A: External & Internal Organizational Networks Run by Educated Elites Interacting w/Universities to Re-Islamize Society & Knowledge
B: Codified Education Theory to Promote Monolithic Worldview of Islam to Subvert Universities and Surrounding Society
C: "Campus Holy War" & Other Problems Associated w/Universities and Interactive Organizations As Part of Re-Islamization Program
D: Transnational Influence of Islamism and Its Esprit d' Corps to Other Locales Broadens Influence of the Movement
E: Intended Islamist "Hidden Curriculum" at USF w/Strong Linkages to Codified Education Theory of Muslim Brotherhood Think-Tank

Note: Absence of an "X" for any of the matrix boxes results from not enough information found in the range of population samples identified as "texts" or "discourse" in Chapter Three.
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood with leaders like Sami Al-Arian having received initiation into the parent organization when they were young men. During the 1970’s and early 1980’s, those leaders (i.e., Sami Al-Arian, Mazen Al-Najjar, Ramadan Shallah, Bashir Nafi, and Fathi-Al-Shikaki) while pursuing academic studies in engineering, medicine, and economics, left Egypt during periods of Islamist repression during Al-Sadat’s presidency and just after his assassination. At various points in time during the repression, they migrated to North America, West Bank, Gaza, and the United Kingdom on student or academic work-related visas and commenced the same or similar activity within other universities on behalf of their movement’s cause. Thus, what was a condition for Islamism to advance in a university in one locale sometimes becomes a characteristic in another.

Methods of Data Collection:

*Historical-Case Study Research, Archival Documents and Sources,*

*and Observation of Institutional Events*

This inquiry included the following methods of data collection to answer the research questions about the characteristics and conditions that make higher education an attractive environment for Islamism: historical-case study research, archival/document collection and analysis, and observation of institutional events. Embedded within that collected data was evidence of the *world-historical,* *organizational,* and *individual* discourse of the Islamist movement in higher education defined above. The researcher submitted the proposal document to the Institutional Board of Research (IRB) under expedited status because the study
involved primarily documents analysis, extant historical research, and observation of institutional events that are within the public domain.

**Historical-Case Study Research**

Historical-case study research is a salient means for gathering data for a complex study such as this inquiry, which involves Foucault’s (1969, 1974) theory of institutions and their relationships with sub-institutions and triangulating Foucault’s methodological with textual analysis of Islamism’s world-historical, organizational, and individual discourse. As Adler (1996) notes, case study is “a process which begins with description, develops understanding, and results in an explanation of a specific event or phenomenon as it unfolds over a period of time” (p.20). In this case study, the researcher undertook that approach regarding a “phenomenon”--Islamism--that began as part of a student movement in Egypt in the early 1970’s (see, *inter alia*, Abdalla, 1985 and Hatina, 2001) and then spread into other countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and North America by the 1990’s (see Tibi, 1998, Kepel, 2001, and Emerson, 2001, *inter alia*). The historical aspect of this case study involved methodological characteristics such as the study of complex social phenomena, relevant behaviors that cannot be manipulated by the researcher, unclear boundaries between the phenomenon and its context, and multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 1989: p. 14-23).

Therein, the findings reveal an unexpected but significant pattern across time and space of a mass social movement and its leaders co-opting universities in their service areas for purposes extending well beyond matters of teaching and research. Subordinated to the goals of Islamists, universities become over-politicized havens
for “re-Islamization from above and below” in the form of front activity, or what Muslim Brothers and university militants in West Bank and Gaza call “parallel hierarchies.” In this way, these religious ultra-nationalists groups hope to expand their range of influence in the community at large, with the quixotic goal of re-establishing an Islamic Caliphate, having re-engineered the purpose of higher education toward “Islamization of society and knowledge.” Of course, the researcher does not believe that Islamists in higher education will ever succeed with the greater, totalitarian objective of bringing the world under the banner of their puritanical interpretation of Islam. However, history of the mass movement in higher education at USF and abroad suggests that Islamists have and will continue to challenge the mission and values of higher education, whether in Western universities or in Western-style universities. Within that forecast, the commission of terrorism and the use of universities as part of the material support for terrorism is certain.

Moreover, historical analysis of the case provided a context for the case at USF as it manifested as a local referent to its global predecessors, which Janesick (2000) suggests is a salient component of the case study method as the researcher “stretches” her range of knowledge and insight to discern a research topic’s “historical antecedents” (p. 387) and to present findings based on patterns of association that reveal themselves in the information collected (p. 389). Therein, the researcher looks “for relationships regarding the structure, occurrence, and distribution of events over time” (p. 387). In addition, Janesick (2000) also testifies to the role of the researcher in interpreting the historical data as an “imaginative” activity in which the researcher uses her “own mind and body in analysis and interpretation” (p. 390).
In addition to the relevant literature on the social psychology of mass social movements, Islamic fundamentalism, and Islamic terrorism delineated in Chapters One and Two, the researcher drew upon social and political history texts from major university presses and major publishing houses, national and international, to describe how Islamism intersects with higher education as a means to fulfill the objectives of the re-Islamization program. The role of higher education is not the overarching thesis of any of those texts; however, in all cases the writers of those texts tacitly indicate that higher education is a mainstay of the Islamist movement, with the movement originating in higher education and then permeating outward into the societies where Islamism flourishes. Among the many social and political history texts cited for the fourth chapter of this inquiry were Abdalla (1985), Alexander (2002), Bender and Leone (1995), Bergen (2001), Carey (2001), Chomsky (1999), Dershowitz (2002), Duran and Hechiche (2001), Emerson (2002), Haddad (2002), Harub (2000), Hatina (2001), Hiltermann (1991), Hoveyda (1998), Kepel (2002), Kramer (1997), Kramer (2001), Meddeb (2003), Pipes (1996), Pipes (1997), Pipes (2002), Pipes (2003), Saad-Ghorayeb (2002), Sagiv (1995), Schwartz (2002), Shadid (2001), Sullivan and Abed-Kotob (1999), Tibi (2001), and Zwicker-Kerr (1994). The aforementioned texts represented a broad range of insight about Islamism itself, with writers conveying the mass social movement’s history in both sympathetic/non-sympathetic and critical/non-critical points-of-view.

The Global Referent as Overarching History and Case

Della Porta (2002) states that “cross-country historical research” for mass social movements analysis allows assessment of “trends, processes, and dynamics” (p.301).
By employing that kind of research, a researcher may examine the conditions that
gave rise to that movement and its most salient characteristics in order to understand
its “ebb and flow of collective mobilization” (p. 301). In this study, cross-country
historical research was undertaken to understand the general “ebb and flow” of
Islamism’s interplay in higher education in Egypt, where the movement began in the
1920s, and in other selected locales where the movement later spread precisely
through the migration and influence of Egyptian university professors who were also
Muslim Brothers (see coded indicators $D$, Tables 1 and 2).

Fresh insight into the history of Islamism in higher education in the world was
gleaned from the analysis of archival documents and sources such as investigative
journalism, websites, and an array of Islamist publications. Those archival documents
and sources contain evidence of Islamism’s world-historical, organizational, and
individual discourse vital to our understanding of the mass social movement’s
program of world reformation through the study’s title term “re-Islamization.” Here,
the researcher drew from documents and sources about Islamic fundamentalism and
Islamic terrorism in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, the West Bank, Gaza, the Sudan,
Algeria, and Tunisia. Those countries were selected above all others because more
information has been written about them than about most other countries. It became
apparent during the analysis phase of the research that the Muslim Brotherhood was a
prime force of influence in each of the eight global locales. In addition, some of the
leaders of Islamist movements in those places re-appeared as part of the USF case,
which means that their histories illuminated the transnational significance of re-
Islamization at USF (see items $D$, Tables 1 and 2). Chapter Four’s analysis of the
phenomena in each country showed how Islamism in those countries served as a “global referent” to the North American case at USF, which, in turn, allowed the researcher to compare and contrast the impact and purposes of Islamism at USF to the mass social movement’s international antecedents.

The Local Referent as Part of the “Ebb and Flow” of Its Global Antecedents

Like the analysis of document and sources for the global referent involving re-Islamization in higher education, the analysis of the local USF case drew upon similar archival documents and source texts in order to arrive at an understanding of Islamism’s nested levels of world-historical, organizational, and individual discourse. In addition, this part of the analysis also examined collected media sources in the form of documentaries, investigative journalism, the researcher’s field notes (discussed further in the next section on “Observation of Institutional Events”), government affidavits, court cases, congressional testimony, Islamic Jihad and HAMAS manifestos, government indictments, institutional memos and letters, media reports, emails from stakeholders, Islamist websites and publications, think-tank memorabilia, video-recorded public debates and speeches, university websites, student group websites and constitutional charters, community group websites and charters, and student group leaflets and videotapes. In addition, the special collections section of the USF library in Tampa provided a wealth of information from the archives of three USF administrations related to the Al-Arian affair at USF. Those same archives provided the researcher with a detailed glimpse into the history of USF and its changing academic ethos.
Archival Documents and Sources

A key element of historical-case study research involves the collection and analysis of archival documents toward further engagement with the world-historical, organizational, and individual discourse of the Islamist movement in higher education. According to (Hodder, 2000), archival documents can be formal (e.g., a written contract, a driver’s license) or informal (e.g., field notes, memos, letters). “Such texts are of importance for qualitative research because, in general terms, access can be easy and low cost, because the information provided may differ from and may not be available in spoken form, and because texts endure and thus give historical insight” (p. 704). Insofar as this inquiry proposed a historical-case study involving the intertextuality of the institution of Islamism and its various sub-institutions--along the lines of institutional theory put forth by Foucault (1969, 1971, 1974)--archival documents collection and analysis was salient, too, because the items collected can be “linked to strategies of centralization and codification” and, hence, the “secular and religious processes of the legitimization of power” (Hodder, 2000: p. 704). In this study the researcher collected and analyzed a plethora of archival documents and sources, for which the collection process alone started in September 2001 and is presently stored in three, large, full file bins. Among the kinds of items collected for analysis included but were not limited to those same “texts” located in the section above labeled “Population Samples.”

Observation of Institutional Events

Another major element of this historical-case study was the observation of institutional events. Those events, too, are studied for their potential to provide
insight into the world-historical, organizational, and individual discourse of Islamism in higher education. Angrosino and Perez (2000) state that observation, in and of itself, represents the “fundamental base of all research methods in the social and behavioral sciences” (p. 673). As part of case study method, Angrosino and Perez (2000) further state that observation is the mainstay of fieldwork in which the researcher takes field notes (p. 673). Traditional observation in the field “usually concentrates on well-defined types of group activity (e.g., religious rituals, classroom instruction, and political elections) (Angrosino & Perez, 2000: 677-678).

As part of this inquiry, the researcher took and analyzed field notes for the following on- and off-campus events: student-sponsored guest lectures, university-sponsored guest lectures, Wednesday Bull Market activities, on-campus student group meetings and demonstrations, Tampa community activist demonstrations, and off-campus lectures. Notes for these events were kept in the aforementioned file collection and are preserved there for future inquiry. Again, all of the institutional events in question were from the public domain.

**Validity and Reliability: Triangulation of Vision, Purpose, and Methods**

This chapter would be remiss without sounding a few notes about measures taken to increase its validity and reliability, the nuances of which are embedded in the paragraphs above and are articulated directly in the following paragraphs. One should note that there is debate among scholars about whether the two terms are applicable to qualitative research, with one community of scholars who maintain that qualitative research should employ instead the terms trustworthiness and credibility. A reading of Denzin and Lincoln’s *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (2000) suggests that
anthropological schools of thought that base their methodologies in what is commonly known as “the politics of self-representation,” prefer the later terms. A study is said in that context that if research subjects deny how the study portrays them, then it is therefore not “trustworthy” nor “credible.” This inquiry is not an anthropological study and therefore maintains a preference for the former terms. As it also sheds light on the taboo discourse of a worldwide social movement, which is disposed toward the denial of disclosure of its more unpleasant manifestations (e.g., the killing of apostates, intellectual censorship, and totalitarian intellectual pedigree), one doubts that any Islamist would validate the study as such.

*Validity*, as is commonly defined among researchers, signifies a study that measures what it is supposed to measure, with results being transferable to other situations with similar parameters, research subjects, and characteristics (Janesick, 2000). Validity signifies that the results of the study are probable in light of the information presented (Janesick, 2000). This study carries with it that assumption of *validity* in that it was purposefully designed to be a cross-cultural study with what are called above a *global referent* and a *local referent*. Tables 1 and 2 clarify the similarity of coded findings for both.

*Reliability* signifies the ability of a method for research findings to perform consistently over a long period of time (Janesick, 2000). In that respect, this study again carries that assumption in that it examined the history of a mass social movement that began in the mid-1920’s and has developed its ideological thought and has made strategic advances in higher education in every decade since that time. *Validity* and *reliability* also refer to the factual accuracy of the research, which is
“free from fabrication, fraudulent material, omissions, and contrivances” and to the soundness of its theoretical foundations and methodological approaches (Christians 2000: p. 140). Generally, scholars want to see a multi-faceted synthesis of theoretical perspectives and methods fused with detailed, accurate data for a study of a mass social movement to be judged valid and reliable (Christians, 2000). They also expect an admission of bias and potential limitations, especially in empirical research with a qualitative orientation (Christians, 2000). From start to finish, this study is as multi-faceted as most come in terms of its synthesis of vision, purpose, and methods. It also acknowledges bias and potential limitations.

Vision

The title of the study, in and of itself, characterizes the vision of this study: *Re-Islamization in Higher Education from Above and Below: The University of South Florida and Its Global Contexts* first word, “re-Islamization,” identifies a process that occurs within a particular setting, “higher education,” while the modifying phrases “from Above and Below,” whose prepositional descriptors are capitalized, thereby imply a subversive process. Implied therein is that the study *triangulates* research data about three referential things found in the title: re-Islamization, subversion, and higher education.

Starting in Chapter One, the researcher then qualified those title terms, in addition to the purpose of the study, its research questions, and methods to show how the *triangulation* would occur. According to Blee and Taylor (2002) in *Methods of Social Movement Research*, triangulation “is the term used to refer to
the combination of different kinds of data,” a process that “both increases the amount of detail about a topic and counteracts threats to reliability and validity” (p. 111).

Purpose

As stated in Chapter One and identified by the French scholar Gilles Kepel in *The Trail of Political Islam* (2002) and by the Syrian scholar Bassam Tibi in *The Challenge of Fundamentalism* (1998) the “above and below” process is contextualized further as part of an overall agenda qualified as a totalitarian, religious mass movement. The purpose of the study was aimed at answering research question about Islamism’s interplay in higher education in other parts of the world and at USF.

The first chapter and the literature review (Chapter Two) suggested that the subversion of higher education is hallmarks activity of the world’s two other totalitarian movements, Communism and Nazism, which have been studied as mass movements by various theorists detailed in the literature review, chief among them Herbert Blumer and Hannah Arendt. In addition, the observations of Donald E. Walker, in *The Effective Administrator* (1979) has prescient insight about the influence of subversive mass movements in higher education. Other scholars of higher education organization analysis were also considered, as were scholars of sociology and religious fundamentalism. The movements discussed by Walker owe their genesis to the inspiration of a neo-Marxist social psychologist, Herbert Marcuse, who was part of a Leftist intellectual movement in Germany that would be used in the United States in the 1960s and after to de-Westernize higher education. Another scholar, the Tunisian diplomat-historian Ibn Khaldun, from ancient Islam also was highlighted as a theoretical antecedent for his discussion of “The School of Ancient
Scholars,” Islam’s first wave of Islamic fundamentalists who merged matters of faith with those of reason, precipitating the decline of the Islamic mind, for which Islamic civilization, arguably, has not recovered.

Again, the complex theoretical bases of this study also account for its reliability and validity. Snow and Strom (2002) discuss the underlying logic of triangulating multiple theoretical perspectives. They state that trustworthy research must contend “the complexity of social reality and the limitations of all research methodologies. . . . Rather than debate the merits of one theory vis-à-vis another, one does better to combine the multiple theories so that they complement and supplement one another’s weakness” (p. 150, italics added).

Methods

Snow and Strom (2002) also regard the triangulation of analytic methods and data collection across multiple domains of knowledge as essential to achieving reliability and validity in mass movements research as is attention to multiple theoretical bases. Commensurate with that strategy, this study also triangulated multiple methods of analysis and data collection. As delineated above, the main method was textual analysis of three interrelated levels of discourse (world-historical, organizational, and individual), supplemented with relevant micro-data written or spoken by the purveyors of such discourse. Textual analysis enjoined a form of historiography predicated upon the French philosopher Michel Foucault’s “theory of institutions.” In this analysis higher education signified a “sub-institution” subordinate to the mass movement of Islamism, an “institution” bent on consolidating its power and influence in higher education through a program, “Islamization of
Moreover, textual analysis *triangulation* of rich, multiple data sources from historical-case study information, archival documents, and observation of institutional events.

In fact, the researcher challenged the limits of contemporary research into Islamism by undertaking analysis and writing about *micro-data* in the form of taboo subject matter (e.g., terrorism, censorship, front groups, totalitarianism), or what Islamic historian Bernard Lewis calls “disagreeable episodes” in history. In choosing research methods contrary to the so-called “emic” approach of “the politics of self-representation” that politely show only those details that the research subjects themselves want to be known—hence, it is *hagiography* not *historiography*, they want—the researcher then coded the data, parsed out its major themes, and then collapsed those themes into two set of *conditions* and *characteristics* of Islamism in higher education (Tables 1 and 2). Further, those same *conditions* and *characteristics* were presented in narrative form in Chapters Four and Five.

Patton (2002) further states that the process of external validation of data and findings represents the last and possibly most important element of achieving validity and reliability. While no inquiry is values-free, Patton (2002) claims that leaving an “audit trail” in which others assist in vouching for the consistency and dependability of the data results in quality research. One might consider external validation as a form of quality control, therefore.

Thereunto, the researcher extends her gratitude to the largesse of numerous external validators identified below either as individuals or *en masse*, who have availed themselves to the researcher, upon the researcher’s request or not, over the
past few years. Their generosity came in the form of reacting during question and answer sessions in peer-reviewed paper presentations in national conferences, in the form of on-line discussions, and in the form of individual readings of various findings drafts during the 2005-2006 academic year.

Bias and Limitations

On a final note, Blee and Taylor (2002) also acknowledge the importance of admitting biases and limitations that might influence the outcome of the study.

In Chapter One, the researcher discussed her legal position about terrorism, one of the study’s many sub-topics. To reiterate, the researcher accepts the Geneva Conventions defining terrorism, and she accepts the corpus of United States laws and policies used to prosecute terrorism.

As for limitations, the researcher regrets that her committee, during proposal defense, directed her to not conduct interviews because it was held by a previous member that interviews with USF constituents probably would not yield any significant information about the topic. No interviews were conducted, therefore. Board of Trustees statements about the case also were not examined.

External Validation of the Findings

As the researcher amassed and analyzed evidence over the past three years, the aforementioned research questions were reframed into their current form for the purposes of systematically presenting the findings in later chapters. Eventually, the coding method led to the classification of conditions and characteristics essential to understanding Islamism’s interplay in higher education, the contours of which are presented in rich, narrative form in Chapters Four and Five, Given the subjective
nature of all research (see Bohm, 1985, on how the observer, or researcher, controls whether light acts wave-like or particle-like in quantum physics experiments) and given that qualitative research itself “requires personal rather than detached engagement in context,” Meloy (2002) advocates “talking into a tape recorder or to a friend or colleague” as a means to “bring into consciousness” the findings of one’s analysis. In effect, Meloy’s (2002) recommendation allowed the researcher a pragmatic means of contending what Czarniawska (1997) calls “the paradox of applied pragmatism” for which the researcher must interpret information through textual analysis by mediating between two levels of reading, first-level semantic and second-level semiotic, or reader-response. In these cases, analysis of data involves the appointment of an external validator, which this study has utilized in its process of arriving at the coded findings presented in Tables 1 and 2 above.

*External Validators*

This study has had more than one external validator. To that extent, this study may well be unique in the history of the College of Education at USF because its findings have been presented to or read by and critiqued by a range of individuals at USF and in the international academic community. First, as the research proposal mandated, an official external validator, Dr. Michael Buonanno, Professor of Anthropology at Manatee Community College, critiqued an early draft of the manuscript in summer 2005. He made suggestions for improving the richness of the text by inclusions of more detail and multiple voices from the USF community.

Second, at the suggestion of a committee member in October 2005, another person, Dr. Stuart Silverman, Dean of the USF Honors College, read a version of the
manuscript submitted to the thesis committee in July 2005. The concern at that point involved the thesis’ taboo subject matter and questions of anti-Arab bias. Dr. Silverman did not raise concerns about anti-Arab bias, as neither did previously the Middle East specialist on the committee. Dr. Silverman did highlight areas which he felt needed clarification, especially because in November 2005, Sami Al-Arian had not yet confessed to conspiring to commit terrorism. The researcher followed through with Dr. Silverman’s suggestions and re-submitted another draft of the thesis to the committee in February 2006.

Third, Dr. Mohammed Ibn Guadi, Professor of Islamology, The University of Strasbourg, France, reviewed the findings of the post-Dr. Silverman draft of February 2006. Dr. Guadi posed no objections to the treatment of Islam or Islamism in the thesis, noting that its interest in Islamic religious matters, per se, was negligible when compared to the overarching interest in Islamism, a political ideology. Dr. Guadi suggested that previously-conceived material about “viewpoints in the academy” from the research proposal in Chapter One be deleted because it distracted from the earlier stated major theoretical positions involving mass social movements and higher education.

Aside from readings by the aforementioned external persons, some findings from this thesis involving Islamist education theory were presented at two Education Law Association conferences in 2003 and 2004. Those presentations and the response they engendered were also helpful in the coding process of the thesis as it underwent numerous draft revisions. In addition, over the past three years the researcher has received insight from Dr. Ray Hundley, a Professor of Religion at Manatee Community
College who specializes in liberation theology movements. Dr. Hundley agrees with the researcher’s point made in Chapter One that Islamism is a kind of liberation theology comparable to that of the Leftist social movements in the 1960’s, 1970’s, and early 1980’s. Moreover, and also over the past three years, the researcher has presented her findings as they were conceptualized and re-conceptualized before groups of students in international affairs courses at USF, allowing for further redress of concerns and free academic exchange within the USF community.

Furthermore, some findings in this inquiry have been presented to interdisciplinary groups of academics with the following institutions: The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies at The George Washington University, the Hudson Institute, The Center for Advanced Defense Studies, Mercyhurst College, The American Military University, and RAND Corporation. Those experts come from diverse professional, religious, and national backgrounds. Reception by those academics also has been favorable. One such scholar, Dr. Marc Tyrell, of The Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada, regards the scholarship contained within this study of Islamism’s interplay in higher education as among the “best available” on what he calls “jihadist symbolic warfare” (Personal communication by Marc Tyrell, September 2006, in the Small Wars Council/Journal). “Symbolic warfare” refers to the study’s focus on the university as territory for conquest in the Islamist movement’s battlespace.

Another scholar, Dr. Bat Ye’or, from Geneva, Switzerland, received a copy of the findings in August 2006. Her response was as follows:

I want to thank you and congratulate you for your courageous and excellent research on such a difficult and complex subject as the takeover and control of Western knowledge and universities by Islamists. Your analysis is extremely
well researched and supported by an extensive knowledge, good arguments, and investigation on a wide sphere of interrelated domains.

I think your work is extremely important since [sic] it exposes and analyzes the diverse and numerous processes converging to the Islamization of knowledge and thought in academia, and a conditioning to mental and academic dhimmitude. (August 2006, personal communication)

Moreover, the findings of this study have come to the attention of Professor William Gawthrope, who researches and teaches Islamic sacred law at The Joint Military Intelligence College. He believes that the findings about Islamist subversion of universities in this study independently support his research, which suggests that it is impolitic and impolite in Islamic sacred law to criticize Islamic things. Gawthrope understands how imposition of this tradition in secular universities has hindered free inquiry in civil society around the world. It signifies that, tacitly, university research may have become arrogated by Islamic law. If that is the case, then for Gawthrope this study has major implications for intelligence analysts who may have become intellectually conditioned in their universities toward censorship prior to their government service.

Section III:
Chapter Summary

This chapter reiterates the purpose of the study which was to explore Islamism’s interplay with higher education. In addition, it restates the study’s research questions and delineates the study’s method of analysis, along with the rationale for those methods, as a highly creative process called “coding,” in which key patterns and themes are parsed out from collected data over a period of time. In this study, coded
data emanated from textual analysis of three types of interrelated discourse identified by Johnston (2002): world-historical, organizational, and individual. Therein the chapter discusses the possible characteristics and conditions of Islamism in higher education that make it conducive for being studied through a poststructural method involving Foucault’s (1969, 1971, 1974) theory of institutions, which accepts Derrida’s (1966/1967) arguments that language, or signification, is not transcendental and therefore that meaning is not stable. With that in mind, this study ultimately proposed that the researcher engage in an inquiry of how Islamism signifies in other higher education institutions in the world and at USF from 1986-2007. The method is also represented as conforming to commonly accepted modes of social movements analysis. Those modes of analysis involve a range of subject matter involving inquiry into, inter alia, ideologies, basic assumptions, patterns of behavior, religious paradigms, media documents, and judicial texts. Finally, the chapter weighs in on the study’s validity and reliability, through its diligent use of triangulation of theories, methods, and detailed findings. The analytic method applied in this inquiry situates it into an overall cultural fight in the world today between Islamism and intellectual freedom.
Chapter Four

Re-Islamization in Higher Education in Selected Middle Eastern and African Countries: A Prelude to the USF Case

Section I:

Introduction

In consideration of the case against Al-Arian alleging that he used USF as a platform for terrorism-related activities, the researcher noted that constituents often framed the debate over whether Al-Arian should be fired from his tenured teaching position at USF contextually with four major geopolitical problems: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the wars in Iraq, Islamic resurgence, and international Islamic terrorism. For over a decade, opposing points-of-view fought for control over the meaning of the conflict in the public milieu. As of August 2007, with the arrests of two students, Ahmed Mohamed and Youssef Megahed, newer concerns about the earlier case have arisen, including those questioning how much, if any, of Al-Arian’s activity at USF and in its service area is directly related to the new government charges. In other words, are these incidents isolated or are they part of a larger pattern of infiltration at USF? As will be shown in this findings chapter and in context to the next, each about Islamism’s interplay in higher education, the answer to those latest public questions may very well be “yes.”
Here, the reader may recall that Al-Arian, who refers to himself as “an enlightened Islamist” (qtd. in *Time*, 2002), had been accused of using USF infrastructure and his academic appointment not for purposes of teaching and research, but rather as a front for directing and financing terrorism on behalf of the Islamic Jihad’s Palestinian faction, the PIJ (see Emerson, 1994, 2002; *U.S.A. v. Sami Amin Al-Arian*). The PIJ is a militant splinter group of the Muslim Brotherhood, and, according to Waller (2003), Al-Arian was inducted into the Muslim Brotherhood when he was a teenager in Kuwait, where he was born. The plea agreement of April 2006 between Al-Arian and the U.S. government attests the veracity of the accusation, although the former professor’s supporters now contend that he was pressured into making a false admission (Plea Agreement, 2006; Blackburn, 2006; Laughlin, 2006; Silvestrini, 2006). Given the terms of the conflict at USF, the researcher intuited that a full understanding of the USF conflict necessitated study of the case’s historical antecedents, and so the researcher began studying social and political history texts, written by individuals both sympathetic and unsympathetic to Islamism, wondering if those texts might offer information that might exonerate Al-Arian from the charges against him or, conversely, that might support those charges.

What the researcher has discovered from pre-existing scholarship and other sources about conflict in the Middle East and Islamism in the Middle East and Africa is that Islamists in their native countries perennially have relied on the accoutrements of higher education (e.g., sympathetic intellectuals, professional associations, students, student groups, curricula, academic freedom doctrine) as means toward achieving their objectives to establish pure Islamic states. In the locales studied, those objectives
involve the commission of terrorist acts and also lesser acts such as harassment of non-sympathetic colleagues and fellow students in the university milieu. Those actions signify “re-Islamization from above.” “From above” is a term employed in political and military science to denote dramatic, direct action aimed at preparing a society for the ultimate objective of wholesale governance change.

However, the institution (to use the Foucauldian term), or mass social movement, known as Islamism also appropriates higher education and other sub-institutions associated with higher education (e.g., professional groups, journals, student groups, external youth groups) in order to enlist movement members, influence public opinion, gain sympathy, control discourse, and expand its base of power in countries and regions where its leaders exist. Those methods signify “re-Islamization from below.” “From below” is a term employed in political and military science to denote indirect action, especially through covert propaganda campaigns and institutional subversion, aimed at preparing a society for wholesale governance change. As Arendt (1948/1951/1966/1968/1976/1979/1994), Kepel (2002), and Meddeb (2004) convey in their works about ultra-nationalist mass movements, where there is the “above” type of strategy, there exists the “below” kind, as well.

Therefore, this chapter presents in rich-text style the conditions and characteristics of Islamism’s interplay with higher education as the re-Islamization program developed across space and time in key Middle Eastern and African countries. Understanding that interplay--replete with its intellectual history embedded in world-historical discourse, organizational discourse, and individual discourse--may help in deepening understanding of the USF case beyond legal issues and in assisting
the USF community in appreciating its role in either mitigating or exacerbating what is arguably this century’s most salient global problem, Islamism. The chapter also attempts to show that Islamists, believing they are an elite group of social reformists performing the will of Allah, seek to enact their program in higher education irrespective of government and institutional policies. Given Islamic terms of scholasticism defined in Chapter One, combined with extant research on the social psychology of mass movements, terrorists, and Islamists in Chapter Two, the findings presented below engender scholarly consideration that higher education signifies to Islamists a kind of fresh territory for conquest, the dar al-harb, or the domain of war, as part of the overall reformist agenda of re-Islamation from above and below.

Research Question

The research question for findings in this chapter is “What are the conditions and characteristics of Islamism’s interplay in higher education in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Levant, Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan?”

Population Samples

Population samples for this chapter include think-tanks, academic journals, charitable organizations, books about “Islamization,” manifestos of HAMAS and Islamic Jihad, the writings of leaders and followers, websites, leaflets passed out by religious student groups, academic scholarship, media documents, government affidavits, political history, learned societies, organizational networks, and the trans-historical actions of Islamist groups and individuals. Another locale, Iran, also was studied for its sense of interplay with higher education but was not included in these chapter findings. Iranian Islamism is known widely for its Western-educated leaders
and student movement that took over fifty U.S. American hostages on sovereign U.S.
territory, the U.S. embassy in Teheran. Furthermore, the Iranian movement whose
leaders would form the world’s first Islamic republic in the wake of the Iranian
hostage crisis is known widely for having become a state sponsor of international
terrorism after it assumed totalitarian control of the country in 1979. Nevertheless,
when compared to the other locales presented in this chapter, Iran is a unique case in
that its student movement is Shi’a-inspired, unlike the more prevalent Sunni forms
that exist in the world today. That stated, Iran’s educational strategies and sense of
unlimited aims toward re-Islamization from above and below appear remarkably
similar to those which are illustrated in the following pages.

Section II:

Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, The Mother of Re-Islamization in Higher Education:
Conditions and Characteristics

Conditions of Islamism’s Interplay in Higher Education

Condition One: The Fall of the Ottoman Caliphate Engenders Ikwhan Ideologies,
Strategies, and Legacies

Of the wide range of texts about Islamism studied, the researcher notes that
while higher education’s role in fostering the re-Islamization program is not the thesis
of those texts, those texts nonetheless implicate higher education’s role without
exceptions. In Egypt, the road map of re-Islamization in higher education, and
sometimes of it, leads to and from the Muslim Brotherhood, which formed in the
aftermath of the fall of the Ottoman caliphate. Later sections below indicate that the
Brotherhood, sometimes referred to as the *Ikwhan* movement, exerts influence in other higher education systems in the other locales studied.

In turn, one might surmise that the case at USF, given the immigration history of Islamist leaders and their operatives from native to foreign countries over the past forty years, might be a more recent chapter to a problem that has persisted in other parts of the world since 1927. That was the year when Hassan Al-Banna (1906-1949), an elementary school teacher in Egypt, created the Muslim Brotherhood, a group that soon began exerting ideological influence in Egypt, the Palestinian territories, and other adjacent countries largely through the intellectual thought and teaching of Sayyid Qutb (Bergen, 2001; Schwartz, 2002) and other early leaders in the Muslim Brotherhood who were steeped in the ideology of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Al-Wahhab (b.1703) (Gold, 2004).

Indeed, Al-Banna seems to have been destined for the task. A sheikh’s son educated at Cairo’s Al-Azhar University, Al-Banna, by the age of twelve, had become the leader of the Society for Moral Behavior and later, the Society for the Prevention of the Forbidden (Mitchell 1969/1993). Al-Banna and other members of those groups reached “deep into town life” by imposing “increasingly burdensome fines” on Muslims who “cursed their fellows and their families, or cursed in the name of religion” and by drafting and circulating “secret and often threatening letters to those they regarded as living violation of the teachings of Islam” (Mitchell, 1969/1993: p. 2).

Kepel (2002) writes of the overall condition of the Muslim world at the time Al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood:

Ataturk abolished the Ottoman caliphate in Istanbul in 1924, which for so long had symbolized the unity of the faithful, and replaced it with a secular Turkish
nationalist republic. The land of Islam was divided up by the Christian powers at the same time that it was being eaten away from the inside. The Muslim Brothers formed their society in Egypt in order to reclaim Islam’s political dimension, which had formerly resided in the person of the now-fallen caliph. Confronted by the Egyptian nationalists of the time—who demanded independence, the departure of the British, and a democratic constitution—the Brothers responded with a slogan that is still current in the Islamist movement: “The Koran is our constitution.” Islam, for the Brothers, was a complete and total system, and there was no need to go looking for European values as a basis for social order. Everything was made clear in the Koran, whose moral principles, the Brothers claimed, were universal. This doctrine was shared by the entire Islamist movement, whatever their other views. (p. 27-28, italics added)

What the Muslim Brotherhood called for instead was an “Islamic modernity” that contrasts European modernity, which Kepel (2002) describes as “the dividing of society, politics, religion, and cultures into separate fields or discourses” (p. 28). This divided condition also was referred to in many parts of the Middle East as a period of “de-Islamization,” a process discussed previously in Chapter One as oppositional to the “re-Islamization” of contemporary Islamic resurgence.

Condition Two: Exposure of Salafist Doctrine to Radical Western Ideologies and De-Westernizing Ferment in Western-style Universities

From which strands of social theory expounded in Egypt’s modern educational systems did that aforementioned “Islamic modernity” develop? A glimpse into the ideological background of the Muslim Brotherhood during its first two decades of formation suggests interplay of Salafism, Marxism, and Nazism. The first two of these ideologies, each discussed in this section, appear to have shaped Ikwhan thought and strategies during the movement’s first several decades of development, as more and more leaders and followers enrolled in Egyptian and American mass university systems (Mitchell, 1969/1993). The third ideology, Nazism, was imported to Egypt like its Marxist counterpart, but it is discussed separately in the next section because its
influence on *Ikwhan* students and leaders in Egypt stems more from their non-
traditional learning from Rommel’s troops in Libya than from traditional classroom
learning.

Qutb and the early founders of the Muslim Brotherhood owe a salient strand of
their intellectual pedigree to the texts and teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abdul
Al-Wahhab, who was born in the early 1700’s in east-central Arabia (Gold, 2004).
While the Tunisian scholar Meddeb (2003) critiques Al-Wahhab’s works as being
devoid of creativity and independent thought, Al-Wahhab was well-traveled in the
Islamic world’s major centers of intellectual thought and teaching during the Ottoman
Empire.

Al-Wahhab concluded that while “Islam had vanquished many earlier
civilizations” it had nonetheless “been corrupted by foreign influences” and therefore
Islam had lost its sense of unity, or *tawhid* (Gold, 2004: p. 18). As shall be illustrated
later in this chapter, “unity” is a characteristic term for Islamist higher education theory
and practice, especially as conceived by two of the world’s most major countries, Saudi
Arabia and Iran, responsible for advocating and spreading re-Islamization through
government educational channels.

In addition, Muslim Brotherhood education also employs similar terms of
reference. For example, the idea of “unity” in Muslim education at all levels is a
concept Qutb treats extensively in his most popular work *Social Justice in Islam*, first
published in 1953, in which the Muslim Brotherhood’s leading theorist advocates a
new means of Islamic education designed to return the Community of the Faithful, the
*ummah*, to an “original” state of purity by de-Westernizing education. Generally, the
task involves being “careful when we describe Islam not to relate it to other principles and theories” (p. 117), pragmatism being a common philosophical target for Qutb. Drawing theoretically from Al-Wahhab’s doctrine of unity, the overarching raison d’être in Social Justice in Islam is that “Islam is a comprehensive philosophy and a homogenous unity, and to introduce into it any foreign element would mean ruining it” (p. 117). Furthermore, Qutb compares Islam to “a delicate and perfect piece of machinery that may be completely ruined by the presence of an alien component” (p. 117). Thus, later in his work, Qutb argues that education should not be “entrusted” to “human logic alone”; and so, the enterprise of education “relies also upon revelation” (p. 292). Regarding education as vital to disarming Western systems of capitalism and Communism, Qutb views the growth of the Islamic bloc in Indonesia and Pakistan as positive developments for the “awakening of the Arab world, both in the East and West,” a process that he hopes will allow “the world” itself to accept “our social system” (p. 319).

Algar (2002) writes in the work Wahhabism: A Critical Essay that believers in Wahhabism themselves prefer the nominal terms “al-Muwahhidun or Ahl al-Tauhid, ‘the asserters of divine unity’” (p. 1) to describe their sect. Nevertheless, Algar (2002) remains critical of this term, offering the following argument:

But precisely this self-awarded title springs from a desire to lay exclusive claim to the principle of tauhid that is the foundation of Islam itself; it implies a dismissal of all other Muslims as tainted by shirk. There is no reason to acquiesce in this assumption of a monopoly, and because the movement in question was ultimately the work of one man, . . . it is reasonable as well as conventional to speak of “Wahhabism” and “Wahhabis.” (p. 2)
Algar (2002) agrees with Meddeb (2003) in that “in the extremely lengthy and rich history of Islamic thought, Wahhabism does not occupy a particularly important place” (p. 2), “lacking substantial precedent in Islamic history” (p. 10), excepting that the “intellectually marginal” sectarian movement in Islam “had the good fortune to emerge in the Arabian Peninsula . . . and thus in the proximity of the Haramayn, a major geographical focus of the Muslim world; and its Saudi patrons had the good fortune, in the twentieth century, to acquire massive oil wealth, a portion of which has been used in attempts to propagate Wahhabism in the Muslim world and beyond” (p. 2).

From Wahhab’s teachings, the term “Salafist” came into being, defining Al-Wahhab’s followers more by what they opposed than what they advocated, which was to restore what Al-Wahhab contended was a pure form of Islam practiced by Muhammad and the early caliphs, the “al-salaf al-salihin” (Gold, 2004: p. 19). As a point of doctrine, Salafism is a critical element of Islamist thought and practice, such that after a long period of dormancy outside the Saudi Arabian peninsula--held in check largely through British imperialist rule--the doctrine would become ascendant in the Twentieth Century with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo, whose co-founder Rashid Rida and his mentor Muhammad Abduh had studied Wahhabism and had embraced its Salafist tenets (Algar, 2002; Gold, 2004).

Appeal for Salafism grew during the 1930’s as Rida published articles about the doctrine in the journal *Al-Manar*, or “The Beacon” (p. 54), which upheld the Muslim Brotherhood’s manifesto: “God is our objective; the Quran is our constitution; the Prophet is our leader; struggle is our way; and death for the sake of God is the highest of our aspirations. God is great. God is great” (qtd. in Gold, 2004: p. 55); or in its
rhythmic Arabic incantation: “Allah ghayatuna./Al-rasul zaimuna./Al-Quran
dusturuna./Al-Jihad sabiluna./Al-mawt fi sabil Allah asma amamina./Allah akbar.
Allah akbar” (qtd. in Murawiec, 2005: pp. 34-35). That credo, according to Mitchell (1969/1993), “was equally useful as a unique mark of the Brother” (p. 193, italics added). As Algar (2002) remarks, however, the relationship between Wahhabism and the Salafist tenets of the Muslim Brotherhood, so commonly propounded in Middle Eastern university education, rests solely upon intellectual affiliations common to adherents of both doctrines, with “no genetic connection” (p. 4) involving two similar intellectual phenomena in Islamic intellectual history.

Qutb’s intellectual thought and education theory, an outgrowth of the Wahhabi religious doctrine Salafism, arguably represents the epitome of interplay of thought translated into action through higher education and other sub-institutions affiliated with higher education in various Middle Eastern and African countries studied in this chapter. Recall, for example, from Chapter One that Qutb’s ideological views turned increasingly militant while he was earning a graduate degree in education in the United States during the 1940’s. Kepel (1984/2003) in his seminal work Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh illustrates that Egypt’s reasoning for sending Qutb to the United States for extended academic study had less to do with the civil servant’s professional qualifications than it did with the government’s perception that Qutb, through his publications and scholar-activism, was becoming a nuisance in his dissemination of what Shils (1997) calls “ideological politics,” in which those who practice it “shun the central institutional system of the prevailing society” and “practice in them for purposes very different from those who have preceded them in the conduct
of those institutions,” with “extra-constitutionality . . . inherent in their conceptions and aspirations” (pp. 26-7). In short, Qutb had become a threat to the state.

“With no exaggeration his pamphlets can be compared, in terms of spread and influence, with the Communist Manifesto in the period of the early worker’s movement in Europe and later under communism” (Tibi, 1998: p. 56). Similarly, Tibi (1998) refers to Qutb’s “basic missionary message” that world peace could be achieved only under Islam “within the framework of jihad as an expression of ‘world revolution’” (p. 56), based on “religious legitimacy and the use of force in the form of irregular war” (p. 58). “By international legal standards” (see footnote for Chapter One), Tibi (1998) writes, “this kind of violence qualifies unequivocally as ‘terrorism’” (p. 58). No little irony exists here in that the Muslim Brotherhood sought to reject Western influences, not assimilate them; yet the organization did absorb characteristics of the West’s other totalitarian ideologies despite its wish to divest itself from Western ideologies.

The Egyptian government had hoped that an American education in the United States would temper Qutb’s radicalism; however, time in the United States in the 1940’s seems to have emboldened further his radical mind. In a wholesale break with Enlightenment values that distinguish between church and state spheres of influence over people’s private and public lives (see Kepel’s introduction to The Trail of Political Islam, 2002), Qutb conceived a new doctrine of violent jihad to enforce the Muslim Brotherhood’s Salafist tenets. His thought crystallized while he was earning a master’s degree in education in the United States. Then, after returning to Egypt, Qutb refined the doctrine further after learning that Egypt’s President Nasser had no plans to
implement Islamic law in the new government created after the 1952 Free Officers’
coup d’etat, of which Qutb was apparently a key supporter and player.

Finding common ground in the communitarian precepts of Marxist thought,
Qutb reformulated Islamist ideology in his most famous work, Social Justice in Islam
(1952), whose title borrows directly from Marxist rhetoric studied while Qutb lived in
the United States (Berman, 2003). Perhaps, given the timing of the two intellectuals
teaching and studying in the United States, Qutb found appeal in the post-World War II
Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse, who found in Freud and Marx “revolutionary”
ways to justify two-tiered standards of liberty and violence for aggrieved non-Western
social groups. Moreover, as the researcher remarked in Chapter One, the substance of
Social Justice in Islam is likewise immersed in totalitarian precepts that outline how a
religion conceivably could form the governing basis of all aspects of human activity,
both public and private. In addition, the work also possesses another feature common
to other twentieth-century totalitarian mass movements (i.e., Fascism and
Communism): a belief in the theory of the Jewish cabal.

Condition Three: Exposure to European Fascism through Strategic Alliance with the
Nazis

Another condition that further allowed for the Islamist movement to gain
ascendancy in Egypt was its exposure to European Fascism, whose own doctrines and
strategies were cultivated in German universities (Walker, 1995). That exposure further
solidified the totalitarian presuppositions and strategies found in Islamist thought,
which, the researcher notes, germinated in the Middle East at the same time that
Marxist and Fascist thought germinated in Europe.
In the 1930’s Hassan Al-Banna’s Muslim Brotherhood established a covert alliance with the Third Reich. By that time, as Fregosi (1998) documents in *Jihad in the West*, the movement had branched out into the British-occupied Levant. The *Ikwhan* movement held intentions of using its alliance with the Nazis to drive the British out of the Middle East. At the same time, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, also a Muslim Brother, in his position of exile in Yugoslavia for a brief time led a division of SS troops comprised entirely of Muslims. Formation of the troops, Fregosi (1998) documents, was short-lived. The Nazis regarded the undisciplined conduct of the mufti’s troops with contempt and soon disbanded them.

European-Middle East World War II history reveals other, more startling facts about the *Ikwhan*-Nazi alliance in Egypt. That alliance led to the deployment of Muslim Brothers who were students in Cairo’s universities in covert missions into the Libyan desert during Rommel’s invasion of North Africa (Mitchell, 1969/1993). The purpose was to serve as part of the Nazis’ disinformation campaign in Egypt and to prepare the country for a Nazi invasion by disseminating anti-British propaganda in Egyptian cities, starting with university campuses. That is a point which underscores the influence of an anti-Semitic work of propaganda and forgery, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, that was translated into Arabic and disseminated through educational and other cultural channels throughout the Arab world beginning in the 1930’s and continuing to the present day (Pipes, 1997).

According to World War II documents, Nazi success in North Africa, for which Muslim Brothers working and studying in the universities had acted as covert
agents, was supposed to have resulted in a second phase of the Final Solution in that region (*The Forgotten Refugees*, 2005). As the Egyptian counterparts’ leadership in Yugoslavia had stated upon touring European concentration camps, “There were considerable similarities between Islamic principles and National Socialism” (qtd. in Fregosi, 1998: p. 221).

Ye’or (2005), in *The Euro-Arab Axis*, extends discussion of the ideological and strategic influence of the Nazis on the Islamist movement in Egypt with a review of declassified French documents and scholarship about the French government’s role in allowing Nazi war criminals living in France to escape conviction by emigrating to Cairo. Having received cover in Egypt in the early 1960’s, they converted to Islam, joined the ranks of the Muslim Brothers, and plied their academic knowledge in Egypt’s educational system.

By the late 1950’s, however, Fascism, as exemplified in the Nazi movement that had raged across Europe, had fallen out of favor in the West; and so, while the Muslim Brotherhood in several countries in the Middle East had formed alliances with the Nazis during the 1930’s and 1940’s, the ideology of the group, through Qutb’s publications and professorship, underwent a linguistic shift over a period of several decades (Passmore, 2002; Paxton, 2004; Schoenfeld, 2004), with the more traditional terms of opprobrium used by Fascists and the early Muslim Brotherhood (e.g., Jew, international bankers) replaced with softer Marxist labels (e.g., Zionist, imperialist, military-industrial complex) as a means to make Islamist thought appear more respectable to broad classes of constituents.
Condition Four: Alternating Attempts to Appease or Repress the Mass Movement

Another condition vital toward Islamism’s interplay in Egyptian higher education involves attempts by the Egyptian government to appease or repress the movement. Initially, Egypt’s King Farouk courted the Muslim Brotherhood precisely because the mutual aid wing of the group served as a means to appease the lower middle classes in the cities, leaving Farouk with fewer groups among the newly literate classes to oppose his authority (Kepel, 2002). Therefore, during Farouk’s rule the Muslim Brotherhood was given license to organize in Egyptian universities. That is not to suggest, however, that Farouk supported full Islamic law in Egypt in a manner that would appeal to the Muslim Brotherhood; for, during the time of Farouk’s rule, Egypt had undergone the de-Islamization process, which had led to the unveiling of women and, by the end of Farouk’s rule, the country had lifted repressive social standards to such an extent that one woman, Doria Shafik, would become the publisher of four women’s magazines simultaneously, a remarkable accomplishment for any woman in the world in the 1940’s (see Nelson’s Doria Shafik, Egyptian Feminist: A Woman Apart, 1996).

Kepel (2002) asserts that as long as the lower middle classes were receiving social and educational assistance from the Muslim Brotherhood--which in the first few years of its formation had transformed itself into a mass social movement that soon moved north into the region known as the West Bank and Gaza and also into Syria, various North African countries, and the Sudan--Farouk’s government willingly accommodated the group. Farouk’s accommodationist policy allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to accumulate more recruits through its
socio-educational outlets; in turn, the growth of the movement would coincide eventually in the dissolution of the Egyptian monarchy (Kepel, 2002).

The Egyptian monarchy’s accommodationist policy of non-repression of the Muslim Brotherhood did not end in an absence of political violence and peaceful compromise. To the contrary, and as shown below, the monarchial government of Egypt between the world wars would be the first of many governments around the world that would later regret its initial policies of Islamist accommodation, inside and outside educational channels. In Farouk’s case, the Muslim Brotherhood would align itself with a group of Egyptian socialists who would in 1952 overthrow the Egyptian monarchy in a classic military coup. This example is among many in the Middle East and Africa indicating that Islamists are as likely to sow insurrection for the purpose of establishing totalitarian systems of government when existing socio-political institutions accept their presence inasmuch as they sow insurrection when socio-political institutions reject them.

Algar (2000) states that an attempt to assassinate President Nasser on October 23, 1954, led to the government’s arrest of nearly one thousand members of the Muslim Brotherhood, which led to the conviction of seven people, six of whom were hung and one of whom was sentenced to life in prison, and another, Qutb, who was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. The Nasser government also abolished the Muslim Brotherhood as a group with legal rights to operate in Egypt in any kind of institution, including Egypt’s universities (Kepel, 2002).

While Algar (2000) doubts the legitimacy of the convictions, courting the notion that the assassination attempt was a plot conceived by Nasser himself as a
means to justify the Muslim Brotherhood’s political repression, Kepel (2002) views the assassination attempt as the logical outcome of an Islamist group that already had adopted political violence through its paramilitary wing well in advance of Nasser’s assumption of power. Kepel (2002) discusses in context that the Muslim Brotherhood had objected to Nasser’s secular nationalism, which “quickly collided with the Islamism of the Brothers” (pp. 29-30). “The conflict led to bloodshed . . . and their organization was dissolved, their members were jailed or exiled, and several of their leaders were hanged. [The Muslim Brotherhood] no longer had a place in a society that was aggressively modernizing under the banner of authoritarian nationalism, while moving decisively toward socialism and an alliance with the Soviet Union” (p. 30).

When weighed against other evidence besides that which Kepel (2002) presents, Algar’s (2002) arguments regarding Nasser’s complicity in his own assassination attempt seem specious at best, with Algar (2002) never mentioning in his introduction to Social Justice in Islam the Muslim Brotherhood’s terrorist actions prior to Nasser’s assumption of power. One notes here, too, that Nasser had no trouble imprisoning non-Islamist people for extended periods of time on lesser charges than seditious conspiracies and assassination plots, so he cannot be accused of merely singling out the Muslim Brotherhood and Islam.

Indeed, one example of non-Islamist persecution by the Nasser government involves that of the aforementioned Doria Shafik, whose publications were banned during Nasser’s rule (Nelson, 1996). During Nasser’s leadership, Shafik was arrested and jailed. And later, after a period of incarceration had broken her psychologically, Nasser’s government commuted her sentence and placed her under house arrest in the
mid-1960’s (Nelson, 1996). Unlike the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, however, Shafik’s repression and confinement did not result in her refining her feminism in a more militant manner. Instead, Shafik committed suicide by jumping from a second-floor window in her apartment in Zamalek, a swanky international district on Jazeerah (aka Gezirah), an island situated between the banks of Cairo and Giza (Nelson, 1996).

Nasser’s repression of the Muslim Brotherhood allowed for yet another transformation of Islamism in which the problem with Islam’s weakening in the twentieth century was not “overt foreign rule or the absence of social justice” (Algar, 2000: p. 7); but rather, the problem was, according to the next generation of Islamists who followed Qutb’s re-formulation of Islamist doctrine in the 1960’s, “the total usurpation of power intensely hostile to Islam, with the result that entire life of society was fixed in the non-Islamic patterns into which it had gradually fallen as a result of decay and neglect” (p. 8). This is a condition known as jahiliyah, which in turn serves as “an epistemological device for rejecting all allegiances other than Islam” (p. 8).

Now, moderate Muslims who might favor de-Islamization could be singled out, in addition to Jews and their alleged conspirators, for expulsion and extermination. Kepel (1984/2004) refers to the new phase of the Muslim Brotherhood during the late Nasser years as the neo-Muslim Brotherhood, a term that will be invoked throughout the remainder of this chapter when referring to the Islamist group in its late- and post-Nasser manifestations. That education of the Muslim Brotherhood occurred in large part through the family and branch sub-units of the Muslim Brotherhood’s organizational and administrative structure (Mitchell, 1969/1993).
In a collection of writings Qutb drafted while in prison--later published as *Signposts*--the remedy for *jahiliyah* was *jihad* by a so-called “vanguard” of true believing Muslims who “would find its way” by knowing “when to withdraw from and when to seek contact with the *jahiliyah* that surround it” (*Signposts*, qtd. in Kepel, 1984/2003: p. 45). The strategy of knowing when to withdraw and when to integrate, mirrored the movements of Islam’s prophet, Muhammad, who emigrated from Mecca to Medina “when he found himself in weak position” (p. 46). Therefore, this doctrine also gave rise to a re-formulation of the term *hijra*, which became inseparable from the term *jihad* and meant “going underground” and communicating in symbolic language (Tibi, 1998). Kepel (1984/2003) writes that Qutb’s works would fill “the ideological vacuum” (p. 37) that persisted after the death of Al-Banna and the destruction of the Muslim Brotherhood’s library at the group’s General Headquarters. “Although conceived on the basis of Qutb’s observation of the Nasser regime,” Kepel (1984/2003) states, “the basic analysis of *Signposts* would retain its validity under Nasser’s successor as well” (p. 37). Qutb thus adjured, “These signposts will likewise tell it what role it will have to play to attain its goal, to inform it of its real function. . . . These signposts will likewise tell it what position must be taken towards the *jahiliyah* that reigns over the earth” (p. 45). “How and in what terms should it speak the language of Islam to them?” (p. 45), Qutb asks.

Interestingly, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Society of Muslim Ladies, or the Muslim Sisterhood, which prior to the Nasser government’s purges held no significant power in directing the course of the movement (Mitchell, 1969/1993), would adopt a significant educational purpose while their husbands and other family members were
imprisoned. Representing a committee on the Muslim Brotherhood’s organizational chart, their actions arguably represented an early manifestation of “concealed advance” that enabled the imprisoned Muslim Brothers to reconstitute their organization.

Formally abolished by the Nasser government in 1954, the Muslim Ladies, led by the wife, Zaynab Al-Ghazali, of one of the imprisoned leaders, “assumed the charitable task of providing for the released prisoners” (Kepel, 1984/2003: p. 29) who had never been brought to trial. Al-Ghazali’s “network of relations among Brotherhood sympathizers enabled” her “to act as a link in the secret reconstitution of the organization” (p. 29). Al-Ghazali’s role was no less that that of an ambassador in that among her many actions was a pilgrimage in 1957 to Saudi Arabia, where she met with Egyptian exiles, a move that was approved by the Saudi leaders who opposed Nasser. One of the exiled leaders in the Muslim Brotherhood and she “pooled their efforts” (p. 28) and planned the group’s reorganization.

The groups from along the Nile River who met periodically in Al-Ghazali’s home were purportedly there for “Muslim education” (p. 29). However, they soon began coordinating with other groups from Alexandria, Damietta, Buhayra, and Cairo who were holding collective discussions about “the ordeal of 1954” (p. 30). Kepel (1984/2003) writes of these young activists that they and others attending “seminars in Al-Ghazali’s home”:

All became acquainted with the latest literary productions of Sayyid Qutb—in other words, the initial drafts of Signposts. Mrs. Al-Ghazali visited Sayyid Qutb’s sisters regularly, and through this link Qutb received reports about the work of the “seminar,” sending his own writings in return. (p. 30)
By 1964, Al-Ghazali’s para-educational activities had resulted in a new operational directorate, albeit one that was in conflict over how to seize power. The younger activists wanted to violently overthrow Nasser’s government, while “Al-Ghazali held that the organization could do no more than establish ‘educational programmes’ lasting thirteen years at a time; these would have to be repeated until 75 percent of the population were won over” (p. 31). Initially taught by Al-Ghazali, “the martyrology of the Nasser period is of the utmost importance for the subsequent Islamicist movement. The halo of persecution suffered in defence of a faith and a social ideal confers a status of absolute truth upon Islamicist discourse” (p. 35).

Beginning in the 1960’s and into the 1970’s, the neo-Muslim Brotherhood, as illustrated below, made significant transnational achievements outside its country of origin, Egypt, and especially with the assistance of Saudi Arabian wealth and doctrinal support by the Al-Sheikh family who gained control over the kingdom’s restructured educational ministry. Nevertheless, inside Egypt Nasser’s repression of the group seems not to have diminished the group’s resolve. According to Abdallah (1985), the takfir movement found its way into the student movement of Egypt in the 1970’s when Anwar Al-Sadat became president of Egypt after Nasser’s death.

What is known about the student movement in Egypt in the early 1970’s allows us to examine more closely a feature of higher education that is vital to the growth of Islamism: students. Egypt’s student movement in the 1970’s exhibited the lines of intellectual conflict discussed by Kepel (2002) involving differing interpretations of Qutb’s new doctrine, from the extreme to less extreme: the first, that takfir was a condition all over the world, excepting for a handful of true believers, the “vanguard”;
the second, that *takfir* was limited to state leadership; and the third, that *takfir* was allegorical and therefore that the pure among Muslims should preach and not judge.

Whereas the jailed or exiled leaders of the neo-Muslim Brotherhood tended to interpret Qutb’s new doctrine in its less extreme form, young radicals in Egyptian and other Middle Eastern universities in the early 1970’s “wished to break off all contact with the state and punish society for its passive acceptance of an impious government” (p. 32). Therefore, the *takfir* groups in Egypt’s universities were inclined toward the most radical interpretation of Qutb’s thought, a condition likely the result of Zaynab Al-Ghazali’s assistance in re-educating younger members of the group during their older members’ imprisonment in the 1950’s and 1960’s. Kepel (2002) types this new class of student Islamists as adherents to what is commonly known as “popular Islam,” or an unscholarly strain of Islam in which its imams do not receive training in religious schools or universities, the result of which is the *complete* reduction of Islam to a political ideology, as opposed to *partial* in the organization’s manifestations prior to the 1960’s. Tibi (1998) refers to the imams of “popular Islam” as “political imams” or “underground imams”; and Meddeb (2003) accuses them of, *inter alia*, a crude form of anti-intellectualism that on one hand causes them to desire knowledge but only for the paradoxical purpose of destroying the foundations of that same knowledge upon which early Islamic civilization had made great achievements.

As shall be shown below, the Islamist ferment on Egyptian campuses in the 1970’s not only conveys re-Islamization *in* higher education but also provides us with clear evidence of re-Islamization *of* higher education, as students in Egypt’s
Western-style mass education systems sought to impose their ideology on whole campuses. Thus, Qutb’s doctrine of zalzalah, or “shaking,” would take on new meaning in Egyptian society, through Egypt’s mass educational outlets.

Thereunto, whereas Nasser had eliminated what Birnbaum (1988) would call “organized anarchy” in Egypt’s Western-style higher education milieu, Egypt’s new president, Anwar Al-Sadat, would ease campus repression and create new anarchic conditions that sought an Islamist form of social justice through the use of external advocacy groups working in concert student organizations, a trait of higher education discussed in favorable terms by curriculum experts El-Khawas (1997), Hurtado and Dey (1997), and Soldantenko (2001) and also in skeptical terms by Cohen and March (2000). The interplay of external groups and internal ones in Egypt’s universities, of course, was by Al-Sadat’s assumption of the Egyptian presidency a mainstay of Muslim Brotherhood activity discussed above, now reconstituted as the neo-Muslim Brotherhood.

This section also demonstrates a persistent relationship between Muslim student organizations and the commission of terrorist acts, a pattern of activity that would be repeated around the world for the next three decades. As discussed in the cases of Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan below, the radical student groups that arose in the 1960’s and early 1970’s “were at their most militant in the Nile Valley” (Kepel, 2002: p. 81), a condition likely the result of the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in having established parallel institutions of cultural and political reform in Egypt’s civil service (Mitchell, 1969/1993).
Kepel (2002) paints a telling picture of the Islamist ferment on Egyptian campuses after the reconstitution of the Muslim Brotherhood into the neo-Muslim Brotherhood, a process that eventually received political support from Nasser’s successor, Al-Sadat, who lifted the sanctions against the Muslim Brothers who remained in Egypt as a means to counter Egypt’s Marxist influences:

During the summer preceding the October war of 1973, the Gamaat Islamiya (Islamic Associations) suddenly came to life in student circles, on the occasion of the first summer camps organized for their members. Militants and sympathizers attending these camps were initiated into the “pure Islamic life”--which involved regular daily prayers, ideological training, an apprenticeship in the skills of the preacher and the tactics of prosyletism, socializing within the group, and more. A skeleton network of “cadres” was planned that would eventually make the associations the dominant voice in the universities of the Arab world. (p.81)

The Gamaat Islamiyah offered an “Islamic solution” to the failure of the Marxism that had come before it. Confounding any ideological matters, too, was Egypt’s inability to ameliorate the poor condition of its higher education system. Kepel (1984/2003; 2002) describes that system as having “learning conditions [that had] degenerated alarmingly” and “a chasm [that had] opened between the cultural aspirations of the students--many of whom were the first in their families to attend university--and their ability to find jobs” (p. 82). True to the educational doctrines of Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood, the solution offered by Egypt’s Islamist students involved questioning “modern secular values of instruction” (p. 82), which the Gamaat Islamiyah indicted as Orientalist “lies” (p. 82). Instead, Egypt’s students were offered a vision of Islam that was “complete and total” and could both “interpret” and “transform” the world (p. 82). In other words, if Marxism was a secular form of a pre-
modern Christian religion, then Islamism had succeeded in turning itself into a sacerdotal form of a modern secular ideology.

Off-campus, in the places where Islamist students lived, the new associations also acted in ways that resembled the earlier Muslim Brotherhood, “combining practical services with the inculcation of moral standards” (p. 82). Kepel (2002) offers the following example of how campuses were eventually re-Islamized:

When the students were confronted with hideously overcrowded transportation systems, the Islamists used generous donations to purchase minibuses for women students. When this service became overwhelmingly popular, they restricted it to those women who wore the veil. Thus, the privatization of transport became a way of responding “Islamically” to a social problem. (p. 82)

Kepel writes that initially Al-Sadat and the Islamist students enjoyed significant mutual support of each other. “The ‘Believing President’ who sought to establish the reign of ‘knowledge and faith’ saw the Islamist student intelligentsia both as a tool for containing a younger generation that was quick to protest and as a source of cultural and moral values” (p. 83). In addition, Al-Sadat made another significant move. He allowed the return of the Muslim Brothers-in-exile in Saudi Arabia.

Al-Sadat saw these Muslim Brothers, who had become wealthy during their time abroad, as a means to re-privatize Egypt. With these moderate Islamists, Al-Sadat had hoped to “hold the line against more radical groups [i.e., Marxist] whose goal was to subvert society” (p. 83). Along with the return of the exiled Muslim Brothers from their professorial posts in Saudi Arabia came a “massive distribution of radical texts, so beloved of Wahhabite clerics, made accessible to young people with education” (p. 87). “These youth had duly absorbed the moral and conservative
message the Saudi’s intended them to absorb; the trouble was,” Kepel (2002) writes, “they had also paid attention to its destabilizing subtext” (p. 87).

**Characteristics of Islamism’s Interplay in Higher Education**

**Characteristic One: External and Internal Organizational Networks Run by Highly Educated Elites Interacting with Universities and their Service Areas for Purpose of Re-Islamization from Above and Below**

Arendt (1948/1951/1966/1968/1976/1979/1994) in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, writes that one of the more striking features of totalitarian movements is their creation of non-criminal and criminal front groups comprised of members and non-member constituents. Arendt calls that “technique of duplication” (p. 283) a hallmark of totalitarian mass movements. The purpose of those groups is to mimic existing social institutions for the purposes of gaining more membership and support from fellow travelers, establishing a semblance of legitimacy, and subverting societies from below. Also, by shielding leaders in the movement from criticism, the front organizations use uninitiated masses to perpetuate the leadership’s deception and interest in what Arendt calls the “decomposition of the status quo [of society’s existing organizations for teachers, lawyers, students, university professors, etc.]” (p. 371). In agreement with Arendt’s observations, Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) writes that education provides any mass movement, including religious ultra-nationalist types, with a setting that appeals to their reformist natures. In that respect, both scholars agree tacitly with Walker (1979) who, in *The Effective Administrator*, states that pressures on universities from what he calls “militant third-sector groups” (p.21) arise more from their nature than from the nature of the university itself. However, as Birnbaum (1988)
suggests, universities—and this observation certainly extends to Egyptian ones modeled after Western ones—provide anarchic organizational cultures that may contribute to their subversion.

Viewed in its totality, this section investigates how Islamism, as a reformist ideology that relies on above and below strategies, organizationally and administratively engages in interplay of shadow activity with higher education in order to accumulate power. As Mitchell (1969/1993) suggests, this feature equates to fifth column activity conceived by an organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, which has sought throughout its history the overthrow of existing governments by military coup with the intention to replace them with a Western corporate model of governance lacking any separation of powers and leadership among its plethora of councils and sub-units. The Muslim Brotherhood’s shadowing of higher education during its formative years was consistent with its actions within Egypt’s other civil service sectors.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s highly influential version of re-Islamization assumed totalitarian features; or, as Kepel (2002) writes: “Their Islamic version of modernity entailed a ‘complete and total’ blend of society, state, culture, and religion, a blend with which everything began and ended. The social order they envisioned contained no internal contradictions. Political parties were scorned because their quarrels disturbed the unity of the Community of the Faithful [the ummah], thus weakening it in its struggle with the enemies of Islam” (p. 28). At the same time the organization sought “unity” through its vision of an “Islamic Order,” however, “the success of the Society of the Muslim Brothers derived from its capacity to muster
widely different groups in support of its program, while recruiting members through charitable activities such as dispensaries, workshops, and schools near mosques” (p. 30, italics added). As shall be illustrated throughout this chapter and the next, such behavior signifies a characteristic pattern of operation for Islamist groups all over the world. It is a behavior that is no less paradoxical in that, on one hand, it calls for “unity” and “clarity” yet, on the other hand, relies on socio-political ambiguity toward its amassing of power.

Within that context of operating through “schools near mosques” (p. 30) and other external groups such as professional associations and presses that would invariably interact with “schools near mosques” rests the foundation of the interplay between Islamism and higher education, in which twentieth-century Islamism, through its founding group, the Muslim Brotherhood, exacted higher education’s role in furthering the totalitarian goals of the movement inasmuch as the movement exacted demands on all social institutions in Egypt and the surrounding region, no matter how anti- or pro-democratic those institutions and their governments might be.

In the earliest decades of the mass social movement, what began as Egypt’s accommodation of the Muslim Brotherhood ended in the organization’s first period of state repression after student members in the organization’s paramilitary wing began agitating in and around university campuses. Scholarship on the history of the movement suggests that given the unyielding posture of the organization for Nizam Islami, or the “Islamic Order,” the organization gradually restructured itself toward militancy and subversion. Some of that restructuring appears to have been guided by Qutb’s social theory, yet some of it also appears to have been Al-Banna’s concern for
controlling conflict within the group and his interest in advancing a direct confrontation with the state, and in concert with a foreign government. “Al-Banna was an autocrat,” Miller (1996/1997) writes. “His authoritarian instincts were also the source of the group’s autocratic tendencies, its intolerance of dissent, and the political violence that ultimately gave governments the pretext to crush it—three times, in 1948, 1952, and 1954” (p. 58). “Al-Banna was in some ways a prototype of today’s modern militant Muslim—sly, ambitious, action oriented, and willing to embrace violence if it served his ends” (p. 58).

During that time, the Muslim Brotherhood began recruiting “rovers” through its various para-educational subsystems first introduced to ensure success of student members enrolled in Egypt’s educational systems. “Rovers,” or jawwalla, were trained in a legally operating organization modeled after the Boy Scouts of America. However, the rover system soon assumed a secondary purpose. The para-educational indoctrination those students received in the organization’s summer camps provided them with the requisite intellectual, spiritual, and physical training to allow for their recruitment into the Muslim Brotherhood’s Secret Apparatus (Mitchell, 1969/1993), a far more subversive underground organization than the Boy Scouts of America.

What would be a totalitarian ideology without violence committed on behalf of a loyal youth movement indoctrinated by a highly educated leadership? Eventually, as Kepel (2002) demonstrates, the ambiguity of the Muslim Brotherhood movement to appeal to the two opposing strands of populist intellectuals, Marxist and Fascist, in Egypt’s socio-educational milieu culminated in the movement’s first wave of political violence associated with the demise of the Egyptian monarchy. As with the Twentieth
Century’s other totalitarian mass movements, Communism and Nazism, the Muslim Brotherhood’s appeal to the larger society’s hatreds and prejudices against Jews also figured into the intellectual equation. In addition, at that time terrorism had become ascendant within the Muslim Brotherhood’s ranks. While one group of intellectuals unabashedly championed the practice as a laudatory feature of the Muslim Brotherhood, another group attempted to disavow terrorism by claiming that the group’s humanitarian wing bore no responsibility for the actions of the group’s terrorist wing:

The Secret Apparatus, which was the paramilitary arm of the Brothers, went so far as to practice systematic terrorism. The proponents of a fascist interpretation of the Brothers’ ideology saw in this violence a corroboration of their analysis, while those who viewed the Brothers as progressives imputed the violence to an extreme wing of the movement. (p. 29)

Mitchell’s (1969/1993) account of the Secret Apparatus (al-jihaz al-sirri) in the seminal work *The Society of Muslim Brothers* indicates that its development in the organization coincided with Al-Banna’s sense of threat to the existence of the organization. As evidence, Mitchell (1969/1993) shows how a 1942 speech by Al-Banna to his followers immediately preceded a 1942 or 1943 creation of “the special section,” as it was known inside the society, and “the secret apparatus,” outside:

“When asked what is for which you call, reply that it is Islam, the message of Muhammad, the religion that contains within it the government, and has one of its obligations freedom. If you are told that you are political, answer that Islam admits no distinction. If you are accused of being revolutionaries, say, ‘We are voices for right and for peace in which we dearly believe, and of which we are proud. If you rise against us or stand in the path of our message, then we are permitted by God to defend ourselves against your injustice.’” (qtd. in Mitchell, 1969/1993: p. 30)
The Secret Apparatus, like all elements of the Muslim Brotherhood’s organizational administrative structure maintained specific membership ranks: assistant (musa‘id), related (muntasib), active (‘amil), and struggler (mujahid). In addition, the Secret Apparatus developed as an offshoot of the specified “rovers” (jawwala) and “battalions” (kata‘ib), subgroups of “Bodily Training” who developed in the late 1930’s in response to the Muslim Brotherhood’s concerns for British activity in Palestinian territory, “the inspiration for activism within the Society” (Mitchell, 1969/1993: p. 30).

By the 1940’s, subversion on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood had begun. While the Muslim Brotherhood formally claimed to support the British in colonial Egypt when the Nazis invaded Egypt’s Western, or Libyan, desert in the 1940’s, the organization continued in informal capacity to agitate by spreading pro-Axis propaganda, largely by member students who demonstrated in favor of Erwin Rommel’s advance toward Egypt (Mitchell, 1969/1993). These students were part of the Muslim Brotherhood’s rovers and battalions, thus establishing a tradition in the organization in which militancy and education coexisted.

The result of the Muslim Brotherhood’s support of Nazi aggression in North Africa was that in 1941 the Egyptian government would accuse Al-Banna of neglecting his work as a civil servant-teacher, would suppress some of the Muslim Brotherhood’s journals, and would detain and later release certain members suspected of subversive activity. Al-Banna, in turn, adopted a public relations campaign, entreating the sub-units in his organization to propagate the idea that the Muslim Brotherhood was experiencing its first mihna (“persecution”). At the same time, Al-Banna would
establish rapport with Anwar Al-Sadat, who was among the members of the Free Officers group whose revolutionary ideas had taken root in the Egyptian army in the late 1930’s. The record indicates that Al-Sadat “had been overjoyed to see that [Al-Banna] had already started collecting arms” (p. 26), which flowed to Al-Banna through Muslim Brotherhood “agent-followers in army ranks” (p. 26).

In addition to the wartime activity against the British, in their paramilitary capacity, the rovers “more importantly preserved order within the Society and its defense against enemies from outside” (p. 202). Also called “the rover troops’ (firaq al-jawwala), the rovers were the Muslim Brotherhood’s “prime source of power, the machine by which the alleged revolution was to be effected” (p. 203). With close associations and task overlap by the Secret Apparatus with the close-knit families of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Field Apparatuses, the organization’s “spiritual-military training program was a prime inspiration to violence” (p. 203). As the result of the destabilizing terrorist actions attributed to the Secret Apparatus in the late 1940’s, a socialist order eventually assumed power in 1952, which the Muslim Brotherhood welcomed because the new government dissolved all political parties in Egypt and because of the Free Officer’s social resemblance to the Muslim Brotherhood’s well-educated leadership (Kepel, 2002).

Another element of the Brotherhood’s organizational and administrative structure that involves interplay between Islamism and higher education is what is called in British terms, the “academic branch” of the movement. By the late 1940’s academic branches shadowed nearly all academic departments in Egypt’s higher education system (Mitchell, 1969/1993). Academic Branches were also sub-units in the
organization’s overarching Field Apparatus, in turn shadowed by the aforementioned Secret Apparatus. Furthermore, their ranks overlapped with social groups outside the universities that the *Ikwhan* called “families.”

The Muslim Brotherhood’s Field Apparatuses were “the administrative channels through which the voice of high command passed to the operating membership groups and through which the membership was welded to the highly disciplined instrument it was” (pp. 175-176). The administrative unit (*al-maktab al-idari*) represented the largest unit in the field and typically “coincided with the provincial divisions used by the Egyptian government” (p. 176). That office, in turn, was partitioned into districts (*manatiq*), also imitating the organization of the Egyptian government. Mitchell (1969/1993) states that the purpose of the Field Apparatuses following provincial divisions and districts in Egypt’s government was that they “had the obvious value of benefiting from the communication lanes between and among the various divisions and sub-divisions already in official use” by Muslim Brothers who were in Egypt’s civil service.

Of course, re-Islamizing Egyptian society through the Muslim Brotherhood’s network of para-educational outlets that networked with Egypt’s formal educational institutions could not occur without the infusion of funds. For that reason, Mitchell (1969/1993) claims that the most important of all the sub-units of the Field Apparatuses was the branch (*shu’ba*); for it possessed powerful administrative roles in the form of a chairman, two deputies, secretary, and treasurer for each branch. From the very bottom levels, then, of the Muslim Brotherhood the revenues of the society were collected from the various Field Apparatuses and Technical Operations, whose
books were kept by their treasurers, and then circulated upward to the highest offices of the organization. Revenues came from a range of sources: “membership fees [collected by the family in each branch], contributions, legacies, and the profits from its economic enterprises, publications, and sales of emblems, pins, seals, and the like (p. 180-181). Designated fixed shares were dispersed up the organizational rungs. Additional funds came from non-member contributions usually in the form of endowments, gifts, land grants, buildings, and other material sponsorship. As such, Mitchell (1969/1993) writes, “The General Headquarters was, in effect, at the mercy of a strangely decentralized fiscal structure” (p. 181).

Usually the branches were named according to their geographical locations, but not always, in the case of academic branches, discussed below. Accordingly, officers and administrators of the Muslim Brotherhood were responsible to their respective offices and districts; but for most members “allegiance” was to a branch, which consisted of a council of administration elected by a general assembly “composed of registered and paid-up members of the branch” (p. 177). Regular branches Mitchell (1969/1993) describes as a “miniature headquarters” (p. 179). In reading about regular branches in Mitchell’s book, one finds that within the branches exist sections and committees that mirror other ones called Technical Operations. In other words, there were sections for, inter alia, propagation, bodily training and rovers (which were part of the Secret Apparatus), prayers, and students. And there were committees for law and policy issues, statistical information, services, and financial matters. In addition, each branch maintained a reading room, imitating the General Headquarters. Also, each branch cooperated in local educational programs and initiatives. Finally, through the
branches, “‘family’” activities could take shape, with each family consisting of five to ten members, overlapping membership with the branch, and being collectively responsible for the actions of its members. Among the activities of families were therefore disciplinary actions by branch leaders taken against members who were in violation of the Muslim Brotherhood’s principles.

The term “family,” represented the Muslim Brotherhood’s most fundamental educational enterprise for creating cohesion among the organization’s ranks. Originating in 1949, the purpose of the family was “to correct what, in their opinion, is the erroneous image of the system identifying it with the more notorious ‘cell,’ an image fostered by the extensive press campaign launched by the government” (p. 195-196). One member was elected chief (naqib) and represented his family to the branch; four families equaled a clan (‘ashira); five clans constituted a group (raht); five groups signified a battalion (katiba). The “family” system served, moreover, as means to reinforce the loyalty oath, especially as the Muslim Brotherhood became concerned about infiltration of its ranks from outside sources.

In addition, as the Muslim Brotherhood acquired new members from the universities, families increased in their importance as a means to counter the bigness of mass education: “There took the idea of unit breakdowns for the purposes of instruction in the aims and meaning of the movement” (p. 196). Often family systems overlapped in membership with the Muslim Brotherhood’s “Battalions of the Supporters of God” (kata’ib ansar Allah), numbering forty each, consisting of “workers, students, civil servants, and merchants” (p. 196). The “high command of the family system was located in the general headquarters of the family section” (p. 198).
Mitchell (1969/1993) writes that “academic branches were organized differently from the ordinary geographic branches” (p.180) that mirrored the organizational and administrative structure of Egypt’s other social and political institutions. Instead, academic branches were arranged in accordance “with university needs and organization” (p. 180). Illustrating the significance of higher education to the Muslim Brotherhood, in general, Mitchell (1969/1993) states of the academic branches:

The head of the university branch was the recognized leader of the university Brothers; his was a powerful voice in the leadership echelon of the Society in general, among the student Brothers, and among other students. Control of the position was once of the most certain assurances of mobility to the highest ranks in the Society. (p. 180)

In fact, in Cairo in the 1940’s and 1950’s some leaders of the university branches became so powerful that they incurred the animus of other Muslim Brotherhood leaders who held high positions in the organization’s ranks. They also became enemies of the state itself as they mobilized students and the communities adjacent to their universities to challenge Egypt’s various governments (Mitchell, 1969/1993).

About the academic branches, Mitchell (1969/1993) also discusses a distinct organizational pattern that mirrored the organization of Egypt’s higher education institutions. Typically, the para-organizational pattern was as follows:

Directly responsible to the university leader were the leaders of each of the various faculties; the faculties were in turn divided into groups representing each of the four years of schooling. The heads of each year-group were responsible to the faculty heads for the performance of the members of their group. This breakdown permitted an efficient organization of the university Brothers into units small enough to be rapidly assembled and large enough to be effective in their respective faculties. Liaison between faculties was in the hands of the leader of the university. Perhaps no other facet of the activity of the Brothers in the university so astounded (and infuriated) their opponents there as the ability of the leaders to communicate directions and decisions
throughout the ranks of the Brothers with such speed and to have them perfectly obeyed. (p. 180)

There was overlap between these faculties and the families, for the training of faculties translated into para-educational training for the Muslim Brotherhood’s family system, with a “more clearly defined body of learning” and a “more efficient system of teaching and teachers” (p. 200).

**Characteristic Two: Codified Education Theory for Purposes of Promoting Monolithic View of Islam and Subverting Universities and Surrounding Society from Above and Below**

The development of the organizational structure and administration of the Muslim Brotherhood discussed above coincided, according to Mitchell (1969/1993) with the recodification of the Muslim Brotherhood’s educational theory as being “scientific” and stated in more sophisticated terms that would appeal to Egypt’s civil servant professors and their students in the country’s universities. In essence, the Brotherhood thus set out to establish a hidden curriculum in higher education that over the course of several decades would evolve into a codified educational theory. That sense of “scientism” embedded in a proscribed educational doctrine is a characteristic of totalitarian movements, according to Arendt (1941/1948/1949/1951/1966/1968/1976/1979/1994).

Originally, Al-Banna framed the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideal educational curriculum for primary, secondary, and tertiary levels in terms of theological matters and also Islamic and Egyptian history (Mitchell, 1969/1993). However, the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood led to “a noticeable change in tone and emphasis” (p. 189). The education of Muslim Brothers shifted from basic religious and propagandistic
messages toward a more sophisticated tack: “This meant a more consciously ‘scientific’ approach to the problem of Islam. The section for the propagation of the message now began to make use of the talent available to it among its professional members in the fields of law, economics, society, education, chemistry, engineering, and zoology” (p. 189). In addition, Al-Banna’s death “compelled the society to look to its hitherto untapped ‘intelligentsia’ to find answers to the ever-increasingly complex challenges to its premises coming from outside its ranks. Substance, not slogans, became a priority” (p. 189).

Underpinning the movement’s interest in turning the quest for Nizam Islami—the “delicate, perfect piece of machinery” that Qutb wrote about in Social Justice in Islam--into a problem of scientific research and teaching were Technical Operations sections in the Muslim Brotherhood. These were responsible for the creation, maintenance, and dissemination of knowledge conceived within Egypt’s universities among the academic branches and their students. One of these operations sections was the movement’s library in the Brotherhood’s General Headquarters. Tellingly, the Muslim Brotherhood’s library was a gift of Egypt’s former ruling family before Farouk, and thus signified the defunct Ottoman caliphate the Muslim Brotherhoods had hoped to revive (Mitchell, 1969/1993). The library housed all publications penned by Muslim Brotherhood members. Of historical note, King Farouk’s government burned the literature written by the Muslim Brotherhood in 1948, when the group’s Secret Apparatus began instigating civil disturbances that challenged the legitimacy of the government (Mitchell, 1969/1993). The remainder of Prince Muhammad Ali’s original collection was donated to another group, the Society for Islamic Education (SIE),
which had interests in the Al-Azhar University, where some of the early Muslim Brotherhood’s leaders had been trained in Islamic studies (Mitchell, 1969/1993). In 1951, when the Muslim Brotherhood became legal again, the SIE sold the Ali collection back to the Muslim Brotherhood. Then in October 1954 the library was destroyed by fire in a riot in Cairo. The suppression, sale, resale, and burning of the library at the General Headquarters further signifies the importance of the creation and dissemination of knowledge to an educated elite interested in re-Islamizing the society and culture in which they lived.

Ideological transmission of a re-codified “scientific” doctrine also involved the Brotherhood’s *nashr al-da’wa* section for propagating the organization’s religious message. That section maintained close relations with other sections such as labor and peasants, students, liaison with the Islamic world, professions, press and translation, policy, legal issues and opinions, and services. In 1951, press and translation was relocated in the organizational structure as a committee. Sections and committees possessed both advisory and investigative roles, leaders for each group were named by the General Guide or Guidance Council, assistants were appointed by the Guidance Council, and locations were usually at the general headquarters (Mitchell, 1969/1993). Of special note is that the press and translation committee was responsible for publishing the Muslim Brotherhood’s newspaper and magazines; and collecting, filing, and translating the materials into different languages (Mitchell, 1969/1993). These particular sections and committees therefore bore a major responsibility in the spiritual and intellectual training of the members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including members in countries where Arabic was not the primary language. Mitchell (1969/1993)
states that “more important than the committees in the actual operation of the Society were the sections, because they were so intimately and directly involved in the orientation and training of the members” (p. 171). In addition, “chairmanships of most of the sections were prizes which carried with them the possibility of real power within the structure” (p. 171).

The most salient of the sections was *nashr al-da'wa*, if only because the Muslim Brotherhood’s primary interest was disseminating ideology “compatible with ‘the spirit of Islam’” (p. 171), as the Muslim Brotherhood referred to it. The educational aspects of the group’s propaganda were disseminated through “‘missionaries’ (*du’at*) for speeches and lectures, who were particularly well-trained for ‘public meetings’ outside the society; publications of a ‘scientific, cultural, and athletic’ nature, none of which might be issued by any individual Brother without authorization of the section; guidance--spiritual, mental, and physical--of each brother towards an ‘Islamic preparation’ by means of lectures, publications, and organized athletic activity” (p. 172). In addition, *nashr al-dawa* “was responsible for supplying the branches with speakers and lecturers” and provided all Field Apparatuses “with a unified schedule of study for the missionary school which each of them was to maintain, the successful graduates of which would be elevated to the level of organizational missionaries” (p. 172).

Kepel (1984/2003) devotes significant text to the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood’s press and translation section to the students section. In his analysis of the organization’s history, Kepel illustrates how throughout Egypt’s history the press and translation section, through its magazine *Al-Dawa*, motivated the ranks of
the more radicalized student members on Egyptian campuses. Buoyed up by the magazine’s staple content, tales of what Kepel calls the *Al-Dawa* editorial board’s “Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse” (in rank of abomination “Jewry,” the “Crusade,” “communism,” and “secularism”) served as a kind of predictor of incitement to violent action that would start on university campuses and then spread as a social contagion into nearby communities. As a manifestation of the students’ ideological outlook, the magazine offered “long and heavily documented articles . . . aimed at a readership of a higher intellectual level than its other competitors” (p. 104). Aside from the magazine’s journalists publishing exposés such as the one involving the forgery known as the “Richard Document” and printing instructional columns for children on the need to annihilate Jews, Kepel (1984/2003) concludes in his analysis of sixty-four months of issues:

> It need hardly be emphasized that *Al-Dawa* . . . offered readers a vast fresco depicting the triumph of Islam . . . identifying the innumerable enemies, overt or covert, whom the magazine’s journalists tracked down and denounced relentlessly in their zeal to expose the equally innumerable plots against Islam. (p. 110)

Many of the editor’s targets for blacklisting were professors, Muslim and non-Muslim, accused of contributing through their “orientalist” scholarship to the alleged condition of apostasy in Egyptian society.

The *Ikwhan* movement’s publishing history extends to the support of members in Egypt who were not Egyptians but Palestinians studying and teaching in Egypt who would become the founding members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). The result was that the *Ikwhan* publishing record, replete with a subtext of violence and call to arms, assumed a decidedly international character.
In 1979 a publishing house of the neo-Muslim Brotherhood, *Al-Mukhtar Al-Islami*, published a pamphlet written by Al-Shiqaqi, *Khomeini, the Islamic Solution and the Alternative*. Mayer (1990) documents that this work was dedicated to Muslim Brotherhood founder, Al-Banna, and Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Mayer’s analysis of the pamphlet indicates no deviation from any aforementioned discussion of Muslim Brotherhood ideology on Al-Shiqaqi’s part: he indicted Western and Eastern imperialism as a means to dominate Muslims by “confusing ideologies” and “reminded his reader that the Jews” were “enemies of Islam and agents of imperialism” likely in league with both the United States and the Soviet Union (p. 144). Al-Shiqaqi further posited that the Muslim Brotherhood movement was the “sole group that enjoyed genuine popular support” in order to “resist imperialism” (p. 145). The alliance of a Sunni fundamentalist group in Egypt and a Shi’a one in Iran belies commonly held notions on the part of Western observers that sectarian beliefs among Islamist groups in different locales preclude there being a monolithic Islam that overlooks such differences.

According to Zamel (1991), in master’s thesis approved by an interdisciplinary committee of USF professors prior to the creation of USF-WISE in 1991, Nafi “published and edited a journal, *al-Taliah al-Islamiah (The Islamic Vanguard)* specifically for the [Palestinian Islamic Jihad], which was sent to the occupied territories for reproduction, in the same shape and form, and distribution” (p. 192; see also Emerson, 2002). As noted above, the term “vanguard” derives from Qutb’s *Signposts*, the collection of writings that further radicalized the
neo-Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Nafi’s experience with *The Islamic Vanguard* also appears to have been part of a close publishing relationship that Al-Shiqqaqi and Nafi held with one another in the service of their objectives for the PIJ (Emerson, 2001b). For example, Al-Shiqqaqi’s colleague, Nafi, served on the editorial board of *Al-Mukhtar Al-Islami* (Emerson, 2001), which Kepel (2002) states is a part of the neo-Muslim Brotherhood’s “trinity” of publications and in which Al-Shiqqaqi had published the article noted above. Chapter Five findings show that former USF-WISE professor, Ramadan Shallah, cited himself as an editor of the same publication on his vita given to the university as a former editor of the same magazine.

Kepel (1984/2003) states that the Arabic title of the magazine means “Islamic Selection” and “was conceived as a kind of Muslim version of the Arabic-language edition of *Reader’s Digest*, whose typography and layout it copied” (p. 104). It was printed monthly starting in 1979 and ending in September 1981, when Egypt banned the publication because of its propaganda supporting Sheikh Ahmad Al-Mahallawi, a graduate of Al-Azhar University who had renounced teaching for preaching, “where he officiated in the great mosque Qa’id Ibrahim, not far from university campus” (Kepel, 1984/2003: p. 252). Of his relationship with the campus, Kepel further writes:

His influence on the students who came to listen to his sermons and lectures was great, and he did all he could to facilitate their reviews for exams. He even installed microscopes in the annexes of the mosque to help those enrolled in scientific disciplines, thereby implying that Islam and science were compatible. (p. 252)

Another Palestinian academic, Abd Al-Sattar Qasim, also wrote favorably of the Iranian revolution and attempted to have his work published in Egypt and in Jordan. Both countries refused to publish it in its unabridged form, but the work was published in full in 1981 in the West Bank (Mayer, 1990). Qasim and Al-Shiqaqi garnered support mainly from the Islamic Student Movement for the Islamic Jihad through their other publications like Al-Bayan in the early 1980’s. Those publications, too, “revered the teachings of Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb” (p. 153) and were disseminated on Palestinian campuses. Eventually, these new militant leaders who had spent their student days as part of Egypt’s neo-Muslim Brotherhood student cadres were arrested and released by Israeli authorities for having been charged with “membership in an illegal organization and with agitation” (p. 154). For a period of time after that Al-Shiqaqi and the other leaders in the new militant movement stopped public statements about committing jihad against Israel until 1987, when the intifada erupted (Mayer, 1990).

Mayer (1990), like Kepel (2002), illustrates that Al-Shiqaqi was not alone in Egypt in demonstrating a pro-Iranian fundamentalism, even though he was a Sunni and not a Shi’a Muslim. Muslim students at the universities in Egypt were in the habit of distributing a samizdat publication called The Voice of Islam which “applauded Iran’s revolution and its leadership” and other support came directly from the leaders of the neo-Muslim Brotherhood itself. For his views, Al-Shiqaqi and others came under close scrutiny by the Egyptian government, whose president Al-Sadat was personal friends with the Shah of Iran. Al-Shiqaqi was jailed for three months until the government was satisfied that he was not receiving support from Iran for his publication. However, his
file remained open. Mayer (1990) writes that following Al-Sadat’s assassination, Al-Shiqaqi was among the many agitators in Egypt on the government’s list for detention and interrogation; however, by that time Al-Shiqaqi had left Egypt and had returned home to the Gaza Strip.

Nafi, who interacted closely with Al-Shiqaqi while they were students in Egypt (Hatina, 2001), also could not remain in Egypt after the assassination of Al-Sadat. According to court records Mayer (1990) procured from the Egyptian government, Nafi was arrested and interrogated by the Egyptian government because he had “given refuge to a suspect in Sadat’s assassination” (p. 148). After his release, in 1982 Nafi left Egypt and went to London where he became active in the publication of a Muslim Students Federation journal, which was funded by an Iranian-run group called the Islamic Center for Studies and Publishing. Nafi maintained his relationship with Al-Shiqaqi during this time and provided copies of the publications to Al-Shiqaqi, who “distributed them in Gaza Strip mosques via Muslim students” (p. 149). These clandestine publications disseminated freely on campuses in the Palestinian territories, but especially at the Islamic University; they “leaned heavily on the writings of Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb”; and they lauded “actions such as Sadat’s assassination” (p. 149). The people Al-Shiqaqi used to distribute the publications also included employees at the Islamic University and an imam from a local mosque who doubled as a professor at the Islamic University (Mayer, 1990).

By 1984, the Sunni-Shi’a alliances forged in Egypt, Lebanon, and Gaza, largely through the leadership of Islamic Jihad organizations in those places, had become a major concern of Egyptian and Jordanian governments. In fact, at some point Nafi had
been convicted of seditious conspiracy by the Jordanian government after hearings revealed the Islamic Jihad’s role in instigating civil disorder. Indeed, Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Ubaydat told Jordan’s parliament that the transfer of explosives into Jordan from Egypt, Lebanon, and Gaza was occurring on almost a weekly basis. He further testified that those explosives were connected to groups, both inside and outside Jordan’s borders, with ties to Iran (Mayer 1990), which included the Islamic Jihad. One of the organizations was “the Jihad organization, active in Egypt, which recruited both civilian and military Jordanians to form a branch in Jordan” (p. 151).

Of course, one must study a profession before one can become a professional; and, in the Muslim Brotherhood, members in the professions, too, were to color their work with “Islamic atmosphere.” Professions sections had committee subdivisions representing also the different classes of workers in Egyptian society: doctors, engineers, lawyers, teachers, merchants, agriculturalists, social workers, journalists, and civil servants. All held membership in the larger society but remained active in professional associations involved with the universities or they worked in Egypt’s universities (Mitchell, 1969/1993). Mitchell (1969/1993) argues that the most important in Egypt were the teachers’ and civil servants’ committees “because these were the largest professions, and because of their potential role as molders of opinion and instruments of ‘a new generation of Muslims’” in Egypt’s universities and other educational outlets (p. 172).

Another section of vital significance to the Muslim Brotherhood was the liaison with the Islamic world. This section possessed the task of “spreading the message about Islam and the Brothers throughout the Muslim world” through the “existing
nation and Islamic organizations’ in the various Muslim countries”; “studying the problems of the Islamic world ‘in light of the various international political currents’ in cooperation with the policy committee of the general headquarters”; and “organizing an annual meeting to be attended by leaders and representatives of ‘the Islamic movement’ throughout the Muslim world--whether of the Society of the Brothers, or from any ‘Islamic or reform organization--to discuss matters relevant to the Muslim world and the potential unification of the rules and regulations by which the various groups governed themselves” (pp. 172-173). This section collected dossiers on each country and its demographic data and major socio-political issues. Also, it collected information of the growth of “‘the Islamic movement’ therein” (p. 173). Furthermore, it studied problems in each country “through organized research, lectures, publications, and study groups” (p. 173). Finally, the liaison section engaged in exchange of “‘missionaries’” (p. 172).

Combined with the power of the organization to make effective use of its professional talent in reinforcing the movement’s ideology and its objective to establish a pure Islamic state, the missionaries in the propagandizing sections also remained vital to the organization’s re-Islamization program. “And throughout its history the Society, in the traditional Islamic fashion, never minimized the effect of a good speaker” (p. 190). The missionaries, many who were trained in Egypt’s teachers’ colleges and received an Islamist spin on their education through the Muslim Brotherhood’s educational circles, “were required to be good speakers, though they were also expected to bring into what had been almost a purely theological operations more ‘secular’ currents of learning” (p. 190).
In accord with re-Islamization in higher education, sympathetic intellectuals of various and even oppositional stripes in Egypt’s universities supported the Muslim Brotherhood in its fledgling days. In that respect, the utility of sympathetic intellectuals who are not necessarily party members in Egypt resembles those same features that Blumer (1946/1951/1963) writes of mass social movements, generally, and that Sabine (1937/1950/1959) and R. Pipes (2001) write of Nazism and Communism, particularly.

By the 1930’s, Kepel (2002) writes, two major classes of intellectuals had found appeal in the Muslim Brotherhood, owing to the “ambiguous” nature of the movement’s stated ideology: “Left-leaning Arab intellectuals . . . regarded the Brothers as a populist movement whose aim was to enlist the masses and dilute their class awareness with a vague religious sentiment, a tactic that, ironically, played into the hands of the established order” (p. 28). Yet again, Kepel (2002) illustrates that this populist view also “pointed out similarities to the workings of European fascism during the same period, the 1930’s” (p. 28), when the Nazis had begun their period of social preparation for the Holocaust, in part, by politicizing social theory and research in Germany’s universities.

Perhaps what Kepel (2002) alludes to in that respect--he never states why, specifically--involves either the influence of the Russian forgery *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* on the Muslim Brotherhood (see discussion about the influence of the Jewish cabal theory on Muslims and totalitarian social movements in Chapter One). However, Schoenfeld (2004) offers an alternative explanation, which implies that Qutb actually had conceived of an Islamist science and education that would counter what he perceived as anti-Islamic forces that, in turn, were by-products of the Jewish cabal the
Egyptian scholar wrote about in an academic journal he had founded when he was a civil servant-professor in Egypt. In addition, Al-Banna’s Muslim Brotherhood eventually acquired a “scientific” educational theory based on Qutb’s own articulations (Mitchell, 1969/1993).

As will be shown later in this chapter, Saudi Arabian educational influence would lead to more systematically rendered versions of Islamist science and education. In that respect, Qutb again seems to have drafted the earliest of charts for such educational routes of re-Islamization vis a vis research, teaching, and publishing. A sub-section below shows that the educational theory, practice, and mission of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) closely resembles Qutb’s. Moreover, some of the IIIT’s leaders and associates were and may still be members of the Muslim Brotherhood (see Emerson, 2002; Waller, 2003; Katz, 2004; Mintz & Farah, 2004).

The prevalence of a belief in the Jewish cabal presents itself as a major theme in the Muslim Brotherhood’s teachings through both its para-educational and civil service education outlets. For example, in an essay from the early 1950’s in Al-Manar, “Our Struggle with the Jews,” Qutb contends that the de-Islamizationist intellectual power in the Arab world manifested from a secret alliance with the “Jews” who maintained “a massive army of agents in the form of professors, philosophers, doctors and researchers--sometimes also writers, poets, scientists and journalists” (Qutb, 1952/1970; qtd. in Schoenfeld, 2004: p. 42). In addition to the implication that these so-called “Jews” might be actual spies, another implication is that in his famous essay Qutb had conceived of a Jewish science not unlike the Jewish science conceived by Nazi Germany in the late twenties that saw the demise of Germany’s once great
institutions of higher learning wherein hard and soft sciences became subservient to the directives of a monolithic state doctrine (see Walker, 1995).

Qutb’s antidote for that aforementioned suffering from Jewish “double-dealing,” “wickedness,” “deception,” “plotting,” and “evil-doing” was not subjugation—-for that would only drive Jews to commit further conspiracy against Muslims--but wholesale offensive through expulsion from Arab lands and through killing. Qutb’s strategy must have had some effect on Egyptian policy because between 1944 and 2004, the population of Arab Jews in Egypt dwindled from 80,000 to 40, as post-colonial Muslim-Arab governments sequestered, lynched, and expelled their ethnic co-religionists throughout the Central Arab states and North Africa (The Forgotten Refugees, 2006).

In addition, Social Justice in Islam repeatedly underscores the need to purge education at all levels from so-called “alien” and “foreign” influences, including “Jews,” because “policies in this world cannot be divorced from such philosophies” like “the intellectual background pragmatism” which Qutb holds responsible for the U.S. and U.N. position on “the Palestine question” (pp. 292-293). Furthermore, “Our Struggle with the Jews”—a work that was re-published in Saudi Arabia for the first time in 1970 (Schoenfeld, 2004)—-even goes so far as to justify Nazi Germany’s actions as precedent for further “struggle”: “Allah brought Hitler to rule over them” and so present-day Muslims must follow in Hitler’s path, letting “Allah bring down upon the Jews people who will mete out to them the worst kind of punishment, as confirmation of his unequivocal promise” (qtd in Schoenfeld, 2002: p. 43).
The repetition of the term “struggle” to define the task also echoes, of course, another publication associated with the Nazi movement, *Mein Kampf*, translated as “My Struggle,” which was Hitler’s re-formulation of his own particular radical thought written while the future leader of Germany was in prison. Anyone who has ever read Hitler’s vision of a pan-German society in *Mein Kampf* will note immediately the ideological similarity to Qutb’s work in that both overtly blame Jews for the decline of civilization and loss of transnational unity of a group of people--Aryans for Nazism, Arabs for Islamism. Even their remedy is similar: society’s return to a pre-modern condition in which sacred and profane spheres of life, the private and the public, are rendered indivisible, religion being subsumed under the banner of the state.

*Characteristic Three: “Campus Holy War” and Other Problems Associated with Universities and Interactive Organizations toward Advancement of Re-Islamization from Above and Below*

The appeal for an “Islamic Order” (*Nizam Islami*) advanced by Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood is not a term originating in classical Islam (Tibi, 1998). In other words, “For fundamentalists, whatever they may claim, are not traditionalists: the much touted *nizam Islami* is something new that resembles more a religiously legitimated dictatorship or an otherwise totalitarian rule than it does a traditional caliphate” (pp. 141-142). Toward achieving the *Nizam Islami, Ikwhan* strategy necessitates destabilization of higher education and society itself *from above* following a longer period of destabilization *from below*, as identified in the previous two subsections of characteristics. Presented in the next paragraphs, then is a decidedly Egyptian version of Walker’s (1979) concept “campus holy war,” originally applied to
the de-Westernizing professor-led student revolts of the 1960’s and 1970’s, but representing in Egypt a battle for the hearts and minds of Muslim students, most of which centers on the intimidation of liberal intellectuals, the revision of educational curricula, and the commission of violence.

The dictatorial aspect of Islamism’s teachings, Tibi (1998) states, is precisely what leads to the blacklisting of liberal Muslim scholars in Egypt, blacklisting being another feature that Islamism shares with Fascism and Communism. Among those whom Tibi (1998) cites is Muhammad Said Al-Ashmawi, whose area of intellectual interest is the Islamic caliphate. Al-Ashmawi “bluntly states that neither in the Qur’an, as the Islamic revelation, nor in the sayings of the Prophet (hadith) does there exist religious justification for the political order of the caliphate” (pp. 156-157).

For asserting his intellectual freedom and hence the conclusion he draws about contemporary Islamic fundamentalism, therefore, “Ashmawi is among the Muslim intellectuals in Cairo hunted for his rational arguments by fundamentalists (sic)” (p. 157). Other liberal Muslim scholars targeted for attacks include Farog Foda, assassinated in 1992 for being a so-called “enemy of Islam,” and Ahmed Subhy Mansour, an Al-Azhar University graduate whose books have been banned and who himself has been jailed in Egypt, a country often considered among the most liberal in the Islamic world (http://www.freemuslims.org). Of interest, too, is that Mansour, through Cairo’s Ibn Khaldun Center, published a book called Suggestions to Revise Muslim Religion Courses in Egyptian Education to Make Egyptians More Tolerant (1999). This book, aimed at relieving Egypt of its terrorist culture, was among those banned by the censor at Al-Azhar University, who exercised an Islamic version of what
is known in American law as “prior restraint doctrine” (Hall, 2002: p. 550). In Egypt, the Al-Azhar doubles as the country’s judicial seat. The equivalent to such banning in the United States would be the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court being permitted to call any bookstore in the country for the purpose of ordering certain books to not be sold until the court had rendered further decisions about those books.

Other scholars, too, in Egypt have been the recipients of free speech and academic freedom violations. Abu Zaid, a professor of Arabic language at Cairo University, fled to Holland with his wife, also a professor, after Egypt’s re-Islamized judiciary at the Al-Azhar University issued a fatwa against Zaid, declaring him an apostate for allegedly having defamed Islam in a book the professor had written about Muhammad, Islam’s prophet. The order demanded that Zaid be divorced from his wife, against both their wishes, because under Islamic law in Egypt an apostate cannot be married to a Muslim woman (Middle East Times, 2000).

Another scholar to have experienced affronts to his sense of intellectual freedom is Saad Eddin Ibrahim, an Egyptian-American sociology professor and human rights advocate. In July 2000 he and twenty-seven others were arrested and jailed after announcing that their Ibn Khaldun Center would monitor parliamentary elections. Accused of being an American spy by Egyptian Islamists, Ibrahim was released from prison after nearly two years in prison following pressure by the U.S. State Department (MacFarquhar, Dec. 7, 2002).

Kepel (2002) augments Algar’s analysis of Qutb’s re-formulation of Islamist doctrine by stating that “this path diverged greatly from the original way of the Muslim Brothers” for it meant that “the members of society as whole were no longer viewed as
Muslims,” which in Islamic doctrine is “a very serious accusation, called _takfir_” (p. 31; see also Ramadan, 1993, in Chapter Two). The term _takfir_ derives from another, _kufr_, which applies to Muslims who are considered impure. “For those who interpret Islamic law literally and rigorously, one who is impious to this extent can no longer benefit from the protection of law. According to the consecrated expression, ‘‘His blood is forfeit,’ and he is condemned to death” (p. 31). Kepel (1984/2002) apparently regards this change in philosophy that occurred during a period in which many of the Muslim Brotherhood had been imprisoned as so significant that the French scholar invokes a new term to distinguish it: the neo-Muslim Brotherhood.

That accusation of _takfir_, the researcher notes, is precisely that which leads to the blacklisting and charges of apostasy against moderate Muslims who have spoken or published views oppositional to Islamism (see discussion about Khalid Duran’s blacklisting and _fatwa_ in Chapter One). No longer would it be just Jews who were at fault for Islam’s predicament but also Muslims with the exception of a self-anointed few. In addition, Qutb’s re-formulation of Islamist doctrine also may be the driving ideological force behind the intellectual counter-hegemony, kidnappings, and assassination of Middle East scholars at The American University at Beruit (AUB), a Western university run by so-called “Orientalist” scholars (see Said, 1978) ostensibly responsible for the _takfir_ of Lebanese society, during the Lebanese civil war (see discussion about the kidnapping of interim president David Dodge and assassination of Malcolm Kerr in Chapter One).

The rise of the vanguard in the neo-Muslim Brotherhood would, according to Qutb, occur in two stages discussed in Kepel (1984/2003). The first for a member of
this vanguard was spiritual maturation to deliver the believer from jahiliyah; the second, battle against jahiliyah society. The battle, or jihad, “encompasses this flux in totality, from the personal effort to contemplate the Book to combat arms-in-hand” (p. 54). Thereunto, Kepel (1983/2002) discusses other terms relevant to Qutb’s teachings while in prison in the 1950’s and 1960’s. One of these is bayan, or “discourse,” a kind of jihad that in Qutb’s own words “opposes [erroneous] doctrines and concepts” (p. 55). Another salient strategy of the vanguard is al-haraka, or “movement” to “remove material obstacles in the path of the vanguard” (p. 55).

Because Qutb’s writings were vague in how these terms translated into action, members of the neo-Muslim Brotherhood made their own decisions, with action usually taking the form of “coup d’etat, resocialization, or agitation on the university campuses” (p. 57). In addition, when the neo-Muslim Brotherhood members concluded they were in a period of “weakness” (istid’af) relative to the “enemy” society in which they lived, they practiced “concealment” (kitman), a doctrine that had numerous manifestations such as worshipping in mosques led by takfir imams. After a period of time, however, those worshippers might decide to make a “concealed advance” (al-haraka bi’l-mafhum), with “the group’s objectives being revealed little by little to initiates alone, depending on their degree of initiation” (p. 75). Eventually, the advance might take on the characteristics of a direct challenge to society during a “phase of power” (marhalat al-tamakkun), which in a mosque might mean a leadership coup, or in a society, a student demonstration or a coup d’etat. If advancement resulted in objections or repression by the jahiliyah society, then the so-called “vanguard” might retreat into another concealment phase.
Kepel’s analysis of the social history of a document published in an official magazine, *Al-Dawa*, by the neo-Muslim Brotherhood’s press and translation section in the early 1980’s implies how the neo-Muslim Brotherhood employs the doctrine of concealed advance through the use of special language (“signposts”) to the vanguard. In magazine publication, part of that special communication involves the use of blacklisting perceived enemies of Islam, an action that perhaps owes its origins to Al-Banna when he was blacklisting Muslims in the countryside in the Society for the Prevention of the Forbidden. The document in question was composed anonymously for *Al-Dawa* during a time when President Al-Sadat had made peace with Israel and had established a rapprochement with the Bishop of Egypt’s Christian Coptic Church. It is described in Kepel (1984/2003) by the name given to it by the neo-Muslim Brotherhood members after its publication: the “Richard Document.”

Actions signifying cooperation and compromise among religions such as the so-called “shameful peace with the Jews” taken by Al-Sadat contradicted the neo-Muslim Brotherhood’s objectives to purge Muslim lands of foreign groups and religions. Perennially, too, Muslim Brotherhood members drew a conspiratorial line between the alleged Jewish cabal (that allegedly created the “Crusader” conspiracy) and “orientalist” voices in the academy, whom the publishing organ of the neo-Muslim Brotherhood claimed were spies working for a cadre of enemy agents: “We must be aware from the start that the enemies of Islam are the gang of liars represented by today’s colonialist trinity (*thaluth*): Jewry, communism, and capitalism. For fourteen centuries, Our Koran has warned that the Community of infidels (*millat al-kufr*) was one” (*Al-Dawa*, qtd. in Kepel, 1984/2003: p. 117).
In effect, the researcher notes, the initial appearance of the Richard Document in printed form, followed by later reference to it after its contents had captured the popular imagination of neo-Muslim Brotherhood members and their community enclaves along the Nile River, shows how veiled language and hints of enemy conspiracy culminate in a “concealed advance” by the vanguard. It also supports the observations of so many of the social psychologists in Chapter Two (Grauman, 1987; Groh, 1987; Zukier, 1987; Wulff, 1987; Pruitt, 1987; Post, 1990/1998; Beck, 1999) who discuss how the language of conspiracism helps members of militant social groups to suspend their traditional forms of moral logic that would otherwise hold their potential to commit violence in abeyance.

Concealed advance in the case of the Richard Document took the initial form of a family vendetta and then became associated with a larger conspiracy to re-Islamize Egypt from above. Kepel’s (1984/2003) description is worth examining at length. The Richard Document has its origins in the student demonstrations of the neo-Muslim Brotherhood in Minya in 1980, which are discussed below in a section about the birth of the Islamic Jihad. Kepel (1984/2003) writes:

The work of orientalists constitutes one component of the Crusade conspiracy, as is indicated by a mysterious “Richard document” supposedly passing instructions to Christians which featured prominently in the confessional incidents that occurred in Minya in 1980. The “Richard” in question is Richard P. Mitchell, an American orientalist and author of a major work on the Muslim Brethren, *The Society of Muslim Brothers* (1969). At the origin of this affair we find the hand of [editor] Talmasani’s friends, who in 1979 confected what might be called “the Mitchell case.” Before that date, the neo-Brethren harboured no particular hostility to the American historian, and were even somewhat proud that a work of this quality had been devoted to the society founded by Hasan al-Banna. At first the work was noted in *al-Dawa* and even recommended to readers. (p. 118)
The date in which the change of sympathy for Mitchell and his writing is of great interest, given the event touched upon in Chapter One about the assassination of American University at Beruit president Malcolm Kerr. As Kramer (2001) documents in the work *Ivory Towers on Sand*, in 1978 the work *Orientalism* by the late Edward Said, a pro-Palestinian Christian, appeared in print and, according to Muslim scholars at AUB who were assessing local events, Said’s book provided another justification for Islamists in Lebanon to cause harm to Muslim and non-Muslim scholars critical of Islamic militancy. As stated in Chapter One, those scholars’ predictions proved accurate. Might Said’s book have served the editors of *Al-Dawa* in 1979 in a similar capacity?

Be that as it may, in 1979 when Mitchell was in Cairo for a year-long sabbatical, *Al-Dawa* “published a ‘document’ written in Arabic and ‘addressed by the writer to the head of the secret services of the American Central Intelligence Agency’; it called for the urgent destruction of the Islamicist movement by the Egyptian state” (p. 118). Kepel’s next observations arguably illustrate how one “signpost” (the Richard Document) drew members of the vanguard out of their concealment, in turn allowing them to extrapolate out a larger meaning encoded in the document, which was that “orientalist Crusaders” from the United States were conspiring to destroy Islam:

It was far from clear why the American professor, even if he had been a CIA agent, would correspond with an American official in Arabic. *Al-Dawa* was unable to answer the denials issued by both Mitchell and the American embassy in Cairo. But the point had been made, and a year and a half later, in Minya, the “Richard document” was said to be the ultimate cause of persecution of Muslims organized by the Crusaders. Young readers of *Al-Dawa* in Minya felt there could be no truth to the denials: Mitchell was a CIA agent and the Christians were his fifth column. (pp. 118-119)
Kepel (1984/2003) then analyzes three more articles that appeared in the magazine just before student-initiated riots erupted in a few cities along the Nile River, including Minya and Cairo. According to the magazine:

It seems that “the Copts of Egypt are the happiest minority in the world; all their material and moral rights are not only protected, but extended.” They lived in perfect harmony with the Muslims and enjoyed the enviable status of dhimmi: “Everything was for the best until Shenouda became patriarch of the Copts of Egypt. Then phenomena appeared the like of which had never before been seen: we heard it said that Egypt was Coptic and that there was no place for Muslims, and so on.” (p.119)

Kepel (1984/2003) further allows from his analysis that the “articles in Al-Dawa denounced foreign powers, in particular Copts living in America, for having incited the world’s happiest minority to arrogance and defiance. The traditional distinction between good Christians who submit to Islam and evil Crusaders was obliterated in the heat of the moment: one article went so far as to suggest an indiscriminant boycott of all shops belonging to Copts” (p. 119). In the same breadth, however, the magazine’s editor wrote, “Love is the symbol of the Society of Muslim Brethren” (qtd. on p. 124).

Setting apparent rhetorical contradictions aside, Kepel (1984/2003) concludes that the violence-oriented neo-Muslim Brotherhood students initially could not strike out at the state that their organization sought to undermine through its organizational and administrative system of ideological propagation; so they instead set their sights on minority Christians, scapegoating Egypt’s minority Copts in various actions that came on the heels of articles published in Al-Dawa, giving them tacit clearance. Although Kepel does not state so directly, the implications of his description of social history are strong: to radicalized students supporting the tenets of the neo-Muslim Brotherhood,
those articles were “signposts” that articulated in coded message what kind of action the elect “vanguard” Muslims in Egypt must take based on about the condition of the ummah. Approaching the so-called “phase of power,” the students could challenge certain parts of society through “orientalist” blacklisting and Christian lynching; but if more “signposts” appeared in print media that tacitly assumed the conditions were right for state challenges, then the vanguard students could take direct action against lesser state apparatuses like the Minya police station in 1980.

Kepel (1984/2003) dramatizes how another “signpost” in the form of a leaflet published by the jama’at al-islamiyyah (discussed in greater detail below) proffered incentive to proceed further in a direct attack against the state. This leaflet was more than a “signpost” to take a concealed advance; it showed in coded language that a direct attack on Egypt itself was imminent: “The leaflet concludes by suggesting, in the form of a purely rhetorical question, that Sadat, having received his orders from the White House, is now applying the instructions of the ‘Richard Document’ and that a top-level functionary, the Christian governor of Southern Sinai, is providing his coreligionist with their automatic weapons” (p. 161). This leaflet appeared about one year before Al-Sadat’s assassination, an action itself committed by another vanguard of student neo-Muslim Brotherhood members and their associates in the Egyptian army who felt that they could be successful in waging a wholesale coup d’ etat.

In Minya, if interpreted as a “signpost” that the phase of power was nigh, the leaflet tacitly signified that the students should destabilize their own locality in advance of possible future attacks against the country’s highest seats of government. Apparently, as Kepel (1984/2003) concludes, the students in Minya had “access to
arms depots” and were able “to turn the traditional violence into political violence against the state, in this case the siege of a police station in a large city” (p. 161). The same kind of violence would be committed by similar student groups in Asyut during four days of armed rebellion after Al-Sadat’s assassination.

Other violent splinter groups of the Muslim Brotherhood formed in response to Al-Sadat’s rapprochement with the Islamist movement in Egypt. Among their actions, especially after 1977 when “The Believing President” traveled to Israel to make peace, were the kidnapping and murder of an Islamic cleric by a radical group called the Society of Muslims and sometimes the Al Takfir wa-l Hijra (“Excommunication and Hegira”). “This group sent shock waves through the Muslim world far beyond Egypt, and the term takfiri (one who excommunicates other Muslims) passed into colloquial Arabic as a description of the more sectarian elements of the movement, which had been hatched in Nasser’s penal colonies by students arrested during the 1965 police raids” (Kepel, 2002: p. 84). The leader of this movement was Shukri Mustafa, an agricultural engineer who believed that nobody except his own followers was a true Muslim.

Buoyed up by the incendiary publications that blacklisted Egyptian and foreign “orientalist” professors in alleged collaboration with the Jewish-Crusader conspiracy (see sub-section on the Richard Document above) and by the denunciation of the Al-Azhar University by Egypt’s own military prosecutor in Shukri’s trial, dissatisfied students would foment civil conflict in most major cities along the Nile. In turn, Al-Sadat dissolved the Egyptian Students’ Union, confiscated their property, closed their summer camps, and censored Al-Dawa, the Muslim Brothers’ magazine (Kepel, 2002).
“After Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem and the signing of peace with Israel, the foreign policy of the Egyptian government came head to head with the fundamental tenet of Islamists, *including those of its moderate wing*: namely, hostility to Jews in general and to the Jewish state in particular” (p. 88).

Not to be stopped, however, the students resorted to more secretive actions in Egypt’s major cities “with the more politically inclined militants” coalescing “under the aegis of a shadowy group called Jihad” (p. 86). This group appears to be the reconfiguration of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Secret Apparatus, a terrorist version of the organization’s Field Apparatuses, which also were led by student members and their campus advisors. The major theorist for this group was a Qutb-inspired electrical engineer, Abdessalam Al-Faraq, who penned the work *The Neglected Duty*, which posited that the *ulama* were required to declare *jihad* against any ruler who had failed to implement Islamic law. Thus, Al-Faraq deemed Al-Sadat an apostate for he “fed at the tables of imperialism and Zionism” (qtd. in Kepel, 2002: p. 86). Moreover, Al-Faraq condemned moderate Muslims for their alleged capitulation with Egypt’s political process that the radicals were trying to weaken and overthrow. *The Neglected Duty*, the Richard Document, and other forgeries published in *Al-Dawa* spurred a conspiracy to assassinate Al-Sadat and foment mass uprisings in Egyptian cities. Those uprisings were crushed by Al-Sadat’s successor, Vice President Hosni Mubarak, whose government immediately sent army paratroopers into Egypt’s major cities to hunt down Egypt’s Islamist students and their mentors.
In the months after Al-Sadat’s murder, the ulama at Al-Azhar University sought through their scholarship and teaching to prove Al-Faraq’s treatise a “deviant” form of Islam:

The ulemas pushed their claim that they alone were competent to interpret the great texts of Islamic tradition, which were beyond the grasp of ordinary “ignorant” people led by graduates in electrical engineering. (p. 87)

Nevertheless, damage to Egyptian society had been done and divisive Islamism would remain in Egypt, with the most significant terrorist attack after Al-Sadat’s assassination there occurring in November 1997 with the massacre of Western tourists and Egyptian security guards at the Temple of Hatsheput in Luxor. Egypt’s economy has not recovered since that attack and slid into further decline following the September 11 attacks in the United States (2002, personal communication with Abdelwahab Hechiche).

Some scholars describe the Islamic Jihad and its affiliated organizations as cultural groups who perform good works for dispossessed people. They also describe those groups’ acts of violence as “spectacular operations” perpetrated by “freedom fighters” (see, for example, Hiltermann, 1991; Abu-Amr, 1994). Or, in other words, those scholars dodge the term “terrorist acts” even though the political violence committed by takfir groups bear no conformity to Geneva warfare conventions that would designate them in a legal sense as “freedom fighters” (see footnote, Chapter One). Public record dating back to the mid-1970’s suggests bona fide terrorist activity for re-Islamizing Egypt from above, starting with the country’s higher education institutions. This section shows that the radicalism of Egypt’s intelligentsia not only involved native Egyptians but also foreign nationals, a strong number of whom were of
Palestinian heritage. Sivan (1990) states that scholars have devoted scant attention to
the role of Palestinian students in the takfir groups’ attempts to re-Islamize Egypt, its
university system notwithstanding.

While Kepel (2002) suggests that the violence of the student takfir groups
erupted in 1977, Egypt saw earlier incidents involving this “revolutionary” group of
Islamist cells. One example was the attempted takeover of the Military Technical
Academy at Heliopolis, a suburb of Greater Cairo. While the attempted takeover was
against the state of Egypt, it was perpetrated by Palestinian students residing in Egypt
whose goal was to liberate Egypt from its condition of jahiliyah. This is a point of
history often missed by observers sympathetic to the objectives of Palestinian militant
Islamic groups who object to the existence of the state of Israel. Palestinian students’
objectives stretched far beyond their sense of injustice toward the establishment of the
Jewish state and into the arena of forcing conformity of a monolithic religious doctrine
that all Muslims in all societies should practice. In other words, their view of Islam as a
total way of life was immersed in the Islamist discourse of Qutb and the Muslim
Brotherhood.

Sullivan and Abed-Kotob (1999) show that the attempted takeover of
Heliopolis’ military academy was supposed to lead to a general coup against the Al-
Sadat government, making the terrorist act the first of its kind during the Al-Sadat
failed assault was against a military institution by a group calling itself the Islamic
Liberation Party (ILP), resulting in the execution of its leader, Salih Al-Siriyyah, a
Palestinian student from Jordan who studied at the Al-Azhar University. Other students
involved in the attack were forced underground, recreating their cause in other Islamic Jihad groups along the Nile River and directly through the use of religious student associations in Egypt’s universities. Among those students were other Palestinians, Salim Al-Rahhal, Kamal Al-Sa’id Habib, and Muhammad ‘Abd Al-Salam Faraq.

According to Sullivan and Abed-Kotob (1999), most were engineering students with advanced degrees in their fields; their concerns about Egyptian society were “ethical and moral” (p. 82), an understatement that hints at the re-formulation of Islamist thought by Qutb and his adherents noted above. As part of the Gamaat Islamiyah, they sought university policy changes regarding women’s dress codes, curriculum, and segregation of the sexes. In an interview, one leader, Tal’at Al-Qasim, recollects that in the mid-1970’s:

The group worked to change the munkar (that which is forbidden) and after some destruction of property they got a law passed banning alcohol. It was after that these activists formed a real organization. In Minya University in 1977-78, they took over the student union. (qtd.in Mubarak, 1996: p. 56)

In Egypt, according to Hoveyda (1998), individuals who wished not to conform to the demands of Islamist students often were harassed into conformity and silence.

The student uprisings began in 1972 when “the growing current of political activism was beginning to develop into a fully-fledged movement (Abdallah, 1985: p.176). In tacit reference to neo-Muslim Brotherhood activities, Abdallah (1985) writes that the “formation of a variety of societies helped to provide students with a platform for collective activities and discussions” (p. 176). These collective meetings were called “Families” (Abdallah, 1985: 176). While Abdallah (1985) does not draw the connection, the “Families” he describes signify the lower rungs of the academic branches of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Field Apparatus:
While some were primarily social and cultural gatherings, usually called “Families” and supervised by a member of the teaching staff, others were overtly political. The most prominent political group was the Society of the Supporters of the Palestinian Revolution (SSPR), established in Cairo’s Faculty of Engineering by a group of activists, some of whom had previously visited Palestinian camps and guerilla groups in Jordan. (pp. 176-177)

That activism was the direct result of dissatisfaction of the Egyptian-Israeli War of 1967, in which students were demanding that Egypt recover lost territories now occupied by Israeli forces. Abu-Amr (1994) documents that this type of professor- and student-led paramilitary support for the Palestinian cause dates back to the 1930’s, when Al-Banna authorized tactical support and supply lines through the Sinai desert into the Levant. Even as the Al-Sadat government was openly supporting those students to check Marxists influences, however, Islamist student uprisings in 1972 led to the creation of a commission in Egyptian Parliament regarding their activities and to the arrest of the Youth of Islam’s faculty leader Issam Al-Ghazali. The final parliamentary report condemned the movement, for it consisted of “a small minority whose illegitimate activities were ignored by the vast majority of students” (report qtd. in Abdallah, 1985: 202). Moreover, the parliament alluded to wall-magazine articles that “included articles violating moral and religious values . . . articles calling for violence and agitation . . . and articles exceedingly frivolous” with many of the articles “prepared outside and not inside the university” (pp. 202-203). Finally, the report stated that “the university campuses have become accessible to strangers who do harm to university traditions and to students” (p. 203).

As the years passed, the Gamaat Islamiyah would amass greater political presence on Egypt’s campuses, such that by 1976 “they had become one of the three principal groupings of the student movement opposing the regime on clear ideological
grounds,” and “between 1977 and 1981 they became the dominant force, managing to win increasing numbers of seats in Student Union elections, which they swept in a landslide in the academic year 1978/1979” (p. 227-227). Abdallah (1985) concludes that despite the Muslim students’ successes in gaining wide support for their re-Islamization program:

The central obstacle to their creation of a coherent student movement was not so much their views, which many see as “extreme,” but their tactics against those who held different views or did not behave as good Muslims. Acts like forcing the separation of the sexes in lecture halls, breaking up the meetings of their opponents, tearing down their posters, and so on served to display fundamentalist muscle but alienated rising numbers of students, leaving the student movement as a source of disturbance rather than as a real source of influence in national politics. The fact that some fundamentalists realized this and acted more democratically does not alter the general picture or exonerate the fundamentalist current as a whole from responsibility for making a shambles of the universities and for causing the energies of the activists to be wasted in internal squabbling. (pp. 227-228, italics added)

Minimizing the more disruptive elements of the Gammat Islamiyah involved myriad and sometimes conflicting policies and actions, especially by the time the 1979 revolution in Iran further exacerbated the students’ resolve in Egypt (Abdallah, 1985): checking identity cards on campuses, appeal to university professors and Islamic scholars, wholesale government repression, political reform, and accommodation of the neo-Muslim Brotherhood.

Qutb’s radical ideology also held enormous influence on a core group of young men who would become the founding members of the Islamic Jihad and its factional offshoots in the early to mid-1970’s, but that would claim official formation much later in the 1980’s. The United States and all other European nations consider the Islamic Jihad an international terrorist group (see www.statedepartment.us). The men Hatina (2001) cites are Dr. Fathi Abd Al-Aziz Al-Shiqqi (first Secretary General of
the Islamic Jihad; brother of Khalil Shiqaqi, a political science professor and pollster inside the Palestinian territories; Dr. Bashir Nafi (aka, Shamim A. Siddiqi and Ahmed Sadiq, in exile in London; convicted of seditious conspiracy in Jordan); Dr. Ramadan Abdullah Shallah (an economist; current Secretary General of the Islamic Jihad); and Dr. Sami Al-Arian (computer science professor; chief of North American Islamic Jihad).

Given Hatina’s (2001) accounts, one may deduce that the Islamic Jihad started as a student movement led originally by this core circle of men, with the elder Fathi Al-Shiqaqi, a medical student who lived among them in Cairo’s Ayn Shayms district, acting as their mentor:

The historic roots of the Islamic Jihad go back to a group of students [see above] from the Gaza Strip, many of them members of the Brothers, who were enrolled in universities in Egypt in the 1970’s. They were influenced by the activity of militant Islamic groups such as Al-Jihad and Shabab Muhammad (Muhammad’s Youth), and the Islamic Associations (Al-Jama’at Al-Islamiyya) based in the campuses. . . . In Egypt, [Al-Shiqaqi] came into contact with a group of Palestinian students [cited above] who had no cohesive ideological outlook or political experience and were studying in various fields. (p. 24)

Fathi Al-Shiqaqi was born in Gaza but moved to Egypt where in 1974 he entered medical school at the University of Zaqqaziq. His decision to become a medical doctor stems from his father having died of cancer in the mid-1960’s (Sivan, 1990). Al-Shiqaqi studied in Egypt for seven years, from 1974-1981, and became a part of the neo-Muslim Brotherhood’s students circles (Mayer, 1990). Following the Arab defeat in the wars with Israel, “the advent of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1978, and the worried reaction of the West, seems to have greatly impressed young Al-Shiqaqi, as well as many other Muslim students” (p. 144).
Characteristic Four: Transnational Influence of Islamism and its Esprit de Corps through the Migration of Professors and Students to Other Locales

Kepel (2002) states in a few sentences in *The Trail of Political Islam* that starting in the 1970’s, Muslim Brothers from Egypt re-located to locales like Algeria and Tunisia, where societies were in the process of restructuring during their periods of post-colonialism. Given Mitchell’s (1969/1993) seminal account of the movement’s organizational development, the precedent for that activity likely emanates from the Muslim Brotherhood’s sending of academic missionaries from its liaison section to study and report on the needs of Muslims in other world regions, and to encourage Muslims from other regions to connect with the movement’s Cairo headquarters. The liaison section “provided a kind of haven for those of the many hundreds of ‘foreign’ Muslim students who found themselves in sympathy with the ideals of the movement” (p. 173). Mitchell (1969/1993) writes, too, that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood regarded these foreign students as potential “missionaries” who were urged to join the organization’s other factions in other countries. Finally, the liaison section managed the General Headquarters’ library, functioning as “a clearinghouse for the literatures of the various ‘Islamic movements’ throughout the Muslim world” (p. 174). In effect, that migration of professors and students equates to the Brotherhood’s amassing of an esprit de corps of fellow travelers contributing to the growth of the movement on transnational levels.

In addition to the customs of the liaison section, other factors for the movement’s transnational influence of its ideology and esprit de corps arose later in the movement’s development in the 1970’s. In the wake of group repression by Nasser and
later Al-Sadat, some members in the Brotherhood’s ranks fled to other countries to escape prosecution (Kepel, 2002). Other nations welcomed them as political refugees in exchange for academic talent (Berman, 2002). However, another factor engendering Islamism’s transnational influence involves Egypt’s high unemployment rates which caused “young men, with college degrees and other advanced training to turn to militant Islam when their hopes of marriage, a decent home, and fulfilling work were dashed” (Miller, 1996/1997: p. 55). Those young men, in turn, became the so-called “Afghan Arabs” of Al-Qaeda, who after the Cold War, then either returned to their home countries or traveled yet again to other places like Bosnia or the United States with the requisite commitment and training to re-Islamize those locales, too (Berman, 2003). This Qutb-inspired hijra of educated leaders and followers became part of the Islamist lecture circuit in North America in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s that Steven Emerson would expose in 1994 as having ties to academics at The University of South Florida (see Emerson, 1994; Emerson, 2002). Most of those individuals, including Sami Al-Arian, had been indoctrinated into the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood in their native countries before creating newer militant offshoots of the parent organization (Waller, 2003).

In a lecture at USF in 2002, Edward Walker, former U.S. ambassador to Egypt, spoke of the connection between Egyptian higher education and Al-Qaeda in a manner that illustrates the process of transnational migration among Egypt’s highly-educated militants. When asked “How does Middle Eastern higher education exacerbate conflict in the Middle East?” Walker explained that in Egypt the most sought-after graduate programs are medicine first; engineering, second; and education, third. However, only
undergraduates from wealthy families can afford to pay for private tutoring that would help them pass entrance exams to those programs, so less privileged students seeking admission to graduate programs are compelled to seek tutoring in nearby mosques, and those mosques that offer tutoring services for university exams typically maintain a radical fundamentalist character.

Walker, during his 2002 lecture, also claimed that those tutorial services do not come without a price: students gradually come to accept the non-accommodationist doctrines of the “political imams” who lead those mosques. As the popular Egyptian saying suggests: “In Egypt, if you want something, you must give something.” Therefore, the price exacted by political imams on students needing tutoring for college entrance exams is, as Hatina (2001) also notes, the taking of loyalty oaths both to their political imam and to a politically-charged religious doctrine that effectually makes offensive \textit{jihad} a “sixth” pillar of Islam unmentioned in either the Koran or other traditional Islamic sources of exegesis like the Hadith.

Walker stated further that this scenario exacerbates conflict in the Middle East because many of the students who joined Egypt’s radical mosques in the 1970’s and 1980’s became the so-called “Afghan Arabs” of Al-Qaeda who are now dispersed all over the world in both Islamic and non-Islamic societies. If one accepts that sometimes cultural groups who emigrate to other countries replicate in some manner the beliefs and traditions of their native cultures, then why not those students acculturated to the beliefs and traditions of the neo-Muslim Brotherhood? Bergen (2002) notes that these highly educated but militant “Afghan Arabs” have returned to their native countries since the end of the Afghan-Soviet War, or to other countries if their native countries
refused them, with intentions to commit terrorist actions designed to establish Islamic rule through the process that Islamists commonly call “Islamization of knowledge and society from above and below.”

In addition, the associations of the majority of well-known Islamists and their terrorist counterparts not only involve educational attainment in certain fields of study, with the assistance of nearby radical mosques, but also involve activity in student-led organizations. For example, Mohammad Atta, the leader of the Al-Qaeda cell responsible for the 9/11 attacks, born in 1968, was of a middle-class Cairo family who could afford to send him to study in Germany, where the technology student took seven years to graduate with a four-year degree at the Hamburg Technical Institute, where Atta founded an Islamic student group. Bergen (2001) also adds that another two of the student group’s fifty members also joined Atta’s conspiracy to level the World Trade Center and other U.S. landmarks in 2001.

Section II:

Saudi Arabia’s Higher Educational Interplay of Corporate Wealth and Muslim Brothers in Exile: Conditions and Characteristics

Conditions of Islamism’s Interplay in Higher Education

Condition One: Transnational Influence of Islamist Thought and its Esprit de Corps through the Migration of Ikwhan Professors and Students to Saudi Arabia

The transnational influence of Islamist thought and its esprit de corps through the migration of Ikwhan professors and students, a characteristic of Islamism’s interplay with higher education in Egypt, hence becomes a condition of that same
interplay in Saudi Arabia and other locales studied. Qutb’s re-formulation of Islamist ideology led to new lines of intellectual battles that started in the prison cells of the Nasser government and then spread to the Muslim Brotherhood’s countries of exile, where the outcast leaders of the group to other countries would become the teachers and university professors of future Islamists (Algar, 2000; Kepel, 2002; Gold, 2003). Evidently, exiled leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood fared better than those such as Qutb, who remained in Egypt and would eventually face torture and public execution. Those leaders, qualified to teach in colleges and universities, would take Qutb’s ideology to other countries starting in the late 1950’s, thereby exacting greater influence and garnering more power throughout the Middle East and, later, the world.

Outside Lebanon, Syria, West Bank, Gaza, Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan perhaps the most important country or territory to which members of the Muslim Brotherhood were exiled was Saudi Arabia, if only because that country had adopted another similar version of political Islam commonly known as Wahhabism that Saudi Arabia in turn could afford to export to other countries, literally and eventually on a global scale, because of the oil-rich nation’s accumulation of wealth in the Twentieth Century (for extended discussions about Wahhabism, see Bergen, 2001; Algar, 2002; Rashid, 2002; Schwartz, 2002; Trifkovic, 2002).

However, as Gold (2004) traces through examination of historical record, Saudi Arabia could not have exported its own radicalized version of Islam had it not imported a class of highly educated professors who were, first and foremost, members of the Muslim Brotherhood exiled from Nasser’s Egypt and also other countries like Syria and the Sudan; and, second, fully immersed in a cross-pollination of Al-Wahhab’s and
Qutb’s intellectual thought and teaching through socio-educational channels such as mosques, universities, student organizations, professional organizations, and academic journals. This reformist educational process may represent one of the most dramatic but unstudied aspects of globalization.

In effect, Gold’s analysis points to a second transcultural merger of Wahhabi and Muslim Brotherhood doctrines that renewed itself in the 1960’s and 1970’s, leading to new developments in the re-Islamization program especially through educational channels, international students associations, and youth movements. As Moussalli (1992) supports, the use of education is vital to what Qutb calls zalzalah, or “shaking,” or “revolution,” considered essential to the rebuilding of civilization under a puritanical Islamic interpretation. While zalzalah is strong, it is not violent but comes directly through the process of education, or by teaching the “true Islam” and by refuting “Western ideologies” (Qutb qtd. in Moussalli, 1992: p. 203). The researcher notes that zalzalah, if viewed as an aspect of re-Islamization from below, maintains important implications for education theory promulgated by theorists associated with the Saudi-funded International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) and also by various theorists from Iran. Saudi Arabia’s and Iran’s most significant texts of education theory are deconstructed in other sections and subsections in this chapter. Examples of that educational theory put into practice, in the form of an original documents analysis of Sami Al-Arian’s magazine Inquiry, which specifically targets an “intellectual” audience, are cited in Chapter Five.

The aforementioned next phase of re-Islamization as conceived by Qutb also corresponds to Blumer’s (1946/1951/1963) theory of mass social movements in terms
of the kinds of sub-institutional apparatuses needed to enlist new recruits and to widen
a social movement’s base of support, the *esprit de corps*. Furthermore, the next phase
also supports Blumer’s (1946/1951/1963) position that intellectuals therefore are
critical to the formulation of thought in advancing mass social movements.

“Certainly among the fashionable postmodernists and multiculturalists in the
West, I fail to see a commitment to Western civilization. . . . In this framework, owing
to the spread of cultural relativism, it seems no longer possible, for instance, to defend
human rights as universal rights,” (Tibi, 1998: p. 46) asserts. “It was once considered
progress when sociologists—along the lines of the *sociology of knowledge* developed by
Karl Mannheim—determined knowledge to be embedded in the social conditions from
which it grew. But it is a setback to the sociology of knowledge to apply this very
approach to cultures, as some anthropologists do in speaking of an *anthropology of
the de-Westernizationist drive of the Islamic fundamentalists” (p. 47), a point to which
the researcher will return in an analysis of higher education theory and practice, “the
Islamization of knowledge,” published in seventy languages by a Saudi Arabian
publishing group in Riyadh.

In an interview with Abdul Wahab Al-Anesi in Yemen, December 2000,
Bergen (2001) briefly notes that Islamist leaders come from two classes of educational
attainment: the older generation usually studied at Cairo’s Al-Azhar University,
Egypt’s seat of Islamic learning; the younger, at other universities in Egypt where they
studied technical subjects like medicine, engineering, and business—as opposed to
traditional Islamic scholasticism and textual exegesis. Thus, Bergen (2001) states that
one should not be surprised that Osama bin Laden’s top aide, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, is a medical doctor from upper-class Egyptian stock; that his military advisor in the United States also graduated from an Egyptian university with a psychology degree before becoming a computer network analyst in California; and that another Al-Qaeda official studied electrical engineering in Iraq.

One of those leaders who came to Saudi Arabia was Sayyid Qutb’s brother, Muhammad Qutb, who became a professor of Islamic studies at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah (Gold, 2004). In fact, Osama bin Laden himself was one of Muhammad Qutb’s students (Gold, 2004). In addition to Muhammad Qutb, the infamous “Blind Sheikh” of Egypt, Omar Abdul Al-Rahman, later convicted for conspiracy to blow up various New York City landmarks in the 1990’s, lived in Saudi Arabia between 1977 and 1980 and taught at a girl’s college in Riyadh after having been imprisoned in Egypt several times under both Nasser’s and Sadat’s governments (Gold, 2004).

Noted above, Al-Zawahiri was a professor of medicine whom the Saudis accepted on a work visa even though he had served a jail sentence in Egypt for his involvement in the assassination of Anwar Al-Sadat (Gold, 2004). He was among many Ikwhan members who sought refuge in Saudi Arabia following periods of violence committed on the part of terrorist cells they aided and abetted. An appendix in Marc Sageman’s *Understanding Terror Networks* (1995) indicates that twenty out of thirty-two of Al-Qaeda’s central staff are Egyptians from the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), another offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. These men represent the highly-educated theoretical base of Al-Qaeda, the most talked about but certainly not the only
terrorist element of the Islamist mass movement. While the world focuses on places like Afghanistan and Iraq as terrorist-sponsoring states, it might well consider that Egypt, considered the intellectual center of the Islamic world, has produced the majority of today’s leading theoreticians and strategic leaders in the global salafi jihad network.

Archival evidence shows that Muhammad Qutb, in addition to teaching, edited and published his brother Sayyid’s writings while working as a professor of Islamic studies in Saudi Arabia (Gold, 2004). Thus, Sayyid Qutb’s call for Muslim expansion throughout the world through militant jihad was re-invigorated in Saudi Arabian Islamic studies: “He who understands the nature of this religion [Islam] will understand the need for the activist push of Islam as a jihad of the sword alongside a jihad of education” (Qutb qtd. in Sagiv, 2000, Fundamentalism and Intellectuals in Egypt, 1973-1993).

In addition to the Muslim Brothers from Egypt who migrated to Saudi Arabia in the mid-1960’s, however, were those members who had earlier established the Palestinian faction of the same group (Gold, 2004). Those members included Abu Jihad (aka Khalil Al-Wazir), who founded the Palestinian Fatah movement. In addition, Yasser Arafat, who in 1948 fought with Muslim Brotherhood paramilitary units in Egyptian-controlled Gaza, applied for a Saudi work visa. Arafat holds a PhD in engineering from Cairo University, but then moved to Kuwait before returning to the Palestinian territories to lead the PLO in the late 1960’s (Gold, 2004). Moreover, neo-Muslim Brotherhood members from the group’s Syrian faction came to teach in Saudi Arabia during the Saudi government’s educational restructuring toward Wahhabism;
and so did neo-Muslim Brotherhood members of the Sudanese faction, including, at various points in time, Hassan Al-Turabi from 1975-1977 (Gold, 2004). Turabi, as commonly reported in the media, is regarded as the person most responsible for engineering the coup to overthrow the government of the Sudan in 1989, with logistical and financial assistance from Iran. In the early 1990’s, Al-Turabi guest-lectured for USF-WISE.

Condition Two: Changes in Saudi Arabian Educational Policy Resulting from Accumulation of Oil Wealth

In order to understand further the Saudi contribution to re-Islamization in higher education it is instrumental to know about the policy changes in Saudi Arabian higher education in the early 1960’s. Arguably, those changes provided a “welcome structure” (Wulff, 1987) for exiled Muslim Brothers to import the ideology of re-Islamization to a country that, through its accumulation of oil wealth, could in turn export re-Islamization, literally, throughout the world, including the United States and, as one shall see in the next chapter, WISE, the USF think-tank that received most of its funding by the Saudi Arabian government though the IIIT general headquarters in Herndon, Virginia.

In that respect, Gold’s (2004) analysis of Saudi Arabia’s educational policy changes appears to be highly informative: Until 1951, the Saudi government—a monarchy that perennially had courted the Wahhabi clerical elite in order to maintain power, a circumstance not unlike King Farouk’s courtship of appeasement of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during the same period of time—only had three ministries. However, from 1951 to 1975 a total of twenty new ministries were added as
the monarchy amassed more wealth. As a result, the mechanisms to run society necessitated more bureaucratic oversight. As such, Gold (2004) writes, “[King] Faisal needed to find a formula to give the ulama a role in governance that would appease them but not undermine the role of the Saudi royal family” (p. 77).

Thus, two ministries became the “exclusive province” (p. 77) of the Wahhabi religious leaders, who under those ministries created the Committee for Commanding Good and Forbidding Evil, a kind of religious police that has the power to make arrests in its enforcement of public morality. Another organization that was created during this period of reform in Saudi Arabia was a supranational group called the Muslim World League (MWL) that served as a kind of clearinghouse that would further bind the ties between Saudi Arabian Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood Salafism (Algar, 2002). Established in 1962, this body consisted of the chief mufti of Saudi Arabia, a descendant of Al-Wahhab, and eight other men from the Muslim Brotherhood, including a grandson of Al-Banna (Algar, 2002). Sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood, as implied in his diminution of Qutb’s contribution to terrorism illustrated in Chapter One, Algar (2002) takes an apologetic route about the merger between the two reform movements “given the persecution to which [the Muslim Brothers] were subjected in their homelands” (p. 49). At the same time, Algar (2002) asserts that “there was, in any event, a political price to be paid: support, explicit or implicit, for the policies of the Saudi government, for article four of the Muslim World League’s covenant committed it to work for the establishment of ‘Islamic solidarity’ as articulated by the Saudi regime” (pp. 49-50).
Two of the ministries alluded to above were Pilgrimage and Awqaf (religious endowments) and Justice. A third, the Ministry of Education, underwent a significant leadership change in 1963 by having its director, Prince Fahd, replaced by a Wahhabi cleric of the Al-Sheikh family, direct descendants of Al-Wahhab. Algar (2002) reserves a portion of his essay on Wahhabism for criticism of what he obviously regards as a most pernicious aspect of Islamic education reform that began in Saudi Arabia but would egress into other higher education systems throughout the world, leaving a deep mark of intellectual impoverishment: “The dead hand of Wahhabism has left nothing in its place. With the exception of small, semi-clandestine teaching circles, all that is now to be found in Mecca and Medina are institutes for the propagation of Wahhabism, grotesquely mislabled as universities” (p. 44).

That decision to give control of Saudi Arabia’s educational ministry to the Al-Sheikh family permitted the Wahhabi religious establishment to maintain total control over all Saudi higher education institutions. Gold (2004) therefore deduces:

The entire generation that was born during the 1960’s and came of age during the 1980’s grew up on Wahhabi doctrines. . . . The Education Ministry as a whole became a stronghold of religiously conservative bureaucrats. The Saudi government also installed backers of the Muslim Brotherhood at all levels of education. The curriculum used in schools focused on Islamic and Arabic studies, helping to preserve the grip of Wahhabism on Saudi society. (p. 78)

Thus, in that respect, one may conclude that the Saudi Arabian monarchy, which maintains a tight coupling with its ministries, purposefully opened up an organizational institutional vacuum--albeit not very anarchic in kind like Birnbaum’s (1988), given the absence of democratic pluralism and academic freedom in Saudi Arabian institutions--into which the Wahhabi education ministers and leaders would permit professors from Egypt’s exiled Muslim Brotherhood to work. Were the Muslim
Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia not of like-minded, radical reformist ideology, the merger would not have occurred.

Enrollment statistics provide further support for the influence of the puritanical strain of Wahhabi Islam which cross-pollinated with Qutb’s in Saudi Arabia: “During the quarter century from the mid-1960’s through the end of the 1980’s, the number of students in Saudi universities exploded” (pp. 78-79) writes Gold (2004). Furthermore, “In 1965 there were 3,625 university students throughout the kingdom; by 1986, the number had reached 113,529. Yet relatively few Saudis went off to study at Western universities. In the mid-1980’s, the number of foreign Saudi students reached a peak of 12,500; the figure would taper off to 3,554 by 1990 and stay at that level for the rest of the decade” (p. 79).

The researcher has found no data, however, on how many of those foreign students in Western institutions returned to Saudi Arabia after their non-immigrant visa statuses had expired. Moreover, “Thirty percent of Saudi students in Saudi universities majored in Islamic studies, while the other 70 percent devoted an average of a third of their coursework to religious study” (p. 79). Eventually, the Saudi higher education system would open itself to foreign students from all over the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, such that by the 1990’s 85 percent of the student body in Saudi Arabia would be non-Saudi (Gold, 2004). In that milieu, Gold (2004) claims that the Islamic University of Medina and the King Abdul Aziz University became “hothouses for Islamic militancy” (p. 90).
Characteristics of Islamism’s Interplay in Higher Education

Characteristic One: External and Internal Organizational Networks Run by Highly Educated Elites Interact with Universities for Purposes of Re-Islamization from Above and Below

Gold (2004) writes that among the most important organizations financially underwritten through Saudi Arabia’s burgeoning system of ministries is the World Association of Muslim Youth (WAMY), whose North American headquarters has been raided twice by the U.S. federal government since the September 11 attacks. Moreover, Emerson (1994, 2002), Pipes (2002), Katz (2004), and Gold (2004) show variously how WAMY and many of the organizations it supports financially and logistically have leaders who are associated with, have been accused of, have been indicted for, or convicted of terrorism. The purpose of WAMY and its affiliate groups, however, is to spread their message of Islam throughout the world through the support of Muslims and through the conversion of non-Muslims.

Study of the WAMY network reveals that education is integral to its overarching purposes, which give rise to an objective of “Islamizing education” throughout the world. That objective gives rise, in turn, to other affiliated groups that interact with universities, para-professional groups, publishing organs, students, and sympathetic intellectuals. For example, Gold (2004) states that WAMY supports the Muslim Students Association (MSA) and its offshoot, the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA). The ISNA’s website (www.isna.net) shows that it, in turn, acts as a parent group of its academic association, the Association of Muslim Scientists and Engineers (AMSE), which refers to the same academic journal as the Association of
Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS), the American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences (AJISS), published through the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), as stated on the IIIT’s website, www.iiit.org. Another group belonging to this network of front organizations is the Muslim American Society (MAS). In addition, Gold (2004) devotes considerable editorial space to the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America (IIASA) for its role in advancing re-Islamization in education.

*World Association of Muslim Youth*

Gold (2004) shows that WAMY was established as a charitable organization in 1972 by Saudi Arabia’s education ministry in order to disseminate Wahhabi doctrine. The organization operates “like a semi-governmental arm, protected by Saudi embassies and consulates abroad” (p. 79). Through WAMY and other organizations like those cited below, Saudi Arabia “embarked on a massive campaign to bring Wahhabi Islam to the world” such that “between 1982 and 2002, 1,500 mosques, 210 Islamic Centers, and 2,000 schools to educate Muslim children were established in non-Muslim countries alone” (p. 126). On its website, WAMY states that its objective is “to serve the ideology of Islam through the *tawhid* [or the oneness of Islam].” As discussed in Section I, the doctrine of *tawhid*, or “unity,” is a core belief of the Muslim Brotherhood. Undisputed evidence brought forth in the trial *U.S.A. v. Holy Land Foundation* (2007) reveals that WAMY and the other organizations cited in this chapter section are indeed North American arms of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Underscoring that ideological mission, WAMY also publishes and distributes texts about Islam ranging from basic religious texts to the writings of Qutb. One such work, *The Difference Between the Shi’ites and the Majority of Muslim Scholars* “sets
forward the thesis that Shiism was the product of a Jewish conspiracy” (p. 152). The use of the term “ideology” by an organization like WAMY, the researcher suggests, is also crucial to understanding the significance of the Islamist vision as it operates through religious and secular educational channels. Indeed, the term’s use supports previous observations by Pipes (2002) about the importance of ideologies in the service of the totalitarian mass social movement; and it supports Duran’s (1978) thesis about Saudi involvement in spreading a divisive form of militant Islamic fundamentalism throughout the world through the funding of Islamic institutions. And, as Blumer (1946/1951/1963) observes, it is often inside higher education institutions where ideologies are created, discussed, and even promoted, which explains in part why Islamists find higher education an attractive medium for carrying out the re-Islamization agenda.

Another work, further underscoring the prevalence of Jewish conspiracy theories in the Saudi educational establishment’s publishing venues for students at the University of Medina, is *The Methods of the Ideological Invasion of the Islamic World* which states that secularism in education and the mass media are “aggression against Islamic legitimacy” (qtd. in Gold, 2004: p. 101). That work bears the seal of Saudi Arabia on its cover because it is sponsored by the kingdom’s Directorate for Religious Research, Islamic Legal Rulings, Islamic Propagation and Guidance. *The Methods of Ideological Invasion of the Islamic World* claims that the Crusades are still in continuance and that the so-called “Crusaderism” of modern Christianity was an invention “planned by the international Jewry” albeit “under the new American umbrella” (qtd. in Gold, 2004: p. 102). Perry and Schweitzer (2002) support Gold’s
analysis of the prevalence of anti-Semitic literature in Saudi Arabian educational institutions and publishing houses that publish classic anti-Semitic works such as *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* (see Chapter One’s discussion of this forgery’s influence on Islamic thought and higher education) and *Talmudic Jew*, each of which are Western inventions thereby supporting Pipes’ (1997a, 1997b, 1998) observations of Jewish conspiracism forming the basis of government policy in the Middle East and of the Western mind of radical Islam. The concept of “ideological invasion,” which Tibi (1998) calls “paranoid scholarship” (p. 193), resembles the concept of “intellectual incursion” described by the scholars for the IIIT (see below). As discussed in the sub-sections above about Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood, beliefs in Jewish conspiracism and the use of “orientalist” scholars is also a hallmark of their educational theory and practice, thus denoting a transmission of educational thought across time and space, and from Egypt to other parts of the world.

Of course, WAMY and its publications are free to exist, a point that Salah S. Al-Wohaibi, the American-educated secretary general of WAMY makes when asked about changes Saudi Arabia might make in its teaching and publication practices. Invoking the mediaeval Islamic standard of etiquette, *adab*, in which non-Muslims must not criticize Muslims, Al-Wohaibi states, “Saying that the Jews and the Christians are infidels is part of our religious dogma” such that any changes should be decided by Saudis and not others. “It doesn’t mean we try to incite hatred against others, but my religion has its own principles that should not be violated or changed” (qtd. in MacFarquhar, 2004: p. A3).
In addition, through apparatuses like WAMY, which work in concert with educational institutions of all levels and kind, Gold (2004) documents that academic chairs for Islamic studies were donated to Harvard Law School and the University of California at Santa Barbara. Moreover, the Saudis funded Islamic research institutes at the American University, Howard University, Duke University, and Johns Hopkins University (Gold, 2002). In turn, charities like WAMY became “pivotal conduits for funding the most extreme Palestinian organizations, including HAMAS” which was “a natural Saudi ally, having grown out of the Gaza branch of the Muslim Brotherhood” (pp.126-127, p.224).

Echoing Ye’or’s (1998) discussion about modern reformulations of dhimmitude in the academy, Gold (2004) makes an assertion showing how Saudi Arabian financial support of Islamic studies programs overseas directly challenges the concept of academic freedom in which faculty and administrators in higher education shield themselves from the excesses of a government’s influence: “The Saudis, in short, were donating enormous sums [through charitable educational outlets], and contributions on such a massive scale can create certain expectations: the recipient might well adapt his positions toward the donor’s to assure continuing assistance” (p. 127).

_Muslim Students Association_

Another result of the aforementioned changes in Saudi Arabia’s education system involves the country’s relationship with the MSA National and its student field groups in the United States, a relationship characterized by a specific emphasis on re-Islamization by dissemination of published material and of financial support. By most accounts the MSA, founded in 1963 at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
(see www.msa-national.org/about/history.html), would not have become such a formidable student religious organization in the world were it not for two factors: (1) the financial assistance in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s of Saudi Arabia to Muslim followers of the teacher Mawlana Abu Al-Ala Mawdudi in India; and (2) Arab students who supported the Muslim Brotherhood under the radicalized philosophy of Qutb (Gold, 2004). That financial trend has continued until the present day, according to Professor Sulayman Nyang, a Sufi Muslim who studies the social and intellectual pedigree of the MSA and other Muslim organizations that started in the 1960’s (Gold, 2004). Dowd-Gailey (2004) also documents the flow of money from Saudi Arabia to the MSA and its affiliate groups, and so does Alex Alexiev of the Center for Security Policy (www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=static&page=alexiev).

Another Sufi Muslim, Stephen Schwartz, who is a convert to the religion, testified in 2003 to U.S. Congress the following:

Shia and other non-Wahhabi Muslim community leaders estimate that 80 percent of American mosques out of a total ranging between an official estimate of 1,200 and an unofficial figure of 4-6,000 are under Wahhabi control. . . . Wahhabi control over mosques means control of property, buildings, appointment of imams, training of imams, content of preaching including faxing of Friday sermons from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and of literature distributed in mosques and mosque bookstores, notices on bulletin boards, and organizational and charitable solicitation. . . . The main organizations that have carried out this campaign are the [ISNA], which originated in the [MSA], and the Council on American-Islamic Relations. (qtd. in Dowd-Gailey, 2004).

Mintz & Farah (2004), in a work of investigative journalism published in The Washington Post, write that the founding members of the MSA were indeed members of the Muslim Brotherhood. In addition, they write that the leadership of many of the other organizations that maintain interest in higher education, secular or not, in the U.S. cited in other sub-sections below are or were members of the Muslim Brotherhood.
On its website, the MSA claims that it is the parent group to a variety of other groups such as, *inter alia*, the ISNA (discussed below), the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), the Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA), and the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS). The MSA began collaborating with similar organizations in other parts of the world when Saudi Arabia created in 1966 the Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO), headquartered in Riyadh, which also partners with the MWL and WAMY, whose headquarters are also in Riyadh (Algar, 2002). The MSA and those groups shared early leadership among seventy members who studied and taught mostly in mid-Western states. Those members, among them Ahmad Sakr, Mahdi Bhadori, Ahmad Totonji, and Illyas Ba-Yunus, were foreign graduate students “bent on returning home after their studies”; yet while many did “a significant portion realized that they would still have the responsibility of spreading Islam as students in North America.” Another one of the MSA’s early “intellectual mentors” was Ismail Al-Faruqi, a Palestinian professor at Temple University criticized by Algar (2002) for his “heroic efforts to elevate the intellectual status of Muhammad Al-Wahhab” (p. 51) and lauded by Esposito for his “pioneering efforts” in the field of Islamic studies in North America (qtd. in Pipes, 2002: p. 117).

According to the website *www.MSAnational.org*, “The main goal,” those foreign students who founded the MSA contended, “was always Da’wah,” or the spread of the MSA’s version of Islam in its host society. In addition to those accomplishments, the MSA states that it was the first Muslim organization to publish a newsletter and magazine, *Islamic Horizons* and *Al-Ittihad*
While positioning itself as a religious student organization, the organization’s Starters Guide cited on the MSA website advocates Islamization of campus politics: “It should be the long-term goal of every MSA to Islamicize the politics of their respective university. . . . The politicization of the MSA means to make the MSA more of a force on internal campus politics. The MSA needs to be a more ‘In-your-face’ association.”

According to Dowd-Gailey (2004), 150 MSA chapters exist on college and university campuses in North America, while a national office in Washington, D.C. “assists in the establishment of constituent chapters and overseas fundraising and conferences while steering a plethora of special committees and political task forces” (www.meforum.org/article/603). The politicization of the MSA extends to its having created alliances with mostly left-wing student political and cultural groups on university campuses throughout the country, including International ANSWER (Act Now to Stop War and End Racism), a group that was formed by International Action Center, a communist organization in New York City that acts as an umbrella organization to a host of radical social and political groups (Dowd-Gailey, 2004). In January 2004, the Senate Finance Committee publicized a list of organizations whose members have been linked to international terrorism and has requested that those organizations, the MSA notwithstanding, disclose their financial records (Dowd-Gailey, 2004).

The MSA not only is criticized for its members’ involvement in and affiliation with international terrorism but also is criticized for its narrow interpretation of Islam, the religion, and its Arab-only cultural orientation. For example, Nyang is critical of
the MSA because he contends that the group, like its offshoots and affiliated organizations, promotes Islam through the lens of Arab culture at the expense of other cultures that also practice the religion (Gold, 2004). Sufi convert Schwartz (2002) also supports arguments like Nyang’s. Dowd-Gailey (2004) contends further that such a narrow interpretation of the religion on the part of the MSA represents “a prime characteristic of militant Islamic groups: a refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of secular society and personal spirituality.” Algar (2002), in turn, traces this rarefaction of intellect and of spirituality to the Muslim World League, discussed above, and elaborates on the close relationship that the MSA has maintained over the decades with the Muslim World League, to the extent that criticism of Saudi Arabia at the MSA’s annual conventions is considered taboo. In addition, Algar (2002) illustrates that local MSA chapters often distribute at their Friday prayer functions on college campuses Muslim world League publications aimed at preventing what the Muslim World League refers to as “inimical trends and dogmas” (p. 51) such as Sufism, a mystical and highly individualistic variety of Islam.

Islamic Society of North America

The most comprehensive information about the ISNA that is not published by the ISNA comes from Emerson (2002) in an appendix entitled “The Terrorists’ Support Network” found in the book American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us; and, second to Emerson’s work, Gold (2004), in Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism. In addition, the undisputed findings of fact in the trial U.S.A v. Holy Land Foundation (2007) reveal archival documents indicating that the ISNA and over twenty other organizations act as arms of the Muslim Brotherhood
in North America. The ISNA is an offshoot of the MSA and has been cited as an unindicted co-conspirator in that same trial. Sami Al-Arian, according to the website www.freesamial-arian.org, is a co-founder of ISNA.

While it may seem out of place to discuss an organization based in Plainfield, Indiana, in a section about Saudi Arabia’s role in re-Islamization in higher education, the researcher derives justification from some important facts also related to Saudi Arabia’s restructuring of its education ministries to include the funding and printing of educational literature that apparently flows through the ISNA’s home offices, and then to various Islamic Society chapters and mosques in cities throughout North America (Gold, 2004). Evidently, the literature then flows in reprinted form to MSA chapters who distribute such literature on university campuses (see, for example, the publishing information on literature distributed at USF’s MSA booth: “Hijab: Unveiling the Mystery,” “Status of Women in Islam,” “Discover Islam: The Reader,” and “Islam at a Glance”). In addition, it is instrumental to the study to know where and when some of the ISNA leaders received their university education and what they teach to students in college classrooms. This section reiterates Emerson’s (2002) and Gold’s (2004) discussions about the ISNA’s interplay with higher education, and also analyzes ISNA documents culled from the ISNA’s own website and other Islamic websites that post articles about the ISNA and its involvement in higher education.

Emerson (2002) finds that the ISNA is the largest Muslim organization in the United States and is an umbrella organization for hundreds of other North American Islamic organizations. Founded in 1981, as the logical outgrowth of the MSA, whose earliest members had graduated from college, the ISNA rejected Sufism as an
acceptable form of Islamic faith (Gold, 2004). Emerson (2002) claims that some of those organizations under the ISNA’s wing openly promote “the Islamic fundamentalist doctrines of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad” (p. 216). Emerson (2002) states that the ISNA “convenes annual conferences where Islamist militants have been given a platform to incite violence and promote hatred” (p. 216). For example, the ISNA estimates that about 10,000 people participated in its 1997 Chicago conference in which the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), and the Marzook Legal Defense Fund--“all of [whom] have ties to Hamas” (p. 220)--have actively participated. According to HAMAS, as documented in its own organizational charter, the group is part of the Muslim Brotherhood (Alexander, 2002; Hroub, 2000).

The current secretary-general of the ISNA is Sayyid Muhammad Syeed, who was a board member of another organization that raised money for mujahideen, or jihad fighters, in Afghanistan, Africa, Lebanon, and Palestinians in Jordan (Emerson 2002). According to the ISNA website, Syeed holds a doctorate in sociolinguistics from Indiana University at Bloomington and co-founded the American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences. Syeed also serves on the board of directors for the Institute of Islamic Sciences, Technology and Development (IISTD), a group whose chief mission, according to its website, is the “Islamization of knowledge and higher education in the U.S.A.” or “Islamizing higher secular and pseudo-Islamic education systems” (www.islamicscience.org). Syeed was born in Kashmir in the 1940’s and considers himself during childhood as a “prisoner of conscience” but will not disclose the details of his detention during childhood during the conflict between India and breakaway

In a 2003 interview with the *Christian Science Monitor*, John L. Esposito, a renowned Islamic studies specialist and director of the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University, credits Syeed in a public speech for his advancement in the areas of human rights and positive interfaith relations among Muslims and Christians (Whittle, 2003). He also gives Syeed and other ISNA members present specific advice on what kinds of new terminology they should use to express their grievances in a post-September 11 milieu of government scrutiny, advocating that the ISNA avoid strident terms of blame like “imperialism” and “colonialism” (Rashed, 2003). The esteem that Esposito holds for Syeed is apparently mutual, for in an August 2003 feature article on *IslamOnline.net*, Syeed calls Esposito the “Abu Taleb of Islam,” Taleb being the uncle of Muhammad who “gave unconditional support to the Muslim community at a time when it was weak and oppressed” (Rashed, 2003).

*IslamOnline.net* is an ISNA affiliate group.

The 1996-2000 president of the ISNA Board of Directors is Muzammil H. Siddiqui, who also acts as president of the Islamic Society’s Orange County chapter. He acquired a B.A. in Islamic and Arabic studies from the Islamic University of Medina in 1965 (Gold, 2004), after the restructuring of Saudi Arabia’s education ministry so that it would be directed by descendants of Al-Wahhab. Like most ISNA leaders he had served on the MSA National Board of Directors and was a leader in his university’s MSA (Gold, 2004). Emerson (2002) quotes him as saying, “Islam will not
allow a Muslim to be drafted by non-Muslims to defend concepts, ideologies and values other than those of Islam” (p. 217).

Under the leadership of all these men and one woman cited above, the ISNA has opposed all peace agreements between Israel and the PLO, as has its parent group, the MSA (Gold, 2004). In addition, through its widely-read publication *Islamic Horizons*, the ISNA has voiced support for Islamic militancy in the Sudan, Turkey, and Algeria (Emerson, 2002).

A 1998 program for the ISNA’s annual convention in Chicago, Illinois, demonstrates the organization’s interest in fostering relationships with higher education in various ways, as part of its purpose in advancing re-Islamization “from below” through legitimate channels, as opposed to the “above” ways alleged by Emerson (1998), the U.S. Department of Justice, and numerous congressional and senate committees since the mid-1990’s (see the *9/11 Committee Report*, released in July 2004). For example, Session 6C features five panelists on the topic “Guilty Until Proven Innocent: Prisoners of Conscience in the U.S.” moderated by Abduraham Al-Amoudi. Two of those panelists are or were university professors, David Cole (Georgetown, law) and Sami Al-Arian (USF, computer engineering). Sami Al-Arian is one of the ISNA’s founding father (see [www.FreesamiAlArian.org](http://www.FreesamiAlArian.org)). Furthermore, another session, 11B, is entitled “Building Muslim Institutions for Higher Education: Why and How?” which illustrates the concerns of the ISNA about the transition from high school to college for the Muslim youth it claims to represent.

Of interest here, too, is that Al-Amoudi himself was convicted in August 2004 on terrorism-related charges involving his involvement in a plot to assassinate a Saudi
Arabian prince. A known member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Amoudi became the leader of a political lobby headquartered in Washington, D.C., the American Muslim Council (AMC) (Waller, 2003). Al-Amoudi became a naturalized citizen in 1996 when in so doing he swore to defend the Constitution against “all enemies, foreign and domestic”; yet, after his taking of the citizenship oath, in a videotaped rally in Washington, D.C., told an audience that “I think if we are outside this country, we can say oh, Allah, destroy America, but once we are here, our mission in this country is to change it” (qtd. in Waller, 2003: http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony). Moreover, after becoming a naturalized citizen, Al-Amoudi called upon President Clinton to release someone the Muslim lobbyist considered a political prisoner, Sheikh Al-Rahman, mentioned above regarding his conspiracy to blow up New York City landmarks (Waller, 2003). Al-Amoudi is also the president of a committee called Muslims for a Better America (Waller, 2003). According to Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. (2003), Al-Amoudi was also affiliated with the IIIT, another Saudi-funded thinktank discussed below in terms of its influence on higher education. Al-Amoudi, along with Sami Al-Arian and a Republican lobbyist Grover Norquist, “gained access to the White House” in order “to spread Islamist influence to the American military and the prison system and the universities and the political arena with untold consequences for the nation” (Gaffney, 2003, italics added). Islam professor Khalid Duran states that the ISNA speakers would never be able to convene such conferences in their native countries. “They would not be able to hold this conference in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco or Pakistan. Many of the speakers are barred from those states” (qtd. in Gossett, 2004: p. 16).
Two other groups under the ISNA banner are the Muslim American Society (MAS) and the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), which recently merged. Those groups maintain an organizational structure close to that of their parent group, the ISNA, with an “Ameer (President),” “Secretary General,” three “Vice Presidents,” and an “Executive Council,” “Zonal and Regional Presidents,” “General Assembly” members, and a “Majilis Ash-Shura.” Like the ISNA, the leaders of the major governing bodies of the group serve on each body. The MAS website, www.masnet.org, cites its affiliation with ISNA groups, including the MSA, and claims that it developed out of an “Islamic revival movement which evolved at the turn of the twentieth century” that later “brought the call and the spirit of the movement” to “the shores of North America with arrival of Muslim students and immigrants in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s.” Context clues in other parts of the MAS website indicate that the “revival movement” in question is none other than the Muslim Brotherhood (see “Departments—Tarbiyya”).

The MAS posts an obituary of IIIT founder Al-Faruqi (discussed further below). In the obituary, al-Faruqi is lauded as a “pioneer in Muslim-Christian relations,” for his founding leadership in the MSA, AMSS, and for his chairmanship of the NAIT and the Islamic Studies Steering Committee of the American Academy of Religion. Furthermore, the MAS writes that Al-Faruqi was “among the vanguard of Muslim intellectuals who settled in America,” and his “vision, ideas, and impact . . . were transmitted through his writings, his Muslim students (as well as non-Muslim students) who returned to teach and work in government ministries throughout the
Muslim world, and the organization and institutions he funded and led” (p. 2, italics added).

Given the various positions this Muslim academic held within the ISNA subgroups, Al-Faruqi obviously had achieved significant power in the ISNA ranks prior to his and his wife’s murder in the 1980’s. As a founder of the IIIT and other organizations also, according to the MAS, he “provided an important intellectual foundation for both the scholar-activists of the 1970’s and 1980’s and the emerging intellectual generation at the beginning of the twenty-first century” during his academic appointment at Temple University. Al-Faruqi’s “impact” shall enjoy more detailed analytical commentary below. As was typical of Muslim Brothers who were also professors in Egypt’s university system, Al-Faruqi achieved significant prestige within the ISNA ranks, resulting in the accumulation of power through his academic status at Temple University and his founding leadership in the IIIT.

The MAS website continues on by discussing the foundation of the MSA and the ISNA. It boasts an on-line journal, *The American Muslim Online*, which publishes informative reports about current events, such one by Omer bin Abdullah, whose lead sentence is “Terrorism enables the weak to confront the strong, and thus has an enduring appeal to those who are dissatisfied with the status quo” (July 2003, p. 1). Located in Virginia, the president of the MAS is Dr. Souheil Ghannouchi. Ghannouchi’s bio published by the August 2002 MAS Youth and MSA Boston “Tarbya and ‘ilm Camp” indicates that he has a PhD in chemical engineering from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Prior to becoming MAS president, he was president and imam of the Islamic Center of Madison. He was also the president of the Madison
MSA, and he is a “veteran of the Tunisian Student Movement.” According to Kepel (2002) the Tunisian movement owes its inspiration to the Muslim Brotherhood members who emigrated there from Egypt and taught in Tunisian universities. In all likelihood, the MAs leader is related, therefore, to Rashid Al-Ghannouchi, discussed below.

The MAS Youth, on its website, endorses the MSA program, and posts on its website, www.ymusa.org, a weblog that makes liberal reference to the Muslim Brotherhood. For example, the weblog states:

The history of the Islamic movement in this century dates back to the 1920’s when Imam Hasan al-Banna and Mawlaana Mawdudi began their work. Their inheritors have continued their work through the decades and we have witnessed many trials and periods of hardship. . . . So what is our role here and now in North America? Khilaaafah? Jihaad? Taziyyyah? The Islamic Movement today is not just you and me. The Islamic movement today means many organizations and many millions of people. We have a global agenda that is to revive the Muslims, and this includes all that Islam requires of us. So is the movement working for the Khilaaafah and the application of Shareeyah? Of course it is. Is the movement working for jihad? It is the duty of the movement by way of example, to defend Muslims wherever they have been attacked. . . . It is our responsibility that Islam should now be introduced to the people of this land [North America] . . . as the cure to its many diseases.

Following another quotation by Al-Banna, the weblog posts another article dated November 14, 2002, which mourns the death of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Guide-General, Mustafa Mashour, which states that in 1981, he founded the International Muslim Brotherhood in Germany, after leaving Egypt during Al-Sadat’s arrest of Muslim Brotherhood leaders. Here, the MAS Youth, led by Ghannouchi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood-inspired Tunisian student movement, directly reveals its sympathy to the Muslim Brotherhood. A directory of North American mosques, published by the ISNA and available on-line shows that
another International Muslim Brotherhood branch was introduced in North America in
the 1949 the same year that Sayyid Qutb arrives in the United States for graduate
study. The Quba Institute in Philadelphia attributes its development of educational
programs to its “partnerships with the Muslim Student Associations of local
universities” (www.qubainstitute.com).

The MAS, invokes a term called tarbiyyah on its website to refer to not only the
intellectual and spiritual but also the physical training of its young members. Citing the
term’s origins in the behavior of Muhammad, the MAS states, “Also, Islamic history
proves the effectiveness and relevance of this methodology. Imam Hassan Al-Banna,
the founder and leader of a great Islamic movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, said,
‘When ever you find the good Muslim, you find with him all means for great success.’
(Sic) message of Islam, but also left a great generation that carried the message and
spread it all over the land and moved humanity from darkness into light.” Furthermore,
the MAS defines its mission as follows:

MAS delivers a rigorous educational curriculum to its current and potential
members that focuses on the systematic development of the Muslim individual,
the Muslim family and the Muslim community. The focus of Tarbiyah is to
groom members who are distinguished, strive for excellence, have a sense of
mission, self-motivated, conduct a balanced life, live in peace with themselves
and their environment, be equipped with the necessary knowledge,
understanding, and skills to make a difference in the society by taking an active
role, both individually and collectively in the reform process that seeks to make
the betterment of our community, our country, and the whole world. (sic, italics
added to illustrate the totalizing nature of the MAS reformist program).

Moreover, the MAS writes that the “Tarbiyah process also aims to put members
and potential members on the path of constant self-purification and self-development,
and instill in them the passion for truth, righteousness, and justice/fairness.”

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Association of Muslim Scientists and Engineers

One of the ISNA’s academic professional associations is the AMSE. A link from the ISNA to the AMSE reveals a website layout with topical placement and symbolism close to that of the ISNA, the AMSS, the AMJISS, and the IIIT. For example, like the AMSS (discussed below as a sub-affiliate of the IIIT), the AMSE uses the same font and names to describe its “departments” and customary activities to advance what it calls “Islamic science”: “research papers, speakers bureau, career centre, discoveries, and voyages.” Many of the scholars in the AMSE, as cited in the association’s research department, hold positions in North America’s major universities (e.g., Dr. Zarjon Baha, Building Construction, Purdue University; Dr. Mohammad Karim, Dean of College of Engineering, City University of New York). Others are affiliated directly with the IIIT: Dr. Iqbal Unus, Dr. Seyyid Hossein Nasr, Dr. Usma Hassan, Dr. Ziauddin Sardar, Dr. Mahbub Ghani, and Dr. Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman, all of whom write about topics that merge matters of science with faith, as indicated in the titles of their works (e.g., “The Concept of Ilm and Knowledge,” “Science in Islamic Philosophy,” “Tauheed and Knowledge,” and “Islamization, Science, and Technology.”)

Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America

Located in Fairfax, Virginia, the IIASA is actually an overseas branch of Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University and is part of the ISNA umbrella in North America. According to the IIASA’s website, the IIASA was founded in 1988. Among other purposes, it trains over four hundred students for religious leadership in U.S. mosques. Its major higher educational texts are printed by the Saudi Arabian Ministry
of Islamic Affairs and Endowments and are written by scholars in Saudi Arabian universities (Gold, 2004). Two of those books, *The True Religion* and *A Muslim’s Relations with Non-Muslims, Enmity or Friendship?*, assert that “Judaism and Christianity are deviant religions” (qtd. in Gold, 2004: p. 152) and that people who call for brotherhood and equality among religions are “parasites” (p. 152). The IIASA is affiliated with the International Curricula Organization (ICO) whose task is to develop Islamic and Arabic studies curricula for use by Islamic schools in Western countries in English-speaking schools. Apparently echoing the philosophy of the Muslim Brotherhood, the ICO’s goals maintain a distinct reformist agenda with an emphasis on helping Muslim youth “avoid assimilating cultural practices that are contradictory to Islamic values” (see http://www.manahijj.com/icoCurricula.htm).

**Characteristic Two: Codified Education Theory for Purposes of Promoting Monolithic View of Islam and Subverting Universities and Surrounding Societies from Below**

The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) is another organization that directly receives its direction of mission and funding from Saudi Arabia. The organization therefore exemplifies how Saudi Arabia, according to Duran (1978), has spread a “divisive” form of Islam around the world that, according to Algar (2002), has rarefied Islamic scholarship under the banner of a monolithic voice that purports to represent “true Islam.” Algar’s (2002) discussion of the IIIT centers precisely on its conception as an organ of Saudi Arabia designed to promote Wahhabism. In turn, that version of Islam, which has been explicated above as a blend of both Wahhabi and neo-Muslim Brotherhood doctrines, further illustrates the characteristics of Islamism’s re-
Islamization program “from below” as it seeks what the IIIT calls “integration” (*Islamization of Knowledge*, 1982/1989/1995) with the domain of modern knowledge in higher education institutions in the United States and other countries throughout the world. Given such an understanding, one might consider that on a conceptual level Islamists consider modern institutions of higher education in the same manner that they, by nature of their doctrine expounded in Chapter One, regard higher education institutions as they regard any “territory” that Muslims have not yet conquered: the *dar al-harb*, or the domain of war.

On its websites and in its plethora of white papers and books about higher education theory the IIIT calls its program “Islamization of knowledge,” thus supporting the objectives of the larger mass social movement encapsulating the IIIT’s mission, Islamism, and its totalitarian objective of bringing all lands where Muslims reside under Islamic rule. Chapter Three’s overview of the case at USF, which involves the North American chapter of the IIIT, notes that founder of the IIIT in North America was Isma’il Al-Faruqi, who for a time taught at Temple University. He was a Palestinian immigrant who once wrote, “Nothing could be greater than this youthful, vigorous, and rich continent [of North America] turning away from its past evil and marching forward under the banner of Allhu Akbar [God is great]” (qtd. in Pipes, 2002: p. 113).

Perhaps the premier Islamic studies scholar in the United States, Georgetown University’s John L. Esposito lauds Al-Faruqi as a “pioneer in the development of Islamic studies in America” (qtd. in Pipes, 2002: p. 113). While Esposito never
provided a full critique of Al-Faruqi’s scholarship at the IIIT, his counterpart in the field of Islamic studies, Algar (2002) does offer the following summation:

Al-Faruqi, in his day one of the principal promoters of Wahhabism in North America, had it almost right when, in the introduction to his translation to *Kitab al-Tauhid*, he described the books as having “the appearance of student’s notes.” It would have been closer to the mark to say that this and many other writings of [Al-Wahhab] were the notes of a student. In a flight of fancy that would have done honor to a medieval court panegyrist, al-Faruqi attempted to account for the general modesty of his hero’s literary output by asserting that “he applied himself [to rectifying the alleged misunderstanding of *tauhid* by virtually all Muslims] with a mental vigor too great for his pen. (p. 14)

Algar (2002) further enjoins that the lack of completeness and breadth of Al-Wahhab’s scholarship caused Al-Faruqi, a “custodian of Wahhabism” (p. 15) who translated Al-Wahhab’s works into English and then published them between 1968 and 1988 in publishing houses in Delhi and Riyadh, to not indicate where his amendments to Al-Wahhab’s text began and ended. Algar (2002) expresses a certain sense of mystification as to why another professor of Islamic studies would even bother to “regard the expansion of” Al-Wahhab’s scholarship “as a necessity” (p. 17). Because Al-Wahhab “regarded the authorial act as one more unauthorized ‘innovation’ that for centuries had clouded the Muslim mind” (p. 17), Algar (2002) questions why a twentieth-century proponent of Al-Wahhab’s teachings, Al-Faruqi, would engage in further acts of “innovation,” which for Al-Wahhab was an act of spiritual abomination that defied the true interests of Islam.

Another element of Algar’s (2002) criticism of Al-Faruqi’s elaborations of Al-Wahhab’s scholarship involves the MSA’s publication in 1980 of *Sources of Islamic Thought*. Appreciating that “it might appear at first sight puzzling that students pursuing a higher education should be attracted to a Wahhabi reading of Islam” (p. 51),
Algar (2002) explains the affinity: “Attuned to a rationalistic worldview fostered by their studies of engineering and natural sciences, they found in Wahhabism a ‘rationalized Islam,’ one already stripped of niceties and ambiguities of juristic reasoning, the complexities of theology, and the subtleties of Sufism, all of those having been decried as ‘accretions’” (pp. 51-52).

In kind, Algar’s (2002) observations support Duran’s in an interview with Emerson (1998) on the attraction of engineers and other students in the hard sciences to the Muslim Brotherhood (see Chapter One). In addition, Wahhabism’s inability to appreciate paradox in the domain of Western education’s charge to create and disseminate knowledge is further illustrated in the education theory published by various scholars from Al-Faruqi’s IIIT itself, despite the underlined paradoxical statements in the “Overview” of the IIIT’s mission on the website www.iiit.org:

The International Institute of Islamic Thought is a private, non-profit, academic, and cultural institution, concerned with general issues of Islamic thought. The Institute was established in the United States of America in 1981 (1401 AH). It is independent of local politics, party orientations and ideological biases. (italics added)

Aside from the Wahhabist underpinnings of the IIIT’s stated program to “Islamize society and knowledge,” the claim of independence from ideological bias is rendered all the more contradictory in the next statement, with underlining again added to emphasize the “ideological bias” embedded in the IIIT mission:

The Institute is an intellectual forum working from an Islamic perspective to promote and support research projects, organize intellectual and cultural meetings and publish scholarly works. It has established a distinct intellectual trend in Islamic thought which relates to the vivid legacy of the Ummah (Muslim nation), and its continuous efforts of intellectual and methodological reform. This involves a large number of researchers and scholars from various parts of the world.
Moreover, the IIIT further shows that the “ideological bias” that it claims not to have is conceived not solely for the “Muslim nation” or ummah; rather, it is conceived for humanity:

The International Institute of Islamic Thought is dedicated to the revival and reform of Islamic thought and its methodology in order to enable the Ummah to deal effectively with present challenges, and contribute to the progress of human civilization in ways that will give it a meaning and a direction derived from divine guidance. (italics added to show the Islamist ideology embedded in the IIIT’s mission)

Of course, according to the logic of the IIIT, “Islamic thought” as a foundation for all of humanity is not a bias because its vision of Islamization transcends the boundaries of nation-states and surpasses other religions. Again, that “Islamic thought” represents classic Muslim Brotherhood doctrine. Therefore, the monolithic worldview of the IIIT’s “Islamization of society and knowledge” program coherently resonates in the organization’s “Objectives and Means” to “formulate a comprehensive Islamic vision and methodology that will help Muslim scholars in their critical analysis of contemporary knowledge”; “develop an appropriate methodology for dealing with Islamic legacy and contemporary knowledge, in order to draw on the experiences of both past and present, to build a better future for the Ummah and humanity at large” (italics added to show the Islamist ideology embedded in the IIIT’s objectives and means). As will be amplified in an analysis of original documents of the IIIT below, contradiction of thought identified by Algar (2002) is not the only kind that lends itself to textual scrutiny.

Also of major relevance to this inquiry is that the IIIT was the primary funding source of USF-WISE (see Chapters One and Five), a fact which establishes a strong ideological association between Islamists at USF and those in Herndon, Virginia,
headquarters for the IIIT in the United States. The relationship also reveals an ideological connection among USF-WISE and the Saudi-funded WAMY network described above. Ideological association, of course, alone cannot be used to convict a person of a crime; however, examination of ideological association is an acceptable line of academic inquiry and discourse, as the writings of the many scholars cited in Chapter Two’s literature review suggest. When one studies the social psychology of a mass social movement, in part, one studies the ideology of that movement as a characteristic feature for analysis.

As with previous organizations, this section’s explication of the IIIT’s website and books stems from the group’s practice in North America, but places it in a chapter about the global context of Islamization because it receives its funding for administration, research, and development from Saudi Arabia through the North Atlantic Islamic Trust (NAIT, see Emerson, 2002); maintains similarly named chapters in other countries; and partners with traditional higher education institutions and academic professional associations throughout the world. In addition, the IIIT’s texts of educational theory and practice are translated into scores of foreign languages by publishers in Riyadh and disseminated in all continents.

Here, one finds it helpful to note that the scholars involved with the IIIT do not refer to their educational agenda of re-Islamization as “Islamist” but rather as “Islamic,” a point discussed by Duran and Hechiche (2001) in non-educational contexts. So the only means to understand where the IIIT fits into the “Islamist” aspect of contemporary Islamic fundamentalism’s mind is to examine the content of the IIIT’s texts and statements made by scholars associated with the organization. Therein, clues
include patterns of thought such as blaming the decline on Islamic civilization’s
decline on jahiliyah, takfir, and kufr; by establishing the condition of dhimmitude on
other religions, cultures, and institutions; and restoring the Islamic caliphate, dissolved
in the early Twentieth Century in favor of the Westphalian system of nation-states.

A critical review of a work by Zahra Al-Zeera, *Wholeness and Holiness in
Islamic Education*, published by the IIIT, offers further insight into the nature of the
methodology that the IIIT has developed in the course of several decades of
consideration by a group of IIIT-affiliated scholars throughout the world. This review
by Jeremy Henzell-Thomas, available on the IIIT website, defines the IIIT
methodology by using common postmodern discourse supportive of
de-Westernizing the production and dissemination of knowledge in higher education.
Henzell-Thomas represents the Book Foundation in the United Kingdom, a group that
offers Islamic education and raises money for it. In his book review, Henzell-Thomas
praises Al-Zeera’s work for its ability to overcome “passive acceptance” in the human
and social sciences “which by their very nature can never be as ‘neutral’ or value-free
as the ‘pure,’ ‘hard,’ natural sciences.” Moreover, the reviewer objects to the Western
rationalist tradition for its “unremittingly reductionist mode of blinkered scientism”
which claims “to operate under the most rigorous conditions of objectivity” but which
are nonetheless “founded upon *a priori* assumptions germane to the Western secular
world-view of positivism which radically restricts the nature of reality only to that
which is observable by quantitative means.”

The invocation of de-Westernizing postmodernist principles by the IIIT and its
class of international scholars is not without its paradoxes. While postmodernism
The IIIT disavows the idea that a “transcendental signified” is behind all logos, the IIIT nevertheless affirms the existence of that very thing in the service of its call to restore the Islamic caliphate in lands where Muslims live:

From an Islamic perspective, the denial of God does not elevate man, for it is of course the underlying unity and interconnectedness of everything in existence which makes the microcosm of man a mirror of the macrocosm and which alone endows man with the possibility of becoming fully human by virtue of his divinely appointed role as khalifah, or viceregent. . . . Authentic “Islamization of knowledge” cannot be a parochial concern but must be an inclusive activity which avoids the limitation and fixity of a non-perspective by acknowledging and valuing different levels of description, by synthesizing and integrating traditional and contemporary knowledge, or perennial and acquired knowledge, by going beyond facile dichotomies representing competing models of reality, and by reconciling opposites and resolving contradictions within an overarching Islamic paradigm. This unity, after all, is by definition what the doctrine of tawhid implies in the domain of knowledge.

As such, constructivist methods serve to justify, in decidedly paradoxical terms, an Islamist educational program, “Islamization of society and knowledge,” that denies messy contradictions in knowledge by stating, a priori, that “multiplicity is only the manifestation of a single reality, the ultimate truth,” which itself is an assertion that no constructivist in the Western tradition would agree.

The review of the Al-Zeera book of education theory ends with an invocation of a mediaeval Muslim scholar considered important to the neo-Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) (Kepel, 1984/2003). Al-Ghazali’s influence on the takfir student groups supported by professors who were neo-Muslim Brothers rests in Al-Ghazali’s descriptions of the ulema, or jurisconsults who issue legal opinions, or fatawa, on certain matters concerning Muslims. Al-Ghazali stated that “the jurisconsult serves as master and director of conscience for political authority in administering and disciplining men that order and justice may reign in this world” (qtd. in Kepel,
1984/2003: p. 229), a position that gives sanction to “ruling classes as rulers” and “imposing recognition of the legitimacy of domination of the ruled” (p. 230).

In essence, what the IIIT does is translate Al-Ghazali’s idea of “right” Islamic government by an elite jurisconsult’s interpretation of early Islamic texts such as the Koran and the Sunnah into a means of managing Islamic education, covering all fields of knowledge, not just the law. Henzell-Thomas praises Al-Zeera’s book about Islamic education theory by stating that “only a curriculum in harmony with the teachings of the Holy Qur’an and intended to integrate man’s understanding of God, the universe and his own nature can be spacious enough to accommodate and reconcile competing paradigms.” In addition to the IIIT’s theory being presented as encompassing God’s will, the same theory is presented as “scientific,” although some Western observers and other early Islamic scholars like Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), a Tunisian medieval Islamic scholar favored by Sufis, might conclude that matters of faith and science are separate.

Despite the possible contradictions in something that is a matter of faith being also a matter of science, a 1988 IIIT essay posted on the organization’s website by Taha Jabir Al-Alwani affirms the merger. Also a leader in the ISNA according to a 1998 ISNA convention program (see ISNA section above), Al-Alwani--following the essay’s presentation in Islamabad, Pakistan, in 1982 on “Islamization of Knowledge” at the Second International Conference on Islamic Thought--explains thus:

When the League of Muslim Youth expressed their desire to hold a course on Usul al Fiqh “Source Methodology in Islamic Jurisprudence,” the material for this study formed one of the six subjects covered in the course. . . . The science of Usul al Fiqh is rightly considered to be the most important method of research ever devised by Muslim Thought. Indeed, as the solid foundation upon which all the Islamic disciplines are based, Usul al Fiqh not only benefited
Islamic civilization but contributed to the intellectual enrichment of world civilization as a whole. It will not be out of place to note here that the methods of analogical developed within the framework of Islamic jurisprudence constituted the methodical starting-point for the establishment and construction of empiricism, which in turn is considered the basis of contemporary civilization.

Al-Alwani further allows:

We present this brief work to all who are interested in gaining some knowledge of this science, and we ask Allah Ta’ala to help us benefit from what we learn, and to learn that which will not benefit us, and to protect us from knowledge that is not beneficial, and from deeds that are not acceptable to Him.

The IIIT characterization of its educational theory and practice being a “science” or “scientific” resemble Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood’s earlier formulations of Islamist educational theory practice. The parallel is apparent not only in terms of employment of the terms “science” and “scientific” but also in terms of the plan to merge matters of reason with revelation by applying a person’s interpretation of Islamic law to all things studied.

The aforementioned works introduce the reader in general fashion to the IIIT’s mission and educational theory; however, the book Islamization of Knowledge: General Principals and Work Plan (1982/1989/1995), offers specifics in chapters beginning with a “problem” statement and then proceeding to other chapters on the following topics: explaining the institute’s “task” of applying its educational theory, refuting “traditional methodology,” countering that methodology with an “Islamic” version, explaining further the “agenda” of the IIIT, stating “indispensable clarifications” about the “Islamization” program and the “Islamization of knowledge” program, and ending with a needs statement about “financial requirements.” The one hundred thirteen-page work is a translation of Islamiyat Al-Ma’rifah and holds its
origins in the Saudi Arabian educational system’s publishing organ, the International
Islamic Publishing House (IIPH), headquartered in Riyadh and distributing Islamic
books and tapes in seventy languages. *Islamization of Knowledge’s* introduction and
individual chapters enable understanding of an influential international educational
theory for graduate studies, in particular, and why the IIIT recognizes the importance
of interacting with secular higher education institutions in the West. The author or
authors of the text in question is or are unknown. References to the work in the sections
below are therefore cited in-text as “the IIIT” and various referential common nouns
such as “the author or authors,” “the text,” “the work,” “the book.”

The introduction to *Islamization of Knowledge*, in the course of seven pages,
gives the reader an historical overview of the condition of the Muslim community from
the inception of Islam to the present, as perceived by the IIIT, and in turn give reasons
for the “work plan” described in the book, which supports the establishment in 1972 of
an associate group, the Association for Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS, discussed
further below). The introduction never documents specific examples to explain the
IIIT’s version of Islamic history; however, it does describe in the most general of terms
centuries of plots, assaults, and domination by foreign groups and persons whose sole
objective is to keep Islam in a state of “weakness,” an oft-repeated term in the book.

Khaldun (1377/1967/1989) writes of Al-Ghazali and his coreligionists that they
“were very intent upon meddling with philosophical works. The subjects of the two
disciplines (theology and philosophy) were thus confused by them. This has gone so
far that the one discipline is no longer distinguishable from the other” (p.353).
Therefore, Khaldun (1377/1967/1989) in part traces the decline of Islam to the
intellectual impoverishment of his own civilization caused by his own Muslim people. Khaldun’s argument is that, early on, Islam discovered Aristotelian logic, a mainstay of the Western intellectual tradition, and thereby made great achievements in the advancement of knowledge that the West would adopt; but then Islam proceeded to equate logic with matters of faith, soul, and heart and slid into centuries of malaise.

To the IIIT, its founder, and notable scholars, however, problems with the Muslim community have not changed since the dawn of Islam. Islamization of Knowledge thus thematically conveys the sense of conspiracism discussed above and in previous chapters and exhibits a conceptual interplay with Qutb’s concepts of takfir, kufr, and jahiliyah. To the IIIT, Islam has been beset with “challenges and conspiracies” and “unrelenting psychological and economic warfare, covertly and deviously waged” (p. ix). With repeated attacks over the centuries, Islam never entirely lost its will to power, and so its “enemies set out . . . more devious methods” (p. ix) such as “intellectual incursion--a process that introduced (under the guise of logic, common sense, and pragmatism) certain metaphysical concepts that led to much controversy and endless sophistry” (p. ix). The result, accordingly to the introduction, was “intellectual incursion” (p. ix) giving rise to sectarianism (e.g., Sufism) that “impaired” Islam’s “unity” and “distracted its scholars from the original sources and unsullied fountainheads of Islam: the Qur’an, the Word of Allah (SWT), and the Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad (SAAS) (p. x).

Again without providing any specific empirical evidence to support the book’s introductory claims, the IIIT further states that even during the Ottoman Empire “intellectual deviancy” (p. x) remained a threat because in “the age of the European
Renaissance, the intellectual incursion began to assume new dimensions by becoming more systematic, all-embracing, and sophisticated' (p. x). Apparently, it was during the Renaissance--although scant evidence of actual dates and specific events are provided to know for certain in this paragraph--that Islam was further weakened by “Western imperialism, its religious functionaries [never directly identified as Jews and Christians], and orientalists’ machinations” who “together turned their campaign into a total and exhaustive onslaught” (p. x). “Islam, itself,” the IIIT text implies, was raped, “the prime target to be penetrated” (p. x). On an educational level, Orientalism was the aggressor laying “the groundwork for this new intellectual offensive against Islam and the Ummah” and was “aided and abetted, materially and morally, by numerous organizations and supporters, and succeeded eventually in ensnaring the hearts and minds of many Muslims, reshaping its thinking and clouding their Islamic vision” (p. x).

Furthermore, the IIIT’s locus of responsibility for Islam’s decline not only involves, inter alia, plots by Orientalist intellectuals, Crusaders, and deviant religions but also the time “when the West created an alien entity inside Muslim lands to act as a convenient springboard for its plans and ambitions” (p.xi). Presumably, because the introduction never states the year nor names the “entity” in question, the “alien entity” is the state of Israel, or what the IIIT text calls “the most cruel and inhumane act of imperialism in the world. . . . Shaken by such calamitous events, the Muslim mind was unable to distinguish between right and wrong or good or evil” (p. xi).

In The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder, Syrian sociologist, Tibi (1998) refutes such “fundamentalist” historical
claims and calls them forms of “paranoid scholarship.” Tibi (1998) writes, for example, that the “decline of the Ottoman Empire was not the result of a ‘Western conspiracy against Islam,’ but part of unfolding global history; it marked the end of the long historical epoch of divine orders that had reigned virtually throughout the world” (p. 144).

Yet the IIIT remains wedded to its vision of history that accordingly culminated in the creation of Israel. And despite the odds stacked against Nizam Islami, the author or authors of the IIIT textbook asserts that “several groups” (p. xii)--who are never identified specifically--“within the Ummah have remained faithful to the truth and have adhered to their beliefs” (p. xii) set out to rescue Islam from its weakness.

“Unwavering in their faith and regardless of prevailing suppression, corruption, and pessimism,” the people in this Islamic vanguard “provide a map of the way to deliverance and salvation” (p. x). Thus, in 1972 the IIIT and the AMSS were created jointly “to address the intellectual problems facing Islamic thought” (p. xii). Never identifying them by name, Islamization of Knowledge, first published in 1982 and then reprinted in 1989 and 1995, holds also that members of one group were “young men” who “had attained a clear understanding of the nature of the problem and its cure while still studying at various Western universities” (p. xii): “intellectual deviation,” “stagnation,” “loss of vision,” “confusion,” disintegration,” and “weakness” leading to “aimlessness and impotence” (p. xii). These are the same accusations that appear in Qutb’s and the Muslim Brotherhood’s writings, meant as educational tools for Muslims living jahiliyah society.
Referring to Muslims as a “nation,” “Malaise of the Ummah” signifies the basis of the IIIT’s definition of the problem of Islamic civilization’s loss of power in the Twentieth Century. “In this century, no other nation has been subjected to comparable defeats or humiliation. Muslims were defeated, massacred, double-crossed, colonized, and exploited, proselytized, forced or bribed into conversion to other faiths” (p. 1). Moreover, they “were secularized, Westernized, and de-Islamized by internal and external agents of their enemies” (p. 1). To the unknown author or authors of this work of educational theory and practice, such actions “aggravate” because Islam “is, in fact, an integral, beneficial, world-affirming, and realistic religion in which practical solutions for contemporary problems of humanity can be sought and found” (p. 1). Moreover, the “malaise” affects the political, economic, and cultural character of the Muslim “nation”; and “there can be no doubt that the intellectual and methodological decline of the Ummah is the core of its malaise” (p. 5). In addition, and without providing any empirical evidence the author or authors state:

As far as Islamization is concerned, never before have both the traditional and the secularist schools, colleges, and universities been more daring in advocating their un-Islamic themes and never before have they had the captive ear of the overwhelming majority of Muslim youth as they do today. . . . The secularist educational system has assumed tremendous proportions, elbowing out the Islamic system from the field. Islamic education, for the most part, remains a private affair that has limited access to public funds. . . . The forces of Westernization and secularization, and resultant de-Islamization of teachers and students, continue to gather momentum in colleges and universities; and nothing has been done to stop that degeneration. . . . No Muslim government, university administration, or private organization is doing anything about the sinking morale of college youth or about their continuing de-Islamization through “education.” (p. 6)
In addition to matters of de-Islamization, the author or authors condemn Muslim university professors for their own “lack of a clear vision” (p. 6), which tacitly accuses Muslim university professors of takfir and jahiliyah:

Look at the highest model of the Muslim university teacher—the professor with a doctorate from a Western university, especially in the social sciences and humanities. . . . In most cases, he was not Islamically motivated beforehand, i.e., he had not embarked upon his expedition to seek knowledge for the sake of Allah (SWT), but rather for materialistic, egoist, or at best, nationalistic goal. . . . that teachers in Muslim universities do not possess the vision of Islam and, therefore, are not driven by its cause is certainly the greatest calamity of Muslim education. (pp. 7-8)

Also, the author or authors condemn the West’s “subjects and methodologies” which the Muslim cannot digest as well as the non-Muslim because those things have been de-Islamized:

Unconsciously, these dispirited materials and methodologies continue to exert a sinister de-Islamizing influence upon students by posing as alternatives to the Islamic disciplines. . . . Without a cause, the Muslim is not driven to master the totality of knowledge in the discipline; and without that mastery no transcendence of that discipline’s state-of-the-art is possible. For the Muslim, the only cause that can really be a cause is Islam. (p. 8)

And, in a comparative statement that perhaps more than a few educators in the West would deny, simply because postmodernism has given rise to de-Westernization in the Western curriculum (see, for example, Tibi, 1998): “Nowhere in the Muslim world is the Islamic vision taught to all students as the Western tradition is taught to high school students in the West with consistency, universality, utmost seriousness and commitment on the part of all” (p. 9). Late in the book, however, the author or authors contradict this early statement about the “consistency” and “commitment” of the Western curriculum in a critique of its “flaws and defects” (p. 59), “disjointed
approach,’ (p. 68), “unimaginative methodology,” (p. 68) and “misguidance and deception” (p. 83).

The next two chapters reiterate the aforementioned content and themes of *Islamization of Knowledge*, again without offering *any* evidence for their *raison d’etre*, but then propose a solution, identified as “The Task,” which is to merge the Western tradition of education with that of revelation, just as Qutb had suggested in 1953 in *Social Justice in Islam*: “The two systems must be united and integrated, and the emergent system must be infused with the spirit of Islam and must function as an integral part of its ideological program. . . . The educational system must be endowed with a mission, and that mission must be none other than that of imparting Islamic vision and cultivating the will to realize it on the largest scale” (p. 13). In essence, for the IIIT, this merger equates to an educational system in a kind of Golden Age during Islam’s formative years before “some Muslims tried to overcome the difficulties they faced in a changing world by adopting *tasawwuf* (Sufism)” (p. 23), which purportedly divided the realms of revelation and reason and separated thought from action.

Wahhabism’s and the neo-Muslim Brotherhood’s concern for “unity” becomes the leitmotif for the Islamic principles articulated in Chapter IV. In a series of major sections, the author or authors claim that the New Islamic Man envisioned in their exposition of *zalzalah* in Western education—a process implied in the previous chapters as an Islamic version of Marx’s thesis (Western education) and antithesis (the spirit of Islam) leading to synthesis: the Islamization of knowledge—must have infused in his education the unity of “Allah,” “Creation,” “Truth,” “Knowledge,” “Life,” and “Humanity.” As the chapter unfolds, one finds that those educational objectives will
bring Muslims out of their “jahiliyah”; whereas, “failure to perform these duties” will keep them immersed in their de-Islamized condition (p. 45). Thereafter, a series of condemnations follow. Among those things condemned is “chauvinism,” which is to “assume the advantage of the ethnic entity as the ultimate criterion of good and evil” (p. 48). Chauvinism thus signifies a form of ethnocentrism, for which the author or authors state the Muslim “is the exact opposite of this conception of reality” (p. 49). In contrast, “committed” chauvinists are the “Jew, German, French, or Russian” who “assumes the Jewish people, Germany, France, or Russia to be ultimate realities’ (p. 48).

Chapter Five of Islamization of Knowledge offers further insight into how the IIIT intends to guide scholarly study and graduate research as a means to advance a particular political dogma or monolithic “vision,” Islamism, whose explicit purpose is to force conformity and reform thought, contrary to textual assertions of “independence,” thereby keeping foreign influences found in Western knowledge in check. Presumably, this “agenda” is not considered by the author or authors of the book to be “chauvinistic” or “ethnocentric”:

First, we must enlist the cooperation of Muslim scholars working in Western universities and elsewhere to supervise these youths to guide them in their academic activities, and to lend them all possible help to complete their essential Islamic knowledge and to adopt a right and independent approach to their studies. Help from Muslim scholars is also needed to inspire topics that tackle issues which really concern the Ummah and are helpful in elucidating its vision. . . . These theses should be a means of tackling the issue of Islamization of knowledge instead of allowing these theses and studies to be used as a means of molding the Muslim mind into a completely alien Western pattern. Such theses should not be used for exploiting Muslim intellect to further the interests and objectives of alien powers nor as a means of collecting vital information to be manipulated by alien teachers and organizations. (p. 79, italics added to underscore themes of intellectual conformity and thought reform inherent to the IIIT’s stated educational theory and practice)
The IIIT enjoins, too, that the “desirable research studies should be original, analytical, critical studies and not descriptive and emotional” (p. 126). Furthermore:

Second, is offering material support to promising scholars of outstanding merit. . . . Its goals include ideological reformation, the Islamization of knowledge. . . . This material support will offer fields of study that are essential to providing special skills required by a Muslim community or country where the absence of such skills may cause serious setbacks and problems. (p. 79, italics added to illustrate explicit statements of thought reform along monolithic ideological lines)

And, as the very first clause in the aforementioned passages states, such educational theory and practice is expected to occur with the assistance of “Muslim scholars” working within Western universities, where traditional notions of academic freedom to pursue “independent” research are not circumscribed by educational theory and practice that imposes “ideological” limits on what is studied and written about. Thus, one may argue that an organization like the IIIT operating on a university campus might, as Marty and Appleby (1993) state about any kind of Islamic fundamentalism, poses a direct challenge to existing institutions given Islamism’s characteristic reformist will to power. However, the IIIT’s repeated claims that “Islamization of knowledge” is a “science” refute Marty and Appleby’s (1993) other assumptions that Islamic fundamentalism differs from other types of religious fundamentalism because its adherents do not hold their religious education is “scientific.”

Adoption of the “agenda” advances in seven conceived stages: “creation of understanding and awareness” by engaging “the problem of knowledge and thought” with “a wide cross-section of people,” including “scholars, thinkers, the educated elements of the Ummah, and their leaders alike . . . through their diverse organizations, groups, clubs, and forums of Islamic media” (p. 59). Such engagement
is explicitly stated a serving the purpose of “the ideological cause and the
Islamization of knowledge” (p. 59). In that respect, cooperation with “all
international centers of knowledge in general and in those of the Islamic world” the
IIIT regards as “indispensable,” and is “cooperation with all academic institutions and
the mass media” (pp. 59-60). In addition to establishing relations and official
partnerships with those “international centers” and “academic institutions” through
“conferences, seminars, studies, and publications,” the *Islamization of Knowledge*
boasts an existing “special program for university teachers, scholars, and thinkers”
where they can” spend their sabbatical leaves at the Institute in order to devote their
time exclusively to research” to “produce pioneer academic works that will guide and
help others who are working in various fields toward the Islamization of knowledge”
(p. 60). Invoking a military term, the IIIT describes this special class of Muslim-only
intellectuals working in and with higher education institutions as a “cadre” that
“instills” a “stable Islamic ideological basis” (p. 74).

The IIIT also proffers information about money and banking toward the
advancement of *zalzalah* in higher education. For example, the final chapter of
*Islamization of Knowledge* laments in its opening sentence the “restricting” of
“support for charitable work and public service to governments and official
contributions subject to numerous political, administrative, and routine limitations”
that “deprive the Ummah of one of the most important sources of support for
enterprise and creative activity” for “the general welfare and reformation” (p. 97).
*Waqif*, or what the IIIT describes as “the institution of endowment,” held a “sacrosanct
position in Islam,” and so the author or authors clarify that “it was not permissible for
anyone to misuse the waqf or to divert its funds from their lofty purposes” (p. 97). However, as was stated earlier in this analysis about the IIIT’s version of history, “imperialism had hegemony over the Islamic world” and “the floodgates of Western ideas and philosophies that were hostile and inimical to the norms and legacy of the Ummah were thrown open, and Islamic charitable institutions were violently and viciously attacked” (p. 98). Recognizing that it must assimilate somewhat with Western money and banking laws and policies in host countries, the IIIT advocates that Muslims take advantage of “opportunities in its own immediate milieu,” such as “U.S. laws and its system of private enterprise aimed at encouraging people to participate in public works of charity” (p. 98). Moreover, the IIIT advocates donations to a range of “Islamic charitable organizations, such as the Institute, mosques, schools, Islamic centers and other important Muslim organizations active in the United States” (pp. 98-99). Presumably, those organizations are the same ones housed under the ISNA umbrella, given that the IIIT is a sub-group of the ISNA.

The USF library holds another book of higher education theory and practice published by the IIIT, Toward Islamization of Disciplines (1984), which was placed in general collections in 1990, according to library records, two years prior to the creation of USF-WISE. The book is an affirmation of what its unknown editor calls “Pax Islamica” (p. 448), a term reminiscent of the ancient Roman concept of empire building in which a foreign minority group rules over a native majority group. In addition, the Islamist borrowing of the term Pax Romana also signifies Pipes’ (1997a) observations of what he calls “the Western mind of radical Islam,” arguably another feature of the mass social movement in higher education responsible for Islamists’
study of the West through Western education for the purpose of conquering the West. The researcher suggests that creating “Pax Islamica” by “Islamizing” the various disciplines of Western thought represents but another manifestation of Qutb’s doctrine of *zalzalah*, or the “shaking” of a society’s institutional foundations from “below” through educational channels.

Under *Pax Islamica*, native religious communities will be permitted their religious identities but will serve under a world-wide Islamic empire, thus consigning non-Muslims to the pre-modern status of dhimmitude, which Yeo’or (1998) defines as a condition in which non-Muslims make a pact with a ruling Muslim group in exchange for various “rights” known in the West as “life, liberty, and property” but with the understanding that non-Muslims, while permitted certain “rights,” are second-class citizens. The book *Islamization of Disciplines* equates *Pax Islamica* to the United Nations, only “superior . . . because . . . its constitution is divine law, valid for all, and may be invoked by anyone in any Muslim court” (p. 449).

Like the other IIIT texts presented above, *Islamization of Disciplines* also illustrates the intention to reform Western education through the application of Allah’s will by utilizing the so-called “scientific” methods of Islamic jurisprudence. For example, the chapter “Research in Psychology: Toward an Ummatic Paradigm” criticizes Western knowledge’s habit of creating new knowledge in the discipline of psychology, or “organizing a new psychological community around a new psychological paradigm” (p. 124) in order to resolve conflicting claims among the different fields of psychological study. That kind of “Ummatic paradigm” is carried across all chapters for all disciplines in the book, tacitly supporting Meddeb’s (2003)
critique of contemporary Islamic fundamentalism’s anti-intellectualism paradoxically wrought by highly educated men. Instead of creating new knowledge to come to terms with intellectual conflict, the “Ummatic paradigm” negates the need to create new knowledge by applying an elite scholar’s interpretation of divine will to settle intellectual dispute:

Fortunately, Muslims have their own tradition of resolving such disputes from the history of the development of jurisprudence (fiqh), as we have mentioned earlier. . . . This tradition should be continued if psychology is to develop an Islamic spirit. (p. 126)

Tibi (1998) finds the concept of “Islamization of Knowledge” a troubling pursuit of behalf of political Islam because in reviewing the writings of Islamic fundamentalism, the religious underpinning of Islamist political ideology, “we no longer encounter this notion of plurality of humanity (‘each has his own religion’)” (p. 152). Specifically, Tibi (1998) observes how the spread of such thought engenders “disorder” in the form of religious persecution, intellectual persecution, and civil war. “Political Islam is an entirely different caliber,” Tibi (1998) writes. “Those Muslims who regard their religion more as an ethical than a political context, as a source of conduct and not as a system of government, are considered by fundamentalists to be ‘misguided Muslims,’ or even apostates. Thus, the fundamentalists draw the conclusion that they are justified in slaying these Muslims they arbitrarily declare apostates” (p. 152).

Referring to a work described by Schoenfield (2004) above for its anti-Semitic content, Methods of the Intellectual Invasion of the Muslim World, Tibi (1998) states that the authors, both education professors in Medina, Saudi Arabia, indict various Muslim scholars dating as far back as the early 1800’s as having
capitulated to the “intellectual incursion” described in the IIIT’s Islamization of Knowledge. According to those professors, Tibi (1998) asserts, there “has been a colonial mu’amarah/conspiracy directed against Islam, a conspiracy that resulted in the destruction of the caliphate” (p. 153). Neither they, nor the IIIT, for that matter, “consider the fact that the concept of a caliphate cannot be found in the Qur’an” (p. 153). “Some bright liberal Muslim thinkers do not contest the political character of Islam. They do, however, refuse any dogmatic solution to the crisis of the nation-state in Islamic civilization, be it purely secular or fundamentalist. It is unfortunate that these Islamic thinkers are such a small minority and that they are already exposed to the threat of being slain as murtad/apostates” (p. 157).

Tibi (1998) thus enjoins that an “unbiased reading of the political writings of current fundamentalists leads one to conclude that we are dealing with a brand of political propaganda. The style, language, and method of argumentation of these works all reveal propagandistic tactics, not a theology or an intellectual discourse. Reasoning for these zealots is heresy” (p. 156). The same observation could be made about the IIIT’s theory and practice of higher education, in addition to the scholarship of the AMSS and the AMSE, the IIIT’s associated academic groups.

The IIIT’s mission of re-Islamization in higher education garners support from an academic association called the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS). Founded in 1972, its objectives are close to those of the IIIT. The AMSS also publishes in concert with the IIIT a quarterly journal, the American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences (AJISS). Its mission, according to the journal’s website, is “to serve as a bridge between Muslim intellectuals and scholars all over the world to effect the
development of scholarly approach in the field of Islamic social sciences and human studies.” In addition, the journal presents its mission in contrast to what it calls the “face of apparently unstoppable secularism and modernization/Westernization which continues to spread around the globe.” The AJISS’s Editor-in-Chief is Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman; Editor, Katherine Bullock; Assistant Editor, Layla Sein.

The AJISS jointly sponsors conferences and seminars along with the AMSS, IIIT, and the Islamic, Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (IESCO). The IIIT, the ISNA, the AMSS, the AJISS, and their associated scholars and groups will be revisited in the next chapter on re-Islamization’s interplay at USF.

Characteristic Three: “Campus Holy War” Advocated and Exported to Other Locales for Purposes of Re-Islamization from Above and Below

Islamists in Saudi Arabian higher education appear to have used their universities as platforms for re-Islamization from above and below, advocating and exporting the practice to other regions around the world. An archetypal example is that of Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, noted earlier in Chapter One as having conceived of the idea of an elite group of “martyred scholars” who would sacrifice their souls in the effort to unite the world ummah. Azzam taught Islamic studies in the 1970’s at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah (Gold, 2004) before becoming a key figure in the fundraising and recruitment network of violent jihad that would eventually establish itself in the United States (Emerson, 1994, 2002). Azzam’s teachings were action-oriented. He advocated everything from heresy allegations against Muslims who did not accept violent jihad, to Jewish conspiracy charges, to terrorism, and to total war against apostates and infidels.
Gold (2004) offers the following information about Azzam’s history and ideological influences:

Azzam was born in a Palestinian village near Jenin in 1941. In 1959, he traveled to Syria to study at Damascus University; he lived there through 1966, and during that time he joined the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1973, he completed his doctorate in Islamic jurisprudence at Al-Azhar in Cairo, where he met the family of Sayyid Qutb. Subsequently, he taught Islamic law at the University of Jordan in Amman, where he again became active in the Muslim Brotherhood. Because of his involvement with the Brotherhood, he was dismissed from his university position. So, like other Muslim Brothers, he moved to Saudi Arabia. There he joined Muhammad Qutb on the faculty of King Abdul Aziz University. At the university, Qutb and Azzam shared a young Saudi student named Osama bin Laden. (pp. 94-95)

At the time he taught as a professor of Islamic studies in Saudi Arabia, Azzam became known in the Muslim world as the “Emir of Jihad” because he followed in Qutb’s steps to “restore the centrality of jihad”: “Anybody who looks into the state of Muslims today will find that their great misfortune is their abandonment of Jihad” (qtd. in Gold, 2004: p. 95; a fatwa from Defending the Land of the Muslims is Each Man’s Most Important Duty). Azzam’s legal ruling continues as follows, and supporting the idea that jihad is the sixth pillar of Islam: “Verily, the repelling of the disbelieving enemy is the most important obligation after Iman [faith]” because there may arise such a situation in which it is obligatory upon each and every one to march forward, when Jihad is obligatory on all Muslims if the enemy invades one of our countries or he surrounds one of our territories. Then it is obligatory upon the whole of creation to march out for jihad. If they fail to respond they are in sin” (pp. 95-96).

Thus, Azzam’s teaching de-centered blame on the problems with the Muslim world away from the establishment of Israel and instead looked at “a broader attack on the Islamic world” (Gold, 2004: p. 96) to include all countries where Muslims live,
including those like the United States, where Muslims did not originate but did 
emigrate. The problems with those countries therefore involved the West’s alleged 
capitulation with Zionists (aka, “Jews,” “international bankers,” “military-industrial 
complex,” “capitalists”) who had ruined Islamic civilization (Gold, 2004). Gold (2004) 
surmises in his conclusion about Azzam’s ideological influence through teaching and 
publishing in the Saudi Arabian university system and through his earlier interests in 
the Muslim Brotherhood in other countries that while the sheikh’s “ideology played a 
key role in the defeat of a world superpower [the Soviets in Afghanistan],” it also 
“would have an even more significant impact on world affairs, for his writings 
ultimately justified the indiscriminate terrorism that Al-Qaeda would come to 
practice”:

“Many Muslims know about the Hadith in which the Prophet ordered his 
companions not to kill any women or children, etc., but very few know that 
there are exceptions to this case. In summary, if non-fighting women and 
children are present, Muslims do not have to stop an attack” (qtd. in Gold, 
2004: p. 99)

Furthermore, “Those who believe that Islam can flourish and be victorious without 
Jihad (fighting) and blood are deluded and have no understanding of the nature of this 
religion,” Azzam teaches (p. 99).

As Western professors with expertise in government and international affairs 
might advise their national leadership, Gold (2004) writes that Azzam consulted with 
the Saudi Arabian government on matters of warfare in the Balkans, where many 
Muslim veterans of the Afghan conflict against the former Soviet Union would later 
fight. While the atrocities committed by the non-Muslim Serbians were inexcusable 
under international standards of warfare, acts committed by Bosnian Muslims, justified
by extreme interpretations of Islamic law, were no less violative. “The Arab force,” having received legal guidance by Sheikh Azzam and other Islamic scholars in Saudi Arabia, “acquired a reputation as fierce fighters, known to have severed the heads of the ‘Christian Serbs’ and mutilated their enemies’ bodies” (pp. 143-144).

Azzam’s radicalized Ikwhan worldview also maintains adherents in North America who apparently enjoin him in the world-historical discourse of the Islmaist movement. For example, many of the Islamic Centers and Societies under the umbrella of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA, discussed above) are led by spiritual leaders who were trained in Saudi Arabian universities and whose salaries are paid at least partially by the Saudi Arabian government (Modany & Weyrich, 2004). A major contingency of those leaders have connections to the Muslim Brotherhood. Sheikh Jamal Said of the Mosque Foundation of Illinois, which classifies as a “Center,” is one of those leaders. Born in 1957, Said is of Palestinian heritage, was born in the West Bank, and claims to have received his earliest religious inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhood in that region. In 1967, he moved with his family to Amman, Jordan, to “an upscale neighborhood” (Modany & Weyrich, 2004: p. 1), and then later studied Islam in Saudi Arabia.

In 1985, Said moved to the United States and became the prayer leader at the Mosque Foundation in Illinois, where he “developed a national reputation and easily attracted prominent Muslim activists to Bridgeview” (p. 2). His arrival there was not viewed favorably by some members of the mosque, who prefer to practice faith without politics. The moderates at the Bridgeview mosque attribute the radicalization of the mosque to the fact that most of the leaders of the mosque are members of the
Muslim Brotherhood (Modany & Weyrich, 2004). “In an interview in Cairo, Brotherhood leader Mohammed Mahdi Akef said he and other Brotherhood members helped create the society [in Bridgeview, Illinois] and that it follows Brotherhood philosophy. The society [in Bridgeview] said it is independent but is influenced by the Brotherhood and other groups” (p. 3). Said declines to be interviewed but reportedly tells worshippers “that those who criticize mosque leaders are ‘hypocrites’--a condemnation that in Islam could cause someone to be shunned” (p. 3).

Section III:

“Parallel Hierarchies” in Levantine Higher Education: Conditions and Characteristics

Conditions of Islamism’s Interplay in Higher Education

Condition One: Transnational Influence of Islamism and its Esprit de Corps from Non-Indigenous Organizational Networks toward Advancement of Re-Islamization from Above and Below

Islamism would not have become a formidable force in the Levant were it not for the organizational support emanating from two major sources cited in this chapter’s previous sections, the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia. Research implies that each attempts to influence higher education and its accoutrements in the Levant for purpose of a common objective in defiance of U.N. charter, the destruction of the state of Israel.

By the 1980’s, chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood had existed already in the West Bank and Gaza, and in other areas of the Levant (Mitchell, 1969/1993; Abu-Amr, 1994). In fact, the Palestinian chapter of the group extended as far back as the
1930’s. Established Muslim Brotherhood infrastructure thus provided the Islamic Jihad with an institutional network that would assist the Islamic Jihad’s organizational development in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. The Islamic Jihad would continue to advance itself by relying on the existence of Muslim Brotherhood institutions even after the Muslim Brotherhood had divested itself of its direct organizational affiliation with the terrorist group in 1982 (Zamel, 1991).

Zamel (1991) states that after 1982 the Islamic Jihad operated from the Muslim Brotherhood’s two major sources of infrastructure, the Islamic University (est. 1971) and its adjacent Islamic Center, or the *Mujama*, a type of mosque which Zamel (1991) refers to as “the public front for the Brotherhood (sic)” (p. 154). In the *Akram Document* revealed in undisputed evidence in *U.S.A. v. Holy Land Foundation* (2007), Islamic Centers are referred to as bases of “operations” toward the ‘settlement’ of North America through “civilizational-jihadist process with all the word means.” In addition, the purposes of the Islamic Center in the West Bank and Gaza are similar to those of other so-named Islamic Centers throughout the world: it is a multipurpose sub-organization of a parent organization that accepts guidance and aid from outside governments, Saudi Arabia in particular, and controls a majority of mosques within its metropolitan area. Similarly in the Palestinian territories, the Islamic Center in Gaza “was primarily established as a mosque, but attached to it were a medical clinic, a youth sports club, a nursing school, an Islamic festival hall, a *zakat* [charity] committee, and a center for women’s activities and for training young girls” (p. 16).
In addition, another terrorist group, HAMAS, founded in 1983 out of two other “secret networks” (p. 154)—one, “the intellectual arm of the Brotherhood”; the other, “its paramilitary organization” (p. 154)—also operated out of those same two institutions of the Muslim Brotherhood. While Abu-Amr (1994) states that HAMAS operates as both a group that performs non-violent cultural actions and as one that performs “spectacular actions” or “daring attacks” (see, inter alia, pp. 107, 112), the Islamic Jihad exists only to carry out “spectacular” or “daring attacks.”

*Characteristics of Islamism’s Interplay in Higher Education*

*Characteristic One: External and Internal Organizational Networks Run by Highly Educated Elites Interacting with Universities for Purposes of Re-Islamization from Above and Below*

This sub-section shows that the experience of re-Islamization in the Levant bears little difference than in its place of origin, Egypt. In the Levant, the introduction of Muslim Brotherhood chapters and activities gave rise to terrorist sub-groups, or what the Muslim Brotherhood termed in the late 1930’s “Secret Apparatuses” or Zamet (1991), “secret networks” (p. 154). And, as was true of the parent society in Egypt, the accoutrements of higher education in concert with nearby mosques and their related associations have been paramount to the advance of the mass social movement in its quest for power and ideological reform of its host societies. HAMAS notwithstanding, the Islamic Jihad also emulates the leading intellects and founders of the Muslim Brotherhood who worked as civil servants in Egypt’s education system. For example, a major chapter on the Islamic Jihad in Abu-Amr’s book *Islamic Fundamentalism in the
West Bank and Gaza (1994) demonstrates that the Islamic Jihad considers Qtub’s *Signposts* as “sources of education and indoctrination” (p. 97).

In addition, the group considers Al-Banna’s focus on “revival, organization, and upbringing” and his “personality” and “various roles he played” as vital to the Islamic movement against the “Zionist entity” and Israeli “occupation” of Muslim land (p. 97). Furthermore, another source reveals that a combination of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Jihad at least one Palestinian university, Bir Zeit, follows the Muslim Brotherhood’s campus organizational and administrative structure that works in concert with nearby mosques, as that structure described in Section I. For example, one Bir Zeit student, himself a leader in the minority Communist bloc, comments:

> The Islamists were very good at organizing. This we could see during the elections campaigns, when they would hold large marches which were organized and directed by Islamic supporters outside the campus. Also, the Islamic bloc used the mosque in Birzeit village as its headquarters and people from all over the region would meet up there. The leaders on the campus were called “emirs” and in each faculty there was an emir from the Islamic bloc who led the students. This meant that power was very centralized and the emir must be obeyed unquestioningly. (qtd. in Milton-Edwards, 1999: 137)

Lastly, throughout the Levant Islamist students through the influence of faculty learned the ways of the “localized political arena and the university became an important training ground for the movement” (p. 137).

As noted above, kinship between the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Palestinians dates back to the 1930’s and 1940’s. The foundation of that kinship explicitly involves higher education as a “domain of war” for Palestinian societal reform and the denial of the state of Israel. For example, in the 1930’s and 1940’s, according to Abu-Amr (1994), the Muslim Brotherhood had Palestinian rovers and
branches under the Egyptian organization’s guidance. Those rovers and branches were in the practice of making incursions into the Sinai peninsula during times of official banishment under the guise of what the Muslim Brotherhood called “scientific missions”: “During the Palestinian revolt of 1936, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood carried out propaganda activities on behalf of the Palestinians,” whose Grand Mufti, also a Muslim Brother (Abu-Amr, 1994: p. 3), had formed an alliance with the Nazis (Fregosi, 1998). On behalf of the Palestinians, the Muslim Brotherhood also “formed a committee (the General Committee to Aid Palestine), headed by Hasan Al-Banna . . . . The society established a students’ committee to explain the Palestinian cause to Egyptian students” (pp. 1-2).

Soon thereafter, the students committee adopted another organizational purpose, which was “to assist in the training of Palestinian scouts” in West Bank, Gaza, Syria, and Jordan (p. 2). That kind of behavior was contested by Egypt’s government and other neighboring governments in the Levant, such that the fear of paramilitary assistance and training would lead to political destabilization, overthrow, and soured relations among neighboring countries. Abu-Amr (1994) documents throughout his book that many of the leaders of the Fatah movement, HAMAS, and Islamic Jihad had been members of the Muslim Brotherhood branches in the Levant, a fact that explains why so much of the terrorist organizations’ purposes, strategies, and tactics resemble the Muslim Brotherhood’s, even when those groups claim no relationship to Al-Banna’s group. “Nevertheless,” Abu-Amr (1994) writes, “the Muslim Brotherhood continued to smuggle in [to the Palestinian territories] volunteers on a smaller scale.
The society disguised this endeavor by forming ‘scientific missions’ whose declared task was to conduct explorations in the Sinai desert” (p. 3).

By 1954, Abu-Amr (1994) states, eleven branches of the Muslim Brotherhood existed in Gaza alone, a condition that provided the group with enough infrastructure to accept aid from foreign agencies and governments. To begin, members were mostly “students in the refugee camps because the Muslim Brotherhood was active in the schools for Palestinian refugees operated by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)” (p. 8). In addition, “Students who were studying in Egyptian universities also joined” as part of foreign exchange programs (p. 8). Moreover, even as the society itself declined as a formidable force in the Levant in the 1960’s after decades of intermittent repression, the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood’s radical offshoot groups would continue to enjoy “good relations with the Saudi royal family who gave material support” to the society in Egypt and Gaza (p. 8), such that by the 1980’s Saudi Arabia’s education ministry was giving ideological, endowments, and student financial aid to Islamic universities in the West Bank and Gaza (p. 14). While one could contest the use of the term “moderate” to describe the Muslim Brotherhood, Zamel (1991) writes that “Saudi Arabia has long been favorably disposed to moderate groups like the Brotherhood” (p. 131).

The universities, combined with their relationships with nearby mosques “away from the eyes or interference of the Israeli authorities” (p. 15), became the most important of all venues to recruit followers dedicated to the cause of Islamism in the ideology’s most militant forms that arose out of the Muslim Brotherhood movement (Abu-Amr, 1994). The Muslim Brotherhood’s domination of universities in West Bank
and Gaza’ Islamic universities was evidently extensive, to the extent that all, “including the Islamic university, were subject to the authority of the [Muslim Brotherhood’s] Islamic Center [al-Mujamma’ al-Islami] and its leadership” (p. 16). Zamel (1991) further allows that the Islamic University and the Islamic Center served as a “power base” to “advance the political agenda” of the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoot groups like Islamic Jihad and HAMAS (pp. 128-9). Moreover, he states that the university and the center were “legal fronts for the Brothers from which they administrated their increasingly sprawling empire” (pp. 128-9) and were “tools to indoctrinate and recruit the youth and as a powerful political leverage through apportioning and distributing patronage” (pp. 128-9).

According to Eqbal Ahmad in Hiltermann (1991), the socio-educational “front” activity of the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Jihad, and HAMAS is a planned process that Islamist activist-scholars call “outadministering the enemy” (p. 13). Islamist groups achieve such seditious goals through organizational networks that do not exist “simply to inflict military losses on the enemy” but “to destroy the legitimacy of its government and to establish a rival regime through the creation of parallel hierarchies” (qtd. in Hiltermann, 1991: p. 13; italics added). The researcher adds that such awareness by those organizational networks that aided and abetted the 1987 intifada represents a strategy that the mass social movement Islamism has known since its inception in 1927. Indeed, the entire organizational and administrative structure of the Muslim Brotherhood, and possibly the organizational and administrative structure of the ISNA, resembles an elaborate “parallel hierarchy.”
Characteristic Two: Codified Educational Theory for Purposes of Promoting Monolithic View of Islam and Subverting Universities and Surrounding Societies from Above and Below

Zamel (1991) characterizes the purpose of higher education in West Bank and Gaza after 1971 as “social, economic, cultural, and educational infrastructure and organizing . . . that helped in the emergence of a new cadre of activity, replacing the old often uneducated and apolitical Koranic teachers and preachers” (p. 132, italics added). The term “cadre” is revealing in that the term possesses a militaristic connotation in which education reform is achieved through hiring a new class of activist professors beholden to a single ideology to “replace” an “apolitical” type, a fact that signifies not a broadening of the Palestinian mind but rather its displacement. In that sense, higher education in the West Bank and Gaza were reduced to the status of “parallel hierarchies.” Zamel’s (1991) characterization of the Islamic University, Bir Zeit University, and Al-Najah University indicates that their purpose is culturally subversive, emphasizing re-Islamization’s drive toward turning a religion into a political ideology.

Within those universities, education is therefore not a means to advance knowledge, but rather is a means to “indoctrinate” Palestinians under the banner of a single political ideology. Zamel (1991) conveys that that purpose became the mainstay of both religious and secular universities in West Bank and Gaza: “The creation of Islamic colleges . . . , where Islamic political activity permeated the structure of the school from the administration to the faculty to the student-body (sic), gave a momentous push to the diffusion of Islamist politics” (p. 132); however, the “Muslim
Brotherhood also targeted secular institutions for proselytization (sic) and recruitment. Preachers and activist students established clubs on university campuses and held lectures and sermons calling on the youth to return to Islam for salvation” (p. 133).

Abu-Amr (1994) offers other revealing descriptions of the condition of higher education in Palestinian universities, whose administration, faculty, students, and staff seem dominated by the ideology of Islamism and fully entrenched in re-Islamization, which in turn affects those universities’ surrounding society, in terms of religious and ideological politics. That description is worth quoting at length, despite Abu-Amr’s contradictory assertion in another section of his history of *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza* that Palestinian universities are “relatively autonomous” (p. 30):

The Palestinian universities in the West Bank and Gaza have been an important field for Muslim Brotherhood activity and a platform for the dissemination of ideas and for gaining influence. . . . The Muslim Brotherhood enjoys strong support in the universities of the West Bank and Gaza. The votes of the society’s supporters fluctuate between 30 and 50 percent. Even in Birzeit University, which has been known for its strong nationalist, leftist, and liberal tendencies, the Islamists muster considerable support in the student body. Muslim students have always controlled the student council in the Islamic University in Gaza. Currently, they also control the student council in the University of Hebron. (pp. 16-17)

In addition:

The Islamic University in Gaza, founded in 1978, is considered the principal Muslim Brotherhood stronghold. The university’s administration, most of the employees who work there, and the majority of students are Brotherhood supporters. Current student enrollment in the university is estimated at five thousand. This university, together with other Palestinian universities, supplies the mosques in the West Bank and Gaza with young preachers. More importantly, these universities graduate a new breed of educated Muslim leaders who can occupy key positions in society. (p.17)
And:

In the student council elections of 1987, the Islamic Bloc received nearly 800 votes while the Fatah supporters won 650. The Islamic Jihad movement won 200 votes, while supporters of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) won 150 votes. In a previous year, the Islamic Jihad was able to win 400 votes. Islamic student groups control student councils in several high schools and community colleges across the West Bank and Gaza. (p. 18)

Moreover, Islamist student groups are involved in the publishing of several magazines, evidently meant to instill a so-called “Islamic spirit” that is reminiscent of the educational theories, teachings, concerns of the Muslim Brotherhood and educational groups like the IIIT:

The content of these publications concentrate on individual behavior and suggest that the Islamic culture has been distorted by Western influence. Anti-Israeli rhetoric was tolerated because of the religious nature of these publications. Since the eruption of the intifada, these publications have contained strong political messages. In addition to a constant call for a return to Islam, strong criticism is directed at local nationalism and secularism. Israeli occupation is described as a curse or punishment from God because the Palestinians have left the true path of Islam. Israel, the United States, the West and Arab governments are also targets for attacks. Together with published material, the Muslim Brotherhood circulates recorded sermons and speeches of famous Islamic leaders and preachers. . . . The ultimate message being disseminated in Islamic literature, tapes, and other media is that the resolution of the Palestinian problem can only be attained through Islam. (p. 18-19)

And finally, the “Islamic spirit” extends to university professionals and their associations, especially by the Muslim Brotherhood’s terrorist offshoots:

Another intervening factor mitigating the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence has been the emergence of the Islamic Jihad movement in the early 1980’s which came to challenge the moderate nonmilitant line of the Muslim Brotherhood. A decline of the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence in Gaza Strip was reflected in the elections of the Arab Medical Association. In 1985, the Muslim Brotherhood won three seats, Fatah four, and the leftist factions won the other four seats. In the association’s elections of 1987, the PLO groups won nine seats, while the Muslim Brotherhood won only two. In the Engineer’s Association the Muslim Brotherhood won only one seat in the 1987 elections,
after having won the majority of seats in 1981. But in the elections of 1989, the Brotherhood (Hamas) won five out of the nine seats in the association, which reflected a decline in the PLO’s presence.

(p. 19)

Hroub (2000) further supports observations about the effects of Islamism in Palestinian higher education: “Hamas combined Islamic socio-instructional discourse with the discourse of nationalist resistance, placing each at the service of each other” (p. 239), a condition which fuses the boundaries between knowledge and political indoctrination. In the Palestinian universities, that same condition is one that permits little deviation, as students, faculty, and administrators are effectually trained to force conformity on others who might stray from that single-minded path. Indeed, an interview with the late HAMAS leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, whom Israeli defense forces assassinated in 2004, shows that HAMAS’ enlistment of student rovers helped expose and commit to death “on the basic of” a “composite Islamic-instructional-nationalistic-resistance code” suspected Muslim collaborators with Israeli agents (p. 239).

Perhaps the most extreme example of Islamist control of Palestinian higher education is the campus atmosphere of Nablus’ Al-Najah University, sometimes described as a “breeding ground for suicide bombers” (http://www.ict.org). At Al-Najah University, every student party such as the Muslim Palestine Party, the Shuhada/Martyr’s Party, and the Al-Quds Party maintains direct affiliation with a terrorist group such as HAMAS/Islamic Jihad, Fatah Military Wing, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The Muslim Palestine Party, which takes orders from HAMAS/Islamic Jihad, two terrorist groups that merged in the late 1990’s,
captured 48 out of 68 General Council seats in the university’s 2001 student elections (http://www.ict.org).

The Student Assembly of Al-Najah holds regular marches in memory of suicide bombers in which students dressed as the “next seven bombers” wear white shrouds and explosive belts, the objective being the promotion of “the message of Jihad throughout the broader Palestinian population” (http://www.ict.org). The rallies and conventions held by the student council typically “feature a telephone address by a Hamas or Islamic Jihad leader” (http://www.ict.org). For example, in November 2001 Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, General Secretary of Islamic Jihad, stated in his address to the students: “Youth of Palestine...Yesterday’s student council elections were a vote in favor of the Intifada, a vote in favor of the Jihad and the struggle, a vote in favor of the blood of the fallen heroes, ... a vote in favor of the heroic suicide bombers of the Iz Adin al-Qassam battalions and the Jerusalem squads. This is the righteous choice; this if the true referendum...a test of the students of Al-Najah passed with flying colors” (http://www.ict.org). In addition, on-campus rallies covered and photographed by the media feature what might be considered a militant Palestinian version of the ROTC, with “operatives armed with various types of weapons, including anti-tank missile launchers,” plays that “demonstrate to the students how to murder Israelis and blow up Israeli passenger buses,” and plays the “re-create suicide attacks” such as the one on the Sbarro restaurant in Jerusalem” (http://www.ict.org).

Incentives for joining HAMAS-Islamic Jihad involve non-militant benefits for students in the form of a support system for students that involves academic guidance and financial aid. “Combined with regular student meetings, this strengthens the
students’ link and commitment to Hamas/Islamic Jihad” and creates “a natural transition to their becoming active members in the terrorist wing” (http://www.ict.org). In fact, “many of Hamas’ leaders in Nablus, including leaders of the Iz Adin al-Qassam terrorist wing, began their involvement in the movement while students or professors at the university” (http://www.ict.org). The infrastructural connection of indoctrination and recruitment of students and professors at Al-Najah University is so tight that Hamas itself refers to university as a “greenhouse for martyrs” (http://www.ict.org).

Nevertheless, and despite its wholesale support of activities that violate humanitarian law and Geneva warfare conventions, Al-Najah University signed a partnership agreement with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and is a full member of the International University Union. Under the auspices of these relationships, Al-Najah sends lecturers to other countries and receives them from abroad.

**Characteristic Three: “Campus Holy War” and Other Problems in Universities Associated with Interactive Organizations’ Advancement of Re-Islamization from Above and Below**

Islamism in Levantine higher education also is characterized by a continuum of religious intimidation and violence similar to that which has been noted in the previous sections. Perhaps adopted through Muslim Brotherhood influence was educational immersion in *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, a Western import and forgery explicated in previous sections and chapters. As has been amply cited in the press since HAMAS’s assumption of political power in the Palestinian territories in 2006, HAMAS cites *The Protocols* as justification for the destruction of Israel. Milton-Edwards (1999) observes, for instance, that Islamist Palestinian education expresses a
“hatred for Jews” that “is almost blind, extending well beyond the realm of religion, theology or ecumenical conflict” (p. 188). HAMAS, for example, “even by its terms of religious reference, stretch the limits of credibility and are clearly a symptom of racism rather than religious difference” (p. 188).

If the Muslim Brotherhood and its terrorist offshoots in the Levant were dissatisfied with their efforts at “re-Islamization from below” by re-directing academic work and life toward the advancement of a monolithic political ideology that “Islamizes modernity,” then those groups could always resort to “re-Islamization from above.” Despite their repeated failures to achieve their objectives through the use of terrorist attacks and other forms of political violence, “the radical are resourceful in finding new locales in which to operate” (e.g., Afghanistan, Bosnia, Africa, Western Europe, North America, Pakistan) (Sivan, 1998: p. 3). Driven from one country to the next, what Qutb called in Signposts a new form of hijra obligatory of the so-called “Islamic vanguard” has increased “coordination between (sic) Islamist movements of various countries” (p. 3). In this chapter, that coordination apparently begins through what has been described above as “academic missionary” activity inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, the mother of re-Islamization, and receives added impetus when radicals come under the close scrutiny of their native or host societies.

Alluded to in aforementioned sections and chapters, the earliest known instances in the Levant of terrorist activity committed by the Islamic Jihad happened in Lebanon. Those instances directly involved the American University of Beruit (AUB), a university in the Levant that had been established after the fall of the Ottoman caliphate. By the late 1970’s, Lebanon had become engulfed in civil war, a condition
from which AUB faculty and administrators sought to shield the campus and themselves. Zwicker-Kerr (1994), the wife of AUB president Malcolm Kerr, who himself was born in Lebanon and was the son of an AUB chemistry professor, writes that, in the last years of her husband’s life, Kerr had worked diligently to appease rivalry among campus groups, disavowing a military presence on campus by any government--Israeli, Syrian, or otherwise--despite the possible security against terrorism a military presence might bring the campus.

“Malcolm gained local popularity by forbidding Israeli military from visiting the campus in a shouting match where he remained adamant that no foreign forces would enter the campus” (p. 208), Zwicker-Kerr states. In an October 1983 convocation that preceded his official inauguration in early 1984, Kerr defined his role to AUB, having become the first graduate of the university to become its president and following in the path of his father and grandfather as AUB professors: “I therefore feel a natural identity not only with the faculty but also with the students” (p. 209). Kerr further spoke of the university’s “liberal arts tradition, its international quality, and its concern for the individual” (p. 209). Sensitive to religious issues at AUB and in its surrounding milieu, Kerr staved off condemnation by his Christian colleagues after appointing a Muslim vice president, Dr. Abdul Hamid Hallab.

Yet Kerr’s overtures could not appease the external Islamist forces that had begun interacting with AUB faculty and students. One month after his inauguration, Kerr was assassinated by members of the Islamic Jihad, a terrorist group that few in the world knew about at that time. The New York Times report for January 19, 1984 read as follows:
The president of the American university of Beruit, Malcom Kerr, was killed here today when unidentified gunmen fired two bullets into his head while he was walking toward his office. Soon after a male caller telephoned the Agence France Presse and said the slaying was the work of Islamic Holy War—supposedly a pro-Iranian underground group. A Beruit born American citizen, the 52-year-old Dr. Kerr was trained as a Middle East specialist at Princeton, Johns Hopkins, and Harvard University and pioneered in the study of political relationships among the Arab countries. Fluent in Arabic, Dr. Kerr also took a master’s degree at the American University of Beruit, where his father was a professor of chemistry and his mother was the advisor to women students. There he met his wife, the former Ann C. Zwicker, when she was studying as a junior abroad student from Occidental College in California. (qtd. in Zwicker-Kerr, 1994: 3).

Kerr had reluctantly accepted the appointment at AUB after interim president David Dodge and fellow colleagues had been kidnapped by the Islamic Jihad, who along with Hezbollah and other terrorist groups had found the war-torn country a perfect medium for re-Islamization from above (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).

While Kramer (2001) documents how attacks on “orientalist” professors figured into the militant justification to hold Dodge and his other colleagues hostage, giving them copies of Said’s (1978) Orientalism to read during their captivity, Saad-Ghorayeb (2002) illustrates that their reformist efforts of terrorist groups at AUB enjoyed major success and professes appreciation for Western education. For example, “even though the West is accused of using its schools and universities as mediums through which Arab and Muslim culture can be infiltrated and Western values and norms propagated, [Hezbollah] views the Western educational system as superior to all other educational systems in the contemporary Arab and Muslim world” (p. 107). Thus, Islamists saw that the only matter requiring attending at AUB was its re-Islamization. As in the Palestinian universities, Islamic blocs of students therefore
came to dominate student governments after 1984 and their faculty advisors now dominate the professions and their associate unions (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).

On-campus violence by the Islamic Jihad also permeated the universities in West Bank and Gaza, demonstrating once again how re-Islamization from above occurs not only in but of higher education in Egypt and the Levant. In some cases the violence was between competing Islamic groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Jihad, or the violence was between Israeli soldiers and the Islamic Jihad. Such activity, Hatina (2001) and Abu-Amr (1994) document, coincided with a surge of pamphleteering distributed on campuses by students who re-printed pamphlets distributed by nearby mosques such as the Izz Al-din Al-Qassam Mosque and the Islamic Center. At the Islamic University, for example, local press reported a consistent pattern of conflict as the Islamist students, encouraged by their faculty “emirs” and the spiritual leaders of adjacent mosques, “stormed the campus, damaged property, and attacked fellow students” (Milton-Edwards, 1999: p. 136). Those actions, coupled with persistent threats to administrators, caused repeated closures of the university, as Islamist students refused to compromise with non-Islamist campus interests (Milton-Edwards, 1999).

Elsewhere, at Hebron University, the 1980’s and early 1990’s also saw similar eruptions signifying campus re-Islamization. While at Hebron University, a greater spirit of cooperation existed between Islamists and Communists among the student body and faculties, campus election, decisions, and actions strongly reflected the spirit of an Islamist corps. Some students doubled as preachers in nearby mosques, while the professors themselves championed the Islamist movement (Milton-Edwards, 1999).
Evidently, one of the clearest indication of the spirit if Islamism at Hebron University, however, was the building of a shrine on the campus to honor a local hero, Sheikh Abdullah Azzam (Milton-Edwards, 1999), the so-called “emir of jihad” discussed in previous sections and chapters, who made violent jihad a sixth pillar of Islam, taught in Saudi Arabia, then became a favorite Islamic scholar on the ISNA lecture circuit in North America, and then was killed in a car-bomb attack in Pakistan.

Not always about Israeli “occupation,” most of the on-campus violence involved “disputes” about “control over the university, and other peripheral issues” (p. 43) as groups competing for power accused each other of being “the willing tool” of “Christian” “Phalangist” “hatred” in order “to achieve their aims and their capitulationist and liquidationist plots” (qtd. in Abu-Amr, 1994: 44). In other cases, administrators were accused of being “in collusion with nationalists” (p. 44) or with Arab or American “imperialist intelligence agencies” (p. 45). Indeed, an administrator at Al-Najah University in Nablus who sympathized with Palestinian nationalists “was thrown from the third floor of a university building” by Islamist student demonstrators in 1983, an event that was followed by similar events at the other Palestinian universities in later years.

Milton-Edwards (1999) offers a more detailed account of the same incident than does Abu-Amr (1994), however, offering information that disavows alleged imperialist conspiracies: “[Islamist] grievances stemmed from claims that the university authorities were supporting the rights of lecturers to express leftist political views. In the previous year the university administration had reinstated four lecturers dismissed on account of holding such views. . . . The [Islamists] openly challenged
arguments in favour of the right to political expression, either by lecturers or students” (p. 132). Such comments illustrate much more than Islamists merely seeking control over higher education; indeed, they reveal the Islamist challenge to academic freedom. While Abu-Amr (1994) does not state the person who was thrown from the window was killed in the attack, Milton-Edwards (1999) does. His death caused such a furor at Al-Najah University that in the coming years, Islamist students evidently regained their composure, ceasing re-Islamization from above actions on campus, and limiting their actions to peaceful protest and political organizing (Milton-Edwards, 1999).

Violent demonstrations by Islamist students in the early 1980’s set the stage for the Palestinian intifada against Israel that began in October 1987 (Abu-Amr, 1994; Milton-Edwards, 1999). Abu-Amr (1994) does not document it but Hatina (2001) states that the intifada began when students from the Islamic University attacked and killed a Yeshiva student, following yet another flurry of pamphleteering sponsored by leaders at the Al-Qassam mosque, which was the spiritual headquarters of the Islamic Jihad in Gaza. The mosque was named after Izz Al-din Al-Qassam, the “father of Palestinian armed resistance” who has been elevated “to almost a saintly status” (Abu-Amr, 1994: p. 98). Alexander (2002) documents several other killings of Jewish students by the PIJ between 1983 and 2002, including the murder of Alisa Flatow, a U.S. American study abroad student. The circumstances of her death will be examined more fully in the next chapter.

By 1989, two years after the intifada’s inception, the uprising had not achieved its purpose in producing the desired result of driving the state of Israel into the sea. Nevertheless, the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, HAMAS, and Islamic Jihad
continued to romanticize the event: “The number of detainees, wounded, and martyred from among the student members of Islamic blocs, the students, the faculty, and employees of the Islamic university, the mosque-going faithful--young and old, the imams, and the young heroes are absolute proof that the launching of the intifada was the result of that preparation and development” (Sheikh Yassin, qtd. in Hroub, 2000: p. 239). The “preparation and development” to which Yassin refers is the establishment of “parallel hierarchies” in the Palestinian higher education system, a feature that we have now witnessed in higher education systems in three different locales: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the combined Levantine areas of Lebanon, West Bank, and Gaza.

Section IV:

The University as “Ladder to Power” in Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan: \textit{Ikwhan} Interplay with Post-colonial Vacuums of Intellectual Thought and Social Policy

\textit{Conditions of Interplay in Higher Education}

\textit{Condition One: Transnational Influence of Islamism and its Esprit de Corps through the Migration of Professors and Students from other Locales}

The author or authors of \textit{Islamization of Knowledge} occasionally refer to the group of unnamed Muslim students in the 1960’s who left their native countries because of alleged “political persecution” as a “diaspora,” a term customarily used to refer to the scattering of Jews to countries outside Palestine after their Babylonian captivity. Besides Saudi Arabia and, as the IIIT educational discourse in Section II suggests, North America, that group of students also emigrated to Algeria, Tunisia, and
the Sudan. In those countries, processes of re-Islamization in higher education are similar to that witnessed in the previous sections. In Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan, re-Islamization would occur with the advent of radical student movements led by professor-/political-imams. In turn, re-Islamization would take on above and below characteristics that would challenge Algerian, Tunisian, and Sudanese families and societies, destabilizing post-colonial governments seeking to be brought into modernity’s fold.

Nevertheless, during the first phase of Algerian colonial independence, Islamists remained quiet and did not challenge Algeria’s independent government to reform along lines of the Nizam Islami (Kepel, 2002). Perhaps, given the Muslim Brotherhood’s failure in Egypt under the Nasser government, Muslim Brothers-in-exile in other locales had learned patience, putting Qutb’s doctrine of concealed advance to the test. Not until 1985, after the Algerian government had created “institutional vacuums” (p. 49) under its agrarian reform program would the Algerian Islamist movement move into Qutb’s so-called “phase of power.”

**Characteristic One: External and Internal Organizational Networks Run by Highly Educated Elites Interacting with Universities for Purposes of Re-Islamization From Above and Below**

In his historical analysis, Kepel (2002) implies that socialism weakened the power of traditional Islam throughout the Muslim world, therefore providing what Wulff (1987) would call a “welcome structure” for the untrained political imams of the Islamist movement to enact their program. Initially, re-Islamization came in the form of “below” type strategies enacted through the Ikwhan movement’s usual means of
creating front organizations interacting with universities. This feature is thus witnessed in Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan.

The relative ease for Islamists to fill the institutional vacuums created in Algerian society can, in part, be attributed to the country’s lack of Islamic religious universities to train the ulama (Kepel, 2002). Thus, “the religious field was quickly taken over by intellectuals of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS)” (p. 56). These intellectuals, of course, came from the same class of professors and other professionals associated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s “political” or “underground” imams. Esposito and Voll (2001), however, cite as cause the ulama themselves for their propensity to remain “aloof” (p. 16) from Islamist social activism. In that sense, they take the same position as Islamists themselves, who perennially indict traditional religious leadership, scholarship, and jurisprudence just as they would any societal institution that does not affirm their standards of a Nizam Islami (Kepel, 2002). The accusation against the traditional scholars of Islam’s ancient universities is, at its simplest, an accusation that they live in ivory minarets.

In Algeria in the 1960’s, “Among the Egyptians who were recruited at this time to Arabize and de-Frenchify the school system was a substantial number of Muslim Brothers on the run from Nasser’s repression” (p. 163), Kepel (2002) writes. “The Egyptian contingent trained a whole generation of strictly Arabophone teachers who agreed with their ideas and later formed the basis for the FIS” (p. 163). Second in command of the FIS was Ali Benhadj, a teacher. Evidently, Muslim Brotherhood influence in higher education would last well into the 1980’s in Algerian society. For example, Benhadj himself would find considerable guidance by two Egyptian Muslim
Brothers that the Algerian government hired to teach in its newly founded Islamic studies program founded in 1985, Muhammad Al-Ghazali (husband of Zaynab Al-Ghazali, see Section III) and Yusuf Al-Qaradawi (also noted for his guidance in Al-Qaeda, a group that received its earliest military training from the Islamic Jihad, see Section II).

By the late 1970’s, the failure of Marxism in Algeria and other socialist locales caused “the young Islamist intellectuals, as they took stock of their failure to impress the masses, to convert to Islamism because it seemed a more genuine discourse” (p. 64). Taking advantage of conflicts between a middle class populace and authoritarian government, the role of the FIS on Algerian campuses was like that which the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt had adopted over the decades: the FIS focused on the moral and cultural aspects of the Islam that would have broad appeal to the middle class and urban youth (Kepel, 2002), with adherents being able to interpret Islamist ideology as they chose, because of Qutb’s deliberate ambiguity of terms articulated in *Signposts* and other theoretical tracts being disseminated throughout the Arab world.

As also in the case of Egypt, professor-led university students were among Algeria’s most militant Islamists. In general, these Islamist students who initiated Algeria’s first riots in 1988, were first-generation college students, most of whom were of provincial mindsets, having migrated to the cities from the agrarian countryside (Kepel, 2002) and perhaps susceptible to the simplicities of the Islamist intelligentsia’s propaganda in ways that second-generation students might not be. By the mid-1980’s, the degrees these young students had attained had become “worthless on the job
market” when Algerian oil prices collapsed, reducing Algeria’s Soviet model budget by half (p. 160).

In light of Kepel’s (2002) observations about Arab national interest in blurring distinctions between Islam and Marxism in Algeria and, indeed, many other countries, it becomes transparently logical that members of the reconstituted neo-Muslim Brotherhood exiled from Egypt—and inspired by theorist-educator Qutb’s Marxist version of Islam—would find an ideological niche in Algeria, now in international alignment with Moscow. Given that the Muslim Brotherhood had been studying Islamic societies and Islamist movements in other parts of the world since the 1930’s when the Cairo headquarters divided the world into major geographical divisions and began maintaining records of those places in its library, it is also likely that an unstable Algeria, during its final push toward independence whereupon it would need to rebuild socio-educational institutions, had been flagged by the neo-Muslim Brotherhood as a locale where a highly educated class of Islamist professors and other professionals might gain access and influence.

The same argument could also be applied, of course, to Tunisia and the Sudan. Esposito and Voll’s (2001) attenuated discussion about the beneficial purpose of Muslim Brotherhood activity in the Islamic world in Makers of Contemporary Islam supports such reasoning. In addition, Kepel (2002) states that in 1963 a society of religious intellectuals did exist in Algeria, calling themselves Al-Qiyam al-Islamiya (“Islamic Values”). They were anti-Western, sought the existence of an Algerian Islamic state, and in 1966 sent a letter to Egypt’s President Nasser requesting the pardon of their revered educator-theoretician, Sayyid Qutb (Kepel, 2002).
Like Algeria, Egyptian Muslim Brothers-in-exile played a major hand in the development of the MTI, with professor-led students leading the Islamist assault against Tunisian society (Kepel, 2002). The MTI modeled itself after the Muslim Brotherhood in that it cultivated a strong relationship between university campuses--replete with activist professors and student advisees--and nearby mosques led by underground imams. Even so, the information provided by Esposito and Voll (2001) employs softer terms to describe the relationship and never mentions academic freedom denials, other violations of individual rights, and violence sponsored by MTI followers. Like the Muslim Brotherhood, the MTI achieved broad appeal across professional classes that included “middle-class professionals, professors, teachers, engineers, lawyers, scientists, and doctors” (p. 101). In addition, and also following the Muslim Brotherhood’s model, the MTI published its own magazines and journals that addressed “the particular circumstances and conditions of Tunisia by developing an ideology, program, and solutions more specifically suited to the Tunisian experience” (p. 102). 1984, according to Esposito and Voll (2001), would see a “new period of vitality and growth” (p. 102) as the first generation of the MTI would work side-by-side with the second generation.

The leader of the MTI was Sheikh Rashid Al-Ghannoushi, actually a philosophy major who, under the Bourguiba government, was charged with and convicted of seditious conspiracy in 1987 with financial assistance from Iran (Jones, 1988), thus making the MTI the second but not the last terrorist group discussed in this study to have garnered Khomeini’s support. Making no apologies for his politicized view of religion, Al-Ghannoushi is credited with the parallelism, “Islam is ancient but
the Islamist movement is recent” (qtd. in Pipes, 1997: p. 44). While he could have
received a death sentence for his actions, the courts sentenced the philosophy professor
to a life sentence of hard labor so that, unlike his theoretical antecedent, Sayyid Qutb,
Al-Ghannoushi would be deprived the Islamist honorific “Martyr of the Mosques” (p.
19). Al-Ghannoushi is one of several activist-intellectuals cited in Esposito and Voll’s
(2001) book to have been invited to USF-WISE in the early 1990’s, where they would
convene at roundtable conferences.

Exactly how did that “vitality and growth” of Al-Ghannoushi’s MTI affect
Tunisia’s university system and then radiate broadly into Tunisian society? An
autobiographical essay by Samia Labidi in Ibn Warraq’s Leaving Islam: Apostates
Speak Out (2003) suggests that the result came in the form of rejection of Islamism, as
opposed to its acceptance, given the heavy-handed manner in which the MTI attempted
to force conformity on Tunisian society starting in the 1970’s. The process began on
university campuses and then found their way into the most fundamental part of any
society, the family unit. Labidi writes of the manner in which Islamism “infiltrated” her
family through the husband of one of her older sisters:

The sister who had succeeded in going up to university, the first to save the
honor of women, flirted with the beginning of the movement of radical Islam in
the mid-1970s in Tunis. No one at the time gauged the impact that this
encounter would have on the stability of my family. It was a mini Islamic
revolution that was taking place in the heart of our home, from one day to the
next a change of regime was in place; we went from one extreme to another.
The intrusion of this son-in-law provoked a radical change in all of us; my
father, my mother, my four sisters, my four brothers, and
myself. . . . The husband of my sister turned out to be one of the founding
members of the Islamist organization [MTI], known under the name El Nahda
(Renaissance). He represented the hard line of this movement, those who
advocated military action. His strategy was to take control of his family-in-law
to consolidate his power of oppression. (p. 320)
After a lengthy description of her family’s indoctrination into the MTI and its politicized version of Islam, Labidi (2003) then states that her situation was typical for “thousands of other families in North Africa and the Arabo-Muslim world” (p. 324). Islamism “provoked the breakup of families, one after another” (p. 324). Crediting the strength of her mother to ask her father, a convert to Al-Ghannoushi’s cause, for divorce, Labidi at eighteen years abandoned the veil and went to Paris in 1983, where her mother had fled previously.

In 1989, Islamism saw its second creation of a totally Islamic regime. To achieve their revolution and support its continuation, Sudanese Islamists also took direction and financial assistance from Iran. The person most credited for engineering the overthrow of the Sudanese government is Hassan Al-Turabi, “whose success resulted from a military coup d’état and had no popular dynamic whatsoever” (Kepel, 2002: p. 176). “Instead, it was the consequence of a long process of infiltration by the Islamist intelligentsia of the Sudan’s state apparatus, army, and financial system, with the cooperation of an emerging devout bourgeoisie” (p. 177).

In addition, the Sudan, an East African country just south of Egypt, had maintained since 1944 a well-established system of mutual aid groups run by Sudanese members of the Muslim Brotherhood who took their earliest direction from Hassan Al-Banna (Kepel, 2002). “As in other countries of Black Africa, in the Sudan the Muslim religion was tightly controlled by mystical brotherhoods, which gave short shrift to the rigorous, city-oriented approach of Banna’s disciples and their plans to Islamize a state and social structure from which they felt excluded” (Kepel, 2002: p. 177). In addition to traditional opposition by Black Muslims, the decades-long intention by Al-Turabi
and his colleagues to “Arabize Africa” according to a non-indigenous plan conceived by Al-Banna’s followers was also opposed by Christians and animists in the south. Those Christians rejected “any national project associated with Arabism--meaning, with an Islamic ulterior motive--because it feared that its Black African identity would be swiftly annihilated by any such development” (p. 177).

As has been the case regarding the growth of Islamism in other selected locales, the mass movement in the Sudan therefore arose in the country’s university system, and it was in that system that Al-Turabi used his “Western training to build an original Islamist political movement named the Islamic Charter Front (ICF)” (p. 178). By 1965, the ICF, through its proselytism and planning, achieved 40 percent of the vote in student council elections. Meanwhile, in national elections, the Ummah Party dominated in 1965 with sixty-six seats, and its leader, Sadiq Al-Mahdi enjoined in an alliance with Al-Turabi’s ICF (Kepel, 2002). Eventually, Al-Turabi would marry a sister of Al-Mahdi and, by the 1990’s, other political marriages would take place, including the betrothal of one of Al-Turabi’s nieces to Osama bin Laden.

**Characteristic Two: Codified Education Theory for Purposes of Promoting Monolithic View of Islam and Subverting Universities and Surrounding Society from Above and Below**

Islamist education propounded in Algerian, Tunisia, and the Sudan, owing to their influence by Muslim Brotherhood professors who were not “indigenous” to those places would take on similar characteristics to those seen in other countries in previous sections of this chapter, thus supporting Blumer (1946/1951/1963), Sabine (1937/1950/1959), and R. Pipes (2001) about the nature of totalitarian mass
movements. The propaganda of the movement came to be disseminated through educational channels in an intellectualized form seen as scientific and worthy of respect, couched in the terms of typical of the Islamist intelligentsia.

According to Esposito and Voll (2001), most of the so-called “makers of contemporary Islam” in their book of the same name took early direction in their pledge to Islamism from the Muslim Brotherhood explicated in Section I. Two of those “makers,” Rashid Al-Ghannoushi and Hassan Al-Turabi, are from Tunisia and the Sudan. Another in Esposito and Voll (2001), Ismail Al-Faruqi, founder of the IIIT, has been discussed previously in Section II. Given that Sunni-inspired Muslim Brotherhood activity is a direct feature in all selected countries except one, Iran, we can deduce that Islamism, as it extended itself across time and space, has maintained great consistency in the ways it exacts re-Islamization from above and below.

Indeed, as a strategy employed in the higher education milieu, “propaganda and terror present two sides of the same coin” (Arendt, 1948/1951/1966/1968/1979/1994: p. 341) for mass movements with totalitarianism on their minds. Through various means, the Algerian and Tunisian governments have prevented Islamists from assuming complete power; hence, in those societies Islamists have not been fully able to turn propaganda dissemination into full-fledged indoctrination. However, in the Sudan—as in Iran and Saudi Arabia—“totalitarianism possesses absolute control and it replaces propaganda with indoctrination” (p.341).

As is the case with Islamist education elsewhere in the world, consistency also has come in the form of the mass movement’s emphasis on its modern “scientific” nature, Islamic modernity, in which the movement reduces “science” to a “surrogate
for [achieving] power” (p. 345). So in this final section, by following what Qutb calls in *Signposts* the Islamist “hijra” to Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan, we can better grasp the meaning of what some international affairs scholars refer to as an “Islamist internationale” (Fuller, 1997: p.153) as witnessed in this case through the lens of professor-led student movements that arose in those countries during the last three decades.

In the 1960’s Algeria became one of many countries across in North Africa to have achieved independence from colonial occupation. Under the consecutive presidencies of Ahmed Ben Bella and Houari Boumedienne, Algeria became ideologically aligned with Communism emanating from Moscow. The newly formed post-colonial government of Algeria viewed “traditional Islamic institutions as thoroughly reactionary” (Kepel, 2002: p. 46). And so, Algeria’s independent government restricted Islamic social functions, subjecting them “to rigorous controls with a view toward using them as conduits for their own socialist ideology” (p. 46). In Marxist-styled countries like Algeria, “schoolbooks of the 1960’s went out of their way to impress upon children that socialism was simply Islam properly understood. Pamphlets demonstrating the inherently socialist nature of Islam were to be found all over the Muslim world. Yet even this socialist version of Islam was kept under close surveillance” (p. 47). “The religious legitimacy of regimes,” Kepel (2002) writes, “was carefully fostered, but religious issues were kept out of the public eye, which was supposed to be trained instead on the battle against imperialism and Zionism” (p. 47). In this respect, one may find a similarity to Nasser’s Egypt, where that president’s
marginalization of traditional religion and Islamism paved the way for an even fiercer militancy that would later rise to challenge the Al-Sadat and Mubarak presidencies.

A similar process of delegitimization of traditional Islamic scholarship happened in Tunisia. Kepel (2002) shows that Tunisia’s model of government, unlike Algeria, after achieving independence from colonial rule was founded upon a predominantly secular but non-Marxist model under the leadership of Habib Bourguiba. Unlike Algeria, Tunisia did have an ancient university for religious training, Zitouna, founded in Tunis in 734. Bourguiba himself had experienced a purely secular education during the French Third Republic and had enjoyed the full support of the urban middle class for his struggle against French rule (Kepel, 2002). Hence, appeasement of Islamists or even of the ulama at Zitouna University was not a major factor in the earliest period of Tunisian independence. And so, like Algeria, a kind of religious vacuum did occur in post-colonial Tunisia. “With strong support behind him,” Kepel (2002) writes, Bourguiba rejected the clerics out of hand and emptied Zitouna of its substance by directly abolishing the ulemas as an organized body” (p. 54). As with Algeria, the institutional vacuum that opened in the absence of the ulama resulted in a kind of blowback during the 1970’s when the underground imams of the Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI, “Islamic Tendency Movement”) appropriated religion in Tunisia for its own political gain (Kepel, 2002).

Characteristic Three: “Campus Holy War” and Other Problems Associated with Interactive Organizations for Purposes of Re-Islamization from Above and Below

At the same time, Algerian students gained inspiration from the first Palestinian intifada, which they witnessed on television and read about through Islamist
publications. Indeed, during the October 1988 riots, students ritualistically “taunted Algerian police as Jews” (p. 161) during police counterattacks. Inside the universities, which were part of the country’s civil service, Islamist student demands traversed a range of issues from establishing an Algerian Islamist state to segregating the sexes in the country’s educational system. When the Algerian government denied those demands, those same students revolted in armed conflict.

Similar events ranging from religious persecution to acts of terrorism also arose in Tunisia following the build-up of front organizations with the help of exiled Muslim Brothers from Egypt. During the mid-1980’s Islamists capitalized on a disaffected public and engaged in a series of terror campaigns throughout the small, North African country (Versi, 2001). As part of the esprit de corps that had also consumed their Algerian counterparts, the MTI (later Al-Nahda) of Rashid Al-Ghannoushi, himself a Muslim Brother, targeted everything from political institutions, mosques, and people, both native and from abroad. As part of the Islamist movement’s re-veiling program, terrorists from this movement that started as but another professor-led student movement hurled acid into women’s faces. Versi (2001) writes, too, that “They tried to silence opposition by claiming that attacks on them were tantamount to attacks on Islam (http://www.africa.co.uk/archive/tunisia). The argument would be heard repeatedly by the Islamist movement, and on a global scale. In a country about to be consumed by anarchy, President Ben Ali mounted a successful two-part campaign against terrorism that involved police work and distinguishing Islamism from Islam (Versi, 2001). Under the new policy, the state oversaw religious affairs. “This came as a huge relief to minority communities such as Jews and Christians who, after enjoying
Islam’s traditional tolerance for other faiths for centuries, had begun to fear for their futures during the height of fundamentalist terror” (Versi, 2001: para. 14).

The Sudan would not be as fortunate as Tunisia. Islamist leader Hasan Al-Turabi, who in his thirties was head of the University of Khartoum’s law faculty, used his field of knowledge to gradually Islamize the Sudan’s legal system from below, leading up to the 1989 military coup. Esposito and Voll (2001) discuss in context that among the kinds of Islamic law that Al-Turabi agreed to codify into the Sudan’s constitution were *hudud* punishments such as amputation, flogging, and stoning. Moreover, Esposito and Voll (2001) quote Al-Turabi who once stated that *hudud* and other Islamic judgments are “in reality, the historic precondition for the perfection of society” (p. 133). In apparent defense of Al-Turabi’s consignment of legal practices that violate international human rights standards, Esposito and Voll (2001) state of the “unpopular dictatorship” that slowly arose under Al-Turabi’s aegis that “the benefit to be gained was that issues of implementation of Islamic law became more central to Sudanese politics than ever before, a form of Islamic law, however flawed it might be in scholarly terms, was in place as the law of the land” (p. 133). By the mid-1990’s, that same legal system had led to the wholesale persecution of Black Christians and animists in the southern part of the country. Allegations of genocide and UN investigation resulting from challenges to the UN raised by President Bush’s Secretary of State, Colin Powell, have been met with resistance, including the expulsion of the head of the UN’s investigatory team in the Sudan.

In summation of Al-Turabi’s legacy, Esposito and Voll (2001) call the activist-intellectual’s “full program of social and political reform . . . extremely
controversial” (p. 134). Of Al-Turabi himself, those same Islamic studies scholars write without attention to the human rights violations ascribed to this Islamist faculty-leader role model:

Hasan Turabi has throughout his life been a person of ideas, an intellectual. He has also been, since the completion of his graduate studies in 1964, an active and visible political leader in Sudan. In many ways, he is the prototype, almost stereotype, of the Muslim activist intellectual. The significant difference between him and most other Muslim activist intellectuals is that he had a decade in which he had the political power to put his ideas into practice. (p. 149)

Shadid (2001) comments on Al-Turabi’s appeal to Western academics that the NIF leader “has received lenient treatment” by Westerners “attracted to his dexterity with languages and his ability to converse on their level and in their cultural context, with references to American presidential scandals, racial tension in the United States, and even Louis Farrakhan’s Nation of Islam” (p. 177).

Tacitly accusing Al-Turabi of intellectual doublespeak, Hannah Wettig, in a Cairo Times article “More Equal than Others” (1999) describes an interview with the Sudanese leader:

A colleague in the National Islamic Front (NIF), Hassan Makki, claims that Turabi makes 80 percent of the decisions, and just leaves twenty percent for shura. “Foolish,” Turabi says when confronted with this opinion. “I’m a Muslim.” Which is probably supposed to mean that Islam is so inherently anti-authoritarian that true Muslims just can’t help but decide everything through consensus. But even in consensus, a few voices may be more equal than others. “Some people are the mouthpiece of public opinion,” Turabi says. “Do you think that socialism was invented by Marx and Engels? I sense currents of public opinion, and then I can express them.” (p. 2).

Furthermore, the anti-democratic nature of Al-Turabi’s “prototypical” leadership style manifests in his assessment of Western democracy, which he compares to his own version of it:
The only significant difference between a Western republic and an Islamic republic is that the Western electorate doesn’t believe in God. Without acknowledgement that men and women are created by God, public life can become very corrupt. (p. 3)

Given that Al-Turabi claims that his democratic government does believe in God, Wettig (1999) wonders, therefore, why after spending two weeks in Khartoum, “this correspondent was unable to find a single ordinary citizen with a good thing to say about the man” (p. 3).

Both Kepel (2002) and Esposito and Voll (2001) discuss how Al-Turabi claimed spiritual and political legitimacy in the Sudan. In essence, the Ph.D. from the University of Khartoum was of a Sudanese religious aristocracy that included dual pedigree, Mahdi and Sufi. It also seems apparent from reading Esposito and Voll (2001) that Al-Turabi used that dual pedigree to enamor the Sudan’s university students, with whom he had maintained direct access through his position on the University of Khartoum’s law faculty. In addition, the charismatic leader aroused considerable antipathy from traditional Islamists by recruiting female students into the ICF ranks, countering the monopoly of leftist student groups in the Sudan who advocated women’s emancipation.

Those early overtures that so easily seduced Khartoum’s students, however, would lead to the “setting up of a military dictatorship that involved several years of savage repression against the secular middle class” (Kepel, 2002: p. 182). In the aftermath of the 1989 coup, “Purges and executions were immediately carried out in the upper ranks of the army, while civil and military officials were subjected to ‘reeducation’ to make them adopt the Islamist view of the world. People were routinely
interrogated and tortured in ‘ghost houses’--anonymous villas used by security services” (p. 183).

Conditions that Al-Turabi’s dictatorship fostered in the Sudan’s university system, which had previously enjoyed a relatively high degree of academic freedom, were just as appalling to human rights advocates. Resistance in the academic professions and student unions “were systematically crushed,” shut down as the re-Islamization from above program “went into full swing in 1991” (Shadid, 2001: p.155). The coup in the university system by NIF supporters involved “tactics that included the detention of rival leaders, dirty tricks, and violence” (p. 163). In fact, Khartoum University, Al-Turabi’s alma mater that had given him the Western knowledge that would allow him to formulate how he would re-Islamize the Sudan from below, first, and from above, second, “was another victim” of Islamists who, in the words of one former professor, sought “to break the mystique of the university” (p. 163). “The university was a ladder to power,” another former professor states. “Now that they’ve arrived they’ve thrown it on the ground so that no one else can climb it” (p. 163). In total, “Twenty thousand judges, professors, soldiers and civil servants were fired and replaced with the [NIF’s] supporters” (p. 161).

The toll on students and the curriculum after Al-Turabi’s revolution is predictably tragic. Shadid (2001) writes of those educational conditions:

Arabization had forced professors to read aloud from English-language books and translate into Arabic because there were not enough texts in translation to distribute. Lecture halls had no chalk and photocopying paper was in short supply. One administration official speculated that the university had lost two-fifths of its professors. Those remaining were paid the equivalent of $30 to $60 a month and the money increasingly did not arrive on time, a testament to Sudan’s crumbling economy as much to do with government neglect. There were signs of faith and zeal the regime was supposed to inspire. [Some signs]
urged young women to wear the veil. Outside the campus’ main walls were amateurish portraits erected by government spaced every ten yards or so of students killed in the civil war. Under the picture was their name with the appellation shahid (martyr), his school of study and date of death. On more than a few, there were scratch marks as though disgruntled students had scraped keys across what the Islamic government had celebrated as religious sacrifice. In 1997, the government shut the doors of the university, exhorting 20,000 students to the front. “A million martyrs for a new era” was the slogan. In the end, students and professors told me, only about 250 heeded the call. (p. 164)

Kepel (2002) further states that international organizations denounced the Sudanese human rights abuses, but “Turabi dismissed those abuses as minimal, attributing them to ‘extreme sensitivity’” (p. 183). By the early 1990’s, Al-Turabi may not have won the hearts and minds of human rights advocates or Western liberal governments, but he had won the hearts and minds of other radical Islamist leaders and groups, including Tunisia’s MTI and Palestine’s HAMAS (Kepel, 2002). His revolution of the intelligentsia had thus become as unpopular as Khomeini’s student revolution, and led to the Sudan “being classed as a rogue state that actively supported terrorism” (p. 184). As with the Algerian and Tunisian faculty-led student movements, Sudanese experiment may have moved mountains in select quarters of the country’s elite intelligentsia, but it did not have the love of the people--let alone the University of Khartoum’s students and professors.

Characteristic Four: Transnational Influence of Islamism and its Esprit de Corps through the Migration of Professors and Students

Because the MTI maintained international networks in France, which also happened to be where Samia Labidi’s brother-in-law would flee from the close watch of Tunisian investigators. In France, as in Tunisia, Labidi would be hunted by Islamists, where she started a career as a journalist and wrote a book about her own
brother entitled *Karim, My Brother, Ex-Fundamentalist and Terrorist* (1997). Labidi writes of her French experience that “we must reveal and admit that Islamism in the West is an imported product, not a local one. Many Islamists, fleeing their own country of origin, were freely accorded political refugee status, and they were able to continue their activities in their host country as well as their own from a distance” (p. 328).

“Now, the private domains of the Islamists and the home base of their activities are to be found in Europe and in the United States. They know how to manipulate those who knew nothing of Islam, and to make dupes of those who agree with them” (p. 328), Labidi (2003) states. And finally, she concludes of Islamism in the West:

> The attack is progressing on two parallel fronts, on one hand they are sponsoring from a distance the establishment of Islamist states in Arabo-Muslim countries, and on the other they are undermining the West from the inside. Thus, it would be enough for the first half to invade the other half of the planet to establish international Islam. You would have to be a fanatic of God to imagine such a scenario” (p. 328).

That *hijra* of Islamists moving from one country to the next to avoid prosecution during a “phase of weakness” is not unlike the one envisioned by Qutb from his prison cell and transcribed in the collection of writings called *Signposts*. For believers in the *Nizam Islami*, the movement is a reformulated manifestation of *jihad*, incumbent on believers everywhere, whether in the *dar al-Islam* or the *dar al-harb* (Kepel, 1983/2002).

As exiling oneself from a country divided by Islamic fundamentalism failed for victims of political Islam like Labidi, Tunisia’s internal appeasement policy failed, too, as it typically fails when a government contends communitarian militancy that ultimately rejects compromise. By the late 1980’s, Al-Ghannoushi was forced to flee Tunisia to Great Britain, where he would be convicted a second time of seditious
conspiracy, this time in absentia. The conviction came in 1988, after President Bourguiba was forced into retirement, allowing a former director of Tunisian military intelligence, Zain Al-Abidine Ben Ali to assume the presidency. Under Ali’s direction, Tunisia’s state Security Court was abolished, a policy decision that would be regretted. Ali released all political prisoners, including Al-Ghannoushi, who was given amnesty in 1988 (Jones, 1988). Like his theoretical hero, Qutb, Al-Ghannoushi’s prison sentence served as a means to help his movement reorganize, and not to repent.

Noting the problems inherent to communitarian ideologies that deny the rights of individuals that formulate rule of law in Western democracies, the Moroccan philosopher Abdou Filali Ansari observes, “For Ghannoushi, the principal question is always how free to the community [the ummah] from backwardness and ‘the other.’ However significant his concessions in favor of democracy . . . the community--not the individual--remains . . . the ultimate objective” (qtd. in Brumberg, 1997: p. 221). Furthermore, in noting Al-Ghannoushi’s denial of the rights of the individual, Ansari states that Al-Ghannoushi’s vision of Islam is not a vision one might equate with the Christian Reformation. Instead, he equates it to the Counter Reformation (Brumberg, 1997), an analogy that by default compares Al-Ghannoushi to England’s Oliver Cromwell. From his base in the West, in London, Al-Ghannoushi has often stated that he and other Islamists prefer Western democracies but that, of course, is not because Islamists are democratic people. The preference involves instead Islamists’ appreciation for the benefits of democracies, whose liberal social institutions provide Islamists cover and legitimacy for committing terrorism and other human rights violations in their native and host countries. As Emerson (2002) suggests in the
in societies that care about rights of individual association and due process with much
greater ease than in societies whose leaders know not the meaning of enacting law and
policy by “least restrictive alternatives” yet “according to the needs of the day.”

Al-Ghannoushi’s academic credentials seem typical of the Islamist movement’s
early leaders, except that according to Esposito and Voll (2001) his highest degree is an
M.A. in philosophy. Born into a provincial, rural family suspicious of Western culture,
he received a partial undergraduate education in Tunisia’s religious institution, Zitouna
University. However, he withdrew from the university during his fourth year, then
became a primary school teacher, and considered becoming a journalist (Esposito &
Voll, 2001). In 1964, a year the researcher notes represented the apex of Nasser’s
police raids on Egyptian students, Al-Ghannoushi went to Egypt and enrolled at Cairo
University to study agriculture. After four months of study in Egypt, however,
President Bouguiba, concerned about the influence of Nasserism on Tunisian study
abroad students, withdrew Al-Ghannoushi, who then enrolled at The University of
Damascus, where he received a B.A. in philosophy (Esposito & Voll, 2001). The irony
was that while in Syria Al-Ghannoushi joined the Syrian Nationalist Socialist Party.
Hence, his removal from Egypt failed to prevent his immersion into Marxist politics.

Al-Ghannoushi’s thought would not remain purely Marxist for long, however,
for Esposito & Voll (2001) compare his travels in Europe to Qutb’s travels in the
United States, where European culture would serve as a form of revulsion leading to
Islamist enlightenment. Al-Ghannoushi’s thought further congealed when, back in
Damascus, the 1967 Six Day War would erupt and the Israelis bombed the Syrian capitol.

After completion of his degree, the future leader of the Tunisian student movement moved to Paris and earned a master’s degree at the Sorbonne. And it was in Paris, among the French-speaking North African students, that Al-Ghannoushi would join a Muslim student-activist group, Pakistani in origin (Esposito & Voll, 2001). An M.A. in philosophy being his highest earned degree, the better educated Al-Ghannoushi served as an imam in a storefront mosque to fellow North African students (Esposito & Voll, 2001). His immersion into Muslim student life and activism was not unlike that of the underground imams of Egypt and Algeria, in that Paris, too, held no seats of traditional Islamic learning for the ulama, whose sensitivity to a less politicized form of religion might not prevent Islamism’s total development but at least could mitigate its more pathological manifestations in societies where organized Islamic religious universities either did not exist (i.e., Al-Ghannoushi’s Paris) or had been marginalized under Marxist influences (i.e., Nasser’s Egypt, Bella’s and Boumedienne’s Algeria) or under ultra-secular influences (i.e., Bourguiba’s Tunisia).

The Sudan’s role in the transnational influence of Islamism in the years after its professor-led movement had succeeded in making the country the world’s second Islamic republic remains forever marked by its connections with Al-Qaeda. In 1998, many of the highly educated leaders of the world’s most major Islamist terror groups discussed in the aforementioned pages assembled in the Sudan to announce the formation of the World Islamic Front (WIF) (9/11 Commission Report, 2003). By that
time, the established leader of this group, Osama bin Laden, had married one of Al-
Turabi’s nieces during his period of refuge in the Sudan. There these leaders signed the
“Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders.”
The document, published originally in London on concluded as follows: By god’s
leave we call on every Muslim who believes in God and hopes for reward to obey
God’s command to kill the Americans and plunder their possessions wherever he finds
them and wherever he can. Likewise we call on the Muslim ulema and leaders and
youth and soliders to launch attacks against the armies of the American devils and
against those who are allied with them from the helpers of Satan” (qtd. in Lewis,
2000/2001: p. 320). After signing this document, the signatories returned to their native
countries or to other countries, where they would heed the call, finding higher
education an “appealing setting” for re-Islamization.

Section V:
Chapter Summary

This chapter undertakes study in an uncharted area of higher education inquiry of critical importance to international education and government policy in a world
environment beset with problems related to Islamism and its self-styled program of re-
Islamization from above and below. By synthesizing what is known about Islamism in
social and political history texts, whose purposes of inquiry do not focus on higher
education, with other texts such as Islamist websites and educational discourse, and
then tracing the intellectual pedigree and teachings of leading Islamists, the chapter
presents a genealogy of re-Islamization as it developed across space and time in key
Middle Eastern and African locales. The texts in this chapter range greatly, and the majority of them are written by individuals sympathetic to the Islamist movement.

The result is that the chapter provides a foundation for understanding the significance of Islamism and the totalitarian movement’s leaders, who would eventually take their Qutb-inspired hijra to North America and, as the chapter hints, USF, thus establishing the university as a place where leaders in an Islamist international would coalesce. In addition, this chapter shows in rich discussion USF’s historical antecedents in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Levant, Iran, Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan that higher education apparently represents a kind of dar al-harb, the “domain of war,” or fresh territory in the quest to create a worldwide Nizam Islami. Therein, Islamists and sympathetic colleagues reduce research, publication, and teaching to a form of propaganda, or what Tibi (1998) calls “paranoid scholarship” that often involves the scapegoating of Muslim and non-Muslim professors as part of an alleged Jewish-Crusader conspiracy aimed at keeping “Islam” in a state of weakness and oppression.

Finally, the chapter shows how the socio-political networks of the Muslim Brotherhood--not always under the classic names of the Egyptian organization--provide direct and indirect material support Islamist terrorist movements like the Islamic Jihad, HAMAS, Al-Qaeda, FIS, MTI, and NIF. In those cases, higher education institutions that cooperate with on- and off-campus organizations become fronts for destabilizing activity against individuals and societies resistant to re-Islamation. Problems manifest in the form of violations to individual rights to life, liberty, and property, and also espionage committed by students and their faculty.
advisors. In that sense, Islamists challenge academic freedom through violating the
teaching and research choices of dissenting faculty and the coercion of administrators,
most dramatically witnessed in the form of blacklisting, libel, physical violence,
institutional disruption, kidnappings, and murder. In the process, students also become
targets of coercion when on-campus pressure is placed upon them to conform to the
Islamist worldview or when Islamist student blocs assume political control of student
government.
Chapter Five

Toward Local Confirmation of a Global Narrative:
Islamism Comes to USF and Its Service Community

Section I:
Introduction

In the previous chapter, the researcher presented the historical antecedents of the University of South Florida case by documenting Islamism’s conditions and characteristics, illustrating how the totalitarian movement appropriates higher education in Middle Eastern and African locales to achieve its objectives. The relationship between one institution, Islamism, and a sub-institution, higher education, the researcher refers to as “interplay,” representing in this study a signification of interrelated ideologies, strategies, and legacies of direct and indirect action diffused across geographical space and time. More succinctly, that interplay may be called “re-Islamization from above and below.” By studying that interplay through the range of texts (e.g., historical records, court documents, para-professional associations, publishing organs, media archives) that link the Islamist movement with the milieu of higher education, we can better understand the gravitas of the Islamist movement’s interest in an appealing setting (e.g., higher education) as a means to advance an ultra-nationalist strategic agenda of global conquest.

In the locales cited, the Muslim Brotherhood, a group indigenous only to Egypt, provides an ideological and strategic base for the re-Islamization program’s progress in other locales. Chapter Four findings appear to show that exiled Muslim Brothers from
Egypt became university professors in the locales studied and began exerting influence in higher education institutions. Eventually, that influence spread to surrounding communities. Apparently, that Qutb-inspired “hijra” proved itself highly adroit at filling vacuums in post-colonial societies aligned with the Soviet Union and socialist policies, which marginalized traditional forms of Islamic faith. However, the movement was just as likely to establish itself firmly in other types of authoritarian states that alternately tried to appease and suppress the movement. Supported by the World Muslim Youth Association (WAMY), a Saudi Arabian organization founded during the kingdom’s ministerial restructuring several decades ago, the Qutb-inspired “hijra” of students also came to North America in the 1960’s. In North America, they founded the Muslim Students Association National (MSA), whose graduates later formed the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA). Sami Al-Arian, a former USF professor and leader in the Islamist movement, claims to have helped found the ISNA (see www.FreesamiAl-Arian.org).

The Muslim Brotherhood’s “vanguard” student initiates became the leaders of Islamist movements in Saudi Arabia, the Levant, North Africa, and the Sudan. In those cases, the people who rose to power the fastest were the movement’s intellectuals. By the 1990’s Islamist subversion in higher education, emanating into communities outside university milieu, had become particularly severe in Algeria, a country that had no ancient Islamic university to counter the vacuum filled by the Armed Islamic Group (AIG). The Islamist movement was no less prone to using universities as “ladders to power” in the other locales studied, eventually leading to government overthrow and the establishment of highly repressive “Islamic” states like the Sudan. There, the
concept of social preparation from below for a long period of time in advance of direct action from above proved successful the Ikwhan re-Islamization strategy. In the Sudan, in Stalinist fashion, professors who had helped their Islamist academic counterparts achieve power were among the first to be removed from their professional appointments. Many were jailed, tortured, and killed. While the Islamist movement sought a broad base of support in the locales studied, that same movement was conceived and led by an intelligentsia financially supported through its professional sections and committees, many of which were financed by charities abroad.

Research Question

The research question for this chapter about re-Islamization from above and below in higher education is “What are the conditions and characteristics of Islamism at USF and its service area, Tampa Bay, 1986-2007?” An answer to that question demonstrates whether and to what extent the highly publicized case at USF confirms or denies the global narrative of re-Islamization in higher education from above and below. It is a case that involves media, constituent, and government accusations that a group of terrorist leaders used the university as a front for the Islamic Jihad’s Palestinian faction, the PIJ. The chorus of voices representing the media, external and internal constituents, and government is richly detailed in this chapter in narrative form that specifies relationships among events, texts, and concepts. The chapter also conveys relevant information about re-Islamization at USF, replete with apparent pressures on the curriculum that may have been forgotten by chance or acts of repression. The details of Islamism’s conditions and characteristics at USF and its service community emanate from a multi-layered approach to data collection known as
coding through which information has been collected and analyzed repeatedly over a four-year time period, as, *inter alia*, key themes, ideas, problems, processes, and incidents have been categorized, compared, and contrasted. At the advice of her committee during proposal stage, no interviews were conducted for this inquiry.

Several strands of research explicated in Chapter Two find relevance in this chapter’s findings. Those strands of research provided initial theoretical bases for analysis of the material collected. The evidence cited in this chapter supports the social psychology of Blumer (1949/1946/1951/1955), who conveys how religious nationalist movements find in higher education “an appealing setting” in the service of their objectives. In addition, the blurring of propaganda and education and the growth of non-criminal front groups cited in this chapter’s evidence also support the observations of Blumer’s colleague at The University of Chicago, Arendt (1948/1949/1951/1966/1976/1979/1994), in her studies of totalitarian mass movements. Arendt observes that in totalitarian movements educational propaganda and terror represent two sides of the same coin, with front organizations maintaining strong interest in universities. Where educational propaganda exists in a totalitarian mass movement, levels of terror also exist. Those levels of terror range from low-level intimidation of dissenting individuals to *coup d’état*.

The research also supports Walker (1979), who observes in *The Effective Administrator* that pressures on universities from militant external groups stem more from the reformist nature of those groups than the open, democratic nature of universities themselves. Finally, that same evidence in this chapter supports, respectively, Birnbaum (1988) and Margolis (2001) on their respective studies about
organizational anarchy in universities and hidden curricula in multicultural education. Other evidence lends credence to Becher (1998) on the tribal nature of university faculties who may violate their most cherished democratic ideals when they are challenged. Evidence also supports Chafee and Jacobson (1997) on the defensive nature of academics when their conclusions are challenged. Shils’ (1997) notions about the perils of ideological politics in the curriculum also receive support in this chapter.

Population Samples

In the spirit of this inquiry’s methodology, the findings depicting the Islamist movement’s interplay with USF and its service community draw from analysis of institutional documents, institutional meetings, presidential archives, publications, websites, professional associations, intellectual pedigree, media exchange, and an array of other texts. As in the previous chapters, this chapter considers sources of the so-called “Orientalist” and “Occidentalist” intellectual pedigree. The researcher also has endeavored to present the array of conflicting points-of-view regarding the characteristics of re-Islamization at USF as the mass reform program became part of a vitriolic exchange, aired largely in the local press, about academic freedom “rights.” These population samples offer further insight into the linkages among the Islamist movement’s world-historical discourse, organizational discourse, and individual discourse expressed at USF and in its service community.

At the time of writing, former professor Sami Al-Arian has plead guilty to conspiracy to commit terrorism, for which a reading of the plea agreement involves a range of activity articulated in the 2003 indictment and in 2003-2006 court testimony. Some of that activity involves the use of USF infrastructure and personnel, so therefore
the university was assigned unwittingly as a platform for the material support of terrorism, or re-Islamization from above. On May 1, 2006, Al-Arian read a statement to the judge prior to learning the Honorable James Moody’s decision about the former professor’s sentencing. Following that statement in which Al-Arian professed respect for the U.S. legal system and the generosity of a nation that would allow his children to attain their fullest potential in higher education, Moody castigated the defendant, calling him a “master manipulator” who in public forums praises the U.S. but in private ones condemns it and who sends his children to the finest universities but raises money to blow up children elsewhere.

Of that May 1 sentencing, the *Tampa Tribune* further wrote, “In a statement he read, Al-Arian had the gall to say he harbors no bitterness or resentment. It is perhaps the ultimate display of Al-Arian's arrogance to make himself a victim on the day he is being sentenced as a criminal. It is also telling that in Al-Arian's separate statement to his supporters he never acknowledges or apologizes for the crime of providing support to members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, an organization responsible for hundreds of deaths and maimings in Israel. Instead, he writes, ‘I'll continue to call and work for the peaceful engagement and dialogue between civilizations, in particular between Muslim and Western intellectuals and academics,’ as if that were what he has been doing all along” (“Judge Gets to the Heart of Al-Arian Case,” 2006).

To date, no indication has been found that other internal or external USF constituents were involved in the criminal activity at USF. However, there is indication that supporters of Al-Arian at USF and in Tampa Bay appear to be part of a wider mass social movement that involves what Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) calls an *esprit d’*
corps of sympathizers and fellow travelers who add to the semblance of legitimacy the movement requires. Al-Arian is considered a leader in that movement which, since his arrival in Tampa in 1986, has amassed the sympathy of broad classes of academics at USF and throughout the world. As he told his supporters after his sentencing, “I’ll continue to call and work for the peaceful engagement and dialogue between Muslim and Western intellectuals and academics.” In addition, the findings in this chapter suggest this broad, influential base of academic constituents share in a common intellectual ferment, a well-defined Islamist epistemology that enjoins a d’rigueur anti-Western epistemology that gained ascendancy in higher education after the post-World War II generation achieved professional appointments in their academic disciplines (from Chapter Two, see King, 1972, for discussion about Marcusian social psychology’s influence on post-World War II American intellectual thought; and see Kramer, 2001, for a discussion about that same influence in Middle East area studies programs). Be that as it may, sympathy for Al-Arian or his cause does not equal criminality of fellow travelers and colleagues.
Section II:

Re-Islamization at USF and its Service Area Community: Conditions and Characteristics

Conditions of Islamism at USF and its Service Area Community

Condition One: Temporal Developments Related to Expansion of the University’s Mission with Eventual Formation of a Partnership with Sami Al-Arian’s Think-tank, World Islam Studies Enterprise

Participant observation of institutional events and documents analysis of USF’s history found in the university’s Tampa library Special Collections department reveals a range of temporal developments involving major changes in USF’s mission over the span of several decades. As shown below, the changes in mission were marked on one hand with USF’s need to earn public trust while on the other hand to maintain independence from potential political pressures. Those developments led to the internationalization of the university and to pressures on the university through other socio-political forces (e.g., foreign policy crises, the Johns Commission, the diversity movement, the accountability movement). By the early 1990’s, those developments also had contributed to the rationale for the USF partnership with Al-Arian’s think-tank, World Islam and Studies Enterprise (WISE). Arguably and paradoxically, university expansion laid the foundations for USF and its service community to become fresh territory for intended conquest, a problem which caused an enormous diminishing of public trust in the university after 1994 when terrorism investigator Steven Emerson exposed USF’s links to international terrorism in a PBS documentary.
Founded in 1956 on the site of a World War II airstrip, Henderson Airfield, with its motto being “Truth, Wisdom,” USF boasts a student population of 41,571 students and 2,202 full-time professors. USF was also Florida’s first coeducational university and the first in Florida to integrate during the Civil Rights period.

The original mission for the newly legislated USF in 1956 was that its curriculum be organized along interdisciplinary lines represented by “cutting edge” faculty, as opposed the compartmentalized organization the university represents today with most faculty representing narrow areas of specialization in their fields. Had USF realized that goal, the university’s political culture might have become analogous to a nation-state. Instead, the institution appears to have evolved into a mass university governed by the “tribal” interests of faculties more devoted to the ideologies of their fields of study, as Becher (1998) describes, than to, inter alia, the mission of their universities or even the values of their societies, which may on occasion conflict with their own.

In addition to the early interdisciplinary mission, original emphasis at USF was on teaching as opposed to research. Over time, that aspect of USF’s organizational identity would change, too, lest the university stagnate and lose its competitive edge for faculty, students, and funds. In that respect, the university’s academic tribes became ever mindful of the bottom line and the basic needs of their groups, who must hunt, gather, and fiercely guard scarce resources in the proverbial “changing environment.” Those circumstances, as Becher (1998) avers, may threaten a faculty’s professional identity and existence, causing that faculty to react when challenged, and
in a manner that contradicts the ethic of strict scrutiny prior to rendering judgment about research, teaching, and curriculum development.


The administrations of each of USF’s presidents were marked by significant national and world events in which social and geopolitical issues of the day affected how each president might have reshaped the university’s mission for teaching and research: Allen and Mackey, the Cold War, Civil Rights, Vietnam, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict; Brown and Borkowski, The Iran Hostage Crisis, the end of the Cold War, the Persian Gulf War; Castor, the Republican Revolution, Globalization, the Balkans Conflict, the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Accords; Genshaft, the September 11 Attacks and the U.S.-Iraq War. To greater or lesser extents, therefore, Middle East affairs have punctuated the entire history of USF’s administrative calls—and community, faculty, and student responses—to reshape curriculum.

During Borkowski’s presidency, the university was elevated to Research II Carnegie status and under Castor, Research I. In addition, USF’s presidential history appears relatively consistent with a recurrent area of concern in higher education
administration, shortened spans of presidential tenure, sometimes perceived as a problem whose causes range from the so-called “corporatization” of higher education, to the “us versus them” scenario between faculty and administration, and to matters of “sunshine law disclosure” in the selection of presidential candidates.

USF’s founding also came on the eve of the formation of the Florida Legislative Investigatory Committee (FLIC), or the “Johns Commission,” named after Senator Charley E. Johns. The FLIC conducted covert investigations of students, faculty, and curricula in Florida’s state universities. Eventually, according to USF’s website, the FLIC would accuse USF’s faculty of corrupting students with “trashy and pornographic” novels like *The Grapes of Wrath* and with the study of evolutionary theory. FLIC representatives would take students to a motel on Dale Mabry at night and question them, and so, when President Allen became aware of this development, he insisted that the commission come to the campus and question students and faculty in the open ([http://isis.fastmail.usf.edu/history](http://isis.fastmail.usf.edu/history)). While eventually Allen would be forced out of office in the late 1960’s during the rise of Marcusian educational doctrines at USF, resonating in the national trend of faculty-led student rebellion, Allen’s position regarding the FLIC investigations and also his stance against having a campus ROTC positioned him as a distinctly liberal-leaning first president.

USF’s knowledge of the intrusion of the FLIC into the soul of the newly founded university, matters of teaching and research, has been kept alive largely through the stewardship of Dr. Sherman Dorn, a faculty union leader and historian who holds an appointment in the College of Education. Through Dorn’s efforts, the
FLIC legacy would be cited repeatedly on campus, on the faculty union website, and in the local press during the restructuring of the governance system of Florida’s K-20 system under House Bill 2263, the Florida Education Governance Reorganization Act of 2000. The matter would come to light again during Genshaft’s decision to fire Al-Arian when these matters collectively were illustrated in a spirited manner on the USF faculty union’s website, using the metaphors of a chess match and a hammer descending on a nail.

Dorn’s long sense of history was compatible with that of U.S. Senator Bob Graham’s. That long, collective memory of campus history resonates with Becher’s (1998) concept of academic tribalism, expressed by ressentiment over ancient affronts resurrected in the rhetoric of current battles. Graham, in a speech given at USF to the state task force charged with overseeing the restructuring, claimed that the abolition of the Board of Regents would signal the death of academic freedom at USF and other institutions. He used the metaphor “executioner” to describe the political nature of those leading the restructuring and delivered stern warnings about “haste executing the executioner.” The history of the earlier Board of Control, which governed until the mid-1960’s and evidently had political ties to the FLIC, was cited as cause for concern on behalf of faculty leadership and the U.S. senator. By contrast, the Board of Regents was perceived as a buffer between the excesses of unwelcome conservative political intrusion at USF and other institutions; some thirty-five years later, that abolition of the Board of Regents surely signified the opposite to the most vocal of faculty and the senator himself. Many USF students and faculty participated
in giving Graham an extended standing ovation after the senator condemned the
actions of the task force.

Faculty leadership and some university presidents speaking on campus in
January 2000 charged that the Board of Regents’ abolition placed USF and other
institutions in an unwelcome position of major instability. Such concerns implied that
policy vacuums in USF’s organized anarchy widened in the late 1990’s, with the fate
of the faculty’s collective bargaining contract becoming the critical issue of
uncertainty. The demise of the unitary contract held through the suddenly defunct
Board of Regents heightened concerns about academic freedom and free speech.

For Florida public education, H.B. 2263 also signified the most dramatic
development in the history of the accountability movement, a shrewd gubernatorial
interpretation of a ballot initiative to amend the state constitution for public education
governance. “Public” became a word that the newly elected Governor Jeb Bush and
his legislative allies liberally construed as reference to all of public education, K-20,
as opposed to K-12 only. In a meeting that took place in the Marshall Center
Ballroom in early 2000, Florida faculty objected to Senator Jim Horne’s repeated
assertions that higher education should be “run like a business,” and that local boards
of trustees comprised of, mostly, non-academic CEOs could hold universities
accountable to their constituents. Horne’s statements were met with the unforgettable
logic of USF’s faculty union president, Dr. Roy Weatherford, a philosophy professor:
U.S. corporations would not want an executive board consisting of distinguished
Latin professors from around the country telling corporations how to govern
themselves. Ergo, what good could the CEO’s of multinational restaurant chains do for Florida’s universities?

At the same time as the governance changes, however, other issues were rippling throughout the state and at USF in the form of affronts to the respect for cultural diversity on Florida campuses. In disclosures that made headlines in Florida’s major newspapers, the president of The University of Florida (UF), Dr. John Lombardi, outraged some constituents for his having called Board of Regents Chancellor Dr. Adam Herbert an “oreo” at a private cocktail party. Faculty, students, other colleagues, and the public exercised Walker’s (1979) “moral veto” and forced the UF president to resign. The statement was considered unbecoming of a university president, even if it had been uttered in private. Thereafter, UF and the regents began the arduous task of replacing the ousted president, a process that in turn reinvigorated the “sunshine law” debate over presidential appointments.

And of course, following Governor Bush’s election in Florida, his brother, George Walker Bush, would become President of the United States, in a post-election battle that made its way all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, whose verdict, according to Alan M. Dershowitz (2001) in his book of the same name, was a “supreme injustice.” The election stirred up strong emotions about civil rights pertaining to minorities who were former convicted felons and, in more general terms, about the Republican ascendancy in Florida, which for the most strident of opponents signified a majority tyranny of Christian fundamentalists and capitalist conservatives. Those matters, along with Governor Bush’s changes in education and state contract bidding signifying the demise of affirmative action policies, also would
cause faculty at USF and elsewhere in the state to move into an increasingly
defensive posture.

After President Genshaft’s banishment of Al-Arian from campus in September
2001, her informing him of her intent to fire him, in December 2001 and her firing of
him in February 2003, the basic assumptions of the faculty’s defensive posture about
governance changes, unwarranted political intrusion, academic freedom, and tenure
coaesced with the basic assumptions of the Islamist movement in Tampa Bay, which
advocated its own interpretations of peace, liberty, and justice. From that point
forward, the concern about political intrusion into the soul of the university was
virtually indistinguishable from Al-Arian’s cause, although other constituents argued
that Genshaft’s decision to terminate Al-Arian’s employment had merit and had little
to do with academic freedom:

“The process was very undemocratic. It resulted in a very bad decision. This is the
kind of governance that has been in place since the BOT was established” (Susan
Greenbaum, Professor of Applied Anthropology at USF and Anthropology Graduate
Program Advisor, qtd. in “No Support,” The Oracle, Jan. 10, 2002).

“This is a unique case of how one person’s activities outside the scope of his
employment have resulted in harm to the legitimate interests of the university” (Judy
L. Genshaft, USF President, CNNfyi.com, Jan. 14, 2002).

“I certainly agree with Tom Auxter, president of the ‘NUTTY PROFESSORS UNION.’ No one
who has attained the holy grail of tenure should be fired, including Sami Al-Arian. In
an effort to preserve ‘intellectual freedom,’ a new position should be
created for which Al-Arian is eminently qualified: Professor of Anti-Semitism 101,
with special focus on damning America” (Daniel Holmer, Editorial, The Tampa
Tribune, Jan. 15, 2002).

“In fact what is going on is, in my opinion, the culmination of a series of actions,
beginning with the decision to reorganize the state university system, that amount to a
coup of the right, designed to force the university to become a docile and compliant
servant of the politically connected and economically privileged” (Silvio Gaggi,
Professor of Humanities, Editorial, “President, BOT Endanger Academic Freedom,”
The Oracle, Jan. 15, 2002).
“We will not sell our principles for an endowment” (Roy Weatherford, Philosophy Professor and USF Faculty Union President, qtd. in “Al-Arian Responds,” The Oracle, Jan. 15, 2002).

“[What has happened to Al-Arian is] a bigotry and prejudice being perpetrated on the entire Muslim community. [Genshaft] doesn’t have the moral courage or moral certainty to stand for what’s right” (Eric Vickers, Executive Director for the American Muslim Council, a group advertised in Inquiry, qtd. in “Al-Arian Responds”).

“What we are seeing is vigilantism. A media circus” (Roy Busch, Director of government Affairs at the American Muslim Council, qtd. in “Al-Arian Responds”).

“A lot of people are talking about this in terms of issues that have nothing to do with this case. Terms like racism . . . I don’t know that people ought to be throwing a word like racism” (Tom Gonzalez, USF Attorney, qtd. in “Al-Arian Responds”).

“On Monday a press conference was held for Dr. Sami Al-Arian at the Islamic Academy of Florida. Many people spoke on behalf of Dr. Sami Al-Arian, such as an American civil liberty leader, a professor, a Berkeley graduate and many more. They all came to show support and to send President Genshaft a positive message. . . . Firing Dr. Al-Arian would be labeled as discrimination. Dr. Al-Arian is an innocent man who has no links to any terrorist acts or organization. He has been teaching me for the past seven years and has been one of my biggest role models. I don’t think anyone would be able to fill the shoes of such a great person” (Diana Mitwalli, USF Student, Editorial, The Oracle, Jan. 16, 2002).

“There was more disruption, and he violated the collective bargaining agreement [which states that an ‘employees’ activities which fall outside the scope of employment shall constitute misconduct only if such activities adversely affect the legitimate interests of the university or board]” (Judy Genshaft, qtd. in “SG Senate Supports Genshaft,” The Oracle Jan. 16, 2002).

“I’m more concerned with possibly having a future faculty position and what you can and cannot say” (Gigi Brathwaite, Applied Anthropology Graduate Student who voted not to fire Al-Arian for career reasons, qtd. in “A Reputation to Uphold,” The Oracle, Jan. 31, 2002).

“[Genshaft’s intent to fire Al-Arian] suggests controversy is not wanted at the University of South Florida. . . . The Board of Trustees has said they will stand by President Genshaft’s decision. I will only believe that if the president’s decision goes against them” (Susan Greenbaum, qtd. in “A Reputation to Uphold”).
“I care about my own reputation, and I have to make my own decisions. There aren’t any gains for me in this. I’m not a rubber stamp for the board” (Judy L. Genshaft, qtd. in “A Reputation to Uphold”).

“Al-Arian used his office to do ICP business on at least one occasion. . . . Fortunately, Steven Emerson is there to provide documentation and explanation. More than any other source, his American Jihad accurately and courageously informs the government and people of the United States in detail that their enemy in the war on terror resides not just in the caves of Afghanistan but also in their very midst, even at their leading universities” (Daniel Pipes, Feb. 4, 2002, “The Terror Aiding Prof,” New York Post).

“Time magazine questioned whether, after Al-Arian’s firing, any professor would feel safe to speak his or her mind. An article in The Chronicle of Higher Education is titled “Blaming the Victim?” Al-Arian obviously has been successful in making himself seem the victim. But the firing is not about censoring unpopular views. . . . The image of Al-Arian as an innocent academic reluctantly thrust into the spotlight is simply false. This is a man who pursued his cause with a single-minded zealotry that endangered and discredited USF. For years nothing was done. Now, thanks to Genshaft, Al-Arian is finally facing consequences” (Editorial, The Tampa Tribune, Feb. 7, 2002).

“Fourth, America was founded on dissent and when all of sudden you justify the elimination of dissent by firing a professor because of his political opinions, then have we compromised our freedoms? Tenure was established for that very purpose: the maintenance and perpetuation of freedom, not for its dissolution” (Publicus Americanus Anonimus, University, qtd. in “Colloquy,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, 11:40am EST, Feb. 8, 2002).

“We all sign contracts that prohibit us from committing acts ‘detrimental to the college.’ I submit that any academician who espouses a belief summarized by so volatile a statement as ‘Death to_________(fill in the blank with ANYTHING)!” has breached that agreement. Those extremist, anti-intellectual statements can only reflect badly on the institution. . . . Academic freedom was established to allow for dissent between intellectuals, not for the propagation of hatred by people temperamentally estranged from the civility and decorum of the dispassionate search for the truth, meaning and value promoted in higher education” (Alan Punches, ADS Director, Virginia Intermont College, qtd. in “Colloquy,” 1:10pm).

“I just have to question the appropriateness of the very discussion of this topic including the live colloquy. This is a personnel matter that is best settled in a private forum between the university and the individual involved. I’m not sure what purpose is served by trying this matter in the court of public opinion. I don’t see any benefit for either the people involved or higher education as a whole in doing this” (Karl Bridges, Associate Professor, University of Vermont, qtd. in “Colloquy,” 1:45pm).
“Professor Al-Arian is simply abusing the tenets of academic freedom to justify his use of a college campus to support a radical and despicable middle-east [sic] group. It only serves to demean the importance of academic freedom when someone uses it for personal gain” (Molly Mefume, Scholar-in-Residence, Evergreen State College, 3:08pm).

“As mentioned in the article, I resigned as a faculty administrator at USF because of the letter of intent sent to Dr. Al-Arian. . . .This issue has nothing to do with whether one supports or detests Al-Arian’s political views, as I think my commentary explains. Unfortunately, other faculty and USF employees feel the same as the faculty member who was afraid to be named in this forum, as many have told me privately. And their fears are justified” (Elizabeth Bird, Professor of Anthropology, qtd. in “Colloquy,” 4:00pm).

“This has major national ramifications. I’m a little disgusted that this could happen. I’ve been here 26 years, and we have made this a highly respected university. We recently became a level-one research university—one of only three publics in Florida. In that environment, do you want to deny academic freedom, deny tenure?” (Harry Vanden, Professor of Political Science, qtd. in “Blaming the Victim?” The Chronicle of Higher Education, Feb. 8, 2002).

“Absolutely not [is Al-Arian a terrorist]. I’ve heard Sami speak in my church. He talked about how [September 11] is wrong and an evil act” (Harry Vanden, qtd. in “Blaming the Victim?”).

“I don’t believe this is a case of academic freedom. A person has academic freedom to go into his classroom and discuss issues that may be difficult—freedom to teach unpopular things. But after 9/11, hate speech of the kind he set forth is like screaming “Fire!” in a theater. . . .I assume that most of the threats are from kooks or crazies. But if a crazy kills you, you’re still dead” (Sara Mandell, Professor of Religious Studies and former President of the USF Faculty Union, qtd. in “Blaming the Victim?”).

“The reasons muddy the line between what is and isn’t acceptable conduct. If we’re going to fire someone for disruption, then any faculty member who is a primary cause of disruption must be fired, or you’re being arbitrary and capricious. . . .Mr. al-Arian has not made statements like this in a number of years. To the best of my knowledge, he’s what I would consider slightly conservative. He believes the Palestinians are oppressed. Guess what? So do I’” (Gregory Paveza, Professor of Social Work and current Faculty Senate President, qtd. in “Blaming the Victim?”).

“There was never any explanation of why it was an emergency. They wanted to do it when there as few people around as possible. I think they very underestimated the reaction of the students and faculty to such a move” (Nancy Jane Tyson, Professor of English and former Faculty Senate President, qtd. in “Blaming the Victim?”).
“It’s not about what he says. It’s about what he’s doing to this university. And he doesn’t seem to care” (Dick Beard, Chairman of the USF Board of Trustees, qtd. in “Blaming the Victim?”).

“I was there and saw the process. The board treated the faculty with contempt” (Elizabeth Bird, qtd. in “Blaming the Victim?”).

“The charges are a trumped-up pretext, because the real charges are illegal. The fundamental lesson is that local boards of trustees are more susceptible to local political pressure” (Roy Weatherford, qtd. in “Blaming the Victim?”).

“Does Roy Weatherford really mean to suggest that the City of Intellection will be leveled unless he and his colleagues can sit down in the cafeteria with a man who raises money for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad? Is the desirability of murdering Jewish people the sort of ‘idea’ university tenure is designed to protect?” (David Tell, Editorial, The Weekly Standard, Feb. 11, 2002).

“The argument of tenure is fatuous; it is clear that Dr. Al-Arian has used USF for his own means without deference to the cost of his actions upon the university, students, faculty or community” (Carol A. Roth, Member of Community Resource Counsel of the Tampa JCC Federation, Editorial, The Oracle, Feb. 21, 2002).

“There is no evidence. There was no evidence before 9-11, and there isn’t any evidence now. I assure you, if they had evidence to indict Al-Arian as a terrorist, it would have been done. . . . It’s a propaganda campaign. Some facts are right; some are in error. For Judy Genshaft to basically bend to the winds of hysteria is wrong. I’m not defending Al-Arian. I’m defending a principle” (Vincent Cannistraro, Former Counterterrorism Officer in Afghanistan, Reagan Administration, qtd. in “The Al-Arian Argument,” The St. Petersburg Times, Mar. 3, 2002).

“This is a unique case—U-N-I-Q-U-E—an extraordinary case. . . . [He should have been fired years ago because] he has been known to have ties with terrorists. It’s been willful, organized, repeated” (Judy Genshaft, qtd. in “The Al-Arian Argument”).

“Politics is far too involved in the governance of higher education in Florida. The governor has failed to take seriously the will of the electorate, and our individual institutions are being increasingly managed by boards that reflect political ideologies rather than educational missions” (Merle F. Allshouse, Director of Academy of Senior Professionals at Eckerd College, 1994-2003, Mar. 18-25, 2003).

“Everything that’s going on here right now has to do with politics, power, control, money, and ego. There is nothing that has anything to do with a humanitarian interest” (Reverend Nina Burwell, Member of Gulf Coast Coalition for Peace and Justice, Mar. 18-25, 2003).
“People are afraid to speak out today. . . . We knew the arrest would affect us for years” (Sarah Mitwalli, USF Student, qtd. in “USF After Al-Arian,” The St. Petersburg Times, April 17, 2005).

“We don’t talk about [Al-Arian’s indictment] much. It’s sad that so few people are sticking up for a guy who’s innocent until proven guilty” (Naveed Kamal, USF Student, qtd. in “USF After Al-Arian”).

“We’ve never been a hotbed of anything” (Roy Weatherford, USF Philosophy Professor and Union President, qtd. in “USF After Al-Arian”).

“The Committee only did a few things in joint sessions with WISE. . . . We were under attack by Jewish groups, Zionist groups, for giving Islamic scholars a platform. They felt by giving them a platform, we were being supportive. But aren’t academics supposed to delve into the issues?” (Arthur Lowrie, USF Adjunct Professor, qtd. in “USF After Al-Arian”).

“Sami’s lies damaged the university and destroyed the good work being done by the committee” (Arthur Lowrie, qtd. in “USF After Al-Arian”).

“Relations between the board of trustees, the faculty and the administration hit bottom with the Star Chamber trial in which they fired Al-Arian without even hearing from him” (Roy Weatherford, qtd. in “USF After Al-Arian”).

“It’s getting harder to get a serious debate going on the Iraq war, or Iran, or any Middle East topic” (Michael Gibbons, USF Professor of Government and International Affairs, qtd. in “USF After Al-Arian”).

“There is a national environment of apprehension and it is present on campus here, too. People are more reserved in expressing their views, especially if it is an Islamic point-of-view. . . . I am not a Muslim, but if you were a Muslim and you had good sense, you would want to be careful being misinterpreted. And that does mean there is a loss in the quality of discussion on the campus” (Jamil Jreisat, Professor of Public Administration, qtd. in “USF After Al-Arian”).

Aside from governance change and tenure concerns, the presidential files of Borkowski and Castor show in their totality other areas of tension at USF as administrators, faculty, students, and external groups sought to shape university policy for accountability during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. In that respect, H.B. 2263 was but the most recent chapter in a much longer history. Prior to H.B. 2263, for example, the files of Borkowski show that all of Florida’s public universities had
been directed by the Florida legislature and approved by Governor Lawton Chiles in 1991 to implement nine accountability measures. New legislation led to the redress of USF’s strategic plan under the aegis of five USF internal constituent bodies: the Accountability Task Force, the Undergraduate Council, the Graduate Council, the Research Council, and the Instructional Service Council.

The strategic plan ratified by those councils implies that its *raison d’être* rested with the demands of mostly external constituents (“legislators, parents, and students”) who believed that “colleges and universities ‘do not know what they are doing,’” meaning that funding for higher education had increased but no evidence existed that “resources were used wisely.” In their document, those councils quoted Peter Ewell, an expert in higher education who advocates that universities focus on specific areas of institutional importance and avoid, therefore, “cosmic game playing.” The latter term might best be restated as a call for humility in curriculum development, by examining *what is* and improving on that, as opposed to entertaining grandiose visions of a curriculum that *should be*.

At the time of USF’s drafting of the strategic plan in 1991, the nation’s twenty-third largest university held that its “strength and quality” were exemplified by several specific programs. Those programs were the University Honors Program, fine and performing arts, marine science, psychology, Florida’s only College of Public Health, and the Florida Mental Health Institute.

Despite decades of international matters related to Middle East affairs and previous calls to reshape curriculum accordingly (e.g., Brown’s answer to the
Iran-Hostage Crisis, “Global Awareness”), programs in religion, government and Middle East studies were not lauded in the new plan. The fact is that in the early 1990’s there was no Middle East studies program at USF. What did exist were a few courses about the Middle East taught in the Government and International Affairs (GIA) department and also the Department of History. Reece-Smith’s 1996 findings discuss some Committee on Middle East Studies (COMES) members as stating that the only course on the Middle East taught at USF was a jointly conceived course by full-time professor Dr. Abdelwahab Hechiche and part-time professor Mr. Arthur Lowrie.

However, USF did offer other courses about the Middle East. For example, the course evaluations of Dr. George H. Mayer, a former New College provost who became a USF history professor in 1979, show that he had taught a highly popular one on the Sarasota campus lauded by both young, progressive students and Sarasota’s conservative, Jewish community. In addition, USF’s then honors college, New College, would ask Hechiche from GIA to coordinate special lectures. In fact, an early event involved Hechiche’s invitation of two renowned colleagues of cited elsewhere in this inquiry: the late Dr. Edward Said, Professor of Literature and pro-Palestinian activist from Columbia University, and the late Dr. Malcolm Kerr, Professor of Middle Eastern History and Politics from the American University in Beruit, Lebanon, where he was assassinated by Islamic Jihad gunmen for having expressed “Orientalist” views (see Chapter Four’s discussion on higher education in the Levant). Hechiche, a native of Tunisia with French-U.S. citizenship was hired at
USF in 1970 and is the only professor on campus with a doctorate in Middle East studies.

The strategic plan under President Borkowski also provided impetus for the university’s continued interest in the USF-WISE partnership established in 1992, even though, according to Reece-Smith (1996) and various newspaper reports found in USF’s media files, on- and off-campus constituents already had begun voicing concerns that WISE might be a front group for HAMAS. That was a concern stated by Dr. Ailon Shiloh, an original member of USF’s Committee on Middle East Studies (COMES) from the Department of Anthropology. Shiloh had speculated as much to another COMES member, Arthur Lowrie, a long-standing USF adjunct professor in Government and International Affairs (Fechter, “USF Professor Questioned Ties with Think Tank,” 1996).

As mentioned above, at the time of the partnership formation USF had no “Middle East Studies” program, per se, although in the media constituents often referred to USF’s teaching of Middle East affairs as a “program” or that the university maintained a “Middle East Center.” Factually, COMES members acknowledged the absence of such a program in their justification to pursue the development of a Middle East studies program, and that the university held few courses on the subject (Reece-Smith, 1996). While COMES acknowledged what was (i.e., the absence of a program), the leading backers of the WISE partnership and relevant administrators interested in the bottom line (i.e., from where would the money come) were also hopeful about what could be (i.e., Peter Ewell’s cosmic vision), as media statements excerpted below suggest:
“The University of South Florida was going to become one of the country’s best 25 public colleges by the end of this century. . . . To help reach that lofty status, the faculty members aligned themselves with a local think-tank in 1992. Now, that think-tank headed by a USF engineering professor, is being linked to Middle Eastern terrorist groups” (Mark Kenyon, Reporter for The Tampa Tribune, “Thinking Through Academic Freedom,” 1995).

“It’s money and glory” (A.C. Higgins, Professor of Sociology at State University of New York, Albany, Specialist in university research ethics, qtd. in Kenyon, 1995).

“Universities are always hunting for showpieces. They are constantly searching for ways to say, ‘Look at us. Look at how good we are’” (A.C. Higgins, qtd. in Kenyon, 1995).

“Schools are on the lookout for big names, people with connections. They just buy these faculty members” (A.C. Higgins, qtd. in Kenyon, 1995).

“At all colleges there is a drive for prestige. Some schools do it better than others” (Peter Smith, Spokesman for the Association of American Universities, qtd. in Kenyon, 1995).

“It’s extremely healthy. If you compete, you’re going to find that strong programs survive. If a program is not attractive to students and employees, it will wither away and die” (James Appleberry, President of the Association of American Colleges and Universities, qtd. in Kenyon, 1995).

“By aligning themselves with a university, think-tanks can legitimize themselves. The fact that they have university affiliation allows themselves to pass themselves off as being objective when they really are not [and] pass off worn rhetoric as research” (Lawrence Soley, Marquette University Professor, Higher Education Professor who studies think-tanks, qtd. in Kenyon, 1995).

And so the strategic plan’s development of the Task Force on Future Academic Frontiers “composed of senior, distinguished faculty” may have aided COMES’ grand expectation that its WISE partnership would evolve from think-tank status to the Southeastern United States’ only Middle East studies program.

The professors serving on COMES did not or may not have known that virtually all of the board members of WISE were known in the intelligence
community and in international academic publications to be founding members of the
PIJ. Key faculty and administrators did know, however, that WISE was
Saudi-funded through the IIIT (Reece-Smith, 1996). Saudi funding also happened to
be part of a national trend. In the early 1990’s, Saudi Arabian diplomats and their
relations had begun funding other Middle East research centers within the U.S.
(Baer, 2002). Among the more notable contributions were those made to the Middle
East Studies program at The University of Arkansas, which received gifts from Saudi
Prince Bandar to the tune of tens of millions of dollars in two lump sums after the
election and inauguration of an Arkansas governor to the U.S. presidency (Baer,
2002). After Clinton’s election in 1993, the national competition to fund Middle East
studies programs had become fiercer than ever.

First perpetuated in Europe, Saudi gift-giving in higher education signified a
growing trend in funding Middle East programs in the United States under the trend
of reversing what the late Edward Said called “Orientalist dogma”(Kramer, 2001). In
particular, funding by Jewish, Israeli, or U.S. American government interests were
identified in unproven conspiratorial terms (Kramer, 2001). In his history of changes
in U.S. education’s fast-rising area studies discipline, Kramer (2001) writes: “Many
failings could be laid at the door of Middle Eastern studies, but the most damning was
their failure to expose the weaknesses of Orientalism. A lone and now forgotten
rebuttal came from Malcolm Kerr, a political scientist born to two American
educators in the hospital of the American University at Beruit, trained at Princeton,
and tenured at UCLA” (p. 36). Kerr wrote that Said’s book, which inspired a counter-
hegemony of gift-giving by an Arab foreign government, charged “the entire tradition
of European and American Oriental studies with the sins of reductionism and caricature” but in the process committed “precisely the same error” (qtd, in Kramer, 2001: p. 36).

USF’s change in mission from a university whose major focus was on teaching to one in which research and internationalization became its raison d’ etre apparently resulted in the institution’s realignment of academic freedom and related policy. The change seemed necessary because an absence of policy had resulted in what some considered an unequal balance of power between administration and faculty. The record of policy changes related to investigations of faculty corruption in the 1980’s adequately illustrates the tensions generated by USF’s policy vacuums which apparently led to ambiguous formulations of the university’s academic ethic, creating tensions between faculty and administration.

During the period in which USF had redressed its strategic plan for accountability, university memos revealed that the relatively young institution was in the throes of another kind of conflict that led to the drafting of hitherto unwritten policy for procedures to investigate faculty for “non-criminal malfeasance, misfeasance, or other misconduct.” Ostensibly, those terms include investigations covering charges that faculty have abused the responsibilities of their professional appointments. This new policy directive was led by the Faculty Senate Executive Committee (FSEC) and is instrumental, like the 1991 strategic plan, in gauging what kinds of issues the faculty consider important as part of their professional ethics and affairs. Hence, the first paragraph of the FSCE’s 1991 policy statement reads as follows:
The fundamental character of the academic enterprise should set the context of administrative decision making. Thus, the values of the academic environment—values that encourage free speech, self direction, independence of thought and action, individual responsibility, collegiality, and the highest standards of ethical behavior—should guide the determination of methods of investigation and documentation that will be employed in the resolution of situations involving non-criminal malfeasance, misfeasance, or other misconduct of employees in the performance of their duties.

Moreover, the policy statement further iterates:

Every effort is made to investigate and document the situation in a reasonable, straightforward, collegial, and ethical manner consonant with the values of the academic community. It is the policy of the University that the methods of investigation utilized in non-criminal situations will not include investigative surveillance.

The latter point was written in response to an investigation of a USF faculty member that had begun in 1988. Tacitly noting the anarchy of Birnbaum’s (1978) organizational anarchy, the FSCE observed that the surveillance of a faculty member was a “product of that sort of institutional dissonance.” Softly chastising the administration for past actions, the Faculty Senate allowed nonetheless in an eloquent letter written by then Senate Speaker Phil Smith that “we would like to be very clear that we have no tolerance for faculty or staff members who engage in malfeasance or misfeasance in the performance of their duties.”

In light of aforementioned policy changes enacted under Borkowski and at the behest of the USF Faculty Senate, Castor’s widely publicized inaction to investigate Al-Arian may have been a response to those changes. However, if that assumption is accurate, then Castor never cited specific USF policy in her statements, or was never quoted as having known about specific policy. There is also no evidence in her archives that she was aware or not aware of policy for investigating faculty. What she
did express was that the university should not be “the arbiter of ‘good’ and ‘evil.’”

Therefore, although Al-Arian had been accused of misappropriating his professional appointment to teach and research, the university would leave the matter to the U.S. government to decide. When the problem was investigated by the university, similar conclusions were drawn about not investigating faculty involved in criminal wrongdoing: the allegations were a criminal matter outside the scope of the university and not as an administrative matter within the university’s range of concern (Reece-Smith, 1996).

*Condition Two: Epistemological Developments in Higher Education Giving Rise to De-Westernizing Intellectual Trends Affecting an Internationalizing USF Community*

A Middle Eastern outgrowth of the multiculturalism movement in education, a trend toward “dialogue” originated in European universities in the 1960’s, thus laying the intellectual foundations for the two-tiered rights standards, justification of terrorism and self-incriminatory anti-Western discourse among Western academics (Ye’or, 1998, 2004, 2005). A similar trend appears to have emerged in the wake of USF’s mission change, also contributing to the rationale for the partnership with Al-Arian’s think-tank WISE, supported by the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT). Such epistemological changes in higher education contribute to the view that USF’s curriculum could be manipulated for purposes of re-Islamization from below. Recall that Blumer (1946/1951/1963) refers to these developments as “shift[s] in mood or impulse” by mass social movements.
The process of subverting European culture through education with “dialogue” signifies a form of re-Islamization of society and knowledge from below, as Al-Faruqi advocated through the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT (see IIIT educational theory and strategy explicated in Chapter Four). The theory bears close approximation to that which was codified by the reformulated Muslim Brotherhood beginning in the late 1960’s, when Sayid Qutb’s collection of writings were smuggled from prison and disseminated in Zaynab Al-Ghazali’s teach-ins for Egypt’s newest generation of university students. The new vanguard Muslims in Egypt’s universities came to support the doctrine of “concealed advance,” part of Qutb’s call for zalzalah, a kind of “revolution” or “shaking” of a society that occurs specifically through education (Kepel, 1984/2004). Original documents like the Muslim Brotherhood Project (1982) and the Akram Document (1992) reveal the transnational organizational organization’s strategic plans to mollify the North American mind through informational warfare waged in the continent’s universities. These documents support the IIIT educational theory. The consistency in such social preparation is not surprising, given that the IIIT is one of scores of undisputed front organizations for the Muslim Brotherhood currently operating in North America.

Ye’or (2004) writes of the dramatic diplomatic codification of zalzalah’s corollary, the Euro-Arab Dialogue, that this “deliberate, comprehensive process has taken place through several means: the control of Middle Eastern Studies departments at European universities, and the re-writing of historical textbooks; allowing Euro-Arab bodies to screen cultural exchanges and publications relating to Islam and the Arab world for unwelcome content; taboos imposed on issues related to immigration
and Islam; disinformation campaigns demonizing Israel (and America), while fostering a comprehensive and ‘brotherly’ alliance between EU and Arab League countries on the political, cultural, and social levels; and the servile obedience of the EU’s mainstream media to all these initiatives” (p. 2).

“Dialogue” enjoins the soft, referential terms of Islamic “resurgence” and “revivalism” in *d’rigueur* Middle East studies discourse. As a matter of epistemological coincidence, those same terms also find their way into the Sami Al-Arian’s magazine *Inquiry* and its disclosure of conference proceedings by the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS), an IIIT affiliate discussed in the previous chapter, and the Islamic Committee for Palestine (ICP), which was part of the chain of front groups that Al-Arian used in his confessed conspiracy to commit terrorism.

Moreover, what Ye’or (2005) calls “the dialogue industry” also coincided with Saudi Arabian funding of Middle East programs. As has been reported *ad infinitum* in the press after the September 11 attacks on U.S. institutions, the Saudis were also responsible for funding a significant majority of mosques in the U.S., largely through the ISNA’s financial holding company, the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT). According to Hillsborough County quitclaim deed records for property ownership, the mosque Sami Al-Arian founded, The Islamic Community of Tampa Bay, also called the Al-Qassam Mosque, was deeded to the NAIT in the late 1980s. During the partnership negotiations with WISE, USF would be informed that the organization primarily responsible for funding the USF-WISE partnership was Al-Faruqi’s brainchild, the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), which received most
of its funding from Saudi Arabian sources (Reece-Smith, 1996). And so it appears that subsidizing Middle East programs in U.S. universities represented Saudi Arabia’s other major endeavor in the re-Islamization of America, which always has represented the Shining City on the Hill for all religious people to reinvent according to their own cosmic visions.

The specifics of the IIIT’s role in fostering the dialogue movement in North America and at USF warrant further explication for the purpose of appreciating why USF became the object of so much public animus in the months after Emerson’s 1994 exposure of Al-Arian’s fundraising activities for violent action in the Middle East. This is a salient aspect of the USF case that no one until now has investigated. As shown below, the matter evolved into an attempt to foster a hidden curriculum at USF as it held high hopes to create a major Middle East studies program in the southeastern United States.

Along with funding for re-Islamization of American education came intellectual pedigree resting primarily with Al-Faruqi’s scholarship and later his influence on American Middle East studies scholarship. Al-Faruqi is considered to be the founding father of North America’s “dialogue” movement (Ye’or, 2005). Murdered in his own home, along with his wife, in 1986, Al-Faruqi was the Temple University professor lauded by his former student, Esposito, who in the early 1990’s was hired to teach at USF until faculty objected to the salary he was offered.

Al-Faruqi “anchors Christianity in an explicitly anti-Jewish context that denies Jesus’ Jewish heritage, replacing that heritage with an Arab one in which Islam becomes the ‘primal religion of humanity’” (Ye’or, 2005: p. 221). Such ahistorical
revision opposes traditional Western exegesis of Jesus’ lineage from the Old Testament, which Al-Faruqi calls “Jewish ethnocentrism” (qtd. in Ye’or, 2005: 221). That revision explains how North America, where Muslims are neither indigenous people nor a majority people, can entertain a goal to “re-Islamize” as opposed to simply “Islamize.”

Al-Faruqi’s ideas find partial basis in the Koran, which teaches that all people are born as true Muslims. From a traditional academic view or from Ibn Khaldun’s view, that belief is a matter of Islamic faith and not a fact of history. Historically, there is no evidence of Islam or Muslims prior to about 650 A.D., when Muhammad’s revelations were thought to have been collected in the Koran (Trifkovic, 2002). Not all Muslims, however, subscribe to the view that all people are born Muslims. For example, Sufis practice a more flexible doctrine which holds that Jews can be Muslims and Muslims can be Jews. Many Sunni Arab Muslims, however, accept a more literal reading of the Koran.

Given that the United States is experiencing similar problems in its educational institutions and in its civil service sectors, Ye’or (2004) states:

Americans should know that this self-destructive calamity did not just happen, rather it was the result of deliberate policies, executed and monitored by ostensibly responsible people. Finally, Americans should understand that Eurabia’s contemporary anti-Zionism and anti-Americanism are the spiritual heirs of 1930’s Nazism and anti-Semitism, triumphally resurgent. (p. 3).

According to this revisionist theology expressed through “dialogue,” Islam always existed, even before Muhammad, but it had been obscured by the Judeo-Christian tradition. Jews and Christians are therefore Muslims who have strayed from the primordial Islamic faith. Hence, even in the United States, whose
tradition is rooted in Judeo-Christian history and where Muslim immigration is for the most part a recent development, education curricula require “re-Islamization,” not “Islamization.” Thus, the program denies history. In turn, the university transforms into a prime territory for conquest in the Islamic battlespace, the dar al-harb.

In that respect, the new scholarship that became popular in European and American centers for so-called “Muslim-Christian Relations,” “Understanding,” or “Dialogue” has become a theological avenue in which to deny Jews their traditional Israelite heritage. That denial of history, rooted in Palestinian replacement theology, is a point which underscores the overall epistemological conflict noted by Kramer (2001) and other critics (e.g., Pipes, Lewis, Tibi) of the condition of Middle East and Islamic studies in the international academy.

Saad-Ghorayeb (2002) draws similar conclusions about the replacement theology of Hizbullah, a Lebanese terrorist group which, like Islamic Jihad, holds innumerable ties to Iran. Hizbullah, like its radical Palestinian counterparts, HAMAS and PIJ, embraces a theological concept that the alleged Jewish cabal began when rabbis allegedly deviated from Moses’ revelations. Anchoring its theology of Jewish conspiracy in Koranic text, Hizbullah claims that Jews, who are inherently depraved and full of “conspiratorial predilection” (p. 182), corrupted their adherents by failing to adhere to the Torah, which “foretold the coming of Jesus and Mohammad” (p. 183). Logically flowing out of this argument, then, is that Jews who do not convert to Islam are Muslim apostates, for the true interpretation of the Torah is to be found in the Koran, which shows that Moses was a Muslim prophet, and not a Jewish one.
From that, therefore, logically flows further theological justification for condemning to death those Jews who do not submit to Islam. In the pages of Al-Arian’s Inquiry, explicated further below, the distinction is posited in terms of “Zionist Jews” and “non-Zionist Jews.”

With the exception of Ye’or (2005), critics have seldom looked to Al-Faruqi’s early influence in epistemological changes in Middle East and Islamic studies. The usual focus, as articulated in Chapter One, is instead on the intellectual influence of Said and also Esposito, both of whom make mention of their Christian backgrounds in their perennial championing of the Islamist movement. Said and Esposito are also in a class of scholars whose views dominate Middle East studies (Kramer, 2001). They, too, in the interest of promoting “dialogue,” employ softer terms like “Islamic Revivalism” or “Islamic Resurgence” in their discussion of Islamist movements or “societies.” Other scholars such as Walid Phares (2004, 2007), who teaches at Florida Atlantic University, claim that the scholarship of “dialogue” is really an “academic jihad.” In The War of Ideas (2007), Phares states, “I have observed with amazement American students stripped of their basic rights to be educated accurately about the main geopolitical and ideological threats to their homeland. Instead of using classroom time to profoundly analyze the rise of what would become Al-Qaeda or the Khomeini regimes long-term strategies, we professors had to ‘clean up’ the diseducating process that blurred the whole vision of a generation” (p.161).

“Revivalism” and “resurgence” notwithstanding, other tropes in the Islamist educational lexicon are “dialogue” and “understanding.” Ye’or (2004) refers to this
lexicon, having found a semblance of scholarly respectability in academia, as “the ‘dialogue’ industry” (p. 2). Commensurate with that industry is an assumption that those who were best qualified to teach about the Middle East and Islamic things were devout Muslims (Lewis, 1993). In one sense, that assumption signifies a contemporary manifestation of a pre-modern tradition in Islam, adab, which holds that only Muslims may study Muslims and Muslim things (Duran & Hechiche, 2002).

In their media commentary about the USF-WISE case, some professors at USF stated that they had supported WISE because WISE scholars were “devout Muslims,” such that their high degree of faith may have been major criterion for claiming scholarly legitimacy (Lowrie, 1995).

The meanings of the tropes of re-Islamization are rarely defined by their users. Taken at face value, the terms convey a semblance of neutrality. In addition, the terms are so ambiguous that they arouse no objection, for who in a Western university in a civilized society would object to the need to have “dialogue” or “understanding” with a religious or cultural group he or she knew little about? Why wouldn’t a major university in the Southeast want to broaden its international horizons for the purpose of “civilizational dialogue”? Surely objectives like these were consistent with USF’s new strategic plan. Local press excerpts show that several leading participants in the defense of the USF-WISE partnership were prone to using those tropes of re-Islamization to defend the reputability of the USF-WISE mission:

“WISE is a research institution. We believe in dialogue and understanding between Muslim and Western scholars” (Sami Al-Arian, qtd. in “Jihad Link Stuns University,” 1994).
“I am a seriously religious person, never extreme. My concern for understanding is one of my top priorities. We sought to initiate real dialogue” (Sami Al-Arian, qtd. in “Al-Arian Rebuffs Allegations,” 1995).

“Hasan Turabi is one of the world’s leading authorities on Islamic law, a graduate of Oxford and the Sorbonne and a former attorney general and foreign minister of the Sudan. . . . Rashid Ghannoushi is one of the most prominent intellectuals of the modern Islamic movements and the leader of the banned An-Nahda (Renaissance) Party in Tunisia. . . . We believe American scholars should have the opportunity to debate with Ghannoushi, no matter what his views. . . . Consistent with that ethos, the Royal Institute of International Affairs of London invited Ghannoushi to deliver a lecture on May 9, 1995. . . Therefore, we’ll continue to foster dialogue at USF that will facilitate the elimination of violence toward political ends” (Mark T. Orr, Jamil Jreisat, James Strange, Tamara Sonn, Arthur Lowrie, Sam Fustukjian, Robert Brinkman, Guest Column of some COMES professors at USF, The Tampa Tribune, “Academic Inquiry Justifies Inviting Controversial Speakers,” 1995).

“Our joint objective in these activities was to enhance community understanding of Islam and to counter the stereotype of the Muslim as a fanatic, violent, anti-democratic and anti-Western” (Arthur Lowrie, Guest Column, 1995, “Finding the Hidden Agenda”).

“WISE, with a well-stated commitment to eradicate American’s ignorance of Islam, is one of the few links USF has with Tampa Bay’s large Moslem community. It has facilitated greater Western understanding of Moslems and Islam, and appreciation of values and interests by Moslems. . . . That should be easy in this global village in which the United States is the sole economic and military superpower” (Mark August, Editorial in The Tampa Tribune, “Keep Islam Debate Alive on Campus,” 1995).

 “[COMES] chair Mark Orr recalls that Shiloh was interested mainly in where WISE got its money—an interest the committee shared. After WISE officials said most of their support came from an established Islamic organization in Washington, the committee was satisfied, and Shiloh participated in WISE events, Orr and Lowrie said” (James Harper, “Mideast Intrigues Play Out at USF,” 1996).

“The decision by USF to suspend its agreement with WISE has been made in haste. WISE, which may have needed financial aid and moral support from the local Muslim community in Tampa, must be faulted, nonetheless, for its close coordination with [ICP] for one single reason: ICP has a socio-political agenda. WISE has none. . . . It was certainly inappropriate for WISE to rely heavily, if this has been the case, on many people with similar socio-political agendas” (Khalil Shikaki, Al-Najah University Professor and former USF-WISE Professor and University of Wisconsin Professor, Editorial, The Tampa Tribune, 1995).
“It is striking that three of those eight are academic specialists on Middle East and Islamic subjects. Their arrests reveal to what extent Middle East studies is a field that serves as an extension of the region’s radicalism. Other defendants teach computer engineering, manage a medical clinic, own a small business, and serve as imam in a mosque. . . All three alleged terrorists succeeded in talking the academic talk, fooling nearly everyone. Shallah wrote in 1993, in his capacity as director of WISE, that the organization’s long-term goal is ‘to contribute to the understanding of the region’s Islamist trends, misleadingly labeled “fundamentalist” in Western and American academic circles.’ Almost any North American academic specialist on Islam could have written those same sneering and duplicitous words. Many do” (Daniel Pipes, “Terrorist Profs,” Feb. 24, 2003, New York Post).

If the users of terms like “dialogue” and “understanding” are not probed rigorously about their meaning, there is a tendency to assume that “dialogue” and “understanding” equates to “mutual respect” and “equality” among people, religions, and nations. In light of other evidence presented in this inquiry, one finds it reasonable to assume that some users of those terms might have the IIIT’s Pax Islamica in mind, which enjoins a theology like that of that of militant Islamist groups like Hezbollah, HAMAS, and the PIJ. Recall from Chapter Four that Pax Islamica in the book Islamization of the Disciplines, placed on library shelves near the time of the USF-WISE partnership formation, is a social condition in which a minority of devout Muslims imposes its version of Islamic law and customs on a majority people. According to the IIIT educational strategic plan depicted in Chapter Four, Pax Islamica starts in secular Western-style universities, where the minority group imposes its traditions on the universities’ academic disciplines, re-Islamizing society and knowledge from below.

USF’s strategic planning under Borkowski coincided with the “dialogue” movement in that the plan called for USF to revitalize its “traditional liberal arts courses” toward “multicultural dimensions such as values and ethics, international
and environmental perspectives, race, ethnicity, and gender.” In addition, the plan called for initiatives to “maintain sensitive concern for the educational, personal and social well-being of all students” to “enhance our sense of community.” Moreover, “internationalization” and “health and human welfare” were cited as among the most promising areas for renewed development in the USF curriculum.

Despite the support for “dialogue” in the early 1990’s, critical appraisals of Islamist epistemology--the “dialogue industry”--were raised in the academy and at USF. For example, USF’s presidential files from the early to mid-1990’s suggest that the administration had been apprised of developments regarding the epistemological tensions between traditional Judaic and non-traditional Islamist points-of-view brewing in the international academy, of which USF had reshaped its mission to become by achieving Research I status. A file labeled “Jewish Affairs” signifies attempts made by distinguished professor Dr. Jacob Neusner of USF’s religious studies program to educate Presidents Borkowski and Castor about the condition of his discipline, Judaic studies. By the early 1990’s, experts in Judaic studies had recognized that their field of study had undergone an epistemological assault from within and out, some of it involving Islamist epistemology’s tendency toward minimizing or denying the Holocaust and toward claiming that Jews were not “true” Israelites. On its face, this theological argument’s closest comparison is that of Christian Identity theology, which also denies Jewish claims of Israelite heritage. In short, traditionalist experts in Judaic studies had taken notice of what Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) would call a “shift in mood or impulse” in their professional
field. It is precisely the same kind of shift noted by Kramer (2001) and Ye’or (2005) in other area studies programs in American and European higher education.

In their totality, Neusner’s correspondence details on-going concerns of international scholars in the field, especially those in Europe who by the 1990’s had experienced the intellectual backlash of the EAD’s pro-Islamist policies. Those policies codified Euro-Arab diplomatic agreements for the revision of university curricula that would asymmetrically incorporate Islamist theology like Al-Faruqi’s into European religious and Middle East studies programs (Ye’or, 2005). Here, it may be helpful to note that Neusner was the most published professor at USF before he returned to Brown University in 2006. His erudition and professional wisdom might have been the kind that no university administration would have wanted to ignore during a period of internationalization within the institution. According to correspondence in Borkowski’s and Castor’s presidential files, the nation’s most formidable center for Judaic studies is at Brown University, a program that Neusner himself shaped into before taking an appointment at USF.

In September 1993, one year after the USF-WISE partnership had formed and complaints of anti-Semitism at USF had surfaced, President Borkowski’s office received from Neusner correspondence from a university rector in Sweden to Neusner in regard to a libel case involving Radio Islam, a broadcasting station in Sweden. The libel case involved Radio Islam’s use of another one of Neusner’s colleague’s statements about the Holocaust. Apparently, Dr. Jan Bergman’s testimony was “used and manipulated in court” in order to support the legally-held libelous views of Radio Islam’s broadcasting agent, Mr. Ahmed Rami. Radio Islam was another by-product of
EAD broadcasting policy (Ye’or, 2005). Bergman’s statements as they were aired in the court and in the media were evidently so offensive that Neusner condemned them, declaring that Bergman’s statements “maligned Judaism as well as the State of Israel and the Jewish people through time and in our own day.”

However, the letter submitted to the USF president’s office shows, in the end, that Neusner accepted Bergman’s eventual apologies to Holocaust survivors “who heard selections of [Bergman’s] testimony and were injured by them.” There is no indication in either Borkowski’s or in Castor’s presidential files on Jewish affairs whether either chief administrator called upon their institution to ask academic questions related to allegations of anti-Semitism at USF, and how they might compare to those addressed in Neusner’s correspondence. There is also no evidence in the files to confirm or deny whether Neusner’s submission of these letters signified an attempt by the distinguished professor to educate either president about similar matters of Islamist epistemology as they might manifest in USF’s curriculum.

The correspondence Neusner submitted to the president’s office also reveals the values of an internationalized academic community that condemns racism in all forms. Written by the Rector of Uppsala University, Dr. Stig Stroholm, the letter is an exercise in how an administrator might try to mediate conflict among faculty and within a particular discipline. Walker (1981), in an essay “The President as the Ethical Leader of the Campus,” states that the kind of mediation demonstrated by Stromholm is a university president’s most important function. The rector’s letter states that “Professor Neusner’s own public involvement, along with that of many others, in Europe, the State of Israel, and North America, is aimed at denying academic
legitimacy to the racism that takes the form of anti-Semitism, anti-Judaism, “Holocaust
Revisionism,” and the delegitimization of the right of the Jewish People to build and
sustain the Jewish State, the State of Israel.” In his final analysis, Stromholm praises
Neusner for his efforts in reestablishing peace within his field of study—a peace
signified by Neusner’s acceptance of an apology by Bergman—wherein there had been
prior conflict.

Stromholm’s letter would not be the only one that Neusner would submit to the
president’s office. Another letter, penned by the president of Wellesley College, Dr.
Diana Chapman Walsh, is a work of censure against a Wellesley professor, Dr. Tony
Martin, who published a book in 1993 entitled The Jewish Onslaught: Dispatches from
the Wellesley Battlefront. While Walsh defends the rights of faculty to self-express
freely and without reprisal, she exercises her own rights to academic freedom as an
expression of independent conscience in the letter by condemning Martin’s book for its
“application of racial and religious stereotype.” “We must speak out against the
content of this particular book. It violates the basic principles that nourish and sustain
this college community and that enable us to achieve our educational goals: norms of
civil discourse, standards of scholarly integrity, and aspirations for freedom and
justice,” Walsh states. “Standards of reason and logic demanded in academic discourse
cannot be met through stereotyping and group ad hominem argument. Rhetoric of this
kind undermines the force and critical exchange of ideas on which teaching and
scholarship rest,” she further asserts. Walsh had taken a decisive stand in defining the
legitimate interests of the prestigious Wellesley College, the alma mater of U.S.
Senator Hilary Rodham-Clinton.
In addition to the letter from the president of Wellesley College and the one from the rector from Uppsala University, non-academic matters concerning Jewish affairs manifest themselves in USF’s presidential files. Chief among those matters is the Jewish National Fund’s (JNF) interest in USF, which itself sponsored study abroad students in Israel and at a time when their safety in that country could not be guaranteed. The JNF, during the early 1990’s, was urging USF to support “Solidarity Missions” to Israel in order to relocate Russian Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union “on reclaimed land,” a point of contention among the academy’s more vocal supporters of Palestinian rights and also on behalf of the first Intifada (“Uprising”) instigated almost exclusively by HAMAS and Islamic Jihad in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s.

The concerns expressed in USF’s “Jewish Affairs” and other presidential files bring us back to the topic of this inquiry, re-Islamization in higher education. As has been amply demonstrated in previous chapters and reiterated in this chapter, a critical subtext of that program is the romanticizing of Islamist discourse within the academy, often noted for its anti-Semitic biases, sense of conspiricism, and blurring of internationally recognized legal distinctions between “terrorism” and “freedom fighting.” The “Occidentalist” view supplants a traditional “Orientalist” understanding of the Middle East. Scholarly judgments in the accused Orientalism also are couched in positivist terms and condemned for their alleged Western biases. Orientalism’s alleged anti-Islamic biases also are presupposed in the educational theory and views of Al-Faruqi, his associated think-tanks, and among his intellectual pedigree who teach the replacement theology of Palestinianization, a sub-topic of re-Islamization,
described in Ye’or’s diplomatic-intellectual-cultural history of the EAD in her historical analysis *The Euro-Arab Axis* (2005).

In addition, efforts to de-Westernize knowledge and society take their justification under precepts of Critical Theory, a neo-Freudian/neo-Marxist philosophical position supportive of the Occidentalist view. These *d’ rigueur* intellectual ferments in the academy are precisely those that give rise to Ye’or’s neologism “academic dhimmitude” defined in Chapter One. This epistemological rift in the academic disciplines circumscribes the conflicts noted in Neusner’s correspondence submissions to USF’s administration, although there is no record of COMES ever having considered a possible need to delve into epistemological questions that circumscribe the USF-WISE curriculum.

Reece-Smith, a former Interim USF President but himself not an academic, inquired about many important matters regarding USF-WISE but not about the partnership’s epistemological undercurrents that by the early 1990’s had caused major tensions in various fields like Middle East and religious studies. At best, Reece-Smith noted that there were some complaints about a “lack of balance” in the USF-WISE program to his 1996 report commissioned by President Betty Castor. He also mentioned that there had been unsubstantiated charges of anti-Semitism in the USF-WISE curriculum which existed in the form of faculty bias about recognition of the state of Israel.

Additionally, but less apparently, that same non-traditional epistemological view for “civilizational dialogue” and “understanding” that is, in part, the source of Neusner’s academic concerns, coincided with USF’s strategic plans to revamp its
“traditional” liberal arts curriculum along “race, ethnicity, and gender” lines.

Confounding all those developments, too, rests the overall condition of the university replete with ongoing efforts to fill policy vacuums that wax and wane in a rapid, expansionist, anarchic political culture of “academic tribes and territories.”

**Condition Three: Transnational Influence of Islamist Thought and its Esprit de Corps through Migration of Ikwhan Professors and Students to USF and its Service Area Community**

Documents found in USF’s library in university presidents’ files in Special Collections, along with Middle East scholarship about the history of the PIJ, show that Al-Arian and his associates in those organizations had international connections and experience with re-Islamization in higher education before setting their sights on USF. Some of that prior history was presented in the previous chapter and is reiterated here. A salient subtext of their prior international connections involves activity related to the *Ikwhan* movement, or Muslim Brotherhood. Also, as noted in the previous chapter, two USF-WISE visiting scholars from the Sudan and Tunisia, Hassan Al-Turabi and Rashid Al-Ghannoushi, are lauded on the Muslim Brotherhood website as being *Ikwhan* “graduates” before establishing the Sudanese Liberation Front and the Islamic Tendency Movement. Formed after the Brotherhood had for a number of years re-Islamized Sudanese and Tunisian societies from below, those organizations fomented extreme forms of violence and terrorism in both countries, committed in the name of defending “true Islam.” As widely reported in the media, Al-Turabi presently resides in the Sudan under house arrest and Al-Ghannoushi lives
in exile in London, unable to return to Tunisia having been convicted of seditious conspiracy \textit{in absentia}.

Sami Al-Arian is the son of Palestinian refugees who first lived in Kuwait and then later left Kuwait for Egypt. While in Kuwait, Al-Arian was indoctrinated into the Muslim Brotherhood (Waller, 2003). Also, one media report indicates that Al-Arian’s father was a garment-maker in Cairo, affluent enough to be able to give the young Al-Arian $10,000 to travel in the mid-1970’s to the United States for graduate studies (Renford, 2002). With his father’s generous gift, Al-Arian arrived in the United States in 1975 with an Egyptian passport.

Al-Arian first attended undergraduate school in Illinois at Southern Illinois University and then moved to North Carolina before moving to Florida after being conferred a PhD in 1985 in computer engineering. While in Raleigh, North Carolina, in the early 1980’s, Al-Arian started a student prayer group, participated in demonstrations against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and became active in several related Muslim-Arab organizations. All but one of those organizations he later advertised in his ICP journal, \textit{Inquiry}. Those organizations are the Muslim-Arab Youth Association (MAYA), the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), and the Muslim Students Association (MSA) (Renford, 2002).

Despite the aforementioned denials in the media, Al-Arian’s educational involvement with a transnational network of non-criminal and criminal networks run by highly educated elites in the Islamist movement is too robust to be coincidental, a point Reece-Smith (1996) noted in his investigative report to Betty Castor. For
example, at USF Al-Arian became associated with other university professors in Florida who would find themselves under considerable public scrutiny after the September 11 attacks: Dr. Imam Mahgoub, Dr. Khalid Hamza, Dr. Bassem Alhalabi, and Dr. Mustafa Abu Sway at Florida Atlantic University (FAU). These professors all belong to the ISNA and some of its sub-groups like the American Muslim Council (AMC) (Central Florida Future, 2003). The AMC is another group that is cited as undisputed fact in U.S.A. v. Holy Land Foundation (2007) as a political organ of the transnational Muslim Brotherhood. At least one of the professors noted, Abu Sway was known to have ties to HAMAS, the terrorist organization with which Al-Arian had negotiated an organizational merger in order to keep the PIJ financially solvent (see U.S.A. v. Al-Arian, 2003). HAMAS is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, as is Al-Arian’s PIJ. Abu Sway was deported from the U.S. in 2005.

Another Florida engineering professor, Hussam Jubara, a University of Central Florida (UCF) visiting professor, was mentored by Al-Arian at USF and served on the boards some of Al-Arian’s Tampa-based organizations, including WISE (Central Florida Future, 2003). Following Al-Arian’s arrest, Jubara was arrested during UCF’s 2003 spring break for alleged falsification of immigration documents and participating in terrorist groups. He also turned up in the international record as being a known HAMAS operative. While in Tampa studying for his engineering doctorate and working with Al-Arian at WISE, Jubara and Ramadan Shallah lived at the Pampas Place address recently implicated in the 2007 USF student arrests.
As stated in the previous chapter, Hatina (2001) shows that while in Egypt
Al-Arian had been part of Cairo’s student circles who received education and
indoctrination during the Muslim Brotherhood’s reformulation into the neo-Muslim
Brotherhood. This was during a period of time when students were apt to translate the
terms of Qutb’s signposts into their most radicalized form, replete with subtexts of
terrorism (Kepel, 1983/2004). By the 1980’s the PIJ would become one of several
offshoots of the neo-Muslim Brotherhood. Its Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)
counterpart would absorb in the 1990’s into the ranks of Al-Qaeda (Venzke &
Ibrahim, 2003).

Both major factions of the Islamic Jihad, PIJ and EIJ, became involved with
Al-Qaeda. The connections between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic Jihad make the
allegations against Al-Arian and USF-WISE even more compelling today than in
1994 when they first surfaced: Emerson (1994) had shown in a national PBS
documentary that Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, Bin Laden’s mentor and a known Muslim
Brotherhood member, had lectured on “Jihad by the sword” as a spiritual value
incumbent on all true Muslims to “kill Jews wherever they may be” at Al-Arian’s
ICP. According to Emerson (1994, 2002) and 2005 court testimony in Tampa, ICP
used the same address as WISE, the think-tank that came to USF in 1992.

The primary purpose of many of these Muslim scholars was to raise money
for global jihad (Emerson, 1994, 2002). Indeed, Emerson referred to those appearing
on Al-Arian’s ICP lecture circuit as an “all-star cast” (1994). The researcher also
learned by studying issues of Al-Arian’s magazine published in Tampa in the early
1990’s during the USF-WISE partnership that the magazine featured full-page ads for
charities shut down after the September 11 attacks. Two of those charities, Benevolence International and Mercy Foundation were directly tied to Al-Qaeda fundraising toward the September 11 attacks. Another one, the Somali Relief Fund, was advertised in Inquiry at a time when Al-Qaeda was in Somalia disrupting the U.S.-led humanitarian intervention.

The ads for charities tied to Al-Qaeda in Al-Arian’s Tampa-based magazine would not be the former professor’s only connections to the Islamist movement’s most notorious militant group, Al-Qaeda, which partly consists of Ikwhan initiates. Another connection involves Mazen Al-Najjar, Al-Arian’s brother-in-law. Another more recent media report by an investigative journalist in North Carolina reveals that Al-Najjar had attended NCSA&T at the same time as the captured Al-Qaeda operative, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad (Sperry, 2005), known as “KSM” in the 9/11 Commission Report (2004). Like Al-Arian, “KSM” was indoctrinated into the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait. According to that report, “KSM” masterminded the September 11 attacks. According to the media report from North Carolina, Al-Najjar and Muhammad were in a Muslim students group together and were commonly referred to on campus as “the mullahs” (Sperry, 2005: p. 268). Al-Najjar was a teaching associate in mechanical engineering at NCSA&T in 1984 at the same time “KSM” was enrolled in the same program.

However, Al-Najjar’s on-campus friendship with “KSM” would not be the only historical connection between members of the WISE think-tank at USF and Al-Qaeda. Another member of the board of directors of WISE was Tarik Hamdi (aka, Tariq Abdulmelik Ismael Azami), who earned a master’s degree in Islamic studies at
the Hartford Seminary’s Center for Islam and Muslim-Christian Relations in the early
1990’s. The Hartford Seminary is also cited on the thirty-two page IIIT brochure
given to COMES prior to the partnership formation between USF and WISE.
Declassified government documents from 1998 show that Hamdi provided an Al-
Qaeda operative in the Sudan with a satellite phone, an action that violates AEDPA
(1995) provisions for providing material support for terrorism (Horowitz, 2005). That
phone allowed Osama Bin Laden to communicate with his followers for preparation
of the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania (9/11 Commission Report,
2004). At one time, Hamdi was also employed at IIIT. Hamdi also was a board
member for Al-Arian’s mosque (Katz, 2003). In turn, the IIIT connections establishes
another Muslim Brotherhood connection to Tampa Bay, for Katz (2003) illustrates in
her book that the IIIT is an *Ikwhan* front.

Questioned vigorously after the September 11 attacks by Bill O’Reilly,
Al-Arian defended his relationship with Hamdi, who is reportedly on a terrorist watch
list. Al-Arian states, “He is not on any list. In fact, he has received security
clearance by the FBI, and he is helping the authorities with their investigation”

So during Al-Sadat’s post-appeasement period when the newly formed,
professor/student-led Gamaat Islamiyyah (“Islamic Groups) had formed along the
Nile, Al-Arian moved to the United States. However, as stated in Chapter Four, his
student counterparts, Al-Shiqiqi, Shallah, and Nafi remained in Egypt at least until
finding themselves under government scrutiny after Al-Sadat’s assassination.
According to Egyptian court documents cited in Sivan (1992), Al-Shiqiqi and Nafi
were briefly detained and questioned for their harboring of suspects in the conspiracy to assassinate the Egyptian president.

Of interest here is that Ramadan Shallah’s curriculum vita found in Special Collections archives also places him in Cairo at the time of Al-Sadat’s assassination, where Shallah served on the review board of an Ikwhan publication. The Cairo magazine Shallah was editing at the time of Al-Sadat’s assassination was soon banned by Mubarak’s new government, who viewed it as a direct source of sedition (Kepel, 1984/2003). At that time Shallah was studying at The University of Zaqaziq, where the elder Al-Shiqqaqi had acquired his medical degree.

After Al-Sadat’s assassination, Al-Shiqqaqi, Nafi, and Shallah appear to have left Egypt for the Palestinian territories and the United Kingdom (Hatina, 2001). In those locales, Nafi and Al-Shiqqaqi would commence transnational publishing activities on behalf of the PIJ and the first Intifada of 1987. Shallah’s vita indicates that he was working on a doctorate in economics at The University of Durham at the same time Nafi and Al-Shiqqaqi were working on their transnational publishing activities. These observations are supported by Alexander (2002) who writes that most of the PIJ founding members “were students who had been expelled from Egypt” (p. 30). In a recent interview Shallah discussed talks among the leaders of the various Palestinian terrorist groups. He stated in vague terms that he could not attend the talks in Cairo because “circumstances” would not permit him (Shallah interview, 2003).
Characteristics of Islamism at USF and its Service Area Community

Characteristic One: External and Internal Organizational Networks Run by Highly Educated Elites Interacting with USF and its Service Area Community for Purposes of Re-Islamization from Above and Below

A leader in the Islamist movement prior to his arrival in Tampa Bay, Al-Arian was hired at USF 1986 for a tenure-track faculty position in computer science, during the university’s expansion toward internationalization. As this section demonstrates, Al-Arian’s hiring at USF coincided with a build-up in USF’s service area of non-criminal and criminal organizations that would, over the course of a decade, interact more and more with the university as a means to protect Al-Arian and others from outside investigations as well as provide a semblance of legitimacy for the criminal enterprises established by Al-Arian and fellow Islamists at USF. The movement in Tampa Bay also consisted of an effective propaganda campaign, excelling at controlling media discourse in order to shield the movement’s “vanguard” from internal dissension, as advocacy groups also interacting with internal constituents at the university coalesced in the Tampa Bay area. This advance also represents the below activity of an overall two-pronged strategy of the Islamist movement, re-Islamization from above and below. The Akram Document put forth as undisputed evidence in the Texas Holy Land Foundation trial refers to this kind of grassroots organizational activity as the work of “beehives” to advance the goals of the mass movement. Analysis of those organizations, their highly educated leadership and their interaction with USF through, inter alia, para-professional associations and publishing organs enables understanding of the substantial influence
of Islamism at USF and its service community—and how the university could be regarded as territory for Islamist conquest.

The developmental course of the build-up of criminal and non-criminal front organizations at USF and in Tampa Bay is one familiar to Blumer (1946/1951/1963), Arendt (1948/1951/1966/1968/1976/1979/1994), and Walker (1979), both of whom have studied the appeal of higher education to mass movements. The higher education milieu serves as cover, making illegitimate causes appear legitimate. Arendt further states that these “fronts” or “secret societies hiding in plain sight” in which the leadership replicates itself on multiple boards of directors for a plethora of causes (e.g., legal, political, religious, educational, charitable) seek erosion of public confidence in existing institutions. “This technique of duplication,” perfected by the Nazis, Arendt writes, “proved extremely fruitful in the work of undermining actively existing institutions and in the ‘decomposition of the status quo’” (p. 371). It appears to be a hallmark of Islamist political warfare. Yet, at the same time, the leaders of those societies “adopt a strategy of consistent lying to deceive the non-initiated external masses” (p. 376).

For Al-Arian, the lying that was disclosed in court testimony and confirmed by the Honorable James Moody in federal court centered on whether Al-Arian was an advocate of Muslim-Arab civil rights and peace or a purveyor of out-group hatred and terrorism. The belief that front organizations were advancing an ignoble cause at USF did not go unnoticed by USF’s external and internal constituents. Indeed, that was the thesis of Emerson’s 1994 PBS documentary on the subject. For over a decade, local and national media elicited insights from Al-Arian and those who
sought to shield him from threats to his cause and from expert academics and terrorism investigators knowledgeable about the role of front organizations in university settings. Commentary from those constituents is stated here:

“It is a false and totally fabricated charge that we’re talking about Muslims in general. These charges were made about terrorists, not about Islam” (Steven Emerson, investigative journalist and terrorism expert, qtd. in Fechter, “Tampa Group Sympathizes with Terrorists,” 1995).

“I certainly would have offered them [USF internal constituents] a copy of the film. I would think that if they were doing an investigation they would at least look at the allegations instead of just asking Sami” (Steven Emerson, qtd. in Fechter, “Tampa Group Sympathizes with Terrorists,” 1995).

“He felt the [Emerson documentary] was a setup . . . taken out of context” (Michael Kovac, qtd. in Fechter, “Tampa Groups Sympathizes with Terrorists,” 1995).

“WISE, with a well-stated commitment to eradicate American’s ignorance of Islam, is one of the few links USF has with Tampa Bay’s large Moslem community. It has facilitated greater Western understanding of Moslems and Islam, and appreciation of values and interests by Moslems. . . . That should be easy in this global village in which the United States is the sole economic and military superpower” (Mark August, Editorial in The Tampa Tribune, “Keep Islam Debate Alive on Campus,” 1995).

“What we have been witnessing is journalistic terrorism. It is journalism without conscience—an attempt to create a story through accusations of guilt by association. It is guerilla warfare journalism, where the purpose is not to report the news but to create it. . . . The best Fechter can do is quote Israeli reporters and academics or U.S. Anti-Defamation League officials who have fears and suspicions” (Darrell J. Fasching, Chairperson of USF’s Religious Studies Department, Editorial Column in The St. Petersburg Times, 1995).

“I was manipulated, exploited. Now I am more vigilant” (Abdelwahab Hechciche, COMES member and Professor of Government and International Affairs, qtd. in Fechter, “ ‘I Was Manipulated,’ USF Professor Says: He Resigns from Middle East Group,” 1995).

“[Hechiche] said he was assured the committee investigated the think-tank’s backers before USF signed a contract to share resources and train students” (Michael Fechter, “ ‘I Was Manipulated,’ USF Professor Says,” 1995).
“This affair concerns the parents of the students, the community and the state. It is an affair that concerns me as a member of the university. I feel like I’m guilty by association” (Abdelwahab Hechiche, qtd. in Fechter, 1995).

“I have done nothing, nothing, zero, to endanger the national security of the United States or to endanger the life or rights of any of its citizens” (Sami Al-Arian, qtd. in “Professor’s Home, Office Searched,” 1995).

“The only thing I have done is speak my mind . . . about an issue involving my homeland because I thought this is a country that values freedom of speech and different points of view” (Sami Al-Arian, qtd. in “Professor’s Home, Office Searched,” 1995).

“Eventually, we’ll know. It’s not a great secret. That’s one of the reasons this is a great country. Things will be known. The truth will come out” (Sami Al-Arian, qtd. in “Professor’s Home, Office Searched,” 1995).

“The United States provides civil liberties, freedom, democracy, and within the United States is the best arena for these organizations to act in the academic world” (Walid Phares, Professor and Middle East Terrorism Expert at Florida Atlantic University, qtd. in “Bomb Scare, Terrorist Probe Jolt Florida University,” 1996).

“The issue is not about academic freedom. The issue is about truth in advertising and academic honesty, and whether in fact WISE was appended to USF as a means of legitimizing radical fundamentalist extremists and their entry into the United States” (Steven Emerson, qtd. in “Tribune Series Debated at USF Forum,” 1996).

“I checked with some of my sources. They say [Ramadan Abdullah] is absolutely not the same person [as Ramadan Shallah]” (unidentified part-time USF professor, qtd. in Dvir, 1995, “The Disappearance of Professor Shallah”).

“I would be very surprised if this was the same man” (Louis Cantori, Professor of Islamic Studies at University of Maryland and Former Attendee of USF-WISE roundtable conferences, qtd. in “Ex-USF Prof Leads Jihad,” 1995).

“I don’t see any possibility that there are two Dr. Ramadan Abdullah Shallas from Gaza, affiliated with the Islamic Jihad, educated in Durham, England, and affiliated with a university in Florida. I know it’s him” (Yigal Carmon, Former Counter-Terrorism Advisor to Israel, qtd. in “Ex-USF Prof Leads Jihad,” 1995).

“You’re making an assumption that because someone was elevated to the head of an organization that has a terrorist element that he has terrorism on his mind” (Harry Battson, USF Vice President of Public Relations, qtd. in “The Disappearance of Professor Shallah” 1995).
“Under Dr. Shikaki’s leadership, the Islamic Jihad took responsibility for the attacks on the Marine barracks in Beruit, Lebanon, as well as many other attacks. This attack killed 242 U.S. Marines and 58 French paratroopers. . . . Are we so stupidly naïve that we think a man would be given leadership of an organization and not reflect the organization’s views? I hope the university administration looks very carefully at its Middle East studies department in an effort to make sure its philosophy is educational and not political” (Marlin Ginsburg, Hudson resident, Editorial, The St. Petersburg Times, 1995).

“I had to bring photos to campus and show them to USF officials. Academic freedom had nothing to do with it” (Michael Fechter, Tampa Tribune reporter, qtd. in Dvir, 1995).

“This was never a debate about academic freedom. It was, and remains, a sorry commentary on USF’s sloppy commitment to due diligence with organizations attempting to do business with the school” (Daniel Ruth, Editorial, The Tampa Tribune, 1995).

“Everything in America, people who work hard can be in touch with the whole world. See, many people visit here from Europe and the Middle East. At the same time, Tampa is not Washington, D.C.; it is not New York. This is an atmosphere of anonymity” (Abdelwahab Hechiche, qtd. in Niebuhr, 1995).

“The university messed up, and we’ve got to have procedures in place so that if it’s WISE or the Charlie Reed Foundation, you can’t subvert the internal public processes that have to be in place to ensure accountability” (Charles Reed, Florida State University System Chancellor, Board of Regents, qtd. in Fechter, “Reed: Islamic Group Dealings in Error,” 1995).

“I have no information that leads me to believe [that WISE] is staffed by anyone sympathetic to terrorism or an advocate of terrorism or a participant of terrorism. I think quite to the contrary. They’re serious scholars who are concerned with peace in the area” (Mark T. Orr, qtd. in O’Neil, The Oracle, “Report Ignores Terrorism,” 1995).

“The university is not in an investigative role in all spheres of society. We have a role to play in making sure our mission is carried out” (Michael Kovac, qtd. in O’Neil, “Report Ignores Terrorism,” 1995).

“[The university should address the terrorism ties question] if in fact there’s any link that’s authoritative between USF and some terrorist activity.” (Alan Stonecipher, Board of Regents Spokesperson, qtd. in O’Neil, “Report Ignores Terrorism”).

“There is really nothing to worry about. I haven’t done anything wrong. I haven’t done anything illegal” (Sami Al-Arian, qtd. in “Federal Agents Search Professor’s Home, Offices,” 1995).
“Agents searched not only Al-Arian’s USF office but also his Tampa home and the office of [WISE]—the think-tank where Al-Arian and Shallah worked—at 5620 E. Fowler Avenue” (Deborah O’Neil, USF Oracle writer, “Federal Agents Search Professor’s Home, Offices,” 1995).

“Computer science professor Peter Maurer said most faculty in the department dismissed earlier reports about Al-Arian as ‘media exaggeration.’” (Deborah O’Neill, “Federal Agents Search Professor’s Home, Offices,” 1995).

“It’s a shock. It’s a big difference between reading things in the newspaper—which you may or may not believe—and having them here searching his office. It’s a little harder to ignore” (Peter Maurer, USF Computer Science Professor, qtd. in “Federal Agents Search Professor’s Home, Offices,” 1995).

“The problem is that Shallah didn’t come out of a vacuum. There are still two or three people working at the university who are still connected with the Islamic Jihad. We are asking the university for an investigation” (Dan Berman, qtd. in Dvir, 1995).

“[Not only do they like universities for propaganda purposes, but campuses are a good] place where they can blend in and recruit supporters” (Stephen Sloan, Terrorism Expert at University of Oklahoma, qtd. in “Foreign Scholars with Agenda Can Easily Seduce Colleges,” 1995).

“Terrorist groups, Sloan said, exploit democratic societies, because they understand the rights granted by them. They get unwitting support from well-meaning defenders of free speech, assembly, and other forms of expression” (Tim Collie, “Foreign Scholars with Agenda Can Easily Seduce Colleges,” 1995).

“In fact, history has been that the more extreme groups, even within the PLO, have drawn from the intellectuals, the sons and daughters of the intelligentsia, the most prominent Palestinian families” (Shibley Telhami, Director of Cornell University’s Middle East Studies program, qtd. in “Foreign Scholars with Agenda Can Easily Seduce Colleges,” 1995).

“I was concerned that in this country we are not allowing some of the dissenting voices of Islam to be heard [so I lent my name to a journal Shallah edited]” (Richard Bulliet, Director of Columbia University’s Middle East Studies program, qtd. in “Foreign Scholars with Agenda Can Easily Seduce Colleges,” 1995).

“Bulliet visited Tampa in 1992 for a WISE conference featuring Sudanese extremist Hassan Turabi. He acknowledged that Islamic Jihad has claimed credit for violent acts, but calling them a terrorist organization merely provides ‘grist for snap judgments about very complex movements and politics’” (Tim Collie, “Foreign Scholars with Agendas Can Easily Seduce Colleges,” 1995).
“Abdullah’s connections don’t matter, Wilson said. It’s dangerous to threaten the free speech of a professor or group ‘just because their group or cause may be unpopular’” (Tim Collie, quoting John K. Wilson, of Teachers for a Democratic Culture, “Foreign Scholars with Agenda Can Easily Seduce Colleges,” 1995).

“Others contend that the issue is not free speech at all, but a university’s conception of its values and mission. Did USF have any business dabbling in Middle Eastern politics or affiliating itself with WISE, a group that shared leadership with a charity raising money for Islamic Jihad?” (Tim Collie, “Foreign Scholars with Agenda Can Easily Seduce Colleges,” 1995).

“I don’t want to criticize some of the individuals there. But if they’re regional experts on the Middle East, they may want to brush up on the subject of Islamic and international terrorism” (Steven Emerson, qtd. in “Foreign Scholars with Agenda Can Easily Seduce Colleges,” 1995).

“I have worked closely with WISE for the past five years [1990-1995] and, in my opinion, there is no substance whatever to the Tribune allegations” (Arthur Lowrie, June 5, 1995 letter to General J.H. Binford Peay III, Head of Central Command, MacDill, A.F.B., copied to Sami Al-Arian and Ramadan Abdullah, qtd. in “Terrorist Leader’s Email Revealing,” 1995).

“Sami told me yesterday that all of his outside activities with ICP, conferences, travel, etc., was documented each year in his evaluation folder and was in his tenure folder as well” (Arthur Lowrie, June 2 letter to USF’s Middle East committee, qtd. in “Terrorist Leader’s Email Revealing,” 1995).

“Also among the computer articles was an attack on journalist Steven Emerson’s testimony before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee on May 27, in which Emerson outlined a network of terrorist support groups in America . . . Lowrie forwarded the article written by the American Islamic Group, which describes itself as a non-profit organization aiming to expose threats against Islam” (Cathy Cummins, “Terrorist Leader’s Email Revealing,” 1995).

“What some of the WISE people were doing on their own, or may have been doing on their own, I have no idea” (Arthur Lowrie, qtd. in “Terrorist Leader’s Email Revealing, 1995).

“Lowrie sent Shallah a copy of a memo he had written to other members of USF’s Committee for Middle East Studies. The committee was discussing how it might rebut the Tribune articles” (James Harper, “Email Tells Little of Ex-Professor,” 1995).

“But the testimony is bracketed by comments from the American Islamic Group, which says Emerson is among the ‘vicious and vile dogs dressed in suits’ spreading lies against Islam so that Muslims will give up their true religion” (James Harper, “Email Tells Little of Ex-Professor,” 1995).

“We believe the Central Command books in Abdullah’s home are not a coincidence. Ramadan Abdullah Shallah is an agent for Middle East terrorist groups, and they have links to Iran” (Anonymous federal agent for the USF case, qtd. in The Orlando Sun-Sentinel, 1996).

“It sounds like a distortion of the facts” (Robert Cannella, Attorney for Sami Al-Arian, qtd. in The Orlando Sun-Sentinel, 1996).

“[The Tampa Tribune] is acting like a pit-bull conspirator with the FBI against the Muslim minority and its constitutional rights” (Pilar Saad, Editorial Column in The Oracle, 1996).

“[William West and Barry Carmody of the INS found records] reflecting numerous calls between Al-Arian’s residence . . . and . . . phone numbers with known alien terrorist suspects . . . identified in the World Trade Center bombing investigation and who associates of the individuals who were indicted and convicted in that case” (William West’s affidavit for search warrant for Al-Arian’s on- and off-campus offices, qtd. in The Miami Herald, 1996).

“These people represent a network of more than a half-dozen of the top terrorist organizations in the Middle East. They are people who are at or near the top of the network. There are links here to Tunisia, to Egypt, to Iran, and to Syria” (Walid Phares, Professor of International Affairs at Florida Atlantic University, qtd. in The Orlando Sun-Sentinel, 1996).

“Records seized in the investigation show frequent telephone calls between Al-Arian and associates of several men convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Al-Arian set up visas for Ramadan Abdullah Shallah and Basheer Nafi, two Palestinians whom U.S. intelligence agencies regard as terrorists. They were hired as research associates at the think tank” (E.A. Torriero & Edna Negron, The Orlando Sun-Sentinel, 1996).

“Right now, this is the number one terrorism investigation in the world. This was a cell of international terrorism operating under the nose of a university.” (Steven Emerson, Independent Terrorism Investigator and Journalist, qtd. in The Orlando Sun-Sentinel, 1996).

“[Messages sent by Khalil Shiqqi to his brother Fathi al-Shiqqi by Ramadan Shallah] show Shallah was known to have access to the Jihad leader. At least two letters seized in the documents ask him to contact Shiqqi” (Michael Fechter, “Records Reveal Terrorist Message,” 1996).
“[Shiqaqi asks Shallah] to send messages to his brother Fathi without mentioning [Fathi’s] name: ‘Is it possible to prepare that?’” (FBI Translator, qtd. in Fechter, 1996).

“The voter registration was an unfortunate, regretful incident [despite Al-Najjar’s advanced education]” (Luis Coton, Al-Najjar’s immigration attorney, qtd. in Fechter, 1996, “Researcher’s Visa Violations May Lead to Deportation”).

“Mazen and I never lived together and never consummated the marriage” (Jan Fairbetter, Al-Najjar’s first wife in North Carolina, qtd. in Fechter, 1996, “Sham Marriage Used to Seek U.S. Residency”).

“The documents released after Al-Najjar’s July hearing indicate WISE officials communicated with and collected information about terrorist leaders. In their search of WISE offices in November, federal officials found jihad communiqués and biographies of radicals such as Sudan’s Hasan Turabi, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, and Islamic Jihad spiritual leader Sheikh Abdel Aziz-Odeh” (Michael Fechter, “Records Reveal Terrorist Message,” 1996).

“If you look at the secret evidence cases across the country, they’re all against Arabs and Muslims” (David Cole, Law Professor at Georgetown University and Consultant for Mazen Al-Najjar’s detention case, qtd. in “The Politics of Immigration,” 1997).

“They come in as students and then they don’t leave. They go to one employer. They violate the rules of this country” (Russ Bergeron, INS Spokesperson, qtd. in “The Politics of Immigration,” 1997).

“It’s no doubt it’s political persecution” (Sami Al-Arian, qtd. in “The Politics of Immigration,” 1997).

“They can’t give up. This case is the clearest challenge to the Anti-Terrorism Act. I think it will end up in the Supreme Court” (Kit Gage, National Lawyers Guild Representative and LA8 Attorney challenging the McCarran-Walters Act during Communist immigration, qtd. in “The Politics of Immigration,” 1997).

“The courts are no place to decide ‘who we are.’ Immigration should be subject to the political process, not the judicial process. We should not have courts taking away the power of the Legislature to say who can come in and who can’t stay” (David Stein, Head of Federation for American Immigration Reform, qtd. in “The Politics of Immigration,” 1997).

“The only reasons he is in jail are his faith, Islam, and his nationality, they say. There’s just one problem. That’s not what happened. Omitted in this public sympathy campaign is documentation that Al-Najjar is not a random victim of overzealous investigators. He was ordered deported by a U.S. immigration judge based on
standard immigration rules. In fact, Al-Najjar could be freed quickly if he dropped an appeal of that order and agreed to leave the United States. It is American due process that grants him the right to appeal. While he does, federal officials continue a separate criminal investigation that they think shows Al-Najjar is part of a terrorist front” (Michael Fechter, Unidentified Tampa Tribune article, 1997).

“Everyone must be aware of what’s going on. When Mazen gets out of prison, you’ll be the next to go in. There is an underlying bias in this country generated from (the United States) foreign policy and the media. I defy anyone here to find anything said about the Middle East where it is used with the word democracy. In this country the Middle East and democracy are natural enemies” (Muhammad Al-Asi, Imam from Washington, D.C., previously featured in Emerson’s PBS documentary Jihad in America, qtd. in “Hundreds Support Prisoner’s Release,” 1997).


“There are Christians, Native Americans, and African Americans here. I don’t care who you are, everyone is entitled to basic rights. I could have kept my mouth shut and gone to a barbeque. But if I did that I would be forgetting the true meaning behind this holiday [July 4]” (Ruben Max Griffin-May, Hillsborough Interfaith Clergy Association and USF Religious Studies Adjunct Professor, qtd. in “Hundreds Support Prisoner’s Release,” 1997).

“How sad, on Independence Day, that some are under tyranny” (John Cooke, United Church of Christ member, qtd. in “200 Rally for Ex-Teacher’s Release,” 1997).

“How did we get here? A member of my spiritual family sits alone. Mazen, today my heart is imprisoned with you” (Max Maya, qtd. in “200 Hundred Rally for Ex-Teacher’s Release,” 1997).

“It’s sickening. He is one of the most decent people I know” (Richard Preto-Rodas, USF Professor, qtd. in “200 Rally for Ex-Teacher’s Release,” 1997).

“The university was manipulated by some very devious groups and individuals” (Norman Gross, President of Promoting Responsibility in Middle East Reporting and former Desegregation Leader for Rochester Public Schools, qtd. in “200 Rally for Ex-Teacher’s Release,” 1997).

“This is a form of torture” (Fedaa Al-Najjar, Mazen Al-Najjar’s wife, qtd. in “Critics Say Rights Lost in Terror Fight,” 1997).

“Do you believe the Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a terrorist group?” (Jorge Perez, U.S. Justice Department Attorney to Louis Cantori, Middle East Studies Professor
from U.S. Naval Academy, AJISS Review Board Member, and Former USF-WISE Roundtable Attendee, qtd. in “Critics Say Rights Lost in Terror Fight,” 1997).

“One person’s terrorist one day is the same person’s prime minister the next day” (Louis Cantori to U.S. Attorney Jorge Perez, qtd. in “Critics Say Rights Lost in Terror Fight,” 1997).

“Cantori says he was shocked when another WISE member, Shallah, turned up as a Jihad leader. So, how, Perez presses, could Cantori know that Mazen Al-Najjar is not a terrorist as well?” (Susan Aschoff, St. Petersburg Times, “Critics Say Rights Lost in Terror Fight,” 1997).

“You don’t want to create law out of knee-jerk reactions, fearful reactions. But I don’t think you’re entitled to all the rights of a U.S. citizen because you’ve penetrated our borders” (Harvey Kushner, Chairman of the Criminal Justice Department at Long Island University and Terrorism Expert, qtd. in “Critics Say Rights Lost in Terror Fight,” 1997).

“People are always looking for someone to blame. . . . When it comes to taking someone’s freedom, we have a Constitution and we have rules, and this is way over the line” (David Pugh, Representative of the Center for Constitutional Rights, qtd. in “Critics Says Rights Lost in Terror Fight,” 1997).

“I would rather err on the side of safety. The abuses by the other side—the Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, even the IRA—have been so great, we had to act” (Harvey Kushner, qtd. in “Critics Say Rights Lost in Terror Fight,” 1997).

“Immigration and civil rights lawyers say the government already wielded a heavy club. For more than twenty years, INS has had the right to use classified evidence to imprison, to deny residency and to grant asylum” (Susan Aschoff, St. Petersburg Times writer, “Critics Say Rights Lost in Terror Fight,” 1997).

“He doesn’t hurt a fly. He’s a community leader. It makes you paranoid that such a man could be arrested and jailed as a terrorist” (Pilar Saad, former USF student and organizer for the Tampa Bay Coalition for Justice and Peace, formed to free Al-Najjar, qtd. in “Critics Say Rights Lost in Terror Fight,” 1997).

“The problem is that (the current rules) . . . mean you have to wait until there is blood on the street before the bureau can act” (Oliver Buck Revell, Retired Senior FBI official, qtd. in “Critics Say Rights Lost in Terror Fight,” 1997).

“By September 1995, the crackdown on terrorism had become a campaign to make Islam the new Red Threat in America. We were suffering ‘anti-Islamic hysteria.’ The terror threat is real. We must not forget that. But while law enforcement agencies must have our support, they do not have carte blanche” (Arthur Lowrie, qtd. in “Critics Say Rights Lost in Terror Fight,” 1997).
“It’s un-American. It’s like we’re in a Third World country that uses these despotic tactics [such as use of secret evidence to detain a non-immigrant with allegiance to a mother country]” (Luis Coton, Al-Najjar’s immigration attorney, qtd. in Merzer, “INS Holds Palestinian on Secret Evidence,” 1998).

“The bottom line is, under our regulations, we’re permitted to do this” (Lemar Wooley, INS spokesman, qtd. in Merzer, 1998).

“It has been 487 days since Dr. Al-Najjar has not been charged with a crime and the classified evidence doesn’t point to any criminal activity” (Statement of the Tampa Bay Coalition for Justice and Peace, qtd. in Fechter, “Attorney to Oppose Use of Secret Evidence,” 1998).

“As a native-born American, proud of America, I am ashamed by the way we permit our immigrants to be treated” (Richard Condon, Hillsborough Organization for Progress and Equality, qtd. in Fechter, 1998).

“There’s a key to open the door to Al-Najjar’s release from federal custody, and it’s in its own pocket. . . . There’s a mountain of public material tying Al-Najjar to Islamic Jihad and some very nasty people. . . . Al-Najjar could get out of jail any time if he simply dropped his deportation appeal. . . . The U.S. government deport people all the time for reasons more mundane than being associated with fronts for violence and terrorism” (Daniel Ruth, Editorial, The Tampa Tribune, 1998).

“It’s the destruction of a career” (Al-Arian, qtd. in Aschoff, “USF Wants to Get Al-Arian Out of Limbo, in Class,” March 14, 1998).

“After one and a half years, there appears to be insufficient information for federal authorities to take any action” (Betty Castor, qtd. in Aschoff, 1998).

“What about the likelihood that Al-Arian may be, first and foremost, an international thug who has successfully infiltrated mainstream America via an extremely open-minded and ‘blindly accepting’ USF community? . . . how many more totally ill-intended individuals have already infiltrated the U.S. ‘mainstream’ particularly through the open and accepting atmosphere on colleges and universities? Will they be forever protected from being exposed because of our asinine penchant for putting political correctness above all else?” (Tom Berlinger, Tallahassee, Editorial, Feb. 25, 2003, The St. Petersburg Times).

“The arrest of professor Sami Al-Arian conveniently comes a few days after nearly a million people inside this country and more than 11-million worldwide marched against the U.S. government’s planned war against the Iraqi people. . . . Dr. Al-Arian is a political prisoner. He stood up for the truth” (Penny Hess, Florida Alliance for Peace and Justice, St. Petersburg, Editorial, Feb. 25. 2003, The St. Petersburg Times).
“Considering the vast sums of money that is purported to have passed through his hands, he shouldn’t have any trouble paying for the best defense that money can buy” (Shirley M. Day, Editorial, Feb. 25, 2003, The St. Petersburg Times).

“The scariest thing in all of this may be those voices among us who admit to the possibility of the man’s guilt but seek somehow to excuse it terms of some ‘just cause’ that fueled his actions. . . . I have read the indictment, something I fear that far too few of us have done. It is thorough and it is damning, and if even a fraction of it is true, Al-Arian has been lying to us for years. Al-Arian’s supporters appear far more concerned with damage control than getting to the bottom of things. In Tampa Bay, as elsewhere, the Arab Muslim community appears to be in denial about the whole thing, casting blame everywhere but within and lapping up Al-Arian’s absurd comparisons of himself to Jesus and Patrick Henry” (Lance Goldberg, Weekly Planet film critic, Mar.19-25, 2003, qtd.in “Deconstructing Sami”).

“I work for the folks in international affairs at USF. I really respected the group of academics and students who wanted to study the Mid East—before it blew up in our face. I want this scholarly study to continue. I never felt frightened by Sami Al-Arian’s presence on this campus. I think that was created drama or fiction. There was no fear factor because of its presence here. I’ve been more outraged and perplexed by the university’s behavior” (Maura Barrios, Weekly Planet “Best of the Bay Community Activist, 2000,” Mar.18-25, 2003).

“I think that Ashcroft sort of co-opted this idea and praised the Patriot Act for letting (evidence) be collected and this case created when, actually, most of the case against Al-Arian was done with the RICO Act. I see this as a marketing campaign for the Patriot Act: Scare people about Muslims and create consent to let people’s civil liberties be dissipated through the Patriot Act” (Wayne Genthner, Citizen Activist, Congressional Candidate, and Sarasota Charterboat Captain, Mar.18-25, 2003).

“The controversy affected the political community before it really came to a head as a legal issue. You saw a lot of politicians gathering around Judy Genshaft, supporting her. Florida university boards of trustees are more political, on a local level, than they used to be. If politicians spoke out at all, they spoke in favor of suspension. I didn’t see anybody in the mainstream political process, of any power, standing next to Al-Arian. . . . [The indictment’ vindicated Judy Genshaft and the USF board. . . . I’m sure some of his defense will be that he’s a political prisoner. . . . One reading all of that would get the full spectrum of beliefs: the Tribune hates Sam.; the Planet loves him; the Times hates USF. No one paper did it all” (Wayne Garcia, Political Consultant, Tampa, Mar.18-25, 2003).

“I think he’s guilty of being a Palestinian, of supporting his people, and maybe of saying at times things that were dangerous to say. If anything, I think he’s guilty of that. I don’t think he’s a terrorist. I had a professor at USF who was a Palestinian from Jordan. He was pretty angry. It doesn’t mean he wants to blow something up” (Linda F. Beekman, Sarajevo Project Founder, Clearwater, Mar.18-25, 2003).
“The indictment and arrest of Al-Arian had a serious impact on the political community that I’m associated with. It addresses the question of self-determination of African people and other oppressed peoples around the world. I think Al-Arian has been indicted and arrested because of his alleged affiliation with Palestinian self-determination. It has a chilling effect. . . . In general I thought that the media conceded to the U.S. and Ashcroft the right to criminalize behavior in the struggle for national liberation” (Omali Yeshitela, African People’s Socialist Party, St. Petersburg, Mar. 18-25, 2003).

“Many people have pleaded with me to remain silent. This is exactly what my critics want. Some think that there are powerful groups who are out to get me. My answer is simple. I believe in freedom of speech now more than ever” (Sami Al-Arian, Guest Column, Oct. 8, 2001, The Oracle).

“I don’t recall ever using my office as a return address [for the ICP]” (Sami Al-Arian, qtd. in “Another Forum for Speech,” The Oracle, Jan. 7, 2002).

With the commentary above in mind, we may now turn to more soberly stated evidence about who Al-Arian is and how the Islamist mass movement of which he was a leader inspired him to build an extraordinary network of criminal and non-criminal front organizations interacting with the university.

As stated above, an important feature vital to the build-up of front organizations in Tampa Bay and at USF was the courtship of the local media. Throughout the same time period as the USF-WISE partnership formation, Al-Arian had established a positive relationship with reporters from local newspapers. That relationship is evidenced in several 1991 newspaper reports contained in USF’s Media Files. Those major feature stories published in The St. Petersburg Times and The Tampa Tribune quote Al-Arian on current events involving Muslims. His chief concern in those articles centers on Islamic defamation and stereotyping in light of the Persian Gulf War and the Iranian fatwa against novelist Salman Rushdie, the latter being an event condemned by academics around the globe.
Of course, Al-Arian would not be the only Muslim professor at USF to be interviewed by the local press in these USF media files, although content analysis shows that Al-Arian’s voice and image dominates these early articles. In the articles, he has the first word and the last.

A January 17, 1991, article in *The Tampa Tribune* found in USF’s Media Files describes, for example, how Al-Arian, identified then as an assistant professor at USF, was questioned by FBI agents during the mobilization period prior to the Persian Gulf War. The article was published six months before a June 1991 meeting with Nafi, Shikaki, Al-Arian, and COMES members. The article, entitled “Questions Anger Arab Americans,” states that two FBI agents visited Al-Arian at his home “as part of the government’s campaign to question Arab Americans about potential terrorist activities” because Al-Arian was born in Kuwait. The report states that Al-Arian was asked if he knew anyone who might pose a security threat to the United States. The report, published three years prior to the 1994 Emerson documentary, further states, “Al-Arian said he thinks the FBI singled him out because he has lectured around the country about the Palestinian issue.” In 2004, local media reported that Al-Arian had been an informant for the FBI, a point which if true may be related to his 1991 questioning before the Persian Gulf War.

Another undated article about the Persian Gulf War but that appears to have been written soon after the month-long event’s conclusion features Al-Arian’s commentary on the event. The two-column length article begins with the editorial plea, “But doesn’t anyone care, they [Tampa Bay Arabs] wonder, that thousands of Arabs were killed in the desert and the cities of Kuwait and Iraq?” Identifying
Al-Arian on four different occasions as a USF professor, the article quotes Al-Arian as saying, “It would be difficult for me to understand why anyone would be proud of killing three hundred thousand people.” The article then continues on to quote Al-Arian and others as claiming Israel has the same expansionist intentions as Iraq, but that no one applies the same standard for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the “Jews” whom he argues invaded “Palestine.” While Al-Arian’s statements indicate his desire that Israel not exist, others quoted in the article state they would be satisfied with a two-state solution. Finally, the discussion returns to Iraq, with Al-Arian having the last word on whether returning American troops should receive a hero’s welcome for having liberating Kuwait: “I don’t want to hurt anyone’s feelings, but I recall a saying by an American governor. He was asked, ‘Could fascism come to America?’ He said, ‘Yes, but it would be called patriotism.’” Evidently, Al-Arian’s answer is that U.S. troops do not deserve a hero’s welcome, given his assumption that Fascism and patriotism are moral equivalents.

The final 1991 report in USF’s Media Files is a major feature work entitled “What Muslims Believe.” Comprising an entire section’s front page in The St. Petersburg Times, one half of the page consists of two photographs taken at Al-Arian’s mosque in Temple Terrace. The largest picture is a profile shot of Al-Arian with his head bowed, looking “pensive at the recent service at Al-Qassam Mosque.” In the caption he is identified as a USF professor, a point mentioned several more times throughout the article. Al-Arian again appears in the smaller of the two pictures, this time kneeling while leading a prayer service with eight other men kneeling behind him.
The article itself is about people’s perceptions about Islam, and most Muslim individuals quoted in the article claim that most non-Muslims see Islam as “a barbaric and repressive creed.” The one Jewish religious leader, Rabbi Jan Bresky of Tarpon Springs, quoted in the article disagrees, however. He states, “Islam has been twisted for political ends, and it really is a noble religion, just as Judaism and Christianity have been used at times in history be perverse individuals for their own greedy ends.”

After a long discussion about the major tenets of the faith, the article then turns toward matters of human rights, free speech, and the Iranian fatwa against Salman Rushdie and his editors for defaming Allah and Islam itself. At the time of the Rushdie affair, the academic community, weighing in on matters of right versus wrong, morally condemned Iran’s fatwa that called for the forfeit of Rushdie’s blood. The fatwa drove Rushdie into hiding, ruined his marriage, and led to the assassinations of some of his overseas editors.

First, the article quotes another USF professor of international studies, Dr. Abdelwahab Hechiche, on the cruel forms of hudud punishment exacted without rule of law in many Muslim countries. While some Muslims say that such punishment is effective, fast, and fair, other Muslims do not agree. Speaking for himself only and not for other Muslims, Hechiche states of killing for the purpose of keeping a religion and its people pure, “It seems to be effective, but there is a debate about it. Compassion, understanding, the need to pacify the world, to not use force--this is what Islam is for me at least.”
However, Al-Arian expresses a different view about the use of violence as interpreted through Islamic law, especially when Muslim writers like Rushdie allegedly defame Islam. Having the last word regarding the Rushdie affair, Al-Arian states: “Basically, what [Rushdie] did was to slap every Muslim in the face. It has nothing to do with free speech. You can criticize ideas, even Islam. But you cannot disrespectfully abuse them.” Jihad is therefore not a quiet inner spiritual struggle in Al-Arian’s religious worldview. It also signifies violent struggle.

For some Muslims, the Iranian *fatwa* to forfeit Rushdie’s blood was just cause for Rushdie’s presentation of Muhammad in an unsavory light. So Al-Arian, speaking in his capacity as a spiritual leader for Tampa’s Muslim community, states, “So he won’t ever think of repeating this offense, the best way is to threaten him with the fear of punishment.”

The reporter then asks Al-Arian if Rushdie deserves to die, to which Al-Arian replies, “I wouldn’t weep if he dies, but I wouldn’t do it myself.” It is clear by the content of these early media documents in USF files that Al-Arian, at least in the early 1990’s, expressed two-tiered standards about violence. These statements further show that Al-Arian believed that some people were not entitled to free speech, even if the majority of the academic community of which he was a part held different ethical views leading to academia’s censure of an Iranian cleric who had incited violence against Rushdie and his editors. Military violence committed under multilateral U.N. sanction against a state (i.e, Iraq) that had transgressed its own internationally recognized boundaries was unacceptable to him; however, violence
committed in response to a *fatwa* by Iran’s most supreme leader who objected to the publication of a work of fiction he had never read was acceptable.

As he became in part through his courtship of the local media one of Tampa Bay’s most celebrated Muslim leaders in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, Al-Arian founded a magazine for the Islamic Committee for Palestine (ICP), a charity that was implicated as part of his confessed conspiracy to commit to terrorism (see Emerson, 1994; Emerson, 2002; Katz, 2003; *U.S.A. v. Al-Arian*, 2004). *Inquiry*, having the same address as ICP, was closely related to another organization, the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), which Katz (2003) states is a front organization for the Muslim Brotherhood. A think-tank in Herndon, Virginia, the IIIT was disclosed to USF faculty and administrators during the negotiation of the USF-WISE partnership as being WISE’s primary funding source (Reece-Smith, 1996).

According to an early press report about USF-WISE, Al-Arian told Government and International Affairs adjunct professor Arthur Lowrie that Al-Arian had included his work with the ICP in his annual review file with the university (“Terrorist Leader’s Email Revealing,” 1995). Part of Al-Arian’s ICP activities included editing, publishing, and writing articles for *Inquiry*. The researcher does not know whether Al-Arian’s colleagues ever reviewed *Inquiry* or studied the ICP toward evaluating his intellectual pursuits or community service endeavors toward tenure. Reece-Smith did review some issues of the ICP magazine.

From his review of *Inquiry* Reece-Smith (1996) determined that editor Al-Arian held pro-Palestinian views, although the pages of *Inquiry* reveal an overall editorial concern for a global jihad movement of which the Palestinians represent an
important but small regional part. A review of “The Project,” a document ratified by the *Ikwhan* movement in 1982 reveals a similar rationale: “to adopt the Palestinian cause as part of a worldwide Islamic policy, with the policy plan and by means of *jihad* . . . [by conducting] studies on the Jews, enemies of Muslims, and on the oppression inflicted by these enemies on our brothers in occupied Palestine, in addition to preaching and publications” (p. 10). In comparing *Inquiry’s* contents to the global jihad policy stated in “The Project,” keeping in mind *Inquiry’s* close association with the *Ikwhan* front, the IIIT, featured in a full-page advertisement next to each issue’s table of contents, one is left with the impression that *Inquiry’s* tacit purpose is to enact “The Project’s” “suggested missions” (p. 10).

A significant amount of *Inquiry’s* content is directed toward re-educating Muslims toward an Islamist view of the world, in keeping with the analysis of Islamism’s intellectual history explicated in the previous chapter. The magazine takes a monolithic position in that it claims to represent *all* of the Muslim community, making no acknowledgment that perhaps some Muslims and even some *ulema* trained in Islam’s ancient religious universities might differ with the conclusions of *Inquiry’s* editor-in-chief and his contributors. To that end, discourse within the pages of *Inquiry* denotes a striking consistency in point-of-view, as if an article or statement written by one author or person could have been made by any of the magazine’s contributors and interviewees.

As Blumer (1946/1951/1963) and other social psychologists might argue, the contributions in *Inquiry* display little independent judgment and reflective responsiveness. In other words, the magazine actually defies the task of its stated
target audience--intellectuals charged with the task of independent judgment and reflective responsiveness--in the service of a strident in-group attitude and ideological program. In its totality, the magazine signifies the same kind of monolithic doctrine of the Islamist international described in the previous chapter. Also, most of the content supports strident Islamic fundamentalist views supporting the use of assymetrical warfare (i.e., terrorism) to defend Islam and all Muslims, including those who believe their rights have been affronted by the existence of Israel.

In addition and as will be shown in the following content analysis, the magazine’s advertisements and its feature articles are aimed at not just Muslim re-education but toward the enlightenment of all intellectual people in Muslim and Western universities toward the same kind of Islamist epistemology described above and in the previous chapter. Many of Inquiry’s contributors hold doctorates, work in Western universities, and are known leaders in Islamist terrorist movements like Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group (AIG) and Tunisia’s Islamic Tendency Movement (ITM). In fact, even before 1994, when the case at USF erupted for the first time, academics, journalists, and governments around the world were aware of the problem and had written about the various academics featured in Inquiry from the standpoint that they were the leaders of terrorist movements.

Of course, Inquiry’s featured professors who may not be the leaders of terrorist movements are no less controversial, even if two of them are considered part of the mainstream view in the field of Middle East studies. One contributor, in fact, Professor Hamid Mawlana, writing about the greatness of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, is identified as a professor at The American University in Washington,
D.C.; and another, Noam Chomsky, writing about the Palestinian-Israeli peace accords in wholly unfavorable terms, is identified as a “distinguished professor” and a “prominent American Jew.” Chomsky receives recognition by the magazine, ostensibly, because he is what the magazine occasionally refers to as a “non-Zionist Jew” which the pages of *Inquiry* define as a Jew who can live happily and in peacefully under an Islamic government in which Jews and other *dhimmi* people agree to a two-tiered legal system with different standards of rights for Muslims and non-Muslims.

Not just about glorification of the first Intifada or providing theological justification for the destruction of Israel and Jews, each issue of the magazine is about the Islamist mass social movement’s progress in various countries, including some of those locales studied in the previous chapter. Again, the magazine maintains other international corollaries noted in the previous chapter, Nafi and Shiqaqi’s PIJ publication produced in London and distributed in the Palestinian territories, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s, *Islamic Selection*, for which Shallah was once an editor.

These connections of time and place in Tampa Bay and USF in the early 1990’s, necessitate further explication of *Inquiry* for the purpose of showing the characteristics of the Islamist movement in Tampa Bay and at USF, especially given that some of the magazine’s issues feature photographs of other USF professors and students (e.g. Ramadan Shallah and Sami Hammoudeh at ICP conferences) and a photograph of Sudan’s Hasan Al-Turabi, which was taken at USF during one of USF-WISE’s roundtable discussions. In addition, one issue contains an article by Bashir Nafi under his alias, Bashir Musa, published when Nafi was researching at WISE and
involved with partnership negotiations with USF. Such an explication might therefore underscore the impact of the Islamist movement on USF’s intellectual climate, which could be taken positively if one favors Esposito’s (1995, 1998) apologetic view of Islamism, or negatively if one accepts Lewis’ (1998), Ye’or’s (1998, 2005) and Kramer’s (2001) assessments of the condition of Middle East studies in the West, which they contend has rendered itself subservient to Islamist perspectives in teaching and research. Studied in their totality, Inquiry also well may represent part of the collection of Steven Emerson’s evidence that he deliberately omitted from his 1994 documentary Jihad in America because he believed the prima facie evidence too inflammatory for a PBS audience.

Within its pages, Editor-in-Chief Al-Arian advertised Inquiry as a magazine “with a Muslim view to the intellect and an intellectual view to the Muslim.” A range of Muslim activist-intellectuals associated with the USF-WISE partnership also appeared as contributors or as the subjects of interviews and articles at or around the same time that they had visited or were expected to visit USF for scheduled roundtable discussions, either as visiting lecturers or as attendees of the discussions.

One of those intellectuals was Hasan Al-Turabi. Al-Turabi is the law professor from the University of Khartoum who was discussed in the previous chapter as being a leader in the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood who used his university as means to overthrow the Sudanese government in a military coup in 1989. The Muslim Brotherhood Movement “Homepage” states that Al-Turabi was one of the movement’s most laudable “graduates” (www.ummah.org.uk).
The August 1992 issue of *Inquiry* features the Sudan’s Hassan Al-Turabi on its cover. Of relevance is the timing of the article’s appearance soon after Al-Turabi’s visit to USF during late spring, in addition to many other cities in the United States, where he lectured in various mosques, Islamic Centers, and conferences that are part of the ISNA network. As a means of defending the appropriateness of the USF visit, faculty championing Al-Turabi’s appearance reminded the media and Reece-Smith (1996) that Al-Turabi had also met with U.S. government officials during his U.S. tour. In addition, Dr. Robert Bulliet, an faculty attendee at some USF-WISE conferences, would say of the Al-Turabi visit, which came on the heels of the partnership formation, that progress toward developing a Middle East program at USF had been notably fast (Reece-Smith, 1996).

An editorial without a by-line entitled “Sudan: A New Model for the World” underscores Al-Turabi’s previously stated comments about “Arabizing Africa.” The article claims that the purpose of the Sudan’s 1989 coup was to allow the Sudan to become “Arabs’ gateway to black Africa,” a process purportedly prevented by the country’s previous non-Islamic governments. To the new leadership established in 1989, therefore, “Islam meant a civilizational movement that not only could provide a framework for progress and development, but also a uniting force encompassing all the people of Sudan.” The article further allows that the new leaders “redefined the role of Sudan by insisting on its Arab and Islamic heritage.”

The editorial on the Sudan is then followed by an interview with Al-Turabi himself, in which Al-Turabi uses softer tropes such as those employed by
non-Muslim Middle East scholars romanticizing the Islamist movement: *revivalism, awakening,* and *resurgence.* Identified as the “Secretary-General of the Popular Arab and Islamic Congress which is a mass movement representing Islamic and nationalist trends and parties throughout the Muslim world,” Al-Turabi informs his interviewer that the “Islamic Revivalism Movement in Sudan is in the process of formulating a whole new life plan for Sudan based on Islamic laws and regulations.”

Thereafter, Al-Turabi demonstrates the extent of his knowledge about Western society, in particular his perception of the role of religion in Western democracies. For example, when asked about the potential for a debate between the West and Islam, the Sudanese intellectual asserts, “It is not likely a debate based on the West’s belief system since the West has lost its religious thoughts and beliefs.” Al-Turabi then continues in a statement suggesting that the new leaders of the Sudan know the will of God such that they are convinced they can shape the “New Islamic Man” throughout the country’s acknowledged multi-ethnic and non-Muslim religious groups: “Sudan has advanced not just economically but also mentally to a level that might be the beginning of a total Islamic revival with the will of Allah.”

Toward that end of creating the *Nizam Islami* in the Sudan, Al-Turabi then states that he is “now formulating a comprehensive plan to encompass all branches of life and religion.” The verb “encompass” is an important descriptive term for the Islamist movement, signifying its intentions to “re-Islamize society and knowledge” according to the principles articulated by the movement’s international leadership. Excluding non-Muslim nations and Muslim majority nations that do not support Islamist doctrine, Al-Turabi contends that his new Islamic order “is also subject to
negotiation with any Muslim supporting nation.” Acknowledging post-1989 reforms on the country’s higher education system but without providing specific details, Al-Turabi lauds his government’s new policies, the results of which were described in the previous chapter: “In the field of education, especially higher education, remarkable progress has been made.”

Given those aforementioned statements about the potential to form alliances with other states, only one state is compatible with Al-Turabi’s diplomatic policy: Iran. Of the Sudan’s new alliance with Iran, Al-Turabi states that both countries are integral to “the present Islamic Awakening Movement,” a matter that “exposes them to the pressures of public opinion and a campaign of deception on worldly and religious levels.” Nevertheless, and specifically identifying Algeria in context, the two countries possess a common purpose “to spread the message of Islam that they have started in Asia and Africa.” In addition, the so-called “Question of Palestine” also represents a problem to be overcome by the application of the Iranian and Sudanese models because the existence of Israel prevents “the unification of Muslims.”

The interview also suggests a working knowledge of the Islamist movement’s characteristic tendency to find and fill vacuums of power in unstable Third World locales. Without qualification, for example, Al-Turabi states that only Muslims are best able to “protect independence and interests of all weak third world nations.” Moreover, he states that the Palestinian Intifada and the U.S. victory in the Persian Gulf War “remind Muslims of this.” And so, any attempts by the U.S. and other Western nations to broker peace and security in the Middle East are “far from equality and justice” because such attempts invariably recognize Israel as a legitimate
state, which according to the terms of Islamist epistemology constitutes “Muslim oppression.”

The last article about the Sudan and Al-Turabi is one penned by Aminah Hajara (possibly a relative of Hussam Jubara), “A Roundtable Discussion with Dr. Hasan Al-Turabi.” This work is Inquiry’s recapitulation of the May 10, 1992, roundtable meeting at USF. As mentioned above, that particular roundtable meeting came on the heels of the formation of the USF-WISE partnership earlier in the spring term. It features a large photograph taken at the meeting in which the subject of the meeting, Al-Turabi, is positioned in the lower left-hand corner of the frame. In the photo, Al-Turabi is not facing the camera. He appears not to be the primary subject of the photo although the caption below the photo suggests he is. Instead, another person who is not mentioned in the article, Al-Arian, the CEO of ICP and WISE, is positioned in the center of the frame staring directly into the camera’s lens.

In the article about the USF-WISE roundtable meeting, Hajara summarizes the discussion’s themes and omits any attempts during the discussion to challenge Al-Turabi’s political views: “parties are not essential to popular democracy”; “there was a time when the West did not have political parties”; and “Islam has a history of tolerance and liberalism towards minorities” through the “Ahl al-Dimma” tradition. The Reece-Smith report of 1996 suggests that in actuality little to no attempts were made to challenge Al-Turabi.

Another article in the March/April 1993 issue is penned by none other than convicted terrorist, Rashid Al-Ghannoushi, from Tunisia, who lives in exile in the United Kingdom. Al-Ghannoushi was slated to be a visiting Islamic scholar at USF-
WISE before the U.S. State Department shelved his visa application. Currently, Al-Ghannoushi is a professor in the United Kingdom, as is Bashir Nafi, who was also a director of WISE and an employee at the IIIT, until the government found out that Nafi’s visa had expired. The Muslim Brotherhood Movement Homepage states that Al-Ghannoushi is another “graduate” among the movement’s many “thinkers, scholars, and activists” (www.ummah.org.uk). Reece-Smith (1996) reports that Al-Ghannoushi’s intended lecture did not become the subject of criticism until after Emerson’s and Fechter’s investigations of Islamists at USF.

The Al-Ghannoushi article further underscores the clash of civilizations in which Islamists see themselves as willing participants locked in a cosmic battle over who defines the nature of global justice. In fact, the overall context of Islamist philosophy indicates that it is the Islamist movement itself, and not the West, that perpetuates the clash because it cannot reconcile with several centuries of historical processes emanating from the European Enlightenment. As such, all problems with Islamic civilization are the result of a conspiracy in which nothing happens by chance.

The Al-Ghannoushi article, “Islam and the West: Realities and Politics” clearly undermines the view among apologetic Western academics who believe that it is the United States government, either being a puppet of Israel or the opposite, using Israel as its puppet, that is responsible for the erroneous belief that Islamism is a political ideology underscored by totalitarian strategies similar to Nazism or Communism.

For example, Al-Ghannoushi laments the “transfer” of “selective and secular values to the primitive nations.” He views Islamism’s reaction to the Enlightenment as a kind of Counter-Reformation. Indeed, Al-Ghannoushi calls the Reformation the
“movement of religious reform, scientific discoveries, liberalization, and finally industrialization” that “swept through the Western world and eventually comprising the virtual domination of the world.” He regards the historical process as part of some grand conspiracy to undermine Islam. Therefore, for this intellectual slated for an appearance at USF only the creation of the Nizam Islami will deliver the world from its jahilaya condition. Al-Ghannoushi, at the end of this historical analysis of the development of democracy and scientific invention during the Enlightenment leading to further oppression of Islamic civilization, is stated as having delivered this speech at the Center for Democratic Studies, the University of Westminster, United Kingdom.

The Spring 1994 issue of Inquiry is an overall response to the Oslo Peace Accords represented by Israel and Yasser Arafat’s PLO, which over thirty years prior had achieved observer status in the U.N. for the Palestinian people. The issue features the famous photograph of Yitzak Rabin and Yasser Arafat in front of the White House, about to shake hands, with Clinton in between, his arms outstretched toward the Israeli and Palestinian leaders in a classic gesture of America’s largesse of spirit in mediating Middle East peace agreements.

This issue was published during a time when U.S. federal law had been enacted to make financial and material efforts to obstruct the peace process a criminal offense. Above this picture is the caption “The Handquake: Peace or Surrender?” which happens to be the lead article by Inquiry’s Editor-in-Chief, Al-Arian, who, after Emerson’s November 1994 exposure of his activities related to the PIJ and associations with PIJ leaders, would insist in the media that he favored a two-state solution and that his recorded statements “Death to Israel” did not mean that he advocated the
destruction of the state but merely that it meant “Death to Occupation” (Tiger Bay video, 2002).

The issue also features other critiques of the Oslo Accords by notable intellectuals in American universities. One is entitled “The Morning After” by Edward Said, identified as a “Christian Arab” intellectual from Columbia University, and another is an article by Noam Chomsky, identified as an “American Jew” and distinguished professor at MIT. Chomsky’s article “The Israel-Arafat Agreement: A Just and Lasting Peace or Reductionism?” laments anti-terror laws “to suppress the Intifada” through “meaningless and diplomatic maneuvers.” The Said and Chomsky articles augment an interview with another person who taught at USF as a visiting professor in the early 1990’s, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, who came to USF from The University of Wisconsin, and, prior to that, Al-Najah University, West Bank. Al-Najah University, as evidenced in the previous chapter, is an academic institution where the Islamic Jihad represents the university’s de facto ROTC; where professors and students are lauded on campus for practicing human sacrifice in the form of suicide bombings; and where leaders of the Islamic Jihad give regular addresses to faculty, administrators, and students. Khalil Shikaki himself is the brother of Fathi Al-Shiqaqi, the PIJ’s first Secretary General. The younger Shikaki denies any operational involvement with the PIJ, and USF faculty hired him because of his genuine academic qualifications as a political scientist specializing in Palestinian politics, although they were aware of his relationship to the elder Al-Shiqaqi (Reece-Smith, 1996).

Al-Arian’s article, “The Handquake,” inside the magazine recreates the cover caption in red bold type. It begins with a condemnation of the Camp David Accords in
1978, which he claims weakened Egypt and her neighbors. At that time Egypt became a pariah state to the Arab League, which expelled Egypt from its charter because of Al-Sadat’s so-called “shameful peace with the Jews.” Without qualification, Al-Arian accuses Israel of “Nazi-like tactics” while hailing the success of the Islamist movement elsewhere but saying that the movement in “Palestine” signifies “a feeling of total failure.” In other words, he denies peace with Israel, such that compromise with Israel equates to “total failure.”

He further addresses the West’s, or “the North’s,” concern about Islamism being “The New Cold War” that defines “Islam [as] representing the ideological threat in the South.” “Islam was seen as a threat,” Al-Arian writes, “simply because of its real and potential ability to resist adaptation of secular-humanist values which in many respects deny or ignore God’s revelations.” He does not consider the possibility that Westerners might draw a distinction between Islam the faith and Islamism the political ideology because, under the tenets of his Counter-Reformationist view, faith and political ideology are inseparable things.

According to Kramer, in Ivory Towers in Sand: The Failure of Middle East Studies in America (2001), Al-Arian’s views about the “myth” of an “Islamic threat” became dominant in the field of study with the publication of Said’s epistemological attack Orientalism in 1978. Reece-Smith (1996) also notes in his report to Castor that Al-Arian’s views were fashionable among some members of COMES, including Lowrie, whose article “The Campaign Against Islam and American Foreign Policy” is appended in the report. Lowrie identifies numerous scholars (e.g., Duran, Pipes, Kramer) and journalists (e.g., Emerson, Judith Miller) who--he believes—erroneously

In “The Handquake,” Al-Arian eventually turns to the subject of Yasser Arafat himself. In a rejection of the Oslo Peace Accords and in an apparent denial of Jewish rights to live in security or for the right of Israel to exist at all, Al-Arian states that Arafat “recognized the Zionist entity to live with within secure borders and consequently the right of any Jew in the world to live in Palestine.” Arafat further “denounced the right to fight occupation by any means available” and to “to stop the Intifada.” The Intifada was spurred by Sheikh Awda from his mosque nearby the Islamic University in 1987. Stirring civil unrest by enlisting students to pass out leaflets on campus, Al-Awda called for “martyrdom” actions, or “spectacular actions,” or suicide bombings, or as Meddeb (2003) would call it, human sacrifice. Al-Awda is also among the indicted in *U.S.A. v. Al-Arian*. He somehow was able to enter the United States and visit Al-Arian’s mosque, which holds the same name as Al-Awda’s mosque nearby the Islamic University.

In an apparent invocation of Muslim-Christian replacement theology, Al-Arian demonstrates his antipathy toward Jewish-Israeli identity rooted traditional Judeo-Christian history. First, he objects to Israel’s “absorption” of “two million Russian Jews and Mariconite settlers” and further denies that Jews have any right to worship in Jerusalem “this sacred city to Muslims and Christians.” He claims thereunto that Europe created “the Jewish problem” and that “the Islamic world never
experienced the Jewish problem” and that “in fact, Islam is the reason that Jews exist today.” Invoking a romantic view of Jewish dhimmi status--under which Jews paid special taxes and lived under the threat of extinction if they did not (Ye’or, 1998)--Al-Arian writes of a “Jewish philosophy and science” that “thrived only under the protection provided by Islam.” By contrast, he states that the “pain and suffering” of Jews today is “the result of two conflicting doctrines: the inclusiveness of Islam,” into which he believes all other religions must be subsumed, and “the culture of the regime of Israel and the exclusiveness of Zionism.”

Therefore, using Islamist theological grounds, Al-Arian claims that Jews are not Israelites; and those who say they are usurp the rights of “non-Zionist Jews” who supposedly prefer a two-tiered system of rights under Islamic law. Thus Al-Arian’s contention, as logic follows, Jews have no claim to Israel either theologically or under international legal charter. Hence, Al-Arian prefers the return to a pre-1948 condition before the advent of what he and other Islamists refer to as “the Zionist entity.” The return to a pre-1948 condition Al-Arian calls a “just and comprehensive peace,” when a Jewish state did not exist and Islam “encompasses” everything in a total denial of thousands of years of religious history that unfolded prior to the advent of Islam.

Through this strange, almost Gnostic denial of history, Al-Arian threatens “a bloody civil war” against the PLO and Fatah leaders in his article “The Handquake.” “The Handquake” logically signifies another “shameful peace with Jews” similar to Egyptian-Israeli peace settlements that caused Islamists to justify on radicalized theological grounds the assassination of Al-Sadat. In effect,
Al-Arian’s article denying the legitimacy of the Arab-Israeli peace process and Jewish rights, even to the point of justifying the human sacrifice of Palestinian “martyrs,” clearly contradicts a decade of statements he made in the media after having been identified as a PIJ leader.

Al-Arian’s case against Israel in “The Handquake” gleans support from another article under the caption “Historical Documents” in the form of a “Legal Opinion (fatwa) of Al-Azhar on the Zionist Entity,” circa 1956. This fatwa from Cairo’s ancient religious university condemns the Arab world’s “co-operation with the imperialist powers which backed Israel” as “this sinful aggression . . . so as to establish a Jewish state in this Islamic country and amidst Islamic states.” Therefore, “peace with Israel--or as it is sought by those are advocating it--is lawfully forbidden.” The ulema at Al-Azhar therefore call upon all Muslims to not make peace and those who advocate peace are considered apostates, which, according to the Islamist doctrine explicated in the previous chapter, is a condition punishable by death. Even “a passive attitude” or “neglect” of this duty against these “awful conspiracies” constitutes “the most heinous sin” the article states.

Finally, all articles in the Spring 1994 issue enjoin substantive support from another penned by the “Inquiry Research Unit” entitled “Labor’s Strategy: Improvisation to the Peace Process.” This work of political analysis features another picture of the Rabin-Arafat handshake with Clinton standing between them. Like Al-Arian’s own assessment of Middle East peace negotiations, the Inquiry Research Unit denies “Zionist,” “Arab,” and “international endorsements” of peace with Jews or
Israel. Furthermore, it denounces peace agreements as “Zionist-imperialist conspiracy” to “cobble together a Zionist entity in 1948.”

Other Islamist intellectuals hosted by USF-WISE were not featured in Inquiry, but they nevertheless exemplify a tendency by the Islamist movement at USF and its service area to court non-Muslim academics as part of their appeal to broad classes of constituents, a trait typical of religious-nationalist movements (Post, 1990/1999). Several of them are noted below.

An expert on Islamic militant groups and the Muslim Brotherhood in the Palestinian territories, Dr. Ziad Abu Amr was another scholar affiliated with USF-WISE. In his writing, he romanticizes attacks on non-combatants in Israel as, *inter alia*, “spectacular actions” and “military operations.” Cross referencing many of the events in his work *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza* (1994), shows that some of those “military operations” were in fact suicide bombings against non-combatant passengers on Israeli buses. Other events included the Islamic Jihad’s hostage-taking and murders such as that which took place on the cruise ship *Achille Lauro*, with the highly publicized film footage of a handicapped Jewish passenger being executed and dumped into the sea. As was shown in the previous chapter’s discussion on re-Islamization in Palestinian universities, Abu Amr excels in documenting how the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad have succeeded in using Abu Amr’s own Birzeit University and the Islamic University and Al-Najah University as fronts for re-Islamization from above and below.

Abu Amr is cited in the indictment *U.S.A. v. Al-Arian*:

On or about August 10, 2000, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with Ziyad Abu Amr and requested that reluctant Ziad Abu Amr
travel to the United States to testify at the INS hearing for Unindicted Co-Conspirator Twelve that the PIJ was involved in non-violent activities. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said he could testify to the non-violent activities of HAMAS but could not find someone to so testify regarding the other Islamic movements. (p. 75)

If this part of the indictment is true, then it apparently means that Al-Arian had asked Abu Amr to misrepresent the published findings of his own academic inquiries into Islamist movements in the Palestinian territories.

Dr. Naseer Aruri is another scholar who lectured under USF-WISE auspices. Also of Palestinian heritage, Aruri is a political scientist and chancellor emeritus from The University of Massachusetts. He frequently publishes Middle East commentary in the on-line magazines like *CounterPunch* and *MSANews*. One of his more recent works, “Remapping the Middle East: Demons and Threats throughout History” (2002), firmly identifies him as what Esposito and Voll (2001) would call an “activist-intellectual.” In that article, he laments the outcome of World Wars I and II, the creation of “a Jewish colonial state,” the defeat of “Nasserism,” the labeling of Libya’s Mohamar Qaddafi as a terrorist, and “the Oslo charade in Palestine.” He also supports Harry Belafonte’s remarks that Colin Powell is “a slave whose privilege of living in the master’s house is dependent on good behavior.”

In addition to being a political scientist who lectures in national university forums like USF-WISE, Aruri is a three-term board member of Amnesty International (1988-1994) and Human Rights Watch (1992-1994). Amnesty International is a member of the National Coalition to Protect Political Freedom (NCPPF), founded by Al-Arian in 1996. Amnesty issued a statement claiming that Al-Arian after his arrest in 2003 was a political prisoner. Aruri is also a former president of the Arab American
University Graduates (AAUG). In addition to these high appointments, he has been a
guest speaker with a New York-based organization called Al-Awda.Org, a coalition
that advocates Palestinian “right of return.”

Aruri’s most recent speech for Al-Awda.Org was in April 2001 at the “No
Return = No Peace Rally.” He spoke alongside other prominent
activist-intellectuals, editors, and publishers like Sami Al-Arian of USF, ICP, and
NCPPF; Anthony Arnove, editor of South End Press (Aruri’s book publisher),
contributor to The Progressive, Z Magazine (whose article by Noam Chomsky is
reprinted in Al-Arian’s Inquiry), International Socialist Review, and member of the
International Socialist Organization; and Sara Flounders, co-director of Ramsey
Clark’s International Action Center and occasional speaker for the ISNA annual
conferences.

Aruri and this mix of Al-Awda.org speakers signify a trend in political alliances
in North America between adherents of Islamism and radical left-wing ideology and
causes. The North American alliances continue to grow, curiously, at a time when in
countries like Iran and the Sudan left-wing intellectuals have ceased being enamored
with Islamism (Nafisi, 2005).

Another scholar not previously mentioned in the public debate about
USF-WISE is Dr. Ibrahim Abu Rabi. Abu Rabi is co-director of the MacDonald Center
for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations at the Hartford Seminary. The
MacDonald Center states on its website that among its tasks is to train imams for U.S.
military chaplaincy. The MacDonald Center for the Study of Islam and Christian-
Muslim Relations boasts a famous graduate, Tarik Hamdi, noted elsewhere in this
chapter for allegedly having given a satellite phone to an Al-Qaeda operative in 1998. Hamdi was also a board member of WISE in Tampa Bay before leaving for the MacDonald Center’s M.A. program. He also worked at the IIIT.

Along with Dr. Ingrid Mattson, herself one of the ISNA’s two Vice Presidents, Abu Rabi is a professor of Islamic studies at the same center. Abu Rabi earned his M.A. and Ph.D. in 1983 and 1987 at Temple University, where Esposito studied under Al-Faruqi. Like the other USF-WISE guests, Abu Amr and Aruri, Abu Rabi is of Palestinian heritage. Abu Rabi’s B.A. is from Birzeit University, another university in the Palestinian territories known for its high levels of Islamist influence on academic culture.

According to his on-line curriculum vita, in spring 1995/1996, Abu Rabi was also awarded a research fellowship at the IIIT. The AJISS website cites him as a member of the journal’s advisory council, along with six other USF-WISE lecturers and guest faculty. He traveled throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia between 1984 and 1998 to a total of nineteen different countries. His travels and lectures reveal someone who very much fits the description of an “academic missionary,” as would other Islamist intellectuals who came to Tampa Bay in the late 1980’s and 1990’s. The titles of Abu Rabi’s lectures and papers in those countries and in the United States may illustrate Abu Rabi’s role in the ISNA/IIIT network’s overall strategic goal to “Islamize society and knowledge.”

For example, in the United States, Abu Rabi delivered a paper to the AMSS in East Lansing entitled “The Islamist-Secularist Dialogue in the Contemporary Arab World” (October 1992). In February 1992, Abu Rabi reprinted an article entitled
“Intellectual Roots of Islamic Revivalism in the Modern Arab World” in the Ittihad quarterly published by the Islamic Center of Tampa, Florida. Previously the article had been published in New York’s The Message International. His April 1992 lecture at USF is entitled “Intellectual and Social Foundations of Modern Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World.” He was also a discussant on a panel called the “Islamization of Knowledge” at the American Council for the Study of Islamic Societies, Villanova University. In addition, while not cited on his curriculum vita, Abu Rabi is the editor of a book published by WISE in 1994 that details the proceedings of a roundtable conference with Dr. Kurshid Ahmad, a visiting lecturer to USF-WISE from Pakistan. Ahmad is the Islamist scholar noted in chapter One as having been a direct disciple of one of the Islamist movement’s most renowned theoreticians, Mawlana Maududi. Finally, Abu Rabi has visited other secular universities and centers in the United States, including Esposito’s center at Georgetown, delivering similarly entitled lectures and papers that employ the classic tropes of the re-Islamization program.

Given that the 1996 Reece-Smith report discusses the Khurshid Ahmad lecture and its faculty attendants, the details of that lecture and its outcome, Abu Rabi’s edited book, Resurgence: Challenges, Directions, and Future Perspectives: A Roundtable with Professor Khurshid Ahmad is worth attending at length. Ahmad is an economist from Pakistan and is a known leader in the Jamaat-E-Islami, which maintains strong linkages to the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda and is on the State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization list (Ronczynkowski, 2004). The roundtable discussion in question occurred on May 15, 1993. As with every source cited in this inquiry, the researcher has read the work in its entirety. With few
exceptions, the contents of this book suggest on their face that USF-WISE’s commitment to “civilizational dialogue” amounted to a romantic gloss on illustrating the progress of the Islamist program for re-Islamizing society and knowledge.


The Abu Rabi edition of the Ahmad lecture contains three appendices: the roundtable participants; Ahmad’s bibliography; and Abu Rabi’s “Select Bibliography of Islamic Resurgence.” These appendices, coupled with a reading of the contents, suggest that the Islamist insurgence, which in the book is repeatedly called “resurgence,” was not challenged by the participants as a repressive, destabilizing force by an Islamist international against liberal Muslims and non-Muslims living under its economic theories and practices. As Reece-Smith (1996) notes in his report to Castor, challenges to other roundtable conferences came months after they had transpired.
Characteristic Two: Signs of Islamist Hidden Curriculum at USF, with Strong
Linkages to the Theory, Strategy, Practice, and Practitioners Associated with the
International Institute of Islamic Thought

In delineating the array of non-criminal and criminal external organizations run by highly educated elites interacting with USF, this study already has progressed far in understanding Islamism’s interplay with USF and its service community. But this study of a reformist mass movement in higher education would be remiss were it not to delve more deeply into how the education theory, practice, and practitioners of the movement’s aforementioned network of organizations presented USF faculty and administrators clear indications of an intention to establish at USF a hidden curriculum based on the IIIT’s ideological reform program for Western secular higher education. On one hand, that advancement of a hidden curriculum signifies the process of re-Islamization in higher education from below. It has its roots in a concept already noted, “dialogue.” On the other hand, that same advancement of a hidden curriculum at USF assisted in the use of the university and the people in it in the Islamist movement’s from above strategy in higher education, using USF infrastructure and personnel in the commission of violence.

In a statement echoing Arendt’s observation of front organizations (i.e., “secret societies hiding in plain sight”) in totalitarian mass movements who use education to “decompose the status quo,” Margolis (2001) writes that hidden curricula “hide in plain sight” (p.26). Moreover, Margolis’ counterpart Soldantenko (2001) laments that the hidden curricula of off-campus third-sector groups attempting to legitimize themselves with area studies programs (e.g., Chicano studies in
California) often are doomed because their values clash with the values of Western democratic education. In the end, USF would dissolve the partnership agreement with WISE but not because of a values clash, per se, but because of so-called administrative “irregularities” (Reece-Smith, 1996: p. 21) involved with the partnership that violated USF policies.

The hidden curriculum of re-Islamization of society and knowledge was conveyed by Sami Al-Arian at a Minaret Freedom Dinner in late 2002 (Minaret Dinner Transcript, 2002). At that dinner, he acknowledged the presence of a former WISE roundtable guest, Dr. Charles Butterworth, and then explained the importance of think-tanks to the advancement of the ISNA political and social agenda in the United States. Identifying organizations that a decade earlier he had advertised in full-page color gloss in his defunct magazine, Al-Arian said that those organizations could not attain their objectives without the backing of think-tanks. In context, he then reiterated USF-WISE’s agenda for promoting “civilizational dialogue.” The ISNA organizations connected to the WISE think-tank are cited in this section and received fuller discussion in the previous chapter as part of Saudi Arabian involvement in the international movement to re-Islamize society and knowledge from below. In the course of ten years of published press statements, Sami Al-Arian and his supporters would repeat an immigration judge’s statement that USF-WISE was “respectable and scholarly.”

In the May 28, 1995, article in The Tampa Tribune that reiterated elements of the November 1994 PBS documentary by Emerson, investigative journalist Michael Fechter reprinted a written statement made by Ramadan Shallah, the director of
WISE, about the purpose of the think-tank. Shallah’s statement, part of a 1993 introduction to the Hassan Al-Turabi lecture, was, “Our long-term goal is to contribute to the understanding of the revivalist Islamist trends, misleadingly labeled ‘fundamentalism’” (USF Media Files, p. 44; italics added to show tropes of the Islamist “dialogue”).

Shallah’s statement underscores the notion presented throughout this inquiry that the Islamist movement in higher education is a reformist movement hostile to the Western tradition, signifying the de-Westernizing trend in education that gained momentum in the 1960’s. By its own definition advanced in the pages of Inquiry, the publishing organ of Al-Arian’s ICP, “Islamist revivalism” is anti-Western. Proof of that anti-Western view is presented below, but for now let us accept the premise and then ask, as a matter of academic ethical consideration, whether an epistemological approach hostile to the Western rational tradition contributes to “civilizational dialogue.” Also, let us ask whether “civilizational dialogue” might be a one-sided affair contemptuous of Western concepts like academic freedom and responsibility.

Prior to the USF-WISE partnership formation, an IIIT brochure was given to key faculty and administrators involved in the negotiations. This is an interesting point that has never been investigated in terms of the significance of the USF-WISE partnership’s potential to establish a curriculum hostile to what Shils (1997) calls the academic ethic of preventing the intrusion of ideological politics in the curriculum. That brochure became an appendix in the 1996 William Reece-Smith Report to Betty Castor. Another important item of note is that in giving the brochure to USF faculty and administrators pushing for the partnership, Sami Al-Arian, WISE’s CEO, and
Bashir Nafi, WISE’s Director of Research, also gave them ample indication of what they intended the USF Middle East studies curriculum to be and do.

The language in the brochure is similar to that expressed in the full-page ad that always appears in the same place in each issue of Al-Arian’s Inquiry, to the left of the magazine’s table of contents and editorial board page. The ad/brochure states that one of the purposes of the IIIT is to “regain the intellectual, cultural, and civilizational identity of the Ummah through the Islamization of the humanities and social sciences.” Another stated purpose is “to rectify the methodology of Islamic thought, in order to enable it to resume its contribution to the progress of human civilization and give it meaning and direction in line with the values and objectives of Islam.” In addition, and in keeping with the education theory discussed in the previous chapter, “The Institute seeks to achieve its objectives by holding specialized academic conferences and seminars, supporting and publishing selected works of scholars and researchers in universities and academic research centers in the Muslim world and in the West, and directing university students toward undertaking research on issues of Islamic thought and the Islamization of knowledge.” Also, the ad/brochure states, “The Institute has a number of overseas and academic advisors for the purpose of coordinating and promoting its various activities and had also entered into joint academic agreements with several universities and research centers.”

Over thirty pages, the brochure given to USF is a longer version of the one featured in each Inquiry issue. Its content, too, supports Al-Faruqi’s IIIT educational theory published in Riyadh (see extended analysis in Chapter Four). Received by the backers of COMES and given to USF administrators for review in the early to mid-
1990’s, the brochure reads, “The consensus among leading thinkers within the Muslim Ummah is that we are facing an intellectual crisis reflected by a deficient performance at all levels, a collapse of institutions, and a disequilibrium of relations within the Ummah” (p. 1). The brochure also states that its mission is to organize “expert working groups in every discipline to prepare projects in line with the action plan for the Islamization of knowledge and the reconstruction of Muslim thought” while “freeing [Muslim thought] of that which contravenes the Qur’an and the Sunnah (the Prophet’s tradition), and as a whole, the general objectives of Islam” (p. 2, italics added). The brochure also states that the mission of the IIIT, and its sub-group WISE by default, seeks “to safeguard unity [oneness of the Ummah] and to avoid dissension among the ranks” (p. 31, italics added). This “sincere and humble effort” is made, according to the brochure, to advance “Islamization of knowledge,” which is “but one of the aspects of ‘Islamization,’” which is “a comprehensive moral framework for the individual and society, for thought and action, for theory and application, and for this life and the Hereafter” (p. 31, italics added). A major tactic in achieving those strategic objectives involves IIIT partnerships with Western secular research universities so that, as the brochure states, its educational networks may “put the Muslim intellectual in command of Western culture and knowledge” (p. 29, italics added). Those statements in the brochure indicate that USF, having received this brochure by WISE prior to the partnership formation with WISE, had knowledge of the educational goals of the IIIT and its subgroup WISE. The Syrian social scientist Bassam Tibi (1998) who lives in Germany calls the IIIT’s codified educational vision of Pax Islamica “paranoid scholarship” (p. 197).
The missions of the two ICPs, AJISS, AMSS, and IIIT, underscore the distinct Islamist philosophical-theological position of the think-tank, WISE, that partnered with USF in the early 1990’s and that some COMES professors and other professors at USF and around the country hoped would form the basis of the Southeastern United States’ first Middle East studies institute. That basic position of the AJISS, AMSS, and IIIT is one aimed specifically toward merging matters of faith and reason in scholarship, toward the achievement of religious superiority (not equality) in the world, and the establishment Islamic law in all states where Muslims reside whether as minorities or majorities.

As explicated in the previous chapter, the educational theory and practice emanating from Riyadh publishing houses for those groups in the U.S. signifies nothing less than wholesale attack on Western educational theory and practice. Not meant as peaceful intellectual coexistence, the ultimate objective is total reform of Western education in which Islamist epistemology arbitrates all scholarly judgment in all fields of research and teaching, in both soft and hard sciences. The AJISS, AMSS, and IIIT hope to achieve those goals by demonizing the West, the United States, and the State of Israel, which IIIT discourse refuses to acknowledge by its official name, and referring to Israel instead as “the Zionist entity” or as the state Islamists working at USF hoped the land would become, “Palestine.” In “Palestine,” according to the legal logic of the Islamist movement, Jews and other non-Muslims would live in peace and security, but only so long as they accept two-tiered, dhimmi standards of social and political status. These features further define the trope “civilizational dialogue.” It is that last aspect of the terms of “dialogue”--which became part of an
intended hidden curriculum at USF—that led to accusations of anti-Semitism in
USF’s Middle East course taught by WISE lecturer Ramadan Shallah, who invoked
the term “Palestine” when referring to “Israel” (Reece-Smith, 1996).

Representing another means to those reformist ends, in which higher education
signifies the *dar al harb*, or “domain of war,” education signifies a battleground of
intellectual *jihad*, or Qutb’s doctrine in *Signposts: zalzalah*, or “shaking.” So by
context, Al-Arian’s *Inquiry* signifies much more than an expression of pro-Palestinian
political views. The magazine and its affiliated ISNA sub-groups attend more broadly
to the re-Islamization of the United States, which according to the overall
epistemology of *Inquiry* is an outgrowth of the Reformation, a movement in the West
that de-Islamized Western knowledge and granted tolerance to Jews. So the
underlying purpose is thus to re-Islamize Western knowledge in the West.

For example, in one issue of *Inquiry* the representatives of these Islamist
academic organizations are featured in a December 1993 ICP post-conference write-
up called “Islam and the New World Order: A Call for National Agenda in America.”
Written by Ahmed Fellaj, the article describes the on-going Islamist rejection of U.S.
involvement the Persian Gulf, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf
War. It also features photographs of conference attendants, one of Sami Al-Arian
standing at a lectern under the ICP/PIJ logo, and another of Taha Al-Alwani, of the
IIIT, which channeled Saudi Arabian funds to USF-WISE. The 1992 conference was
about “current assessment and future plans for Muslims in the United States” by
“distinguished” speakers such as “Samih Hamouda [a USF graduate student enrolled

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in three different programs during his time at USF] and Ramadan Abdullah
(Palestine).”

Both Hammoudeh and Shallah were among the indicted in the trial *U.S.A. v. Sami Al-Arian*. Hammoudeh was acquitted of all charges on December 9, 2006, while Shallah never stood trial because he lives in Damascus, where the PIJ is headquartered. Hammoudeh is also the student who was a graduate assistant at USF-WISE, received money for that purpose through university channels, but was never assigned any work at USF (Reece-Smith, 1996). As *Inquiry* shows, however, Hammoudeh was doing work for Al-Arian’s other off-campus organizations eventually implicated in the fund-raising scheme for conducting terrorist attacks in Israel.

Another person present at the ICP conference is “Abdul-Rahman Al-Moudi.” Also known as Abdulraham Alamoudi, this person plea bargained in 2004 for his involvement in a Libyan assassination plot against a Saudi Arabian royal by laundering money through a charity advertised in a full-page ad in Al-Arian’s *Inquiry*. Alamoudi, Hammoudeh, Shallah, and other speakers also discussed “how to deal with characteristics of the Western model” because “the concept of democracy is being used by the West to push for a new state of cultural and political imperialism.”

With the aforementioned delineation of intent to create an Islamist hidden curriculum at USF, at this juncture, one considers it prudent to offer a major explication of the contents of *Inquiry*’s articles. The explication provides us with a means of viewing what the hidden curriculum of Islamist educational theory looks
like when practiced in the discipline of re-Islamized political science. In totality, political science as conceived in the pages of Al-Arian’s magazine, itself being published at the same time as the USF-WISE partnership, resembles educational propaganda along the lines of that which Arendt (1948/1951/1966/1976/1979/1994) observes in totalitarian mass movements.

We can start with an article written by WISE research director at USF, Bashir Nafi. In Inquiry, Nafi’s uses his alias, Bashir Musa, as identified in the indictment U.S.A. v. Sami Al-Al-Arian, for which Nafi is among the indicted and alleged terrorism racketeers. The indictment does not discuss another one of Nafi’s aliases, Ahmed Sadiq, a nom de plume he uses when writing for Islamist websites (www.ict.org). A Ph.D. in biology, Nafi/Musa discusses in a two-page article how tolerance towards Jews, a condition which he claims emanates from the Reformation, has been the source of all Modern and now Post-Modern conflict that weakened the ummah. This article appears in the layout between Inquiry’s full-page ad stating that the magazine is “informative, insightful, and objective” and another for the ISNA/IIIT’s academic journal, the AJISS. Nafi/Musa’s article “Israel: A Zionist Dream through Western Colonial Ambitions” blames all historical conflict on “the Jews.” “For centuries the Jews were scattered in various parts of the world,” a condition which Nafi/Musa evidently prefers and hopes will be re-created in the future. At that time, Nafi/Musa contends that the Jews were a happy, thriving people who existed “under the banner of the Islamic states, in Muslim Spain and later in the Ottoman Sultanate,” where they “had their years of peace and prosperity.” Then, in a statement reminiscent of the kind of stereotypical thinking held by people who
believe in the “Great Jewish-Zionist Conspiracy,” Nafi/Musa states that “it was the Jews’ typical insularity and dealing in usury which fueled Christian hatred against them in the social environment.” In other words, Nafi/Musa faults only Jews and not those Christians who persecuted them as the source of hatred against Jews. He also omits the possibility raised by Ye’or (1998) that Jews’ *dhimmi* status in some Islamic countries might have been a form of extortion in the form of *jihza* taxes, which allowed Jews and other “protected people” to live as second-class citizens, but under constant threat of extinction.

In addition, Nafi/Musa expresses satisfaction with that pre-Reformation historical condition, for next he turns to the Reformation, that time when Protestants, “to reinforce their argument,” pragmatically felt “it was necessary for Martin Luther and his followers to bring the Old Testament--the Torah, the Jewish Holy Book--into light after centuries of neglect by Roman Catholics. This was the beginning of tolerance towards the Jews.” Nafi/Musa states that afterward came all the problems identified by the Islamist educators and groups identified in the previous chapter’s findings: nationalism, the rise of the nation-state, Marxism, and the international trade movement. “Usury,” biologist Nafi/Musa claims, “which had been the cause of the Jews, was given a more respectable name, ‘the banking interest.’” This unusual assessment of Reformation history blaming all of modernity’s ills on tolerance toward Jews was written by the research director of WISE at the time when WISE was in partnership with USF.

The January 1993 issue of *Inquiry* looks specifically to the condition of Muslims in the U.S. One title in it, in particular, conveys the unwillingness of its
writer to accept the U.S. system of laws and policies that uphold civil rights. Indeed, “Muslims and the American Democracy: A Muslim Senate?” signifies a certain hostility toward most of that system’s participants. Writer Masood Rab states, for example, that “the political process of elections” is “ludicrous.” Accusing the system of being overrun by non-Muslims and a *jahiliyah* condition, he questions how “we Muslims” can participate when “we” must have “hospitality suites in the political party conventions next to gays, lesbians, AIDS activists, Zionist organizations, pro-abortion, pro-life and other special interest groups.”

The answer Rab offers is, quite simply, that Muslims cannot; therefore, they first should create a Muslim-only extra-constitutional system. “We need to understand and develop the concept of a Muslim community system while living in non-Muslim societies,” he writes, and “collectively” “implement divine rules in our lives.” Why? Rab believes that “the political system in this land [America] leads to obedience of a man-made system and, therefore, to shirk, with Allah’s system.” By invoking the Arabic term *shirk*, Rab means that Muslims who assimilate with the U.S. political system have rendered themselves impure and have fallen out of favor with what Rab and other Islamists believe is God’s will. This condition is tantamount to the same condition that Islamists in Egypt and other parts of the world accuse fellow Muslims (e.g., Al-Sadat) of having, *takfir*, a condition of apostasy wrought by accepting non-Islamic forms of government and other non-Islamic cultural mores. Rab offers a solution to that problem, irrespective of the views of many Muslims in the U.S. who might prefer the U.S. legal system: “Therefore, becoming part of this political system will be prohibited.” Finally, in a statement that signifies the Islamist
will to make Islamic law the supreme law of the land, Rab illustrates the second part of his strategy for re-Islamizing America’s electoral system: “A Muslim Senate will present an alternative to the present decadent system in this country for the non-Muslims as well.” In other words, Rab’s statement alludes to the Islamist epistemological principle that Islam encompasses everything, as a total way of life for all people in all societies and of all religions.

The *Inquiry* issue also features an article written by Sami Amin, who may or may not be the magazine’s Editor-in-Chief, whose full name is Sami Amin Al-Arian. As is conveyed in *U.S.A. v. Al-Arian, Inquiry*, and many other media documents, Tampa Bay’s Islamist movement scrutinizes political developments and then provides its own distinct interpretation to its own laity. Amin’s article, “Inquiry Exposes a New Scandal in Congress: Congressional Committee Sanctions Genocide in Bosnia” is another example thereunto.

A large reprint of an executive summary entitled “Iran’s European Springboard” to U.S. Congress about some Muslim groups in Bosnia accompanies the article, along with another list of prominent U.S. leaders and elected officials who are a part of the alleged “scandal.” The executive summary states, “The history of the Muslim community in Yugoslavia was largely one of oppression; however, during the Tito years, policies were adopted that enhanced the position of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Islamic community.” Amin considers this statement reprehensible, adding that the editor of the executive summary “is an Israeli-American.” Amin then denounces the report and the congressional counterterrorism task force whose names the article identifies because they endorse the view that “violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina” is
being used “as a springboard for the launching of JIHAD in Europe.” Amin then concludes that the report is “clear-cut proof” that the U.S. has “picked” Muslims “for their new enemy.”

The January 1993 issue also features a report on the most recent AMSS conference proceedings called “Islam and Democracy.” The report features pictures of IIIT leader Taha Al-Alwani and many other AMSS leaders. Present at the conference were Dr. Ibrahim Ahmad Omar, the Minister of Higher Education in the Sudan, and Dr. Abdelwahab Al-Messiri, from Egypt. Al-Messiri is not identified as an Egyptian official. Al-Messiri was the AMSS’s annual Al-Faruqi memorial speaker “who spoke about the secularization of the social sciences and the Islamization of knowledge.” Omar, on the other hand, lectured on “Sudan’s Educational Renaissance,” the same one whose results were discussed in Chapter Four. *Inquiry’s* AMSS reporter also states with certain satisfaction that “even non-Muslims” were present at AMSS. They, too, evidently endorse the Islamist epistemological view that “Western thinkers” have concepts of history that are “shallow, narrow, arrogant, and greatly misrepresentative of the grave problems in our world.” The article implies, therefore, that Islamist education in the Sudan and through the ISNA, the IIIT, the AMSS, and the AJISS is deep, wide, humble, and greatly representative of the grave problems in our world.

Editor-in-Chief Al-Arian’s March/April 1993 issue features titles on its cover page such as “Islam and the West: Realities and Prospects,” “Racist Implications of the Jewish View,” and “Congressional Report: Islam is the Global Enemy.” The issue also contains interviews such as one by Ibrahim Abdullah, from his post in
Lebanon, with Sheikh Abdullah Al-Shami, identified as a “representative” of the “Islamic Jihad Movement.” The name of the interview is “Our Return is Not Negotiable: No One Can Stop the Intifada,” and it glorifies the Islamic Jihad’s “continuous clash” with Israeli citizens, drawing no distinctions between combatants (Israeli Defense Forces, primarily) and non-combatants, and firmly denying the relevance of peaceful compromise between the Palestinian leadership under Yasser Arafat and the state of Israel.

Another article by Ibrahim Abdullah, “Isam Bramah: A Lesson in Commitment and Martyrdom” extols the alleged virtue of human sacrifice by writing about a PIJ terrorist who “motivated others” and became a “martyred hero” himself who recited the Koran as Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) closed in on him in a safe house in a middle-class neighborhood. The “hero” of the story was twenty-eight years old from a middle class family and college educated. Complementing this article is another one by Omar Maxwell about U.S. American presidential politics, “Clinton Sleeping with the Zionists,” which laments the statements of a Jewish leader about Clinton, “He has got something in his heart for the Jews.”

Also in the March/April 1993 issue is a work entitled “Racist Implication of the Jewish View of the Other” by Zaid Shakir. At the time this article was written, Shakir was a student at Yale University and also served as the university’s Muslim chaplain. This article exemplifies the sense of Islamist superiority described by Ye’or (1998, 2005) in her analysis of dhimmitude as a precondition of terrorism and asymmetrical policy standards between Muslims and non-Muslims. In bold green type, the color of the Islamist movement, Shakir states, “The purpose here is to argue that, Western
racism is largely due to the inability of the West to overcome the inherently racist
roots of the Judeo-Christian tradition.” By contrast, Shakir avers that “it is worth
noting that the Islamic view of the ‘other’ is neither exclusive nor dehumanizing.”
The tacit assumption here is one in which Islam encompasses everything, being a
primordial religion preceding Judaism and Christianity, in opposition the traditional
historical view that Judaism and Christianity are parent religions to Islam. As logic
follows further, Muslim converts are not “converts,” _per se_, but “reverts.”

In apparent contradiction to the issue’s other articles Islamism’s glorification of
human sacrifice and the killings of innocent civilians, and especially Jews, Shakir
also states, “Islam is based on a deeply humanistic impulse which sees mankind as a
unified whole. Islam excludes no one from equal membership in the family of man.”
In another article in the same issue, “Islam as a Way to Human Liberation,” Shakir
compares present-day experiences of Muslims in America to the early days of Islam,
and specifically of Muhammad’s religious, political, and military conquests in
Arabia.

Al-Arian’s case against Israel in “The Handquake” (see previous section)
gleans support from another article under the caption “Historical Documents” in the
form of a “Legal Opinion (fatwa) of Al-Azhar on the Zionist Entity,” circa 1956.
This _fatwa_ from Cairo’s ancient religious university condemns the Arab world’s “co-
operation with the imperialist powers which backed Israel” as “this sinful
aggression . . . so as to establish a Jewish state in this Islamic country and amidst
Islamic states.” Therefore, “peace with Israel--or as it is sought by those are
advocating it--is lawfully forbidden.” The _ulema_ at Al-Azhar therefore call upon all
Muslims to not make peace and those who advocate peace are considered apostates, which, according to the Islamist doctrine explicated in the previous chapter, is a condition punishable by death. Even “a passive attitude” or “neglect” of this duty against these “awful conspiracies” constitutes “the most heinous sin” the article states.

“They made articulate, sympathetic, rational spokespersons. Used to seeing radicals with checkered headdresses railing against Israel, Westerners were now seeing highly educated people in Western dress providing coherent, clam, rational arguments for the Palestinian position” (p. 104-105). However, behind the rational messages for a sophisticated international academic milieu about the Palestinians merely wanting peace and dignity, a second message was transmitted within the Islamist movement: As long as Israel existed, there would be no peace and the terrorism would continue (Hammes, 2005). Those conflicting messages that occurred abroad and in the USF milieu exemplify Arendt’s exposition of a “campaign of lying to deceive the uninitiated masses.”

At USF and in its service community, similar conflicting messages about the hidden curriculum of USF-WISE were cast about in the local media, for which the university was reluctant to investigate as a matter of curriculum, teaching, and research. Given that Sami Al-Arian has now confessed to conspiracy to commit terrorism though his array of front organizations, the deception of the dual messages Hammes (2005) notes is evident the statements below:

“In April, the Tampa Tribune interviewed Castor and other USF officials about the Tribune’s investigation, which showed ICP and WISE were virtually identical. They shared leadership, a post office box and, for a time, office space. . . . ICP publications and records of its annual conferences included direct fundraising appeals for Islamic
Jihad and Hamas. In response Castor asked for a review of all spending between the university and WISE. But no questions were asked about the think-tank’s background, its purpose in Tampa or its financial base” (Michael Fechter, “USF Knew of Inquiry by FBI,” 1995).

“This is a very gray area when an institution begins to investigate its members. You can’t cross that boundary line” (Betty Castor, qtd. in “USF Knew of Inquiry by FBI,” 1995).

“By aligning themselves with a university, think-tanks can legitimize themselves. The fact that they have university affiliation allows themselves to pass themselves off as being objective when they really are not [and] pass of shopworn rhetoric as research” (Lawrence Soley, Marquette University Professor, Higher Education Professor who studies think-tanks, qtd. in Kenyon, 1995).

“We’re not in the business of being a shill for propagandists” (Jacob Neusner, Distinguished Professor of Religion at USF, qtd. in Cummins, “USF Ignored Issue, Jewish Leaders Say,” 1995).

“I have no information that leads me to believe [that WISE] is staffed by anyone sympathetic to terrorism or an advocate of terrorism or a participant of terrorism. I think quite to the contrary. They’re serious scholars who are concerned with peace in the area” (Mark T. Orr, qtd. in O’Neil, The Oracle, “Report Ignores Terrorism,” 1995).

“[WISE] was a godsend. [Its scholars were devout Muslims who] offered the kind of expertise rare to find among American academics” (Arthur Lowrie, Part-time USF Professor and former Political Advisor to U.S. Central Command at MacDill A.F.B., qtd. in Niebuhr, 1995, “Professor Talked of Understanding but Now Reveals Ties to Terrorists”).

“One of the problems that remain at the university is a lack of balance in the Middle East Studies program. Other professors [besides Shallah] in the university’s Middle East Studies program, which is part of the International Studies Department, also present one-sided views that offend Jews. It’s a very slanted program” (Dan Berman, Hillel Foundation Director, qtd. in Dvir, 1995).

“Suicide bombing is not an irrational action. Islam provides them with a powerful ideology that grants peace to them and a good life in the hereafter because they were defending the land against the enemy” (Sami Al-Arian, qtd. in Fechter, “Ties to Terrorists,” 1995).

“I heard time and time again in the conferences, ‘The Zionist entity is the dagger in the heart of the Muslim world and must be eradicated.’ . . . In most meetings,
al-Arian served as the moderator and host. I don’t think there’s any question he sets the agenda” (Anonymous Researcher at The Wiesenthal Center, qtd. in “Ties to Terrorists,” 1995).

“In an interview, Al-Arian dissociated himself from the Islamic Jihad and Hamas, but questioned whether it is fair to call group members terrorists. Their attacks are justified when they target soldiers, he said” (Michael Fechter, “Ties to Terrorists,” 1995).

“American student Alisa Flatow, killed in the April 9, suicide bombing of an Israeli bus in the Gaza Strip, was an accidental victim, Al-Arian said” (Michael Fechter, “Ties to Terrorists,” 1995).

“ICP is a charity that contributes to humanitarian causes such as hospitals and orphanages” (Aslam Abdullah, Editor of the L.A.-based Minaret, qtd. in Fechter, “Terror Law Cuts Rights, Arabs Say,” 1995).

“The charge of [ICP] being a fund-raiser for the two groups [Hamas and PIJ] is comical. They are rivals. The Tribune quotes a highly biased source. . . . It is part of a campaign to distort the Muslim image and history. . . . Neither I nor ICP can issue visas. ICP invited over 70 speakers, representing Palestine, Algeria, England, France, Kuwait, Jordan, Syria . . . What [Fechter’s article “Ties to Terrorists”] failed to tell the reader is that our conferences were public and open. We provided . . . complete translations” (Sami Al-Arian, speaking to an unidentified international terrorism class at USF, qtd. in Buel, The Oracle, 1995).

“Al-Arian said that ICP raised money for African relief, Bosnian refugees, a Somali relief fund and ‘many others’” (Doug Buel, Oracle Staff Writer, “Al-Arian Rebuffs Allegations,” 1995).

“Only Tunisia charges [Rashid Al-Ghannoushi] with being a terrorist” (Sami Al-Arian, qtd. in “Al-Arian Rebuffs Allegations,” 1995).

“[I was] dismayed to learn that anyone who once had an association with USF--no matter how brief or small—now heads an organization that includes violence, anti-Semitism, and anti-American ideology among its objectives” (Betty Castor, qtd. in Cummins, 1995).

“The university has not been candid. It was more concerned with public relations than honesty. It allowed itself to be deceived and then, when confronted, it defended that deception” (Jacob Neusner, qtd. in Cummins, 1995).

“[USF’s future agreements with outside groups will be reviewed thoroughly to prevent the school] from being used in any way by individuals who do not share USF’s principles” (Betty Castor, qtd. in Cummins, 1995).
“The guy opened up his course and said, ‘We’re going to talk about the Middle East, and we’re going to talk about Palestine.’ I raised my hand and said, ‘Don’t you mean Israel? It’s an insult to every Jewish student on campus to call Israel Palestine’” (David Burns, USF graduate, qtd. in O’Neil, 1995, “Students Say Shallah was Never Obvious”).

“Anyone who is the head of a major terrorist organization is a fanatic. He was teaching on our campus and presenting his views to students, and that’s one of the most dangerous things in the world to have access to. You’re presenting your influence to people who are looking to you for information” (Dan Bergman, Hillel Foundation Director, qtd. in O’Neil, 1995).

“He made our job of promoting mutual understanding a hundred times harder and he reinforced the stereotypes which American Muslims are going to continue to suffer from. I wish we had not been taken in by him, but his academic credentials were good” (Darrel Fasching, 1995, Press Release, USF Office of Public Affairs).

“We couldn’t be more surprised. There was never any indication that he had any sympathy with acts of terror for anyone’s cause” (Mark T. Orr, Chairman of COMES and Professor of Government and International Affairs, qtd. in Niebuhr, 1995, “Professor Talked of Understanding but Now Reveals Ties to Terrorists”).

“He was one of the best things you can ever imagine, someone who wants to give his time and volunteer. It’s unbelievable to me” (Sami Al-Arian, qtd. in Niebuhr, 1995).

“In an interview, Al-Arian dissociated himself from the Islamic Jihad and Hamas, but questioned whether it is fair to call group members terrorists. Their attacks are justified when they target soldiers, he said” (Michael Fechter, “Ties to Terrorists,” 1995).

“[COMES] chair Mark Orr recalls that Shiloh was interested mainly in where Wise got its money—an interest the committee shared. After WISE officials said most of the support came from an established Islamic organizations in Washington, the committee was satisfied, and Shiloh participated in Wise events, Orr and Lowries said” (James Harper, “Mideast Intrigues Play out at USF,” 1996).

As the IIIT education theory illustrated in the previous chapter suggests, elimination of the “Zionist enemy” would be central to the ideological mass reform program at a deliberately chosen, secular, Western research university in which its status quo would be, as Arendt suggests, decomposed. Moreover, aforementioned attempts to defend the USF-WISE partnership after its
exposure as a PIJ front underscore a tactic illustrated in the IIIT brochure itself, “to avoid dissension in the ranks,” in this case led by Al-Arian and his constituents.

**Characteristic Three: “Campus Holy War” and Other Problems at USF and its Milieu Associated with Use of the University and Interacting Organizations**

Historians of higher education in America would be hard-pressed to find a single case that had mired a university and its external community in a public conflict that would last well over a decade and that would assume such rich and often surprising contours for analysis. While the Islamist movement itself and Sami Al-Arian himself were not entirely responsible for keeping the wheels of this conflict turning, they are partly responsible especially as more and more external organizations established themselves in Tampa Bay in an effort to sway public opinion about the allegations. USF would remain in the local limelight most of the time and in the national and international limelight some of the time, whether the university sought such publicity or not. This sub-section thus details the various problems cited among intra- and extramural constituents in USF’s curriculum and campus milieu as the case regarding the conspiracy to commit terrorism at USF unfolded in the public domain.

In general, that legacy of conflict underscores Birnbaum (1988), who describes the political culture of higher education institutions as organizational anarchies full of loosely and sometimes tightly coupled interest groups competing for recognition and scarce resources. Those groups profess devotion to the academic enterprise and academic freedom, a value that group members speak rationally about.
when circumstances dictate (Becher, 1998). However, those same groups are nonetheless cognizant of the power of Walker’s (1979) “moral veto” and are thus prone occasionally to suspend rational judgment, opting instead for “campus holy war” in which “complex issues of the head” are translated into “simple matters of the heart.” Some of those campus warriors are whom Walker (1979) refers to as “militant third-sector groups who provide stimulus from the periphery” but may “threaten the university with convulsion” if circumstances fail to favor their cause.

During periods of holy war in higher education, the rhetoric of all constituents inflates as warring parties engage in verbal sparring matches during campus meetings and in the media. As the conflict escalates, various constituents build coalitions designed to expiate the campus of problems that concerns them. Replete with an “us versus them” habit of mind, a strong sense of group-think among an aggrieved coalition of on- and off-campus constituents permeates the academic milieu. “When challenged,” Chaffee and Jacobson (1997) assert, “groups tend to defend their convictions mightily” (p. 235). By comparison, in young institutions like USF, where faculty are in the process of trying “to prove their worth in the disciplinary community (p. 237), the problem can become acute as “leading participants” act in “seemingly irrational or pathological ways” (p. 193).

Already, in media statements cited in this chapter’s aforementioned sections, we have witnessed the rhetoric of that “campus holy war.” For example, the section about conditions leading the to the rationale for the USF-WISE partnership indicates that USF appears to have experienced “campus holy war” three times in its fifty-year history. The first period happened during the 1960’s when professors at USF were
investigated by the Johns Commission. After that, there was a long period of relative peace until the early 1990’s when two problems coalesced at or around the same time, the 1994 exposure of Sami Al-Arian’s fund-raising activities for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the 1999 governance restructuring of K-20 education in Florida, an outgrowth of the national accountability movement. However, the concept of “campus holy war” is also a characteristic of Islamism at USF and its service community, as various groups sought “to avoid dissension” among their “ranks.”

Perhaps the upshot of this media war in which various external and internal USF constituents relied on the media as a primary outlet for voicing their grievances exemplifies Shils’ (1997) objection to higher education’s courtship of publicity. Shils (1997) writes that a university’s involvement of the media in its affairs encourages a campus ethos in which “aggrieved members of the universities [to] turn to the press . . . to remedy the wrongs they have suffered” (p. 39). Shils (1997) writes that this practice is part and parcel of the intellectual antinomianism of post-World War II academics whose fields of study have become outlets for the propaganda of whatever social movement of the day is d’ rigueur. For Shils (1997), airing grievances in superficial form in the media, as opposed to thoughtfully debating them in the proper academic forums, serves no purpose in resolving the conflicts embedded in the academy’s epistemological conflicts. Instead, he states that the trend is “anarchistic” (p. 192) and further erodes trust in the relevance of an academic institution and in civil society itself.

Immediately after Steven Emerson exposed Al-Arian in the *Jihad in America* documentary in November 1994, followed by Michael Fechter’s investigations in the
following year, Al-Arian undertook intramural and extramural measures to deny the allegations that he was using his professional appointment at the university in a conspiracy to commit terrorism abroad and to spread Islamist propaganda in the university curriculum. For example, Al-Arian wrote letters to campus constituents maintaining that allegations brought against him and others were the result of “intense pressure” on the university “by some who are misinformed; are heavily biased; may have hidden agendas, or have totally one sided views when it comes to Islam and the Middle East” (Al-Arian, Letter to Betty Castor, 1995). For over a decade, he repeatedly informed the press that an immigration judge, Kevin McHugh, a non-academic who presided over Al-Arian’s brother-in-law’s detention case, regarded WISE as a “reputable, scholarly think-tank” (see, *inter alia*, Al-Arian, 2001; Renford, 2002).

That being noted, it is also common knowledge that Al-Arian testified in immigration court during his brother-in-law’s detention in a penitentiary in Manatee County. In his testimony, Al-Arian plead the Fifth Amendment in administrative immigration court to over ninety questions asked of him about Mazen Al-Najjar and terrorism allegations that surfaced at USF and in Tampa Bay in late 1994 (see, *inter alia*, Genshaft’s rebuttal to USF’s censure by the AAUP). While pleading the Fifth Amendment in criminal court is not meaningful in an adjudicative sense, in administrative court it is (Hall, *Oxford Companion to the Law*, 2002). In their understanding of that legal difference, in September 2002, USF, the Genshaft administration and a newly formed local board of trustees, attempted to sue Al-Arian under the tenets of administrative contract law, so that the university could ask Al-
Arian questions about those same allegations. Years earlier, Al-Arian had informed President Castor he would refute the allegations against him, if the university asked. The courts dismissed the USF suit of 2002. Thus one aspect of “campus holy war” involved exacerbating conflict between USF faculty and administration.

Al-Arian’s offer to Castor is a detail missed by most observers. Al-Arian wrote a letter dated June 1, 1995, to Castor, received on June 2, 1995, in which he informed her that he would refute allegations that he was involved in raising funds for the PIJ--and using USF infrastructure for that cause--that had led to the deaths of U.S. Americans overseas, in violation of federal foreign relations and national security laws enacted during the Reagan administration (Franck & Glennon, 1993). Al-Arian sent copies of the letter to Dr. Michael Kovac, USF’s Interim Provost and Dean of Engineering, and Dr. Mark T. Orr, Professor of Government and International Affairs (GIA), Asia specialist, and then Chairperson of the Committee on Middle East Studies (COMES). The letter states: “I’d like to assure you that the slanderous and defamatory reporting concerning me will not go unchallenged. They will be challenged in the appropriate forum. However, if you or any of your assistants care about a point by point refutations [sic] of the Tribune’s allegations, I’ll be happy to provide them to you face to face with full documentation.”

The researcher has found no evidence in the university’s records that the Castor administration accepted Al-Arian’s offer or that Al-Arian later volunteered the “full documentation” he claimed to have had. Indeed, by the time that Castor commissioned former USF interim president William Reece Smith, Jr., a Tampa attorney, former Florida Bar Association president, and former Interim USF
President, to investigate the USF-WISE case, Al-Arian was not available for interviews. Apparently, his lawyers had advised him against speaking directly to the relevant university personnel (Reece-Smith, 1996).

So it appears that the only venue Al-Arian apparently provided for the university to decide whether he had violated the USF academic ethic to teach, conduct research, and even fulfill the USF mission for community service was the media itself, especially through WUSF-TV, The Oracle, student groups, and various off-campus newspapers or on-line media outlets. In other words, except for joining the union during the period that Genshaft announced that she intended to fire him, Al-Arian chose to work outside USF’s grievance system to plead his case against the university. In those extra-systemic venues, refutation came in the form of generalized statements that Al-Arian had been discriminated, slandered, defamed, and libeled because of his religion, Palestinian heritage, and political activism.

So at the same time Al-Arian was using the media to garner sympathy from USF’s and Tampa Bay’s esprit d’ corps, he leveled charges against that same media whenever it reported evidence and criticism portraying him adversely (Al-Arian, 2001, “Freedom of Speech Still Important”). Comparing himself variously to Patrick Henry and the unpopularity of Jesus and Paul in their time, he wrote, “I believe in the American political system and in the Constitution. If I have a problem with a policy, I believe in working within the system to affect it. . . . As for my security, I will be cautious” (para. 10; para. 16). At the time of his arrest, in fact, his wife, Nahla Al-Arian, sister of Mazen Al-Najjar, would compare him to “‘other prophets’” during courthouse protests (Lush & Brink, 2003; Silvestrini, 2003).
During a decade of media courtship, Al-Arian apparently had re-invented himself as a champion of civil liberty and human freedom, and as an American hero, a martyred prophet, and a saint.

As campus holy war progressed, more than a few observers regarded the media campaign as a brilliant but cynical effort of Islamist dissembling. While Al-Arian’s press statements appeared satisfactory to many external and internal USF constituents--and were sufficient to maintain support and even admiration by colleagues and students on campus--counterterrorism and intelligence experts would disagree, noting that aggressive courtship of the media is typical of accused terrorists eventually convicted of their crimes (see Dyson’s “The Terrorist in Court” in *Terrorism, An Investigator’s Handbook*, 2001/2005). Supportive of that observation is the media campaign Al-Arian launched after the terrorism allegations surfaced in late 1994 and in the spring semester of 1995. That campaign of alleged character defamation was one that Al-Arian allegedly discussed via telephone with other known or unknown members of the PIJ, including the first and second Secretary Generals of the designated terrorist group, Fathi Al-Shiqaqi and Ramadan Abdullah Shallah (see FISA wiretap transcripts in *U.S.A. v. Sami Amin Al-Arian, et. al*, 2003).

Al-Arian’s persistent maintenance of media involvement, being one he purposefully may have adopted while continuing to act allegedly as the PIJ’s North American leader but started before his exposure in Steven Emerson’s PBS documentary *Jihad in America* (1994) and Michael Fechter’s *Tampa Tribune* series “Ties to Terrorists” (1995), apparently kept the university and its service area
community in a divided condition of professional, social, and political conflict for over ten years.

The university became the object of public scrutiny and distrust in other ways, too. For example, within a year after Al-Arian’s hiring, other developments related to his move to Tampa Bay would take place on and off campus in the Temple Terrace area where he resided. After USF hired Al-Arian, the engineering department accepted his brother-in-law, Mazen Al-Najjar, into its doctoral program at a time, when Al-Najjar was in violation of his non-immigrant’s student visa. The INS had regarded him as having overstayed the visa (Merzer, 1998). According to federal law, such a violation may result in the suspension of a university’s license to host any foreign student or scholar, thereby jeopardizing an institution’s mission to internationalize its curriculum. While in Tampa, Al-Najjar would be placed in immigration detention twice for the violation, which federal authorities likely used as a means to force him to turn evidence against his brother-in-law before being deported in 2003 and becoming unindicted co-conspirator number thirteen in *U.S.A. v. Al-Arian* (2004).

According to media reports that surfaced in the mid-1990’s, the first time Al-Najjar was arrested and jailed was in April 1985 in North Carolina. In North Carolina, Al-Najjar, having realized apparently that he was at risk of deportation for being in violation of his student’s visa, entered into a sham marriage agreement with a woman who testified to that effect in immigration court (Merzer, 1998). The woman who married Al-Najjar for profit stated under oath that she and Al-Najjar never had lived together and never had consummated the marriage although they had been
married for sixteen months. Al-Najjar maintains, however, that the marriage was a 
love affair that turned sour (Merzer, 1998). USF Media Files suggest that as these 
details were disclosed in the press, within successive days Al-Arian, various campus 
constituents, Al-Arian’s external support groups, and his external detractors 
consistently aired their views in campus, local, national, and international media. In 
ten years the university would hardly draw a breath as new evidence implicating him 
in the conspiracy came to light.

In response to Al-Najjar’s detention, Al-Arian formed a new organization 
called the National Coalition to Protect Political Freedom (NCPFF), which held 
rallies and press conferences at the Al-Qassam mosque and in other venues in Tampa 
Bay. The NCPFF would become another group that would interact with USF, USF 
students, and sympathetic intellectuals as means to persuade the public that the 
government was targeting Al-Najjar because of his politics, religion, and Palestinian 
heritage.

Two USF professors were drawn into this battle in the campus holy war. In 
Tampa Bay, Al-Najjar would be jailed again on the same charges of student visa 
overstay in 1996. USF professors Dr. Jamil Jreisat and Mr. Arthur Lowrie testified for 
Al-Najjar’s defense in immigration court, stating that Al-Najjar and his family would 
experience significant social and economic hardship were the INS to deport them to 
the Middle East (USF Media Files, p.2). Al-Najjar’s wife, a Palestinian who was 
raised in Saudi Arabia had come, like her husband, to the United States in 1988 and 
also had over Stayed her visitor’s visa (Merzer, 1998). They were both ordered 
deported in 1998, but both had appealed their deportation orders. Because Al-Najjar
was also deemed a national security risk, he was placed in a federal prison in Manatee County in 1998; whereas his wife, Fedaa, was not considered a threat and was not jailed (Merzer, 1998).

Another major event involving the university that happened during the first year of Al-Arian’s and Al-Najjiar’s arrival in Tampa Bay and at USF went unnoticed until revealed in a newspaper report in 1995. That event was a mosque leadership coup in nearby Temple Terrace. According to press reports (Fechter, 1995) and sworn testimony in U.S. Congress (Emerson, 1998), Al-Arian and his brother-in-law began attending an unnamed mosque in Temple Terrace, and on May 8, 1987, they orchestrated a leadership coup at the mosque. The coup was so violent that it warranted a call and eventual report by the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Department. Apparently, the commission of violence during the coup resulted in the miscarriage of a pregnant woman involved in the fighting who was struck with a large purse. She also happened to be the imam’s wife. While this early incident did not occur on the USF campus, the imam of the unnamed mosque was an associate professor of mathematics, Ibrahim Ahmad, employed at the nearby USF. In government testimony he is described as a “traditional imam” (Emerson, 1998) as opposed to the “political” kind described by Tibi (1998). Emerson’s description may or may not be accurate. However, given the context of the violence--Ibrahim Ahmad’s name exists on several jointly held property deeds with Al-Arian relative to the mosque location and Ahmad’s name appears in 1987 as the registering agent and first corporate officer for the mosque--quite clearly some kind of betrayal between two men had occurred, leading one to deny the spiritual authority of the other.
After the leadership coup, Al-Arian became the Temple Terrace mosque’s new imam, and he named the mosque after Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam, who was a legendary Palestinian leader, activist, and militant from the 1930’s who garnered financial and material support through the Muslim Brotherhood in the Palestinian territories during the time of purchase of Arab lands in the Levant by Jews who were sold those lands by Arab landowners (Fromkin, 1989). “To find a mosque similarly memorialized you would have to go the Gaza Strip,” Emerson (2002) writes. “There the al-Qassam Mosque is a recognized hangout for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a terrorist organization that has established as its trademark the decapitating and dismembering of both Jews and Palestinian ‘collaborators’” (p. 110). Actually, Emerson is wrong about only finding another in the Gaza strip. A third exists in Bridgeview, Illinois, and was the location of another mosque leadership coup, a non-violent one. In 2004, its imam raised funds for Sami Al-Arian’s defense.

After the leadership coup in Temple Terrace, the mathematics professor and his wife initiated a civil suit against Al-Arian but later dropped it (Fechter, 1995). The couple had filed an injunction to prevent Al-Arian and others named in the suit from approaching them and their homes (Fechter, 1995). The Hillsborough police charged someone identified as Hala Al-Najjar with aggravated battery. However, prosecutors in Hillsborough County did not try the case because they believed they did not have enough evidence for conviction (Fechter, 1995). The mathematics professor’s contract with USF was about to expire at the time of the coup, and after the incident he and his family moved out of town (Fechter, 1995).
According to Internet searches and his on-line vita, Ahmad has taught at The University of Maryland between 1982-1983; USF, 1983-1987; NIU, 1987-1999; UCF, 1999-2005. Currently, Ahmad is at Colgate University. His undergraduate degree is from Cairo University, 1965, making him somewhat older than his rival imam-professor, Al-Arian, who also came to the U.S. from Egypt. Ahmad acquired his doctorate from Florida State University in 1975.

Of interest to this aspect of the study, too, is that the leadership coup in Temple Terrace resembles the kind that occurred in non-radical mosques in Egypt in the 1970’s following the re-organization of the Muslim Brotherhood into the neo-Muslim Brotherhood as advocated in the doctrines expressed in Qutb’s *Signposts* (Kepel, 1984/1993/2003). In Egypt, the mosque overthrows were violent and initiated by Muslim Brothers who were part of Egypt’s intelligentsia. Often, the coups involved mosques nearby universities in an Egyptian version of campus holy war.

And so it seems by actions that occurred at, to, or near USF in 1987, re-Islamization from above and below--through zalzalah, concealed advances, and phases of power--may have begun at USF and in the university’s service community, when a full-time USF mathematics professor was compelled to vacate Tampa Bay. Perhaps, therefore, these mosque leadership coups, often violent in nature and involving people in nearby universities, are early indicators of terrorism in a local community connected to a university. The overthrow of a traditional imam by Al-Arian and his brother-in-law also may signify another turn of the screw for the new impulse toward re-Islamization at USF and its service community. If one applies the strategic logic of the Islamist movement, Temple Terrace had become the *dar al-harb*.
Another battle in campus holy war involved a clause in the USF-WISE partnership acted upon in 1992 at the time that the USF-WISE partnership had formed. USF’s College of Arts and Sciences was planning a university to university partnership with an institution in the Middle East. This partnership never came to fruition because the U.S. State Department declined USF’s proposal after the partnership’s exposure as being part of a PIJ front.

Evidence of the proposal is detailed at length in the 1996 Reece-Smith report to President Castor, although Reece-Smith (1996) does not recognize the significance of the intended partnership as another potential means to provide financial and material support for international terrorism resulting in the deaths of U.S. Americans, students, and other innocent civilians. Nor did Reece-Smith (1996) illustrate how the State Department’s decline of the proposal signified a failure in the advancement of USF interests toward internationalizing the curriculum. Not that anyone could have, however, for in the mid-1990’s, it was probable that most academics in the United States and at USF were unaware of Al-Najah University being controlled vertically and horizontally by Palestinian terrorist organizations (see discussion of universities in West Bank and Gaza in previous chapter). At that time, it is likely that only government interests in Israel and the U.S. would have known such details.

The overseas university in question was Al-Najah University, whose significance in the re-Islamization from above and below program was articulated in Chapter Four. WISE member Khalil Shikaki, brother of PIJ leader Fathi Al-Shiqqaqi, was a professor at Al-Najah before coming to the United States under the auspices of the University of Wisconsin. Shikaki presently teaches at Al-Najah today.
The major document Reece-Smith (1996) provides is a proposal to University Affiliations Program of the United States Information Agency, which is a part of the U.S. State Department that has the power to issue or revoke an American university’s license to host foreign national students and scholars. Submitted by Dr. Mark Amen, of USF’s International Studies program and COMES member, and Dr. Adib Khatib, Al-Najah’s Vice President for Cultural Affairs and University Relations, the proposal sought involvement from social sciences, English language, library sciences, and public health. The document requests funding for $97,947. The faculty exchange program was slated to involve single-semester and short visits.

When campus holy war over WISE erupted, however, and arguably tarnished the reputation of COMES, GIA, Arts and Sciences, and USF as a whole, all hopes evaporated for internationalizing the curriculum through a university to university partnership, or even to create a Middle East studies program. But the fact that these plans were in progress at the time the USF-WISE partnership was formed may help in understanding why so many USF professors who were involved in these projects for shaping the curriculum became so defensive when the controversy erupted. In all likelihood, they thought they were doing genuine good for their professions and the university.

Some, however, arguing for Walker’s “moral veto,” like Emerson (1998) and Tampa Bay’s Jewish constituents, would say that some of USF’s Middle East professors denied factual evidence that a terrorist cell was using university infrastructure for purposes wholly unrelated to advancing academic freedom at USF. Some pushing for the “moral veto” even pointed to other scholarly evidence (Sivan,
advancing their position that something was amiss—and that it did not involve the creation and dissemination of knowledge. And one professor, Neusner, would argue that the partnership signified the opposite. Neusner’s assessment was that USF had become a “shil for propaganda” (Editorial, 1996).

Other press statements and internal documents drafted by faculty reveal the intensity and nature of the interpersonal campus holy war that had spread across the campus. For example, on-going tensions among USF faculty serving on the Committee on Middle East Studies (COMES) came to light in the mid-1990’s. According to Reece-Smith (1996) and various newspaper reports found in USF’s media files, in 1991, prior to the signing of the partnership agreement with WISE, one committee member had voiced concerns that WISE might be a front group for HAMAS. That was a concern stated by Dr. Ailon Shiloh, an original member of USF’s Committee on Middle East Studies (COMES) from the Department of Anthropology. Shiloh had speculated as much to another COMES member, Arthur Lowrie, a long-standing USF adjunct professor in Government and International Affairs (Fechter, “USF Professor Questioned Ties with Think Tank,” 1996). Lowrie, along with Jreisat, had led USF’s push to create the USF-WISE partnership (Reece-Smith, 1996). Shiloh stated that he began asking questions in 1991, wanting to know “more about the think tank’s source of funding” (Fechter, 1996). Shiloh also questioned the think-tank’s motives, “which he argued were for spreading propaganda—not furthering academic debate” (Fechter, 1996).
Lowrie, according to Shiloh in another Tribune article, dismissed Shiloh’s observations about WISE being a front organization for terrorism because Shiloh happened to be the only Jew serving on the seven-member committee (Fechter, 1996).

“The WISE think-tank had so much money and they were distributing it with such largess. They were paying for everything. . . . I thought they were setting up a base [for Hamas]. What better place than Tampa, Florida? Completely out of the way” (Fechter, 1996).

In the same article, Fechter also quoted another USF professor, Dr. Nathan Katz, as stating therefore that money may have been an overlooked motivation behind [COMES’s] relationship with WISE” (Fechter, 1996). During the period of partnership formation, the director of COMES, Dr. Mark T. Orr, an Asian specialist with GIA, was the addressee on a letter written by Ramadan Abdallah Shallah, who in the letter identified the Saudi-funded IIIT as the largest contributor to WISE.

In turn, Lowrie denied Shiloh’s assertions (Fechter, 1996). Fechter quoted him as saying, “It wasn’t clear what his concerns were. Because they were Muslim? Because they were Muslim fundamentalist? Because they were Palestinian?” (Fechter, 1996).

According to other press reports, another COMES member, Hechiche, had asked the major COMES backers of WISE about the reputability of WISE. He was given their assurance that the think-tank was above-board in its professional intentions and faculty credentials (Fechter, 1995, “‘I Was Manipulated,’ Professor Says”). Shiloh, from the anthropology department, and Hechiche, from the government and international affairs department, appear in the public record about the case as the only
two COMES professors to have asked either academic or administrative questions about WISE prior to the signing of the agreement with USF.

Campus holy war also was fought over other mysteries involving who knew whom and when and what regarding the USF-WISE partnership formation. Seven months after the USF-WISE agreement, Editor-in-Chief Al-Arian, the founder of WISE, published an article written by WISE’s research director, Bashir Nafi, in the October/November 1992 issue. According to the Reece-Smith Report (1996), Nafi was present during a meeting in which COMES faculty and WISE members discussed how to present their partnership proposal to the USF administration. At that same meeting, for the first time some COMES members were surprised by the presence of another Palestinian colleague from across campus, Al-Arian, who was identified as “a member of the Muslim community” (Reece-Smith, 1996: 43). Reece-Smith (1996) neglects mentioning that the introduction omitted two important details: the Al-Arian was the imam of the nearby Al-Qassam Mosque and the CEO of WISE.

In July 1996, Nafi was deported to the United Kingdom, where he became a citizen years earlier having married an Irish woman. Like Al-Najjar, Nafi had been determined by the INS as having violated the provisions of his visa. In Nafi’s case, he had come to the United States to work at WISE, but he had left the Tampa area for Herndon, Virginia, where he took up work at the IIIT, the think-tank that funded WISE. Nafi’s academic credentials were not in Islamic or Middle East studies. In fact, Nafi was a biologist. Another WISE associate, board member Tarik Hamdi, also worked at the IIIT, twice raided by the FBI (Katz, 2003; Sperry, 2005).
Nafi’s involvement in the USF-WISE case also received media attention in 1995 and after when press reports had revealed that he had been cited in a 1991 master’s thesis by a Saudi Arabian student, Abdul Aziz Zamel. The media reported and Reece-Smith later investigated that Zamel had quoted another scholar Sivan (1991) that Nafi was a founder and current leader of the PIJ, operating out of London. According to Reece-Smith (1996), several USF professors who were COMES members, including Hechiche, Orr, and Jreisat, signed the thesis but admit to not making the connection between the person cited in the master’s thesis and the person who would appear at USF as the research director of WISE. As was noted in the previous chapter, another relevant but previously not reported element of the Zamel thesis is that it, too, boldly states that Palestinian terrorist movements use universities in West Bank and Gaza as fronts for indoctrination, recruitment, and the commission of violence (i.e., re-Islamization from above and below).

Statements from Chapter Two of Abu Rabi’s edited book on the USF-WISE roundtable discussion with Ahmad are discussed at length in the Reece-Smith report because COMES and WISE formed at approximately the same time:

I would like to say a couple of words about the connection between the University of South Florida and the World and Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE). This is a very happy marriage indeed. . . . Then comes WISE into the picture—an institution devoted to the research and study of Islamic thought and life. *The institution approached us several years ago, and suggested that WISE and the university co-sponsor events on Islam and the Middle East. We, naturally, welcomed this opportunity, and we created the Committee on Middle Eastern Studies in order to facilitate future work with WISE and other similar institutes and scholars in the United States.* (Reece-Smith, 1996: 7-8; italics added)

Reece-Smith (1996) never references those statements as having been published in Abu Rabi’s edited work. Instead, Reece-Smith calls those statements “a written
transcript of the proceedings of that conference” (p. 7). Therefore, a reader of the report never would know that they had been published by WISE in the form of a book. Reece-Smith examined the statements “because of a suggestion [by an unnamed person he interviewed] that the formation of [COMES] was influenced by the organization known as [WISE]” (p. 7).

The statements above were made by Dr. Jamil Jreisat, a professor of public administration who served on COMES. Of them, Reece-Smith concludes: “While the latter part of this statement is somewhat ambiguous, it can be read to suggest that [COMES] was created at the instance of WISE to facilitate work with WISE and its like organizations” (p. 8; italics added). Upon interview, Reece-Smith states that “Dr. Jreisat believes his remarks are not correctly transcribed. But assuming they are, he says he erred and he confirmed to me, as others have done, that WISE had nothing to do with the creation of [COMES]” (p. 8). In Abu Rabi’s edited book publication, Jreisat’s opening remarks occurred in concert with Ramadan Shallah’s, known to most as “Ramadan Abdallah,” although the curriculum vita and employment application he gave to the GIA department toward his hiring as an adjunct professor teaching out-of-field identifies him by his full name, “Ramadan Abdallah Shallah” (see USF Media Files with vita contained in them, USF Library Special Collections). These observations do not imply any wrongdoing by Abu Rabi or Jreisat. They are simply clarifications of the historical record of the Islamist movement at USF. Abu Rabi’s list of Ahmad roundtable participants re-appears as an appendix in the 1996 Reece-Smith report to President Castor. The typography of the list in Reece-Smith (1996) indicates that it was a direct photocopy of the Abu Rabi (1995) list.
Campus holy war also involved USF constituents’ confusion over the identity of Ramadan Shallah and whether Al-Arian knew him prior to Shallah’s arrival in Tampa to teach under the auspices of USF-WISE. For his part in Shallah’s arrival at USF, Al-Arian would tell the media that he had not known of Shallah until his appearance in Tampa, despite Emerson’s (1994) ability to factually prove that Shallah had been a speaker at Al-Arian’s ICP conferences in Chicago in the 1980’s. In addition, Shallah cites Al-Arian as a local contact person on his USF employment application found USF’s Special Collections Media Files. That detail also suggests that Shallah knew Al-Arian prior to his appearance in Tampa Bay. Moreover, while Shallah was known to his colleagues at USF as Ramadan Abdullah or Abdallah, his employment applications and tax forms show him as having signed the name “Shallah” to the official USF record. In addition, some university forms reveal the economics professor’s full name in type-written lettering, “Abdullah-Shallah.”

Later during his appointment at USF, Shallah would turn up in October 1995 in Damascus to announce that he had become the PIJ’s second Secretary-General, after Fathi Al-Shiqaqi’s assassination, blamed on the Israeli Mossad. Shallah’s assumption of the PIJ post in Damascus, which occurred after he had informed his colleagues at USF that he needed to go home to visit his ailing father (Reece-Smith, 1996), became a point of contention in Tampa Bay that would serve as further support for Emerson’s allegations that had surfaced initially in late 1994.

While many professors who knew Shallah would say they were surprised that a quiet, Muslim professor at USF would turn into a terrorist (Media Files, p.32), some archival information indicates that the possibility could have been foreseen. For
example, Shallah’s curriculum vita initially given to Government and International Affairs, the department that hired Shallah to teach Middle East courses, shows that he had served on the editorial board of what is described as an “Arabic Monthly,” the *Al Mukhtar Al-Islami*, or *The Islamic Selection*, published in Cairo and an official publishing organ of the neo-Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Modeled after *The Readers’ Digest*, this is also the same magazine that was banned in Cairo after the assassination of Anwar Al-Sadat, and also implicated in the blacklisting of “orientalist” professors, Muslim and non-Muslim, who advocate peace with Jews and Christians, Egyptian Copts in particular.

According to press reports, some USF professors and others on campus defended Shallah’s hiring, claiming that he had amassed a scholarly record (Reece-Smith, 1996). Neusner (1996) harshly criticized that defense, noting that the WISE scholars at USF were working out of field from their professional qualifications. Shallah, hired to teach Middle East politics, held a Ph.D. in economics. Nafi, WISE research director, held a Ph.D in biology. Al-Arian, CEO of WISE, an Islamic studies think-tank, was a computer engineer.

Even so, after Shallah announced to the world media that he had become the second Secretary General if the PIJ, there was a period of denial on behalf of USF faculty and one administrator that the Ramadan Abdallah Shallah in Damascus and the Ramadan Abdullah, as he was known to most at USF, were the same individuals. For example, Harry Battson, Associate Vice President for Public Affairs, stated, “We have no independent confirmation that Abdallah is the same person who is reported to now head the Islamic Jihad” (Press Statement, 1995). However, as mentioned above,
independent confirmation did exist—in Shallah’s employment files and in other public
domain sources, such as Al-Arian’s Tampa publication, Inquiry.

The denials also came despite USF’s hiring of the previous PIJ Secretary-
General’s younger brother, Khalil Shikaki, as a Middle East specialist in political
science. The younger Shikaki was known by COMES professors to be related to the
PIJ’s secretary-general but his credentials were unimpeachable, unlike Shallah’s,
which, as shown above, is represented by unacademic publications like the Islamic
Selection (see Kepel, 1983/2004). In addition, the younger Shikaki was thought not to
hold his older brother’s militant views, nor did anyone believe he was an actual
member of the PIJ.

Evidence provided by Katz (2003) in and in the FBI composite video also
shows that Shikaki had lectured with Al-Arian’s ICP, knew Ramadan Shallah prior to
WISE, yet he denied knowing Shallah outside their shared experience with USF-
WISE. Interestingly, however, the younger Shikaki would be among the few
academics intimately familiar with USF-WISE to admonish his colleagues at USF
about the blurring of ICP politics with the think-tank, WISE: “It was certainly
inappropriate for WISE to rely heavily, if this has been the case, on many people with
similar socio-political agendas. USF should encourage WISE to strengthen its
scholarly and academic integrity and independence on ICP” (“Scholar From the West
Bank Shares His Views on USF-WISE Relationship,” 1995). Even after August 2002,
Al-Arian continued to support for the blurring of the monolithic political program of
ICP with USF-WISE (Minaret of Freedom transcript, 2002).
Campus holy war at USF eventually spread beyond the USF service area and into the national academic arena, whose leading legal voices objected to changes in the nation’s counterterrorism legislation. By 1995, the U.S. State Department had placed the PIJ on its terrorist group list. Furthermore, under the newly legislated Anti-Terrorism Act and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1995 (AEDPA), the material and financial support of international terrorism became illegal and punishable under federal law. In addition, federal law had been enacted making attempts to disrupt the Israel-Palestinian Peace accords, Oslo I, a federal criminal offense.

AEDPA did not go uncontested, however, by the well-known law professor David Cole of Georgetown University, who petitioned U.S. Congress to overturn the legislation criminalizing material and financial support for terrorism. Cole, who was one of Mazen Al-Najjar’s many legal consultants during his first detention for immigration violations, later drafted another petition against the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act. Both petitions were signed by some of the nation’s leading law professors, including one who would become the lead AAUP investigator regarding alleged academic freedom violations at USF, Dr. William Van Alstyne (Cole, 1996; Dempsey & Cole, 2001). Cole appeared on the USF campus several times to speak about the so-called “new McCarthyism” and infringements on academic freedom allegedly embedded in the nation’s counterterrorism laws. His most recent appearance was on May 25, 2006, in the aftermath of Al-Arian’s confession of conspiracy to commit terrorism.

At the same time AEDPA was enacted and contested, some faculty at USF would call the on-going media allegations about Al-Arian’s role in disrupting the
peace process “journalistic terrorism” (Fasching, 1995). Moreover, USF’s vice president for public relations, Dr. Harry Battson, when asked by *The St. Petersburg Times* in November 1995 to discuss USF’s numerous faculty connections to the PIJ, explained that the PIJ was a humanitarian group. In the process of defending the USF-WISE partnership, he stated, “We entered into the relationship because we thought there were mutual gains. We espouse diversity, we espouse understanding different cultures, and we will always do that” (Media Files, p.3). In addition, he was paraphrased as stating that there was no proof that “Shallah, WISE or the Islamic Jihad promoted terrorism.” “The Islamic Jihad does a lot of things,” Battson stated, “There may be a terrorist element to it, but it is also an important cultural group in the Middle East. You’re making an assumption that because [Shallah] was elevated to the head of an organization that has a terrorist element that he has terrorism on his mind.” (Media Files, p.3). After being criticized for those statements, Battson later told the press that he had been misquoted.

Whether Battson was accurately quoted or not, academic justification for groups that double as terrorist fronts is not unique. Indeed, the same justification has been argued forcefully by the nation’s leading law professors. While in the previous chapter this study showed that the PIJ never has maintained a humanitarian wing like its HAMAS counterpart, law professor David Cole would continually press that AEDPA, and later the USA PATRIOT Act, was a means of punishing individuals based on their association and not criminal actions related to international terrorism financing. Or, in other words, he would apply the same logic in more general terms than USF’s various external and internal constituents in Tampa Bay would apply in
their defense of Al-Arian, two graduate students (Mazen Al-Najjar and Sami Hammoudeh), one board member (Tarik Hamdi), and two other people who taught at USF-WISE (Ramadan Shallah and Bashir Nafi).

The contours of campus holy war manifested in other ways that went largely unobserved to the masses of constituents at USF and in Tampa Bay. Nevertheless, the battle drew a distinct parallel to the ways in which problems regarding the intimidation of takfir or “orientalist” professors occurred on campuses in the Middle East, in Egyptian versions of campus holy war.

For example, one case involves Khalid Duran’s reprisal after he published unfavorable views of Saudi Arabia in The Role of Political Islam in 1978, noted above. Emerson (2002) states that, originally, Saudi Arabian government agents blacklisted Duran and then, years later, Duran was blacklisted again by the Council for American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), an advocacy group for “civil rights.” That blacklisting later evolved into a fatwa, or religious ruling, by a Jordanian cleric calling for the University of Chicago professor’s blood. Blumer (1946/1951/1993) calls the groundswell of support for a mass social movement’s beliefs and actions, while often not directly related, a form of “contagion” typical of mass movements. Arguably, that kind of “contagion” led to Duran’s fatwa through the communications of Islamists and sympathetic institutional support apparatuses.

Duran would not be the only dissenting professor targeted for blacklisting. Campus holy war also manifested in the apparent blacklisting of an alleged “orientalist” professor at USF, according to several documents found in President...
Castor’s archives labeled “Islamic Jihad.” Those documents reveal a surprising history of the problem at USF of which few people are aware.

Findings in Castor’s “Islamic Jihad” file indicate that in 1981, a local newspaper reporter accused USF’s senior Middle East specialist, Dr. Abdelwahab Hechiche, who was hired in 1970 to teach international affairs, of supporting the PLO. The public accusation came many years before the PLO was recognized internationally as anything except a terrorist organization. Hechiche informed the university that he would resign from his position if proven guilty of the charges. He faced his accuser in a public forum and refuted the journalist’s claims. In a letter found in Castor’s files, Hechiche claims that his campus colleagues did not defend him when the allegations surfaced. Hechiche’s 1981 predicament, combined with later developments regarding his scholarship in Judeo-Arab relations and humanitarian peace initiatives, resurfaced within the chambers of his department, GIA, the USF administration, and the USF police department as the Al-Arian affair unfolded in 1994-1995.

Some context here is on order: recall that after the November 1994 PBS documentary *Jihad in America* and the May 1995 *Tampa Tribune*’s “Ties to Terrorists” series, Hechiche became the first and one of the few faculty to state that he and the university had been “manipulated” and “exploited.” In the press, he also stated that the university had failed to grasp the international significance of what had happened at USF. The university’s handling of the case apparently compelled Hechiche to resign from his COMES member position, as he urged the university to investigate the allegations. The following year, an article bearing his name and other
university personnel names appeared in an Arab-American newspaper in Washington, D.C., *Al-Nashra*. Then in 1998, a video produced by an organization started and presided by Sami Al-Arian, appeared in Tampa Bay. It, too, presented Hechiche’s name and 1995 press statements about USF-WISE in it, tacitly implicating the professor and mysterious forces in the USF service area in a conspiracy to defame Muslims and Arabs. According to confidential sources, at various points in time over the past decade, those documents were distributed or shown on campus, in Tampa, and to select Muslim-Arab audiences around the country who would have been subscribers to the English-language magazine *Al-Nashra*, headquartered in Washington, D.C.. *Al-Nashra* has affiliated publishers in the Palestinian territories, as a basic on-line search shows.

These works published by Arab Media and pro-Islamist groups in the United States and in the Palestinian territories variously implicated Hechiche and several other USF employees in an Israeli-led conspiracy to disrupt the Middle East peace process (“The Melissa Carlson Story”) or to defame devout Palestinian Muslims residing in America (*The Case of Mazen Al-Najjar*). Both accusations are quite grave if directed toward a Muslim. In the eyes of Islamists, conspiracy with Jews and Israel signify apostasy (see, for example, Chapter Four’s discussion about the pamphlet “The Neglected Duty” and Al-Sadat’s assassination following Egypt’s peace accords with Israel). The first of the two works appeared one year after Clinton’s executive order making the disruption of the Oslo Peace Accords a federal criminal offense. In
consideration of these documents and in light of Al-Arian’s confession, one must ask whether their publication signified an attempt to deflect attention from Al-Arian onto someone else.

Section III:
Conclusion

Perhaps the most salient finding about the contours of re-Islamization at USF amounts to another paradox of Islamism’s Western mind hostile to the West. The academics that served on the board of directors of WISE and who worked at USF-WISE published and wrote articles denouncing the full course of world history after the Reformation. They believed the Reformation rendered legitimate a conspiracy that granted tolerance toward Jews. Yet, the Reformation denounced by Islamists at USF in their English-language publications in Tampa Bay brought them the one value they would esteem when challenged about their alleged misuse of it: academic freedom.

Up until his arrest in 2003 and subsequent firing, Al-Arian displayed masterfully his grievances in a way that appealed to broad groups of people on campus, off campus, and on the international stage. Like the leaders who had used universities as “ladders to power” in Middle Eastern and African universities, he astounded friends and enemies alike in his persuasive arts and organizing skills.

Colleagues who participated in or defended USF-WISE and its roundtable lectures had cast themselves as part of an accepting, like-minded group espousing terms that seemed good but might not have been good, “dialogue,” “understanding,”
“resurgence,” and “revival.” Beneath the veneer of those soft terms that never were fully defined in the media war after the challenge was the program “re-Islamization of society and knowledge.” That program hid in a curriculum in plain sight, as all hidden curricula do hide. When evidence of it in a thirty-two page brochure was given to them, key faculty and administrators apparently did not question it. Moreover, it may have been wrought by non-criminal “secret societies hiding in broad daylight”: those of the ISNA network, for which Al-Arian was a founding member.

Re-Islamization of society and knowledge was the product of an Islamist epistemological ferment perhaps within the purview of academic experts at USF to debate in scholarly forums. Instead, discourse apparently degenerated into *ad hoc* sparring matches in the local media.

Counter-Reformationist hostility toward academic freedom rights and responsibilities at USF, inauspiciously conceived by what Lowrie in June 2005 called “Sami Al-Arian’s lies,” was comparable to similar assaults identified in Chapter Four in the form they took but not in degree. At USF there would be no kidnappings or murders of “Orientalist” professors collaborating with Zionists, Jews, Crusaders, and Christians; but there may have been denials of course teaching and subtle and not-so-subtle blacklisting in Arab media and civil rights advocacy videos.

Those challenges to the academic ethic apparently may have been overlooked by a coalition of on- and off-campus constituencies who, for over ten years, charged that Al-Arian was the target of a conspiracy to defame and stereotype Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims, and Islam itself. That coalition focused on the ideologies of Israel, America, the West, capitalism, nationalism, multinationalism, Zionism, Judaism,
secularism, racism, neoconservatism, McCarthyism, counterterrorism, but not Islamism as the cause of Al-Arian’s unwelcome PBS exposure in 1994.

Al-Arian himself had laid the foundation for this remarkable organizational network that may have kept the university in a state of conflict for over ten years. Many onlookers were persuaded by the deep expressions of his grievances and charges of racism and discrimination; others, such as potential apostates and dissenters suffered silently, chilled by the threat of professional recrimination, campus intimidation, and defamation litigation. September 11, however, emboldened people--including a new university president--to ask, “How much must we endure?”

The voice of a religion transformed into a political ideology thus may have come to USF and its service community in the form of front groups having criminal and non-criminal purposes. They co-opted a university’s sympathy for minorities, its ambiguous academic ethos, and its institutional policy vacuums during a period of program expansion, mission internationalization, and governance change.
Chapter Six

Summary, Conclusions, Implications, and Suggestions for Future Research

Problem Statement

Leading scholars in the field of Middle Eastern studies, especially through its professional group, The Middle Eastern Studies Association (MESA), have not studied the interplay of Islamism, if viewed as a totalitarian mass social movement, with higher education. By “interplay,” this inquiry means the ideologies, strategies, and legacies of direct and indirect action associated with Islamist movements as those movements interact with higher education. In short, that interplay may be referred to as “re-Islamization from above and below.” The term “re-Islamization” refers to a mid-twentieth-century intellectual trend in the Middle East that contradicted an earlier one known as “de-Islamization” in which modernizing societies began separating sacred and profane spheres of life (Duran & Hechiche, 2002). The terms “from above” and “from below” also require some definition, owing inspiration to Tibi’s (1998) and Kepel’s (2002) histories of the Islamist movement. “From above” is a term employed in political and military science to denote dramatic, direct action aimed at preparing a society for the ultimate objective of wholesale governance change—the creation of a new socio-political order. “From below” is a term employed in political and military science to denote indirect action, especially through covert propaganda campaigns and institutional subversion, aimed at preparing a society for wholesale governance change. As Arendt

In addition to the absence of inquiry in Middle East studies, experts in the field of higher education have not studied Islamism’s interplay with higher education, which ostensibly could lay out baseline information about the characteristics and substantive causes and conditions that involve Islamism in higher education. While this study considers terrorism or political violence as a potential characteristic of the Islamist movement, coverage in this analysis extends to the mass movement’s non-violent characteristics.

The problem of Islamism in higher education is apparently worldwide, existing not only in universities in the Middle East but also in North American universities, most notably at The University of South Florida (USF), in Tampa, Florida, a highly publicized case in which computer engineering professor Dr. Sami Al-Arian, a Palestinian born in Kuwait and self-described “enlightened Islamist” (qtd. in *Time*, 2002), was indicted by the federal government on terrorism and criminal racketeering charges and later fired by university president Dr. Judy L. Genshaft. At the time of writing, Al-Arian has confessed to a criminal charge of conspiracy to commit terrorism. Findings of fact in the trial *U.S.A. v. Al-Arian* (2005) reveal that some of that conspiracy occurred on the USF campus through the establishment of a front organization attached to the university in the form of a legal partnership for the purpose of directing communications on behalf of the criminal enterprise, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).
Of the case against Al-Arian, terrorism expert Steven Emerson (1998), in consideration of his and other media investigations resulting in the government’s occasional declassification of information to the public, writes:

Beyond the issue of how a terrorist front could operate undetected for nearly five years, an interesting question raised was to what degree was The University of South Florida complicit in the creation of a terrorist cell? According to documents collected by federal authorities and interviews with various university officials, mounting evidence suggests that university officials closed their eyes to the warnings and indications that a terrorist cell was operating with the university imprimatur. (p.40)

Of that alleged terrorist cell operating at USF, Emerson (1998) further states that it “succeeded, in large part, in establishing [its] support infrastructure because [it] networked together with other militant Islamic groups” in a “pan-Islamic militant partnership” most readily seen in the first World Trade Center bombing, “a collaboration from five different radical Islamic organizations—the Gama Islamiya, Islamic Jihad, al-Fuqra, Sudanese National Islamic Front, and Hamas” (p.41).

While radical Islamic fundamentalism, or Islamism, has been studied widely in the academy, the tendency of the most publicized and, arguably, the most influential of intellectuals is to palliate its more inimical aspects (e.g., intellectual persecution, religious persecution, rarefaction of knowledge), favoring it as a revolutionary liberation theology that champions the self-determination of oppressed cultures (see, inter alia, Said, 1978, 2001; Chomsky, 2001; Esposito, 2002). That view represents a core element of post-colonialism and anti-Western resistance theory fashionable in Middle East studies (see, inter alia, Lewis, 1994, Tibi, 1998: Kramer, 2001).

Outside the academy’s orthodox point-of-view, however, are many scholars throughout the world who do regard Islamism as a totalitarian threat, or at least as a
mass social movement with hegemonic objectives that destabilizes societies and discriminates against women, secularists, humanists, Westerners, Jews, Christians, non-Arab minorities, and liberal Muslims (Tibi, 1998; Duran & Hechiche, 2001; Kramer, 2001; Pipes, 2002; Ye’or, 2002; Meddeb, 2003; Warraq, 2003). What that may signify, in effect, then, is that few in the academy, owing to professional views that might cause them to look positively or naively toward mass social movements in education, simply have not conceived that there may be a difference between Islam, the religious faith of millions of Muslims around the world, and Islamism, a violent, repressive political ideology with aspirations of global hegemony (Fregosi, 1998; Tibi, 1998; Duran & Hechiche, 2001; Pipes, 2002; Ye’or, 2002; Meddeb, 2003; Warraq, 2003) that deliberately uses higher education to advance itself ideologically and strategically. Therefore, and arguably, when such a political ideology establishes itself within a higher education institution, few in that institution possess the kind of specialized knowledge or critical judgment that would provide cause for concern, or even the moral resolve to question the propriety of that movement on a university campus.

**Purpose of the Study**

Specialization in area studies programs like Middle East and higher education seldom advance conceptual research models that triangulate their and other multiple fields of theoretical expertise and practice from across academic disciplines in order to create new knowledge out of existing knowledge, and then enrich that same discourse with current case study observation. In this study, the researcher consulted numerous works by the world’s foremost authorities and publishing houses in Middle
East and higher education studies, concluding that experts in both areas have not explored directly Islamism’s interplays with higher education to advance Islamism’s agenda for worldwide reformation.

Thus, the purpose of this study was to explore that interplay. Therefore, the researcher situated the case of alleged Islamist international terrorism and related matters at USF in a global context, comparing and contrasting conditions and characteristics involving Islamism and USF with similar problems in other parts of the world. At the same time, however, the study triangulated extant theory and research from social psychology, political science, and history about the collective behavior and characteristics of mass movements, their leaders, and their followers. According to Walker (1979), a university chancellor and sociologist, the collective nature of mass social movements is more responsible for the problem of mass movements in higher education than are the characteristics and conditions of higher education itself in drawing mass movements to it. Walker (1979) does state, however, that the democratic nature of the university offers a loophole of which mass social movements take advantage. Within that overarching context, the case involving Islamism at USF, 1986-2007, became an important example for analysis.

Research Questions

Out of the aforementioned strands of discussion about the problem’s hypothetical conditions and characteristics, the researcher established two overarching research questions for the study:
1. What are the conditions and characteristics of Islamism’s interplay in higher education in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Levant, Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan?

2. What are the conditions and characteristics of Islamism’s interplay with USF and its service area, 1986-2007?

In this study, interplay came to be understood as the contours of interrelating ideologies, strategies, and legacies of direct and indirect action undertaken by the Islamist movement in the university milieu and its surrounding environment. In short, it connotes a decades-old process that Kepel (2002) in his work *The Trail of Political Islam* calls “re-Islamization from above and below.” That interplay involves a range of temporal developments manifesting as conditions upon which the Islamist movement exacted its influence in host societies, and out of those conditions arise the Islamist movement’s characteristics. In this analysis, we examine those conditions and characteristics as they pertain to matters of higher education. In this inquiry “conditions” signify things that give rise to the occurrence of the Islamist movement in higher education institutions in a particular place and time. “Characteristics” refers to certain features that are typical of the Islamist movement in higher education institutions in a particular place and time. As will be shown, sometimes a condition in one place represents a characteristic in another.

*Method*

So with those details about the array of extant literature about mass social movements in higher education in mind, this study employs a method of historiography involving Foucault’s (1969, 1971) theory of institutions to investigate
Islamism’s interplay with higher education, culminating in a study of the movement and its leadership at USF. Its philosophical base being postmodernist in origin, Foucault’s theory of institutions accepts Derrida’s (1966, 1967) arguments that language, or signification, is not transcendental, and is, to the contrary, quite arbitrary and sometimes coerced in institutional settings regarding meaning, which happens through a process of signification, or free play, or interplay. In short, things signify other things but they do not “mean” other things in a transcendental sense. Writing about the history of sexuality and penal systems, Foucault (1969, 1971) employs Derrida’s deconstruction of what Derrida calls “the transcendental signified” and shows how institutions and sub-institutions engage in an interplay of linguistic signification and other practices in order to consolidate power and knowledge, imposing limitations on discourse through structures of institutional thought.

In the study of organizations, institutional analysis focuses “on the multiplicity of factors involved in describing organizational life and events” (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998: p. 43). Hence, in their drawing upon Foucault’s theory, Said (1978, 1983), White (1974), Leitch (1992), Czarniawska (1997), and Meddeb (2003) variously employ Foucault’s theory to culture, academic disciplines, literature, organizations, and Islamism, respectively. Those “institutions” are each involved in a signification process with other “sub-institutions,” such that critics of those “institutions” and “sub-institutions” may interpret the signification process by analyzing, inter alia, ideological habits of mind, basic assumptions (and reactions to challenges of those basic assumptions), actions, archives, pedagogy, taboos, publishing records, religious texts, and judicial texts. In turn, authors, or people who
signify, lose control over the meaning of their “institutions” and “sub-institutions.” At the same time, critics can, as White (1974) states, “re-familiarize us with events which have been forgotten through either accident, neglect, or repression” by “looking at the ways in which events evolved,” “providing more information about them,” and showing how their developments “conform to or deny other [signifying] story types” (pp.399-400).

In this analysis, a three-year process of coding for thematic association reveals an interplay of ideologies, strategies, and legacies of direct and indirect action diffused across geographical space and time, with higher education representing organizational territory upon which the Islamist movement and its leaders exact their plans for ultra-nationalist conquest. By coding, this inquiry means the “simultaneous collection and analysis of data” that is compared and contrasted to the point that “interrelated concepts” are “refined and integrated into the theoretical framework” of the study (Charmaz, 2000: p. 509). This coding process proved to be well-suited for an inquiry that draws from multiple academic fields of study because “it accounts for variation” and permits modification of “established analyses as conditions in the research changed or as further data were gathered” (p. 510-511).

Coding of the data also involved textual analysis of the Islamist movement’s discourse on three interrelated levels identified by Johnston in *Methods of Social Movement Research* (2002): world-historical (e.g., the discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood and its leadership), organizational (e.g., the educational discourse of the International Institute of Islamic Thought), and individual (e.g., the discourse of Sami al-Arian). As the researcher amassed and analyzed evidence over the past three years,
the aforementioned research questions were reframed into their current form for the purposes of systematically presenting the findings in later chapters. Eventually, the coding method led to the classification of conditions and characteristics essential to Islamism’s interplay in higher education, the contours of which are presented in rich detail in Chapters Four and Five.

*Response to Research Question One*

The first research question examined Islamism’s interplay in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Levant, Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan. The findings reveal a process of re-Islamization in higher education through direct and indirect action across geographical times and space, with the transnational organization the Muslim Brotherhood serving as a purveyor of front activity aimed at undermining existing civil service organizations, including higher education, *from below*. That kind of “decomposition of the status quo,” as Arendt calls the process in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, signifies a form of covert action aimed at the slow subversion of overarching culture, after which would result in Middle Eastern versions of what Walker calls “campus holy war” engendered by professor-led “militant third-sector groups” in *The Effective Administrator*. In the process, purveyors of re-Islamization view the higher education milieu as fresh territory for conquest. As part of the process, Islamists develop and establish codified educational programs and hidden curricula directly tied to their stated world-historical discourse to bring the entire world under the banner of “true Islam,” that amounts to nothing more than a revolutionary paradigm paradoxically inspired by Western ideologies conceived and cultivated in Western universities. Over a span of several decades, the conditions and
characteristics of Islamism in higher education arose first in Egypt and then expanded into other locales. In the locales studied, the Ikwhan (Muslim Brotherhood) movement proved itself very adroit at filling large and small policy vacuums in the societies where it maintained charters, but there was a tradeoff: academic freedom and the sense of physical security requisite for it to take place in the locales studied suffered huge losses in the Islamist movement’s battle for the Muslim mind.

In Egypt, particular conditions were found, the first which was a major temporal development affecting the entire Islamic world, the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate. That major condition engendered Ikwhan ideologies, strategies, and legacies that would be carried forward into the other locales studied. A second condition that primarily in Egypt, the intellectual center of the Islamic world, was the exposure of Salafist theological doctrine to radical Western ideologies and an overall de-Westernizing ferment in Western-style institutions during Egypt’s period of de-Islamization. A third condition in Egypt was the exposure of Ikwhan ideology to European Fascism through a strategic and ideological alliance with the Nazis in World War II. Finally, a fourth condition giving rise to Islamism’s continued interplay in higher education was the Egyptian government’s alternating attempts to appease or repress the Ikwhan movement. Characteristic of Islamism in Egyptian higher education were the amassing of organizational networks run by highly educated elites interacting with universities and their service area communities. That front activity served the Ikwhan movement’s two-pronged reformist program, re-Islamization from above and below. Other characteristics included implementation of a codified educational theory to intellectually subvert universities and their societies;
the enactment of an distinctly Islamist version of “campus holy war” that involved intellectual intimidation, persecution, and terrorism; and the transnational influence of the Islamist movement in Egypt to other locales through the migration of *Ikwhan* professors and students.

In Saudi Arabia, the Levant, Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan, the transnational migration of professors and students from Egypt became a major condition toward the advancement of Islamism’s interplay in higher education in those locales. Saudi Arabia had another distinct condition, however, owing to its accumulation of oil wealth that necessitated the expansion of its educational bureaucracy: changes in educational policy to appease the isolationist Wahhabi sect that, in turn created, a range of transnational organizations whose members consisted of the Al-Sheikh family (e.g., Wahhabi) and exiled *Ikwhan* members residing in the Kingdom. In Saudi Arabia, the Levant, Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan, higher education saw similar characteristics such as organizational front activity, campus holy war, and outmigration of professors and students to other places in the world, including North America, Tampa Bay, and USF.

*Response to Research Question Two*

Islamism’s conditions and characteristics at USF and its service community could be examined more closely as events unfolded in the researcher’s presence and because the researcher could obtain substantial documents from websites, news media, and USF archives. While there are some differences between the global referent and the local one, the overarching similarities are striking, especially in terms of the characteristic establishment of external and internal front organizations.
interacting with USF, the intended use of codified Islamist educational theory as part of a hidden curriculum at USF, and the fomenting of campus holy war. *Ikwhan* activity was documented in the USF case and connections to the other locales studied were explicitly established.

Conditions laying the foundation for Islamism at USF and in Tampa Bay included changed in the university mission over a period of several decades leading to the internationalization of the university. Those changes culminated in a partnership agreement between USF and World Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE), funded by an *Ikwhan*-associated think-tank, the International Institute of Islamic Thought, and run by members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad who held dual membership in the Muslim Brotherhood. In turn, those members brought other Muslim academics from places like Tunisia and the Sudan. Those academics also held dual membership in the Muslim Brotherhood, aside from being the leaders of the Islamic Tendency Movement and the Sudanese Liberation Front. Another condition involved epistemological changes in higher education that gave rise to de-Westernizing intellectual trends affecting Middle East studies. That condition further laid the groundwork for the front activity that would develop at USF. Furthermore, the activity would not have occurred had there not been a migration of *Ikwhan*-associated students (e.g., Sami al-Arian, Ramadan Shallah) from the Middle East to North America. Those students—who became professors at USF and directed the think-tank at USF, WISE, a front for the PIJ—were motivated to turn USF and its service area community into territory for intellectual conquest, inasmuch as they sought a command and control center for conspiracy to commit international terrorism.
Relevance to the Literature Review

Higher Education’s Characteristics and Conditions

This inquiry’s findings support most of the discussion in the literature review about organizational and administrative theory and practice in higher education. Here, we discuss higher education’s characteristics that cause higher education to welcome the mass movement into its milieu. Numerous books and articles studied seem generalizable in an international context, with Western theory and practice applicable to the Middle Eastern and African locales selected for this inquiry. The reason for application of Western theory and practice to Middle Eastern and African locales involves the simple fact that Islamists and Islamist organizations have what Pipes calls a “Western mind.” As Lewis suggests, even their concept of world revolution toward achieving the Nizam Islami is not located in the Koran. To the contrary, the concept emanates from Islamism’s exposure to revolutionary ideologies conceived and cultivated in Western universities or through the Muslim Brotherhood’s strategic and ideological alliance with the Nazis during World War II.

All of the Islamist educational theory and practice studied in this inquiry embraces de-Westernizing principles discussed by Chaffee and Jacobson (1997), Stark and Latucca (1997), Musil (1997), Kramer (2001), Margolis (2001), and Soldantenko (2001). At USF that de-Westernizing presupposition appears crucial toward the partnership formation of USF-WISE, which internal campus constituents hoped would become a formidable area studies program in the Southeastern United States. Globalization, as discussed by Gaff and Raticliff (1997), Johnston and
Spalding (1997) and Cohen (1997), was also a driving force behind the partnership, for who would deny the need for USF to know about non-Western cultures? The Islamist epistemology that supported the USF-WISE curriculum also received support from a broad base of social science scholars who organized the production and dissemination of knowledge around neo-Marxist and postcolonial theories (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Stanley 2002; Margolis, 2001; Soldantenko, 2001).

As Becher (1989/1993/1996) and Birnbaum (1988) could have guessed, the organized anarchy of a university during a period of rapid expansion left many policy vacuums for people with common ideological causes to fill, and those people reacted mightily when their basic assumptions were challenged. They rested their self-defense on academic freedom claims and avoided the real issue affecting the curriculum, the clash of epistemologies. At various points, the university either passively withdrew from the conflict or was accused of wanting to silence intellectual exchange. Supportive of Shils (1997) and Walker (1979) the university became mired in “campus holy war” in which grievances were aired almost entirely in the media, and not in traditional academic forums.

*Islamism’s Characteristics and Conditions*

This inquiry’s findings demonstrate strong support of the various strands of research in the literature review on the social psychology of mass movements, Islamic fundamentalism, and terrorism. Here, we start with a discussion about Islamism’s characteristics that render higher education susceptible to being viewed as a *dar al-harb* (“domain of war”), which Islamist leaders and their *esprit d’ corps* of external and internal constituent groups attempt educational reform--understood in Islamist
terms as *zalzalah*, or “shaking”--or use university infrastructure for purposes other than research and teaching in order to cause instability in societies leading toward the overthrow of existing governments. Whether abroad or at USF, all university systems studied were subjected to *zalzalah*, re-Islamization from below.

Herbert Blumer, first a sociologist at The University of Chicago and later distinguished chairperson of sociology at The University of California at Berkeley, is most responsible in Western research for advancing a theory of collective behavior developed initially in the 1940’s and refined through the 1960’s. Defining “collective behavior” as the “way in which a new social order arises [under] the emergence of new forms of collective behavior” (p. 169), the chapter findings about the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood suggest similar genesis of elementary collective groupings in Al-Banna’s village, where Al-Banna, a sheikh’s son, became the leader of two societies that predate the Muslim Brotherhood. These were small-order social groups that fined, denounced, or drafted “secret and often threatening letters” (Mitchell, 1969/1993: p. 2) against people alleged to have acted un-Islamically.

That early activity in those small societies would be repeated in a grand manner later on with Al-Banna’s founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1927 and, as the Twentieth Century progressed, into an Islamist internationale of leaders and followers caught by a “social contagion” that “always continues to operate . . . for a long time” and in which “unreflective responses of individuals . . . becomes pronounced (Blumer, 1946/1951/1963: p. 176-177). In turn, that social contagion--which is a term employed by the Tunisian scholar Meddeb (2003) to describe the “malady of Islam”--is in its more advanced stages one that causes “far-reaching effects on institutions
ensuing from shifts” resulting from “the selective interests on the mass” (p. 187) to “establish a new order of life” (p. 199). While the Muslim Brotherhood, through its administrative structure and tasks would provide helpful educational assistance to Egyptian students in mass universities, ultimately the influence of the organization would become responsible for its and its associated terrorist groups’ affronts to higher education in the totalitarian quest for *Nizam Islami* (i.e., “Islamic Order”). As in the overseas cases, Islamist leaders at USF also demonstrated uncanny skill for appealing to a broad base of on- and off-campus constituents in the service of their objectives. In this sense the greatest goal was to “re-Islamize society and knowledge” by harnessing control not only of educational curricula but also the media.

In the service of that utopian end, Islamism developed a program of re-Islamization that came to be promulgated through secular and religious universities. As Blumer (1946/1951/1993) states, the development of a specific program is a hallmark of any mass movement. In so doing, the program possesses its own distinct propaganda and behavior requiring “an appealing setting” (p. 194). In this chapter, higher education represents one of those appealing settings for re-Islamization of society and knowledge from above and below. That program is a mainstay of Islamist groups in all locales studied, and is also the mission of the IIIT in Herndon, Virginia, whose Saudi-published educational texts are distributed in over seventy countries. Islamists at USF made no secret of their intentions. The objectives of their secret societies hid in broad daylight.

As Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) writes, that program enjoins various means to achieve its objectives: agitation, an *esprit de corps*, morale-building, ideological
formation, and operating tactics. Through higher education, the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups and sub-groups examined exhibit those same traits, replete with slogan “The Koran is My Constitution” and other discourse such as *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* that “utilizes the emotional attitudes and prejudices which people already have” (p. 195). That behavior, Blumer (1939/1946/1951/1955) would argue, classifies Islamism as a religious nationalist movement in which “the past of the people is glorified” and is “intimately associated . . . with a feeling of inferiority” (p. 219). The idea expounded in Islamist educational discourse that Muslim civilization was weakened and oppressed by an alleged Jewish-Crusader conspiracy, in which the creation of the state of Israel was the alleged final turn of the screw, underscores the inferiority complex of the world’s most pressing problem today, a religious ultra-nationalist movement with adherents willing to use mass casualty terrorism to restore the *ummah*, or “Community of the Faithful.”

Arendt’s (1948/1951/1966/1968/1976/1979/1994) study *The Origins of Totalitarianism* also proved applicable to a Middle East context, especially in terms of its analysis of Islamism’s potential to subvert education and commit terrorism through a build-up of criminal and non-criminal front groups interacting with universities. Arendt understands that the paramilitary character of totalitarian mass movements cannot be appreciated fully if they are not examined in connection to other organizations created by those movements (e.g., legal, educational, university professional, etc.). What Arendt calls a “technique of duplication” was documented in all locales studied, whether in the Middle East, Africa, or North America. Those “secret societies hiding in plain sight” may serve important humanitarian purposes
but they nevertheless exist as “instruments of destruction” as non-initiated people involved with the movement are consistently lied to and intellectually prepared to accept “swift and radical” deterioration of professional standards” (p. 372).

Blumer and Arendt notwithstanding, another scholar from the Fourteenth Century, Ibn Khaldun, writes presciently in *The Muqaddimah* (1377/1989) about characteristics of Islamic civilization. Written during a period in which Islamic civilization was in a state of decline, after having made great scientific achievements, one of Khaldun’s chapters is about education and ways of knowing things. Khaldun (1377/1989) suggests that divine knowledge and other forms of knowledge, like medicine, should be kept separate and not subsumed under religious law. His reasoning stemmed from his observations of the decline of the Muslim world. In his work, he lamented the takeover of religion and life by a group of Islamic scholars who had “confused” matters of theology “with those of philosophy” (p. 137). The same process is happening throughout the world today, but the difference is that the year is 2008, not 1377, and the confusion of faith and reason affects the entire world, not just the Islamic world.

It is those same orthodox scholars, who might be better described as Islam’s first “fundamentalists” and whose so-called “Golden Age” Islamists expound perennially through their educational theory, that seek application of Koranic law to the study of the academic disciplines. As Khaldun (1377/1989) observed in his day, that kind of intellectual coup-making results not in an expansion of knowledge but, rather, in its contraction, which is not a purpose of higher education. It should come as no surprise, then, that members of the Ibn Khaldun Society in Cairo, Egypt, and in
the United States (e.g., Khalid Duran) have been denounced, blacklisted, jailed, attacked, and murdered for arguing that Egypt needs to reform its educational teachings in order to reduce the culture of terrorism and re-stabilize Egyptian society.

Another prescient element of The Muqaddimah is its treatment of the term “group feeling,” which bears strong resemblance to other terms from the literature review such as “social contagion,” “collective delusion,” “group mind,” “groupthink,” and “groupism.” From the field of social psychology, those terms were defined originally in Bion’s (1959) studies of “basic assumptions groups,” which are groups of people characterized by losses of self-reflection, self-consciousness, and individual identity. Basic assumptions groups are the opposite of creative, task-oriented work groups. They form what Meddeb (2003) calls “irrational solidarity.”

Khaldun (1377/1989) observes that “once group feeling has established superiority over people who share in it, it will, by nature, seek superiority over people who have other group feelings unrelated to the first” (p. 108). Thereunto, this inquiry supports Khaldun (1377/1989) in that Islamism, having developed into an international mass social movement advocating Nizam Islami, seeks to subject all people, including liberal Muslims, under its own aegis of the “right path” or “true Islam,” which the movement regards as a superior way of life. Furthermore, the goal is achieved through “propaganda and violence” (pp. 248-249). In times of power vacuums those who have group feeling “seek superiority and domination” (p. 293) and persecute others through “assassination and exile” (p. 250). This study demonstrates in various contexts that Islamism seeks institutional vacuums of power inside secular and religious universities and also in whole societies mired in warfare.
Similar to Khaldun’s (1377/1989) observations about persecution, this inquiry suggests a similar pattern of activity taking place on behalf of the Islamist movement. Its manifestations range broadly, from the domination of student councils that coerce universities to recodify educational curricula and campus life along Islamist lines to the persecution of liberal Muslim and non-Muslim intellectuals. While a group like the Muslim Brotherhood or Islamic Jihad or Islamic Tendency Movement might justify such actions under its interpretation of Islamic law, Khaldun (1377/1989) does not equate that use of propaganda, intimidation, and violence with *jihad*. In his work, *jihad* is an inner spiritual struggle or a form of religious defense. Actions resulting from people having been afflicted with the contagion of “group feeling” categorically are not *jihad*. The call for religious reformation by scholars associated with the Ibn Khaldun Society indicates that higher education is a kind of battleground for that reformation. Therefore, the counter-Reformationist Islamist discourse explicated in this inquiry directly contradicts Khaldun (1377/1989) and his intellectual heirs.

Tibi (1998) calls that educational theory and practice “paranoid scholarship.” The extended review of Al-Faruqi’s scholarship and IIIT theory—published through Saudi Arabia’s education ministry and distributed worldwide—along with the theories of Qutb, Shari’ati and Choudhury, illustrate the paradoxes of the movement, which is hostile to the West and modernity but nevertheless is Western and modern. Hence, the inquiry supports Pipes (1997) who writes extensively about radical Islam’s Western mind, whose leaders are educated in Western or Western-style universities and who adopt Western principles to re-invent the world’s Western institutions, its universities notwithstanding. Islamists at USF as well as abroad exemplified that paradox.
Freud (1915, 1930) also receives support from the inquiry’s findings, for through Freud’s discussions of humanity’s death and life instincts one may witness Islamism’s desire to become civilized or to be civilized. However, as the movement progressed it became more radicalized, not less, under the teaching and direction of the movement’s leading theorist, Qutb, an Egyptian educator. In the process, the inquiry shows how higher education—an institution customarily considered a place of creativity—being appropriated for the purpose of destroying civilization and, hence, for its own self-destruction.

Marcuse’s profound influence on the development of Marxist theory and on American intellectual life in the middle of the Twentieth Century and in the American academy also maintains a tacit subtext in this inquiry. King (1972) discusses Marcuse’s influence on the rise of the New Left intelligentsia who would garner respectability from their positions in American universities starting in the 1960’s. However, one witnesses in this inquiry a similar development taking place in European universities where Islamists would study, translate, and assimilate Marxist doctrine into an Islamized form. Of the many themes from Marcuse’s works are justifications for two-tiered standards of liberty and violence for “oppressed” and oppressors” as part of a Third World critique of the West and Western science, in which higher education is indicted for capitulating to the forces of “total administration,” with “scientific objectivity” existing as “a form of social control and domination” (King, 1972: 101).

Given that sad state of affairs, Marcuse (1966) calls for “selective tolerance” to overturn the institutional repression of aggrieved groups. Selective tolerance holds that forms of knowledge and speech are excluded if they are “oppressive” (p. 116). If the
suppression of speech is deemed insufficient to liberate so-called “oppressed” groups, then terrorism, re-defined as a “natural right of resistance,” becomes acceptable by activist-intellectuals who direct research and teaching toward the liberation of oppressed groups. In this inquiry, educational theorists like Qutb follow in Marcuse’s legacy, using Marxist terms to rationalize their militant worldview of Islamic liberation, a point touched upon in Keddie and Monian (1993), who write about Iranian adoption of Marxist terms in the 1960’s. Therein, a pre-modern Islamic etiquette, adab, morphs into a modern form of Islamist “negative tolerance,” in which no one is allowed to criticize Islam or Islamists without risk of impunity because to do so is, arguably, defamatory and might lead to Muslim stereotyping and further oppression. Nowhere in this inquiry was this viewpoint expressed better than in the media war waged by Al-Arian’s extensive network of external and internal campus advocacy groups.

However, Marcuse (1966) also argues that violence, as a means of lifting cultural oppression, should be used only to lift oppression and, if it leads to more oppression, then it was used illegitimately. This is an aspect of Marcusian doctrine that Islamist intellectuals and the many non-Muslim intellectuals in higher education who support the movement and its use of political violence seem to have forgotten, given their continued support of activist-intellectuals who have manipulated and abused their universities on the way toward Nizam Islami.

Jungian social psychology, in context to Nazism and the aggression of the Third Reich, also maintains relevance in that both movements, Nazism and Islamism, are totalitarian ones whose core ideology hinges upon “a strong,
myth-based ultra-nationalism seizes both the leadership and the popular imagination” (Catherwood, 2002: p.94). This is an example of what Blumer calls “social contagion.” The goal is the restoration of lost dignity and power by blaming and repudiating enemies, a circumstance in which a group of people become over-identified with their shadow selves to the extent that they lose their individualist, self-reflective capacities and project their own problems elsewhere. Social contagion manifests in a variety forms, such as repudiation of enemies in, inter alia, Islamist educational theory, academic journals, magazines, videos, and religious teachings show that Islamism’s locus of blame is an alleged “Jewish-Crusader conspiracy” that dates back to Islam’s beginnings. Indeed, Islamists synthesized the conspiracism of the Nazi movement into their own religious worldview during the 1930’s and 1940’s when the Muslim Brotherhood formed an alliance with the Axis powers.

Given the reformist nature of Islamism as a form of religious fundamentalism, we understand better how Islamists adopt a militant posture that causes them to gravitate toward higher education institutions as a “domain of war.” This inquiry shows that Islamists are not different than other fundamentalists from other religions in that they “reorder scientific inquiry” and “reshape educational systems” including “non-fundamentalist state or social institutions” (Marty & Appleby, 1993: p. 2; Mendelsohn, 1993; Tibi, 1993; Ramadan, 1993). In contradiction to Marty & Appleby (1993), however, this inquiry suggests that Islamic fundamentalists are a threat to the state in addition to society. Hoveyda’s (1998) discussion of the financing of Islamist institutions, including those discussed in the section about Saudi Arabian education, further illustrates the state threat of Islamist education reform. He mentions that
WAMY printed a bombing manual found in the possession of one of the young men convicted in the first World Trade Center attacks.

The inquiry also supports Tibi (1993), Keddie & Monian (1993), and Rapoport (1990/1998) who write variously that the conflict about Islamist methodology in higher education is at the heart of most intellectual censorship, intimidation, and charges of blasphemy in the Middle East, especially that which came after 1969, with the advent of Qutb’s ultra-radical reformulation of religious terms in *Signposts*. That same conflict about educational methodology extends to Laqueur’s (1999) discussion about the international victims of Islamism, which involve not only the famous case of Salman Rushdie and the assassinations of his editors in the early 1990’s but also to political dissidents in France, Germany, Austria, Italy, Venezuela, Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan. The researcher would add the United States to the list, too, however, where the case of blacklisting and a *fatwa* against Khalid Duran for his role in translating documents related to the case against the Islamic jihad leaders at USF may be regarded as the archetypal example of how what used to be confined to “over there” is now “here.” Blacklisting also came to USF in the form of hoax newspaper reports and a video variously accusing a liberal Muslim professor of being a part of an elaborate Zionist plot to undermine the Oslo Peace Accords and to defame Islam.

As has been shown through the IIIT educational theory, in particular, Islamist methodology is rooted in a mythic ultra-nationalism to reclaim the dominance of the *ummah*, or Community of the Faithful, such that it translates into reactions against foreign influences, thereby supporting Tehranian (1993a), who illustrates how Islamic fundamentalism turns “to education and media for new socialization, recruitment, and
organization of their members” with “traditional and modern networks of communication in the religious institutions, schools, and media” serving “as indispensable tools in the formation and dissemination of fundamentalist messages” (p. 316).

Those observations are at the heart of the attempts at establishing Nizam Islami in the various locales studied, but most successfully in Iran and the Sudan and also in the Palestinian territories, where professor-imams in nearby mosques leading student movements caused what Tehranian (1993a, 1993b) calls the “total” control of education and media.

Insofar as challenges to religious education are considered, Piscatori (1993) suggests that religious authority became “fragmented in modern Muslim societies” (p. 143) leading to the proliferation of Islamist activist-intellectuals who compete with traditional leaders for authority. In addition, in the Algerian context, Laqueur (1999) makes similar observations. This inquiry, in its discussion of vacuums of power in ancient religious universities during some countries’ establishment of post-colonial Marxist or ultra-secular governments that marginalize religion, supports Piscatori (1993). At USF, vacuums in the form of weak policies for non-immigrant scholars, graduate supervision, mission change, ambiguity in the academic ethic, and governance restructuring were also used to Islamist advantage, apparently keeping the university in a divided political condition for over a decade.

This inquiry denies another claim by Piscatori (1993), however, who writes that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and in the Palestinian territories is
non-militant. Al-Banna’s development of the Secret Apparatus, which was the first group led by the Muslim Brotherhood’s cadre of activist-intellectuals and student followers in Egypt and the Palestinian territories, belies Piscatori’s (1993) statements. The inquiry supports Piscatori (1993) elsewhere, however, in his non-detailed discussion of the Islamic Jihad’s use of charismatic leaders who infiltrate and gain control of mosques in West Bank and Gaza, and then gain control of the Islamic University’s administrative and student bodies.

Finally, the inquiry also supports Rugh (1993) who discusses how the Muslim Brotherhood and its charitable networks gained influence among Egypt’s youth requiring tutoring in their desired fields of study, engineering, science, and math—areas of study that do not “afford them much opportunity for criticism and evaluation” (p. 153). In turn, Rugh’s (1993) assertions echo that of Duran (1978) who writes in *The Role of Political Islam* that Saudi Arabia was spreading a divisive form of Islam around the world through educational institutions, and who also comments that in Egypt the joke is that the Muslim Brotherhood is really the “Engineering Brotherhood,” whose political imams lack the intellectual capacity to see shades of gray in matters of politics, religion, and life itself. The tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood appears, too, to have found its way into the USF-WISE curriculum, through its initiates who became leaders in the PIJ and its North American front organizations. These individuals gave notice of their organizational world view by offering USF faculty and administrators a brochure that articulated in over thirty pages the principles for “Islamization” of secular higher education precisely through think-tank partnerships with universities.
Major Implications

This study has revealed the basic assumptions and paradoxes of a mass movement that started in Egypt in the late 1920’s and had come to USF and its service community in the 1980’s. In turn, more so than any article, essay, or book written about the case to date, by grounding the case in mass movements theory and New Historical analysis, this study seemingly reveals how so many highly intelligent, qualified people in the academic profession supportive of the academic enterprise could become enamored with a mass movement that, as Meddeb (2003) notes in The Malady of Islam, is a “social contagion” marked by anti-intellectualism and intellectual persecution. From this study, the following major implications are identified:

1. The postmodernist methodology of this study challenges the claims of an assumption currently popular in the field of Middle East studies, “the politics of self-representation,” which holds that observers must merely report the claims of Islamist leaders without questioning their authority. In other words, if an Islamist tells the media that “Death to America. Death to Israel” and “The Koran is my Constitution” are not part of a program of terrorism and religiously-inspired imperialism, then observers must not question his utterances any further; for to do so might means that they are imposing observers’ own allegedly “racist” or “culturally imperialist” assumptions on his. And his assumptions, by default, trump the observers’. That is so because the Islamist research subject is from an allegedly “oppressed” culture and his observers’ are from a culture that allegedly “oppresses” his. So observers are to accept what the author of “Death to--” and “The Koran is my Constitution” tells observers to accept. His definition is therefore the only definition that should matter to observers who are not part of his “culture.” Furthermore, observers need not probe the issue any further because that would mean opening up lines of inquiry that are currently taboo in the field of Middle East studies. Taken to its logical conclusion, the mimetic basis of “the politics of self-representation”--while situated in a culturally specific context--holds that observers must not question the justifications of any discourse or referential actions produced by the Islamist movement, including Pax Islamica, suicide bombings, fatava against Salman Rushdie, hudud punishments, testimonies of apostates, conspiracy theories, etc. In effect, what observers are expected to do under the precepts of “politics of self-representation” is arrogate their tradition of independent judgment, free...
speech, and academic freedom to another person’s puritanical interpretation of Islamic law and totalitarian political ideology. On the other hand, postmodernist historiography frees observers from that trap of institutionalized censorship that is *d’rigueur* in the academy today.

2. In addition, the social psychology detailed in this study’s literature review may enable understanding of the deeply-felt reactions of on- and off-campus stakeholders at USF regarding the furor over academic freedom at USF. A professor’s right to free speech garnered the most consistent media discussion but the emotionally charged atmosphere and defensive posturing surrounding that discussion apparently obscured a much graver issue involving the Islamist movement, Sami Al-Arian, and academic freedom: re-Islamization in higher education.

3. The Islamist movement, while having been lauded as a benign theological force of liberation and democratic spirit, has, over an eighty-year time period extending from Cairo, Egypt, to Tampa, Florida, proven itself hostile to the values of the Reformation, including those values embodied in the term “academic freedom,” which carries a core assumption that a university will be vigilant and not become party to a codified educational theory and practice that seeks to bring the production and dissemination of knowledge under an elite group’s interpretation of God’s will, under a divisive ideological politics, or in this case both.

4. As such, the Islamist movement’s program of intellectual subversion maintains an ancient referent in Islam, that of the School of Recent Scholars, a religious orthodoxy who, by the time Khaldun had written his last work in 1377, had taken over intellectual life in the Islamic world by insisting that matters of faith and reason were inseparable things. While Khaldun did not rule out jihad as a legitimate form of warfare, he did not equate it with the persecution of people by political violence, physical liquidation of opponents, and banishment. In his writing, Khaldun implies that the intellectual retrenchment of the School of Recent Scholars coincided with waves of political violence that marked the decline of Islamic civilization.

5. The forces of internationalization and mission expansion have not been entirely positive for The University of South Florida, as the USF-WISE case suggests, especially as that case is compared with what is known about the impact of the Islamist movement in the locales studied in Chapter Four; indeed, the university’s better nature—the one that encourages civility and multicultural tolerance seems to have been misused purposefully by various leaders and external players in the Islamist movement under the guise of a qualified free expression, in which some cultures and religions have greater, “encompassing,” rights and in which other cultures and religions have lesser rights. The problem may be
defined best by terms emanating from the Islamist movement’s reformulation of premodern traditions of Koranic exegesis and jurisprudence: academic dhimmitude and academic adab. As Lewis (1994) and Ye’or (1998, 2005) note, when modern scholars subvert their or other’s right of inquiry to ancient contractual traditions between Muslims and non-Muslims, the end result is historical negationism, in which knowledge is sought and taught on the basis of what is best for the ummah and God.

6. In such an atmosphere, the signing of a partnership agreement with a group of academics who believe they know God’s will, becomes a kind of dhimma, or a contract made between believing Muslim and non-Muslim parties. A serious mistake on behalf of the university and its academics may have been made in that different groups operationalized the terms of the USF-WISE contract differently. For example, “civilizational dialogue” may not mean the same thing to a non-Muslim as it does for a Muslim; and neither might a legal contract signify the same thing for an orthodox Islamic fundamentalist as it would for mainstream academics operating in a secular university in a secular society.

7. In that sense, the university appears to have underestimated or misunderstood the values of the think-tank WISE and its Muslim constituents in Tampa Bay and its primary source of funding, the IIIT in Herndon, Virginia, assuming that WISE and the IIIT held the same values, which they apparently did. Interestingly, this is a problem identified in the 9/11 Commission Report (2004) on the underestimation of the nation’s intelligence community about the nature of the Islamist mass movement and its potential threat to world peace and security. The problem is widely referred to as “mirror imaging” (Lowenthal, 2000).

8. A fair amount of information (e.g., the mosque leadership coup involving a USF math professor, publication of Inquiry, Ramadan Shallah’s vita, the Al-Nashra document, Dr. Hechiche’s resignation letter, Dr. Neusner’s concerns about Islamist epistemology as it affected Judaic studies) found in USF’s presidential and media archives indicates that the William Reece-Smith Report to Betty Castor (1996) may not have captured the full gravitas of the USF-WISE case. After the William-Reece Smith report, the university stopped formally investigating the case, even as it seems to have progressed as part of a widening mass movement in Tampa Bay that would continue to have severe impact on the university, from souring relations among student religious groups to pressures on the curriculum by external advocacy groups.

9. This study sheds new light on the USF case itself in that, given its consistent connections with the Muslim Brotherhood--the least common denominator of all Salafist-Sunni-Arab Islamist
terrorist organizations in the world today—this study implies that it was the Muslim Brotherhood and not the PIJ that infiltrated USF through its partnership with WISE, largely funded by the IIIT, a Muslim Brotherhood front, and through its hosting of numerous visiting lecturers such as Al-Turabi and Al-Ghannoushi who were Muslim Brotherhood leaders who, like the PIJ leaders in the study, went on to found terrorist groups.

10. The September 2007 indictment against two USF students of engineering, one of whom lived in a house that Sami Al-Arian had rented on behalf of WISE during its partnership with USF raises a new question: to what extent is USF’s international reputation now based on a capacity for providing anonymity and safe haven to Islamic radicals, especially those in the engineering profession and who hail from Egypt, a leading passport nation for Islamism’s mujahideen?

Suggestions for Future Research

Therefore, in light of these implications, which lay out baseline information about the interplay between the Islamist movement and higher education, the university may want to consider re-opening the case about Sami Al-Arian for further study and debate. The researcher recommends that the case be investigated by qualified academics from both the faculty and high administration, with additive testimony by the university’s religious student groups. Perhaps a special commission of Faculty Senators and administrators could jointly review the case as far back as 1986, when Sami Al-Arian was hired and his later acquisition of tenure in the early 1990’s, around the time of the USF-WISE partnership. Among the many questions requiring answers include: Who recommended that Al-Arian apply for his position at USF? Which external community actors were involved? Who was on his search committee? Tenure review committee? How did he become the faculty advisor of the Muslim Students Association? Was the Muslim Students Association involved with
his off-campus activities in the Islamic Association for Palestine and related external organizations? Besides Hussam Jubara, a deported HAMAS operative in 2004, how many foreign national students did Al-Arian recommend attend USF? What were their academic success rates? Where are they now? How and when did Sami al-Arian begin to amass political power on campus? Who supported him and why? What were their shared values, if any? Did they have external business or non-profit conflicts of interest that might have induced the on on-campus partnership with USF-WISE? Can it be determined whether Al-Arian had any involvement with the hiring of faculty or student admission recommendations outside his field of teaching and research in computer engineering? If so, what are the academic ethics of that? What are the views of dissenting, non-Islamist faculty and other groups and when and why did they dissent? Before, during, or after Steven Emerson’s and Michael Fechter’s exposure? Who and what processes were involved in derogating their voices from the official and unofficial record? Should a university allow an outside court decide whether an accused terrorist has misappropriated his contract to teach and research? Or should it investigate and make its own decision independent of an outside court? How does a university that values the principal of due process assist a colleague who chooses to air his or case in the media instead of arbitrating his grievances through designated university channels?

In addition and given that the terrorists who inserted themselves into the USF milieu were supportive of Hasan Al-Turabi--whose genocidal regime in the Sudan purged the Sudanese university system of its intellectual content and forced students and professors, along with millions of other citizens, into refugee camps
(McCrummen, 2007: p.2A)--the researcher recommends that USF establish a program to locate Sudanese refugee-intellectuals and offer them scholarships to complete the education denied to them by the Sudanese Islamist movement became the ideological and civil service mainstay of the 1989 government.

Future research also should involve asking questions and conducting studies about the range of sub-issues embedded in this study, all in an effort to cure USF and higher education around the world of that Blumerian “social contagion.” Ways of measuring the degree of “the malady of Islam” in individual higher education institutions must be found. Ways of healing those institutions must be sought according to need and circumstance. A very important question that requires longitudinal analysis is how extensive is the International Institute of Islamic Thought’s (IIIT) influence on higher education systems in other countries and regions? and What is the effect of that possible influence on higher education and the surrounding milieu in those areas? In other words, have they achieved or do they seek total control over the meaning of Islam in those other regions, as they apparently do in the places studied in this thesis? Moreover, are other IIIT chapters involved with terrorism financing and support in those countries and regions? Are they involved with Islamic insurgencies in West Africa and Southeast Asia? Do they influence governments and agencies? Do they have connections to academics in the West? Are they engaged in exchange programs with the West?

While this study presents characteristics of Islamism in higher education generalizable across time and space, no two universities are completely alike. So a monolithic program for change must be resisted. In other words, these implications
and suggestions for future research do not signify a remedy of counter-hegemony. To the contrary, they signify a need for competition in a marketplace of ideas--a truly diverse intellectual economy instead of one based on limited commodity production.

International constituents that support such an educational enterprise must be identified and supported. Cooperation with governments like our own, which in the *9/11 Commission Report* acknowledged that terrorism was a symptom of a larger social movement, must be broached collegially and not with hostility and suspicion.

The way to contend that mass movement in higher education is not to deny that millions of people around the world practice the world’s youngest monotheistic faith, Islam. As Jung similarly noted of the German people, Muslims have genuine spiritual gifts that have been obscured by apologetics for a repressive creed, what some refer to coyly as “True Islam.” Higher education must acknowledge those Muslims who understand the difference between Islamism and Islam. As Jung also noted of the German people, over-identification with a destructive influence upon the Muslim mind, Islamism, must be challenged--even at the risk of *ad hominem* accusation.

When Islamism came to Tampa Bay and its university, it apparently brought with it an impoverishment of intellectual thought, not an enrichment of it that might advance the collective aims of the university. Media reports dating back to the early 1990’s showing Al-Arian’s views on Salman Rushdie demonstrate that point. So does his and his brother-in-law’s highly un-collegial overthrow of an imam, a USF math professor and co-holder of property deeds with Al-Arian, from his mosque. The imam’s pregnant wife suffered a miscarriage after being physically assaulted in the
coup. Apparently, that early action against a fellow religious leader in Temple Terrace speaks volumes about Al-Arian’s apparent hubris as an “enlightened Islamist” in apparent need for cover in a mosque located near USF. The contents of Inquiry, an ICP publication said to have been cited in Al-Arian’s annual review file, also maintain an anti-intellectual character reminiscent of Meddeb’s (2004) critique, further distinguishing Islamism’s closing of the Muslim mind. Do not Muslims and Arabs in our nation’s universities deserve better than what international affairs expert Dr. Walid Phares calls in Future Jihad (2007) the “mollification of intellect” through “an intellectual coup d’etat” that “distorts the ideology of jihadism” (p. 226)?

That anti-intellectualism, supported by a pre-modern epistemology that merges faith with reason and justifies the subjugation of Jews and other groups that Islamists believe are in their purview to conquer, appears to have been imported to USF and Tampa Bay by highly educated leaders who learned those things in the Middle East and other Islamic countries, largely through Muslim Brotherhood organizational channels. Finally, the Islamism that came to USF derives, in part, from an anti-intellectualism that is exported from a publishing house in Saudi Arabia to over seventy countries.

Suffice it to say, countering that anti-intellectualism of the Islamist movement might start in higher education institutions, but it cannot if higher education institutions defend Islamist epistemology on grounds that a university is not supposed to be the “arbiter of good or evil” or by intellectuals who believe in human sacrifice disguised as justifiable therapeutic warfare. Oppressed people everywhere deserve a much greater political economy than that. A country that exemplifies a different way
is Poland, whose Solidarity Movement led by Lech Walesa demonstrated and effected change in a dignified, lasting manner. True Thoreauian heroes love life. They do not condone human sacrifice. They do not love death more than they love life.

For those reasons, this study also recommends that the university support and fund a War and Peace Studies Program, for it is clear that the university and its service area possesses only limited understanding of either war or peace and the knot of marriage between the two. For example, without systematic study how could the university and its service area know that a non-kinetic, non-violent, informational war of “re-Islamization” was being waged on the campus as “Pax Islamica” and “civilizational dialogue”? At the same time, some internal and external university constituents justified the practice under the principles of free speech and the right of revolutionary rebellion. Likewise, achieving peace among Israelis, Palestinians, and the Arab world by means of suicide attacks on unarmed civilians was lauded as the only feasible means of uprising by a weaker enemy against a militarily stronger one. The Polish Solidarity Movement in the 1980s, however, proves that peaceful means of political change and international recognition can and does happen. Marcusian rebellion that encourages perpetual revolution is not a means to achieve peace.

Since the September 11th attacks, our society has learned much more about the nature our ideological adversary, but it has not fully awakened and as of 2008 it may be sliding back into a pre-9/11 state of unconsciousness. Many academics who hold the most coveted positions in Middle East studies programs still research and teach from a limited perspective that the “threat of Islamic” is a “myth.” In addition to this study, Walid Phares (2007) draws a similar conclusion. These academics have not
studied how what is typically called “resurgence” also may be an “insurgence.” Many of them refuse to entertain such a possibility as they promulgate a doctrine that “The West” manufactures such questions in order to oppress non-Western cultures. In another respect, however, those academics may be correct. Perhaps “Islam” is not a threat, but Islamism is. And those who have suffered from it the most have been Muslims themselves. Like Jacques Derrida, an Arab Jew from Algeria who felt alienated from his Arab ethnic brothers, many Muslims feel a similar alienation. If such alienation exists in the Islamic-Arab world, then what is the magnitude of that alienation among them in Western societies where Muslims have immigrated? In other words, has that alienation been imported to the West? If so, how does it manifest psychologically, politically, religiously?

Our society still has a long way to go toward understanding that Islamism and its more violent offshoot “Jihadism” signify a long-term strategic/ideological threat in both the domestic and international arena. In the past, the United States and the world were faced with a previously identified long-term strategic/ideological threat, Communism. At that time, in the 1940s, the nation’s premier doctoral research institutions had defense studies programs that provided the institutional and intellectual capital to assist peaceful democracies in effectively countering a hostile adversary that they understood as an existential threat. We may only imagine what our lives would be like today had not those university programs existed. The manifest absurdities of McCarthyism, the Vietnam War, and the rise of Marcusian doctrine in education changed academia’s view of defense studies. According to Major General Robert Scales, who holds a doctorate in history from Harvard University, not a single...
such program exists today. The university and the nearby MacDill Air Force Base have enough intellectual capital between them to jointly oversee a War and Peace Studies Program at USF. Such an enterprise would be wholly aligned with the university’s strategic plan for 2007-2012.

USF may have a debt to pay in its role in aiding and abetting a political ideology that is apparently hostile to academic freedom everywhere in the world. It does not matter whether people aided and abetted that ideology knowingly or not. When USF-WISE came to be, USF apparently stopped asking traditional academic questions about fundamental academic things. The promotion of a political program called “re-Islamization of society and knowledge” cloaked in the more benign terms of “civilizational dialogue” seems to have become the overriding reason for curriculum decisions. Acceptance of that doublespeak apparently resulted in a university suffering from, in Jung’s terms, collective guilt. Moreover, the leaders of WISE apparently were courted and one was given teaching assignments in Middle East courses not because they or he possessed the proper academic credentials but because they were of a particular religious faith.

It is true that USF strengthened its collective bargaining contract and that the faculty and administration mended fences since Al-Arian’s arrest and confession of conspiracy to commit terrorism by using USF infrastructure and personnel in his front activity. But a newspaper report in The St. Petersburg Times saying that USF has “moved on” may deny a deeper problem that apparently has not been redressed. Blaming the media, 9/11 hysteria, a new McCarthyism, the U.S. government, or a
foreign government is not the way for USF to expiate its problems regarding the findings of this study.

Academic freedom is a product of the Reformation. The writings of Islamists who came to USF-WISE have demonstrated by word and deed that they are not academic freedom’s friend because they are not the Reformation’s friend. Indeed, where they have succeeded in overthrowing governments, they have used universities as “ladders to power” and then ruined academic freedom at great cost to human life. They have betrayed their colleagues both abroad and at USF. Two of the people on the USF-WISE visiting scholars list, Hasan Al-Turabi and Rashid Al-Ghannoushi, were leaders in that betrayal. Yet Islamist doublespeak at USF referred to them as “respected intellectuals.” Universities, professional associations, academic disciplines, students, publications, student groups, and area studies institutes are not supposed to be places where *logos* is used to consolidate power and knowledge in the service of a single political ideology.

The sense of the academic ethic governing how USF makes amends rightly comes from Edward Shils’ great essays on the subject. Shils possessed a living memory of how a political ideology in the form of Nazism slowly prepared Nazi Germany for the Holocaust through the advancement in the universities of a kind of social justice for an aggrieved German people following the Treaty of Versailles. The results of that slow takeover of the once envied German universities harmed Germans inasmuch as they harmed Jews and world civilization itself. That takeover of the academic disciplines by a political ideology led directly to the destruction of Europe, the self-destruction of Germany, and the implementation of the Final Solution. The
subversion of Germany’s academic ethic to a political ideology is why, after the defeat of Germany, in 1947 the new German constitution made academic freedom a constitutional amendment. Shils’ memory of Germany’s intellectual holocaust in the 1930’s and 1940’s is why he objected to the advancement of Marcusian doctrines of two-tiered standards of social justice in American universities in the 1960’s and 1970’s.

Perhaps more concrete implications than a discussion of USF’s role in advancing a social movement that denies intellectual freedom could be addressed in this final chapter about USF’s long walk in a dark wood, but they are embedded in the deeper implication above regarding what Jung in the early part of the Twentieth Century would call higher education’s “collective soul.” Until measures are taken to acknowledge fully USF’s problems that led to a social contagion that overtook the campus and its service area, smaller measures like “investigating partnerships with outside sources thoroughly” or even firing a professor later convicted of providing services to a terrorist group will remain just that, small measures that treat symptoms and not problems. A world suffering from a grave social contagion deserves so much more than that.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: Excerpt from a Muslim Brotherhood Movement English-Language Website, with Names of Known Sami Al-Arian Associates Highlighted in Upper Case Bold Lettering under Sub-Heading “Intellectual Development” (http://www.ummah.net/ikhwan/)

Muslim Brotherhood Movement

Homepage

History

Soon after the biggest calamity happened in 1924 with the collapse of the "Khilafa", and the declaration of war against all shapes of Islam in most of the Muslim countries, the Islamic "revival" entered into the movement phase in the middle east by establishing "Al-Ikhwan Al-Moslemoon" (Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt, 1928 [1]. Soon after that date, it began to have several branches outside Egypt [2]. Al-Ikhwan, since that date, began to spread the principal Islamic idea: That Islam is "Creed and state, book and sword, and a way of life" [3]. These principles were uncommon at that time even among many muslim "scholars" who believed that Islam is restricted within the walls of the mosque [2]. The Ikhwan, after a few years, were banned and tortured in most of the Muslim countries [2]. However, the "mother movement" kept growing and working. Its 1st leader and guide (murshid) _Hassan Al-Banna_ prefered "gathering men over gathering information in books" [1], and so he emphasized building the Ikhwanic organization and establishing its internal rules so that it would keep going, unaffected by his absence. And that's what happened after his shahada in 1949 in Cairo.

Organization

Al-Ikhwan has branches in over 70 countries all over the world. The movement is flexible enough to allow working under the "Ikhwan" name, under other names, or working according to every country's circumstances. However, all Ikhwan groups, in all countries are characterized by the following with respect to their method [3]:
1- Following the Salaf: Rejecting any action or principle which contradicts the Quran or Sunna, and inviting people to nothing but them both.
2- Establishing the Sunna: Working -as much as possible- to spread the Sunna in every aspect of life.
3- Increasing the Iman: By concentrating on the purity of hearts, loving Muslims in the sake of Allah, and remembrance (plus being away of any Sufi mistakes).
4- Political Activism: By putting political programs for "Islamising" government in different countries (after realistic studies), and establishing these programs thru the convenient ways which do not conflict with Islam.
5- Stressing Physical Health: By forming sports clubs and committing members to regular exercises.
6- Enriching Scientific Study: By enhancing the knowledge of members and others about Islam. Members with "Shari'a" major have special study programs.
7- Establishing a Sound Economic Infrastructure: By supporting and/or sponsoring any Islamic project and facing its "fiqh" problems. By the way, the ONLY accepted source of money to the Ikhwan is its members' OWN money [3].
8- Fostering Social ties: By maintaining brotherhood links among the members of the Islamic society.

Main objectives A huge tree of "sub-goals" branches from these main objectives which are derived from the Quran and the tradition of the prophet (pbuh) [3,4]:
Appendix A: (Continued)

1- Building the Muslim individual: brother or sister with a strong body, high manners, cultured thought, ability to earn, strong faith, correct worship, conscious of time, of benefit to others, organized, and self-struggling character [3].
2- Building the Muslim family: choosing a good wife (husband), educating children Islamicaly, and inviting other families.
3- Building the Muslim society (thru building individuals and families) and addressing the problems of the society realistically.
4- Building the Muslim state.
5- Building the Khilafa (basically a shape of unity between the Islamic states).
6- Mastering the world with Islam.

Objectives 1 to 4 are parallel and interlinked, and continuous even after reaching 4, 5 or 6.

Main methods of education (tarbiah):

The main (not the only) way of "building" is the Islamic education "tarbiah". Its methods are briefly:

1- Halaga (a weekly unit study and practice meeting).
2- Katibah (a monthly several-units-meeting).
3- Trip.
4- Camp.
5- Course.
6- Workshop.
7- Conference.

1 to 7 are for members, non-members, or both, with different established goals, schedules, and leaders [5].

Establishing the Islamic government:

Al-Ikhwan believe that ruling a government should be the step which follows preparing (most of) the society for accepting the Islamic laws. Otherwise, ruling a totally corrupt society thru a militant government-overthrow is a great risk [5]. Preparing the society is achieved thru plans for: spreading the Islamic culture, the possible media means, mosques, and da'wa work in public organizations such as syndicates, parliaments, student unions, ... [6]. Parallel to that, distinct muslims should be trained to administer political, economical, social, and student organizations efficiently (and Islamicly), as another preparation step. Moreover, the Ikhwan don't demand the rule for themselves; they welcome any leader who wants to establish a TRUE Islamic government to have all the Ikhwanic support and help.

Some Achievements of Ikhwan

1. Liberating Muslim lands

Throughout their history, the ikhwan have had many accomplishments. However, their philosophy is that they prefer action and work over words and propaganda. The ikhwan have played and continue to play a major role in the struggle to liberate Muslims lands. The ikhwan's bravery in the 1948 Palestine war has been recorded by all sides. The total number of volunteers from the ikhwan in 1948 numbered 10,000 from Egypt, Syria and other countries. In addition to participating in the battle to liberate Palestine, they served to raise the consciousness of Muslims all over the Islamic World and restore to them the spirit of struggle and dignity. The ikhwan have played a role in liberating Muslim lands from colonialist powers in almost every Muslim country. The ikhwan were active amongst Muslims in Central Asian Muslim republics since the '70s, and their involvement can be seen recently in such republics as Tajikistan. More recently they had a major role in the struggle for Afghanistan and Kashmir.
Appendix A: (Continued)

2. Intellectual development

The school of Ikhwan counts amongst its graduates many of the thinkers, scholars and activists of this century. To list but a few:

* Hassan Al-Banna
* Sayyed Qutb
* AbdelQader 'Audah
* Mustapha al-Siba'yi
* Hassan al-Hudaybi
* Umar al-Tilmisani
* Yusuf al-Qaradhawi
* Sa'eed Hawwa
* ABDULLAH 'AZZAM
* Muhammad Hamed Abdul-Nasr
* RACHED AL-GHANNOUSHI
* Mahfouz al-Nahnah
* Muhammad Ahmad Al-Rashid
* Fathi Yakan
* Shaikh Abdul-Fattah Abu Ghuddah
* Shaikh Ahmad Yaseen
* Mustapha Mashhour
* Muneer al-Ghadban
* Shaikh Abdul-Majeed al-Zindanee
* Shaikh Syed Sabiq
* Shaikh Muhammad al-Ghazali,
...........and many others

The contributions of these thinkers, scholars and activists to Muslim thought existence in the twentieth century is well-known. Stemming from the notion that Islam is comprehensive for all areas of life, the thinkers and activists who have gone through the training of the ikhwan have branched out to address as many areas of Muslim life as possible. Theories have been developed in areas of fiqh, finance & economics, political systems ....etc. This can be discussed in detail during the discussion period.

3. Development of Institutions

Beginning in the late 50s and early 60s and up till now, the Ikhwan contributed to establishing firm basis for Islamic communities in Europe and North America. This was done mainly through fostering the establishment of local community organizations, islamic schools, national associations, and special interest organizations (Medical, Scientific, Cultural ...etc.)

The Ikhwan were the main motivators behind setting up experiments in Islamic financing on a nationally and internationally viable scale. The theory and practical requirements needed to set up an Islamic banking system came from amongst the ranks of the Ikhwan. From the earliest years, establishing an Islamic Economic system was a priority for the Ikhwan. Hassan al-Banna, Sayed Qutb, Yusuf al-Qaradhawi and numerous other scholars laid down some of the groundwork for practical theories of Islamic finance. Further specialized writers such as provided the practical basis for Islamic Financial Institutions, a number of which were developed in Muslim countries.
Appendix A: (Continued)

Theme

Allah is our objective.
The messenger is our leader.
Quran is our law.
Jihad is our way.
Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.

References


Frequently Asked Questions About The Movement.

Please Press Here to see the question list.

Important Disclaimer: The maintainer of this page is not a member of Al-Ikhwan party and does not approve or agree with everything they say. This page is there for the soul purpose of answering the questions you always had and never knew who to ask. This page has no political purpose of any kind and no connection what so ever to any organization or institution.

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About the Author

Terri K. Wonder holds an M.A. in English, and she was a study-abroad student at the American University at Cairo in 1998. As a graduate student at USF, she served as assistant-to-the editor of *The International Journal of Educational Reform*. Interested in religious reform movements in education, she co-authored “Faith-Based Doctrine, Law, Policy, and Social Education Reform” (2001) with Dr. Permuth. She also has co-written papers on the legacy of *Brown v. Board of Education*. In 2006, Terri presented in Turkey a paper on youth violence in for a conference held by Turkey’s Interior and Education Ministries. Terri K. Wonder’s doctoral research has initiated several lines inquiry involving higher education, Islamist movements, and the global security environment. She has presented peer-reviewed papers on related topics for The Education Law Association, The National Intelligence Conference, The Intelligence Summit, and the US Army Anti-Terrorism Conference. In spring and fall 2008, she will have two papers published in *IALEIA Journal* and *The Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*. 