Newmann  The Radical Perspective on Social Studies: A Synthesis and Critique

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The Radical Perspective on Social Studies: A Synthesis and Critique

Fred M. Newmann
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Abstract

Radical writing in education suggests a) that emancipation should be the guiding social ideal; b) social life should be understood largely in terms of such concepts as domination, autonomy, contradiction, and the social construction of knowledge; and c) that teaching should emphasize the development of critical discourse. If potentially appealing aspects of these ideas are to be incorporated into social studies, research is needed to develop more specific social visions consistent with the value of emancipation, to determine what organizational changes must be made in schools, and to identify specific teaching practices that maximize the intellectual accomplishment and emotional rewards of critical inquiry.

In comparison to the 1960s and early 1970s, social studies literature in the past ten years has seen few attempts to develop rationales for social education. A significant body of social thought, the radical perspective, has emerged in academia, however, and its implications for social studies should be explored. For a variety of reasons, radical writing has not produced specific proposals for social studies curriculum, but this paper synthesizes the work of various authors into a set of propositions whose implications for curriculum and teaching can be examined. It then discusses the strengths and weaknesses of these propositions, and proposes an agenda for research that must be undertaken if potentially appealing aspects of radical thought are to be incorporated into social studies teaching.

The Mainstream

U.S. citizens take pride in local control of education, and there is considerable diversity between schools in demography and educational climate, but the topics that students study in social studies, the sequence in which they occur, and teaching practices are remarkably similar throughout the country. Several studies have confirmed the existence of a modal pattern characterized by the teaching of isolated facts focused on life in the United States and its history, a passive acceptance of dominant social institutions
and roles, and the acquisition of social knowledge as something to be received as authoritative rather than to be understood or constructed as problematic. This modal pattern, or mainstream, has come about not through the development of an explicit comprehensive rationale, nor through centralized political control, but apparently through unique historical events (such as recommendations from influential professional organizations, see Hertzberg, 1981), the politics and economics of textbook publishing (Fitzgerald, 1979), the effects of teaching students massed in large groups within bureaucratic structures (Bidwell, 1965), and the absence of debate on fundamental issues of political-economic ideology in the society at large.

Of course there are many exceptions to the mainstream pattern, and social studies educators often speak about lack of agreement within the field. Teachers have been bombarded with proposals to increase attention to various topics: global education, law-related education, economics, ethnic studies, area studies, environmental issues, the holocaust, or prevention of nuclear war. Beyond such proposals for the study of particular topics, four general curriculum rationales have critiqued mainstream curriculum in the last twenty years: social science inquiry (Morrissett & Stevens, 1971); critical thinking on public controversy (Oliver & Shaver, 1974); moral development (Kohlberg, 1981); and social action (Newmann, 1975). Each has articulated a theoretical rationale, has developed materials or specific programs for schools, and has been tried in the schools. The impact of each on the mainstream curriculum has been almost negligible, with social science inquiry having probably the most and social action the least influence.

These alternatives proposed substantial departures from classroom practice, and they failed to take root, but not because of their political radicalism—none of them directly challenged central assumptions of political-economic organization in the United States. Even the citizen action rationale which taught students to take assertive action to influence public policy was grounded in liberal political theory, emphasizing participatory democracy and consent of the governed.

The reform rationales in social studies did question conventional ways of packaging knowledge for students, and they asked teachers to engage students in more active forms of inquiry, where the process of reflection would be given more attention than recall of information. In many ways, however, the curriculum projects were unresponsive to the perspectives and working environments of teachers. Without offering broadly based programs of teacher education to inspire new visions of social education, they asked for professional commitments much at variance with teachers’ previous training. In their zeal to promote reflective skills, they neglected the importance of mastery of content as a basis for organized reflection and as a requirement for advancement in the credentialing system. The projects required increased preparation time for teachers and increased oppor-
tunities for teachers to respond to individual students’ ideas, without altering time schedules in schools that already stretched teachers to their limit. Studies have shown that innovations unresponsive to such conditions in the schools are unlikely to be widely implemented (Haas, 1977; Berman & McLaughlin, 1978; Shaver, Davis & Helburn, 1978; Hertzberg, 1981).

In contrast to the ferment stimulated by curriculum development during the 1960s and early 1970s, the recent period has been quiet, some would say virtually dead. Special topics have been advocated continuously, but since Newmann (1975), I have seen only one attempt to develop a new rationale for the field, namely, the social roles approach presented by Superka and Hawke (1982). This proposal was limited to a conceptual argument without ensuing development of materials. The apparent failures of earlier reform efforts have perhaps discouraged academics in social studies from further inquiry into alternative rationales.

In short, we continue to lack a comprehensive rationale for social education that articulates and defends the prescriptive social and ethical theory on which it stands, the major explanatory-descriptive assumptions it holds about society, conditions of schooling and social change, and the theories of teaching and learning it supports (Newmann, 1977). Of course, we have witnessed a host of reports on the general reform of schooling, reflecting both conservative attempts to strengthen mainstream trends and statements that advocate more progressive schooling, but none offers a fresh or even a detailed rationale for social education. An important literature related to social studies, though not focused upon it, has, however, blossomed. A radical perspective has gained increased attention in academia, and its relevance to social studies demands that we consider it in some detail.

**Propositions in the Radical Perspective**

I define the radical perspective as the set of propositions presented below. It is gleaned primarily from the writing of U.S. authors such as Cherryholmes (1980), Apple (1982), and Giroux (1983). Others (e.g., Anyon, 1979; Popkewitz, 1978; Whitty, 1976) have also articulated some of the propositions in one form or another, and those who share this perspective often rely on Marxian thought and work of authors outside the U.S. such as Habermas, Gramsci, Friere, Bernstein, Young, and Bordieu. My purpose is not a comprehensive literature review, nor careful scrutiny of any individual author. Rather, it is to identify some themes which seemed stressed in an increasingly visible network of discourse in U.S. journals and graduate study, and which offer, in my judgment, important challenges to the way in which U.S. citizens view social studies education.

The perspective includes propositions which promote a central social value or ideal, which describe the nature of social life, and which suggest strategies for improving education. Main propositions on these three matters are summarized as follows.
Emancipation, the social ideal. Much radical writing begins with the critique of social life presented below. The critique is usually not formally derived from a statement of preferred values or social ideals, but the central ideal can easily be inferred. If there is any single theme pervading these analyses, it is emancipation. The ultimate social ideal, and thus the purpose of education, ought to be the emancipation of all people such that none are subject to domination or exploitation by others economically, politically, sexually, intellectually, or spiritually.

Social Life: dominant interests, autonomy, and contradiction. Schooling and teaching in social studies must be understood in terms of at least the following broad insights on the nature of social life.

Almost all policies and social practices tend to serve the interests of particular groups by violating or repressing the interests of others, especially minorities, the poor, and women. Persistent patterns of domination are typically legitimated through subtle methods not apparent to those dominated, and even persons of dominant classes are victimized. The net result in most social structures, especially capitalistic ones, is injustice, alienation and dehumanization—in spite of aggregate increases over time in material standards of living and in personal choice for segments of the population.

Dominant interests, however, cannot entirely suppress the spirit of subordinated interests, because individuals and organizations always retain some measure of autonomy, some potential to resist and to force compromise upon dominant interests.

Social life involves a host of contradictions with which humans must deal; for example, the resistance of working class students to the dominant culture can further subordinate their own interests; oppressed groups may gain access and power, but then join the establishment in dominating others; vivid expressions of individuality may be generated by pressures for conformity to group pressure.

Knowledge itself is socially constructed and validated through human perception, guided by human purposes. Thus knowledge is constructed to serve human ends, and its public use usually serves to legitimate dominant interests. Nevertheless, if the quest for knowledge is addressed to the understanding of contradictions and creative uses of conflict, it offers resources for emancipation.

Education strategies: social knowledge, practical skills, critical discourse. The responsibility of educators is to teach knowledge, skills, and critical discourse that generate action toward emancipation. School programs and teaching procedures would seem to be guided by at least the following principles:

The knowledge to be taught should concentrate on ideas regarding social life mentioned above, emphasizing the significance of dominant interests, struggles for autonomy, contradictions, and the social construction of
knowledge. Such ideas should not, however, be foisted upon students and teachers through a centrally developed curriculum. They must be formulated in response to particular, local circumstances through a process that connects teachers and students to their own cultural histories and that empowers them to define the curriculum.

Analytic understandings should be taught in conjunction with specific tools of literacy, numeracy, academic basics, and interpersonal communication skills that build personal efficacy to act in the imperfect world-as-it-is. Such skills are needed for individual survival and development, but their mastery should be inspired by a commitment to work for a collectively emancipated world.

Teaching must be guided by continuous examinations of one's own experiences, of common sense, and of expert knowledge. Relationships must be created in which teachers and students can subject their fundamental beliefs to the scrutiny of one another and to a continuous process of dialectical revision. Such discourse creates new demands for knowledge itself in the quest to determine the nature of a better world and to arrive at guides for action.

This abbreviated synthesis may be challenged, for it does not include a full discussion of two important issues: selectivity and originality. I have selected particular aspects of radical writing that focus on education and schooling, without analyzing radical scholarship on more general social, economic, and political issues. Within the work on schooling, I have selected ideas that have implications for the deliberate planning of curriculum and instruction in schools. Neglected here are theories about society and hidden curriculum, some of which suggest there is no point in attempting to affect schools until more fundamental structural changes occur (such theories offer no assistance in the task of school improvements). I also rely primarily on U.S. authors speaking presumably to conditions within the U.S. I offer no discussion of the historical or conceptual (disciplinary) contexts from which the selected propositions emerge. I risk creating a strawman, because authors give varying degrees of emphasis to different parts of the perspective, and some may even reject some of its propositions.

Those familiar with the history of U.S. education may find nothing new or unique in themes above considered radical. In the U.S., the work of Dewey, Counts, or Rugg might be cited as offering intellectual roots for several of the ideas, and connections might also be drawn to other work (some much earlier) in philosophy and social analysis. Progressive educators and curriculum reformers within the inquiry movement of the new social studies in the late 1960s may identify with the goal of emancipation and may equate previous approaches to the teaching of critical thinking with the teaching of critical discourse. Workers in alternative schools, advocates of experiential education, and classroom teachers may also subscribe to these ideas. I do not mean to suggest that each theme in the perspective has been developed
originally by the authors cited. Distinctions among the propositions of different reformers at different historical periods may be useful, but this is not the purpose here. The propositions I have presented are radical in the sense that they tend to recur in the writings of educators identified with a radical tradition of scholarship, and that, if implemented, these propositions would represent major departures from conventional practice in schools.

There are risks in presenting an oversimplified rendition of radical thought, in possibly appropriating ideas for purposes not intended by authors and in neglecting the contextual development of these ideas in relation to other traditions such as American liberalism, progressivism, or European radical thought. A parsimonious summary is necessary, however, if U.S. social educators are to consider radical work carefully. Scholars and practitioners often dismiss the writing of individual radical authors because of mystifying jargon, excessively abstract and deterministic analyses, impractical or politically threatening proposals. Unfortunately, deficiencies of this sort in some of the writing tend to deflect attention from significant propositions that deserve careful analysis. Because this work represents a conception of social education distinct from the mainstream, and because it contains in my view powerful, though insufficiently developed, ideas, it deserves more careful formal examination than the social studies community has offered. The risks of oversimplification have been taken in the hope that propositions stated in this way will stimulate a more thorough and focused response to radical thought.

Strengths

Each of the propositions can be defended as fundamental to education for social democracy. The central social ideal of human emancipation has been justified through an extensive literature in the Western tradition. Of course, appeal to the general value of emancipation alone may not resolve a number of issues in attaining social justice. Unregulated liberty to pursue private economic interests will generate inequalities of wealth that reinforce political and social domination; the apparent emancipation of some is won through the exploitation of others. If emancipation is interpreted as unrestrained personal choice, it will threaten the degree of social cohesion and order required for equal protection of individuals' rights. If it is interpreted primarily as the right of groups to collective self-determination, this may threaten the rights of individuals within a collective. If emancipation is viewed as the right of man to be free from forces of nature, it may lead to ecological disaster. In spite of these difficulties, almost all concepts of justice, fairness, democracy, and human dignity in Western liberal thought assume an equal entitlement to liberty or to emancipation from unreasonable constraints on liberty. In this sense emancipation constitutes a powerful normative basis for evaluating the quality of social life, and for establishing social goals.
Radical propositions also offer helpful constructs for describing and explaining social life. The themes of domination, special interests and techniques of legitimation offer a continuous invitation to search for the subtle ways in which we are affected by institutions and the ways in which our own participation tends to reinforce or to oppose dominant interests. Such concepts challenge conventional notions of pluralism that assume a more egalitarian and open exchange among different interests.

The theme of human agency and autonomy is powerful, because it represents a fundamental human aspiration and requirement for social justice. It seems particularly relevant to the concerns of youth who struggle to build unique personal identities in spite of adults' efforts to socialize them into preconceived forms. Similarly, the concepts of contradiction and conflict call attention to persistent intellectual and emotional challenges to youth and adults alike: Must one tell the truth even if it hurts someone? To gain enough influence to change institutions, one must first advance to positions of influence, but does that very effort serve to perpetuate the status quo? When expert witnesses disagree on technical matters, whom am I to believe? By focusing upon contradictions and conflict, radical interpretations of social life can offer students the resources to reflect upon important problems that conventional teaching tends to avoid.

The radical perspective directs close attention to the relationship between knowledge and values, and it candidly acknowledges human emancipation as the particular social value that guides its own inquiry. This offers a more accurate account of the social function of knowledge than does the interpretation of science as a value-neutral search for authoritative truth. Searching for truth in an emancipatory fashion requires an unending dialectic in which authoritative truth is never discovered in any final sense. Such a conception of knowledge is powerful, because it invites continuous revision and reexamination, and because it is deliberately connected to the broad human aspiration for social justice.

Presumably a radical curriculum would emphasize social concepts already discussed, along with basic skills of literacy, and these would be directed toward action to empower students in both school and nonschool situations. What seems most unique among radical educational ideas is the emphasis on critical discourse, the conception of learning, and the creation of meaning as an intersubjective experience. Rather than viewing the teacher as a dispenser of truth and the student as a receptor who accumulates knowledge for future use, both are seen as participating in a search, the success of which requires mutual adaptation to the other's social constructs; each must learn to suspend one's views sufficiently to allow the other's to penetrate. Requiring a high degree of interpersonal trust, this dialectic process transforms learning from a one-way transmission process between superior teacher and inferior students into a cooperative activity among persons who genuinely need one another in order to enhance their
knowledge and personal agency. This is not to suggest that students and teachers are intellectual equals, for the teacher has many tools that the student must learn to use. This conception of the learning process, however, enhances the human connection and reduces alienation between teacher and student.\(^5\)

Radical strategies for school improvement would seem to avoid strategic mistakes of previous school reform efforts. Recognizing teachers’ need for empowerment over their curriculum and pedagogy, radicals avoid the promulgation of centrally developed curriculum. Instead, the specific content of radical social studies must be developed in response to needs of local teachers and students. Radical groups publish teaching materials intended for national or international audiences on sexism, prisons, or social class, and they assist in the formation of broad support networks for radical teachers, but they do not advocate single programatic solutions to curriculum improvement. This is consistent with concern for emancipation and with the long U.S. tradition of local control of education. It is also supported by recent research on effective innovations which endorses the significance of local, school-based reform and teacher ownership of improvement efforts (Little, 1982; Popkewitz, Tabachnick & Wellage, 1982; Purkey & Smith, 1983).

According to the radical perspective, however, working toward greater teacher control over curriculum and the nature of discourse in school cannot be achieved by focusing on life in schools alone. Because school life is so intimately connected with culture beyond school, patterns of domination in school are unlikely to change unless patterns in the community beyond schools are also challenged. In this sense, reform within schools is viewed not as a search for technical or administrative solutions to professional problems, but as a broad political challenge requiring simultaneous work in school and community. This view of educational reform is more politically astute, and of special significance to issues in social education, than the assumption that education can be improved simply through the discovery of more effective techniques by professional educators.

To summarize, impressive strengths of the radical perspective include the explicit connection of knowledge with the legitimate social purpose of human emancipation; several substantive concepts that probe more deeply into the nature of social life than does conventional curriculum; a process of teaching focused on critical, cooperative discourse; and an approach to reform that respects the culture of local teachers and students.

**Weaknesses**

In spite of the strengths just summarized, considerable resistance to the radical perspective is well-known. The failure of the perspective to take root in U.S. politics or education can be explained through radical ideology as the work of dominant interests to suppress opposition (e.g., by creating
myths of equality and justice, by co-opting potential dissidents to become part of the establishment, etc.). Lack of support, however, can also be attributed to weaknesses in the perspective itself; i.e., its inadequate response to important human concerns. Among educators, much resistance seems to flow from objections to its ideological substance, its neglect of organizational constraints on teaching and its relative silence about pedagogy for dealing with ambiguity, contradiction, and criticism. These problems represent challenges to the radical perspective that can reasonably be made even by persons who subscribe to its central propositions.

_Ideological substance._ In the U.S. many people hold a sanguine view of the economic-political system; they fail to see the patterns of domination and exploitation that concern radicals. In spite of much evidence to the contrary, the U.S. public generally maintains faith in equal opportunity, meritocracy, technological progress and openness in the political system. When so many believe that comparatively high levels of emancipation have already been achieved, interest in the radical view is dampened.

Some radicals explain this as false consciousness, generated by dominant interests (corporations, government agencies, professional groups) to maintain their influence in a capitalistic system. Without trying to document here the specific extent of domination or the needs for emancipation in the U.S., it should be recognized that observable, objective differences in the nature of domination-exploitation can be found in different societies, and that those who compare societies’ standards of material well-being and opportunities for political and expressive freedom may find a radical perspective more or less useful, depending upon the social context. To the extent that radical propositions about social life are considered alien to persons’ lived experiences, the ideology will be understandably resisted.

Both liberal and radical political theory hold up the hope of minimizing the domination of some people by others. Liberal theory has emphasized democratic procedures for regulating political conflict, aimed at the pluralistic ideal of individuals and groups free to pursue private interests without getting in one another’s way. Radical studies have exposed the persistence of domination and exploitative relationships even within democracies supporting constitutional liberties, collective bargaining, and populist political reforms. But both liberal and radical theory have been criticized for holding up a naïve hope that social domination can be eliminated. All societies and their sub-groups perpetuate dominant norms, positions, offices, to which people must conform, but many of these can be defended as necessary for that degree of order in social life necessary to the dignity of participants. From this point of view, relations of domination must be expected; the challenge is to fashion them in the most just forms or in the ways that enhance human dignity (emancipation).

What particular social structures are most likely to accomplish this? Liberal theory emphasizing governmental regulation primarily to maintain
fair competition among private interests has been criticized for its failure to define a more substantive vision of the public good (Lowi, 1979; Stanley, 1981). The radical perspective in education seems to assume democratic socialism as an ultimate goal, but the specific outlines of that social order remain vague. How centralized or decentralized will government be? What forms of private property and private financial gain will be acceptable? What levels of status or privilege will differentiate people from one another? What levels of personal choice will be available in career, consumption patterns, or child rearing? To the extent that the laudable goals of equality and emancipation remain unconnected to specific policy proposals, the social vision of the radical perspective is considered to offer no meaningful alternative.

Organizational constraints on teaching. Several aspects of teachers’ work make it difficult to offer a critical social education. As an employee accountable to a school board that derives its authority from the state and the public at large, the teacher will be at risk in teaching students to evaluate critically the economic-political system. The teacher’s dependence upon the employing organization thus constrains the arenas to which critical social thought can be applied. Rather than having the opportunity to build their own curriculum according to locally defined needs, teachers must plan instruction to fit into a credentialing system of grades and tests so that student mastery of standard content can be compared across the nation (or the world). The credentialing system is built on a conception of knowledge as certain and conclusive: One demonstrates knowledge by producing right instead of wrong answers. In contrast, radical education cannot easily be incorporated into the conventional credentialing system, because it assumes significant areas of knowledge to be problematic and tentative. Finally, teachers’ interaction with students is organized in ways that stifle critical discourse. Because they must teach students in large groups, teachers can spend very little time responding to individual work. For managerial reasons, certain instructional activities prevail (e.g., lectures, films, silent seatwork, short-answer objective tests, discussions requiring short verbal responses). Activities more conducive to critical inquiry present cumbersome logistical problems (e.g., discussions soliciting lengthy student responses, one-to-one dialogues between teacher and student, small group projects). The radical literature has analyzed alienation in bureaucratic work settings, and radical writing in education has described subtle ways in which schooling denies empowerment to both students and teachers alike. The radical critique has not, however, included proposals that specify how teachers’ work in schools might be reorganized to permit more authentic critical discourse with students.

Ambiguity, contradictions and criticism. As mentioned earlier, radical insights into social life offer exciting possibilities for inquiry that respond to personal concerns for justice, autonomy, the resolution of dilemmas, etc.
On the other hand, these ideas and the process of critical discourse can be disquieting, because they ask us to demystify what has been taken for granted, to search for exploitation in relationships that on the surface may appear voluntary and harmonious, to continue to work for a better world rather than accepting what we have. Even in the most supportive settings, humans have great difficulty subjecting their own beliefs to continuous scrutiny, difficulty in resolving ambiguity and contradiction, difficulty in sustaining interest in abstract issues of social justice, especially when criticism highlights negative features in the human condition. In short, radical education for many people is likely to involve a painful struggle, not an immediate sense of joy, growth or positive accomplishment. Given certain limits on the degree of ambiguity, contradiction and criticism which humans find constructive or tolerable, it is not surprising that teachers often emphasize consensus over conflict, certainty over ambiguity, and a hopeful, positive view of social life. Radical writing on education, concerned heretofore largely with how schools reflect structural domination or how aspects of resistance may develop, has given almost no attention to the specific pedagogical problem of teaching social criticism and coping with ambiguity and contradiction in intellectually constructive and emotionally rewarding ways.

Having summarized central propositions, strengths, and weaknesses of the radical perspective, consider now an agenda for intellectual work that seems necessary to deal with the weaknesses so that appealing aspects of the perspective might find their way into social studies education.

**A Research Agenda**

If the gulf between mainstream academics and social studies teachers is as wide as several observers have noted (Shaver, et al., 1978; Mehlinger, 1981), the gulf between teachers and radical academics may be even wider, because the radical perspective seems to demand a fundamental shift in conventional views of social life and of learning. This gulf between academics and school teachers can be expected to persist so long as organizational structures within which they work hold neither group accountable for serving the other's interests (each can attain success in their own domain without responding seriously to the concerns of the other domain). Without discussing here organizational reforms for bridging the gap between academics and teachers, I shall attempt the more modest task of suggesting forms of intellectual work and research that seem necessary to resolve legitimate concerns that mainstream educators have with the radical perspective. This agenda addresses each of the weaknesses just discussed.

**Social alternatives.** Radical social ideas and the critique of social life must be refined to convey a more coherent vision of the social alternatives to be pursued and more persuasive arguments to justify the apparent benefits of radical social change in relation to apparent costs. The need to elaborate
upon the meaning of emancipation and preferred forms of democratic socialism has already been mentioned. Scholarly work should help to clarify conceptions of emancipation such as individual freedom, collective self-determination and the expression of individuality guided by the constraints of collective purpose (as well as discussion of which constraints are most justifiable). It should attempt to reconcile the need for local empowerment and decentralized authority with the facts of global interdependence and the imperative to work for certain universal ideals (e.g., economic equality) which can conflict with local empowerment. Economic analysis and policy argument is needed to show how particular policies or reorganized institutions could be expected to accomplish many goals simultaneously; for example, more equitable distribution of wealth, increased productivity, decreased worker alienation, reduction of threats to peace and to the environment. Scholarly work on such unfinished aspects of radical social ideology is critical if the perspective is to attract broader interest. It may be inappropriate to expect educationist academics to undertake this work, but they could help to convey the work of policy theorists who tackle these issues.

Structures of schooling. We must study how the structures of schooling might be revised to permit the kind of interaction among teachers and students which radical teaching demands. Radical interpretations of social life can, of course, be taught through a traditional text and lecture format to large groups of students required to recapitulate the transmitted content on standardized tests. If used exclusively, however, such methods violate the principle of critical discourse. The development of understanding through critical discourse would seem to require much different conditions of teaching.

If students are to be active learners, critically examining problems of social life, dealing seriously with ambiguity, conflict and contradiction, at a minimum they require opportunities to express themselves frequently (orally and in writing) and to receive prompt, detailed feedback on their views. They must have an opportunity to pursue topics in depth and complexity, rather than being pressured to master superficial surveys of many topics. To engage in honest critiques of one another's ideas, they must learn within an atmosphere of cooperation and trust, not competition and individual isolation. If students are to take the process of schooling seriously (as opposed to mechanistically meeting its demands), schools must minimize student alienation; for example, by offering opportunities for student choice in school work, by cultivating consensus among faculty and students on the central purposes of the school; by integrating various aspects of schoolwork (Newmann, 1981). To develop school cultures of this sort would require substantial changes in mainstream schooling (e.g., much less emphasis on standardized testing; much more time for collaborative teacher planning). Research should concentrate on which particular changes
in school organization and the working conditions of teachers and students seem most necessary to the practice of radical education and how these might be stimulated in U.S. schools.

**Pedagogical issues.** Beyond organizational issues such as course requirements, teachers' time to work with individual students, testing and credentialing systems, we must address questions of pedagogy, and try to identify the kinds of teaching that constructively guide our encounters with ambiguity, contradiction, and criticism. We need more knowledge on at least two problems: a) What teaching strategies and classroom norms will build sufficient trust among students and teachers so that they will authentically risk themselves in discussions of social life? b) What teaching strategies can guide critical inquiry so as to minimize frustration and maximize a sense of positive intellectual accomplishment leading to constructive action?

For years, social studies educators have called for the teaching of critical thinking, but without developing a pedagogy for building the foundation of interpersonal trust on which such inquiry must rest. Critical discourse must focus relentlessly on exposing our errors in perception, our lack of knowledge, our failure in logic, and other inadequacies in our understanding of social life. We learn in part only by exposing our inadequacies, so that they may be corrected. Because it is often personally threatening to expose oneself to such scrutiny, we refrain from risking ourselves in this way (and many educators often respect our vulnerability by not demanding it of us). As a result of this negotiated agreement between student and teacher not to risk oneself, very little learning, in the radical sense, ever occurs.

We could benefit from description of specific classroom practices showing how teachers give critical feedback that enhances, rather than diminishes the dignity of students. Approaches to coaching and socratic teaching (see Adler, 1982; Sizer, 1984), to cooperative learning (see Johnson, Maruyama, Johnson, Nelson, & Skon, 1981; Slavin, 1983), and to other forms of student empowerment within the classroom (e.g., Schor, 1980) should be studied not only for their effect on student mastery of subject matter, but most importantly for their contribution to a climate of discussion in which participants feel secure enough to submit their ideas to serious critique.

A climate of open sharing is necessary, but not sufficient. The products or outcomes of that sharing must represent to students and to teachers constructive intellectual accomplishment. At one extreme, rigorous social inquiry can accentuate a perception of conflict and persistent negative appraisal: history becomes a continuous tale of exploitation and unjustice, punctuated by a host of tragic human clashes. Careful thought about solutions to such problems often magnifies a sense of complexity and ambiguity regarding the facts of social life, legitimate ideals, and constructive courses of action. This can lead to student frustration, cynicism, nihilism, and
moral relativism which inhibit both further inquiry and purposeful social action. In contrast, teaching which conveys knowledge about social life as authoritative and which presents an essentially positive assessment (through a beneficent view of social institutions and praise of human progress) avoids these problems.

Research should help identify teaching practices that maximize students' sense of accomplishment: for example, teacher and peer praise for individual progress in articulating a more defensible position on a controversial problem, opportunities for students to create concrete products of inquiry (e.g., a publication or a broadcast), or using methods of inquiry to exert influence in some area of public life. Literature of experiential education suggests guidelines for student activities to enhance motivation and sense of accomplishment, but there is virtually no scholarly work on pedagogy to maximize the rewards of problematic social inquiry.7

The frustrations of problematic inquiry visit themselves upon teachers as well as students. In spite of much rhetoric about the need to teach thinking skills, research on teaching offers few clues on how to do this successfully. In the absence of clear pedagogies that have proven effective in the teaching of critical thought, teachers understandably direct efforts toward instructional ends over which they feel more command. Thus, teachers' sense of professional worth is built largely upon a conception of self as master of a subject, who has good rapport with students, not as a skilled socratic investigator committed to clarifying the nature of what we do not know as a way of understanding what we do know. If the teacher's sense of professional competence rests primarily in transmitting certainties about social life to students, the teacher trying to conduct critical discourse may feel not only intellectually lost, but even deprived of the opportunity to contribute his/her own professional assets. Research is needed on ways of making problematic inquiry rewarding to teachers who have previously depended upon more authoritative ways of expressing their competence.

By accentuating the need for intellectual work in these areas I do not intend to minimize the substantial political obstacles which a radical perspective on social education must confront. Even if some of this research is fruitfully pursued, groups with political and economic clout will act to suppress radical approaches to social education. In this sense, political organization and action demands as much attention as research. In my view, however, a substantial portion of resistance comes not from doctrinaire opponents of critical thought or of socialism, but from persons who actually subscribe to general radical propositions, yet who have understandable difficulty implementing them for the reasons discussed. To the extent that research helps to resolve some of these issues, it will facilitate the engagement of these educators. Without such research, even the appealing dimensions of the radical perspective will be ignored by mainstream academics and school teachers.
The cry for educational reform is out in the U.S. Lip service is given to the development of reasoning skills, but most emphasis is placed upon mastery of content in the main disciplines through increased course requirements and increased testing of students, with almost no attention to the problem of equity for disadvantaged students. Progressive educators have critiqued these trends; Adler (1982), Goodlad (1983), and Sizer (1984), for example, emphasize the teaching of critical thought. Nevertheless, if reform is enacted in response to many of the other commission reports, it will proceed in a conservative, even repressive direction.

Scholarship on the issues raised here is not simply the responsibility of radical writers in education. Other academics should join in the task. Radical and progressive educators may differ in their social analyses, but their common concern for critical social inquiry would seem to require significant changes in the way teachers' work is organized and changes in pedagogy that several current reform reports either neglect or oppose. Unfortunately, neither radicals nor progressive have developed adequate responses to the problems of ideological substance, school organization and pedagogy raised here. Unless academics devote scholarly attention to problems such as these, we shall offer only impotent challenges to mainstream reform, now in the process of further solidifying historically persistent, regressive forms of social education.8

References


**Endnotes**

1. For summaries of several studies see Shaver et al. (1978), and Morrisset (1982). Although not focused on social studies, general reports on schooling by Goodlad (1983), Boyer (1983), and Sizer (1984) also confirm aspects of this picture.

2. For descriptions of alternative approaches to social studies in America, see Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1978); Mehlinger and Davis (1981); Morrissett and Haas (1982).

3. Butts (1980) offered a thoughtful analysis of the history of citizenship education in the U.S. and a rationale for a conception of citizenship of pluralism within national unity, but this reaffirmed previous democratic conceptions of polity and citizenship, emphasizing the significance of public good over private interests.
4. Newmann (1985) provides a review of the implications of these general reports for social studies.

5. Teachers who consider themselves to be politically radical may not practice critical discourse in the classroom. Their teaching can be doctrinaire or dogmatic, and such teaching can be found in the classrooms of teachers of diverse political commitments. Radical writers who focus on the teaching process, however, emphasize the ideal of critical discourse.

6. Stake and Easley (1978) found that U.S. social studies teachers generally do not feel censored or limited by their school administrations or parents in the community, apparently because teachers' social values and attitudes generally match those of the communities where they teach. Bitter controversy between individual teachers and administrators or citizens does erupt occasionally, but the prevailing harmony can be explained by the fact that schools usually hire teachers who subscribe to dominant community values.

7. Some efforts along these lines were made when Newmann and Oliver (1970) addressed problems in the teaching of public controversy in classrooms, and when Newmann (1975, 1977) addressed ways of responding to the frustrations of social action.

8. This article is based on a paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Social Science Education Consortium, hosted by the Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, at Irsee, Federal Republic of Germany, June 18-23, 1984.

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Effects of Teacher Enthusiasm on Three- and Four-Year-Old Children's Acquisition of Four Concepts

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Abstract

This study tested the effects of three levels of teacher enthusiasm on 3- (n = 26) and 4- (n = 29) year-old children's acquisition of four concepts. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three treatment groups (low, medium, high enthusiasm) by stratified randomization. The interactions of (a) age, (b) sex, and (c) age and sex with enthusiasm were examined, and informal observations concerning behavioral differences among treatment groups were made. Results of a $3 \times 2 \times 2$ ANOVA indicated that there were no significant differences in achievement. Differences in behavior among the three treatment groups were reported by the teachers, with subjects taught at a high level of enthusiasm characterized as more attentive, interested, and responsive than subjects in the other two groups.

There is much in the literature concerning the general topic of teacher effectiveness and how to define, identify, measure, evaluate, and train for it (Biddle & Ellena, 1964). One of the teacher behaviors which is frequently linked with effective teaching is that of enthusiasm (Bettencourt, 1979). Correlational studies have shown a relationship between teacher enthusiasm and achievement (Rosenshine & Furst, 1971), while results of experimental studies have been less clear.

A number of studies have examined the effects of teacher enthusiasm on student achievement. Most of these studies, however, have utilized junior high (e.g., Bettencourt, 1979; Larkins & McKinney, 1982; Malcolm, 1977; McKinney & Larkins, 1982), high school (e.g., Mastin, 1963; Sneed, 1977; Young, 1973), or college level students (e.g., Land, 1980; Ware & Williams,
Few studies have tested the relationship with elementary subjects (e.g., Brophy & Evertson, 1974; McKinney, Larkins, & Burts, 1984; McKinney, Larkins, Kazelskis, Ford, Allen, & Davis, 1983), and none have examined the relationship with preschool children.

Three studies (Brophy & Evertson, 1974; McKinney, et al., 1984; McKinney et al., 1983) were found that utilized subjects from the lower elementary grades. Brophy and Evertson (1974) included teacher enthusiasm as one of several variables in a correlational study of achievement at the second-grade level. They reported no correlation between teacher enthusiasm and student achievement.

McKinney et al. (1984) examined the effects of teacher enthusiasm on first-grade students' achievement. Fifty-two subjects were randomly assigned to one of three treatments (low, medium, and high enthusiasm). Three social studies concepts were taught by a single teacher over a three-day period. No significant differences were reported on the first and second days of the study. However, the mean for the medium treatment level differed significantly from the low and high groups on Day 3 and on a composite score for the three days. This difference was small and lacked practical significance. In an attempt to help explain their findings, the researchers reported casual observations of student behavior. They noted that students in the high enthusiasm group appeared to be more disruptive, while the low enthusiasm group was more lethargic. Subjects in the medium enthusiasm group displayed more emotion and interest in the lessons than the other two groups.

McKinney et al. (1983) also examined the effects of teacher enthusiasm on fourth-grade students' achievement (n = 160). Six teachers, who were trained to exhibit the three enthusiasm levels (low, medium, high), taught three social studies concepts. Results showed that no significant differences existed between or among the three groups (low = 70.24, medium = 72.64, and high = 71.37). Similar student behavior was noted as in the McKinney et al. (1984) study. Students in the high enthusiasm groups were reported to be "climbing the walls," while students in the low enthusiasm groups were described as bored. They concluded by stating that elementary students appeared to show more appropriate behavior when teachers conveyed a medium level of enthusiasm.

Although enthusiasm is considered by many concerned with early childhood education to be an important teacher characteristic (Eliason & Jenkins, 1977; Evans, 1974; Hymes, 1974; Katz, 1978; Todd & Heffernan, 1977), results of recent research raise questions as to the importance of enthusiastic teaching with younger children. The primary purpose of this study was to determine the effects of three levels of teacher enthusiasm—low, medium, and high—on 3- and 4-year old children's acquisition of four concepts. The secondary purposes were to determine a) the differential effects or interactions between age and level of teacher enthusiasm relative to
concept acquisition, b) the differential effects or interactions between sex and level of teacher enthusiasm relative to concept acquisition, and c) the interaction effects among the levels of teacher enthusiasm, age, and sex relative to concept acquisition. The researchers were also interested in obtaining information concerning the relationship between level of teacher enthusiasm and the observed group behavior of the 3- and 4-year-old subjects. It was hypothesized that there would be a significant difference in the task achievement of 3- and 4-year-old children taught under the three levels of enthusiasm but that there would not be any significant interactions.

**Procedures**

**Sample**

The sample consisted of 55 subjects drawn from a population of 3- and 4-year-old children attending a day care program in a medium-sized southern city. There were 26 three-year-old (7 male and 19 female) and 29 four-year-old children (10 male and 19 female) used in the study. Because of the age of the groups involved, the test had to be individually administered. Therefore, the sample size was kept small to keep the testing procedure manageable. Subjects were assigned to one of three treatment groups by stratified randomization based upon age and sex.

**Treatment**

The study was conducted for eight days and consisted of three experimental treatment groups (low, medium, and high enthusiasm). The medium level was included since findings from several previous studies dealing with younger children indicated behavioral differences as well as significant differences in achievement of subjects when teachers conveyed a medium level of enthusiasm. All subjects were presented the same controlled (scripted) instructional lessons by two white, female, experienced early childhood teachers. Treatment varied according to the level of enthusiasm exhibited by the teacher during the lesson presentations. A modification of the descriptors of enthusiasm developed by Collins (1976) was used to define each level and included vocal delivery, eye contact and expression, gestures, body movements, facial expressions, acceptance of ideas and feelings, and overall energy level. One of Collins' descriptors, word selection, was not included because the lessons were scripted to maintain consistency of lesson content among treatment groups.

Low teacher enthusiasm was defined as speaking in a monotone voice; exhibiting little eye contact and expression; utilizing few gestures and body movements; showing little facial expressions or feelings; indicating little acceptance of subjects' ideas and feelings; and generally appearing lethargic. Medium enthusiasm was described as pleasant variations in the pitch and speed of vocal delivery; appearing interested with some eye contact; maintaining a steady pace of gesturing; moving freely, slowly, and steadily; look-
ing pleased, happy, or sad as called for; accepting ideas and feelings with some variation in response to subjects; and an even level of overall energy with some variations from high to low. The high treatment level was characterized by great and sudden changes from rapid excited speech to a whisper; good eye contact and variations in expression; quick and demonstrative movements of the body, head, arms, and face; large body movements; vibrant, demonstrative facial expressions with quick and sudden changes when obviously called for; ready to accept and praise, encourage, and clarify students' ideas and feelings with many variations in response; and an overall high energy level maintained.

**Teacher training.** In order for the teachers to be able to effectively present the lessons at the specified level of enthusiasm, extensive training of the teachers, including a pilot study, was conducted. The training procedure utilized both individual and group training sessions and included: a) reading and discussing studies concerning teacher enthusiasm, b) discussion and demonstration of the operational definition of the three levels of teacher enthusiasm, c) taping sessions with feedback, and d) practice sessions with feedback. Training continued until each teacher was able to clearly differentiate the three treatment levels. No additional training was required after the pilot study.

**Rater training.** To verify that level of teacher enthusiasm remained constant throughout the study, raters were trained to observe and rate the two teachers during the lesson presentations. Raters were rotated daily so that each could observe and rate each teacher. To help control for bias in rating, the raters were not informed as to which treatment condition was being observed at any time throughout the study.

Training of the raters was conducted prior to the study utilizing an adaptation of the Collins' Rater's Tally Sheet on Teacher Enthusiasm (Collins, 1976). The training process included a) reading and discussing studies concerning teacher enthusiasm, b) discussion and demonstration of the rater's tally sheet, c) practice sessions with feedback, and d) practice and feedback during the pilot study.

To establish that the raters were able to rate the teachers in a like manner, for the first six days of the pilot study, both raters were assigned to one teacher each day where they observed and made independent ratings as the lessons were presented at the three levels of enthusiasm. On the last two days of the pilot study, the two raters independently rated different teachers. High interrater reliability between the raters, utilizing a Spearman's rho correlation coefficient, was established during the pilot study ($\rho_s = .83$ to $1.00$) and maintained throughout the main study ($\rho_s = .89$ to $1.00$).

**Lessons**

The social studies concepts of land, air, water, and sound pollution were selected as the topics to be taught. Scripted lessons relating to the different
kinds of pollution were developed. The lessons followed the Merrill and Tennyson (1977) instructional design for concept teaching which consisted of five parts—definition, expository presentation, attribute isolation, inquisitory practice presentation, and test. During the definition phase, the name of the concept and its critical (essential characteristics) and variable attributes (nonessential characteristics) were presented. The expository presentation consisted of sets of matched example and nonexample pairs which ranged in difficulty from easy to hard and which were divergent so as to cover the full range of the concept. The teacher stated whether the photograph or drawing was or was not an example of the concept as she pointed out the presence or absence of the critical attributes (attribute isolation). During the inquisitory practice presentation, the subjects were presented with new, randomly ordered, different examples and nonexamples. Subjects were asked to classify each picture as an example or nonexample of the concept and to give a reason for their choice. Immediate feedback and clarification were provided by the teacher.

To control for the effect of the teacher and time of day that the groups were presented the lessons, a counterbalanced design was employed. Both teachers taught all groups of subjects an equal number of days, and treatment was rotated so that groups receiving the lessons first one day were last the following day, second the next day, and so forth. Due to the age and characteristics of the subjects, the two teachers presented the lessons to an assigned age group (3s or 4s) for the first four days of the study. On the fifth day, the teachers switched age groups.

Data Collection

Posttest. The dependent variable, achievement, was measured by means of a 48-item criterion-referenced test. Because of the age of the subjects, this test was divided into subtests, each containing six items which were administered daily throughout the eight-day study. The reliability of the instrument, as estimated by Cronbach's alpha, was .895.

The test was individually administered to each subject at the end of each day's lesson by one of five trained testers. To eliminate the effect of both the tester and the amount of time-lapse between the lessons and test taking, a counterbalanced design was employed.

The test items included an equal number of new randomly ordered examples and nonexamples of the concept and were constructed to be congruent with daily instructional objectives. Slides were taken of magazine pictures and line drawings and were used as the method of presenting the test items. The subject was presented the slide and was requested to indicate whether the picture was or was not an example of the concept and to give a reason for the answer. A score of 1 was given for each incorrect response, a score of 3 for a correct response without an acceptable explanation, and a score of 5 for a correct response with an acceptable explanation. Each child's daily response scores were summated to give a daily total with a
range of from 6 to 30. The achievement score for each subject was the mean of the subject’s daily response totals. Mean daily scores were used in the analysis because of the number of absentees. Subjects who missed more than two days were not included in the data analysis.

Anecdotal Observations. A secondary purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between teacher’s level of enthusiasm and student group behavior. In order to gather information concerning the behavior of subjects in the different treatment groups, observations were recorded daily. The researchers planned to have two outside observers record behavior; however, when the observers became unavailable, the two teachers were used to gather this information. Immediately after each presentation, the teachers recorded their perceptions of group behavior on daily log sheets. Teachers were instructed to observe for the following behaviors: a) attention to the lesson presentation, b) interest in the lesson, c) responsiveness to the questions posed by the teacher, d) accuracy and completeness of the answers given by the subjects, and e) indication of understanding of the concepts presented.

Design and Analysis
A randomized posttest only design was used. A 3 × 2 × 2 (enthusiasm × age × sex) factorial ANOVA was used to test for differences in the main effect of enthusiasm and for possible interaction effects. The rejection level used for all tests of the hypotheses was .05.

Findings
Achievement. Findings reported in Table 1 indicate that the overall F for treatment was nonsignificant. As shown in Table 2, the least squares means for the three levels of enthusiasm were virtually the same (low = 20.85, medium = 20.50, high = 20.97). In addition, no interaction effects of en-

<table>
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<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
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<td>.05</td>
<td>.95</td>
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<td>269.96</td>
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<td>.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENTHUSIASM × SEX</td>
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<td>Age × Sex</td>
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<tr>
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<td>8.58</td>
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Table 1
Summary Table of Analysis of Variance Comparisons of Achievement Scores for Three Levels of Enthusiasm
Table 2
Least Squares Means and Standard Error for Treatment Groups, Age, and Sex

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>n</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>SE</th>
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</thead>
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<td><strong>Treatment I (Low Enthusiasm)</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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</tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1.69</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Year Females</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatment II (Medium Enthusiasm)</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16.10</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24.90</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
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<td>14.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-Year Females</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18.16</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Year Males</td>
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<td>26.13</td>
<td>2.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Year Females</td>
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<td>23.67</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatment III (High Enthusiasm)</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18.81</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
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<td>21.51</td>
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<td>3-Year Males</td>
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thusiasm with age, sex, or age and sex relative to task achievement were found (See Tables 1 and 2). Therefore, for this study, teacher enthusiasm was not found to have an effect on the acquisition of the concepts by the 3-and 4-year-old children, and that lack of effect was the same across age levels and sex.

Anecdotal Observations. Observations recorded by the teachers did seem to indicate differences in group behavior as it related to level of teacher enthusiasm. Generally, subjects who were taught at a high level of enthusiasm appeared more attentive, more interested, and more responsive to the teachers' questions than did the other two groups. They were more vocal in their answers, as opposed to merely nodding yes or no or inactively answering. They also appeared to show more sympathy for the animals harmed by pollution. Although they usually answered most of the questions correctly, they did not seem to be much different from the two other groups in this respect.

The 4-year-old subjects in the medium enthusiasm group were attentive and responsive throughout the study, but 3-year-old subjects in this group were frequently inattentive, especially during the last five days of the investigation.

Subjects in the low enthusiasm group were often characterized as restless, inattentive, uninterested, bored, and unresponsive. The 4-year-olds were described as “wild” on the last day of the study.

Discussion

There are several possible explanations why this study did not find that level of teacher enthusiasm affects achievement. One explanation is that because enthusiasm is such an ambiguous human characteristic, it is difficult to quantify and accurately measure results. Another reason may be that, as Brophy and Evertson (1974) and Rosenshine (1979) have postulated, teacher enthusiasm is less important for younger children than it is for older children. Bettencourt (1979) has suggested that perhaps enthusiasm covaries with some other teacher characteristic. Enthusiastic teachers may devote more time to planning lessons and have more energy to sustain them than less enthusiastic teachers. These variables (e.g., scripted lessons prepared for the teachers) were controlled in the present experiment. Only two teachers were used in this study. Future researchers may want to include more teachers to see if the present findings can be replicated.

The lack of measurable differences could also have been related to the amount of time the teacher spent teaching the subjects. The lessons were brief (15 minutes) due to the short attention span of the children, but perhaps the daily contact was not long enough for teacher behavior to make any real difference. However the amount of time occupied by the lessons and testing each day approached the limits of 3- and 4-year-old children's attention span.
Another possible explanation has to do with the interruptions of the children from their regular daily program. Although the researchers rotated groups in an attempt to eliminate any effects that discontinuance from the various activities of the children might produce, there remains the possibility that the number and the timing of the interruptions were difficult for the children to adjust to, thus resulting in negative effects. Future research should be structured so that there are few interruptions in the daily routine. Additionally, investigators may want to sample subjects who are not enrolled in a preschool program.

As hypothesized, no significant interactions were reported in this study. This finding does not lend support to an interaction effect between sex and enthusiasm as suggested by the research of Land (1980) and McKinney and Larkins (1982).

Although the analysis did not produce significant $F$ ratios between and among groups, differences were observed in the behavior of the children in the three treatment groups. Subjects who were presented the lessons at a high level of enthusiasm were characterized as more attentive, interested, and responsive than subjects in the other two groups. These data lend support to the findings reported by Gillett (1980) that teacher enthusiasm positively affects student on-task behavior. Readers should keep in mind, however, that observational data were recorded by the instructors who taught the lessons, and thus have a possibility for bias. These findings are not in agreement with the informal teacher and observer observations of first- and fourth-grade students reported by McKinney et al. (1984) and McKinney et al. (1983). The level of a teacher's overt enthusiasm may have a different effect on the behavior of younger children. In order to more adequately address the question of the relationship between teacher enthusiasm and student group behavior, blind observers should be used in future studies.

Evidence is mounting to support the contention that teacher enthusiasm may be less important for younger children, especially in relationship to achievement, than is commonly believed. Further research is needed to answer questions raised in this study in order to help clarify the role of teacher enthusiasm in the educative process.

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The Development of Children's Economic Reasoning

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Abstract

This study was designed to extend earlier research on the development of economic reasoning by focusing on how young children think about economic problems and ideas. A total of 70 children from an urban preschool and two urban elementary schools participated in the study. They were interviewed using a structured interview protocol which presented questions and hypothetical problems about such economic concepts as scarcity, choice, opportunity cost, and monetary value. The participants' responses were divided into theoretical categories labelled unreflective reasoning and emerging reasoning and were examined for statistically significant differences. Using the unreflective and emerging classifications, the authors describe the participants' responses. The authors conclude that the nature of children's economic reasoning is supportive of cognitive development theory, that children's economic reasoning varies somewhat by personal experiences, and that the intermediate grades are an appropriate level to emphasize economic instruction.

Concern about low levels of economic literacy in the United States has led to increased interest in teaching economics at the elementary grades. Many elementary social studies textbook series beginning in the primary grades give attention to economic concepts such as needs, wants, specialization, and division of labor. A survey by Yankelovich, Shelly, and White (1981) found that 16 states require or recommend that economics instruction be included at the K-8 or K-12 levels. The Joint Council on Economic Education has produced primary grades (Davison, 1977) and intermediate grades (Kourilsky, 1978) curriculum materials for teaching economics. The National Center for Economic Education for Children produces and distributes nationally the Elementary Economist which contains specific teaching suggestions for teachers in grades K-2, 3-4, 5-6. In addition, the Primary Industry Education Project in England (1983) has developed an economics program for the elementary grades.

These curriculum materials are produced without the benefit of extensive research about how children think about economic problems and ideas. Studying the development of children's economic reasoning can help insure
that there is more congruence between approaches for teaching economics and children's understanding of economic ideas. Some recent studies have found evidence that children's economic reasoning develops in a manner similar to what might be expected according to cognitive development theory. Burris (1976) found discrete stages in children's thinking about the economic ideas of exchange, value, and property rights. In her study of children's understanding of pricing, Fox (1978) found that the reasoning of eight-year-old children was qualitatively different from that of younger children. Studies of Armento (1982) and Schug (1983) found some evidence to support the notion that economic reasoning develops in a manner consistent with cognitive development theory.

The present study was designed to extend earlier research on the development of economic reasoning by having as its central purpose the examination of the economic reasoning of young children (preschool, grade one and grade three). While some earlier studies have included young children as part of the sample, they have not been the central target of any investigation. The result is that we know very little about how young children reason about basic concepts.

The broad precepts of cognitive development theory served as the basis for this study (Brainerd, 1978; Flavell, 1963). We believed that qualitative differences in the types of reasons children use to approach economic problems by grade level would support cognitive development theory. It was anticipated that the participants' reasoning would move from simple at earlier ages to more complex for older children.

**Research Design**

Participants in this study included a total of 70 children who were randomly selected from classes in an urban preschool and two nearby elementary schools. Twenty-five children were four-five years of age, 23 children were six-seven years old, and 22 children were eight-nine years old.

A structured interview protocol served as the main instrument for the study. The interview consisted of a series of questions and hypothetical problems intended to elicit responses illustrating children's reasoning about basic economic concepts. Scarcity, choice, opportunity cost, monetary value, price, exchange, and advertising were the concepts selected for investigation. Six of these concepts—scarcity, choice, opportunity cost, monetary value, price and exchange—were selected because they are widely recognized as being basic economic ideas (Hansen, Bach, Calderwood, & Saunders, 1977). Advertising was added because of interest in how ideas about personal economics might develop. The interview protocol was an adaption of an earlier version used by Schug (1980) and included some modified questions from Burris (1976).1

Each of the 70 individual interviews was tape recorded. The audio tapes were used to prepare verbatim transcripts. Data from the interview
transcripts were coded into descriptive categories by two independent readers using a code manual developed for the project. Differences between the readers were discussed and a consensus was reached on the coding of all responses. Next, the descriptive categories were inspected and reclassified on a theoretical basis into broad categories approximating stages of cognitive development. Finally, the percentages of student categorical responses were tested for statistical significance by a series of chi square tests. Chi square tests were judged to be an appropriate form of analysis because of the nominal nature of the data in this study.

Students' responses were classified into one of two theoretical categories — unreflective reasoning and emerging reasoning. Unreflective reasoning was characterized by ideas which were highly literal, linear, or tautological responses. Often, unreflective responses were based upon the physical properties of the object or process being discussed. Also included were responses wherein students were unable to give a reason beyond a yes or no response or were unable to give reasons beyond their own immediate individual needs. Emerging reasoning was considered to be a higher order of reasoning wherein the participants were able to identify reciprocal relationships, see the viewpoint of others in a concrete context, and were less literal, more flexible in their responses. The following paragraphs describe specific examples of unreflective and emerging reasoning about the economic concepts used in this study.

Results and Discussion

To explore children's thinking about the concept of scarcity, the participants were asked to imagine that they had one hundred dollars to spend and to identify some of the things they would like to buy. The participants were next questioned about whether they believed they had all the things they wanted. About 55% of the participants' responses were unreflective statements which tended to be tautological or failed to elaborate any supporting reasons beyond a yes or no statement. "I have everything I want but I don't want anymore" was an example of this type of thinking. Other unreflective statements suggested that economic needs and wants could or could not be met due to the rules or guidelines established by their parents: "Cause my mom says no," or "You have to live with that," were typical responses.

Table 1 indicates that emerging reasoning was a common type of response among a large percentage of the participants at each grade level. Chi square tests revealed no meaningful grade differences. Many children in the study were able to recognize that their economic wants could not always be met either because their income was limited or because their own economic needs and wants would continue to be unfulfilled. The following are typical responses.
"My mom don't have that much money to spend for me."
"I might want something and it might cost more [and I won't] have enough money."
"I want a doll house—a big doll house."
"I'd like an expansion module so that I could play other cartridges that are on Atari."

The relatively high percentage of participants using emerging reasoning at each grade level is noteworthy because it suggests that the concepts of scarcity might be more highly developed in children than was reported in earlier research. Data reported by Schug (1983) suggested that the concept of scarcity was slower to develop among children in the early grades.

The concept of choice was investigated by asking the participants how families, when they are unable to buy all that they want, decide what to buy now and what to buy later. This concept was difficult for many children in this study. Table 1 shows that emerging reasoning develops differentially by grade level and was widely used only among the grade three participants.

The most common unreflective response about the concept of choice (19%) was that the participant simply did not know how such a decision would be made. In 16% of the unreflective responses the participants list the things the children or their family wanted rather than describe a
decision-making process. "[I want] a purse and a dress," was a typical response. Other unreflective responses suggested that the families should just get more money. Characteristic comments were, "They can buy money" and "Get more money from the bank."

Emerging reasoning about the concept of choice was represented by responses which involved establishing economic need or want as criteria for decision making. The following are examples of responses characterizing emerging reasoning.

"They would buy things that they really need now and buy things that they don't really need . . . later."

"If you have enough money for what you need to buy, like for food and stuff, it comes first."

"The things that we'd need more we'd get, but the things that we didn't desperately need, we'll get later."

"I think that the gas bill and the telephone bill and electric and other sorts of things would come first to their minds."

The concept of opportunity cost is fundamental in economics. It refers to the idea that whenever a choice is made, a cost is incurred. That cost is the foregone alternative or the opportunity. To study this concept with children, each participant was presented with a box filled with similarly priced, inexpensive items such as paper pads, stickers, pencils, and felt tip pens. The children were asked to identify which two items they would like to keep and why. Next, the participants were asked if they gave up anything when they selected one item over another.

Unreflective reasoning about opportunity cost was characterized by the failure to recognize that one alternative was foregone when the decision was made. The most common unreflective responses were yes or no answers with no supporting reasons or a simple "I don't know."

Emerging reasons regarding opportunity cost were those wherein the participants was able to recognize that something was given up when the decision was made. The following are examples of emerging economic reasoning regarding opportunity cost.

Q — "When you picked the stickers instead of the note pad, Nathan, was there anything that you were giving up?"
A — "Yeah. I was giving up having a note pad that I could really use. Cause I like to draw and all that."
Q — "When you selected the game instead of the stickers, Rachita, was there anything that you were giving up?"
A — "Yes."
Q — "How were you giving something up?"
A — "Because, these I need to put in my sticker collection, but I really could play the game."
Table 1 shows that there is a pattern in the development of emerging reasoning by grade level. Emerging reasoning about opportunity cost is the only concept in the study which does not show steady upward progression by grade level. The emerging responses of the first grade students declined from the level of the preschool/kindergarten participants before increasing again at grade three. It is difficult to explain this result. One explanation might be that the concept of opportunity cost is a fairly difficult one to measure and that our set of questions did not measure children's reasoning as effectively as we would have liked.

The concept of monetary value was studied by presenting the participants with a real dollar bill and a play dollar bill. They were asked which dollar they preferred to have. All of the participants selected the real dollar. It was pointed out by the interviewer that the real dollar and the play dollar were alike in many ways. Next, the participants were asked why the real dollar was considered to be valuable while the play dollar was not.

Two types of responses were characteristic of unreflective reasoning which declined significantly with grade level ($\chi^2 = 6.63; p < .05$). The most frequent unreflective response (over 50%) was the simple assertion that one dollar was real and the other was not. “This one is just pretend and this one is real” and, “This one is a fake dollar and this one is not” were common responses. Thirty-six percent of the unreflective responses suggested that the participants were distracted by the physical characteristics of the dollars and used those to describe why the dollars were valuable or not. Typical responses were the following.

“This one has more ones.”
“This one has George Washington on it.”
“Children would like this one better cause it says $90.”
“This one is green and this one is red.”

Table 1 shows that the percentage of emerging reasoning increased with grade level but not significantly. The type of reasoning used by the participants is, however, still of interest to help understand how young people think about why money is valuable. Over three-fourths of the emerging responses suggested that value was associated with the fact that the real dollar was functional. It could be used to purchase things which people want while the play dollar could not be used for purchases. The importance of functionality is reflected in responses such as “This dollar is not real because you can't buy anything with it” and “I can buy real stuff with this but not with this.”

Reasoning about the concept of price was investigated in two ways. First, the participants were asked to name some things which cost a lot of money. They were then asked to explain why the items listed cost so much. Second, the participants were asked to name some things which were inexpensive.
The children were then asked to explain why the items mentioned cost so little.

Unreflective reasoning about price was characterized by two types of responses. First, about 40% of the total responses suggested that price was related to the physical characteristics of the item. Some goods were expensive because of their large size. "Some games [cost a lot] and some laser pistols [cost a lot] because they're big" and "A bed [costs a lot] because they're so big" were typical responses. Similarly, inexpensive products were those which were small in size. Characteristic reasons were as "Gum costs a little 'cause it's little." A second common unreflective reason was a single tautology. "A new phone [costs a lot] because of the price tag" and "[A play car costs a little] because the price tag says it doesn't cost a lot of money."

Table 1 shows that emerging reasoning about price developed by grade level. Characteristics of emerging reasoning included mentioning factors of production such as labor and tools or the function of the product as criteria which make an item expensive or inexpensive. Emerging reasons related to higher prices were "A lot of things are hand made and nowadays they make things more by machine than by hand" and "A refrigerator [costs a lot] because . . . it's cold and you can really put your food in there and make it cold." Emerging reasons related to lower prices were "A pencil cost a little because it's not that big and it doesn't take that much to put it together and make it" and "It's just candy—they don't have to make it."

The preceding paragraphs correctly suggest that the types of reasoning used by the participants to explain high or low prices of particular products were very similar. It is important to note that emerging reasoning was 20% and 26% higher for the younger children in the study when they were discussing why some products cost more. Perhaps because these children have lived through some periods of difficult inflation, they are more mature in their responses regarding higher prices rather than lower prices. It should also be noted that the types of reasons children used in this study regarding price are supportive of earlier research by Burris (1976).

The concept of exchange was explored by asking the participants first about their experiences shopping at stores. The participants were then asked why people give money when they buy things at the store. A follow-up question was then posed to probe the participants' understanding of economic exchange relationships beyond simple store transactions. The participants were asked what the store owner did with the money after he/she received it. These interview questions were adapted from earlier research by Burris (1976).

Unreflective responses about why we give money at the store were most often yes or no responses which were not supported by reasons. In about one-third of the unreflective responses the participants tended to focus on the superficial aspects of the transaction. They saw money changing hands but did not understand that an exchange was taking place. This kind of
reasoning was suggested in comments such as, “We give money, then, when other people get theirs they can still get some money back,” and “You pay money and get money back.”

Emerging responses about why we give money at the store showed no grade level differences and began at a high level (64%) for the preschool/kindergarten participants. Emerging reasons recognized that an exchange was taking place. The most frequent reason from all the responses mentioned that money is given at the store in order to purchase merchandise. “So we can get the things we want,” and “Because if you don’t pay, then you probably won’t have any food at home to eat,” were typical responses. The next most common emerging responses suggested that money is given at the store in order to provide income to the store owner and the workers or to enable the store owner to purchase merchandise. Representative comments here include: “So people at the store can pay their rent,” and “The store wants to have a lot of money to buy more stuff.”

The most advanced type of emerging reasoning recognized that money was the basis for transaction in which both parties receive some benefit. This type of reasoning was rare, making up only 8% of the total responses and was present only among the first and third grade participants. The following are quotes suggestive of this type of reasoning:

“It's like a trade. If you want to trade—give somebody something—and if they have a really neat thing, and you want that, you ask them . . . I'll trade you this for that.”

“This is like trading. When you trade, they're not going to give you a box of stickers—they're not just going to give it to you—you have to give them something back.”

The question used to further explore the participants’ thinking about exchange asked what the store owners did with the money they received. Unreflected reasoning was characterized by a literal and superficial interpretation of what happens. Over 25% of the unreflective responses suggested that the store owner simply puts the money into the cash register. “Put it in the cash register” and “She puts it in a little box” were typical responses. Another type of unreflective response stated that the store owner takes the money and “keeps it” or “puts it in the bank.”

Emerging reasoning regarding the store owner’s use of money developed by grade level and involved an understanding of additional exchanges and interdependent relationships. Three-quarters of the reflective responses mentioned that the money was used to purchase additional merchandise, pay employees, or pay other expenses. Fifteen percent of the responses implied that the owner took a profit. The following are some representative comments:
“They do a lot of things: they buy more merchandise, they fix up the store more. Like if it’s Easter [and] the store has nothing they buy Easter decorations for it.”

“Buys some more new things and then he sells them and gets more money.”

“He gives some of it to the place that makes the things and keeps some for paying his workers and then keeps a little for himself.”

Table 1 shows that there is a dramatic shift between the youngest children in the study and those in grades one and three. Virtually none of the preschool/kindergarten participants used emerging reasoning. At grade one, however, over 40% of the participants were at this level and by grade three, the percentage is still higher. It appears that children’s experiences in the early grades are highly influential in expanding their understanding of the exchange relationship. These findings are also supported by research conducted by Burris (1976).

Reasoning about the concept of advertising was studied by asking the participants about commercials they see on television. The participants were questioned about what commercials they liked and why. Next, they were asked why we have commercials and if commercials always tell the truth.

Unreflective comments about the purpose of commercial were most common in the youngest children in the study. Over 40% of the unreflective responses indicated difficulty in distinguishing television commercials from other types of programming, often confusing commercials with news or weather shows. “Because you know how cold it is outside,” and “There’s a house on fire—they’re talking about that,” were typical comments. Another type of unreflective response suggested that the purpose of commercials was to give television viewers a break from regular programming. “You can’t go right ahead without having a rest . . .” was an example of this type of comment.

Emerging reasoning about the function of television advertising developed in a meaningful fashion by grade level and was characterized three-quarters of the time by the idea that commercials provide consumers with information about available goods and services. Some comments also reflected a suggestion that commercials manipulate consumers by making them want to buy things. The following are some typical responses:

“So people know what’s in the store and what flakes they can get and how much money they would need.”

“So they know what to buy.”

“To make people buy something. To make you want to go to the store and buy that kind of thing.”

“So they can show things, so they don’t surprise people when they go to the store. They can advertise them on TV commercials.”
It is noteworthy that two third grade participants used the more abstract idea that the purpose of television commercials was to support other television programming. The following are their comments:

"Cause the TV commercials help the TV show that it's on. Like when they have to take breaks, and that's how they stay on, I think. Like the TV commercials pay them to cut into the show."

"Well, sometimes they are to keep the TV show running. You know, so it stays on TV. Like we saw this one show. Now, it's not on television cause it didn't have enough commercials supporting it."

Unreflective reasoning about the truthfulness of television commercials most often involved statements about the correct information provided by advertising. These comments suggested that the individual had actually seen the advertised product at the store and, therefore, the commercial was accurate. The following quotes are examples:

"... I go to the store and I see that food that they show on the commercials."

"In the two commercials they really tell us the truth because I believe them because I've seen the He Man figures before."

"Cause a commercial said something and I thought it was true so I went to the store and it was true."

Emerging reasoning about whether commercials tell the truth was overwhelmingly characterized by responses suggesting that advertised products do not measure up to claims or that commercials provided information which was not correct. The following are some typical comments:

"They said that Fiesta, that new soap called Fiesta, that it will make you sing, and I tried it and it never made me sing."

"The last time they had a toy out and I bought it—it was a Slinky—and then I tried to make it go downstairs and it don't."

"Like Era Plus or something like that... they have a protein and they have all this thing. I had a big stain here and I put some Era Plus on this right away. I got it all over and it won't come out cause my Mom tried it, and it won't come out at all."

Table I shows that over one third of the preschool and kindergarten children in this study were becoming aware of the purpose of advertising and that this understanding increased dramatically for the children in grade one. Few, however, of the youngest children in this study challenged the truthfulness of television advertising. This changes for the first and third grade students. The percentage of emerging reasoning about the truthfu-
ness of commercials increases markedly between preschool/kindergarten and grade one and between grade one and three. It appears that between grades one and three young consumers and their families are having some unsatisfactory experiences with products they or their families purchase. Some cynicism toward marketing practices begins to develop already in the primary grades.

Conclusions

This paper has presented a description of how young children think about basic economic ideas and problems. We think that several important conclusions can be drawn from this information. First, it seems clear that economic understanding develops in a manner supportive of aspects of cognitive development theory. For example, the type of the participants' reasoning was significantly different by grade level for five out of seven concepts in the study. In addition, the pattern of responses in all but one case showed an upward progression from simple to more abstract forms of reasoning by grade level as characterized by what has been defined as unreflective and emerging economic thinking.

Second, the findings of this study suggest that economic understanding varies somewhat depending upon children's experiences. Understanding about ideas related to aspects of exchange and television advertising, for example, develop more quickly than such fundamental economic concepts as choice, opportunity cost, and monetary value. This implies that young children's economic reasoning can be enhanced by providing them with personal economic experiences. Primary grade teachers can introduce economic related experiences involving simulations of stores, banks, and assembly lines. In addition, community based experiences, such as a visit to a factory, bank, police department, or fire station can be redesigned to emphasize the economic ideas involved.

A third and perhaps most difficult conclusion from this study relates to what economic education is appropriate for young children. Some children as early as preschool/kindergarten and grade one are already developing a basic understanding of some economic ideas such as scarcity and the purpose of advertising. Clearly, some instruction in basic economic concepts can begin at this level especially if tied to children's personal economic experiences. Yet, the majority of children in these young age groups are still reasoning about economic problems in a literal and superficial fashion. The majority of children in grade three are beginning to use more advanced types of economic reasoning. One reason for this may be that young consumers in grade three and above are having more economic experiences and are starting to make some economic decisions. The present study, reinforced by earlier research (Schug, 1983) suggests that the upper primary or the intermediate grades are an appropriate level at which to emphasize instruction about fundamental economic concepts.
References


Endnotes

1. It is clear that the precise wording of the interview can influence the type of response. Researchers who are interested in seeing the complete protocol are encouraged to contact the authors.

2. This research was partially funded by a grant from the Joint Council on Economic Education.
Abstract

In 1981, NCSS adopted a resolution supporting the teaching of global education. In this study, pre and posttreatment standardized attitude scales were administered to graduate education students taking a course about global education, and to a suitable control group. Students who took the global education course became more favorable toward global mindedness and world order. They became less favorable toward the nationcentric perspective. The experimental group’s attitude toward patriotism was unaffected.

Traditionally, the world has been perceived as a collection of nation-states, occasionally isolationist, frequently joining in alliances and often-times engaging in bitter conflict, but almost always striving to advance their individual interests, sometimes at the expense of other nations. This nation-centric perspective, the one most commonly taught in schools (Naylor, 1973; Nelson, 1976), has been challenged by those who perceive the world more broadly. This challenge was institutionalized in 1981 by the National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS) which passed a resolution calling for the social studies curriculum to include a global emphasis so that broad relationships, which transcend intergovernmental relations, might be addressed.

Consistent with the NCSS resolution which calls for a global emphasis and with our perception that society considers patriotism desirable, we sought to determine: a) if teachers' attitudes toward global mindedness could be positively influenced by a graduate education course in global understanding and b) if Goodlad’s (Becker, 1979, p. xvi) assertion that such a change does not diminish teachers’ level of patriotism could be substantiated.

Ways of Viewing the World

Nationcentric View. People view the world using concepts which serve as filters. One of those conceptual filters is the nationcentric perspective. Though useful in the past, it does “not ease our understanding of a contem-
porary scene characterized by an ever increasing interdependence of mankind and the accelerating globalization of culture” (Mehlinger, Hutson, Smith, & Wright, 1979, p. 9).

Advocates of the nationcentric perspective place the good of one's own country as the supreme value. They see the world not as a connected whole, but as a group of individual sovereign states each legitimately attempting to protect and advance its own interests even at the expense of people in other countries. They often favor strict immigration controls, a strong national defense and support their country's dominant race, religion and work force while excluding all others. They oppose their country's involvement in supporting world standards of freedom and working conditions and are generally suspicious of international involvements, especially if such liaisons cause their country to give up anything to others.

Global View. A contrasting option held by some is the global minded perspective. Subscribers emphasize belonging to the world community—the oneness and interconnectedness of all peoples on the planet. They manifest this belief by holding that people should be free to live wherever they wish in the world, schools should teach world history rather than only national history, decisions should be made on the basis of what is best for people worldwide (even at the expense of an individual country such as the United States), and acknowledge that their own country may be no better than many others.

World Order View. A third conceptual option for viewing the world is the world order perspective. Proponents of this viewpoint charge that the other two perspectives are inadequate to deal effectively with the complex issues facing humankind today. They believe that everyone is a citizen of the world and, as such, there should be one world government, complete with regulatory committees and a police force. They oppose the continuation of national governments. For an expanded discussion of the world order perspective, as well as the global minded and nationcentric perspectives, see Abdi (1979, pp. 33–45).

Patriotic View. Patriotism refers to a sense of pride in one's own country, a desire to live there, respect for and loyalty toward its people. It differs markedly from the nationcentric perspective, with which it is sometimes confused, in that it lacks exclusivity and rejection of others. The difference is sharply illustrated by the patriotic statement, “The fact that I love my country doesn't make me feel less kindly toward other countries.”

Prior Research

Various factors have been found to relate to teachers' attitudes toward global mindedness. Wilson (1975) found that teachers who have traveled outside the United States were more worldminded, as measured by the Worldmindedness Scale (Sampson & Smith, 1957), than their colleagues who had not traveled. Worldmindedness, as measured by this attitude scale,
encompasses both the world order and global minded perspectives. Factors which did not distinguish between the two groups were: sex, age, and grade level taught.

Using the same instrument, Ernster (1976) investigated the attitudes of secondary teachers toward worldmindedness and confirmed Wilson's findings that foreign travel, rather than grade level taught, related positively to a worldminded attitude. In contrast to Wilson's findings, Ernster concluded that, with her subjects, sex differences existed between those who demonstrated worldminded attitudes and those who did not and also found that social studies teachers' views were more worldminded than were the views of teachers of other subjects. In general, both the Wilson and Ernster studies indicate that foreign travel appears to be associated with a more favorable attitude toward worldmindedness.

**Procedures**

**Sample.** A sample of convenience was used to form the experimental and control groups. All 19 students enrolled in a 5-quarter-hour, 10-week graduate education course entitled Social Studies for Global Understanding served as the experimental group. This course, which met weekly, consisted of 5 (26.3%) males and 14 (73.7%) females. The mean age was 30.2 years. On average, this group had completed 1.2 years of graduate school. Thirteen (68.4%) had taught and their experience was about equally distributed from kindergarten through high school. Six were social studies teachers. Two-thirds of the group had traveled outside the United States; seven (36.8%) to from one to four countries and five (26.3%) to five or more countries.

The control group was comprised of 30 students, the total enrollment in the following courses at the same university: Educational Statistics, Curriculum Planning, and Social Studies Concepts and Issues. There was no discussion of global mindedness in either the statistics or curriculum course. In the social studies concepts and issues course some of the content had global ramifications, but global understanding was not the major thrust of the course.

The control group's sexual composition, 8 (26.7%) males and 22 (73.3%) females, was almost identical to that of the experimental group. The control group averaged 2.2 years of graduate school completed, a year more than the comparison group. This group's mean age was 34.2 years, four years older than its counterpart. The control group had done less teaching than the experimental group with only 16 (53%) reporting such experience. As with the experimental group, these subjects taught about equally in grades kindergarten through high school. Control group participants were more widely traveled than their opposites, reporting that 11 (36.7%) had been to between one and four countries and 12 (40%) to 5 or more nations outside the United States.
Treatment. The objectives of the experimental treatment were to a) define global education, b) state its purpose, c) provide a rationale for its inclusion in the social studies curriculum, d) describe a variety of methods and materials suitable for teaching global education, e) describe the effects of several existing programs, and f) outline a way in which global education can be introduced into their school’s social studies curriculum. To meet these objectives, students were required to read and discuss the text, *Schooling for a Global Age*, edited by James M. Becker, and a wide variety of periodicals and literature produced by educational groups.

Instruments. Pre- and post-tests were administered to assess each group's attitude toward global mindedness, world order, nationcentricity and patriotism using two standardized tests, The Worldmindedness Scale (Sampson & Smith, 1957) and the Patriotism Scale (Christiansen, 1959). The Worldmindedness Scale consists of 32 items, each using a 5-point Likert scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree (coded in the analysis from 1 to 5, respectively). This instrument has a published reliability coefficient of .93 and has been judged to have acceptable criterion-related validity (Shaw & Wright, 1969, p. 204).

Both Forms A and B of the Patriotism Scale, totaling 40 items, were combined and administered as one test. This instrument has reported reliability coefficients ranging from .69 to .83 and has also been deemed to have content validity (Shaw & Wright, 1969, p. 208). To minimize testing effect approximately half of the subjects took the Patriotism Scale first followed by the Worldmindedness Scale while the remaining subjects were tested in the reverse order.

Because we believe that the construct of worldmindedness is multidimensional, we created three subscales by grouping items that logically fit into three defined categories: global mindedness, world order and nationcentric. The reliability of these subscales, using coefficient alpha based on our data, are .64, .64 and .78, respectively.

Analysis. Four analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) were used to analyze the attitude data. In each ANCOVA, the pretest served as the covariate and the posttest as the dependent variable. An assumption of ANCOVA is that within-group regression lines are parallel for the experimental and control groups. This assumption of equality of slopes was tested for each analysis at alpha equal to .05. Type I error was controlled by using the Bonferroni Inequality to set alpha (.05/5) for making decisions regarding statistical significance for the effect of the treatment on adjusted means. We selected the univariate analysis to allow us to look at each dimension separately in line with our hypotheses rather than the more omnibus hypothesis tested in a multivariate analysis.

Results

Table 1 shows that the difference between pre- and post-test means on any particular variable for the control group never exceeds approximately 1
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Pretests and Posttests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Experimental Group</th>
<th>Control Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Means</td>
<td>Standard Deviations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World order pretest</td>
<td>16.58</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World order posttest</td>
<td>19.68</td>
<td>4.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global mindedness pretest</td>
<td>19.84</td>
<td>5.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global mindedness posttest</td>
<td>23.95</td>
<td>4.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationcentric pretest</td>
<td>33.47</td>
<td>6.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationcentric posttest</td>
<td>28.90</td>
<td>10.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism pretest</td>
<td>105.26</td>
<td>12.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism posttest</td>
<td>105.05</td>
<td>10.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From a practical viewpoint, this indicates that group means of the attitudes measured in the control group remained stable. It also provides some support for the belief that the experience of taking the pretest did not affect the scores on the posttest.

Using ANCOVA to compare the experimental and control groups, significant differences ($p < .01$) were found on all three subscales (global mindedness, world order and nationcentric) created from the Worldmindedness Scale (see Table 2). As can be seen in Table 3, the experimental group became more favorable toward global mindedness and world order and less favorable toward the nationcentric perspective in comparison to the control group. Thus, the hypothesis that a graduate course on global understanding can favorably change teachers' attitudes toward global mindedness was supported.

The ANCOVA results for the Patriotism Scale indicated no significant adjusted mean difference between the experimental and control groups ($p < .75$). This combination of results supports Goodlad's (Becker, 1979)

Table 2
Summary of Analysis of Covariance Significance Testing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Significance Test for Equality of Slopes</th>
<th>Significance Test for Equality of Adjusted Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$F$-value</td>
<td>Probability$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Order</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>.2367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Mindedness</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.6843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationcentric</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>.0609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>.1537</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$Probabilities for test of equality of slopes are from $F(1,45)$.

$^b$Probabilities for test of adjusted means are from $F(1,46)$. 

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view that acquiring a rich appreciation of the whole of humankind (global mindedness) does not contribute to a lessening of national pride (patriotism). These results may be generalized on logical grounds to students who elect to take a course in global understanding and who are similar to those in this study.

In none of the four ANCOVAs was the test for equality of slopes significant at alpha equal to .05. This provides some evidence that the assumption of equality of slopes in ANCOVA was satisfied. It may also be observed that the covariance adjustment changed the posttest groups mean very little.

**Discussion**

One way to interpret the results is to look at the magnitude of the changes that are statistically significant. For example, in Table 3, the difference between the adjusted group means of 19.28 and 14.89 is 4.39. Thus, the average (hypothetical) person in the experimental group gained slightly more than 4 points on the World Order Subscale. In comparison to the control group, the effect of the global understanding course is to move the hypothetical person one point more favorable (e.g., from neutral to agree) on four of the seven items on the subscale.

It is also interesting to translate the means back to the original 5-point Likert scale to interpret the descriptive categories (from strongly disagree to strongly agree). For instance, in Table 1, the mean of the experimental group on the Patriotism Scale pretest was 105.26. Because there were 40 items on this scale, the equivalent mean on the Likert Scale is 105.26 divided by 40 or 2.63. Hence, the experimental group was about midway between disagree and neutral toward patriotism at the beginning of the course. After completing the course, the experimental group's mean on the Patriotism Scale was still 2.63 (105.05/40). In this study, clearly the global understanding course did not change attitudes toward patriotism.

In conclusion, graduate courses such as the one offered the experimental group appear to increase both global mindedness and a world order perspective. As a group, these students became more aware of world problems and issues and more supportive of world government, rather than national governments, as a vehicle for addressing these concerns. At the same time, they continued to value their national identity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Experimental Group</th>
<th>Control Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Order</td>
<td>19.28</td>
<td>14.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Mindedness</td>
<td>23.57</td>
<td>19.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationcentric</td>
<td>29.48</td>
<td>35.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism</td>
<td>105.09</td>
<td>104.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Shaver, Davis & Helburn (1979, p. 151) and Gross (1977, p. 199) found evidence to support the notion that teachers may reflect their beliefs in their classrooms. Their results, in conjunction with our research, suggest that more global-minded teachers will teach in ways consistent with these views, thus, in turn, passing this perspective on to their students.

References

Abdi, E. G. (1979). The teaching of selected international relations concepts in Georgia public high schools. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA.


Endnote

1. An overview of the treatment is available from the authors.
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