Frames in the U.S. Print Media Coverage of the Kashmir Conflict

by

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Frames in the U.S. Print Media Coverage of the Kashmir Conflict

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ABSTRACT


The study found that in the first two phases, the conflict was described as a violent Kashmiri separatist movement, a frame that changed to one depicting it as ongoing violent conflict between India and Pakistan. In all phases, Kashmiris were predominantly identified as armed militants fighting for secession of Kashmir from India, a goal that decreased in prominence in the last two phases. India was depicted initially as a country suppressing the rebellion in Kashmir through violent means with the help of its armed forces, a frame that shifted later to a military force fighting Pakistani troops and non-Kashmiri Islamic fighters. Pakistan was consistently identified as a country supporting the Kashmiri separatist movement with arms and training, and later as a
country itself participating in the conflict through its military. The United States was consistently described as a country concerned with peace and security in South Asia. The dominant frames in all periods were found to be portraying the conflict as a war and in the last two phases, a potential nuclear war. The Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris were always characterized through their religious identities – Indians as Hindu, and Pakistanis and Kashmiris as Muslim or Islamic. Official sources were consistently greater in number than unofficial sources for India, Pakistan and the United States but for Kashmiris, unofficial sources scored over official ones in all four periods.
Chapter One
Introduction

The mass media have been shown to have a significant impact on what issues the
cultural agenda focuses on and how it thinks about them. Two of these effects of the mass media
are embodied in the theories of agenda setting (McCombs and Shaw, 1972) and framing
(Gamson, 1989; Goffman, 1974; Graber, 1988; Entman, 1989; Tuchman, 1978)
respectively. In the works of the above experts on it and many of the other researchers
who have investigated it, framing has been advanced as a theory that applies to the
different stages of the mass communications process – message formation, transmission,
and assimilation.

Past research in international mass communication has shown the media are very
influential in setting the public agenda with regard to foreign nations. Indeed, for the
American public, not only are the media the chief sources of information about foreign
affairs, prestige newspapers such as The New York Times, The Washington Post and the
Los Angeles Times are also sources of information for foreign policy elites, including
government officials (Graber, 1980). In a survey of 629 randomly selected residents of
Dade County, Florida, Salwen and Matera (1992) found a distinct agenda-setting
influence of the news media regarding perceptions about foreign countries. Their results
indicated evidence in the form of changes in public assessments of foreign nations as
dangerous places in relation to media coverage of those nations. The public also provided
an accurate assessment of the relative frequency of coverage given to each country in the
U.S. media. Since the media are the major sources of information about foreign nations
for U.S. audiences, it can be argued that the specific information contained in media
messages (frames) are also transferred to people, so that they have a media-induced
problem definition, sense of moral responsibility, and treatment recommendation for
whatever is happening in a particular foreign country. It is this ability of the media
through their use of frames to tell people how to think about something that makes the
study of frames very important.

Kashmir has been a flashpoint in relations between India and Pakistan since their
independence from British rule in 1947. In the past 56 years, the two nuclear-capable
countries have fought four wars, three of which have centered on Kashmir. As recently as
the summer of 2002, the two nations were almost on the brink of war and had amassed
millions of troops on their mutual border after an attack by a group of gunmen from the
Kashmiri separatist group Lashkar-e-Toiba on India’s Parliament Building on December

This study will attempt to identify and analyze the terms that have been used by
the U.S. media to describe the conflict and the different parties to it – India, Pakistan, and
the people of Kashmir. It also will look at whether and how these frames have changed
over the years as the conflict has evolved and different actors have entered and exited the
scene. In addition, it will attempt to place the changes in the frames, if any, in the context
of changes occurring in the relationship between India and Pakistan, in global events and in international equations.

Since international events are outside the direct experience of most people who depend on the mass media for information on foreign affairs, it is important to determine to what degree bias is reflected in news reporting because “legislators, as well as the public, may form negative or positive stereotypes of a country based on media portrayal that is disproportionate and distorted” (Dickson, 1992). In order to understand whether the press revealed a bias for or against the U.S. government vis-à-vis the US-Sandinista conflict in Nicaragua, Dickson analyzed the content of The New York Times and The Washington Post articles between 1983 and 1987. The purpose of her analysis was to find out the degree to which these papers relied on U.S. government officials rather than other sources for information about the conflict. Results of the content analysis indicated that both papers were heavily dependent on officials in Washington for information and an overwhelming majority of stories about the conflict were put together by the papers’ staff members in the United States, particularly in Washington, DC.

Several explanations have been offered for the disproportionate reliance of the media on officialdom. According to Entman (1989), the media get most of their information from officials because the “least expensive way to satisfy mass audiences is to rely upon legitimate political elites for most information” due to the elites’ cultural legitimacy and the “facts” they supply. The extent to which the media are dependent on official sources can be gauged by the fact that the beat system in most media organizations is organized along the lines of government bureaucracy. The enormity and
complexity of day-to-day events necessitate the establishment and practice of certain routines in order to make it possible for media organizations to control the task of reporting the news (Shoemaker and Reese, 1991). Therefore, the established routines of newsgathering, as well as the ease of availability and the perceived prestige and objectivity of official sources, ensure the media’s dependence on them for information. Thus, as the results of Dickson’s analysis point out, the media to a great extent legitimate the prevailing government “line” (p. 569; emphasis in original).

Apart from organizational routines, the principle of objectivity that journalists must observe while reporting on a multi-dimensional issue also ensures that certain voices will get aired more than others. Since the practice of objectivity means journalists have to interview legitimate elites on all major sides of a dispute, it is easy for those elites who can improve their access and package their viewpoint in media-friendly terms, to make sure that they gain favorable coverage (Entman, 1989; Noakes and Wilkins, 2002). Since the nature and identity of the sources used is important to understand the manner in which an event or issue has been covered, this study will look at the sources used by the U.S. media in the coverage of Kashmir to determine which voices and perspectives got aired.

Justification for the Problem

It is important to understand how the U.S. media have covered the Kashmir conflict by studying the frames they have used in this coverage for three reasons. First, because in general the study of frames helps one to understand how the media construct
social reality, the study of these frames will help one understand how the U.S. media have described, explained and interpreted the Kashmir conflict. Second, since foreign news is the most obvious area where the media shape people’s perceptions of reality for the reason that a vast majority of people have limited resources for acquiring and interpreting information about events in foreign nations (Gamson, 1992), then this study could serve as a starting point for the study of the impact of the frames used in coverage of the conflict on the perception of the conflict itself and the parties engaged in it. Third, by analyzing the coverage of Kashmir for the presence of frames as well as tracking the changes in those frames over a 15-year period, this study will contribute to knowledge about foreign news coverage of the U.S. media, particularly about an area of the world that has until recently not been of much interest to U.S. policymakers and consequently the media.
Chapter Two

Review of Literature

In order to understand the frames that have been used in the coverage of the Kashmir conflict, one needs to acquaint oneself with the genesis and history of the conflict as well as the nature and significance of media frames. This section provides a brief account of the Kashmir issue in the context of relations between India and Pakistan and also their relations with the international community, particularly the United States. This chapter also discusses in some detail the concept of framing as a means of organizing media text as well as the impact of frames on consumers of the media.

Overview of the Kashmir Dispute

The British left the Indian subcontinent in August 1947, but not before supervising its division into two nations - India and Pakistan. The basis of partition was religious – while India was seen as a Hindu-majority state, Pakistan was envisioned by its founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, to be the home of the subcontinent’s Muslims. Hindu-majority areas were designated parts of India while Muslim-majority areas were parts of the new Pakistan. All provinces ruled by kings and princes were given a choice of acceding into either nascent state. The region of Kashmir (or the current Indian state
called Jammu & Kashmir) was a Muslim-majority province ruled by a Hindu king who procrastinated on the decision to join either India or Pakistan (Ganguly, 2001; Dixit, 2002).

In October 1947, a tribal group in the southwestern part of Kashmir rebelled against the king and was provided support by the Pakistani army in the form of men and materials. When the rebels moved to the outskirts of Srinagar, the capital of the region, the king panicked and approached India for assistance. The Indian Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, agreed to provide military assistance on the condition that the king accede to India and the accession be approved by a popular leader and the people’s representative, Sheikh Abdullah.

Once the above two conditions were met, the Indian Army was airlifted into Kashmir. The two sides fought a bitter battle till the declaration of a United Nations-sponsored ceasefire on January 1, 1949. By the time the war ended, the rebels supported by the Pakistani Army had managed to capture a third of the territory of the former princely state. The ceasefire line was declared the Line of Control (LoC) between the two nations and it has remained as such till this day. India referred the matter in 1948 to the United Nations Security Council, which passed several resolutions asking Kashmiri rebels and Pakistani forces to withdraw and mandating a free and fair plebiscite to determine the fate of Kashmir. Due to deep-rooted mistrust of each other, India and Pakistan have never carried out the terms of the U.N. resolution. The area captured by the rebels in the 1947 war is called “Azad” (Free) Kashmir by Pakistan and “Pakistan-occupied” Kashmir (PoK) by India. The area under Indian control is called the state of

The dispute about whether Kashmir should be a part of India or Pakistan is tied to the respective identities of the two nations. While on the one hand Pakistan contends that Kashmir should legitimately be a part of its territory because the two-nation theory holds that Muslim-majority regions be a part of Pakistan, India insists that it cannot allow any part of its territory to be separated from it on the basis of religious affiliation because India was founded to be a pluralistic and multi-religious nation (Dixit, 2002). Pakistan has consistently demanded that India conduct the UN-mandated plebiscite, a demand that India refuses to meet on the grounds that the plebiscite was on condition that Pakistan withdraw completely from the region, which it has not done to date. India also asserts that Kashmir is legitimately a part of its territory because the king chose to accede into India after the partition. Another important reason why India refuses to let go of Kashmir is because it fears this will set off a domino effect and provide support to other regions in India that want to break off from the Indian union (Cohen, 2003).

In subsequent years, the Cold War between the then U.S.S.R. and the United States shaped India-Pakistan relations. While Pakistan courted western powers by advertising itself as a potential protector of Western interests in the oil-rich and predominantly Muslim Middle East, India positioned itself as a non-aligned nation and developed a close relationship with Russia (Ayoob, 1999). Pakistan was a major U.S. aid recipient through the cold war years and was given substantial arms assistance by the United States to help bring about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
Along with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Pakistan was a very important partner in the U.S. effort to support Afghan resistance fighters to mount a “jihad” (holy war) against the Soviet Union.

Tensions between India and Pakistan continued to simmer and reached a head several times, resulting in three more wars after the 1947 war – one in 1965, when Pakistan attacked India, believing it to be weakened by a humiliating defeat in the hands of China in 1962; and another in 1971, when India was instrumental in helping what was then East Pakistan to break away from Pakistan and become a separate nation – Bangladesh (Ganguly, 2001). The third, albeit undeclared war was fought in 1999 in the Kargil sector in the upper reaches of the Himalayas in Kashmir.

A decisive turn in the Kashmir dispute came in 1989, when Muslim extremists started an armed separatist movement in the Kashmir valley (Dixit, 2002; Cohen, 2003). Their objective was a Kashmir independent of both India and Pakistan. After the start of the movement for self-rule, Hindus, who were a minority in the Kashmir valley, left their homeland in hordes. As civilian massacres became an everyday occurrence, the state government was dissolved and the Indian Army moved into the state to control the situation. Throughout the 1990s, the Indian Army continued to battle militant groups in Kashmir. India routinely accused Pakistan of supporting various terrorist groups in Kashmir and repeatedly asked Pakistan to refrain from doing so. On the other hand, Pakistan persistently accused India of denying Kashmiris the right to self-determination and of committing human rights violations (Dixit, 2002). Matters were further complicated and took a turn toward Islamic fundamentalism and “jihad” when the
Afghanistan war ended in a Russian defeat in 1989 and Afghani mercenary fighters moved into Kashmir to support militant groups in the early 1990s.

Another turning point in India-Pakistan relations and in Kashmir as the subcontinent’s flashpoint came when both countries tested their nuclear devices in May 1998. Defying pressure from the western powers to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which stipulated a ban on nuclear testing, India tested five nuclear devices on May 11 and May 13, 1998 (McHorney, 2002). Alarmed at India’s actions, Pakistan also conducted underground nuclear tests on May 28 and 30. As a punitive measure, the U.S administration headed by President Bill Clinton imposed economic sanctions against India and Pakistan, limiting U.S. economic aid as well as trade and military transfers to both countries.

The nuclearization of the subcontinent raised the profile of the Kashmir issue in the international arena, as western powers became increasingly alarmed at the possibility of border skirmishes escalating into a nuclear war between the two countries, notwithstanding India’s offer of no first use of nuclear weapons. Ironically, according to New Delhi and Islamabad, overt acquisition of nuclear weapons had significantly reduced the likelihood of war between them (Ganguly, 2001).

The first post-nuclear-tests war between India and Pakistan was fought in and around Kargil in the upper reaches of the western Himalayas in the summer of 1999. Taking advantage of inadequate patrolling of this very harsh and inhospitable terrain, the Pakistani Army and Kashmiri insurgents had infiltrated across the LoC in the spring of 1999, taking the Indian Army by surprise. India conducted air strikes against the
intruders, who had a strategic advantage over ground troops as they had firmly
entrenched themselves in high-altitude positions. The Clinton administration, in marked
contrast to its policy of mediating regional disputes, refused to support Pakistan’s attempt
to bring the issue into the United Nations Security Council. This stance was also a
departure from the traditionally pro-Pakistani U.S. policy, and finally forced Pakistani
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to order a withdrawal from Kargil on July 4, 1999
(Ganguly, 2001; Dixit, 2002).

The decade of the nineties saw the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the
United States as the world’s sole superpower. Indo-US relations improved, with
increased bilateral trade and the emergence of India as a hub for information technology.
Clinton’s refusal to mediate in the Kargil crisis and his subsequent visit to India in 2000
marked a positive shift in relations between the United States and India. Taking
cognizance of India’s assertion that Pakistan was sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir,
Clinton, in a public broadcast in Pakistan during his 2000 visit, warned Pakistan of
potential international isolation if the nation did not change its course.

The events of September 11, 2001 and the U.S. war against terrorism changed all
that and brought Pakistan back to center stage in the triangular relationship. While India
courted the United States enthusiastically – a marked departure from its previous policy
towards the country – the U.S. chose to partner with Pakistan in its attempt to uproot the
Taliban from Afghanistan (Mohan, 2002). Pakistan’s location and the Pakistani Army’s
intimate knowledge of the Taliban no doubt played a decisive role in the US decision to
ask Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf for support.
Nevertheless, the terrorist attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City have made the U.S. administration more sympathetic to India’s terrorist concerns. The administration’s new pro-India attitude was reflected in its response to the spate of terrorist attacks in India after September 11, notably the attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001. In response to this attack, India mounted a massive military deployment, cut off transportation links with Pakistan, downgraded diplomatic ties with Pakistan, and threatened to go to war against Pakistan (Schaffer, 2002). The George Bush administration quickly intervened and for the first time formally acknowledged the link between Kashmiri terrorist groups and the Pakistani state. This act pressured Pakistani president General Pervez Musharraf to declare that Pakistani soil would not be used to export terror to any part of the world and resulted in formal commitments from Pakistan to end cross-border infiltration into India. He kept his promise and in January 2002 banned the Lashkar-e-toiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad, two Islamic jihadi outfits that had been involved in the attack on the Indian Parliament (www.rediff.com).

At present, there is a debate in academic circles as to whether the United States should help India and Pakistan work out a permanent solution to the dispute over Kashmir, going beyond its traditional role of episodic crisis management. Some argue that the moment is opportune, with India-U.S. relations improving considerably (Mohan, 2002) and the growing realization in the United States that in order to check global terrorism, failing states such as Pakistan need to be addressed on a long-term basis (Schaffer 2002). Others, however, argue that U.S. mediation in Kashmir is a distant
possibility because the region is of little interest to the United States for several reasons (Limaye, 2002, p164). The dispute is largely unfamiliar to most Americans and Kashmir contains no resources that are of interest to the U.S. and its allies. Also, resolution of the conflict does not involve any ideological values dear to the United States. Although preventing nuclear war has been the centerpiece of U.S. policy towards South Asia in the past decade, the region still remains a low-priority area for U.S. diplomats.

Framing

A major and fairly recent part of media effects research, framing theory is used to explain the power of a communicating text. Framing by the mass media is an essential part of their role in the construction of social reality (Tuchman, 1978). The news media have the power to shape the meanings that the audience assigns to an issue or event because they “disseminate the information that people want, need, and should know” (p. 2). In this way, the media actively promote the frames of reference that readers and viewers use to interpret and discuss public events and problems. McCombs, Shaw and Weaver (1997) have equated framing with second-level agenda setting, which is transfer of issue attributes from the media to the public. They argue that framing is an extension of agenda setting in terms of media effects. The mass media have been shown to have on the public, a powerful agenda setting influence whereby the priority assigned by the media to certain issues gets translated into the priority assigned to them by the consumers of these mass media (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). While agenda setting describes the
power of the media to tell people “what” to think about, framing can be regarded as
telling them “how” to think about it.

Framing can be defined as the selection of some attributes of a given event or
issue and the presentation of them as more prominent than other attributes or aspects of
the event or issue in the media. According to Entman (1993), “to frame is to select some
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in
such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (p. 52; emphasis in original). According
to Gitlin (1980), the origin of frames lies in the media’s selection of certain versions of
reality over others. “Day by day, normal organizational procedures define “the story,”
identify the protagonists and the issues, and suggest appropriate attitudes toward them”
(p. 4; emphases in original). Since this research is limited to the print media, it will
discuss only frames that are embedded in print news texts.

Frames have four locations – the communicator, the text, the audience and the
culture – and on any given issue, frames from different locations might be different from
each other (Entman, 1993). The communicators (journalists) have certain ways in which
they cover each event and these are dictated by news values, routines of news coverage –
deadline pressures, preferred use of certain types of sources over others, and
organizational ideology – and their own personal values (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991;
Tuchman, 1978). These factors contribute to them looking at events in a certain manner;
this gets translated intentionally or otherwise into frames in the text that they write
(Gamson, 1989).
The presence of frames in a text can be gauged by looking for the use of “certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments” (p. 52; Entman, 1993). These frames are transferred to the readers, who interpret them according to their mental schemata, defined as mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information (Graber, 1988). In the words of Lippman (1922), “the only feeling that anyone can have about an event that he does not experience is the feeling aroused by his mental image of that event” (p.13). Although each member of the audience has unique mental schemata, frames can be regarded as having a common effect on the majority, if not all, of the people subjected to them. This common effect on readers is what makes it important to study the frames used by the mass media.

The fourth location for frames is the culture, which can be regarded as a storehouse of values, beliefs and practices that inform both the communicator and the audience. The frames embedded in popular culture assume special significance in international communication because journalists reporting on a foreign nation are bound to frame their messages in a manner that is compatible with the audience and cultural frames in their home country. According to Graber (1980), American correspondents abroad must operate within the context of current American politics and the current American culture and their stories “must not only reflect the American value structure, but also conform to established American stereotypes.” For example, Noakes and Wilkins (2002) contend that US media coverage of the first Palestinian intifada (popular
uprising against Israel in 1987), was sympathetic to the Palestinians’ cause because the claims of the intifada resonated with Western social movement frames.

Entman (1993) has said that the frame in a text is an imprint of power. Several powerful groups compete to get their frames included in the reporting of an event or issue and therefore a communicating text conveys the frame of the group that won the battle to dominate it. According to Lippman (1922), since major issues are very complicated and subject to several different choices and opinions, “it is natural that everyone should wish to make his or her own choice of facts for the newspapers to print” (p. 345). An obvious example of this tussle for ensuring that one’s interpretation of an issue is the dominant perception about it, is the one that goes on between interest groups on either side of a debate.

Andsager (2000) studied the comparative success of pro-life and pro-choice groups in dominating media discourse on policymaking on late-term abortion in 1996 through their use of rhetoric. She found that although pro-choice groups had more press releases than pro-life ones, the rhetorical terms used by pro-life groups appeared in the media twice as frequently as those used by pro-choice groups. Andsager posited that this could be because the pro-life rhetoric “fit-in with journalists’ attitude towards late-term abortion, which most people found grisly, as well as the traditional newsworthiness value of conflict” (Andsager, 200; p. 589). It is apparent from her study that the rhetoric employed by competing groups has an impact on journalistic framing.
Framing Effects

The salience of a frame in a media text is a product of the interaction of the frames embedded in the text and in the mental schemas of the reader. Although the presence of frames in a text, as detected by researchers, does not guarantee that audience frames will be identical to the frames in the text (Entman, 1989), media frames, by emphasizing some aspects of a problem over others, activate certain kinds of knowledge within people, and this in turn affects their trains of thought and recommended behavior. According to Price, Tewksbury and Powers (1997), media frames have two kinds of effects on the audience – applicability effects and accessibility effects. During processing of a media text, the salient attributes of the text activate in readers’ minds certain ideas that affect their response to the message. These are called applicability effects. Once activated, these ideas and feelings remain in the readers’ minds and are used in making subsequent evaluations. These are defined as accessibility effects.

Price et al (1997) conducted an experiment in which undergraduate students were asked to read articles about possible cuts in state funding. They manipulated an article to reflect three different dominant frames – a conflict frame, a human interest frame, and a consequence frame. They also used a fourth group as control, subjecting its members to a story that just had the bare bones of the proposed budget cut. In the posttest questionnaire, respondents were asked to write down all thoughts and feelings they had while reading the stories randomly assigned to them. Coding of the open-ended answers revealed a significant difference in the responses of the groups subjected to different frames.
To study the long-term effects of message framing on readers’ cognitive responses, Tewksbury, Jones, Peske, Raymond and Vig (2000) conducted a two-wave experiment where they asked undergraduate students in the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, to read five experimentally manipulated versions of a news article on proposed state regulation of large-scale hog farms. One of the articles was an objective version of the issues surrounding hog farms with equal emphasis on the environmental impact of unregulated hog farms and the economic impact of regulating them. Two articles moderately emphasized the environmental and economic frames respectively while the last two were extremely lopsided in each direction. The respondents were asked to fill out a posttest questionnaire with specific questions gauging their “feelings towards large-scale hog farms” and whether they thought large-scale hog farms should be banned in the state of Illinois. They were also asked to summarize the large-scale hog farm issue. Three weeks later, the subjects completed an identical test.

The results confirmed that subjects’ cognitions were affected by the relative dominance of frames within the articles that they read. For example, the subjects in the environmental frame were more likely to support regulation of large-scale hog farms. The strength of the pattern was lower three weeks later but still present, reflecting the persistence of frames. As the results of this experiment indicate, the different frames that journalists use to report on an issue can significantly impact public thinking on that issue. However, Tewksbury et al (2000) caution that such prominent effects may only be in case of issues that are not very mainstream. Iyengar (1991) found that the relationship between media frames and audience frames is strongly contingent upon the issue under
study. For instance experimental manipulation of a highly salient issue like unemployment did not have a significant impact on the respondents’ attribution of responsibility for a problem. Since foreign news constitutes a very meager amount of coverage in the U.S. media and the American public is highly ethnocentric (Graber, 1980, it follows that the dispute over Kashmir is not a very salient issue for them and therefore media frames would have a major impact on what they think about the issue. From the above discussion, one can conclude that media frames do have an impact on audience thinking about issues, particularly regarding non-salient ones.

**Research Questions**

In light of the literature cited above, it can be argued that it is important to understand the frames that the U.S. media have used in the past and are using now in their coverage of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan because those media frames are the source of the mental frames about the issue for American people as well as for American policymakers, albeit to a lesser extent. Drawing from Entman’s (1993) perspective on frames, one can say that analyzing the media coverage for frames would also yield information about the problem definitions, causal interpretations, moral evaluations, and treatment recommendations that the U.S. media have been promoting for the Kashmir crisis.

Gamson (1989) conceptualized that media discourse on any issue can be conceived as a set of interpretive packages, with the frame as the central organizing idea forming the core of each interpretive package. Frames are the tools that help the audience
and even journalists in constructing meaning and making sense of relevant events, by suggesting what is at issue. However, packages are not static. Media discourse on any particular issue evolves as these packages change over time incorporating new events into their interpretive frames.

In the 15-year time period chosen for this study, many changes occurred in the nature of the dispute over Kashmir, in India-Pakistan relations, in the two countries’ relationships with the United States, as well as in the global climate. At the beginning of the time period under analysis – 1989 – the Cold War was ending between the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union, the Afghanistan war between the occupying Soviet troops and U.S.- and Pakistan-supported Afghan resistance fighters or “mujahideen” ended in 1989 with the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and an armed separatist movement started in Kashmir. While the movement for self-rule in Kashmir evolved with Kashmiri rebels seeing the advent of Afghani mujahideen in their ranks through the nineties, on the global front, the Cold War came to an end and the focus of international relations shifted towards nuclear containment. In 1998, both India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons establishing their identity as nuclear-capable states and in the opinion of the world Kashmir became a flashpoint that could trigger a nuclear war. In 1999, the two countries fought the Kargil War, which ended in a ceasefire brought about by the Clinton administration. The late 1990s also saw improved relations between India and the United States.

The next major event that shook the world was the terrorist attack on the twin towers in New York City on September 11, 2001, which fueled the Afghanistan war and
ended in the rout of the Pakistan-supported Taliban. On December 13, 2001, an armed jihadi group staged a suicide attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi killing 14 people, including the five attackers. In the summer of 2002, India and Pakistan mobilized their troops along their border in Kashmir resulting in a massive standoff. The year 2003 saw a cooling down of tensions between India and Pakistan. This study attempts to track the changes in U.S. media discourse on the Kashmir dispute in order to investigate whether these events had an impact on the frames employed in its coverage. Therefore, the first research question for the study is:

**Have the frames in the U.S. print media coverage of the Kashmir conflict changed in the 15-year period from January 1, 1989 to December 31, 2003 and to what extent have these changes reflected major developments in the region, in relations between India and Pakistan, and in international affairs?**

Since U.S. interest, threat to U.S. security and threat to world peace have been found to be significant predictors of foreign news coverage by the U.S. media (Chang, Shoemaker, and Brendlinger, 1987; Chang and Lee, 1992), an analysis of the frames in the coverage on Kashmir would also show whether these concerns are also reflected on how the issue is presented in the U.S. media. Exploring the frames in the coverage on Kashmir would reveal whether the contextual statements made reflect the U.S. government’s position on the issue as well as the country’s changing relationship with India and Pakistan.
Drawing from the above discussion, the second research question is:

**What have been the dominant frames in the U.S. print media coverage of the Kashmir conflict, and to what extent have these frames reflected such major themes as religion, armed conflict, U.S. national interest, threat to world peace, and so on.**

The above literature review established the importance of sources – especially official – in the reporting of events and issues. It was also suggested that media frames carry the imprint of power because they are the outcome of the battle among sources from different sides of a dispute to get their respective version of reality to be the one that is most accepted. Frames are tools that help in the construction of reality and organize the world into manageable chunks for the mass media audience (Tuchman, 1974; Gamson, 1989). Since making sense of the world requires effort, it follows that tools that are prominently displayed and made cognitively readily accessible have a higher probability of being used. Consequently, the sources that have the most access to the media because they mold themselves to media requirements are more likely to ensure that their interpretation becomes the dominant one.

This study will look at the sources used in the media text on the Kashmir conflict to determine their origin and nature because these characteristics are important indicators of the meanings that the media have chosen to attach to the issue. Last but not least, knowledge of the sources used from both sides of the conflict and the relative emphasis placed on them by the US media will inform the public relations and lobbying efforts of the two countries.
Therefore, the third research question is:

What are the nature and affiliation of the sources used by the U.S. print media in the coverage of the Kashmir conflict?
Chapter Three
Methodology

Frames are difficult to detect in news texts because many of the framing devices used might appear as “natural” (Entman, 1991, p. 6; emphasis in original), unremarkable choices of words and images. It is this nature of frames – to be present in a very inconspicuous or “natural” fashion in the text – that makes them instrumental in establishing a particular version of reality as the “common sense” (p. 6; emphasis in original) or widespread interpretation of events. Both Entman (1991) and Gamson and Modigliani (1989) contend that frames can be constructed from and are manifested in the form of metaphors, keywords, concepts, symbols, visual images, exemplars, catchphrases and depictions. In order to detect the frames used to describe the Kashmir conflict and the actors involved, one therefore needs to identify these framing devices. Stripped down to their grammatical basics, these devices are merely nouns and verbs, and their modifiers – adjectives and adverbs. This method of analyzing parts of speech to detect frames used in this research study is derived from the works of Entman (1989), Dyer, Miller and Boone (1991) and Mills (1993).

Entman (1989) compared the U.S. media coverage given to the shooting of a Korean Air Lines flight by Soviet fighter planes on September 1, 1983 that killed 269
passengers and crew with the coverage given to the shooting of an Iran Air plane on July 3, 1988 that killed 290 people on board. In order to identify the frames, he looked for specific words – nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs chosen to describe the victims, the incident, and the act of shooting down of the planes. For example, some of the words that described the victims were “innocent human beings,” “loved ones,” and “passengers;” some words for the incident per se were “atrocity,” “murder,” and “massacre;” and some words used to describe the shooting act were “barbaric/barbarous,” “deliberate(ly),” and “murderous” (p. 19, p. 20). Similarly, in their analysis of the content of two wire services one year before and one year after the Exxon Valdez crisis in March 1988, Dyer et al (1991) identified three kinds of issues pertaining to the event – legal, economic and environmental. They selected terms – words or groups of words – that characterized each issue “based on the extent to which it was felt those terms occurred in the data context and represented the occurrence of the issue.” Some of the terms that categorized the issue as legal were “litigation,” “trial,” and “arbitration;” some that fit under the economic category were “profit,” “merger,” and “stock;” and finally, the environmental issue category included terms like “wildlife,” “dispersants,” and “otter” (p. 31).

Mills (1993) looked at the frames employed in the coverage of the armed conflict between U.S. agents and the members of the Branch Davidian cult led by David Koresh in Waco, Texas in the spring of 1993 by The Washington Post and the St Petersburg Times. He analyzed 213 stories from these two newspapers for keywords, phrases, or literary devices “with particular attention being paid to nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs and descriptive figures of speech in the texts and headlines” (p. 26). Mills identified
“narrative elements in the text that were instrumental in adding (or subtracting) meaning within the coverage. For example, any nouns used to identify or adjectives used to describe cult members were coded, provided those nouns and adjectives added a sense of meaning to the text.” (p. 26) Mills grouped words such as “standoff,” “fortified,” and “violent” into a “Warfare” frame; words like “messiah,” “abusive,” and “apocalyptic” into a “Religious fanaticism” frame; and words such as “disaster,” “death toll,” and “tragedy” into a “Tragic victims” frame (p. 30). This study will follow the examples of Entman, Dyer et al and Mills in its coding of the text of news reports on Kashmir from January 1, 1989 to December 31, 2003 in The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times and The Washington Post.

These three newspapers were chosen as the media to be examined because they are “prestige” newspapers that enjoy widespread respect not only among the reading public but also among elites, including policymakers (Graber, 1980). The New York Times offers a comprehensive coverage of the Kashmir dispute during the time period under study – 1989 to 2003. A Lexis Nexis headline search for “Kashmir” from January 1, 1989 to December 31, 2003 yielded a total of 188 articles from The New York Times and 53 from The Washington Post while a similar search in the database, ABI Inform Global, yielded 57 articles for the specified period in the Los Angeles Times. Since the aim of this study is to examine the frames employed in the news coverage given to the Kashmir conflict specifically by these newspapers, editorials, letters to the editor, and wire reports were eliminated from the population. The articles were grouped under four time periods because the distribution of stories in the 15-year-period under study was
unequal, with some years having an overwhelmingly large number of stories and some having none, particularly in the *Los Angeles Times* and *The Washington Post*.

The first time period included stories from *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* in the years 1989 and 1990. There were no articles on Kashmir in the *Los Angeles Times* for these two years. The second period of study was 1991 to 1998, and included 31 stories from *The New York Times* and three each from *The Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times*. The third period was from 1999 to 2001, with a significant jump in the number of stories from 1998 to 1999 in the *Los Angeles Times* (3 to 19) and *The New York Times* (4 to 24). The fourth period was the two-year period from 2002 to 2003, because there was a second increase in coverage from 2001 to 2002 in all the three newspapers under study: from 15 to 51 in *The New York Times*, 5 to 24 in the *Los Angeles Times* and from 6 to 21 in *The Washington Post*.

In order to maintain a certain degree of parity with the years where there was no coverage, a random sample was chosen from the years where the number of stories was more than 10 in any of the newspapers. So since the number of articles in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* were more than 10 in 1990, 33 and 13 respectively, a random sample of 17 and 6 stories were chosen from the two newspapers respectively. Table 1 shows the composition of the sample of news stories that were analyzed for this study. In order to answer the first and second research questions which are how have the frames in the coverage of the Kashmir dispute changed in the time period under study and what have been the dominant frames, the selected articles were analyzed for the frames used to describe the conflict, the region, and the three parties to it – Indians,
Pakistanis and Kashmiris. These articles were also analyzed to determine the sources used in the coverage of the dispute. The unit of analysis was each word of interest in each of the 180 articles.

**Table 1: Distribution of Stories (1989-2003) in the Sample**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>No. of stories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>The Washington Post</em></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>The Washington Post</em></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Los Angeles Times</em></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>The Washington Post</em></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Los Angeles Times</em></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>The Washington Post</em></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Los Angeles Times</em></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td></td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The articles were coded for keywords, metaphors, descriptors and other such framing devices by picking out the nouns and verbs and their modifiers – adjectives and adverbs – that have been used to describe each of the following “subjects” – Kashmir as a conflict per se; Kashmir and South Asia as a geographic region; Indians and India; Pakistanis and Pakistan; Kashmiris and Kashmir; the United States; and “Other” parties. Once these terms were identified, the author grouped them into thematic clusters or frames in a manner similar to that of Entman (1989), Dyer et al (1991) and Mills (1993). After identifying the frames on the basis of the keywords found and coded in the 180
articles under study, the author made a list of the frames evident in each of the time periods for each subject and then compared the frames evident in all four time phases for all subjects for any patterns that emerge over the entire 15-year period studied. The author assessed whether changes in the frames may be related to and explained by placing them in the context of developments in the region and in the world at that time.

In order to answer the third research question, namely, what is the nature and origin of the sources used by the U.S. media in the coverage of Kashmir, the articles were coded for the sources used on the basis of two criteria: the first was their affiliation that is whether they were Pakistani, Indian, Kashmiri, U.S or other; the second criterion was their nature – official or unofficial. Sources from both Pakistan-occupied and Indian-occupied Kashmir were categorized as being Kashmiri. Government, military, political and diplomatic sources were categorized as official, whereas representatives of militant organizations, religious organizations, human rights organizations, academic and professional research groups, laypersons and so on were categorized as unofficial sources. Once the sources were coded on the basis of their nature and affiliation, the author performed a frequency analysis on them to see the percentage of official versus unofficial sources used as well as the percentages of Indian, Pakistani, Kashmiri and U.S. and other sources used in the 15-year time period.

In order to establish the reliability of the coding decisions, a random sample of articles was chosen and coded by the author and two other coders who were both University of South Florida graduate students, one in the Mass Communications track and the other in the Journalism track. Both coders were in their fifth semester of study at
USF and had knowledge of mass media theories and practices. For the purpose of establishing the reliability, the author and the two coders coded the first article appearing in all three newspapers in seven randomly chosen years from the 15-year period under study. The total number of articles coded was 13 – seven from *The New York Times* and three each from *The Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times*. There were no articles in *The Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times* for four of the randomly chosen years. The author conducted a brief training session with the two other coders to explain to them the conceptual and operational definitions of each of the categories mentioned earlier. The intercoder reliability between each of the two coders and the author was computed with the help of Holstī’s (1969) formula, which is:

\[
\text{Reliability} = \frac{2M}{N_1 + N_2}
\]

where M is the number of coding decisions on which the two coders agree and \(N_1\) and \(N_2\) are the total number of coding decisions taken by the two coders.

After establishing the intercoder reliability, the author proceeded to code all the 180 articles with the help of a coding sheet (see Appendix A), categorizing the words in the news reports for each period according to their part of speech and “subject” they described. The author also coded the sources according to the “subject” they represented and also based on their nature – official or unofficial.
Chapter Four

Results

Since the findings of this research study were very extensive, a detailed report of the findings has been provided in this chapter while the specific conclusions that answer the research questions as well as explanations, interpretations and implications of these conclusions are included in the final chapter of this document.

Mass media frames are elements – words and groups of words – that are used by journalists to describe, explain and interpret “subjects” for their audiences, which are dependent on the media for information, especially about occurrences in foreign countries. The “subjects” may be events, occurrences and issues, players involved in the event, the thoughts, feelings and attitudes of the players, as well as the situations and contexts of their occurrences. To delineate frames in the coverage of an event or issue, one has to look at the words – keywords and modifiers – that describe the “subjects.” In order to then identify the frames in the coverage of a particular “subject,” one needs to identify the regularities in the keywords and modifiers used for it. One can then place the keywords and/or modifiers that are similar in meaning in thematic groups or thematic clusters or frames and develop names or labels for these frames. The process is somewhat similar to the development of “factors” in the quantitative analysis of news coverage and has been followed in the past by Entman (1989) in his analysis of the U.S. media
coverage of the KAL and Iran Air accidents, Dyer et al (1991) in their analysis of the wire service coverage of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and Mills (1993) in his analysis of the shifting framework of the news coverage of the cult crisis in Waco, Texas.

In order to determine the changing frames used by the U.S. media in their coverage of the Kashmir conflict and thus to answer the first research question, the author followed a process similar to the one described above. First of all words – nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs – used to refer to the 1) conflict, 2) the Kashmir region, 3) India and Indians, 4) Pakistan and Pakistanis, 5) Kashmiris, 6) the United States and 7) other players or actors, were drawn out from the news articles appearing in *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times* in the 15-year period from 1989 to 2003. In order to determine whether the frames used in the coverage of these “subjects” have changed over the past decade and a half, the coverage of the period was divided into four phases: 1989-1990, 1991-1998, 1999-2001 and 2002-2003 on the basis of the frequency of news articles appearing in these years. The number of articles in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* dropped sharply from 1990 to 1991, but there was a leap in coverage from 1998 to 1999. One again, the number of articles in each of the three newspapers in 2002 and 2003 was significantly higher than in 2001.

After the isolation and coding of words, a count was done to determine the frequency with which these words appeared in each phase of coverage. For each of the seven subjects identified above, words that appeared with the highest frequency were identified and grouped and expressions coined to capture the themes or frames among words that seemed to form thematic groups. Depending on their relative prominence,
frames were categorized as major and minor. The relative occurrence of these major and minor frames in each period was then assessed and compared in order to answer the first research question, which is whether the frames have changed in the 15 years of coverage from 1989 to 2003. This established the basis for answering the second research question which was of a more general nature and asked what have been the dominant frames in the coverage of the Kashmir conflict. To answer the third research question, about the nature – official or unofficial – and the affiliation – Indian, Pakistani, Kashmiri, U.S. and other – the sources used in each story were coded according to these criteria. To determine the relative frequency with which they were used, the number of times each source was used within each story was also recorded.

However, prior to coding the 180 articles in the sample according to the previously described method and to establish the credibility of the results generated from the process, intercoder reliability was computed between the author and each of two other coders for 13 randomly chosen articles from the three newspapers under study. The results, which were computed with the help of Holsti’s formula (the acceptable level was set at 0.80 by the author), are summarized in the table below.

Table 2: Intercoder Reliability Coefficients between Author and Two Coders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author and</th>
<th>For sources</th>
<th>For keywords</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coder 1</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coder 2</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Frames for the conflict

Nouns that were synonymous with the events occurring in Kashmir from 1989 to 2003 – armed struggle for separation from India, suppression of the rebellion by India, training and arming of Kashmiri militants by Pakistan, infiltration of foreign fighters especially those from Afghanistan – were identified, and then grouped into thematic clusters within each of the four previously identified phases. Adjectives that described these events were also coded and then grouped in the same fashion. Table 3 provides a summary of the major and minor frames in decreasing order of prominence as determined by the frequency of usage of their constituent words vis-à-vis both nouns and modifiers that were used to describe the conflict in the four periods of U.S. media coverage under study.

1989-1990

In the first phase, in The Washington Post and The New York Times, there were a total of 30 articles on the Kashmir conflict, with 44 words used 197 times to describe the conflict per se. Of these words, the most commonly used descriptors for the conflict were “war” (quoted 40 times), “movement” (19) and “violence” (18). Due to its dominance over other words, “war” was defined as a frame in itself called “Warfare.” While “movement” was classified as part of a Mass-based Action frame, the word “violence” was cast into a Physical Violence frame. Both the latter two frames were minor frames for this period. Since all the other words used to describe the events in Kashmir in the
years 1989 and 1990 occurred far fewer times than the above three, those words were not taken into account.

The most commonly occurring modifier for the Kashmir conflict was “separatist” (12) followed by “independence” (7), “political” (5) and finally “anti-Indian” (4), all of them describing the nature of the events in Kashmir as being motivated by the desire of the Kashmiri people to break away from India. These modifiers form part of the Mass-based Action frame that includes words like “movement” and “struggle” because they indicate the motive for the campaign being conducted by the Kashmiri people.

In the first phase, the most commonly occurring verbs used for the conflict convey the impression of an event that is expanding in scale. Words such as “escalated,” “growing,” “worsened,” “has spread” and their synonyms appeared 10 times representing a Growing Unrest frame.

1991-1998

In the second phase, 48 words were used 238 times to describe the conflict in a total of 39 articles from The New York Times, The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times. The most prominent frame was once again Warfare with the word “war” occurring 51 times, followed by “insurgency” (29), “conflict” (26), “violence” (16), “rebellion” (14), and “dispute” (9). “Insurgency” and “rebellion” were grouped together to form the Internal Revolt frame. In this eight-year period of coverage, only two major frames emerge – the Warfare frame and the Internal Revolt frame.
Although the modifiers signifying the Mass-based Action frame add up to a higher figure (18), the most prominent single modifier in this phase is “guerrilla” (15), which is a part of the Internal Revolt frame because while insurgency or rebellion is a name for the action that is being done, guerrilla signifies the method by which it is perpetrated. The modifier “nuclear” appears only 9 times in this period and can be considered a minor frame named Nuclear Risk.

The frame for the conflict continued to be that of Growing Unrest, with words such as “degenerated,” “has threatened,” and “erupted,” that appeared a total of 11 times.

**Table 3: Frames for the Kashmir Conflict**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1989-1990</th>
<th>Major Frames</th>
<th>Related Words</th>
<th>Minor Frames</th>
<th>Related Words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Noun</td>
<td>1. Warfare</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>1. Mass-based Action</td>
<td>movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Physical Violence</td>
<td>violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modifiers</td>
<td>1. Mass-based Action</td>
<td>separatist independence political anti-Indian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbs</td>
<td>1. Growing Unrest</td>
<td>escalated worsened growing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1991-1998</th>
<th>Major Frames</th>
<th>Related Words</th>
<th>Minor Frames</th>
<th>Related Words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Noun</td>
<td>1. Warfare</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>1. Conflict</td>
<td>conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Internal Revolt</td>
<td>insurgency rebellion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Physical Violence</td>
<td>violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modifiers</td>
<td>3. Mass-based Action</td>
<td>independence separatist secessionist independence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbs</td>
<td>Growing Unrest</td>
<td>degenerated erupted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36
Table 3: Frames for the Kashmir Conflict (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Major Frames</th>
<th>Related Words</th>
<th>Minor Frames</th>
<th>Related Words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Noun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>battle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Warfare</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>1. Internal Revolt</td>
<td>insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Conflict</td>
<td>conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modifiers</td>
<td>1. Long and Dangerous Conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>decade-old</td>
<td>1. Nuclear Risk</td>
<td>nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>large-scale</td>
<td>2. Mass-based</td>
<td>freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>long-running</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>protracted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Outside Interference</td>
<td>Pakistan-backed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan-based</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Religious Identity</td>
<td>Islamic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Verbs</td>
<td>Growing Unrest</td>
<td>has raged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>could escalate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>Major Frames</td>
<td>Related Words</td>
<td>Minor Frames</td>
<td>Related Words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Noun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Warfare</td>
<td>war</td>
<td>1. Mass-based</td>
<td>struggle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>movement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Outside Interference</td>
<td>infiltration</td>
<td></td>
<td>campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>incursion</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3. Physical Violence</td>
<td>violence</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>fighting</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>killings</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Jihad</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>battle</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>4. Conflict</td>
<td>conflict</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>tensions</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>standoff</td>
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<td>5. Disagreement</td>
<td>crisis</td>
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<td>issue</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Modifiers</td>
<td>1. Long and Dangerous Conflict</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>large-scale</td>
<td>1. Nuclear Risk</td>
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<td>widespread</td>
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<td>2. Outside Interference</td>
<td>cross-border</td>
<td>2. Mass-based</td>
<td>separatist</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Action</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>separatist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Internal revolt</td>
<td>guerrilla</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Verbs</td>
<td>Growing Unrest</td>
<td>continued</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>intensified</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stabilizing Unrest</td>
<td>has calmed</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>calming</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1999-2001

In the third phase of the period under study, there were 48 articles from all the three newspapers under study. The most commonly occurring word for the events in Kashmir was again “war” (75 times) signifying a Warfare frame, which was very closely rivaled by “conflict” (70) forming a frame called “Conflict,” and “fighting” (67) which was grouped with “violence” (26) to form a frame called “Physical Violence” because both words signify physical acts of violence with no necessary ideological dimension. The Physical Violence frame was discovered to be the dominant frame for this period, even overtaking the Warfare frame.

The modifiers describing the intensity and possible extent of the Kashmir conflict – labeled the Long and Dangerous Conflict frame – occurred a total of 43 times with words such as “decade-old,” “large-scale,” “long-running,” “dangerous,” “protracted” and “wider.” This frame had a greater prominence than other frames such as Nuclear Risk comprising the word “nuclear” (16), Mass-based Action made up of words like “freedom” and “independence” (13), and Religious Identity signified by use of modifiers such as “Islamic/Muslim” (10). The other frame that emerged through the modifiers for this phase were what was referred to as the Outside Interference frame (10) that included adjectives such as “Pakistan-backed” and “cross-border,” indicating involvement of parties other than Indians and the Kashmiris in the conflict.

Continuing the trend observed in the first two phases, Growing Unrest comprising words such as “could escalate,” “has raged,” and “could deepen,” with a total of 15 uses, persists as the dominant frame in the third period as well.
In the fourth period, although once again “war” (108 occurrences) emerged as the most commonly occurring descriptor of the Kashmir conflict, two new words to dominate coverage were “infiltration” and “incursion.” These two words were considered part of the Outside Interference frame (99) that occurred for the first time in the previous phase. These words convey the perception that the conflict playing out in Kashmir was being actively supported and/or conducted by people outside the region. A close third was the Physical Violence frame with “violence” occurring 41 times, “fighting” occurring 18 times, “killings,” 14 times, “jihad,” 12 times and “battle,” 8 times.

The fourth prominent frame was the Conflict frame, formed from the words “conflict” (30), “tensions” (29) and “standoff” (13), which together occurred 72 times in the last two years of the time period under study. All these three words signify a protracted tussle over something between two or more parties that are unwilling to change their positions on the issue. A third frame was constructed by grouping together words such as “dispute” (30), “issue” (20) and “crisis” (11), which implied that there was a disagreement that had become a cause of contention between two or more parties which, in this case, are India, Pakistan and the local Kashmiris. This frame was labeled as the Disagreement frame.

The Disagreement frame (51), formed by words such as “crisis” (27), “dispute” (17) and “issue” (7), was the fifth dominant frame in 2002-2003. “Struggle,” (17), “movement” (9), and “campaign” (7) constituted a minor frame called the Mass-based
**Action** because all these three words signify a broad-based activity aimed at changing the status quo.

The most commonly occurring frame for modifiers was once again that of a **Long and Dangerous Conflict** (35) – comprising words like “all-out,” “escalating,” and “full-blown” – followed by the **Outside Interference** frame constituted by the adjective “cross-border” (17). The **Nuclear Risk** frame, the **Mass-based Action** frame exemplified by the word “separatist,” and the **Internal Revolt** frame represented by the word “guerrilla,” were the minor frames for this period.

There were two types of descriptions for the intensity and direction of the conflict in this phase with **Growing Unrest** (20) still as the most prominent frame composed of words like “continued,” “intensified,” and “has escalated.” However, verbs such as “calming,” or “has calmed,” or “scaling back,” which were grouped into the **Stabilizing Unrest** frame (15), also appear in this phase signifying a move towards a decrease in the intensity of the conflict in this phase.

**Frames for the Region**

The second category of “subjects” for which frames were identified in the 15-year coverage was the region of Kashmir, a land that lies in the extreme north end of India and Pakistan. About two-thirds of the region, which has a distinct history and a tradition of religious tolerance, lies within India, while Pakistan controls almost one-third. The remaining stretches to the north east are controlled by China. The state of Jammu and Kashmir is an Indian administrative unit, with Jammu as the winter capital of the state.
and the city of Srinagar, which is in the Kashmir valley, the summer capital. Although there are linguistic and cultural similarities between Kashmir and Jammu, while Kashmir is a Muslim majority area, Jammu has a majority of Hindus.

1989-1990

In the first phase, 12 words for the region occurred 54 times, and the most commonly occurring word was “state” (18 times), signifying an identification of the region as a Political Entity that is part of a larger nation. The second frequent description was “valley” (11 times), which portrays the Kashmir region as a Geographical Entity. The most commonly occurring modifiers for the region in this period were those that described Kashmir as a region where the majority of the population followed the Islamic faith. Modifiers such as “Muslim-dominated,” “predominantly Muslim,” and “Muslim majority,” were grouped to form the “Religious Identity” frame that appears 20 out of a total of 45 times in this period.

1991-1998

In the second period, out of 74 times, Kashmir was described 25 times as a “territory,” 19 times as a “region” and 14 times and as a “state,” implying that it was more likely to be described as a Geographic Entity than as a Political Entity in this period. Continuing the trend of describing Kashmir as a Muslim region, modifiers that represent the Religious Identity frame occur a total of 21 times in this period followed by “disputed” that is repeated 16 times and fits into the Disagreement frame.
### Table 4: Frames for the Kashmir region

#### 1989-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Frames</th>
<th>Constituent words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Noun</td>
<td>1. Political Entity, state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Geographic Entity, valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modifiers</td>
<td>1. Religious Identity, Muslim-dominated, predominantly Muslim, Muslim majority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 1991-1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Frames</th>
<th>Constituent words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Noun</td>
<td>1. Geographic Entity, territory, region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Political Entity, state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modifiers</td>
<td>1. Religious Identity, Muslim-dominated, predominantly Muslim, Muslim majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Disagreement, disputed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 1999-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Frames</th>
<th>Constituent words</th>
<th>Minor Frames</th>
<th>Constituent words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Noun</td>
<td>1. Geographic Entity, region, territory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Religious Identity, Muslim, Muslim-dominated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modifiers</td>
<td>1. Disagreement, disputed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Geographical Entity, Himalayan, mountainous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2002-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Frames</th>
<th>Constituent words</th>
<th>Minor Frames</th>
<th>Constituent words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Noun</td>
<td>1. Geographic Entity, region, territory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Religious Identity, Muslim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modifiers</td>
<td>1. Disagreement, disputed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Geographic Entity, Himalayan, beautiful, rugged</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1999-2001

The third phase did not show much change in the identification of Kashmir as a Geographic Entity, except that in this period “region” occurred more frequently (32 times) than “territory” (22 times). The Political Entity frame was a distant third with the word “state” appearing only 8 out of 98 times as a descriptor for Kashmir. In this period, the Disagreement frame comprising the word “disputed,” (33) surpassed the Religious Identity frame with 21 occurrences of modifiers describing the Kashmir region. Descriptions that fit into the Geographic Entity frame such as “Himalayan” and “mountainous” occur 16 times, reinforcing the identification of Kashmir as a piece of land.

2002-2003

In the last phase of coverage, Kashmir continues to be described as a Geographic Entity – as a “region” (41 times) and as a “territory” (19 times) – but its description as a “state” (18 times), although less frequent than region or territory, is noteworthy because it shows a gradual movement towards describing Kashmir once again as a Political Entity. With the modifiers, the region continues to be described in terms of the Disagreement frame – “disputed” (38) followed by the Religious Identity frame – “Muslim” (27), and finally through the Geographic Entity frame – “Himalayan,” “rugged,” and “beautiful” for a total of 16 times.
Frames for India and Indians

The third “subject” for which words were identified and grouped under thematic clusters was India or Indians. In 1989, Jammu and Kashmir was and still is a state in the Indian union, although Pakistan controls a significant amount of its territory. It is important to look at the frames used for India because it is a major player in the Kashmir conflict and because the insurgency in Kashmir is being waged in order to sever the region from India and either establish it as an independent nation or integrate it into Pakistan. In the last 15 years, India has refused to let go of the region, despite heavy civilian and military casualties, allegations of human rights violations, constant efforts by Pakistan to get India to negotiate and even an undeclared war fought with Pakistan on the snowy Kargil heights.

1989-1990

In this period, the most commonly occurring frame for India was the Military Establishment frame formed by combining “troops” (51 times), “army” (18 times), “security forces” (12 times) and “soldiers” (10 times). The second widely used frame included “government” (52 times), “leaders” (8) and “officials” (14), which were grouped with “government” to form a Civilian Establishment frame for describing India. India was described using 29 modifiers that were quoted 216 times. India is described as a “Hindu” country 20 times, signifying the prevalence of the Religious Identity frame in this period. The frame includes modifiers such as “Hindu,” “Hindu dominated,” and “predominantly Hindu.”
There were two major frames for the description of the actions of Indians in Kashmir – one was that of a **Violently Repressor** and the other was that of a **Law and Order Maintainer**. The first frame, made up of words like “killed,” “burned,” “shoot,” “fired” and their synonyms (51 occurrences), had a higher prevalence as compared to the second one, which was made up of words like “sealed off,” “arrested,” “to guard,” and “patrolling,” with 42 occurrences.

**1991-1998**

In this period, 53 words were used 389 times to refer to India in a total of 39 articles. As in the last period, the **Military Establishment** frame, constituted by the words “troops” (85), “army” (39), “security forces” (30), “soldiers” (23) and ‘forces” (13), dominated the **Civilian Establishment** frame, comprising the words “government” (65), “officials” (31) and “leaders” (9). Continuing the use of the **Religious Identity** frame, India is described as a “Hindu nation” (29) in the second phase of the period under study. Other modifiers that reflect the Military Establishment frame for India are “military/paramilitary” used 21 times to describe Indian troops in Kashmir.

While the two frames that emerged in the first phase continue to be present in the second one, this period shows a much higher dominance of the **Violent Repressor** frame, composed of words such as “shot,” “raped,” “tortured,” and “assaulted” (a total of 71 occurrences) as compared to the **Law and Order Maintainer** frame, which included words like “banned,” “monitored,” and “sealed off” (a total of 30 occurrences). The third frame that emerges in this period is identification of India as a **Diplomatic Entity**,
reacting to the events in Kashmir and putting forth its opinion and judgments on the issues involved. This frame was constructed from words such as “accused,” “claimed,” “insisting,” and “refused,” which together were used 67 times.

**Table 5: Frames for India and Indians**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Major Frames</th>
<th>Constituent Words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1989-1990| **Noun**     | 1. Military Establishment troops, army, security forces, soldiers  
               2. Civilian Establishment government, officials, leaders |
|          | **Modifiers**| 1. Religious Identity Hindu, Hindu dominated, predominantly Hindu  
               2. Military Establishment military, paramilitary |
|          | **Verbs**    | 1. Violent Repressor killed, burned, looted  
               2. Law and Order Maintainer Sealed off, arrested, to guard, patrolling |
| 1991-1998| **Noun**     | 1. Military Establishment troops, army, security forces, soldiers, forces  
               2. Civilian Establishment government, officials, leaders |
|          | **Modifiers**| 3. Religious Identity Hindu, Hindu dominated, predominantly Hindu  
               2. Military Establishment military, paramilitary |
|          | **Verbs**    | 1. Violent Repressor shot, raped, killed, tortured, assaulted  
               2. Law and Order Maintainer banned, monitored  
               3. Diplomatic Entity accused, claimed, insisting |
| 1999-2001| **Noun**     | 1. Military Establishment soldiers, troops, army, forces, security forces  
               2. Civilian Establishment leaders, government, officials, power |
|          | **Modifiers**| 1. Religious Identity Hindu, Hindu dominated, predominantly Hindu  
               2. Nuclear Risk nuclear, nuclear-armed |
|          | **Verbs**    | 1. Conciliatory Posturing defused, urged, claimed, agreed  
               2. Aggressive Posturing blamed, refused, accused, denied  
               3. Continuing Warfare have been fighting, shelling, battling  
               4. Violent Repressor killed, shot, fired  
               5. Law and Order Maintainer imposed, arrested, impounded |
Table 4: Frames for India and Indians (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Frames</th>
<th>Constituent words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Noun</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Military Establishment</td>
<td>troops, soldiers, security forces, army, military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Civilian Establishment</td>
<td>government, leaders, officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modifiers</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Nuclear Risk</td>
<td>nuclear, nuclear-armed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Religious Identity</td>
<td>Hindu, Hindu dominated, predominantly Hindu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Verbs</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Aggressive Posturing</td>
<td>glared, rejected, have refused, have ruled out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Conciliatory Posturing</td>
<td>agrees, cut back, welcomed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Continuing Warfare</td>
<td>are fighting, are waging, mobilized, massing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Violent Repressor</td>
<td>killed, shot dead, attacked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Law and Order Maintainer</td>
<td>patrolled, policed, monitors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1999-2001**

The **Military Establishment** frame (117) was slightly more prevalent in this period of news coverage – and was revealed by the naming of Indians as “soldiers” (45 times), “troops” (27), “army” (22), ‘forces” (14) and “security forces” (9) – than the **Civilian Establishment** frame (113), which was constituted by words such as “leaders” (43 times), “government” (40 times), “officials” (17 times) and “power” (13 times). A total of 47 descriptors for India were used 304 times in this period of coverage. The most common adjectives used to describe India in this period remained the ones that form the **Religious Identity** frame (20), followed for the first time by the use of “nuclear” to describe India. The words “nuclear” and “nuclear-armed” occur 19 times and can be grouped under the **Nuclear Risk** frame.

In this phase, the **Diplomatic Entity** frame was split to reflect the nature of the actions being done by Indians. Words describing positive and neutral actions, for
example, “claimed,” “defused,” “urged,” “contends,” “agreed,” and “allowed” (68 occurrences), were grouped into the **Conciliatory Posturing** frame, whereas words that convey a defensive and confrontational stance or a refusal to move away from one’s entrenched position, such as “denied,” “accused,” “refused,” and “blamed” (52 occurrences), were grouped into an **Aggressive Posturing** frame. Although the **Law and Order Maintainer** frame (21 usages) as well as the **Violent Repressor** frame (25 usages) continued to be present in this period in the words used to describe the actions of the Indian government, both were less prominent than the two frames describing the diplomatic functions of the Indian government. Another frame to emerge in this period was that of **Continuing Warfare** that is exemplified by usage of words like “shelling,” “have been waging,” “battling,” and “fought” (used 32 times) that conveyed the impression that India was engaged in a protracted battle or fight with the Kashmiris and the Pakistanis.

**2002-2003**

In what has been a trend that has remained consistent throughout the 15-year period under study, the **Military Establishment** frame for Indians was more prominent than the **Civilian Establishment** frame in this period to the extent that the former (182) occurred nearly twice the number of times for the latter (92). For the former frame, the most frequently used word was “troops” (43 times), followed by “soldiers” (41 times), “security forces” (33 times), ‘army” (21 times and “military” (9 times). For the second frame, “government” occurred 40 times but “leaders” was used 21 times and “officials”
31 times. For the first time in the 15-year period under study, among the modifiers, the Religious Identity frame vis-à-vis adjectives for India takes second position to the Nuclear Risk frame, with the words describing India as a Hindu country occurring 19 times but those identifying it as a nuclear power occurring 37 times.

The most prominent frame to emerge in this period for Indians is that of Aggressive Posturing, comprising words such as “glaring,” “asserted,” “demanded,” “have ruled out,” “have refused,” and “rejected” that have 102 occurrences. The second major frame is that of Conciliatory Posturing, made up of words like “agrees,” “claimed,” “cut back,” “welcomed,” “has accepted,” “hoped,” “offered,” and “pulled back” that occurred a grand total of 63 times. Compared to the prominence of these two frames, the other three frames for India in this period – Continuing Warfare (38), Law and Order Maintainer (24) and Violent Repressor (24) – can be regarded as minor frames.

Frames for Pakistan and Pakistanis

Another major party in the Kashmir dispute is Pakistan, India’s neighbor to the west and a nation founded in 1947 on the principle that South Asian Muslims needed a land of their own separate from India, where majority of the population is of the Hindu faith, although the country is a secular democracy where every citizen has the equal right to practice his or her faith. Since its creation, Pakistan has asserted that Kashmir belongs to it for the reason Kashmir is a Muslim majority province and Pakistan is an Islamic nation. Although founded as a democracy, Pakistan has been ruled by its military for
most of its 57-year existence as a nation. A democracy under Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto when the armed rebellion in Kashmir started in 1989 and later ruled by the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan was taken over in a coup in October 1999 by then Pakistani Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf who declared himself the Chief Executive Officer of Pakistan.

1989-1990

In the first phase of coverage, 19 words were used 53 times to describe Pakistan, compared to 216 times for Indians and 283 times for Kashmiris. Of the 19 words, the most commonly occurring was the word “government” (12 times), “officials” (6 times), and “leaders” (6 times), indicating that the Civilian Establishment frame was dominant over the Military Establishment frame composed of the words “army” (6 times) and “troops” (4 times). As with the modifiers used for India, Pakistan was also described as a “mostly Muslim,” and “Islamic” nation, reflecting the use of the Religious Identity frame (8 out of a total of 16).

Although the Pakistanis had a low profile in this period as compared to the Indians and Kashmiris, a couple of frames emerged for Pakistanis as well. A slightly higher prevalence was of the Active Supporter frame, which was made up of verbs such as “supported,” “armed,” “training,” and “helping,” with a total of 19 usages that conveyed the fact that Pakistan was providing finance, training and arms to the Kashmiris. The second frame was of a Diplomatic Entity and was composed of verbs like “charged,” “denied,” “accuses,” and “challenging,” a total of 17 occurrences.
1991-1998

In the second phase, the Civilian Establishment frame (30) was three times more visible than the Military Establishment frame (10), with “government” occurring 11 times, “officials” 6 times, “villagers” 8 times and “civilians” 5 times. “Troops” (7) and “army” (3) were the third most commonly occurring words for Pakistanis, who had a total of 26 descriptors for this phase that were used 67 times. Continuing the use of the Religious Identity frame, in this phase also, Pakistan continues to be described as a “Muslim” country (8) and as a “nuclear” power (3) out of a total of 17 times.

1999-2001

The Civilian Establishment continues to dominate references to Pakistanis in the coverage in the third period as well. The most commonly occurring word for Pakistanis in this phase is “leader(s)” occurring 56 times. The word “general,” used as a reference to General Pervez Musharraf, who took over power in Pakistan in October 1999 by overthrowing the popularly-elected government, appears 27 times. “Officials” (13) and ruler (9), again a reference to General Musharraf, are also part of the bigger Civilian Establishment frame which is constituted of a total of 137 references. The second most important frame used to name Pakistan is the Military Establishment frame (119) with “soldiers” occurring 42 times, “troops” 34 times, “forces” 15 times, “army” 12 times and “military” 16 times. The total number of descriptors for Pakistan in the third phase was 67. These 67 descriptors were utilized a total of 419 times, 115 more than those for Indians and 194 more than those for Kashmiris.
The most commonly used modifiers for Pakistan for this period again fit into the Religious Identity frame (39), and included words such as “holy,” “religious,” “Muslim-dominated,” and “Muslim majority.” The second frame that is evident in the modifiers for Pakistan is the Military Establishment frame (31), with the use of the words “army” and “military” to describe Pakistanis. For the first time, one can see the occurrence of the Outside Interference frame here as exemplified by the modifiers “Pakistan-based,” and “Pakistan-supported” that occur 15 times. Other modifiers that occur, albeit to a lesser extent, are “militant” (8) and “terrorist” (7).

Demonstrating the growing Pakistani involvement in the Kashmir conflict from 1999, the number of verbs for Pakistanis is this phase is 462, as compared to 378 for Indians and only 101 for Kashmiris. The most evident frame for Pakistanis in this phase was that of Conciliatory Posturing, formed by words that convey positive or neutral actions and gestures, such as “suggested,” “proposed,” “acknowledged,” and “claims,” used 105 times. The second major frame was that of Violent Neighbor, formed by words like “fired,” “shot,” “shelling,” and “fought,” that occurred 76 times. The next major frame was the Active Supporter of Kashmiris frame, with 58 occurrences of related words, including for the first time words describing the movement of Kashmiri and other extremist fighters from Pakistan to India across their border that is referred to as the Line of Control. The last major frame was that of Aggressive Posturing, conveyed by words like “charged,” “accuses,” and “demanded,” used 43 times.
The **Military Establishment** frame (84) takes over from the **Civilian Establishment** frame (62) as the dominant one for describing Pakistan in the fourth and final phase of coverage. The total number of words used to describe Pakistanis in the final phase was 69 and these words were used 397 times. “Troops” appeared 28 times, “forces,” 19 times, “army,” 18 times, “military,” 12 times and “soldiers,” 7 times forming the Military Establishment frame. Part of the Civilian Establishment frame, “Government” appeared 37 times while “leader(s)” was used 25 times. However, a close rival to the Military Establishment frame and one that surpasses the Civilian Establishment frame is a new frame composed of words such as “militants” (53), “jihadis” (14), “fighters” (5), “extremists” (6) and “guerrillas” (4). These words form a group called the **Militant Extremists** frame (82).

Among modifiers, the three most common frames in decreasing order of prominence are **Religious Identity**, with the words Islamic or Muslim (44); **Nuclear Risk**, with the words “nuclear,” “nuclear-armed,” “nuclear-capable;” and finally, the **Militant Extremists** frame, with the modifiers “militant” appearing 22 times and “extremist” 10 times. This compliments the presence of the same frame in the nouns used to describe Pakistan.

The most prominent verb frame for the Pakistanis in this period was that of **Conciliatory Posturing**, as evident through the use of words for positive and neutral actions such as “promised,” “admitted,” “eased,” “has pledged,” “to improve,” and “to resolve” (106 occurrences). The second most prominent frame was a new one called
Cracking Down, which was constructed from words that expressed the Pakistani Government’s actions in this phase aimed at curbing the activities of Islamic extremist organizations like Lashkar-e-Toiba, Al Qaeda, Jaish-e-Mohammed and others. This frame was composed of verbs like “to end,” “cracked down,” “banned,” “has reined in,” “have closed,” “shut down,” and “stopped” (95 occurrences). The third prominent frame was that of Aggressive Posturing, made of “denied,” “demanded,” “facing off,” “rejected” (71 times) – followed by that of Active Supporter made of “arming,” “training,” “backing” (61 times) – and finally, that of Violent Neighbor – “fired,” “killed,” “mobilizing,” “opened fire,” “to bleed,” and “waging” (44 times).

Table 6: Frames for Pakistan and Pakistanis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1989-1990</th>
<th>Major Frame</th>
<th>Constituent words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Noun</td>
<td>1. Civilian Establishment</td>
<td>government officials leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Military Establishment</td>
<td>Army troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modifiers</td>
<td>1. Religious Identity</td>
<td>mostly Muslim Islamic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbs</td>
<td>1. Active Supporter</td>
<td>training helping arming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Diplomatic Entity</td>
<td>charged denied accuses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6: Frames for Pakistan and Pakistanis (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major frame</th>
<th>Constituent words</th>
<th>Minor frames</th>
<th>Constituent words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Noun</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Military Establishment</td>
<td>troops army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Civilian Establishment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>government officials villagers civilians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modifiers</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Nuclear Risk</td>
<td>nuclear nuclear-armed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Religious Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim predominantly Muslim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbs</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Outside Interference</td>
<td>Pakistan-supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Active Supporter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>providing supporting harvesting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Diplomatic Entity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>claimed denied demanded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Violent Neighbor</td>
<td>bombardarded</td>
<td>fought shelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Aggressive Posturing</td>
<td>Demanded charges accused refused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Conciliatory Posturing</td>
<td>suggested proposed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Violent Neighbor</td>
<td>fired shot shelled</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Active Supporter</td>
<td>helping arming</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1991-1998

1999-2001
Table 6: Frames for Pakistan and Pakistanis (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frames for Kashmir and Kashmiris</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The Kashmiris have always regarded themselves as entitled to a special status within the Indian union and have expressed nationalistic aspirations since 1947, when Kashmir became a part of India (Schofield, 2003). In the decades of the 1950s, 1960s,
1970s and 1980s, the Government of India eroded Kashmir’s special status through Constitutional amendments, a trend that bred resentment among Kashmiris who were also disillusioned by the corrupt and inefficient state administrations, lack of civic amenities and rising unemployment. To add insult to injury, the state legislative body elections in 1987 were rigged by the party in power at that time in New Delhi, further angering Kashmiris who finally took to the streets in 1989 and 1990. There were almost daily mass demonstrations by thousands of people on the streets of Srinagar and other Kashmiri towns, and militant organizations of Kashmiri youth took up arms in order to separate Kashmir from India through violent means such as kidnappings and shootings.

**Table 7: Frames for Kashmir or Kashmiris**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1989-1990</th>
<th>Major Frames</th>
<th>Constituent words</th>
<th>Minor frames</th>
<th>Constituent words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Noun</strong></td>
<td>1. Armed Combatant</td>
<td>militants</td>
<td>1. Organized Activity</td>
<td>groups leaders organization(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Ordinary Kashmiris</td>
<td>civilians residents demonstrators mourners</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Separatist Rebels separatists insurgents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modifiers</strong></td>
<td>1. Religious Identity</td>
<td>Muslim mostly Muslim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Mass-based Action</td>
<td>separatist pro-independence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Verbs</strong></td>
<td>1. Violent Protester</td>
<td>bombed kidnapped shot</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Non-violent Protester</td>
<td>demonstrated demanded protested</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Frames</td>
<td>Constituent words</td>
<td>Minor frames</td>
<td>Constituent words</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Armed Combatant</td>
<td>militants guerrillas fighters</td>
<td>1. Ordinary Kashmiris</td>
<td>civilians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Separatist Rebels</td>
<td>separatists rebels insurgents</td>
<td>2. Religious Identity</td>
<td>Muslims Hindus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Organized Activity</td>
<td>groups leaders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modifiers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Religious Identity</td>
<td>Muslim Muslim majority</td>
<td>1. Mass-based Action</td>
<td>separatist rebel pro-independence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Internal Revolt</td>
<td>guerrilla militant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Violent Protester</td>
<td>killed assassinated fired</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Non-violent Protester</td>
<td>claimed are boycotting condemned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

### 1999-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Frames</th>
<th>Constituent words</th>
<th>Minor frames</th>
<th>Constituent words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Noun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Organized Activity</td>
<td>groups organization(s)</td>
<td>1. Ordinary Kashmiris</td>
<td>civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Armed Combatant</td>
<td>militants guerrillas fighters</td>
<td>2. Separatist Rebels</td>
<td>insurgents rebels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modifiers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Mass-based Action</td>
<td>separatist freedom anti-India</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Religious Identity</td>
<td>Islamic Muslim</td>
<td>1. Internal Revolt</td>
<td>militant guerrilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Violent Protester</td>
<td>ambushed gunned down attacked</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Non-violent Protester</td>
<td>to wrench argued defying</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table 7: Frames for Kashmir and Kashmiris (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2002-2003</th>
<th>Major Frames</th>
<th>Constituent words</th>
<th>Minor frames</th>
<th>Constituent words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Noun</td>
<td>1. Armed Combatant</td>
<td>militant guerrillas fighters</td>
<td>1. Religious Identity</td>
<td>Islamic Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Civilian Establishment</td>
<td>government candidates leaders</td>
<td>2. Civilian Establishment</td>
<td>political newly-elected coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Ordinary Kashmiris</td>
<td>civilians voters</td>
<td>2. Violent Protester</td>
<td>slaughtered terrorized massacred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modifiers</td>
<td>1. Religious Identity</td>
<td>Islamic Muslim</td>
<td>1. Internal Revolt</td>
<td>militant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Civilian Establishment</td>
<td>political newly-elected coalition</td>
<td>2. Mass-based Action</td>
<td>separatist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Violent Protester</td>
<td>slaughtered terrorized massacred</td>
<td>1. Continuing Warfare</td>
<td>are fighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbs</td>
<td>2. Non-violent Protester</td>
<td>seeking espoused calling for</td>
<td>1. Continuing Warfare</td>
<td>are battling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Non-violent Protester</td>
<td>seeking espoused calling for</td>
<td>1. Continuing Warfare</td>
<td>are staging</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1989-1990

In the first two years of coverage, the number of times 48 nouns were used for Kashmiris was 283, more than the count for Indians (210) and far above the count for Pakistanis (53). The most commonly used word for Kashmiris in this phase was “militants” (84) which was put into an Armed Combatant frame. A distant second was the word “separatist” which was used 27 times and slotted into a minor frame called the Separatist Rebels frame. Words such as “civilians,” “residents,” “demonstrators,” “mourners,” “mobs” appeared a total of 40 times, forming a cluster called the Ordinary Kashmiris. Also noteworthy were words like “groups” (17), “leaders” (16) and
“organization” (3) that reflected an element of organization to the armed rebellion started by the Kashmiris in 1989. These were put into a minor frame called Organized Activity (36). The most common frame formed by the modifiers used to describe the Kashmiris in this phase is the Religious Identity frame (33), comprising words such as “Muslim” and “mostly Muslim,” followed by the Mass-based Action frame, comprising the modifiers “separatist” (16) and “pro-independence” (7).

By grouping the verbs used to state the actions of the people of Kashmir in this period, two frames emerged. One was that of Non-violent Protester and the other was that of Violent Protester. The Non-violent Protester frame was constructed from words like “demonstrated,” “protested,” “demanded,” “defying,” “complained” and other such words with 41 occurrences that conveyed the apparent dissatisfaction of the people of Kashmiris with the current state of affairs and their desire to bring about a change. The second frame conveyed the parallel militant stream of the Kashmiri separatist/freedom movement, and included words like “bombed,” “kidnapped,” “shot,” and “assassinated” that occurred a total of 27 times.

1991-1998

In the second phase, 55 words were quoted a total of 421 times in describing Kashmiris. The most commonly occurring word was once again “militants” (70) which was grouped with “guerrillas” (47) and “fighters” (5) into the Armed Combatant frame (122). The second thematic cluster, called Separatist Rebels (72) in the second phase of media coverage, is composed of the words “rebels” (39), “separatists” (21) and
“insurgents” (12). The third frame that was evident in the period from 1991 to 1998 was the **Organized Activity** frame (56) that included the words “groups” (34) and “leaders” (22). The **Ordinary Kashmiris** frame was also present, albeit to a lesser extent, with a total of 47 occurrences, the most commonly occurring word being “civilians” (23 times). Another minor frame that bears mention in this phase is the **Religious Identity** frame (41) with the people of Kashmir being described as Muslims 26 times and Hindus 15 times.

Of the 201 times that modifiers were used to describe Kashmiris in this phase, the highest frequency was of the words that are part of the **Religious Identity** frame (80), composed mainly of the word “Muslim” (56), and also by the word “Hindu” that indicates reference to Kashmir’s religious minority – Hindu Brahmins called Pandits, who fled Kashmir in hordes after the armed insurgency started in 1989. The second prominent frame formed by the modifiers used to describe the Kashmir and Kashmiris was the **Internal Revolt** frame, composed of the modifiers “guerrilla” (19) and “militant” (17) and signifying the manner in which the insurgency was conducted by armed groups in Kashmir. **Mass-based Action**, the third important frame in this period, included the modifiers “separatist” (20), “rebel” (8) and “pro-independence” (2).

**Non-violent Protester** and **Violent Protester** continued to be the two frames for the Kashmiris in this phase as well, with the latter still dominating over the former. While the Violent Protester was made up of words such as “torched,” “ambushed,” “attacked,” “detonated,” and “gunned down,” (with 60 occurrences), the Non-violent Protester frame
included words like “have demanded,” “condemned,” “to wrench,” and “are boycotting,” with a total of 39 usages.

1999-2001

The Organized Activity and the Armed Combatant frames occurred with the same frequency in the third phase. Words like “militants” (26), “guerrillas” (15) and “fighters” (15) formed the Armed Combatant frame, while words such as “groups” (28), “leaders” (22) and “organizations” (6) formed the Organized Activity frame. The third frame that occurred to half the extent of the first two ones and therefore was a minor frame was the Ordinary Kashmiris frame (24), with the word “civilians” again occurring with the highest frequency. Another minor frame in this period was the Separatist Rebel frame (22), with the word “insurgents” occurring 11 times and the word “rebels” occurring 10 times. The Religious Identity frame (14) emerged as the third minor frame in this period, with 10 occurrences of the word “Muslims” and 4 of the word “Hindus.” The total number of descriptors for Kashmiris in this phase was 45 and the number of times they were used was 225.

In this phase, the modifiers can be grouped into two almost equally prominent frames – the Mass-based Action frame (33), which includes words such as “separatist,” “freedom,” and “anti-India;” and the Religious Identity frame (32), with words such as “Islamic” and “Muslim.” A third but minor frame that appears in this phase is the Internal Revolt frame (23) that includes the adjectives “militant” and “guerrilla” for describing individuals and groups carrying out the armed movement in Kashmir.
The verbs used for Kashmiris in this period can be grouped into the same two frames that were present in the first two phases. The more prominent frame is once again that of Violent Protester, with words like “raided,” “shot,” and “fighting” used 33 times, followed by that of the Non-violent Protester, with words such as “argued,” “demanding,” “defying” and “disagree” appearing 19 times.

2002-2003

In the fourth and final phase, 83 descriptors for Kashmiris were used a total of 563 times, with the Armed Combatant frame (168) emerging as the strongest in this period. Within this frame, “militant” occurred 123 times; “guerrillas,” 25 times; “fighters,” 11 times; and “militias,” 9 times. Although much weaker than the Armed Combatant frame, the second powerful frame in this phase was the Civilian Establishment frame (82), with “government” occurring 31 times; “candidates,” 20 times; “party,” 19 times; and “leaders,” 12 times. The Ordinary Kashmiris frame came in third in the this phase, with 59 occurrences dominated by the word “civilians” (28) followed by the word “voters” (10).

The most common modifier frame for this period is again the Religious Identity (57) frame, formed by the religious modifiers used to describe Kashmir and Kashmiris, such as “Islamic” (37), and “Muslim” (18). Complementing the surfacing of this frame in the nouns used to describe Kashmiris, the second most prominent frame among modifiers for this phase is the Civilian Establishment frame (32), formed by adjectives such as “political,” “newly-elected,” and “coalition.” The Internal Revolt frame, exemplified by
the adjective “militant” (31), is a minor frame for this phase of the period under study. The other minor frame for this period is the Mass-based Action frame, represented by the word “separatist,” which appears 22 times.

Continuing the trend set in the three previous phases, Kashmir and its people continue to be described as Violent Protesters, who have “shot,” “killed,” “slaughtered,” “terrorized,” and “massacred” (88 occurrences) people, including thousands of Indian security forces, security personnel and Kashmiri civilians. The second major frame to emerge was that of Non-violent Protester, indicated specifically by words like “calling for,” “demonstrated,” “espoused,” “seeking,” and “opposed” (54 usages). There were two minor frames in this period, with the more prominent among them being Continuing Warfare that was conveyed through the use of words like “have been waging,” “are fighting,” “are battling,” and “staging” (33 occurrences) that give the impression that the people of Kashmir have been involved in a long, violent campaign to achieve an end. The final minor frame is that of Violent Outsiders that is conveyed through the use of words like “cross into,” and “infiltrated.”

Frames for the United States

Although South Asia has not traditionally been a region of high U.S. interest, Pakistan was allied with the United States in the Cold War era and provided crucial assistance to America in its fight against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan waged through the local mujahahideen (Islamic warriors). The testing of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan in May 1998 caused U.S. attention to be focused on the region and
particularly on Kashmir which had been a traditional flashpoint between India and Pakistan.

For all the periods under study, the most commonly occurring descriptors for the United States were “administration,” “government,” “officials,” and “diplomats,” all of which fit into the Civilian Establishment frame for the United States in all four phases. There were no significant modifiers for the United States in the entire 15-year period. The United States came across as a Concerned Advisor through the usage of words like “urged,” “warned,” “are worried,” and “alarmed” (12 usages) in the first phase (1989-1990). Concerned Advisor was the frame that surfaced in the second phase (1991-1998) from the analysis of the verbs such as “appealing,” “to ease,” “has encouraged,” and “to settle” used for Americans (15 occurrences).

The role of the United States in the third phase (1999-2001) of the 15-year period of media coverage under study exceeds that of even the Kashmiris regarding verbs. While 96 verbs were used for Kashmiris in this phase, the number was 125 for Americans. The frame of Concerned Advisor still dominates usage with verbs like “called for,” “assured,” “suggested,” “urged,” “agreed,” and “underscore” (68 occurrences). However, there is an undercurrent of firmness in the verbs used for Americans in this phase that was captured in words such as “asserted,” “pressured,” “rejecting,” “to impose,” “warned,” used a total of 21 times and labeled the Assertive Advisor frame. In the fourth phase (2002-2003), the United States once again came across overwhelmingly as a Concerned Advisor “urging,” “assuaging,” “mediating,” (76 occurrences) between India and Pakistan. Other words for Americans in this phase include “to defuse,” “to persuade,”
“discussed,” “called on,” and “offered,” all fitting into the Concerned Advisor frame and signifying the role of a nation playing a pacifist role.

**Frames for other parties in the Kashmir conflict**

All the actors in the Kashmir conflict that were not Indians, Pakistanis, Kashmiris or Americans, were placed in this category.

**1989-1990**

Of the total occurrence of words for other parties (23), the descriptor “reporters” occurred 7 times followed by “journalists” at 6 times and “news organizations,” 2 times making the **News Media** the most commonly occurring other actor on the scene. There were no significant modifiers in this phase of media coverage. No significant frames emerged from the verbs used for the other parties involved in Kashmir in this phase of the coverage.

**Table 8: Frames for Other Parties in the Kashmir conflict**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Frames</th>
<th>Constituent words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Noun</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. News Media</td>
<td>reporters</td>
</tr>
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<td>journalists</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>1991-1998</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Noun</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Human Rights Concerns</td>
<td>groups</td>
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<td><strong>Modifiers</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Human Rights Concerns</td>
<td>human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Verbs</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Concerned Advisor</td>
<td>suggested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>urged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Critical Observer</td>
<td>denounced</td>
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<tr>
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<td>criticized</td>
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</table>
Table 8: Frames for other parties in the Kashmir conflict (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1999-2001</th>
<th>Major Frames</th>
<th>Constituent words</th>
<th>Minor Frames</th>
<th>Constituent words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Noun</strong></td>
<td>1. Foreign Soldiers</td>
<td>guerrillas fighters militants forces mujahideen</td>
<td>1. Separatist Rebel</td>
<td>insurgents rebels separatists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Outside Interference</td>
<td>infiltrators invaders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modifiers</strong></td>
<td>1. Religious Identity</td>
<td>Islamic Muslim holy</td>
<td>1. Separatist Rebel</td>
<td>freedom pro-Kashmir separatist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Outside Interference</td>
<td>Pakistan-based pro-Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Verbs</strong></td>
<td>1. Violent Outsiders</td>
<td>hijacked shot down</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2002-2003</th>
<th>Major Frames</th>
<th>Constituent words</th>
<th>Minor Frames</th>
<th>Constituent words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Noun</strong></td>
<td>1. Foreign Soldiers</td>
<td>guerrillas militants fighters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Concerned Advisor</td>
<td>lauded warned reassured</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1991-1998**

A total of 20 words were used 74 times to refer to other parties, with the descriptors “groups” at 15, “tourists” at 14, “hostages” at 10, and “Afghans” at 8, the last one referring to the mujahideen from Afghanistan who came to Kashmir after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989. Complementing the occurrence of groups as the most prominent noun was the use of “human rights” as the most commonly occurring modifier (16) implying that most of the outside actors in the conflict were international human rights organizations. Thus, the frame **Human Rights Concerns**
emerged from the analysis of descriptors and modifiers used to describe other players involved in the Kashmir conflict.

Although the other players in this phase were also mainly cast in the role of a Concerned Advisor conveyed by words such as “suggested” and “urged,” (10 usages), another frame that emerged was that of a Critical Observer exemplified by words like “denounced,” “criticized,” and “investigate,” used 8 times.

1999-2001

Indicating the growing participation of outside elements in the Kashmir conflict in this phase, 31 words were used 193 times as descriptors for other actors on the scene. The overwhelmingly occurring thematic group or frame was the Foreign Soldiers frame (134) which included words like “guerrillas” (35), “fighters” (25), “militants” (24), “forces” (15), “hijackers” (15), “mujahideen” (12) and “warriors” (8). Two minor frames to emerge from this phase were the Separatist Rebel frame (13) with the words “insurgents” (7), “rebels” (3), and “separatists” (3). The second minor frame was the Outside Interference frame (10) including the words “infiltrators” (6), “intruders” (3) and “invaders” (1).

The most frequently occurring modifiers in this period are religious ones (40 times) – for example, “Islamic,” “Muslim” and “holy” — providing evidence of the existence of the Religious Identity frame. Modifiers such as “Pakistan-based,” and “pro-Pakistan,” constitute the Outside Interference frame (15) formed by the nouns that were used to identify the other players in this period. Complementing the Separatist Rebel
The verbs that were used for describing the actions of other parties in this phase of the U.S. media coverage of the Kashmir conflict were grouped into a Violent Outsiders frame that includes words describing acts of physical violence perpetrated by people other than Indian, Pakistani, Kashmiri or American such as “fighting,” “hijacked,” “shot down,” and “threatened,” used a grand total of 22 times.

2002-2003

Out of a total of 15 words used 43 times to describe the other players, the highest numbers were again for the Foreign Soldiers frame (16) including “guerrillas” (6), “militants” (5) and “fighters” (5). “Terrorists” and “tourists” were the other two words that were mentioned four times each. There were no prominent modifiers for this phase.

The other players on the scene have been mainly characterized as Concerned Advisors through words like “lauded,” “alarmed,” “reassured,” “urged,” “suggested,” “recognize” and “pressuring,” with these and related words being used 29 times.

Sources Used to Cover the Kashmir Conflict

In answer to the third research question, which was what were the nature and affiliation of the sources used by the U.S. media in their coverage of the Kashmir
conflict, the study found that all three newspapers – *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times* – used both official and unofficial sources, but the relative distribution of official versus unofficial sources for each party to the conflict, namely Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris – as well as the external parties – the U.S. and other agents – was different in each period. The results of the analyses of the inter-party and intra-party distribution of sources have been grouped below according to the four previously identified phases of the coverage given to the Kashmir conflict. For each period and each party, the total number of sources, both official and unofficial, was determined.

**Sources used from 1989-1990**

The total number of sources quoted by *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* in this two-year period was 111. Of these, 45 or 40 percent were affiliated with India, 33 or 29 percent with Kashmir, 14 or 12 percent with the U.S., 13 or 11 percent with Pakistan, and finally, 6 or 5 percent with other players or groups. Table 8 illustrates the sources used in this phase of media coverage.

**Indian sources**

Of the 45 Indian sources, 34 or 75 percent were official and were quoted a total of 50 times, while 11 or 25 percent were unofficial and quoted 13 times. The most commonly quoted official sources were “officials” (7), “spokespersons” (7) and “ministers” (6) of the Indian Government (24) or the *Civilian Establishment*. Part of the Prime Minister’s cabinet, ministers are elected representatives of the people and are in-
charge of different portfolios such as Defense, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Travel and Tourism, and Civil Aviation. Another important official Indian source was the Governor of the Jammu and Kashmir state (13), who in each state in the Indian union is the representative of the central or federal government in New Delhi. After the insurgency in Kashmir started to take a violent turn, the elected local government was dissolved by the New Delhi government, which subsequently sent its representative – the Governor – to rule the state. Government-controlled media or State Media constitute the third frequently used official source while the Indian media not controlled by the Indian government or Private Media feature as the top unofficial source quoted 10 times.

**Pakistani sources**

Of the 13 Pakistani sources, 12 were official while only 1 was unofficial. Official sources were quoted 21 times, with the Pakistani Government or Civilian Establishment quoted 12 times followed by the Pakistani Army or Military Establishment quoted 10 times.

**Kashmiri Sources**

Out of the 33 Kashmiri sources used in 1989-1990 by the three newspapers under study, 12 or 36 percent were official whereas 21 or 63 percent were unofficial. Local Government, constituted by the Jammu and Kashmir Police (10) who are a state-controlled unit of the elected government of Jammu and Kashmir (9), was the most commonly quoted official source. Of the unofficial sources quoted 29 times, Average Citizens were quoted 16 times, followed by former officials (4), local media (3), separatist leaders (3) and religious leaders (3).
Table 9: Distribution of Sources in 1989-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Unofficial</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| India       | 1. Civilian Government  
• officials  
• spokespersons  
• ministers  
• Governor – Jammu and Kashmir state
  2. State Media | 34 | 1. Private Media  
2. Experts | 11 | 45 | 40 |
| Pakistan    | 1. Civilian Establishment  
• officials
  2. The Military  
• Pakistani Army | 12 | 1. Private Media | 1 | 13 | 12 |
| Kashmir     | 1. Local Government  
• Police  
• state government | 12 | 1. Average Citizens  
2. former officials  
3. local media  
4. separatist leaders  
5. religious leaders | 21 | 33 | 30 |
| U.S.        | 1. Civilian Establishment  
• Administration officials  
• government officials
  2. Military Establishment  
• The Pentagon | 10 | 1. Private Media | 4 | 14 | 13 |
| Other       | 1. Diplomats | 1 | 1. Private Media  
2. Experts | 5 | 6 | 5 |
| Total       | 69 | | 42 | 111 | 100 |

U.S. Sources

The United States was represented by 10 official sources quoted 25 times, with officials from the U.S. Government (7), the U.S. Administration (10) and the House
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South Asia (3) being quoted the most making the Civilian Establishment the major official source. The Military Establishment, represented by the Pentagon, was quoted 4 times. Of the unofficial sources, other U.S. media mainly the Associated Press or Private Media were quoted 5 times out of a total of 6.

Other Sources

There was only one official source – diplomats quoted 2 times – and 5 unofficial sources quoted 7 times. Other media and experts were quoted 3 times each.

Sources used from 1991-1998

The total number of sources used in this period in 39 stories was 171 of which 43 percent or 74 sources were affiliated with India, a little more than 10 percent or 18 belonging to Pakistani, 24 percent or 41 Kashmiri, 18 percent or 21 from the United States and 10 percent or 17 others. The distribution of sources on the basis of their affiliation is demonstrated in the table below.

Indian sources

Of 74 Indian sources, 63 were officials quoted a total of 99 times. The Civilian Establishment or officials from the Indian Government were quoted most frequently (35 times) followed by sources from the Military Establishment (21 times). The Jammu and Kashmir Governor at 12 times was the third most frequently quoted source but was considered part of the Civilian Establishment. Unofficial sources from India were only 11
and quoted 14 times, with the Indian media (Private Media) quoted 6 times and Indian Experts, 7 times.

Pakistani Sources

There were only 11 Pakistani official sources – all representatives of the Pakistani Government – with most of the quotes from ministers (7), officials (6) and envoys (2) constituting the Civilian Establishment. All Pakistani unofficial sources were Average Citizens, most likely people living in the Pakistani side of Kashmir.

Kashmiri Sources

The number of unofficial Kashmiri sources (32) heavily dominated the number of official sources (9). Of the unofficial sources which were quoted for a total of 62 times, Average Citizens again emerged as the most commonly quoted sources (32), followed by separatist leaders (19), and religious leaders (6). Official sources, who were quoted a mere 10 times in the entire eight-year period, were part of the Local Government. The Jammu and Kashmir Police was quoted 5 times, followed by the Jammu and Kashmir government at 3 times.

U.S. Sources

Unofficial sources from the United States (12) were more numerous and quoted a greater number of times (37) than official sources (9) quoted 19 times. Human Rights Groups emerge as the most frequently cited American sources, followed by the U.S. media (Private Media), 5 times, and experts, 5 times. The Civilian Establishment, comprising U.S. Government officials (11), followed by the State Department (4) and diplomats (2), was the only official U.S. source of information.
Table 10: Distribution of Sources in 1991-1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Unofficial</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| India       | 1. Civilian Establishment  
• officials  
• ministers  
• spokespersons  
• Governor – Jammu and Kashmir state  
2. Military Establishment | 63 | 1. Private Media  
2. Experts | 11 | 74 | 44 |
| Pakistan    | 1. Civilian Establishment  
• ministers  
• officials  
• envoys | 11 | 1. Average Citizens | 7 | 18 | 10 |
| Kashmir     | 1. Local Government  
• Police  
• state government | 9 | 1. Average Citizens  
2. separatist leaders  
5. religious leaders | 32 | 41 | 24 |
| U.S.        | 1. Civilian Establishment  
• government officials  
• State Department  
• diplomats | 9 | 1. Human Rights Groups  
2. Private Media  
3. Experts | 12 | 21 | 12 |
| Other       | 1. Diplomats | 4 | 1. Private Media  
2. Experts  
3. Human Rights Groups | 13 | 17 | 10 |
| Total       | | 96 | 75 | 171 | 100 |

Other Sources

Unofficial sources are more numerous for this group as well, with 13 sources being quoted 18 times, most notably Private Media (10), especially the British news.
agency, Reuters. **Experts** were quoted 5 times and **Human Rights Groups** 3 times. Diplomats (5) are the most widely quoted other official sources of information for the second phase of the media coverage of the Kashmir conflict.

**Sources used from 1999-2001**

In this period, a total of 262 sources were used by the three newspapers in their coverage of the Kashmir conflict. Of these 262 sources, 99 or 38 percent were Indian, 67 or 25 percent were Pakistani (25%), 31 or 12 percent were from Kashmir, 44 or 17 percent from the U.S. and 21 or 8 percent others. While Indian sources still dominate, the percentage of Pakistani sources showed a significant increase from the earlier period. Another noteworthy point is that for the first time both the percentage of Pakistani sources used and the percentage of U.S. sources used is higher than the percentage of Kashmiri sources used, as Table 11 illustrates.

**Indian Sources**

The number of official Indian sources (77) used by the U.S. media was once again much higher than the number of unofficial Indian sources used (22). Indian Government (Civilian Establishment) officials were once again the most widely quoted (46 times) and followed by ministers (36 times) and finally spokespersons (10 times). Among the ministers, the Prime Minister was quoted 12 times. The Military Establishment (21 times) was the second major official source among the Indians for this phase. Of the 22 unofficial sources, **Average Citizens** (12) emerged as the most frequently quoted
followed by Indian **Experts** and academics (9) and finally, the Indian media (Private Media) (5).

**Table 11: Distribution of Sources in 1999-2001**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Unofficial</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **India**   | 1. Civilian Establishment  
  • officials  
  • ministers including Prime Minister  
  • spokespersons  
  2. Military Establishment | 77 | 1. Average Citizens  
  2. Experts  
  3. Private Media | 22 | 99 | 38 |
| **Pakistan** | 1. Civilian Establishment  
  • Pervez Musharraf  
  • ministers  
  • officials  
  2. Military Establishment  
  • Pakistani Army | 46 | 1. Private Media  
  2. Average Citizens  
  3. Experts  
  4. Guerrillas | 21 | 67 | 25 |
| **Kashmir** | 1. Political leaders  
  • All Parties Hurriyat Conference | 10 | 1. Average Citizens  
  2. Separatists | 21 | 31 | 12 |
| **U.S.**    | 1. Civilian Establishment  
  • officials  
  • President  
  • Secret Service  
  • diplomats  
  • experts | 29 | 1. Experts | 15 | 44 | 17 |
| **Other**   | 1. Diplomats | 13 | 8 | 21 | 8 |
| **Total**   | 175 | 87 | 262 | 100 |
Pakistan Sources

In this period, of the 46 official sources from Pakistan quoted a total of 103 times, the Civilian Establishment or Pakistani Government sources were the most frequently quoted, with Pakistani military ruler General Pervez Musharraf dominating as the largest single source of information (30). Pakistani ministers were quoted a total of 21 times, followed by Pakistani officials (20). An official source, the Pakistani Army (Military Establishment) was quoted a total of 22 times. Of the 21 unofficial Pakistani sources quoted a total of 27 times in this period, the Pakistani media (Private Media) appeared 10 times, Average Citizens, 7 times, Experts, 6 times and Guerrillas, 4 times.

Kashmiri Sources

Unofficial sources were more than double (21) the number of official sources (10) for Kashmiris in this phase of the period under study. Average Citizens (20) again emerged as the most frequently quoted Kashmiris followed by separatists (8). Among the official sources, Political Leaders constituted by the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, an umbrella organization of Kashmiri separatist parties, was quoted a total of 15 times, followed by leaders at 3 times.

U.S. Sources

A total of 29 official U.S. sources were quoted 81 times in this period with the U.S. Government or Civilian Establishment remaining the most frequently used source. Officials were quoted 37 times, the President, 8 times, diplomats, 5 times, and experts, 5 times. The White House (8) and the Secret Service (7) emerged as the other two official
sources of information. **Experts** (18) were the most frequently cited unofficial U.S.

**Other Sources**

Official sources (13) were more numerous than unofficial sources (8) for this
category. Although diplomats (18) emerged as the most frequently cited sources among
other parties involved in the conflict, there was no clear majority among the unofficial
sources.

**Sources used from 2002-2003**

A total of 349 sources were used in the fourth and final phase of the coverage of
Times*. Of these, 126 or 36 percent were Indian, 73 or 21 percent were Pakistani, 68 or 19
percent were Kashmiri, 58 or 16 percent were American and 24 or 7 percent others. Table
12 demonstrates the relative distribution of sources according to their affiliations.

**Indian Sources**

The number of official Indian sources for the final phase of the 15-year period
under study was 105. The Indian Government or **Civilian Establishment** was used as a
source of information 143 times, with officials being quoted 80 times; ministers,
including the Prime Minister, 58 times; and spokespersons, only 5 times. Among the
ministers, the defense minister was quoted the highest number of times (28) while the
prime minister was quoted 12 times. Quoted 27 times, the Indian military or **Military
Establishment** was the second most frequently cited official source of information for
the U.S. media. Army spokespersons were quoted 10 times while Indian intelligence sources emerged as the third most commonly used source (17). Unofficial Indian sources were only 21 of whom Experts emerged as the ones cited most regularly (16) followed by the Indian media or Private Media (6) and finally, Average Citizens (6).

Pakistani Sources

A total of 53 official sources were quoted 109 times in this phase, with the Pakistani Government or Civilian Establishment being the most important source of information. The Pakistani president was quoted a total of 44 times; officials were quoted 27 times; spokesman, 12 times; and ministers, 9 times. The Pakistani Army or Military Establishment was quoted only 8 times. Of 20 unofficial sources, the Pakistani media (National Media) were quoted 12 times, Extremist groups 11 times, Experts, 7 times and Average Citizens, 5 times.

Kashmiri Sources

Although official sources (20) are less than half the number of unofficial ones (48), there is an increase in official sources from the previous two periods. The elected government of Jammu and Kashmir is the most commonly cited official source (18), and together with the Jammu and Kashmir Police (7) represent the Local Government. Political Leaders, and specifically the APHC, were quoted 6 times. Of the unofficial sources, Average Citizens (39) again emerge as the most frequently quoted sources among the Kashmiri people, followed by Separatist Leaders (19), Human Rights Groups (13) and Experts (4).
Table 12: Distribution of Sources in 2002-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aff.</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Unofficial</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| India | 1. Civilian Establishment  
• officials  
• ministers  
-- Defense Minister  
-- Prime Minister  
• spokespersons  
2. Military Establishment  
• spokespersons  
• intelligence | 105 | 1. Experts  
2. Private Media  
3. Average Citizens | 21 | 126 | 36 |
| Pakistan | 1. Civilian Establishment  
• Pervez Musharraf  
• officials  
• spokesman  
• ministers  
2. Military Establishment  
• Pakistani Army | 53 | 1. Private Media  
2. Extremist Groups  
3. Experts  
4. Average Citizens | 20 | 73 | 21 |
| Kashmir | 1. Local Government  
• state government  
• Police  
2. Political Leaders  
• All Parties Hurriyat Conference | 20 | 1. Average Citizens  
2. Separatist leaders  
3. Human Rights Groups  
4. Experts | 48 | 68 | 19 |
| U.S. | 1. Civilian Establishment  
• Secretary of State  
• Officials  
• Deputy Secretary of State  
• diplomats  
• President  
2. Military Establishment | 50 | 1. Private Media  
2. Experts | 8 | 58 | 17 |
| Other | 1. diplomats | 14 | 1. Private Media  
• Reuters | 10 | 24 | 7 |
| Total | 242 | 107 | 349 | 100 |
U.S. Sources

The number of official sources (50) for the fourth period is overwhelmingly higher for the U.S. than the number of unofficial sources (8). Representatives of the U.S. Government or **Civilian Establishment** are quoted a total of 113 times with the two most frequently quoted sources being the Secretary of State Colin Powell (27) and officials (27) signifying high-profile U.S. involvement in the region in the final phase of the period under study. While the Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage was quoted 17 times, diplomats were quoted 8 times and the president was quoted 6 times. The U.S. military was the second most commonly used American official source but was only quoted 14 times. Among unofficial sources, the Private Media were quoted 4 times and Experts, 3 times.

Other Sources

Diplomats were the most commonly used official sources of information (16) whereas Private Media (11), especially the Reuters News Agency were the most frequently cited source among unofficial sources.
Chapter 5

Discussion

The preceding chapter identified the frames that the U.S. media, represented by The New York Times, The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times, have used in their coverage of the Kashmir conflict and the parties involved in it. It also listed the sources – official and unofficial – that have been used to cover the events in Kashmir and also their relative distribution among the various parties in the conflict. This chapter discusses the changes that have occurred in the frames reported in the previous chapter over the 15-year period stretching from January 1, 1989 to December 31, 2003. It also describes the frames that have had an overwhelming presence in this coverage and the major sources the three media have cited in their coverage. In addition, it seeks to explain these conclusions by relating them to the events occurring in Kashmir, in the Indian subcontinent and in the world. Finally, this chapter provides the implications of this study’s findings and conclusions on future mass media research.

Changing Frames

In order to answer the first research question, which was whether and how frames used in the coverage of the Kashmir conflict and parties to it have changed in the 15-year
period of study, the study compared the relative prominence of major and minor frames in the coverage of each “subject” over the four phases into which the entire period was divided. The results of the comparison, detailed in the following paragraphs, suggest that the frames indeed have changed throughout the period of coverage under study and the changes seem to be related to local, regional and global developments.

**Coverage of the Conflict**

In the first two periods of its coverage, spanning from 1989 to 1998, the conflict in Kashmir is framed as a movement in which the citizenry is portrayed as rising in revolt against a ruling power and trying to separate itself from that power. This is conveyed by the prominence of the **Internal Revolt** frame among nouns, the **Mass-based Action** frame among the modifiers and the **Growing Unrest** frame among verbs. In the last two periods of the coverage, stretching over 1999 till the end of 2003, the frame that emerges is that of an ongoing conflict in which the concerned parties are engaged in physical violence against each other. This is conveyed through the use of words that form the **Physical Violence** and **Conflict** frame for nouns, the **Long and Dangerous Conflict** for the modifiers and once again **Growing Unrest** for the verbs. A glance at Table 3 shows the frames that dominate the last two phases were minor in the first two phases whereas the frames that were major in the first two phases, conveying the goal of the Kashmiri movement – freedom or separation from India – are relegated to the background in the last two phases.
Table 13: Dominant Frames for the conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Dominant Frames</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989-1990</td>
<td>Mass-based Action, Growing Unrest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2001</td>
<td>Physical Violence, Conflict, Long &amp; Dangerous Conflict, Growing Unrest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>Outside Interference, Physical Violence, Conflict, Disagreement, Long and Dangerous Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-2003</td>
<td>Warfare</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The last two phases also show the emergence of the **Terrorism, Outside Interference, Religious Identity** and **Disagreement** frames. Together with the focus on ongoing violence in the last two phases, these frames convey the idea that the conflict, engendered by a dispute over the region between India and Pakistan, was increasingly driven by people from outside Kashmir who had a strong Islamic identity and who were carrying out activities that could be labeled terrorist.

**Coverage of the Region**

In the first two phases, the Kashmir region is identified as a **Political Entity** – as a state within the Indian union – a description that takes the backseat in the last two phases. In the first two phases, the goal of the armed movement in Kashmir – separation from India – is evident and therefore it follows that Kashmir is referred to as a part of what its people want to break away from. Complementing the greater focus on the ongoing violence and the labeling of the Kashmir issue as more of a dispute between India and Pakistan and less of a separatist movement in the last two phases, Kashmir is identified more by the **Geographic Entity** and **Disagreement** frames. However, in all
phases, **Religious Identity** remains a prominent frame signifying that an emphasis was placed on the fact that Kashmir was a Muslim region and therefore different from the rest of India that in general the reports described as Hindu.

**Table 14: Dominant Frames for the region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Dominant Frames</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989-1990</td>
<td>Political Entity, Geographic Entity, Religious Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2001</td>
<td>Geographic Entity, Disagreement, Religious Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>Geographic Entity, Disagreement, Religious Identity, Political Entity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-2003</td>
<td>Religious Identity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Coverage of Kashmir and Kashmiris**

In all four phases of coverage, the frames for Kashmiris remain largely the same – militants and guerrillas (**Armed Combatants**) belonging to Islamic groups (**Religious Identity** and **Organized Activity**) fighting through violent means (**Violent Protester**) to separate Kashmir from India (**Mass-based Action, Separatist Rebels** and **Internal Revolt**). The only changes that occur are in the relative prominence of the **Ordinary Kashmiris** frame in the four phases of coverage. In the first phase, the ordinary people of Kashmir protesting through non-violent means have a high presence in the coverage. In the second and third phases, they are relegated to the sidelines by the activities of the armed militants who killed, massacred, bombed and kidnapped their way into a greater presence in the media. Ironically, the reasons they cited for committing these violent activities was to draw greater international attention to their struggle to break away from India (Schofield, 2003). The Ordinary Kashmiris frame makes a comeback in the fourth
phase along with Civilian Government frame indicating the start of a political process in Kashmir after elections in and formation of a new state legislature.

Table 15: Dominant Frames for Kashmir and Kashmiris

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Dominant Frames</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>Armed Combatant, Civilian Establishment, Ordinary Kashmiris, Violent Protester, Non-violent protester</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-2003</td>
<td>Religious Identity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coverage of India and Indians

In the first two phases of the conflict, the frames used for India portray it as a nation using its Military Establishment to crush the separatist movement of the people of Kashmir (Violent Repressor). These two frames, combined with the dominant frames for the conflict describing it as a separatist movement and the Kashmiris identifying them as armed militants fighting for freedom from India in the first two phases, create the master frame of a violent confrontation between the government and armed forces of India and the people of Kashmir.

However, this frame is displaced in the last two phases, with the emphasis shifting from the people of Kashmir to the Pakistanis as the chief opponents of India. In the third and fourth phases, India emerges as a nuclear-armed country (Nuclear Risk frame) fighting (Continuing Warfare frame) its nuclear-armed opponent, Pakistan, in Kashmir,
which is a region of dispute between them (Disagreement frame), through its armed forces (Military Establishment). Demonstrating this shift in focus from the people of Kashmir to Pakistan as the main Indian adversary is the decline of the Violent Repressor and Law and Order Maintainer frames for India. Through all four phases, the government of India (Civilian Establishment) continues to present its case in the diplomatic arena (Diplomatic Entity, Conciliatory Posturing, and Aggressive Posturing) but its military activities are highlighted more than its diplomatic activities, perhaps because of the constant presence of the Indian military and paramilitary units in the Kashmir region.

Table 16: Dominant Frames for India and Indians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Dominant Frames</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989-1990</td>
<td>Military Establishment, Civilian Establishment, Violent Repressor, Law &amp; Order Maintainer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2001</td>
<td>Military Establishment, Civilian Establishment, Nuclear Risk, Diplomatic Entity – Conciliatory and Aggressive Posturing, Continuing Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>Military Establishment, Civilian Establishment, Nuclear Risk, Diplomatic Entity – Conciliatory and Aggressive Posturing, Continuing Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-2003</td>
<td>Religious Identity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The portrayal of India as a nuclear-armed nation coupled with an emphasis on its ongoing violent conflict with Pakistan as well as the emergence of Nuclear Risk as one of the minor frames for the conflict in phases three and four, point to an attempt to frame the conflict and region as a nuclear time bomb, a reiteration of the opinion held and expressed frequently by Western governments and international relations experts. An
example of the reportage following the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998 is as follows (Burns, 1998, p.1):

In May, the stakes in the conflict rose immeasurably when first India and then Pakistan conducted nuclear tests and declared themselves nuclear powers. The tests raised worldwide alarm, with President Clinton and other leaders appealing to India and Pakistan to settle their differences over Kashmir to prevent the territory from becoming the flashpoint of a nuclear war.

Coverage of Pakistan and Pakistanis

As was the case with India, the entire period of coverage has four recurring frames for Pakistan: the Civilian Establishment of Pakistan engaged in the activities of a Diplomatic Entity including both Conciliatory and Aggressive Posturing, a Military Establishment that is a Violent Neighbor to India and a country that is an Active Supporter of the Kashmiri separatist movement. Coinciding with the greater depiction of the events in Kashmir as a separatist rebellion waged by armed militants in the first two phases, Pakistan is described more as aiding that struggle with arms, training and money than as involved in a military direct dispute with India. However, as the narrative shifts to the characterization of the conflict as ongoing violence in the last two phases, Pakistan is increasingly framed as an active participant and not just a supporter.

Introduction of the Outside Interference frame and increase in the prominence of the Violent Neighbor frame in the third phase as well as greater focus on Military Establishment frame and the entry of the Militant Extremists frame in the fourth phase, bring Pakistan’s direct involvement to the fore in the last two phases. Reinforcing the greater recognition on the part of the United States and also on the part of the media of
Pakistan as home to several militant Islamic organizations that were engaged in terrorist activities, is the presence of the **Cracking Down** frame in the fourth phase.

**Table 17: Dominant Frames for Pakistan and Pakistanis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Dominant Frames</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989-1990</td>
<td>Civilian Establishment, Military Establishment, Active Supporter, Diplomatic Entity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1998</td>
<td>Civilian Establishment, Active Supporter, Diplomatic Entity, Violent Neighbor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2001</td>
<td>Civilian Establishment, Military Establishment, Conciliatory Posturing, Violent Neighbor, Active Supporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>Military Establishment, Militant Extremists, Nuclear Risk, Cracking Down, Conciliatory Posturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-2003</td>
<td>Religious Identity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A point to note here from the journalistic practices standpoint is that the actions that the different subjects are engaged in and the changes in these actions are more strongly conveyed through the verbs used for them as compared to adjectives and nouns. This might be because journalists paint a more colorful picture through the verbs they use to describe an action done by any actor in the story than through nouns because verbs can be used with greater variety and accuracy in the painting of a picture.

**Coverage of the United States and Others**

The Americans do not have a very high profile in the first two phases and come across as **Concerned Advisors** in the last two phases engaged in diplomatic parleys with India and Pakistan. As far as “Other” parties are concerned, the increased presence of human rights groups (**Human Rights Concerns** and **Critical Observer**) in the second phase complements the Kashmiris separatists fighting the militarily repressive Indian
government frame that characterized the conflict in the first two phases. At that time, international human rights organizations accused the Indian government of committing human rights violations against Kashmiri civilians. In the third and fourth phases, reinforcing the growing participation of outsiders (Outside Interference) and Pakistanis (Militant Extremists and Violent Neighbor) in the ongoing violence in Kashmir is the presence of the Foreign Soldiers frame. The media coverage highlights fighters from outside Kashmir with a strong Religious Identity fighting to separate Kashmir from India (Separatist Rebels frame).

Table 18: Dominant Frames for Other Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Dominant Frames</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989-1990</td>
<td>News media</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999-2001</td>
<td>Foreign Soldiers, Religious Identity, Outside Interference, Violent Outsiders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>Foreign Soldiers, Concerned Advisor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dominant frames**

In answer to the second research question, which was what have been the dominant frames in the U.S. media coverage of the Kashmir and to what extent have these frames reflected such major themes as religion, armed conflict, U.S. national interest, and threat to world peace, this study found that the two frames that have been present throughout the 15-year period investigated, have been the Warfare frame for the conflict reflecting the theme of armed conflict and the Religious Identity frame for the
Indians, the Pakistanis and the Kashmir region and the Kashmiris reflecting the religion theme.

The Warfare frame has been constructed from only the word “war” and since it emerged as the most prominent frame in three of the four phases into which the period of study was divided, it follows that the U.S. media have placed a great emphasis in highlighting the Kashmir conflict sometimes as a “guerrilla” or “separatist war” but mostly as a conflict that has sparked wars in the past between India and Pakistan and has the potential of turning into a “wider war” or even a “nuclear war.”

This frame emerged as a dominant because in almost every news report on Kashmir, there is a standard or “boiler plate” description of the events that have taken place in the subcontinent since 1947, when India and Pakistan became separate nations, independent of the departing British colonial power. Following is a typical description of the nature of relations between India and Pakistan (Burns, 1994, p.6A):

…none deny that a new war, if it began, would almost certainly center on Kashmir.

In two of the three wars the two countries have fought since Britain's departing colonial rulers partitioned the Indian subcontinent in 1947, creating Hindu-dominated India and Muslim-ruled Pakistan, Kashmir has been the battleground.

“No issue between them so focuses the passions -- of religion, of nationalism, and of pride -- that have made each, for the other, an object of enduring dislike and mistrust.

Due in large part to this recurring description of the two nations’ historical conflict over Kashmir, the Warfare frame emerges as dominant. These narratives tie in directly to the rules of journalistic writing that entail a recounting of the background in
order to place the events in context for the reader. This is particularly true of events and issues that are covered sporadically or are far removed from the reader’s experience as the Kashmir conflict undoubtedly is for an American audience.

The second dominant frame that emerges from an overview of the entire period analyzed in this research is the Religious Identity frame used to describe the conflict, the region and the three parties involved – Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris. Whereas India has been described as a “Hindu” or a “predominantly Hindu” country, Kashmir has been described as a Muslim or “Muslim dominated” region, and Kashmiris as “majority Muslim and Pakistan as an “Islamic” or “Muslim” country.

Since the turn of the year, and especially in the last two weeks, the Kashmir Valley, a Muslim region seeking independence from predominantly Hindu India, has been engulfed by a storm of violence. (Gargan, 1993, p1)

Kashmir, a territory about the size of Utah with a population whose majority is Muslim, is wedged between India, Pakistan and China. Its ownership has been disputed between predominantly Muslim Pakistan and largely Hindu India since both gained independence in 1947. The two nations -- the world's newest nuclear powers -- have fought two of their three wars over Kashmir. (Bearak, 2000, p8A)

Although it is a fact that Pakistan was founded as a homeland for the Muslims of South Asia, India was established as a secular democracy where religion is a private and the Indian Constitution guarantees ever citizen the right to practice and preach his or her faith. In the past 15 years, there has been a rise in Hindu fundamentalist forces on the national scene in India, but India’s refusal to let go of Kashmir is rooted in its secular identity (Cohen, 2003, Dixit, 2002). According to Cohen (2003), India “finds it difficult to turn over a Muslim majority region to a Muslim neighbor just because it is Muslim” (p. 46, emphasis in original). However, the constant juxtaposition of the three parties and
their religious majorities seems to convey the impression that the demographics of India have a major influence on India’s attitude towards the dispute and the nature of its policies in Kashmir. However, it can be argued that describing Pakistan as a Muslim country and its claim to the territory of Kashmir as rooted in religion is justifiable since the country was founded as an Islamic nation and because it considers Kashmir as legitimately a part of Pakistan because the population in Kashmir is mainly Muslim (Cohen, 2003, Dixit, 2002, Schofield, 2003).

The identification of the parties by their religion might be related again to the need for explaining in a simple manner a complex situation playing out in part of the world that for most American readers would arguably be remote. The assigning of religious motivation to the actions of the parties concerned may be the result of an attempt to provide a simple explanation to a very nuanced and multi-layered conflict that has persisted through five and half decades.

Threat to U.S. national interests is reflected in the great attention paid to the conflict in the last phase (2002-2003) as reflected by the quantum leap in coverage of the Kashmir conflict and the tensions between India and Pakistan in all three newspapers from 2001 to 2002 (see Table 1). At that time, the U.S. was actively pressuring Pakistan to ban extremist Islamic groups based in Pakistan because after the events on September 11, 2001, these groups were seen as a threat to the security of Americans. This concern is also reflected in the high prominence of the Cracking Down frame among verbs used for Pakistanis in the last phase of the coverage. The increase in coverage was also related to the greater prominence of the frames reflecting a violent conflict in the latter two periods.
(Long and Dangerous Conflict, Conflict, Physical Violence and Outside Interference) as opposed to a separatist movement because there was a massive military standoff between India and Pakistan in summer 2002 and coupled with the fears expressed about the possibility of a nuclear exchange, there is a clear presence of the threat to word peace theme in the frames.

Sources

Past research has shown that the media tend to rely on official sources for information. In her content analysis of the The New York Times and The Washington Post, Dickson (1992) found that the two elite newspapers relied heavily on U.S. government officials for information on the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. One reason is that official sources are more easily accessible to journalists and this greater accessibility makes the job of news gathering more efficient. Another is that these sources are perceived to be more authoritative, with the information they provide considered to be factually accurate (Shoemaker and Reese, 1991; Entman, 1989; Dickson, 1992).

Analysis of sources for the 15-year period of coverage of the Kashmir conflict reveals the same disproportionate reliance on official sources as compared to unofficial ones. In the 1989-1990 phase, the Civilian Establishments of India, Pakistan and the United States were quoted more than three times as often as their unofficial counterparts. In fact for Pakistan, this ratio was 12 to 1. This finding is in accordance with past research that suggests the greater reliance of news media on official, especially
government, sources. Among unofficial sources for these three countries, the Private Media were the most often cited source; this is not surprising, considering that these three nations have well developed press systems. Also, media organizations act as sources for each other and especially when covering a foreign country, journalists pay close attention to the domestic media, often picking up leads from them and then featuring their information in, or following this information up in their own stories.

Only in the case of the Kashmiris is this trend reversed with a greater presence of unofficial sources, especially Average Citizens, in all four phases of the coverage. Separatist and religious leaders have been the two other main groups of unofficial Kashmiri sources that have been cited in more than two phases of coverage. All three newspapers in this study were found to have carried extensive quotes from the ordinary people of Kashmir in many news-based analytical stories. For example:

"They have made every Muslim a suspect," a businessman said of the Indian armed forces' attempts to subdue a fast-growing independence movement. "We are all militants now." (Crossette, 1990, p. 1 A)

"We have bullets from the left and bullets from the right, bullets from in front and bullets from behind," said an elderly Muslim cloth trader in Lal Chowk, a bazaar here. He whispered, "Everything we valued has been destroyed." (Burns, 1995, p. 3)

In the second phase, reflecting a growing concern with accusations of human rights violations made against India, Human Rights Groups feature prominently among unofficial sources, which are incidentally higher in number than official sources for the United Stats and the "Other" parties. India and Pakistan, however, continue to be represented by their respective Civilian Establishments. As compared to Indians and the
people of Kashmir, Pakistan and the United States maintain a low profile in the first two phases, an indication that the conflict at this time was mainly an Internal Revolt that India was trying to suppress by violent means (Violent Repressor).

In the third and the fourth phases, the profile of both Pakistan and the United States is higher than in the first two phases. In fact, Pakistani sources exceed in number even sources from Kashmir, with Pakistani Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf heading the list of Civilian Establishment sources from Pakistan. This seems to signify the greater concentration of power and authority in him, the central figure and face of Pakistan to the world community after 1999. In contrast, India continued to be represented heavily through its Civilian Establishment officials and elected representatives including the Prime Minister and his cabinet of ministers in the third and fourth phases.

Reflecting growing U.S. concern with the nuclear-armed status of India and Pakistan from 1999 to 2001 (Nuclear Risk) and its interest then in roping in Pakistan to hunt down Al Qaeda, the Civilian Establishment sources used from the United States become increasingly high-profile in the third and fourth phases of the media coverage of the Kashmir conflict. In fact, Secretary of State Colin Powell is the most frequently cited U.S. source from 2002 to 2003 implying the intense U.S. involvement in the South Asian region in the last phase.

In the final two phases, although the people of Kashmir still were represented by unofficial sources, mainly Average Citizens and Separatist Leaders, whose number was twice the number of official sources, there was a move towards quoting more official
Kashmiri sources, particularly officials of the elected Local Government and Political Leaders from the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, an umbrella organization of Kashmiri separatist political parties, signifying the start of a political process in Kashmir. Kashmiri human rights groups and experts also emerged as other unofficial sources indicating a greater consolidation of the Non-violent Protesters in Kashmir than in the past.

Therefore, in answer to the third research question, which was what have been the nature and affiliation of sources in the coverage of the Kashmir conflict, this study found that among official sources, Indian sources were the most frequently quoted followed by sources from Pakistan, the United States, Kashmir and “Other” parties. Among unofficial sources, those from Kashmir were the most frequently cited followed by those from India, Pakistan, the United States and finally, the “Other” parties.
Chapter Six

Conclusions

This study has discovered and analyzed the frames through which the U.S. print media have reported on the Kashmir conflict. As discussed in the literature review section of this thesis, media construct social reality through the frames that they use. They construct these frames by singling out some features of subjects, developments or their environments, and emphasizing these features over others. In the case of their coverage of the Kashmir conflict, the U.S. print media, represented by The New York Times, The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times, have chosen to highlight two aspects of the Kashmir conflict – religion and warfare.

Through their consistent use of religious descriptors for India, Pakistan and Kashmir, they have created a simplified version of the complex reality of the region – the desires of its people and the reasons for the tussle between India and Pakistan. The political reasons for the Kashmiri separatist movement – discontentment with corrupt regional governments, lack of adequate civic amenities and industrial development, unemployment, disillusionment with the electoral system, and anger at being shortchanged out of their semi-autonomous status in the Indian union – were never highlighted. Instead, the media chose the easy way out by labeling the conflict as
religious in nature, possibly because conflict over religion resonates with current American cultural frames. It can be argued that with Islam being considered a major threat to Western countries especially after the events on September 11, 2001, the U.S. media might increasingly resort to this kind of religious framing, particularly in cases where one of the parties involved subscribes to Islam.

The second aspect of the reality constructed by the U.S. print media is that of a conflict that essentially is a war and can turn into a larger war or a nuclear war. While this frame does reflect the nature of the developments on the ground that were, it ties into two characteristics of U.S. media coverage of events in foreign counties. First, it confirms what previous studies have found – that U.S. media coverage of third world countries tends to be crisis-oriented defined as dissent, war, terrorism, crime, coups, assassinations or disasters (Shoemaker and Reese, 1991). The pattern visible in the coverage of the Kashmir conflict also reflects this tendency. When the separatist movement started in 1989, since there were mass demonstrations, mass killings, kidnappings and bombings, the conflict attracted a lot of U.S. media attention in one year from December 1989 to December 1990 (40 stories in The New York Times and 15 in The Washington Post). The coverage lagged in the eight-year period from 1991 to 1998 (33 stories in The New York Times and only 3 stories each in The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times) because there were violent events happening in areas of the world that were of greater importance to the United States and consequently to its media – the crisis in the Middle east, Northern Ireland, Bosnia and later Kosovo – although killings, kidnappings and bombings continued unabated in Kashmir (Schofield, 2003).
When India and Pakistan tested their nuclear weapons in 1998, nuclear-capable Western nations, including the United States, started expressing fears that there might be a nuclear war between India and Pakistan, in spite of the fact that India committed itself publicly to no first use of nuclear weapons. Despite repeated reiterations by Indian and Pakistani officials that neither country could afford a nuclear war and that the weapons actually decreased the possibility of even a conventional war and were mere deterrents, the U.S. media continued to quote U.S. and other Western government officials, including former President Bill Clinton and diplomats and experts, as saying that the Kashmir was a nuclear flashpoint. This reflects the imprint of power in media frames, with the United States emerging the clear winner in the framing of the Kashmir conflict by the U.S. media. The priorities and concerns of the United State were clearly reflected in the warfare frame that was employed throughout the period analyzed in this study, a fact that leads to the conclusion that the media in the U.S. reflect the agenda of the government when it comes to international relations.

Entamn (1989) has said that media frame the issues they cover not only by choosing to include certain aspects of reality but also by choosing to exclude some aspects, and that is clearly what the U.S. media have done regarding the Kashmir conflict by not including or emphasizing certain opinions and contentions. They have chosen to look at the conflict through the straitjacket of the U.S. government’s stance on the region and supplemented this stand by quotes from U.S. experts on this issue. They have not promoted to an equal extent the contentions of the Indian and Pakistani governments that the possibility of nuclear war between them is remote. Tying this analysis of the content
of U.S. media frames back to the initial argument that only crisis and bloodshed and possibility of a greater conflict in Third World countries get covered in the U.S. media, the number of stories in *The New York Times* jumped from 4 in 1998 to 24 in 1999, the year in which India and Pakistan fought their undeclared war in Kargil in Kashmir. The coverage again jumped from 2001 to 2002, when India and Pakistan massed nearly a million troops along the Line of Control in Kashmir (6 to 21 in *The Washington Post*, 5 to 24 in the *Los Angeles Times* and 15 to 51 in *The New York Times*) reflecting once again that the possibility of violence on a larger and potentially catastrophic scale ensures coverage by the U.S. media. Another reason for the hike in coverage from 2001 to 2002 was the growing involvement of the United States in the region through the George Bush administration’s aggressive attempts to include Pakistan in its coalition against terrorism and the Afghanistan war, clearly reflecting increased media coverage due to increased U.S. interest in the region.

A shift that clearly demonstrated the influence of changing U.S.-India and U.S.-Pakistan relations from 1989 to 2003 was the move towards greater recognition of Pakistan’s role in actively aiding the militants in Kashmir in terrorist activities, as a fact and not just an Indian allegation. The coverage which criticized the Indian government for its alleged human rights violations and labeled Indian allegations that Pakistan was training and arming Kashmiri militants as claims in the first two periods, changes to being critical of Pakistan for harboring Islamic terrorist organizations that committed violent acts in Kashmir. This shift can be attributed to the increasing closeness between the United States and India and to the U.S. government’s concern with American
security, once again reflecting the impact of power on media frames. In conclusion, one can say that the U.S. media have constructed the reality of the Kashmir conflict by making selected attributes of the conflict salient and by highlighting in their text, problem definitions and causal interpretations advanced by the U.S. government. Also, confirming past findings on international news coverage by the U.S. media, this study shows that media coverage of the Kashmir conflict was crisis-oriented and reflected U.S. concerns in the region.

**Implications for Future Research**

Media theorists, particularly Entman (1989, Gamson (1989) and Graber (1988), have conceptualized frames as being present in the communicator, the text, the audience and the culture, with the presence of frames in any one of these locations influencing their presence in another. Although this study did not look at the frames for the Kashmir conflict among the communicators, the audience and the culture, they no doubt had a great influence on the frames evident in the text.

The events in Kashmir were definitely covered because they were newsworthy from the perspective of the news value of “conflict,” which is arguably the news value on which the media place a great premium and which determines most, if not all, news content. Frames that reflected journalistic practices and socialization were once again the religion and warfare frames, both signifying an attempt to simplify reality and structure it in an inverted pyramid fashion, the need to provide superficial historical background and
boiler-plate descriptions to place the events in context for their readers, and also the 
media acceptance of the government “line” when it comes to foreign news coverage. 

Researchers have found that the mass media have priming effects, in that the 
repeated exposure of audiences to ideas and information in the media triggers related 
ideas and feelings in their minds. Salwen and Matera (1992) found distinct evidence of 
the second level agenda setting influence of the mass media in public perception of 
several foreign countries as dangerous places and as friends or enemies, which persisted 
even though media coverage of those nations had started changing, providing evidence of 
the enduring impact of repeated frames on the audience’s thinking about issues, or in this 
case, foreign countries. Drawing from their findings, one can argue that since the 
dominant frames that have characterized the conflict have been religion, with one of them 
being Islam, and warfare, the readers of the three newspapers in this study would 
undoubtedly perceive the Kashmir conflict as a potentially disastrous war involving 
parties that subscribe to different religions. Viewed in the context of the Middle East 
crisis between Palestinian Muslims and Israeli Jews as well as terrorist acts perpetrated 
by Islamic extremists in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Chechnya and Sudan, this might 
also add to the increasing demonization of Islam in America as a religion that perpetuates 
violence. 

The current study therefore could serve as a starting point for a second-level 
agenda setting study aimed at determining such issues as a) the perceptions of Americans 
regarding the Kashmir conflict; b) the level of correspondence of these audience frames 
with the mass media frames discovered in this study; and c) the persistence of these
media and audience frames. Such a study would add to the body of work about international news reporting and framing of international news as well as to the existing research on effects of frames present in media text on the audience.

This emphasis on religion and warfare as the primary frames for the Kashmir conflict can also be tied to certain characteristics of American culture, the fourth location of frames identified by Entman (1989). American society has been found to be highly ethnocentric, and this tendency of Americans to concern themselves mainly with their domestic affairs is reflected in the low and essentially crisis-driven coverage given to international affairs and particularly events in Third World countries by the U.S. media. High ethnocentrism also breeds ignorance of other cultures and imposition of American interpretations on complex, multi-layered events occurring in other countries. These interpretations are evident in the media text and are maybe brought about by the journalists and imbibed by the audience, making it a somewhat cyclical process.

Therefore, another area of research for which this study could serve as a base is an investigation into the frames regarding foreign countries – especially such South Asian countries as India and Pakistan – that are present in the American culture and how these might impact the frames communicated by journalists who cover events in these countries, editors who edit their reports, or the gatekeepers who select these reports for presentation to the public. A basic tenet of journalism is that its practitioners engage in writing for the perhaps rather specific audience of a particular mass medium. It follows that certain perceptions in the minds of reporters about what American readers would want to read might influence frames that these reporters would use in their coverage of
these countries. One major focus of future study could be the determination of the degree
to which the knowledge of cultural and audience characteristics had an influence on the
frames the reporters, editors, or gatekeepers presented in the stories on which this study
focused.


Appendices
Appendix A: Coding Sheet

Date: _____________________    Newspaper: ______________________

Dateline: _________________________

Headline: ____________________________

Sources:

Type: Official=1, Unofficial=2
- Official: Military, Diplomatic, Government, Political parties
- Unofficial: Non-governmental, human rights groups, militant groups, religious organizations, journalists, laypersons, media

Affiliation: Indian=1, Pakistani=2, Kashmiri=3, U.S.=4, Other=5

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Aff.</th>
<th>No.</th>
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Keywords:

Type: Noun=1, Verbs=2, Adjectives=3, Adverbs=4

Subject: Dispute=1, Region=2, Indians=3, Pakistanis=4, Kashmiris=5, U.S.=6, Other=7

No.= Number of times the word appears in the article

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Word</th>
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<th>Sub No.</th>
<th>Modifier</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Sub</th>
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