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College and University Faculty Assembly of the National Council for the Social Studies

1998 ANNUAL MEETING
Anaheim, California

The deadline for proposals is MARCH 31, 1998. Proposal forms are available on-line at <http://www.ncss.org>, look for the CUFA section or contact the CUFA Program Chair:

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Information for Authors
Editor:

I am sending this to you as TRSE editor and as sponsor of the 1994 CUFA Resolution re California’s Prop 187 and a CUFA boycott of the NCSS meeting scheduled for Anaheim in 1997—and because I have too little faith that the CUFA board leadership would provide a timely and fair hearing for views like mine given my understanding of its recent actions both within the board and with the membership.

With regrets, this year marks my last CUFA-NCSS meeting. I have felt increasingly estranged over the past several years as CUFA (and NCSS) seem to have become less academically nourishing and more politically self-serving (while eschewing both public political activism and political position-taking)—even more so than 25-plus years ago when I first joined and began participating.

The last straws for me were the nature of the reasons given at yesterday’s CUFA business meeting for overturning the 1994 Resolution and the vague promises that (unspecified) constructive action would be taken at some future time. In view of the track record, credibility was nil. For the record, I voted against the resolution in 1994 (I thought that other, more timely actions might be taken if CUFA members’ opposition to Prop 187 was strong). In 1997, I listened to my colleagues talk around issues of principle as well as of economic and personal-professional self-interest as they reversed themselves now that it was time to act on the 1994 Resolution. I have no more patience for Pecksniffery.

So, while I look forward to continuing collegial relations with individuals, I will have nothing more to do with the organization. Sometimes we vote with our feet and our checkbooks. Consider what more direct and substantive contributions to equity and social justice could be made with the dollars that otherwise go to NCSS-CUFA dues and annual meeting registration.

Catherine Cornbleth
University at Buffalo, SUNY
November 22, 1997

LETTERS

Editor:

At the recent College and University Faculty Assembly (CUFA) Business meeting of the Annual Meeting of the National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS) I made clear that I had no intention of continuing my membership and participation in this organization. This decision was not a particularly easy one since I have devoted twenty years of my professional life to NCSS and about 10 years to CUFA.

Contrary to what many believe, I am not “mad” or “angry.” In many ways I am relieved. It has become increasingly apparent that the direction of the organization is in conflict with some of my deeply held convictions about social justice, equity, and democracy. I will try to summarize some of the major issues that have led to my decision.

At the November 1994 annual meeting CUFA passed a resolution to refrain from holding meetings in California. The impetus for the resolution was California’s passage of Proposition 187, an initiative to deny health, education, and other human services to immigrants and their children. As social studies educators California’s Proposition 187 represents an affront to the human rights we claim to hold dear. The CUFA resolution marked a tremendous moment of pride for me—social studies educators taking a principled stand on behalf of those people from whose labor we benefit but whose voices are unheard.

From the moment the CUFA boycott of California was passed, some members or the organization began working to overturn it (which is their right). The same boy-
cott resolution was brought before the NCSS House of Delegates where it failed. The failure of the boycott, while not unexpected, placed CUFA, a relatively small (300-350 members) organization, in a difficult position. CUFA needed to make plans to meet independent from NCSS—something it has never done. However, members of CUFA’s Executive Board followed through on the charge to locate alternate sites for the 1998 meeting.

Since the 1994 boycott resolution passed, things in California have gotten worse. California Proposition 209, which dismantles Affirmative Action in state employment and the state’s college and university system has passed. A current ballot initiative to destroy bilingual education is pending. However, at the November 20, 1997 CUFA Business Meeting in Cincinnati a motion was made that effectively rescinds the 1994 boycott and allows CUFA to meet and hold its program in California in 1998. This motion represented the culmination of three years of machinations and subversions of democratic process.

I am not leaving CUFA and NCSS merely because of the vote change. Having backed the losing candidate in almost every US presidential election since 1968 has taught me how to live with defeat. Rather, I am leaving because I can see no point in participating in an organization that is unprincipled both in what it believes and in how it operates. Below I list some of the major issues that move me to leave this organization:

1. Although the motion to rescind the earlier boycott resolution was printed in the CUFA Newsletter, neither I nor the other African American member of the CUFA Executive Board received the newsletter. We both had written columns in previous newsletters supporting the boycott. Our first opportunity to see the new motion was at the business meeting.

2. I believe that the "alternate proposal to go to California and do something "socially significant" disingenuous. In the past two decades I have seen CUFA produce nothing of social significance at its annual meeting. The group has met in Washington, Chicago, and Cincinnati in recent years. All three of these cities are home to substantial numbers of children of color who attend failing schools. But the CUFA (and NCSS) meeting have seemed immune to their plight.

3. There are less than a dozen African American members of CUFA and even fewer Latinos/as. But in 1991 NCSS dissolved its committee on Racism and Social Justice. CUFA did little to mount a challenge to this action or implement such a program within its own structure. Several members of CUFA make their professional reputation off of “diversity” issues but do little to make it a reality within the organization. One first time attendee to NCSS, an African American woman, commented that she was very disappointed that the African American History Tour of Cincinnati was canceled due to “lack of interest.” The irony was not lost on me.

4. The Executive Director of NCSS spoke in favor of rescinding the original boycott resolution by stating that we should not be “sidetracked by seductive but not so important issues.” If the health, welfare and education of California immigrants is “not so important” to NCSS clearly I am in the wrong organization.

5. Leadership on the CUFA Executive Board has served to silence and disenfranchise those Executive Board members who represent any form of dissent. For several meetings the organization’s journal editor has had to fight for the simplest of requests and has suffered ridicule and mockery. Rules and policies have been invoked in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The 1997 business meeting agenda was sent electronically to Board members with both the NCSS Executive Director and President of the California Council for the Social Studies listed as speakers to the motion, a motion that was yet to be made and seconded. Finally, after several complaints about this irregularity, the agenda was changed. How is it that both the Executive Director and the California Council president were informed of our agenda since neither is a member of CUFA? Additionally, in my view, the current CUFA chair cannot be said to have been “duly elected.” At the 1996 meeting there was discussion about her eligibility since her board term was to be up in 1997. So much confusion arose over whether or not she could run that the other candidate withdrew. The chair decided to “appoint” her chair.
My choice to leave CUFA/NCSS is an act of conscience. I am certain that it will have little or no impact on the organization. It will continue business as usual. But this decision will have a big impact on me. I will no longer be complicit with the organization's conservative, passive, undemocratic stance. I can hold on to a set of principles that I began to formulate as a teenager marching outside of Woolworth stores in the early 1960s in Philadelphia, protesting unfair housing in Baltimore as an undergraduate student in the mid 1960s, standing knee deep in mud at the poor people's campaign in the late 1960s, refusing to eat table grapes and lettuce throughout the 1970s. I made these choices not because I thought I would be in the majority and win, but because I believed them to be morally and ethically right. I have tried to live a personal and professional life in solidarity with those who have suffered and continue to suffer oppression and I have come too far to turn back now.

I have decided to invest my energy and resources in other professional organizations that have made a more concerted effort toward equity and social justice. Although I have been a member of these organizations I have not attended many of their meetings because they have conflicted with NCSS. Both the American Anthropological Association and the National Association of Multicultural Education have much better records of "socially significant" work.

The membership of CUFA has every right to go to California—Anaheim—Orange County. Some have argued that the size of the organization and its insularity from California politics will make little difference on the political and social climate. Many claim to be "neutral" on this and other other issues. I remind them of the words of Elie Wiesel, "Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim. Silence encourages the tormentor, never the tormented."

Gloria Ladson-Billings
University of Wisconsin-Madison
November 24, 1997

Editor:

Three years ago, CUFA took a sharp and decisive position against racism and national chauvinism, two of the dominant trends in our world today. To choose to reverse that decision is not to maneuver more effectively, to be clever, to be thrifty or practical. To turn back on that decision is simply and flatly a retreat, a capitulation to injustice.

It turns reality on its head to suggest that voting against racism and national chauvinism is somehow a diversion from more important issues. The battle against irrationalism, as represented by racism and national chauvinism, is exactly what should be taken up by the intellectuals of CUFA.

This is not a question of democracy in the abstract either. It is a question of right, wrong, and whose interests are served. To suggest that democracy should be a cloak to veil an unwillingness to rise and be counted, to choose secret ballots on a question of principle, is simply disingenuous. It is equally misleading to propose that a majority vote in a room full of White people vetted by class and race privilege is somehow democratic. Democracy would require polling the poor people of California.

This issue is indeed, as some have suggested, a question of unity and solidarity—but not as a matter of unprincipled unity with CUFA. The issues are: solidarity with whom? Around what purposes? Toward what end? All educators will do far better to choose solidarity with the vast majority of people, rather than those few who believe fear, greed, and irrationalism are the motive forces of history. This means that a vote of solidarity against racism and national chauvinism creates a higher form of unity.

Educators are centripetally positioned in our society. We need to take clear and decisive stands on the side of the vast majority of citizens who are objectively hurt by racism and national chauvinism. If we allow racism and national chauvinism to split us apart from these natural allies, we will find the division used to demolish our own well-being.

Rich Gibson
Wayne State University
December 1, 1997
FROM THE EDITOR

DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENTS:
SOME THINGS TO DO ON OUR WAY TO ANAHEIM

At the 1994 CUFA annual meeting in Phoenix, the assembled members took a decisive stand against the rising tide of racism and national chauvinism in the USA—as represented in California’s Proposition 187—by voting to condemn that proposition and to boycott Anaheim as an annual meeting site. In doing so, CUFA joined a number of other professional educational organizations (e.g., American Educational Research Association, American Educational Studies Association, National Reading Council) in making vocal their opposition to xenophobic laws and the dismantling of affirmative action. The 1997 CUFA meeting resulted in a retreat, in part, from this bold stance. And as preparations are made for the CUFA meeting in Anaheim this fall, I am surely not alone in my efforts to make meaning of the debates initiated by the 1994 resolution and consider their impact on the future of the CUFA, NCSS, and social education in general.

The motion passed by the Assembly in Cincinnati, (on a vote of 81 to 39 with 3 abstentions), resolved that the CUFA would “oppose all future conferences and conventions in California, except the next meeting of NCSS in 1998 at Anaheim.” While arguments of convenience won out regarding the Anaheim meeting, I believe that the debates with respect to issues of overt political action by CUFA and NCSS; the social and political responsibilities of educators; the role of researchers and research findings in ameliorating social ills; and the unique position of social studies curriculum and teaching as a force against racism and fascism, have challenged any complacency in the field. These debates are not only beneficial to our intellectual and organization health, but vital to the continued relevance of social education to the creation of a truly democratic society.

The Assembly affirmed the critical importance of continuing the dialogue on these issues in its overwhelming approval of a resolution that the CUFA program in Anaheim focus on a state-by-state analysis of the impact of racism and national chauvinism in educational institutions. Of course, CUFA and NCSS are themselves educational institutions and I believe that it is incumbent upon us to direct our gaze not only at racism and national chauvinism in schools and society at large, but to closely examine the intellectual and organizational structures that constitute what we understand as “social education.” With this charge in mind, I offer the following observations and suggestions.

First, the membership of CUFA and NCSS are overwhelmingly White and the events that transpired in Cincinnati have contributed to making our membership even whiter. For example—CUFA’s reversal
and the NCSS Board of Directors’ sudden about-face on their spring decision to refuse to schedule future NCSS conferences in California while Proposition 187 and the anti-affirmative action measure, Proposition 209, were in effect—prompted the NCSS African American Educators of Social Studies SIG decision to not convene in Anaheim and two prominent African American social educators to resign their membership and/or their leadership positions in CUFA and NCSS.

An organizational climate that is inhospitable to committed social educators of color must be transformed. It is imperative that CUFA and NCSS assess what actions can be taken to make both organizations more hospitable to a diverse membership and start making necessary changes at once. Immediate first steps should include the appointment of Affirmative Action Officers in both organizations, along with the allocation of funds to support the development of appropriate policies and activities to create a climate that is attractive and nurturing to a highly diverse membership. In addition, I call on NCSS to re-institute the Equity and Social Justice Committee and for CUFA to amend its by-laws to create a standing committee with the charge to develop policies and plan actions to resist racism, sexism, and national chauvinism and to promote social justice and equity, within educational institutions and society.

Secondly, so much of the recent debate in our ranks has been devoted to iterating the importance of unity between CUFA and NCSS that substantive discussion of the aims of these organizations has been displaced. I believe these voices reflect less a concern for organizational unity than a deeply held and profound discomfort with any form of dissent and conflict. As the traditional basis for the authority of educational research (and thus the work of researchers) is deconstructed and the purposes of social education are ever more contested, the desire for a single, firm, authoritative foundation for our work as social educators is understandable. But, as several articles in this issue of TRSE make clear, this quest for certainty will be in vain for there is no “safe haven” for retreat.

As Marilyn Johnston points out, action and research are not separate activities that can be connected or disconnected at will. Thinking, reflecting, and speaking are acts, political acts, that have consequences for ourselves and others. Traditional approaches to research allowed researchers to theorize the politics of their work into oblivion. Yvonna Lincoln maintains that social and educational researchers are now working in an arena that demands a new, explicit, action-orientation and, as Nancy Lesko argues, the challenge of action-oriented research is positioning ourselves in the pressing political problems of our time. “Research develops from a full engagement in political issues and their implications for education. This starting point emphasizes the social/political persona of every person and contrasts with the image of re-
searcher who chooses to engage in political life” (Lesko, this issue, p. 106). There is no choice involved, we are already all in political life. Therefore, arguments that presume that the dominant issue in this particular context is solidarity between CUFA and NCSS or promotion of the “social studies movement” beg the question of the purposes of these organizations and “the movement.” To argue that a strong collective stand against the racism and national chauvinism is “a diversion,” or a “less basic” issue than organizational unity or to label such a stand as the pursuit of “extreme idealists” belies, a perhaps unwitting, collusion with forces that support these irrationalities.

In her article, “The Politics of Difference and Multicultural Feminism: Reconceptualizing Education for Democracy,” Leslie Bloom deconstructs universality as it is used in public discourse and the social studies curriculum, illustrating how, despite its orientation toward egalitarianism, universality has failed to secure equal rights for marginalized groups. Bloom’s suggestions for moving from theory to practice in democratic education have much to offer classroom practice and our own professional discourse about the political role of social educators. Bloom argues that if the goal of democratic education is engagement in meaningful civic discourse, social activism, and political participation, we must create inclusive social dialogues that raise consciousness; challenge official knowledge; reveal, rather than conceal conflicts; take risks; and that foster reflective solidarity and responsibility for the well-being of our society.

The recent debates in CUFA have proven that coping with the risks of this kind of discourse can be uncomfortable both intellectually and socially. Our response to this discomfort should not be a retreat to a false (or anti-democratic) unity of purpose and voice. Instead we should examine the question posed by Lesko: Can we come to experience conflict and disagreement as other than disagreeable and to be avoided whenever possible? I agree with Lesko that if we are to engage fully in the politics of education and education research, new approaches to conflict are imperative. Instead of tolerating or managing conflict, we need to learn to work with and through conflict, because these efforts are likely to contribute to a better understanding of the limitations of our own perspectives and the value of others’.

E. W. R.
From Understanding To Action:
New Imperatives, New Criteria, New Methods
For Interpretive Researchers*

Yvonna S. Lincoln
Texas A&M University

Abstract
Higher education has faced a revolution as challenges to positivist science call into
question the grounds for inquiry. The proposed paradigm shift included phenomeno-
logical and interpretive stances, and qualitative methods. Another revolution is on the
horizon: a shift from interpretation to action, as faculty are challenged to facilitate
liberatory social change anchored in social research. New methods, new criteria for
judging the rigor of social action inquiry, support these new social science impera-
tives. Characteristics of the new action stances are high participation by stakeholders,
a commitment to social justice, and an ethics of caring.

From Understanding To Action

There is, I believe, a set of shifts coming to the higher education community. The appropriate canvas is the entire higher education com-
community because I want to talk about inquiry, and higher education is
the only organizational form we have which is dedicated first and fore-
mest to the generation of new knowledge, and the re-consideration,
reconstruction, revision, and reshaping of received knowledge.

As should be clear from the relentless public attacks, higher edu-
cation as an organizational form is undergoing structural and philo-
sophical changes more exhaustive and extensive than it has since the
Renaissance or Enlightenment. An organizational form which has re-
tained its basic organizational shape and form for over a thousand years

*Paper orginally presented as the Couper Memorial Lecture, School of Education and
will likely not survive the millennium unchanged. Quite the opposite. Attacks on authority, on costs, on tenure, on academic freedom, on the forms of research, and on the basic premises of higher education itself appear to be coming from all directions. The rise in state or institutionally mandated post-tenure review policies threaten the unfettered and a-political search for new knowledge, while at the same time, reductions in funding for national research programs threaten the hard and applied sciences and the humanities equally.

**From Prediction and Control to Verstehen**

But there is another kind of change even more profound which is facing institutions of higher education, and that is from within the academy itself. For several hundred years, since before the rise of the Vienna or Frankfurt schools, and coinciding roughly with the advent of the Enlightenment, there has been a commitment within the academy to a special form of knowledge. That knowledge, viewed as secular after a thousand-year reign of religious thought on higher education, served the philosophical and political function of severing mind and body, art and science, the romantic from the rational, the spiritual from the secular, the political from the Church, science from emotion, thought from action, and emotion from knowledge in general. The collective crafters of these Enlightenment dualisms, viewed retrospectively, comprise a lineage which is directly Cartesian, Baconian, Newtonian, Humean.

But the individual who indubitably shaped modern science, particularly the social sciences, most directly was John Stuart Mill. Mill extrapolated from the rapid technological advances he saw around himself in the form of the Industrial Revolution in England, Scotland and France, and theorized that it might be possible to engage in the same sort of technological enterprise for the social sciences which had been effected for industry and mass production. He envisioned a science of humans which could engineer out of society its ills—poverty, greed, illiteracy, hunger, venality, disease, injustice—and replace those ills with social “goods”—a living wage, altruism, literacy, food enough for everyone, health and social justice. We but needed, according to Mill, to apply the same principles of scientific investigation to human problems in order to accomplish the same kinds of near-miracles as had been produced by the inventions of science.

Mill without doubt provided the general shape and direction to the social sciences, long before they were formal disciplines. The theories of secular humanism, particularly the postulate that humans were infinitely perfectible, and that society could and would be improved from generation to generation as it weeded out its worst ills, lay behind much of the philosophical and social theorizing which followed Mill’s death in 1873.
The scientific logic derived from this belief system ran something like this: if we can understand the root causes of phenomena, whether physical or social, then we will understand the relationships between various elements, variables, factors, or components. Once we are able to comprehend the relationships, and to predict them successfully on a regular basis, we will be in a position to control for those elements which lead to unsatisfactory ends, and alter relationships in such a way as to achieve useful, productive, and positive ends.

Thus, the aim of the hard sciences, and later the social sciences, became prediction and control, utilizing the investigatory principle of studying components in a search for their regularized and routine relationships. Any serious student of scientific method will allege, upon reflection, that the main task of science is to understand how the world works, so that it may be reliably predicted, and therefore, ultimately controlled.

Taken together, both the principles of perfectibility (or at least positive change) based on rationality and scientific method combine to create what has been labelled "the modernist knowledge project." Its aim in the natural sciences was, to use the words of an 18th-century scientist, to "wrest Mother Nature's secrets from her." In metaphoric terms, science was about building an "edifice of knowledge." This edifice, a kind of wall, was composed of various bricks representing theorems or proven theoretical relationships among all things in the physical and natural world; the task of each scientist was to attempt adding a verifiable "brick" to the wall. The social sciences adopted, after some period of time, the same metaphor of an edifice.

Unfortunately, what the brick wall accomplished was to act as a barrier between humankind and the natural world it proposed to understand so thoroughly. The metaphors of conquest are invariably attendant to this notion of dragging Nature's secrets from her forcibly, and the results have been an unqualified disaster.

Within the social sciences, the results have been equally injurious, socially. We do not fully understand social ills or their etiologies, and our sometimes misdirected politics and policies have exacerbated the very ills we set about curing. From benign neglect to supply-side economics, we have created more poverty and despair than we have cured. The situation in our public schools—which may be the last common public institution we share in this country—is no better.

We do, however, have some hope for the future. The hope comes in the form of a critique, that is, a "detailed evaluation" or "critical commentary on some problem." This critique has slid sideways from literary criticism, from political theory and political science, from the arts. This detailed evaluation suggests that the possibilities for prediction and control in human events, especially as prediction and control reside in the power to attribute specific and discrete causes to social
phenomena, is extremely limited. To bring the argument closer to home, the postmodern critique of positivism and modernism suggests that, unlike gases or gravity, human behavior is always shaped by context and shaped by time. We cannot generalize about human behavior because human behavior is not a-contextual, nor a-historical, never ungendered, un-classed, or non-racial.

This poststructural, postmodern criticism also suggests that it is impossible to ever have complete knowledge of some human phenomenon. Therefore, the Truths— with a capital T—that we have constructed about human beings are in fact, not omniscient truths. They are all partial truths, shaped by history, economics, social location, class, gender, culture and race. They are, in fact, say the most radical skeptics among the postmodernists, fictions, fables, and myths. There is no absolute foundation for accepting one truth over another, at least not until we evaluate thoughtfully the evidence, derive communal standards to apply to the evidentiary base, and make decisions about which truths we will accept and which we will reject based on the evidence brought to bear on the various claims to truth.

The best we can hope for, some would argue, is not time- and context-free generalizations, which are impossible to achieve in any event, but rather deep, knowing, thoughtful and empathetic understanding of social phenomena—what the Germans call *verstehen*. Thus, throughout the social sciences, and especially in education, we are seeing more and more calls for understanding the manifest and latent processes of schooling as a prelude to reform. Teacher educators are trying to unpack the processes of teaching, and how learning proceeds from teaching as an outcome of multiple and many-layered transactions. Cognitive psychologists are attempting to understand how individuals come to acquire knowledge, to construct meaning around it, and learn to use it. Other educational researchers are trying to understand how we come to learn about our own learning patterns. Still others, such as Howard Gardner, are trying to grasp the nature of intelligence, having just comprehended that we tend to value one kind, even while there is mounting evidence that there are multiple forms of intelligence, and indeed, genius. Yet others are coping with the very meaning of learning disabled, and trying to understand how to break through physical, neurological and emotional barriers to share the world with children and adults who do not learn or process knowledge in the ways of the average individual.

Another set of individuals, of whom I am one, is attempting to cajole the educational research community to think about how it investigates educational problems, and how it thinks about those problems in the first instance. Three groups are attempting to be heard on educational issues and they have interesting things to say, I believe.
The first group are constructivists, and I am one. Constructivists have, as one of their major goals, the understanding of how much of social life is created, constrained and regulated by the social constructions of participants. These social constructions are the result of sense-making and meaning-giving processes engaged in by ordinary individuals in the course of a day, a week, or a lifetime. Indeed, it is often the case that no matter what the physical or social circumstance, as viewed by some disinterested observer, it is less the circumstance than the meaning that is imputed to it which becomes important.

We constructivists are interested in how teachers "construct" their classroom life; that is, how they make sense of it, and how they construct it into a whole and seamless reality. We are interested in why some children learn, and why others, in the same classroom, seem to resist schooling, resist blandishments around learning, and construct the class as a place where boring, uninteresting, or harmful events are likely to occur. We constructivists are interested in such things because constructivist psychology and gestalt therapy tells us that if we can change unproductive, incomplete, or misinformed constructions, or maladaptive constructions, especially if we can change the meaning-making core of these constructions into something more positive, then positive change occurs in individual or group behavior.

Critical theorists are the second group who wish to influence educational research. A central assumption of critical theorists is that schooling (and other social processes) are shaped by deep and often obscure infrastructures, frequently while we are unaware of the hidden process. Examples of hidden infrastructures inherent in schooling would be economics, tracking, racism, classism, or historical forces. For example, critical theorists might argue that historical economic and racial forces, hidden below the public surface of schooling, determine that upper-class white children will get educations superior to minority children, and that such subtle distinctions within the micro-processes of education serve to "sort" and "track" students into managerial, professional and technical careers, in the first instance, and into manual and service labor, in the second instance. Or, for a second example, a critical theorist might argue that the micro-processes of schooling are directed at labor and industrial ends, rather than at the ends of preparing students for critical thinking and participation in democratic life, an hypothesis which would be repugnant to those of us wishing to preserve a democratic civic life and a form of government which is republican (small "r") in nature. The evidence being adduced by the critical theorists is far from complete, but it is extremely compelling to persuade that such micro-processes do exist, and that they exist largely outside the propositional and conscious thought of most teachers and administrators.
The third group of scholars are known as action researchers, and they coalesce around the theoretical position that schooling is best investigated by a praxis orientation, that is, an orientation which includes the cyclical processes of action-reflection-theorizing-action, et cetera. Action researchers act on the premises that appropriate action can only be theorized by the community in which the action is to take place; that theorizing about the purposes and outcomes of action is a locally appropriate process; and that only by working on a problem will useful reflection, diagnosis, and change be produced.

**Toward Profound Knowledge of Educational Phenomena**

Each of these three kinds of researchers is challenging the dominant model of knowledge-gathering and knowledge-using. Each of the three believes deeply that knowledge cannot ever be truly objective; that knowledge can be a political tool; that knowledge cannot be separated wholly from the context in which it was generated; and that knowledge cannot be sequestered from policy debates. Each of the three kinds of educational researchers has also committed to a philosophy of *verstehen*, that is, to forms of knowledge which are deep, structural, historical, socially located, context-specific, and accountable to and inseparable from, issues of race, gender and class. They have abandoned, as individuals, as ideological groups, and as stakeholders in the processes of education, the myths of objectivity, generalizability, reliable prediction, or absolute control. Virtually without exception, they comprehend that solutions, if solutions are to be had, will come locally, rather than nationally. And they feel a deep empathy for and solidarity with those who enjoy less privilege, and those who typically have no voice in the policy decisions which are made on their behalf.

The three groups, whatever their ideological differences with each other may be, seek understanding which is holistic, emic, and intimate. They share a belief that conventional scientific method has not and cannot solve the enduring and persistent problems of schooling, and that new forms of inquiry and action should be undertaken.

They also share a belief that there is a great choice of research problems, use of language for formulating and describing what ought to be studied, choice of experimental design, methods of data collection and analysis, and the evaluation and interpretation of results (Namenwirth, 1986, p. 35).

All three kinds of researchers are likewise sharply aware of the pointed feminist criticisms of science. Whether or not avowed feminists themselves, action researchers, critical theorists and interpretivist/constructivists have become extremely mindful that
Scientists think of themselves as totally rational, neutral beings who have no political agenda and neither interest in, no responsibility for, the ways in which their research is interpreted or utilized by society (Namenwirth, 1986, p. 29).

They know this putative neutrality and objectivity has been bent, at times, to social purposes which “rationalize, justify, and naturalize dominant ideologies and the status quo” (Namenwirth, 1986, p. 29).

The Leap from Understanding to Action

The tendency for conventional scientists to ignore the ways in which their work is used has mobilized a second counter-community in science, including the three groups I have just mentioned, and numbers of others such as feminists. New groups of researchers have made the leap from understanding to action. The shift from prediction and control to verstehen was a climactic reversal of science’s mandates; but the shift from verstehen to action represents nothing less than a decisive transformation in the forms and structures of science itself. Indeed, this transformation in ideas about the means and ends of social science will be part of the transformation of higher education for the new millennium, if we are fortunate. Action, never part of the scientist’s repertoire or vocabulary, is now her or his mandate.

Why Action Now?

One might reasonably ask, Why should social scientists suddenly take an interest in action? The question revolves about the tension between disinterestedness, claimed neutrality, and the myth of objectivity versus responsibility. Marion Namenwirth (1984) argues the case this way:

Science is a powerful tool for good as well as evil, for emancipation as well as for exploitation. How scientists use their time and talent, their training at public expense, their public research funds, and the public trust are not matters to be brushed aside lightly...Residing, as we do, inside a universe filled with enigmas, ...many with applications beneficial to segments of society that are due for some benefits, how do we justify working on research whose applications threaten to be deeply destructive of natural resources, of human life, of the dignity and self-respect of a racial or ethnic or gender group?...As scientists and human beings, we are obliged to make responsible choices about what we do in our work. We must be knowledgeable about how our research is likely
to be applied, and do what we can to prevent dangerous, detrimental applications while promoting beneficial ones. Furthermore, we must cope responsibly with the by-products of our research design... [And] scientists must accept some responsibility for the ways in which their research is communicated to the public (pp. 35-36).

It is not, however, simply the growing call for scientists to abandon their postures of neutrality and objectivity and their presumed inability to account for the uses to which their research is put, which has drawn scientists and social scientists toward more active roles, and toward involvement in civic discourse regarding the results of research, potential applications of research results, or the limits of their research. It is the sometimes cavalier disregard for the heady public policy implications of much modernist-dominated and conventional research. In a recent volume of *Lingua Franca*, an article on the human genome project reported a major scientist with the project as complaining that “I spend a lot of my time going to ethics conferences right now. A climate is being created that’s going to make it more difficult to do genetic research” (Allen, 1997, p. 33). His collegial counterpart on the mandated Ethical, Legal and Social Implications (ELSI) bioethics panel which is charged with thinking through at least some of the ethical implications of the findings as they emerge, noted that when Murray and Herrnstein’s *The Bell Curve* came out that “The genetics societies were the only ones who said nothing. Their approach was, ‘That’s not in our job description.’ Well, that’s a very narrow view of life.... My view is we have to make scientists comfortable with [commentary] becoming a part of their job description” (Allen, 1997, pp. 32-33). A scant two decades ago, we would never have had a bench scientist and a bioethicist having at it in public over the meaning and implications of the scientist’s work, nor would we have had a bioethicist defining public discourse over the meanings of findings as a part of a genetics researcher’s responsibilities.

There is a great schism between where some scientists believe we should be and where the world is moving. To give you another example of the kinds of pressures which modernism brought, and which postmodernism seeks to resolve, let me give you an example from a recent issue of *Discover* magazine.

Jared Diamond reports that he ran into Carl Sagan shortly before Sagan’s death, and remembered that Sagan had been nominated for membership in the National Academy of Sciences. The interesting thing about the nomination is that, once the final election vote was held, the National Academy refused his candidacy, challenged his nomination from the floor, and Sagan’s nomination was repudiated. Diamond reports that “Sagan lost his potential seat in the academy not because he
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failed to produce sufficient important scientific research but because he had too much success as a popularizer of that research" (Diamond, 1997, p. 46). Diamond goes on to discuss the inherent tensions between having a public literate about science’s methods and discoveries, and the requirement of modernist science to remain aloof from public discussion about, or use of, science’s findings. This tension resulted in the rejection from the National Academy of Science of one of the most well-known and publicly articulate scientists this generation has known. Indeed, Carl Sagan’s rejection was almost surely because of his obvious enthusiasm for astronomy, and because of his ability to translate the arcana of astronomy into terms which any American could understand. This violated the idea of the “sacred priesthood” of science, and scientists refused his company.

These examples help to frame the kinds of tensions between what I term “old science” and “new science,” including educational science. Increasingly, there are pressures for various forms of genuine action with respect to the products and processes of science and social science, alike.

**New Imperatives for Action**

There are at least three other equally compelling imperatives for action to replace classical disinterestedness and presumed objectivity. First, it is becoming clear that the kind of science we have been practicing as social scientists has not only not ameliorated persistent social and educational ills, it seemingly has exacerbated them. The disparity between the “haves” and the “have-nots” in American society appears by all indica to be growing larger; the social, economic and educational distance between them appears to grow exponentially. As massive wealth accumulates in the hands of a fortunate few in this country, more and more racial and ethnic minority children fall by the wayside, nutritionally, culturally, socially and educationally. The world’s richest nation refuses to confront the issue of whether we can provide simple, basic health care to all its citizens. I could go on, but the drift is clear: social and educational problems which we have the money and human capital to resolve not only remain unresolved, they appear to worsen.

Second, action coupled to research appears more compelling as we confront a growing scarcity of social and educational resources. The need and desire for other, equally important social services, for instance, competes with the desire for first-rate schools, or the clearly discretionary nature of much higher education funding. In the face of crime prevention, prisons, social and rehabilitation services, welfare services, and various programs for children, both higher education and public education seem quite luxurious as public expenditures, and states are increasingly devolving school expenditures on local com-
From Understanding to Action

Communities as they attempt to provide for institutions and services which cannot be provided at the local level (e.g., roads, highways, prisons).

Third, there is a growing understanding among groups of educational researchers that school reform, educational improvement, and social welfare in general are going nowhere without the active participation of those who have in the past been the so-called “targets” of improvement. Thus, a new contract is being forged between social and educational researchers with a postmodern or action research bent, and those whose lives they study and about whose work they write. That contract represents the confluence of new understandings of the limitations of social science, especially the impossibility of ultimate truth or the creation of generalizations which can guide all action, and a new understanding of respondent participation as a *sine qua non* for the possibility of change. Said more simply, what we know about the limits of knowledge has encountered what we know about social change. The marriage has produced forms of participant action research, and the offspring is growing by leaps and bounds. I might guess that within a generation, virtually no educational researcher will exist who would, with a straight face, claim that experimental method is the one best way to bring about scientific results in educational research or that the best response to communities and schools on the part of university researchers is neutral disinterestedness.

Some of the change we are seeing today is the legacy of the politically active 1960s. While news magazines might well argue that the 1960s only live as quaint nostalgia; in fact, there were many political lessons which live on. One of those critical lessons was that “thinking globally, but acting locally” was a powerful way to pursue change. Much of the community-directed change efforts, particularly in schooling, that we see today are a direct inheritance of this “acting locally” mindset. Community orientation, whether in a city, a town, a rural area, or a village, is part and parcel of this bent toward involving ordinary teachers and citizens in change. Consequently, we are seeing far more research reports which speak of local efforts, deep community involvement with researchers, and increasingly, direction of the research effort by involved citizens.

In short, there are new imperatives for action, even in the face of counter-currents which give contradictory messages from different kinds of hard and social scientists. Nevertheless, the sense of community involvement is strongly emotionally linked to the ideal of a participatory democracy, self-rule, and autonomy; consequently, it is a form of educational research which is likely to gain momentum over time.

**New Criteria for Educational Research**

Along with relatively recent innovations in educational research, we are also seeing new criteria emerge as a way of judging the utility
and efficacy of this new research for action and for participation and involvement. Indeed, the new criteria which address quality almost equally address the nature of the relationships between researcher and researched, and the ethical content of those relationships. From the proposal of criteria which moved beyond reliance on sheer statistical method which Egon Guba and I created (Guba & Lincoln, 1989) to new proposals from others engaged in critical, constructivist and action research, we are seeing what I believe to be a re-framing of the idea of research with human organizations. One of the interesting things about the new proposals for making judgments about research is that different authors have largely come to their proposals by virtue of their own hard-won experiences in the field.

Some of those new and emerging criteria include concepts developed from early childhood education, some from feminist theory, and some from management science. But taken together, they are likely to change the face of research for all time to come, especially since many of them refer to, or are rooted in, acts, relationships, and action. To give some flavor of what I mean, I shall try to show how the new criteria move us farther along the understanding-to-action continuum.

The first criterion of quality in the new world of research is the idea of the community as the arbiter of quality (Lincoln, 1995). While no one would deny that the world of social science must also brings its standards to bear on any given piece of research, the new researcher is more interested in developing a community’s ability to devise its own standards for judging when a piece of research within its boundaries has been particularly useful in promoting positive change. Mary Savage (1988) calls this form of quality judgment neighborliness, and Parker Palmer notes that how we come to know—our epistemology—has embedded in it an ethical relationship. He has found that “every mode of knowing contains its own moral trajectory” (1987, p. 22). Thus, the way a community has come to know and understand frames its ethical sense of itself as a community.

Second, we also now entertain the construct of positionality as a criterion for judging the worthwhileness of knowledge. Positionality, or standpoint epistemology, takes account of the social location of the knowledge producers, and seeks to bound and frame knowledge in terms of where and from whom it came. Positionality is greatly enhanced when the knowledge is developed within and from an entire community, if for no other reason than it has fewer limits on the number of standpoints which it embraces. The research report created by a single individual paradoxically has more limitations than that one negotiated and produced by a polyvocal community. The latter fulfils yet another criterion, that of voice, for when community involvement is wide and deep, many voices are heard.
Reciprocity and caring (or caritas, after Mestrovic, 1996) are also criteria which exhibit great fit with emerging relational models of research, but which would be not only out of character, but would be despised in conventional research, even research inside schools. Reciprocity and caring undermine conventional scientific inquiry’s commitment to objectivity and subject-object dualism, and hence pose a threat to the social and scientific distance and neutrality promised by modernist science.

But reciprocity and caring make a good match to social science when the purpose of that science is not the accumulation of supposedly neutral knowledge, but rather the acquisition of knowledge for praxis, for action, for community building, and for the amelioration of some social predicament.

Reciprocity and caring also fit well with the idea of sharing the perquisites of privilege and power (Lincoln, 1995, p. 284-85). Not all of us have the means or the will to share the money we make as academics and professors, but many of us feel that we can use our relative power and prestige to position ourselves with those who are relatively powerless against the more powerful. This taking sides has many forms. In constructivist inquiry, we argue for criteria of fidelity and rigor which demand we frame inquiries in such a way as to prompt action, and then mandate that if those who are prompted to action don’t know how to take action on their own behalfs, then it is up to us to show them how to enter into the political arena with tact, savvy, and efficacy (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). Participatory action researchers would behave in much the same way, as would critical theorists.

All of these new criteria now being formulated as ways to judge the rigor of postmodern inquiry have at their bedrock different forms of commitment to action. Likewise, all require new bonds, new reciprocities, new interdependences between researcher and researched. They likewise require an understanding of the contingent nature of our relationship with others who have less, for they mandate a shared awareness that our fortunes are inextricably entwined, the privileged with the less privileged.

New Methods for Interpretive Researchers

Emerging mandates for action, and emerging understandings of what quality might mean in postmodern forms of social science, have signified that the old ways of gathering data and making meaning of data will no longer suffice. New methods are called for, and those new methods call for new skills on the part of social scientists and educational researchers. Technical know-how and statistical facility, while they can be helpful, are no longer the best, or only, skills inquirers need. Postulating novel, unfamiliar, and unprecedented mandates for action, and unusual, atypical and singular criteria for judging the quality of
inquiry efforts eventuates in the realization that more traditional forms of training for such researchers are inadequate.

The inquirer bent on meaningful action has to move well beyond the usual statistical training required in graduate programs, acquiring skills which are more easily thought of as belonging to members of the National Labor Relations Board, corporate presidents, or directors of major research laboratories. I am speaking of such skills as facilitation; orchestration; mediation; portrayal and vision-creation; a commitment to diversity and to pluralism as strengths rather than incitement to divisiveness; and to ways of working with groups within communities which enable collaboration, mutuality, and cooperation rather than conflict. These are not skills directly taught in graduate programs in education, or in social science, for that matter.

*Facilitation and Group Dynamics.* Most individuals engaged in research have not had formal training in group dynamics and facilitation. But the new research demands that researchers have training in facilitating groups and group dynamics, more generally. The new imperatives for research, including more action research and more shared research design and analysis work with members of the community in which the research takes place, mandate increased skills in and practice with group facilitation work. Furthermore, as research becomes a more participatory, rather than researcher-designed and -directed activity, additional members of the community may need training of their own, whether in group dynamics or in research and data collection techniques; only an individual trained in group dynamics work with adults can train others.

*Meditation.* The new imperatives for research to be grounded in a real community imply that the inquiry effort will encounter the community in some holistic way. One of the facets which will shape the research effort will be values, particularly those values which are, although often hidden from public view, in conflict. Most communities possess several sets of values which contradict each other; any local election will prove that. But the more deeply an inquiry reaches into a community or school or university, the more sharply will conflicting values, standards, and beliefs appear. Jack Douglas (1976) warned social scientists over 20 years ago that a cooperative model of social science, such as that assumed by social scientists in the earlier part of this century, was probably unrealistic; that it was more realistic to expect conflict rather than cooperation. And that further, people would lie and put up fronts to cover up, among other things, conflict.

The willingness of subjects of lie, to create subterfuges to protect their own privacy, to resist having conflicts surface, all necessitate the researcher’s trying to uncover conflicts as a way to help people understand themselves more deeply, and therefore to plan for effective action. This requires, however, an easy hand with people, and the ability
to mediate and arbitrate when conflicts do surface. Indeed, skilled and empathetic mediation will be needed virtually from the start of any research project in the constructivist, action research, or critical theorist modes I have outlined. Researchers speak of experience-near or experience-distant research; all three of the modes I've related to each other are distinctly experience-near modes. They bring researchers and participants into intimate enough contact to bring values to the surface, and in the process, to bring to the surface the conflicts among those values which invariably are smoothed over in communities in order to move community business and schooling along. As a result of having these conflicts in values rise to the surface, the researcher is required to do ongoing mediation.

While she or he has to mediate throughout the research effort, nowhere is the mediation tougher or more intense than when it is necessary that decisions be made about what actions a community might take, or what kinds of future efforts it might design for itself. This is often cause for disagreements, some of which will need a caring mediator. And that skill, likewise, is not typically taught in graduate programs.

**Collaboration, cooperation.** Yet another set of skills is the set formed by collaboration and cooperation. Most social scientists are trained under the "lone researcher" model, and indeed, our traditional reward systems have been geared to the single-author publication, shaped of course by the single researcher project. But new forms of interpretive research often demand collaboration and cooperation among many kinds of inquirers, and in turn, demand that those researchers be able to teach collaborative modes of working together to members of a community—some of whom may be the holders of those conflicting values. This requires both a teaching function and a modeling function. Where inquirers have not been mentored in collaborative and cooperative research modes, they will have to learn such skills, and furthermore, learn them well enough to model and teach them to others.

**Orchestration.** Closely related to collaboration and cooperation skills are the skills of what Egon Guba and I have termed earlier "orchestration" (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). Just as a conductor keeps the tympanies moving in concert with the brass section, and the violins and woodwinds settling their melodies lightly atop the rhythm sections, so too does a new kind of researcher keep many facets of the research effort underway at any given time. Some members of the community may be in an action phase, while others are in a reflection or theorizing phase; multiple hermeneutic circles of research may be underway at a single time.

While older models of research posited inquiry as a linear process—a process borrowed conceptually from the idea of a laboratory flowchart—newer models of interpretive research see various processes
as overlapping, stepwise, superimposed, or circular. The research-to-action effort itself is an exercise in coordination and synchronization. The researcher, who is often a member of a team, accepts the role of orchestrator and concert-mistress. Researchers who cannot keep their Day-Timers up-to-date will have to learn organization and coordination.

**Commitment to diversity and pluralism.** The real test of the researcher's skill will be her or his ability to elicit and enjoy diversity and pluralism. Seeking out all stakeholders means a formal research commitment to finding such people—those who are different from ourselves in some way—but truly reveling in the pleasure and endless variation of diversity and difference is something else. The researcher who wishes to enjoy her or his work will have to enjoy and celebrate difference, because to do such action-oriented research properly, differences, enormous diversity, and conflict will emerge. The researcher who is uncomfortable with individuals and groups unlike himself will undoubtedly find diversity a painful experience.

When I think of this particular issue in interpretive research, I invariably think of Alan Peshkin (better known as Buddy). Buddy, who is Jewish, was deeply interested in the movement to establish Christian and fundamentalist schools, and so he went and lived for a year in a small community in the Midwest which had begun a private, fundamentalist academy. He was also interested in how a community with a bad name for ethnic strife "constructed" itself, and immersed himself in the life of the town, and especially the high school—where no one was like himself—to discover the strong and warm friendship patterns which existed despite outsiders' views of the town as full of racial and ethnic strife. Buddy Peshkin exemplifies the kind of individual ready for work in, around, and with, difference, diversity, and pluralism. He is an inquirer totally at home with himself, and therefore, able to be at home with others, especially those who are not like him. This is the quality that I mean when I talk about diversity and pluralism; it is a form of grace, a kind of authenticity. And, it is absolutely mandatory for new kinds of researchers.

**Portrayal.** The last skill I will mention is one I label, after Bob Stake, portrayal. Portrayal differs radically from what we ordinarily think of as scientific writing, because the form of discourse is natural language, not the language of traditional social science. Conventional social science speaks with what has been called "the voice from nowhere"; portrayal, on the other hand, demands identifiable voices, voices which come from many "somewheres." Portrayal is the ability to craft compelling narratives, narratives which give outsiders a vicarious experience of the community, and which give insiders both a deeper understanding of themselves, and the power to act. Furthermore, while we assume that the social science monograph will be some book or
article, interpretive portrayals will take many forms, often orchestrated by persons other than university researchers: interpretive readings, skits, plays, poems, role-plays, informal reports, roundtable discussions, forums, and other means of involving community members in sharing data using both written and oral tradition formats.

Many new theoreticians (Denzin, 1994) talk about oral traditions, reminding us that for thousands of years, culture and history both were transmitted without written conventions. Oral traditions are compelling and simultaneously able to re-weave the strands of community. New researchers will utilize all forms of knowing to work with communities in solving their own problems.

Implications for Life in Higher Education

How does all of this impact on higher education? No one can foresee the future entirely, but I believe several implications can be drawn, and I’d like to speculate on them. First, I believe that much of the criticism directed at higher education has to do with the public’s inability to see the impact of research done in institutions of higher education on their everyday lives. There is an image abroad of faculty as pampered, coddled parasites, unable to earn a living anywhere else but the hallowed and sequestered halls of ivy. It is an image which is 99 and 44/100ths percent untrue, but in any event, within a generation, the image is likely to change. The emerging bent toward research with meaningful action components, the mandates from state legislatures for faculty to collaborate with their local schools, and the renewed emphasis on public service, especially in state universities, is likely to alter the reward structures for faculty, ultimately. In so doing, faculty will not only be responding to public pressures to prove they are useful members of society, they will also be responding to their own interdisciplinary demands as educationists and social scientists. Furthermore, they will be responding to their own frustration with a public policy process which both ignores their research, and which is disproportionately weighted toward the “haves” rather than the “have-nots.”

The new faculty will also be more convinced—more so than even current faculty who think differently—that the means of action lies not with a federal government unresponsive to real need, but rather with communities educated to take action on their own behalves. William Ellery Channing characterized his own age in much the same way that new, young interpretivists might characterize theirs:

There are seasons, in human affairs, of inward and outward revolution, when new depths seem to be broken up in the soul, when new wants are unfolded in multitudes, and a new and undefined good is thirsted for. There are periods when the principles of experience need to be modified, when
hope and trust and instinct claim a share with prudence in
the guidance of affairs, when, in truth, to dare, is the highest
wisdom (The Union, 1829).

Answering the call for a new inward revolution, young faculty
increasingly dare to shape careers which are models of a new form of
academic work: the merger of community research with community
service. There will always be a need for some group of individuals to
withdraw from ordinary affairs in order to make unfettered, a-politi-
cal and critical commentary on society, and I would hope that univer-
sities survive the devastating pressures on themselves as institutions
in order to create that space for all of us. We will always need some
places where the young can be trained for critical thinking and the
elder can pursue, in a manner free of political influence, knowledge
and wisdom. But I believe faculty of a new generation will move be-
tween the universities and various communities, in ways which they
have not done before, enacting forms of inquiry which have not been
tried often in this country (although they have a long history in under-
developed countries). Thomas Jefferson said:

I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the so-
ciety but the people themselves; and if we think them not
enlightened enough to exercise their control with a whole-
some discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but
to inform their discretion. (Letter to William Charles Jarvis,
September 28, 1820).

One clear implication of the new mandates for research and the
release of inquirers from the strictures of a conventional posture of
disinterestedness is that social scientists will be in a position to inform
the discretion of individuals and communities as they never have be-
fore. I can see educational researchers moving in that direction in their
collaborative work with schools. I look forward, with a rising genera-
tion of new scholars, to seeing whole communities profit from these
kinds of alliances.

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The Politics of Difference and Multicultural Feminism: Reconceptualizing Education for Democracy

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Abstract
Contemporary society and social education would benefit by being reconceptualized according to a multicultural feminist theoretical standpoint that asserts a politics of difference in place of the current ideology of universality. Making this case, the author critiques universality as it is used in public discourse and policy and demonstrates how, despite its apparent orientation toward egalitarianism, universality has failed to secure equal rights for marginalized groups. The author posits "equivalent rights" in place of "equal rights" and concludes with a discussion of pedagogical strategies that may best facilitate education for democracy.

The combination of civil, political, and social rights is the foundation of democracy. While other nations added these rights gradually over the centuries, the United States pursued an idiosyncratic path. That path began when the first principles of civil rights—the belief in equality and the right to liberty—were enshrined in the Bill of Rights and the Declaration of Independence...From the first moment of the birth of the fledgling state, however, practice compromised principles. (Quadagno, 1994, p. 18)

These are especially critical times for democratic education. (Darling-Hammond, 1996, p. 6)

In her book, The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty, Jill Quadagno (1994) asserts that the United States is an "unfinished democracy." A finished democracy, she explains, would be one in which the combination of civil, political, and social rights is consistently and fully granted to all citizens. In this article, I share Quadagno's concerns that the United States is an "unfinished democ-
Quadagno's concerns that the United States is an "unfinished democracy" due to the lack of full social rights for all our citizens. Social rights are the means through which a society protects and ensures the well-being of all its citizens. As British sociologist T. H. Marshall (1964) explains, in a democratic society, social rights are thought of as "the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security, the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society" (p. 78; cited in Quadagno, 1994, p. 18).

The unequal granting of social rights and the resulting lack of social well-being, I will argue in this paper, is supported and ultimately justified by one of our most fundamental democratic principles: universality. Universality, therefore, as a foundational philosophy, is in dire need of being either relinquished or at least radically reconstructed (Dean, 1996; Benhabib 1992), for it is one of the most dominant and seductive principles that paradoxically undergirds both democratic ideology and social inequities.

In this paper, I seek to demonstrate how a theoretical framework that includes a politics of difference and multicultural feminism may help us to reconceptualize democracy in general and education for democracy specifically. Toward this end, I discuss what is meant by concepts such as "universality," "difference," and "multicultural feminism," the latter two being theoretical frameworks through which universality is critiqued. Then, using examples from the works of multicultural feminists such as Patricia Williams (1991) and Zillah Eisenstein (1994), who reveal how universality is enacted in public discourse and policy, I hope to demonstrate how universality, despite its orientation toward egalitarianism, has failed in practice. These examples further serve to illustrate that universality cannot ensure universal rights because it masks difference. I then present Drucilla Cornell's (1992) critique of universal rights and her call for "equivalent rights," employing her argument as an exemplar for reconceptualizing democracy and therefore, democratic education. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of pedagogical strategies that may best facilitate education for democracy.

My goals for this paper are both theoretical and pedagogical. As a feminist theorist concerned with equity, I write to participate in the critiques of universality because this is essential to the ongoing project of reshaping women's places in society (Elshtain, 1981; Ferguson, 1991; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Pateman, 1989; Phillips, 1991). As a feminist educator, I write to contribute to ongoing efforts to radically challenge the standard curriculum of democratic education (Crocco, 1997; Hahn & Bernard-Powers, 1985; Kohli, 1996; Leonard, 1981; Maher, 1987; Makler, 1997, Munro, 1997; Noddings, 1992; Stone, 1994, 1996; Tetrault, 1987).
Universality

Before I continue, I want to make clear how I am using the term "universality." Universality is the idea that there is an essential sameness in being human—the belief that our common humanity makes us all the same. This belief in a universal essence is the legacy of the humanist assumption that all humans have "an essence at the heart of the individual which is unique, fixed and coherent and which makes her what she is" (Weedon, 1987, p. 32). Universality functions both as a regulative ideal and as a dominant discourse in the United States. As a regulative ideal, it orients us toward egalitarianism, the elimination of social or political inequities in the name of human sameness and for the enactment of human and universal rights. As a dominant discourse, universality provides an acceptable way of talking about a unified "we" who form "our" society.

Universality also philosophically structures the U.S. legal and political systems, particularly in the legislation of universal rights. Because universality demands that all individuals can and must be treated equally in society and under the law, it asks that we grant "universal rights" to each individual by specifying no particular individual. That is, universality asks that we not specify differences of race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or sex because rights are granted by virtue of citizenship. While special laws have been created in modern times to protect children from abuse, for example, thus differentiating them as citizens, universal rights (such as the rights to free speech and privacy) are supposed to be extended to all in the U.S. by virtue of human citizenship. Further, universality supports the idea that neutrality, objectivity, and impartiality in the maintenance of universal rights is desirable and possible in our legal and political systems and that "the government of a democratic society is supposed to be neutral in order to protect 'universal rights'" (Eisenstein, 1994, p. 5).

While these conceptions of universality appear benign and even suggest the best possible moral stance for a democracy, in the rest of this article, I problematize the usefulness of universality and suggest the feasibility of a politics of difference and multicultural feminism in its place.

Theoretical Perspectives:
The Politics of Difference and Multicultural Feminism

The most vital theoretical work comes from postmodernist/poststructuralist feminists who promote women's posthumanist difference as the basis for equality. (Stone, 1996, p. 39)
Politics of Difference & Multicultural Feminism

We are living in a time when discussions about difference and what it means to be different are pervasive and alarmingly contentious. To be different connotes that there is a normative sameness or universal essence from which those who are “different” depart. Difference, particularly in the context of educational theorizing in multicultural times, signifies, but is not limited to, racial and ethnic differences from normative Anglo-whiteness, sex and gender differences from normative maleness and masculinity, sexual differences from normative heterosexuality, social class difference from normative middle-class status; and religious differences from normative Christianity.

To suggest that difference is a salient alternative perspective on which to ground new conceptions of democracy and democratic education is problematic, however, for it motivates the use of essentialist discourses. Essentialist discourses about women, which I will focus on here, are problematic because in them, both sex and gender are taken to be ontologically constant and ahistorical. That is, when women are referred to as “different” from men, it is implied that all women have a common identity based on their biological sex. As Diana Fuss (1989) explains, when we use such categories as male and female,

no allowance is made for the historical production of these categories which would necessitate a recognition that what the classical Greeks understood by “man” and “woman” is radically different from what the Renaissance French understood them to signify or even what the contemporary postindustrial, postmodernist, poststructuralist theoretician is likely to understand by these terms. “Man” and “woman” are not stable or universal categories, nor do they have the explanatory power they are routinely invested with. (p. 3)

Sandra Harding (1991) also importantly reminds us that the ways that people are categorically differentiated are always hierarchical:

It is important to remember that in a certain sense there are no ‘women’ or ‘men’ in the world—there is no ‘gender’—but only women, men, and gender constructed through particular historical struggles over just which races, classes, sexualities, cultures, religious groups, and so forth, will have access to resources and power. (p. 151)

These cautions about how essentialisms are a dangerous undergirding of difference, remind us that it is necessary for any theory of difference to acknowledge the limitations of ontological conceptions
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of sex and gender and the ways that such categories of difference are socially and historically constructed hierarchically and used to express power relations in everyday life and public policy. It is because of these limitations and problems that the concept of difference is employed carefully as a political strategy.

A "politics of difference" (Young, 1990) as I propose here, uses categories such as "women" and "men" as "linguistic conveniences" that recognize how such categories are socially and historically produced in language (Fuss, 1989, pp. 4-5). Diana Fuss (1989) explains why this use of the essentializing and differentiating term "women" is useful for feminist politics:

Many anti-essentialists fear that positing a political coalition of women risks presuming that there must first be a natural class of women; but this belief only masks the fact that it is coalition politics which constructs the category of women (and men) in the first place. Retaining the idea of women as a class, if anything, might help remind us that the sexual categories we work with are no more and no less than social constructions, subject-positions subject to change and to historical evolution. I am certainly not the first feminist to suggest that we need to retain the notion of women as a class for political purposes. I would, however, wish to take this conviction to its furthest conclusion and suggest that it is politics which feminism cannot do without, politics that is essential to feminism's many self-definitions. To the extent that it is difficult to imagine a non-political feminism, politics emerges as feminism's essence. (pp. 36-37)

Difference therefore, as a political strategy, names a collective such as "women," but does so with an understanding of the pitfalls of predetermined categories of difference (Martin, 1994, pp. 644-647; see also, Spelman, 1988); with a sense of postmodern irony for the way in which this and other categories are unstable, dangerous, socially produced, and always incomplete; and with a wariness for how such categories are always in risk of reinforcing subordinating stereotypes. It is only with an understanding of these limitations that a politics of difference is considered consonant with the goals of multicultural feminism.2

"Multicultural feminism" is a term I borrow from Nancie Caraway (1991) who uses it to describe a complex and multifaceted political strategy for "cross-over coalition building" among diverse groups of women who are committed to equity and transforming society. Multicultural feminism is a theoretical stance that recognizes the importance of being able to articulate a "we" within diversity. The collective "we" is therefore defined in fluctuating and contextualized ways;

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it also tenaciously resists assimilation, conformity, hierarchy, and normativity, making a space for "an openness to unassimilated otherness" (Young, 1990, p. 319).

Further, in accord with a postmodern perspective on difference, multicultural feminism allows for a "we" that always keeps at the surface ways that women's lives are materially defined by "a structural relation" that has been "produced and organized by a prior history" (Young, 1994, p. 728). It is a "we" that is again, non-ontological and non-essentialist in that it "disconnects gender from identity" and it is a "we" that does not assume a group with "common experiences, perspectives, or values," what Young refers to as "gender as seriality" (1994, pp. 728-734).

Multicultural feminism is therefore a term used with a sensitivity to the dangers and futilities that practices of a solidarity, based on a politics of difference, entail, such as when solidarity becomes in practice, dictates for assimilation to a majority or occasions for exaggerating already existing negative stereotypes. In this regard, multicultural feminism proposes a solidarity that is quite different from the "we" that is evoked in both universality discourses and ontological, essentialist gender discourses. Because multicultural feminism accepts difference as a political strategy, it is a useful framework for critiquing the universality that is foundational to democracy and democratic education.

A Feminist Multicultural Critique of Universality

While liberal educators may "manage" (Mohanty, 1989-90), evade, celebrate, or teach tolerance of difference and conservative educators may ridicule it as mere games of identity politics or political correctness, multicultural feminism recognizes that difference must be understood in two ways simultaneously: as a part of a person's complex personal identity that shifts and changes and as a public identity that is socially produced and which has meanings in the daily social lives of people who are marginalized, essentialized, subordinated, or named solely by their differences. For multicultural feminism, the harsh realities of marginalization for individuals—socially constructed and personally felt—are difficult to celebrate or evade and are never simply reduced to ahistorical, essentialized gendered, ethnic, or religious characteristics or identity politics. This thorny question of how difference is and might be understood, constructed, and ultimately engaged more productively in the public discourse, legal system, and political theory is the catalyst from which springs one of the central critiques multicultural feminists have of democracy.

The question for multicultural feminism is, if democracy is founded on a principle of universality, that all men [sic] are created equal, from which we are all guaranteed universal rights, how are we as a nation to engage universal rights when we finally recognize, ac-
cept, and work with the idea that there is no universal, essential sameness, and that there are differences in women’s lives, for example, that make a difference in their ability to achieve equity and social well-being? Many multicultural feminists would argue that it is ineffective to make space for differences in the public arena while leaving the current political and discursive systems in place that function as tools of oppression to marginalized groups. Because there are no race neutral, gender neutral, or class neutral citizens, when democratic systems and institutions “deal with us only in our capacity as abstract citizens, they are wishing away not only differences of class [and race and ethnicity] but what may be even more intransient differences of sex” (Phillips, 1991, p. 149). When universality is left in place, striving for democratic citizenship for “all” is ultimately unproductive—a fool’s errand perhaps—and moveover, may be no more than support for the status quo.

Historical as well as recent legal, social, and political events and for some of us, the realities of our daily lives, have rendered the idea and possibility of universality impotent. Multicultural feminism in particular calls into question the concept of universality and the attainability of universal rights for all in our complex contemporary society. Multicultural feminists assert that the very claim for universality is flawed because it does not take into consideration the pre-existing and particular differences among the citizenry that profoundly effect their ability to enact or be protected by/from these rights. In accord with this, universality is understood to be antithetical to current understandings of “difference” because it attempts to erase those differences that have a great impact on individual and group social reality. Further, multicultural feminists assert that universality does not and never has encompassed groups marginalized due to race, sex/gender, or economic status and is therefore a concept in great need of being challenged and problematized. Finally, multicultural feminism claims that neutrality and impartiality in the legal system and within society in general is a concept stripped of its meaning and lacking in integrity. We have only to look at our zoning laws, medical system, welfare reform legislation, prisons, and schools to know that neutrality, impartiality, and universality mean virtually nothing.

And yet, as philosopher Elizabeth Minnich (1994) notes, we are a nation that fiercely attempts to hold onto these conceptions of universality even in the face of—or, I would argue, in defensive response to—extensive critiques from multiple marginalized groups who make up our population. Because we are a nation unable to accept difference, Frankenberg (1992) argues, majority groups in the U.S. think and talk in “race/power evasive discourses” which are characterized by statements such as “I don’t see the color of my students” or, “we’re all the same under the skin.” That is, many people uncritically embrace and speak in the dominant discourse of universality. Even when dif-
ference is acknowledged, it is often in a troublesome form, as Frankenberg (1993) explains:

What becomes clearer about color evasiveness, then, is that more than evading questions of difference wholesale, this discursive repertoire selectively engages difference, evading questions of power. While certain kinds of difference or differentiation can be seen and discussed with abandon, others are evaded if at all possible...[P]ower evasion involves a selective attention to difference, allowing into conscious scrutiny—even conscious embrace—those differences that make the speaker feel good but continuing to evade by means of partial description, euphemism, and self-contradiction those that make the speaker feel bad. (pp. 152, 156-7).

Both Frankenberg (1993) and Minnich (1994) are suggesting that there is a real fear in letting go of universal ideals and accepting difference because “to admit the differences between us as other than equal variations on a single theme [humanity] is to admit that injustice [borne out of these differences] is not an aberration” (Minnich, 1994, p. 305). Without conceptualizing difference, “it is not possible to conceptualize oppression as a systematic, structured, institutional process (Young, 1994, p. 718). That is, if we hold onto universality and evade those differences that are troublesome, we are able to maintain that we all have the same chances in society as humans and that failure to succeed either as a group or individual is not an institutional problem. Therefore, to disturb the universal ideal that people are all the same, is to disturb our national identity of the United States being a just democracy. By holding onto universality, we may claim that injustices are flaws in our political, legal, educational, or economic systems that are in need of fixing, but are not structural, institutionalized problems with democracy itself.

Further Critiques of Universality

Universality and African-American Rights

Legal theorist Patricia Williams (1991) knows that we do not have a just society and she believes in the importance of challenging universality. She explains that the whole issue of

universality is problematic for African-Americans who not only are continually denied universal rights because they do not fit the U.S. universal ideal, but who must acknowledge that the constitutional foreground of rights was shaped
by whites, parceled out to Blacks in pieces, ordained from on high in small favors, random insulting gratuities" (Williams, 1991, p. 164).

Given this difficult relationship to rights historically, Williams (1991) notes that universal rights are denied to Blacks today by the use of political rhetoric that replaces universal rights for Blacks as members of this society with the specific needs of a poor, African American community. Williams says that when universal rights for Blacks are transformed into economic and social needs in public discourse, it is easy to deny these needs since needs are not guaranteed by democratic law; that is, neither the federal government nor the state is obligated to provide basic economic rights or entitlements to any members of its society. Moreover, as Nancy Fraser (1989) explains, when needs replace rights, the way that needs are defined "occludes the fact that the interpretation of people's needs is itself a political stake, indeed sometimes the political stake (p. 145).

Williams (1991) offers, I think, a powerful challenge to the democratic ideology of universal rights, for her articulation of the differences between needs and rights demonstrates how rights can be denied in a democracy when difference is invoked in ways that are fundamentally racist. Therefore, as Williams suggests, Black's relationship to rights discourses and practices have historically been problematic and continue to be so. Paradoxically, however, attainment of them is nonetheless crucial, if perhaps symbolic. As she explains,

For the historically disempowered, the conferring of rights is symbolic of all the denied aspects of their humanity: rights imply a respect that places one in the referential range of self and others, that elevates one's status from human body to social being. For Blacks, then, the attainment of rights signifies the respectful behavior, the collective responsibility, properly owed by a society to one of its own. (Williams, 1991, p. 153)

Williams' conceptualization of both the problems and promises of universal rights gets at the heart of the multicultural feminist critique of democracy. Indeed, it reminds us why so many struggled for passage of the now almost dismantled Civil Rights Act and the never-passed Equal Rights Amendment. Williams' discussion also illustrates the ongoing need to analyze universality and universal rights in their complexities in order to make clear the way that universal rights, despite their promise of eliminating inequality among citizenry, has an exclusionary history and are strategically deployed to deny some citizens full civil and social rights.
Universality and Affirmative Action

Finally, I offer a critique of universality that has been articulated by political theorist Zillah Eisenstein (1994) who examines how the language of universal rights has been used in public discourses aimed at dismantling affirmative action programs. Reaffirming the correctness of universality and universal rights, conservatives opposing affirmative action make the case that affirmative action programs actually deny rights to “all” because they privilege differences of gender and/or race and therefore, give “special rights” to particular individuals. Eisenstein rejects this reasoning. She maintains that the non-specificity or supposed gender/race neutrality of universal rights language—the use of the non-specific “all”—has in practice actually always specified and privileged the White male while claiming to be the most democratic, inclusive language. As she explains, “although neoconservatives claim to be defending the rights of the individual—meaning, presumably, all individuals—in fact the individual they have in mind is always a white male” (p. 3). Without affirmative action, she argues, White males are neither harmed nor do they have decreased access; what they do have that is perceived as a harm, is a larger pool of applicants with whom they compete, resulting in the somewhat increased chance that they will not get a specific job or get into a particular elite institution.

The claim that individual rights are denied by affirmative action suggests that already existing differences from the normative conditions of whiteness and maleness are meaningless. Yet for women- and men-of-color particularly, for many White women, and for all those in poverty, affirmative action means that access to jobs, schools, particular careers, and academic scholarships is increased. Well conceived affirmative action (as opposed to poorly articulated or managed affirmative action) allows those with skills to get jobs that they might have been denied and it gives people opportunities to be considered where they would formerly have been excluded (Eisenstein, 1994, p. 48). Thus, the universality that is invoked in anti-affirmative action discourse is a reaffirmation of the rights of those who already have rights while the rights of those marginalized would be denied in the erasure of socially constructed race and gender difference.

To reiterate—it is for this reason that universality is particularly found to be problematic in multicultural feminist thought: difference is already existing and therefore, to insure individual rights, universality cannot be invoked as contributing to an equitable and democratic society. Finally, given the racist and sexist nature of our society and its consequences for the labor market, affirmative action provides a viable way to move us closer to the granting of full social rights be-
cause it can facilitate the attainment of “a modicum of economic security” (Marshall, 1964) and well-being for more than just a few.

**Making Difference Work: Women’s Lives and Equivalent Rights**

Very simply, rights should not be based on what men, as conventionally defined under the gender hierarchy, need for their well-being, as if there was only one genre of the human species. (Cornell, 1992, p. 293)

Every woman has a universal human right to control her body, yet this right must be specified in terms of a woman’s differing circumstances, such as her ability to get pregnant...This is just as neutral a starting point for discussion as beginning with white men, and it is more honest than pretending to be universal. (Eisenstein, 1994, p. 5)

Protecting social rights and creating legislation that would ensure the well-being of all citizens is a daunting challenge in our current political, economic, and ideological climate. It asks that as a society, we acknowledge the ways that misogyny, racism, and homophobia/lesbophobia, class elitism, and xenophobia permeate virtually all aspects of public life and policy. It is in the spirit of this challenge that Drucilla Cornell (1992) calls for the legislation of “equivalent rights” for women.4

In keeping with the politics of difference and multicultural feminism that I articulated above, Cornell’s (1992) thought-provoking essay, “Gender, Sex, and Equivalent Rights,” maintains that “the respect for difference, including feminine sexual difference,” is the basis for the challenge to enact “equivalent rights” for women (p. 281; see also Mouffe, 1992). Cornell argues that conventional structures of gender identity as either biologically necessary or as culturally desirable not only does not erase the “reality” of women’s suffering, but demands instead the affirmation of feminine sexual difference as irreducible to the dominant definition of the feminine within the gender hierarchy as man’s other or as his mirror image. (p. 281)

Let me both explicate and amplify this sentence, for it contains the basis for the rest of Cornell’s (1992) discussion. First, Cornell is arguing that historically and ideologically, a woman’s identity is reduced both to her biological functioning (her reproductive capacity)
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and to dominant gender stereotypes of femininity (women are "naturally" relational, nurturing, emotional, and desiring of motherhood). Second, she is asserting that dominant structures of gender identity (taken as ontological and ahistorical) cause "suffering" for women whose "lived realities" or everyday lives conflict with dominant structures. Third, Cornell regards it as deeply problematic that normative gender identities structure what is male as normative and what is female as lesser; woman is the "castrated other" who never can measure up as the "mirror image" of man. Fourth, she is asserting that the female gender identity is a stereotype which, although accurate in the sense that women are biologically different from men and are socialized to particular feminine attributes, is also discriminatory because it forecloses alternative individual possibilities and options for women. She explains that female gender identity "forces women to have to operate within an unsatisfactory either/or, inseparable from gender hierarchy in which the female sex is devalued" (Cornell, 1992, p. 291). In other words, rigid gender structures limit women's well-being, and therefore their social rights, because they force women to define their lives by those patriarchal structures that subordinate them.

Given this unequal gender hierarchy, Cornell (1992) maintains that one way to effect a change in society, is to change the way that gendered differences are valued. That is, she recommends as a reasonable political strategy, changing the way existing social/institutional structures treat women as women, rather than attempting the Sisyphean task of asking society to do away with categories of sex and gender. She wants to make women's difference work as a means to end discrimination, to ensure their well-being, and to promote their social rights.

Because current policies are presented as universal and therefore "gender blind," she reminds us, as did Eisenstein (1994), the effect is the perpetuation of gender discrimination. Discrimination is defined by Cornell (1992) as "the imposition of a universal on an individual who does not match that universal" (p. 283). In practice, discrimination occurs when women's options are limited by "forced sexual choices" (Cornell, 1992, p. 291), thus jeopardizing their well-being and their abilities to live their lives to full capacity. Cornell's strategy for effecting these social changes is to enact what she calls "equivalent rights."

Equivalent rights is posited as a judicial means through which structural and institutional inequalities would be redressed or eliminated. It is a means to change ideology as well, for equivalent rights, by valuing difference, would affirm that women have the right of "living without shame of their 'sex'" (Cornell, 1992, p. 282) and without limitations due to their sex and gender socialization. To achieve these goals, Cornell explains that equivalent rights must be understood as
rights, "not just as privileges needed to correct the imposed inequality of women. Neither are they merely a means to help women become more like men in the name of promoting one species undivided by sexual difference" (p. 282).

With regard to work, equivalent rights demands that we change the structures of institutions so that, for example, women's reproductive capacity, which is what renders women most different, is both valued and legally protected. Using the example of the "mommy track," in which women are given a flexible schedule, typically allowing for part-time work so that they can fulfill their obligations as primary caretakers of their children, Cornell (1992) demonstrates how limited women's rights are in the work place because "women are still expected to make sacrifices in their lives because they mother" (p. 292). In corporations or academic institutions, women may be given the "opportunity" to work part-time to care for children, but in doing so, they give up career advancement, status, and often job and economic security. Low-paid women or women with low job-status often lose their jobs as they struggle to balance work and mothering. Therefore, Cornell argues, "such 'rights' are not 'equivalent'" (p. 292). An equivalent right, then, would ensure the right to maternity and/or parenting without a sacrifice being imposed upon women. This is an equivalent right and not a privilege or universal right because

the biological potential for motherhood [and the role of mothering for adoptive mothers] is an aspect of being female for a woman in a way it cannot be for a man. Also, if "mothering" is a valued social activity, then there should be no sacrifice of either status or pay and, of course, in the name of collapsing the gender divide, we should encourage men to take up this activity. I am obviously accepting that if mothering is understood as a social activity, not exclusively tied to reproductive capacity, then men can also be "mommies." (Cornell, 1992, p. 292)

The example of mothering is significant, for it includes the problematic of not just role differences, which are imposed by gender structures, but biological differences as well. Therefore, the struggle for equivalent rights in this context involves both "the recognition of feminine difference in those circumstances when we are different, as in our relationship to pregnancy [and adoptive mothering]" (Cornell, 1992, p. 293) and in our expected relationship to care-giving. Equivalent rights therefore, would allow these aspects of difference to be recognized and equally valued without women having to make sacrifices because of the specificity of our "sex" which makes us "unlike" men. To paraphrase Cornell, very simply, rights should not be based on what men
(and here I would add Whitess, heterosexuals, or the economically stable) need for their well-being, as if there was only one genre of the human species. Rather, rights should be based on equivalencies, what is best for the well-being of all citizens given that differences make a difference.

There are many additional examples I could use to explicate why we need equivalent rights and how a fundamental belief in universality and our faith in universal rights has harmed and continues to harm people-of-color, gays and lesbians, non-Christians, people in poverty, women, and all those who live marginalized at the crossroads of these socially defined but subjectively experienced identities. When difference is engaged as an additive to an already existing, politically driven ideology, and concepts such as universality and universal rights are not called into question as the primary grounding of democracy and universal rights, then we will never do more than reproduce the status quo.

From Theory to Pedagogical Practice

Repairing the torn social fabric that increasingly arrays one group against another will require creating an inclusive social dialogue in which individuals can converse from a public space that brings together diverse experiences and points of view. (Darling-Hammond, 1996, p. 6)

The critique of universality posed by multicultural feminists challenges traditional conceptions of democratic education. It asks that democratic education question standard accounts of our social history and what it means to work toward, rather than to be a democracy. It asks that our classrooms not reproduce the belief that the United States has been and is a completed and just democracy, a belief that nurtures, rather than confronts racism, sexism, heterosexism, class elitism, antisemitism and especially, xenophobic nationalism. Therefore, if the goal of democratic education is to teach students to engage in meaningful civic discourse, social activism, and political participation, what "transformational theory of teaching" (Stone, 1994) would promote the kind of educational practices needed for teaching about such contested topics as unfinished democracy, difference, and equivalent rights? The answer to this question may be found in pedagogical theories that insist upon the importance of inclusive social dialogues in the classroom: dialogues that raise consciousness and challenge official knowledge (Greene, 1992); dialogues that reveal, rather than conceal conflicts (Apple, 1975; Bloom & Ochoa, 1995); dialogues that take risks (Grossberg, 1994); and dialogues that foster both "reflective solidar-
Consciousness raising is typically not talked about as a central goal of education. As Maxine Greene (1992) has argued, much of public education is geared toward training students to meet the demands of our consumer society (see also, Labaree, 1997). To train, rather than educate people, Greene argues, results in “bland accommodations to what is offered as authoritative description” (p. 203), such as in the uncritical acceptance of democracy as a finished product. In contrast, education should be a process in which consciousness is raised. It should be an experience through which we are awakened to a sense of presentness, to a critical consciousness of what is ordinarily obscured. Without such experiences, we are all caught in conventional (often officially defined) constructs in such a fashion that we confuse what we have been taught to see with the necessary and the unalterable. (Greene, 1992, p. 213)

To awaken consciousness so that we and our students do not blandly accommodate to what is given, however, requires an educational environment in which communication and dialogue are central, for “consciousness seldom develops in isolation” (Greene, 1992, p. 213). Dialogue in this context is a process of educational awakening in which all classroom participants critically examine their lived worlds and those of others, not being satisfied with a stable notion of one’s own identity or standard accounts of what is.

Admitting challenges to standard accounts of the world into the classroom invites conflicts, the kinds of conflicts that arise when self-reflection and intellectual content makes people uncomfortable and when individuals dispute their differences. As Michael Apple (1975) has argued, the concerted effort to keep conflict out of the curriculum and classroom interactions can lead to “political quiescence and the acceptance by students of a perspective on social and intellectual conflict that acts to maintain the existing distribution of power and rationality in a society” (p. 95). Therefore, Apple argues that it is necessary to bring into classrooms, rich discussions about what conflict is and how conflict has been an important catalyst for social change. This is a pedagogical technique that Apple (1975) asserts is particularly necessary in the social studies as a means to disrupt the reification of consensus and the tacit “acceptance of society as basically a cooperative system” (p. 105). Additionally, making conflict and controversy central is a pedagogical strategy, as Anna Ochoa and I (Bloom & Ochoa, 1995) have expressed elsewhere, that can be effectively used to enable student research, reflection, and activism regarding those social issues.
which are most complex and controversial—such as the conflicts that would arise over the meanings of difference and the call for equivalent rights.

Engaging in these kinds of dialogues will mean that all classroom participants will need to have (or be taught) the art of listening to the perspectives and voices of those who are typically excluded from participating in national debate, but who are all too often the negative focus of it. It will often mean listening to what makes us angry and to what makes us uncomfortable. Creating such dialogues in the classroom and creating a context in which marginalized voices are heard may therefore be seen as a “pedagogy of articulation and risk” (Grossberg, 1994). As Lawrence Grossberg (1994) explains it, this pedagogical strategy takes

the risk of making connections, drawing lines, mapping articulations, between different domains, discourses, and practices, to see what will work, both theoretically and politically...[It] speaks to the conditions of exile and displacement...to conditions of homelessness and restlessness in terms of a renewed commitment to theory that is motivated by the desire to displace established orthodoxies...It is a pedagogy that demands of students...simply that they gain some understanding of their own involvement in the world, and in the making of their own future (pp. 18-19).

Having consciousness raised, working with conflict and controversy, and coping with the risks these kinds of engagements entail, although initially uncomfortable, both intellectually and socially, may ultimately contribute to better understandings of the limitations of our own perspectives and the values of other perspectives. Therefore, it may encourage what Jodi Dean (1996) calls a stance of “reflective solidarity.” Dean defines reflective solidarity as “a mutual expectation of a responsible orientation to relationship” (1996, p. 3) such as one's relationship to a local community or to the larger society. Reflective solidarity encourages a sense of responsibility to others based on an understanding of the relationship among individuals, their collective group(s), and society. According to Dean (1996), the

conception of solidarity relies on the intuition that the risk of disagreement which accompanies diversity must be rationally transformed to provide a basis for our intersubjective ties and commitments. This means that the expression “we” must be interpreted not as a given [as in
universality claims], but as “in process,” as the discursive achievement of individuated “I’s.” (p. 3).

Dean’s theory of reflective solidarity suggests pedagogical strategies that teachers can employ to make classrooms places where social activism is mobilized. It is a social activism, however, that is grounded in always evolving commitments based on emerging understandings of the self and others. Reflective solidarity suggests, for example, that students be asked to form collectives based on new and emerging understandings of themselves and others, and that these collectives, because they are oriented toward a responsibility for others, accept the obligation for researching inequities in the school and making recommendations for enacting “equivalent rights.” This experience would help students and teachers learn about the difficult processes of working toward democracy through reflective solidarity; they would be active participants in creating, not only an equitable academic environment, but a necessary intellectual environment for working toward a more fully democratic school. This strategy is one which Amy Gutmann (1988) would support, for as she argues, schools must take responsibility for becoming sites, not only of equality, but also of democratic intellectual and participatory engagement.

Finally, classroom dialogue, as it moves from consciousness raising to being the catalyst for activism, must be understood in democratic education as something that is not simply taught, but something that is enacted. Dialogues about difference, social rights, equivalent rights, and democracy, as explicated here for education for democracy, therefore remind us, that “teachers and students need to be repeatedly asked to consider the viewpoint that their learning is not just for their own benefit but also for the democratic well-being of our society (Goodman & Kuzmic, 1997, p. 85). This is part of the risk about which Grossberg (1994) warns us—that reconceptualizing what we’ve always been taught and believed in may change who we are and what we are compelled to do.

Conclusion

As multicultural feminist theorists have demonstrated, giving up the centrality of the “unum” as “the national ideal” in “e pluribus unum” is not as bad or threatening as some (e.g., Schlesinger, 1992) may think. We may still retain the “we” as a diverse signifier of our nationhood while participating in a healthy engagement with difference. Rather than thinking of it as a loss, not having universality as a foundational ideology for democracy may be thought of as an exciting catalyst for intelligent public debate, renewed activism, and fertile teaching. Rejecting the idea that we already live in a finished democ-
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racy with equal rights for all asks us to envision a very different United States than what we have now and ultimately, this perspective may revitalize the way democracy is taught and enacted in the United States.

Notes

1 I owe very special thanks to Anna Ochoa-Becker who got me started on this work by asking me to write a paper on feminism and democracy for the 1995 National Council of Social Studies (CUFA) annual meeting. Thanks also to Jeff Kuzmic, Petra Munro, Kathleen Weiler, and the anonymous reviewers of TRSE.

2 Intensive debates over essentialism and anti-essentialism have been waged on the pages of numerous feminist books, journals and anthologies (see, for example, Spelman, 1988; Butler, 1990; Nicholson, 1990; Martin, 1994; Young, 1990). Although I take a particular stance on the essentialism debate in this article, arguing for its political and contingent deployment, it is beyond the scope of this article to explicate the nuanced ways that the larger debate provides both support for (Fuss, 1989; Mouffe, 1992) and critique of (Young, 1994) this stance.

3 The distinction between needs and rights is not unfamiliar in educational circles where poor, immigrant, and urban children for example, are said to need particular skills such as computer and literacy skills so that they may enter the workforce (as low-paid laborers). Little, however, is said in public discussion of their rights to an excellent education and efforts to increase school budgets is typically said to be “throwing money at a problem.” By using the language of needs, rather than rights, the citizenship of these children is negated; it is therefore easy to both deny them excellence in their education and to maintain status quo funding structures. When children do not receive equal educations and are dehumanized in public discourse as “problems,” they are being denied their social rights.

4 Cornell’s essay also compellingly argues for the enactment of equivalent rights for homosexuals. However, given the focus of this article and space limitations, I will explicate only her discussion of women’s equivalent rights.

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The "Traditions" Revisited: Instructional Approach and High School Social Studies Teachers

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Abstract
The purpose of this investigation was to explore and characterize the instructional approaches of US high school social studies teachers according to Martorella's "alternative perspectives on citizenship education" framework. The study was based on a national survey of 500 high school social studies teachers holding membership in the National Council for the Social Studies. The major finding was that the research subjects identified more strongly with the instructional approaches of social studies as reflective inquiry, social studies as informed social criticism, and social studies as personal development than with the approaches of social studies as citizenship transmission and social studies as social science. Implications are addressed relative to previous findings and future research.
I call "instructional approach" and define as a teacher's normative beliefs regarding instructional purposes, modes of content selection, and instructional strategies. In effect, instructional approach corresponds to how one answers these questions: (1) What should be the purpose of education? Why? (2) How should content be selected? Why? and (3) What teaching methods/strategies should be used? Why?

Overall, my goal was to ascertain individual instructional approaches (or "approaches to instruction") and to classify them according to Martorella's (1996) five citizenship education perspectives: (1) "transmission of the cultural heritage [or citizenship transmission]," (2) "social science," (3) "reflective inquiry," (4) "informed social criticism," and (5) "personal development" (p. 20). My primary research question was: To what extent do high school social studies teachers in the United States approach (again, defined as normative beliefs) their instruction via each of Martorella's five perspectives? In sum, the observed data indicated more support for reflective inquiry, informed social criticism, and personal development than for citizenship transmission and social science.

Instructional Approach: A Position

Note that my own personal position rests upon an understanding of instructional approach as an extremely complex, dynamic concept, one that is both difficult to capture theoretically and difficult to measure empirically. It is more than simply a means by which to characterize classroom practice. My construction of instructional approach focuses upon normative beliefs, both "real" and "ideal," in an effort to create a more meaningful picture of classroom life. My image is one that recognizes the interactive and formative importance of both the internal (or "psychological"—the motives, beliefs, interests, and practices of the teacher as individual) and the external (or "contextual"—the motives, beliefs, interests, and practices of the larger educational system[s] and its [their] players).

In terms of the present framework, my approach most closely resembles the social studies as informed social criticism. I believe that purpose should stem from a broad concern with issues such as equality, social justice, democracy, freedom, culture, identity, and power. Content should be drawn from three sources: (1) the specific interests and experiences of students; (2) "popular culture"; and (3) those forms of knowledge that have been historically marginalized or devalued (e.g., those by culturally dominated groups, for example women, the working class, and persons of color, among others). Method should emerge out of the experienced relationships between teachers and students. Overall, I believe that instructional approach should be constructed within classrooms and between teachers and students—not
imposed externally by administrators, researchers/teacher educators, or legislators, especially, for instance, via such popular contemporary trends as standards and standardization (i.e., the recent push toward national curricula and credentialing standards, teaching "competencies," and broad-based assessments).

Review of the Literature

The purpose of this section is to provide the theoretical and research-based context within which the results will be presented and interpreted. Specifically, three areas are addressed: (1) teacher perspective and teacher socialization; (2) teachers' beliefs; and (3) previous efforts to classify social studies teachers' instruction.

Teacher Perspective and Teacher Socialization

My construction of instructional approach (as well as Martorella's conception of perspective) may perhaps be better understood within the context of that body of literature that grew out of (in part) the classic and influential work of Becker, Geer, Hughes, and Strauss (1961)—namely, Boys in White: Student Culture in Medical School—on the development of "perspective" in medical students during their early classroom and clinical training. According to Becker et al., "the term perspective...refer[s] to a co-ordinated set of ideas and actions a person uses in dealing with some problematic situation" (pp. 34-35). While this understanding is somewhat different from my conception of approach, in that I do not, for example, look directly at teacher actions, it may be that instructional approach—normative beliefs—represents one key aspect or element of overall perspective.

A number of recent studies have attempted to apply and extend this notion of perspective to teachers' classroom beliefs and practices. Works by Adler (1984), Goodman and Adler (1985), and Ross (1987, 1988, 1992), for example, have explored the existence and development of "teacher perspectives" among preservice social studies teachers as well as the relationships between instructional ideas (or beliefs) and instructional practices. As Adler (1984) has argued,

the concept of teacher perspectives...captures...ideas, behaviors and contexts...[They] are the meanings and interpretations which teachers give to their work and their work situations...a kind of operational philosophy developed out of experiences (p. 14).

In a field study of four preservice social studies teachers, Adler (1984) found perspectives that were "dynamic" yet organized around predominant themes, forming, in effect, two broad categories. One
(characterizing two of the students) defined “worthwhile social studies knowledge as that which is personally meaningful” (p. 25). It emphasized “the importance of children’s personal experiences” (p. 25) and of teaching critical thinking skills—process over product. This perspective advanced a constructivist view of knowledge, an integrated approach to curriculum and instruction, and support for a wide range of teaching-learning techniques. The second (characterizing the other two students) stressed the importance of “scholarly” knowledge and “universal” truth, advancing product (content) over process (skills). Textbooks and formal curriculum materials largely determined content and instruction.

In a follow-up study, Goodman and Adler (1985) identified six such social studies teacher perspectives as “expressed through [student teachers’] beliefs and actions” (p. 7). These were social studies as: (1) “Nonsubject” (p. 7); (2) “Human Relations” (p. 8); (3) “Citizenship” (p. 9); (4) “School Knowledge” (p. 10); (5) “the Great Connection” (p. 11); and (6) “Social Action” (p. 12). In both studies, Adler and Goodman found that social studies teacher perspectives developed as the result of “the interaction of a variety of features” (Adler, 1984, p. 27), external and internal forces, including school/institutional structures, prior beliefs and experiences, specific classroom contingencies, and assumptions about teacher roles.

Ross (1987, 1988, 1992), too, has explored the genesis and evolution of social studies teacher perspectives. He argues that teacher perspectives are formed within a “dialectical model” (Ross, 1987, p. 227) of teacher socialization, one that “focus[es] on the constant interplay between individuals and institutions....[One that] acknowledge[d] the constraints of social structure, while not overlooking the active role individuals play in the construction of their professional identities” (p. 227). For Ross (1987), teacher perspective results out of the interaction between “personal biography” and “social structural variables,” an interaction that occurs by way of any one of “four mechanisms” or “interactive processes” (p. 230). Overall, he asserts that the recent work on perspective development and socialization provides a reconceptualization of the traditional models of how one “becomes” a teacher, challenging the belief that learning to teach involves simply a one-way process directed at “beginning teachers as passive recipients of the culture of teaching” (1992, p.183).

Teachers’ Beliefs

Teacher beliefs have attracted wide interest among contemporary educational scholars. This is especially important given this investigation’s focus upon a normative belief-based construct. In general, the literature on teachers’ beliefs converges around four critical themes: (1) the nature of beliefs; (2) theoretical belief-practice models;
(3) beliefs and teachers’ cognitive processes; and (4) empirical belief-practice findings.

Abelson (1986), for example, has characterized beliefs as “possessions” and described their value primarily on the basis of “functionality” and “attributes.” Others have related teacher beliefs to teacher practices generally, finding relationships, for instance, between beliefs and changes in teacher practice (Tobin, 1990), beliefs and how teachers practice (Nespor, 1987), and beliefs and the success or failure of formal efforts to reform teacher practice (Eisenhart, Shrum, Harding, & Cuthbert, 1988). Still others have emphasized the essence and importance of teachers’ cognitive processes (i.e., beliefs as well as modes of thinking, judgment, planning, and decision making), suggesting that such cognitive processes influence teaching practice (and vice versa) in terms of what behaviors teachers choose to exhibit, how they predict student achievement, how they select and implement instructional methods, and how they lesson plan (Clark & Peterson, 1986; Clark & Yinger, 1977; Peterson & Clark, 1978). Further, some studies have found significant empirical relationships between teacher beliefs and student achievement—more specifically, whether teachers credit themselves or students for student “successes” and “failures” (e.g., Ames, 1975; Brandt, Hayden, & Brophy, 1975; Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). In the social studies, important work on teachers’ beliefs has been conducted by Thornton (1988, 1992). He observed several significant connections between instructional beliefs and instructional practices, including, for example, a connection between holistic beliefs about content coverage, children’s understanding, and content knowledge and teachers’ range and implementation of various “curriculum-instructional choices” (Thornton, 1992). Further, he demonstrated that conflicts between teachers’ aims and their detailed lesson plans and between their personal intentions and the intentions of schools and districts could influence “curriculum consonance” and thus affect the actual or realized classroom experiences of students (Thornton, 1988).

In sum, this literature indicates clear links between teachers’ beliefs and various aspects of classroom instruction. It lends support to the relevance and importance of investigating instructional approach via teachers’ normative beliefs.

The Social Studies: Classifying Instruction

Several investigators have attempted to test social studies teachers’ instructional preferences empirically. Here I present an overview of their findings.

Following the original work of Barr, Barth, and Shermis, a number of studies have tried to classify social studies teachers according to purpose, content selection, and method. Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1978) themselves argued that teachers clustered somewhat evenly into six
traditions-based categories (Citizenship Transmission—10%; Social Science—10%; Reflective Inquiry—20%; Citizenship Transmission/Reflective Inquiry—10%; Social Science/Reflective Inquiry—20%; and Citizenship Transmission/ Social Science/Reflective Inquiry—30%). In a well known validation study of the “Barth-Shermis Social Studies Preference Scale,” White (1982), however, observed that very few subjects could be classified into either one tradition or the other. Overwhelmingly, they supported some combination of traditions, with the largest group (81%) sharing affinity with all three traditions and the second largest (14%) with a social science-reflective inquiry complex. From his evidence, White concluded that with respect to the Barr, Barth, and Shermis framework, there were probably two approaches and not three at work. He asserted that the social science-reflective inquiry distinction was likely false, and represented perhaps “one idea, rather than two, in the minds of the respondents” (p. 15).

Brubaker, Simon, and Williams (1977) provided an alternative to the Martorella/Barr, Barth, and Shermis framework (although they clearly overlap). Building upon Brubaker’s own previous work, as well as on that of Barth and Shermis (1970), they constructed a “five-camp model for analyzing social studies curriculum and instruction” (Brubaker et al., 1977, p. 201) organized around questions dealing with citizenship education, assumptions about students’ intellectual and social maturity, content selection, content utilization, and student evaluation. The five approaches are social studies: “(1) as knowledge of the past as a guide to good citizenship; (2) in the student-centered tradition; (3) as reflective inquiry; (4) as structure of the disciplines; [and] (5) as socio-political involvement” (Brubaker et al., 1977, p. 201).

Although Brubaker et al. argued that most teachers probably followed some combination of instructional approaches, they suggested also that each would operate from some deep and singular conception of social education (in terms of, for example, characteristic beliefs and underlying notions of “good” teaching).

In a study based on the Brubaker et al. framework, Morrissett (1977) surveyed 440 social studies teachers in order to determine their preferred instructional approaches, their beliefs about the preferred approaches of their colleagues, and their opinions about the most commonly practiced approaches of the national population of social studies teachers. He found that most respondents reported “critical thinking” (i.e., “social studies as reflective inquiry”) as their individual approach. They indicated their general belief, however, that “history” (i.e., “social studies as knowledge of the past as a guide to good citizenship”) best described the field overall. In fact, in all three instances, the critical thinking, history, and social science (i.e., “social studies as structure of the disciplines”) approaches to instruction ranked as the three most frequently offered responses. Morrissett’s findings implied
some substantial level of instructional homogeneity among social studies teachers in the United States. "Experience" (i.e., "social studies in the student-centered tradition") and (socio-political) "involvement" appeared infrequently.

In a recent national study of social studies teachers' perspectives on citizenship education, Anderson, Avery, Pederson, Smith, and Sullivan (1997) found broader agreement with and support for what they identified as "the somewhat more liberal perspectives—critical thinking and cultural pluralism" (p. 352)—than they found with the somewhat more conservative perspectives of "legalism" and "assimilationism." Further, they observed significant relationships between citizenship perspectives and certain teacher characteristics (e.g., religion, region of residence).

Overall, these findings provide an empirically-based context within which to interpret the results of this study and are addressed comparatively in the "Discussion."

Categories of Instructional Approach: The Framework

The work of Martorella provides one standard, literature-based framework from which to conceptualize, understand, and engage the field of social studies education, one which extends the work of Barr, Barth, and Shermis and emphasizes the central, organizing role of "citizenship." It served as the foundation upon which I constructed the classification framework for this study. From this viewpoint, five instructional approaches (Martorella’s "perspectives") exist, each based upon a particular view of purpose, content selection, and teaching method. The goal of this section is to explain and re-explicate each of the five positions in terms of defining citizenship education and in terms of purpose, content selection, and method.

Citizenship Transmission

Martorella’s first perspective, social studies as citizenship transmission, builds upon the initial traditions work of Barr, Barth, and Shermis. Here, the purpose of social studies education is the acquisition by students of certain "American" or "democratic" values vis-à-vis the teaching and learning of discrete, factual pieces of information drawn primarily from the "canon" of Western thought and culture (i.e., European and American history, literature, the arts, philosophy). Content is based on the beliefs that (1) certain factual information is important to the practice of good citizenship; (2) the nature of this information remains relatively constant over time; and (3) this information is best determined by a consensus of authorities or experts. Teachers operating from this perspective utilize two principal instructional methods: description and persuasion. Description is used for content that
teachers believed is of intrinsic importance, information that should be transmitted directly without interpretation. An example might be the year “1776.”

Persuasion is used with knowledge that teachers perceive to be open to multiple understandings when they wish to convince students that only one is “correct” or “true” (e.g., capitalism is the best economic system). Today, this approach is perhaps most strongly advocated by the wave of conservative educational critics who attained prominence and held influence during the Reagan and Bush administrations (e.g., Adler, 1982; Bennett, 1989, 1992; Bloom, 1987; Hirsch, 1987; Ravitch & Finn, 1987).

Much of the scholarship based upon this tradition rests on the assumption that American society represents a relatively homogeneous culture rooted in the history, literature, and philosophy of Western civilization (Bennett, 1989, 1992; Bloom, 1987). A certain content (Adler, 1982; Hirsch, 1987; Ravitch & Finn, 1987) built from specified facts and ideas developed within the “great works” of Western authors, coupled with teaching techniques designed to promote factual memorization (e.g., Hirsch, 1987, 1996) and critical understanding (e.g., Adler, 1982), work to enhance certain educational purposes, including communication skills (Hirsch, 1987), thinking skills (Adler, 1982), and character (i.e., “shared” American values such as “honesty, fairness, self-discipline, fidelity to task, friends, and family, personal responsibility, love of country, and belief in the principles of liberty, equality, and the freedom to practice one’s faith” [Bennett, 1992, p. 58]).

From this perspective, diversity of experience and multiculturalism are downplayed or ignored (even actively challenged). Cultural and social unity are proclaimed and praised. In curricula, history and literature dominate over learner interests, the social sciences, social criticism, and self-growth/personal development.

Social Science

The second tradition—social studies as social science—evolved out of the broad philosophical and academic movement known as “structuralism.” Extending in range across all fields and disciplines, its influence on scholarship continues even in today’s intellectual climate of various poststructural and postmodern perspectives. Simply, structuralism presents a theoretical and methodological means for understanding the “human sciences.” It suggests that the meaning of any given social phenomenon rests upon a study of its underlying system of relatively stable, constructed, ordered, universal, and functional signs, elements, and activities. From this viewpoint, each academic discipline can be considered in terms of its own distinct, unique, ontological “structure” of concepts, theories, and modes of inquiry. In education, this idea was most widely and successfully advanced by Jerome
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Bruner (1969a, 1969b) and Joseph Schwab (1969); it formed the basis for what became known as the "new" social studies (see, e.g., Fenton, 1966; Massialas, 1992), a classic, archetypal example of which remains the curriculum project Man: A Course of Study (e.g., Bruner, 1969a).

As one of Martorella’s perspectives, the social science approach draws principally from the work of Barr, Barth, and Shermis. As with citizenship transmission, it sets citizenship education as the central focus of and for the social studies. According to Martorella (1996), citizenship education here means “Mastering social science concepts, generalizations, and processes to build a knowledge base for later learning” (p. 20). Purpose within this tradition develops out of an understanding that “Citizenship is best promoted by decision making based on mastery of social science concepts, processes, and problems” (Barr, Barth, & Shermis, 1977, p. 67). Advocates of this position argue that the skills, knowledge, attitudes, and tools of social scientists are appropriate for social studies programs and, directly and indirectly, for effective citizenship. From the social science viewpoint, social studies education is that which provides students with the social scientific content and procedures necessary for successful citizenship, and for understanding and acting upon the human condition in its historical, contemporary, political, social, economic, and cultural contexts (e.g., Bruner, 1969a; Feldman & Seifman, 1969; Massialas, 1992; Michaelis & Johnston, 1965; Wesley & Wronski, 1964; Wronski & Bragaw, 1986).

With respect to content, Barr, Barth, and Shermis maintain that teachers working from within this tradition present students with the inherent structure of the individual social science disciplines. Content, then, involves both the modes of inquiry utilized by social scientists and the problems, facts, concepts, generalizations, and theories that define their particular disciplines (Feldman & Seifman, 1969; Fenton, 1966; Morrissett, 1967).

In terms of instruction, Bruner (1969a) suggested a theoretical framework based upon the “optimal structure [italics added] of [disciplinary] knowledge” (p. 259), arguing that teachers and administrators should organize matters of teaching and curriculum toward the structuralist goals of “economy,” “productiveness,” and “power” (p. 257). In general, instructional methods include those that develop within learners the characteristics of “real” social scientists, characteristics indicative of conceptual understandings as well as modes of strategic inquiry (e.g., an anthropology course might focus conceptually on “culture” and methodologically on “ethnography”).

Recently, some social studies scholars have moved away from the more traditional social studies as social science approach to disciplinary structure (i.e., the structure of the disciplines approach “proper” versus other “competing” approaches) and toward increasingly complex interrogations of the importance of particular and individual con-
struictions of the specific social disciplines. From this newer perspective, academics, teachers, and students all have some understanding of the structure of the various social sciences that relates to how they produce, use, and disseminate disciplinary knowledge. This idea of disciplinary perspective cuts across instructional approach; individual disciplinary conceptualizations influence all individual modes of teaching and learning. Here, it is impossible to teach according to any other approach without simultaneously maintaining some structural comprehension of the knowledge and modes of inquiry of the academic disciplines. There are, however, multiple and dynamic possibilities so that teachers and students may each possess a unique orientation. Within the social studies, much of this contemporary work has focused upon history education, and has emphasized multiple, complex instructional approaches, constructivist understandings of meaning, text, and historical sense-making, and interdisciplinary conceptions of content.

VanSledright (1997), for example, explored historical understanding in terms of how two teachers addressed the "depth-breadth dilemma in teaching American history" (p. 38). He concluded that "[p]ursuing depth in historical study appears to be a worthwhile goal...[and] that there may be a variety of ways to accomplish it" (p. 41), including approaches rooted in pure chronology and those rooted in interrelated concepts and themes. His concern was not with how academic historians produce and interpret historical knowledge, but with how teachers understand history (in a sense, the structure of history) and with how they deal with the everyday problematics and demands of curriculum and instruction.

Wilson and Wineburg (1988; Wineburg, 1991) explored the relationships among conceptualizations of history, history instruction, and historical problem solving. They found that for preservice teachers undergraduate major influenced understandings of the disciplinary structure of history, and that these understandings were linked with classroom instruction in terms of goals, methods, and content (Wilson & Wineburg, 1988). Wineburg (1991) concluded that high school history students (even those with a great deal of prior historical knowledge) solved historical problems less effectively than professional historians because, in part, of their less sophisticated "heuristics" (p. 77) for understanding history as a discipline.

Seixas (1993a, 1993b) has explored academic historians and history teachers as representing different "communities of inquiry" with different connections to historical knowledge (based in part on conceptions of "audience"; see Seixas, 1993a). He argues that while there are similarities between the historical knowledge of teachers and historians and between developments in academic history and social studies curriculum and instruction, teachers and historians often are ex-
cluded from each other’s community of inquiry. For Seixas (1993a), teachers function as conduits between two communities, academic historians and social studies students. He (1993a, 1993b) concludes that history education in classrooms might improve to the extent that teachers and historians develop more inclusive images of their relationship to historical knowledge and to one another.

Overall, the social studies as social science perspective presents two approaches to the social studies, one traditional and one more recent. While this study drew primarily from the more traditional view, the work of VanSledright, Wilson, Wineburg, and Seixas (among others) presents a challenging, dynamic avenue open for further investigation.6

Reflective Inquiry

The third tradition or approach—what Martorella and Barr, Barth, and Shermis identify as social studies as reflective inquiry—developed originally out of the work of John Dewey, especially that which focused on the psychology and philosophy of thinking and learning. From this position, citizenship remains the core of the social studies. But unlike citizenship transmission, in which citizenship rests on the acquisition of pre-established values and content, or social science, where citizenship involves primarily the inherent conceptual and syntactic structures of the individual social disciplines, citizenship here stresses problem solving, or meaningful “decision making in a socio-political context” (Barr, Barth, & Shermis, 1977, p. 64).

The purpose of social studies education is nurturing within students those abilities necessary for decision making in some specified socio-political context (e.g., liberal democratic capitalism), especially with respect to social and personal problems that directly affect individual students within the US as they engage American democracy.7 The key assumption behind this link between decision making and democracy is that within the American socio-political system significant problems rarely imply a single, overt, “correct” solution. Such problems frequently require decisions between several perceived “good” solutions or several perceived “bad” solutions. Democracy thus necessitates a citizenry capable of and competent in the identification of problems, the collection, evaluation, and analysis of data, and the making of reasoned decisions.

This viewpoint has at its center a purpose in which democracy and “reflective thinking” are linked via the processes of education. For Dewey (1933), reflective thinking must be a purpose of democratic education because it: “(1) makes possible action with a conscious aim; (2) makes possible systematic preparations and inventions; [and] (3) enriches things with meanings” (pp. 17-19).
Content includes both meaningful social and individual problems and the information that emerges as relevant to and useful for their subsequent solutions (i.e., “data,” defined as “anything needed to solve a [reflective] problem”; Barth & Shermis, 1970, p. 750). Yet some disagreement exists over the nature of such problems, for example whether they should be student or teacher identified. Some advocates of this approach argue that “A problem is not one because it is designated as such by teachers ...[but] because students identify it as such...” (Barr, Barth, & Shermis, 1977, p. 65). Others contend that teachers should determine the reflective problem, following, for example, Hunt and Metcalf’s (1968) notion that educators should guide students through an exploration of society’s “closed areas” (e.g., “issues related to sex, religion, race and ethnicity, economics, and politics”; Martorella, 1996, p. 16) as problematic. For Dewey (1933), meaning lay principally in a problem’s “power to start and direct significant inquiry and reflection” (p. 47).

According to Dewey (1956), school content or subject matter should be fluid, a “continuous reconstruction, moving from the child’s present experience out into that represented by the organized bodies of truths that we call studies” (p. 11). It should consider “present situations where problems are relevant to the problems of living together” (Dewey, 1916/1966, p. 192). It should not be an end in and of itself, but an inducement to the continuing processes of thought, of meaningful reflective thinking (Dewey, 1916/1966, 1933). The reflective problem is critical. It “is a two-pronged affair: it points outward to objective, empirical phenomena, and it points inward to perceived feelings and values and private outlooks. It is both a social and a personal problem...tied in with the concept of needs and interests” (Barr, Barth, & Shermis, 1977, p. 66).

Within this tradition, the method of social studies instruction is the method of reflective thinking. It “is the process of making decisions and encouraging students to analyze what is involved in a decision. The purpose of the reflective inquiry position mandates a methodology (or multiple methodologies) in which students are taught all of the skills involved in decision making” (Barr, Barth, & Shermis, 1977, p. 65).

Dewey’s work on democratic reflective thinking led to the evolution of a powerful pragmatic theory of education, prominent during the early to middle post-World War II period (yet still influential), spearheaded generally by theorists such as Bode (1940), Bayles (e.g., 1950), and Hullfish and Smith (1961), and in social education by Engle (e.g., 1987) and Hunt and Metcalf (1968). By carrying forward Dewey’s legacy, they and others offered social educators an alternative to the new social studies and to “back to basics” movements: reflective decision
making centered upon closed areas representing a precise time and place—problem solving within a specific socio-political context.

Informed Social Criticism

Martorella’s fourth perspective—social studies as informed social criticism—developed out of Engle’s (1977) critical response to the original Barr, Barth, and Shermis framework. As Martorella (1996) notes, he “created” the category of “social studies taught as informed social criticism by drawing [specifically] on the...analysis of Engle (1977)” (p. 19). This approach is rooted, however, in the early work of “social reconstructionists” (e.g., Brameld, 1956; Counts, 1932) and related to the more recent work of “socialization-countersocialization” theorists (Engle & Ochoa, 1988) and “critical pedagogues” (e.g., Kanpol, 1994; McLaren, 1998). The contemporary literature addresses primarily such themes as the “hidden curriculum,” socio-cultural transformation, and the nature and meaning of knowledge and truth. The work of Nelson (e.g., 1985, 1990; Nelson & Ochoa, 1987; Stanley & Nelson, 1986), perhaps, best represents the current status of this tradition.

From this standpoint, the purpose of the social studies is citizenship education aimed at “providing [students] opportunities for an examination, critique, and revision of past traditions, existing social practices, and modes of problem solving” (Martorella, 1996, p. 20). It is a citizenship education directed toward:

Social transformation [as] defined as the continuing improvement of...society by applying social criticism and ethical decision making to social issues, and using the values of justice and equality as grounds for assessing the direction of social change that should be pursued. (Stanley & Nelson, 1986, p. 530)

Content here consists of that which challenges the injustices of the social status quo. It counters knowledge that is: (1) generated by and supportive of society’s elites; (2) rooted in rationalistic and oppressive forms of logical positivism (e.g., Apple, 1993; McLaren, 1998; Shor & Freire, 1987); and (3) consistent with “social reproduction” and the replication of a society that is classist, sexist, and racist. While it is specific to individual classrooms and students, it can include, for example, “[r]edressing the needs of the disadvantaged, increasing human rights conditions and stimulating environmental improvements [as]...possible foci” (Stanley & Nelson, 1986, p. 528). Teachers and students may claim, further, their own knowledge—their content, their individual and cultural experiences—as legitimate.
Instructional methods are situational, but include such processes as “reflective teaching” (Gore, 1993) and the “dialogical method” (Shor & Freire, 1987), socio-cultural criticism, textual analysis/deconstruction, problem solving, critical thinking, and social action (e.g., Stanley & Nelson, 1986). The orientation is away from lecture and information transmission and toward challenging traditional forms of knowledge, legitimizing socio-culturally constructed knowledges, and detecting hidden forms of domination/oppression within that knowledge that is “officially” sanctioned by schools and powerful interests (i.e., traditional curricula; see Giroux, 1988; Stanley & Nelson, 1986).

Personal Development

Martorella’s fifth perspective—social studies as personal development—grew out of the initial work of Nelson and Michaelis (1980). Focusing on the role of citizenship education, this position reflects the belief that “Citizenship education should consist of developing a positive self-concept, and a strong sense of personal efficacy” (Martorella, 1996, p. 20) within students. It is an approach grounded in the idea that effective democratic citizenship involves understanding one’s freedom to make choices as well as one’s obligation and responsibility to live with their outcomes (i.e., “authenticity”; Fenstermacher & Soltis, 1992, p. 27). In a sense, it is related to what Fenstermacher and Soltis (1992) labeled the “therapist” approach, what Brubaker et al. (1977) defined as “social studies in the student-centered tradition,” and what Joyce and Weil (1992) identified as the “personal family” of instruction.

Content here is selected and pursued by students themselves. It is embedded in the “nature, needs, and interests” (Brubaker et al., 1977, p. 203) of the learners. It is that which helps students attribute and construct meaning to and out of their individual and personal experiences. It may include, for example, material chosen from the arts and humanities (e.g., film, literature, music) to the extent that these offer students the opportunity to: (1) search for personal meaning within their own experiences; and (2) challenge creative works in ways that involve critiquing decision outcomes and alternative choice options, especially as they relate to understandings of character and values.

Instructional methods are “shared” between teachers and students, but include such techniques as Kilpatrick’s “project method,” various forms of individualized instruction, and the Socratic method of recitation-directed dialogue. The teacher fulfills the role of guide, assistant, and/or facilitator of learning.

Overall, this approach evolved out of the progressive education movement of the early 20th century, and out of the types of humanistic psychology (e.g., Maslow, Rogers) and existential philosophy (e.g., Sartre) that have been popular in education since at least the 1960s. Its
best known contemporary advocates include Maxine Greene, John Holt, William Glasser, and Nel Noddings (Fenstermacher & Soltis, 1992; Joyce & Weil, 1992).  

Method

This investigation utilized the procedures of quantitative survey research. Data were collected via a mailed questionnaire distributed to a random sample of American high school social studies teachers holding membership in the NCSS. This section focuses specifically upon two major components of survey design and implementation: (1) the research procedure and (2) validity and reliability.

The Research Procedure

The purpose of this section is to address specific aspects of the survey procedure, including: (1) questionnaire construction; (2) the research sample; (3) implementation; and (4) data analysis.

Questionnaire construction. The questionnaire was constructed primarily out of content drawn from the work of Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977; Barth & Shermis, 1970), Martorella (1996), and Nelson and Michaelis (1980). It solicited answers to a series of closed, forced-response items and followed a standard, Likert-type format. It was arranged into two independent sections. A quantitative procedure was used in order to: (1) facilitate comparisons with previous findings and across a variety of related quantitative studies; (2) accommodate data collected from a large sample; (3) expedite drawing tentative conclusions about the contemporary field of social studies education broadly; and (4) promote replication studies and further comparative analysis. (As I address in the "Discussion," qualitative studies into the issues I explore would be invaluable and encouraged.)

Part I requested information relevant to instruction in terms of specific purposes, modes of content selection, and teaching methods. It included 30 randomly arranged statements for which the response options ranged from 1 ("Strongly Disagree") to 5 ("Strongly Agree"). The overall purpose of Part I was to elicit data that would enable the classification of individual instructional approaches in terms of the Martorella framework. Part I served as the mechanism by which individual calculated instructional approach categories were assigned (see "Data Analysis"). Each instructional approach was broken down into a series of six representative items: two for purpose(s), two for mode(s) of content selection, and two for teaching method(s). Table 1 presents a breakdown of Part I of the questionnaire with respect to each response statement.
Part II consisted of five statements, each providing the same response choices as the items in Part I. Here, however, the purpose was to provide an overall characterization of each individual instructional approach. The specific breakdown was: Item #31—Citizenship Transmission; Item #32—Social Science; Item #33—Reflective Inquiry; Item #34—Informed Social Criticism; and Item #35—Personal Development. Part II concluded by asking the participants to select from among the five the one item with which they most strongly agreed. This section provided a balance to Part I and served as the means by which the selected instructional approach variable scores were assigned (see "Data Analysis").

Both parts of the questionnaire were based on "exemplars" or statements emblematic of the five instructional approaches of interest (see Appendix). They were intended to reflect accurately the spirit and integrity of the proposed model.

Table 1
Breakdown of Part I of the Questionnaire by Response Item

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instructional Approach</th>
<th>Citizenship Transmission</th>
<th>Social Science</th>
<th>Reflective Inquiry</th>
<th>Social Criticism</th>
<th>Personal Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose(s)</td>
<td>Item #29</td>
<td>Item #20</td>
<td>Item #7</td>
<td>Item #5</td>
<td>Item #19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Item #30</td>
<td>Item #9</td>
<td>Item #27</td>
<td>Item #18</td>
<td>Item #22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode(s) of Content Selection</td>
<td>Item #10</td>
<td>Item #17</td>
<td>Item #15</td>
<td>Item #2</td>
<td>Item #1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Item #28</td>
<td>Item #23</td>
<td>Item #24</td>
<td>Item #16</td>
<td>Item #26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching Methods</td>
<td>Item #4</td>
<td>Item #8</td>
<td>Item #3</td>
<td>Item #1</td>
<td>Item #14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Item #25</td>
<td>Item #13</td>
<td>Item #6</td>
<td>Item #12</td>
<td>Item #21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sample. The research sample included 500 subjects randomly selected from a representative set of 1000 high school social studies teachers holding membership in the NCSS (from a mailing list that was randomized by subjects' zip codes). Although no other demographic data were requested (in part to ensure confidentiality, anonymity, and an acceptable response rate), the sampling techniques support the assumption that the subjects are representative of the population of high school social studies teachers who belong to the NCSS. Of the initial 1000, 2 names were removed because of direct professional relationships with the researcher, as were the names of those who participated in the pilot study. Of the selected 500, 10 voluntarily left the study because they no longer taught high school social studies. The final
sample included 490 participants, of whom 220 (45%) chose to take part in the study.\textsuperscript{11}

\textit{Implementation.} Initially, the questionnaire and a cover letter were mailed to each of the research subjects. They were provided four weeks to complete and return their responses. At the conclusion of this period, follow-up letters were mailed, encouraging those subjects who had not yet responded to do so. Lastly, the elicited data were organized and the results tabulated.

\textit{Data analysis.} The first phase of analysis involved entering raw data into a computer file. These data included for each participant an ID number (random and consecutive, ranging from 1 to 500) and his or her responses to each response item.

Second, each subject was assigned a corresponding calculated instructional approach. These determinations were based upon the participants' mean scores for each instructional approach category. Scores were calculated as the summed scores on the appropriate approach questions divided by 6, the total number of relevant items,\textsuperscript{12} (Table 1 indicates the question numbers included in the determination of individual calculated instructional approach categories.) The assigned calculated instructional approach category for each individual was that receiving the highest overall mean score. Ties were classified as "other."

Specific calculated scores were: 1—citizenship transmission; 2—social science; 3—reflective inquiry; 4—informed social criticism; 5—personal development; and 6—other. A crosstabulation analysis provided frequency (n, observed %) and category distribution ($\chi^2$, p, df) information (see "Results").

Identical and independent analyses were run on the selected instructional approach data. Selected instructional approach was defined as the subjects' responses to the question: "With which of the statements above do you most strongly agree? (Please circle one [1].)" Here, this question referred specifically to items 31 through 35, representing, respectively, the citizenship transmission, social science, reflective inquiry, informed social criticism, and personal development approaches. Means and standard deviations were calculated for each of these five statements (see "Results").

\textbf{Validity and Reliability}

\textit{Validity.} Validity was determined according to a number of interpretive and statistical procedures performed via a pilot study. A number of experts (five university professors with specialties in social studies education, curriculum, teacher education, and social theory) reviewed the questionnaire with respect to its clarity and its appropriateness (i.e., whether it sought responses reasonably assumed to be within the knowledge realm of high school social studies teachers—
e.g., opinions regarding instructional purpose, content, and method). In addition, the questionnaire included multiple approach categories and multiple response items within each category. It solicited no intimate, potentially threatening information and ensured confidentiality.

Several quantitative techniques further suggested at least a moderate level of validity. First, a series of within category correlations were calculated for each instructional approach, indicating a relatively modest degree of validity (with correlations ranging from -.0410, \( p=.830 \) [between the citizenship transmission items #29 & #30] to .7089, \( p<.0001 \) [between the social science items #8 & #20]; the grand mean across all 5 categories was .2742). Next, a simultaneous crosstabulation procedure was performed on calculated and selected instructional approach categories. The results demonstrated a dependent relationship between the variables; that is, an association existed between calculated and selected instructional approach (\( \chi^2 [20, N = 30] = 39.13, p<.01 \)). Lastly, a discriminant analysis indicated that selected instructional approach correctly predicted calculated instructional approach for 73.33% of the pilot sample (a relatively strong indication of validity). My points more precisely are that (1) evidence suggested that the items within each category measured similar or related constructs ("content validity") and (2) that two approach measures—calculated and selected—were relatively consistent across the sample ("cross validity").

**Reliability.** The questionnaire appeared to be at least moderately reliable. First, test-retest reliability coefficients were calculated for both selected and calculated approach categories across the two pilot administrations. As a proportion of the participants assigned identical classifications over both pilot applications (for the 16 pilot subjects who responded both times), the overall test-retest reliability correlations were \( r_{XX} = .56 \) for selected instructional approach and \( r_{XX} = .50 \) for calculated instruction approach. When the data for the category of "other" were included this correlation increased to .69. A third set of test-retest statistics was calculated individually for response items 31 through 35 and suggested, again, a moderate level of reliability (with correlations ranging from .40, \( p=.13 \) [for #34, informed social criticism] to .57, \( p<.05 \) [#31, citizenship transmission]). Additionally, crosstabulation procedures for both selected and calculated instructional approach categories suggested a dependent relationship across the two pilot applications; that is, the results implied a reasonable degree of reliability (for selected—\( \chi^2 [16, N = 16] = 30.37, p<.05 \); for calculated—\( \chi^2 [20, N = 16] = 35.00, p<.05 \)).

Overall, the questionnaire appeared at least moderately reliable. The pilot subjects reported few questions as unclear or vague and suggested that the questionnaire captured their beliefs relatively well. The directions and the quantitative format of the instrument assisted in that the respondents knew clearly what types of answers were expected.
from them. The statistical measures also provided some further level of confidence in the general reliability of the questionnaire.

**Results**

The collected data yielded a number of significant findings. They offered insights into the present state of secondary social studies instruction and how it is perceived by frontline educators. The purpose of this section is to present the findings relative to calculated and selected instructional approach and to their interrelationships.

**Calculated Instructional Approach**

Table 2 provides the mean responses and standard deviations for each questionnaire item included in the calculated instructional approach statistics. While the means ranged, generally, from 3 to 4, the data demonstrate a clear distinction, one representing a notably higher level of agreement with some statements than with others. Table 3 presents the frequency breakdown by category: citizenship transmission (9.5%), social science (3.6%), reflective inquiry (23.6%), informed social criticism (24.5%), personal development (15.0%), and other (23.6%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item#</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Item#</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, the data indicate that the observed category distribution is statistically significant and not due simply to chance, $\chi^2 (5, N = 220) = 50.49, p<.001$. From Table 3, it appears that the $\chi^2$ findings are primarily the result of an extremely, unexpectedly low observed
frequency count for social science, and extremely, unexpectedly high observed frequency counts for informed social criticism and reflective inquiry. Table 3 shows too, however, a large category of other.\textsuperscript{13}

A closer analysis of this category suggests, of course, that a large proportion (23.6\%) of the respondents agreed equally strongly (or identified) with more than one instructional approach. The largest number (15 or 28.8\% of this category) agreed equally and most strongly with reflective inquiry and informed social criticism, the next largest with reflective inquiry and personal development (10 or 19.2\%), and the third largest with informed social criticism and personal development (8 or 15.4\%). Overall, the participants empirically classed as other agreed more strongly with reflective inquiry, informed social criticism, and personal development than with citizenship transmission or social science. Of the 52 classified as other, 35 agreed most strongly with informed social criticism and another category(ies), 32 with reflective inquiry and another category(ies), 31 with personal development and another category(ies), 9 with social science and another category(ies), and 8 with citizenship transmission and another category(ies).

\textbf{Table 3}
\textit{\chi^2} Table for Calculated Instructional Approach Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Observed Frequency</th>
<th>Expected Frequency</th>
<th>Observed Percent</th>
<th>Residual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship Transmission</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36.67</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>-15.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>36.76</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>-28.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflective Inquiry</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>36.67</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>15.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Criticism</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>36.67</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>17.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Development</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36.67</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>-3.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>36.67</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>15.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>220.02</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(\chi^2=50.49\) \(df=5\) \(p<.0001\) \(N=220\)

Taken together, these results support informed social criticism as the preferred calculated instructional approach among the participants. Further, they uphold reflective inquiry and personal development as
strong secondary instructional approaches. The results testify, however, to the rather impressive extent to which American high school social studies teachers share attributes and beliefs which embody more than one traditional approach or which, perhaps, transcend the boundaries implied by the framework.

**Selected Instructional Approach**

As described, selected instructional approach categories were assigned based on the participants' level of agreement with a series of exemplar, overall instructional approach statements. Consistent with the findings for calculated instructional approach, the three statements with which the subjects most strongly agreed were personal development (#35, $M = 0.04$, $SD = 0.95$), reflective inquiry (#33, $M = 3.91$, $SD = 0.94$), and informed social criticism (#34, $M = 3.76$, $SD = 1.04$), while the statements with which the subjects least strongly agreed were citizenship transmission (#31, $M = 3.30$, $SD = 1.13$) and social science (#32, $M = 3.36$, $SD = 0.91$). When asked to select from the exemplars the single statement with which they most strongly agreed, the respondents overwhelming chose reflective inquiry (58 or 26.4%), personal development (57 or 25.9%), and informed social criticism (42 or 19.1%). As with calculated approach, these data indicate a distinction in agreement and support between reflective inquiry, informed social criticism, and personal development on the one hand, and citizenship transmission and social science on the other.

**Instructional Approach: Interrelationships**

Table 4 presents crosstabulation statistics for the calculated and selected instructional approach categories. These figures indicate a statistically significant relationship between the two. That is, there are differences between the joint observed and expected cell frequencies that cannot be explained simply by chance, thereby suggesting some degree of linkage between one's calculated and selected instructional approaches. Overall, the largest observed frequencies are for those cells in which both calculated and selected scores are some combination of reflective inquiry, informed social criticism, and/or personal development, thus lending further support to the findings identified above (e.g., in the cell where both calculated instructional approach and selected instructional approach equals 3 [reflective inquiry] the observed cell frequency is 19 while the expected cell frequency is 13.7). Again, the number of participants scored as other demonstrates some level of inter-approach overlap. One interesting exception is the strong relationship between the selected and calculated approach categories of citizenship transmission. Although impossible to determine from the data, this may imply the degree of strength with which the respondents who support this approach hold their beliefs. That is, their support of citi-
zenship transmission may be deeper and more solid than the support of those subjects aligned with the other approaches. Either way, this finding seems to account for a great deal of the observed \( \chi^2 \) statistic.

**Table 4**

*Crosstabulation: Calculated and Selected Instructional Approach Categories*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calculated Instructional Approach (Rows)</th>
<th>Selected Instructional Approach (Columns)</th>
<th>Row Totals (Observed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (Observed)</td>
<td>14 0 2 3 2 0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Expected)</td>
<td>2.8 2.3 5.5 4.0 5.4 1.0</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (Observed)</td>
<td>2 3 1 0 2 0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Expected)</td>
<td>1.1 0.9 2.1 1.5 2.1 0.4</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (Observed)</td>
<td>2 6 19 8 16 1</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Expected)</td>
<td>6.9 5.7 13.7 9.9 13.5 2.4</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 (Observed)</td>
<td>2 4 16 19 11 2</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Expected)</td>
<td>7.1 5.9 14.2 10.3 14.0 2.5</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 (Observed)</td>
<td>3 1 11 2 13 3</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Expected)</td>
<td>4.4 3.6 8.7 6.3 8.6 1.5</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 (Observed)</td>
<td>6 10 9 10 13 4</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Expected)</td>
<td>6.9 5.7 13.7 9.9 13.5 2.4</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Totals (Observed)</td>
<td>29 24 58 42 57 10</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.2% 10.9% 26.4% 19.1% 25.9% 4.5%</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \chi^2 = 97.54 \)  \( df = 25 \)  \( p < .00001 \)  \( N = 220 \)

*Note.* Instructional approach numbers correspond as: (1) Social studies as citizenship transmission; (2) Social studies as social science; (3) Social studies as reflective inquiry; (4) Social studies as informed social criticism; (5) Social studies as personal development; and (6) Other.

**Discussion**

The findings indicate several potentially significant considerations for social studies education and for social educators. The purposes of this section are to: (1) address and interpret the observed results in terms of the related literature, specifically the previous findings of Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1978), White (1982), Morissett (1977), and Ander-
Kevin D. Vinson

son et al. (1997); and (2) propose a number of relevant, and as yet un-tapped avenues for future social studies research.

Previous Findings

The results of this study contradict, or at least challenge, the findings of several previous investigators. Yet while the differences between previous efforts and this one are important, perhaps the real contribution rests upon the extent to which there also exist similarities. In each case, it is essential to look both at the surface level (e.g., the data collection instrument) and at the core (e.g., ontological disputes over definitions).

Again, the present study found a clear distinction in instructional approach, supported by evidence indicating greater affinity for informed social criticism, reflective inquiry, and personal development (on the one hand), and lesser affinity for social science and citizenship transmission (on the other). Further, the calculated approach analysis yielded a large group of subjects agreeing most strongly with more than one category, yet still converging around informed social criticism, reflective inquiry, and personal development. The studies by Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1978) and White (1982) both offered contrary outcomes. Barr, Barth, and Shermis found relatively equal clusters among citizenship transmission, social science, reflective inquiry, and a social science/reflective inquiry hybrid, but they observed the largest frequency data for an overall citizenship transmission/social science/reflective inquiry combination. White observed overwhelming support for various combinations of approaches, with the largest classification being a citizenship transmission/social science/reflective inquiry hybrid and the second largest being a social science/reflective inquiry hybrid. He concluded that the Barr, Barth, and Shermis framework perhaps represented only two distinct traditions.

The differences between and among Barr, Barth, and Shermis, White, and the present study may be understood in several ways. First, and most obviously, both Barr, Barth, and Shermis and White explored only three approaches—the original Barr, Barth, and Shermis traditions—and not five. Second, they were published much earlier than this one, and thus were conducted with survey instruments informed by a different literature and built upon different assumptions than the questionnaire used in this study. Third, they used different research subjects. Not only did the three studies draw unique samples, but they likely did so based upon three distinct populations. It is not unreasonable to assume that the respective populations of high school social studies teachers in the years 1977, 1982, and 1995 were qualitatively unlike one another, and that therefore the results should have been expected to diverge.
Yet all three investigations agree on the popularity of various hybrid perspectives. Based upon the Barr, Barth, and Shermis emphasis on purpose, content selection, and method (here, extended by Martorella), these studies suggest an abundance of instructional eclecticism among social studies teachers. It may be that the reality represents a situation in which there exists a multitude of instructional approaches containing common elements (e.g., the problem solving emphasis of both reflective inquiry and social science). It may simply be that approaches overlap, and that classroom practitioners are pragmatic, not dogmatically tied to any one position, but context-oriented. It may be that the realities of classroom life represent (even necessitate) instruction that is fluid and dynamic, an environment in which the boundaries between and among approaches are much less rigidly defined and clearly distinguishable than those implied by the ideals of traditional models.

The study by Morrissett (1977) utilized the Brubaker et al. framework instead of that of Barr, Barth, and Shermis. He found more agreement with critical thinking, history, and social science than with student-centered experience and socio-political involvement. With the exception of critical thinking (i.e., reflective inquiry), his findings are nearly opposite those observed in this study. Several forces may be at work. First, Morrissett and I relied on different frameworks constructed around different types of questions (although the frameworks clearly overlap). Second, his investigation was published nearly twenty years before this one even began, and thus represented a singular and different educational context, one perhaps incompatible with the contemporary social studies scene. The agreement on critical thinking/reflective inquiry may exemplify the Deweyan roots of the social studies as well as Dewey's continued influence among teacher educators, social education researchers and theorists, and practitioners. The disagreement over the other categories may reflect the importance of historical context. Morrissett's work developed in the wake of the heyday of the "new" social studies and within a climate possibly influenced by the nascent back to basics movements that were to flourish during the 1980s. These conditions may have affected the level of support he found for history and social science. The present study occurred during a period of interest in self-esteem, multiculturalism, constructivism, whole language, and the "whole" child. This could in part explain the higher observed/reported affinity for reflective inquiry, informed social criticism, and personal development.

And yet, the present data also were collected during a period of "conservative restoration" (Apple, 1993, 1996), an era in which a conservative Congress and conservative presidents (Reagan and Bush, obviously, but arguably Clinton) have sought to defund public education, impose national curriculum/testing standards, define schooling
in terms of economic utility (a la *A Nation at Risk*), and organize schools via free enterprise principles and market forces (e.g., recent choice/voucher proposals). Further, and more precisely in terms of curriculum and instruction, this study developed during a period of ideological and applied backlash against progressive educational principles (including those at the foundation of modern social studies education), a time in which reactionary pleas against multiculturalism (e.g., Bennett, 1989, 1992), child-centeredness, “the project method,” and constructivism (e.g., Hirsch, 1996) and in favor of “core knowledge,” “cultural literacy,” and rote learning (e.g., Hirsch, 1987, 1996; Ravitch & Finn, 1987) gained a degree of notoriety, acceptance, and respect. The results of this study might well indicate the extent to which practicing high school social studies teachers have not “bought in” to this right-wing rhetoric—in effect, an “anti-conservative-backlash.”

Newer works, such as that recently published by Anderson et al. (1997), imply the utility of alternate research frameworks and methods. Anderson's overall finding in favor of the perspectives identified as more “liberal” and against those defined as more “conservative” may parallel and support my results demonstrating greater affinity for the potentially more liberal approaches of reflective inquiry, informed social criticism, and personal development. Regardless, both lend empirical evidence to the anti-conservative-backlash hypothesis described above.14

Further, both studies (mine and Anderson’s) call into question the “two cultures” distinction suggested by researchers such as Leming (1989). He argued that teachers and researchers-theorists represented two unique communities separated by a large and defining “gulf.” On the one hand existed practicing teachers with their “real world” and “conservative” interests in “knowledge control,” classroom management, and instilling into their students positive attitudes toward American social, economic, and political institutions. On the other hand existed researchers and theorists espousing a left-wing social, economic, and political progressivist ideology, one committed to the central and interdisciplinary roles of citizenship, socio-political problem solving, and socio-cultural transformation within the theory and practice of social education. Both the present study and that by Anderson suggest (a) that teachers are more “liberal” and less traditional and “conservative” than previously thought and (b) that (if Leming was correct) the philosophical gulf between practitioners and theorists is smaller than once presumed.

Further Research
A great deal of research remains for those interested in the instructional approaches of high school social studies teachers. Most necessary, perhaps, is a broad replication study, following the precise for-
mat of this investigation, in order to further establish and enhance the reliability, validity, and overall utility of the questionnaire.

A second line of investigation might include a series of qualitative studies modeled on the types of questions underlying this study. Such work would allow instructional approach characteristics to emerge from the individual and unique understandings of the participants themselves. Various comparisons could then be made across specific settings. These explorations might examine the extent to which the framework used here adequately portrays the particular perspectives of practicing classroom teachers.

Subsequent studies might focus also on the role played by context. Although such questions were not a significant part of this study, they are nonetheless critical to any further understanding of instructional approach. How does one’s instructional approach relate, for example, to questions of race, gender, socio-economic class, age, religion, region of residence, sexuality, years of teaching experience, college major, grade level and subject matter responsibilities, disciplinary identification, and type of school/district (e.g., middle, high, private, parochial, public, etc.)? How does a teacher’s instructional approach vary according to the characteristics of specific classes or of individual students? Might instructional approach be understood as an issue of power, as the result of a struggle between the beliefs of teachers and the beliefs of others (e.g., administrators) over determining or influencing what goes on in classrooms? What is the influence of school, district, state, and/or national policy?

Another important area of concern involves the extent to which NCSS membership is related to instructional approach. In effect, this is an issue of representativeness: Are there significant differences between high school social studies teachers who are members of the NCSS and those who are not? If so, what is their nature and relevance? Are there key demographic differences? Are there differences in beliefs? Traditionally, in my opinion and experience, the work of the NCSS has been perhaps more in line with and more sympathetic toward reflective inquiry and social science than with, for example, citizenship transmission. Might regular access to NCSS journals (e.g., Social Education, Theory and Research in Social Education) be relevant to one’s approach? How and why? Might it be that NCSS members tend to be more liberal or conservative than high school social studies teachers in general (as Anderson et al. [1997] wonder)? Why? These and similar questions are important to the extent that they provide insights into instructional approach, and to the extent to which they interrogate the NCSS as an influential (or competitive) source relative to the development and maintenance of some specific instructional approach(es).

Other studies might relate approach findings to the related research, for example that dealing with teacher perspective, socializa-
tion, and beliefs. Such work might be especially critical if it could be demonstrated that instructional approaches represent beliefs and perspectives as defined in the literature. For then there is reason to believe that instructional approach is related to instructional practice and thus relevant to understanding teacher actions. Further, if approaches parallel perspectives, then there are even implications in terms of changing practices. If instructional approaches indeed represent teacher perspectives that result from internal-external interactions (e.g., Ross, 1987), then there are questions regarding whether such external forces can effect their desired ends. At heart, what is needed are studies that focus on the relationships between instructional approach and practice and on the mechanisms of instructional approach-practice change.

Lastly, future research might examine other samples, including elementary school teachers and professors of social studies education. Such studies might involve looking for instructional approach consistency across groups. What effect, for example, might a degree of instructional approach dissonance between elementary and secondary educators have on social education? Why? What influences do the instructional approaches of college professors have on those of practitioners? Why? How? Might such influences/differences reflect Leming’s (1989) two cultures? Might they indicate that social studies teachers are more radical and less traditional than some studies have indicated? These and other significant questions related to social studies and instructional approach remain fruitful and may well provide many underexplored opportunities for further investigation and for understanding and improving social education.

Appendix
Exemplar Statements and the Traditions: Purpose, Content, Method

Citizenship Transmission

Purpose: To promote citizenship by instilling in students a standard body of American values and knowledge.
Content: That body of traditional values and knowledge selected and/or mandated by some authority.
Method: Textbook readings, recitation, lecture, question-answer sessions, and guided problem solving.

Social Science

Purpose: To promote citizenship through decision making based on mastering social science concepts and processes.
Content: The structure, concepts, problems, and methods of the social science disciplines.
Method: Methods are unique to each social science (e.g., ethnography in anthropology), and students must learn and apply them in appropriate, discipline-specific situations.
Appendix (Con't)

Reflective Inquiry

_Purpose:_ To promote citizenship by way of inquiry based on what citizens need to know to make decisions and solve problems.

_Content:_ Student-selected, representing individual and social values, needs, interests, perceptions, backgrounds, and circumstances.

_Method:_ Reflective, scientific problem identification and problem solving/decision making.

Informed Social Criticism

_Purpose:_ To promote citizenship by providing opportunities to examine and critique past and present traditions, social practices, and forms of knowledge, especially with respect to cultural, economic, and political injustice/inequality.

_Content:_ Examples of past and present instances of cultural, economic, and political injustice/inequality; ideas, ways of knowing, information, and materials generally marginalized and/or ignored by mainstream society.

_Method:_ Issues analysis, critical thinking, individual/group projects, textual analysis, social constructivist activities, reflective teaching, action research, and dialogue.

Personal Development

_Purpose:_ To promote citizenship by developing in students a positive self-concept, self-esteem, and a strong sense of personal efficacy.

_Content:_ Student-selected based on interest and aptitude; teacher-selected based on student growth and success.

_Method:_ Individualized instruction, differentiated instruction, and alternative assessment.


Notes

I wish to thank Joseph Cirrincione, Martha Geores, Steven Selden, Linda Valli, Thomas Weible, Paula Vinson, and Keri Dunbar for their kind criticism and helpful assistance with this paper. In addition, I wish to acknowledge the insightful comments of E. Wayne Ross and several anonymous reviewers from _TRSE_.

1 I chose Martorella’s (1996) framework over the “original” of Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977; Barth & Shermis, 1970) because it is updated and expanded (i.e., it provides five categories instead of three). My interpretation is that Martorella’s five “perspectives” represent a recent “extension” of Barr et al.’s earlier work. In addition, I acknowledge the difficulty of “knowing” teachers’ interpretations of questionnaire items such as the ones supporting the present study. Such problematics support the need for replication studies (especially regarding the validity and reliability of the questionnaire) as well as for qualitative investigations into social studies teachers’ instructional approaches.
Throughout this paper, I use the term "instructional approach" rather narrowly to refer only to teachers' normative beliefs about purpose, content selection, and teaching method. Following Nisbett and Ross, I use the related term "beliefs" more broadly to mean "reasonably explicit 'propositions' about the characteristics of objects or object classes" (e.g., "teaching," "instructional task," etc.; as cited in Clark & Peterson, 1986, p. 281). Additionally, I use the related term "perspective" either as directly quoted from Martorella (1996) or following Adler (1984) who defines the term to mean "the meanings and interpretations which teachers give to their work and their work situations" (p. 14). As I understand Adler's usage, perspective is a concept that encompasses my definition of instructional approach among other teacher beliefs. Note that in the present study I focus only upon instructional approach as defined.

While these approaches do present and provide unique visions of citizenship education as well as particular insights into questions of purpose, content selection, and teaching method/strategy, Martorella (1996) issues an important caution with which I concur: "These five perspectives certainly do not [italics added] exhaust all of the possible classifications. Furthermore, none of the alternative categories that have been outlined completely avoids overlap among the others" (p. 19). Note, further, that I maintain two additional assumptions throughout this paper. First, I agree with and accept Cherryholmes' (1993) position on the importance of alternative readings of "traditional" research, and thus encourage applying such "pragmatic" interpretations to this work; my own views, in fact, remain most consistent with his "critical," "feminist," and "deconstructive" approaches. Second, I assume with Shulman (1986) that:

there is no "real world" of the classroom, of learning and of teaching. There are many such worlds, perhaps nested within one another, perhaps occupying parallel universes which frequently, albeit unpredictably, intrude on one another. Each of these worlds is occupied by the same people, but in different roles and striving for different purposes simultaneously...Each has its own set of concepts and principles and, quite inevitably, its own set of facts, for facts are merely those particular phenomena to which our questions and principles direct our attention. (p. 7)

In this section, my intention is not to prove anything, but only to "position" myself so that the reader may take into account my peculiar beliefs, attitudes, and biases when interpreting this study.

In the United States structuralism was "popularized" by scholars such as Kuhn, Chomsky, Parsons, Piaget, and Brinton. Bruner's (1977) The Process of Education and Schwab's (1969) "The Concept of the Structure of a Discipline" (defining "conceptual" and "syntactic" structures) were widely influential in education.

Recent scholarship also has focused on the extent to which the social studies itself constitutes a discipline. See, Barth (1991); Keller (1991); Larrabee (1991); Longstreet (1991); McBride (1993); McCutchen (1969); Nelson (1990); and Schneider (1989).

Dewey, of course, cautioned against creating extreme, binary divisions (e.g., "individual" and "social"). He warned against allowing "useful practical distinctions to harden into untenable dualisms" (Garrison, 1996, p. 21).

These themes are elaborated in: Cherryholmes (e.g., 1980, 1982); Giroux (1982, 1985); Giroux & Penna (1979); Leming (1989); Newmann (1985); Stanley (1985); and Wexler (1985). For introductions see Kanpol (1994) and/or McLaren (1998).

That the reflective inquiry and personal development approaches developed out of the progressive tradition does not at all imply a sameness in orientation. More precisely, reflective inquiry evolved from a focus on social problem solving, while the personal development approach grew from an emphasis upon the needs, interests, and experiences of individual students. As stated in note 7 (and pointed out by an anonymous reviewer), Dewey himself perceived such a distinction as false and unacceptable.

Space limitations preclude appending the questionnaire. Complete copies are available from the author.

Two points. First, as I point out in the "Discussion," further research into the importance of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, age, years of experience, grade level iden-
The "Traditions" Revisited

tification, college major, and so on would be valuable. Second, the figure of 45% is consistent with the recent work of Anderson et al. (1997), for example.

12 For example, mean citizenship transmission = (summed scores on #4, #10, #25, #28, #29, #30)/6.

13 Regarding both calculated and selected approach categories, the finding of "other" could imply not only a strong affinity for more than one classification, but also/ or teachers who are in the process of changing their normative beliefs (e.g., Richardson, Anders, Tidwell, & Lloyd, 1991), or of "reframing" (Russell & Munby, 1991).

14 Clearly, labeling the approach categories "liberal" and "conservative" is a subjective process and open to interpretation. I wish to thank and acknowledge an anonymous reviewer for insights into the recent conservative "backlash" and the possibility that it has not persuaded social studies teachers.

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Knowledge, Power, and Curriculum: Revisiting A TRSE Argument

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Abstract
As part of the 25th anniversary of TRSE, I revisit the arguments made in this journal during the 1970s. My interest, as earlier, is in curriculum and the educational sciences as social and political practices, but I reposition the problem to examine the knowledge (systems of reason) as governing practices. Governing, drawing on post-modern theories, focuses on how political rationalities are brought into individual rules for action and participation. Power, from this perspective, is concerned with how knowledge disciplines and produces action. Pedagogy and research are governing practices. They function to socially administer the inner sensitivities and dispositions (the soul!) of the child. The concept of power as governing provides a way to rethink the principles for social policy related to inclusion/exclusion and curriculum, particularly the alchemy that occurs as the systems of reason of social science and history are brought from the spaces in which social sciences and history are practiced into the instructional spaces of schools.

In the 1970s, I wrote two articles in Theory and Research in Social Education concerning curriculum and social science (Popkewitz, 1977, 1978). One article argued that social and educational sciences were focused on issues of consensus and stability rather than diversity and change. I further argued that the concern with consensus had particular, conservative consequences to the construction of curriculum. The second article considered social science as a social and ideological cultural practice that embodies human interests. My point of departure was the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of science literature. The discussions sought to understand how social and political issues are embedded in social sciences and social studies curricula. The latter article served as the introductory chapter to a book called Paradigm and Ideology in Research: The Social Functions of the Intellectual (Popkewitz, 1984). In this essay, I revisit that earlier discussion in light of current discussions about the nature and character of science and
social science. As previously, I consider educational research and curriculum to be social and political enterprises.

My focus here is on a critical tradition within education that I call a "social epistemology" which, in a different context, Foucault (1980) called genealogy or "the history of the present" (see, Dean, 1994; Popkewitz, 1991; 1992). I use epistemology to focus on the rules and standards of reason that organize perceptions, ways of responding to the world, and the conceptions of "self." Concurrently, social epistemology locates the objects constituted as the knowledge of schooling as historical practices. My particular interest is in curriculum and educational sciences as knowledge that disciplines and produces the principles through which individuals act and participate in society. The conception of epistemology, then, is not (as in U. S. philosophy) a metadiscourse to find the ultimate rules of truth, but an effort to provide a social theory about the relation of "reason" to the social conditions by which knowledge is produced.

The essay first proceeds to discuss some contributions of postmodern thought to educational theory, particularly the idea of knowledge as the effects of power. By effects of power, the discussion considers how the knowledge of schooling disciplines and produces what we see, think, feel and act upon in the concrete practices of daily life. The effects are not merely repressive but are productive of the practices and possibilities of social and personal life. Pedagogy, I argue, is a governing practice. It ties the register of administration with the register of freedom in liberal democracies. This paradox of the administration of freedom is expressed through the practices of curriculum that "make" the inner qualities of the child ("the soul") into the object of teaching.

The New Sociology of Curriculum and Its Revision in Post-modern Social Theories

My intellectual travels were constructed initially through the "new" sociology of curriculum that developed in the United States in the 1970s. Previously, the study of U. S. teaching and curriculum had been dominated by functional models of instruction as well as psychological models of learning. The "new" sociology was concerned with the relationship of curriculum content to political issues of production and reproduction.

While functional and psychological paradigms were important for certain questions of classroom instruction, these paradigms did not adequately address the cultural, social and political issues of the knowledge brought into schools. The new sociology of curriculum sought to address this omission. It looked at the everyday processes of classroom
teaching as ways of thinking and organizing the social world, as the effects of power. One important focus was on schooling as a social sorting device to include and exclude children from active participation. The research examined, for example, the ways pedagogical practices disqualified and qualified children of different social classes for school success (see, e.g., Anyon, 1980). Further, the new sociology of curriculum reacted to the empiricism that placed faith in statistical and analytical methods as determinates of truth. The problem of this research, to my mind, was not the use of statistics but the lack of attention to the theoretical grounding in which the statistics were deployed. The empiricist approach was unreflective and instrumental in the use of statistics.

At this time there occurred a strange alliance that still exists today. This alliance was between the new sociology of curriculum and qualitative studies. They acted as political allies in the attempt to revise the problems and methods of educational studies. But this alliance separated the procedures of qualitative studies from the theoretical underpinnings that organized the collection and interpretation of data. When procedures were made central to the research process, instrumental reasoning was re-introduced by the side door. The qualitative studies advocated by critical theorists often shared the same features as the quantitative studies critiqued by those theorists. Further, there is nothing inherent in the technologies of data collection in qualitative studies that makes it "critical" (see, Ladwig, 1996).

The central framing of critical studies of schools and curriculum into the early 1980s was the way in which curriculum and theories of social change focused on the norms of stability and/or conflict. That way of framing the issues of theory and change is being challenged today. Historical discussions of social theory have suggested that conflict and consensus maintain similar universal images of change that are part of the trajectory of colonialism from the end of the 19th century. Thus, even when oppositional and "critical" knowledge was sought, certain continuities with colonialism were masked behind new ideological stances.

The questions that are raised about knowledge as effects of power can be understood as an interdisciplinary field of thought that I will call "post-modern" (see, in educational research, McClaren & Giraldi, 1995; Popkewitz, 1997, in press). These literatures cross a variety of disciplines and "isms," including neo-pragmatism in philosophy, critical literary theory, post-modern social and political theories, genealogical approaches to historical studies, gender studies, and "post-colonial" literatures. My thinking about these literatures is not to celebrate something called "posts" but to engage in a conversation about the systems of reason (knowledge) embodied in research about teach-
ing, learning, and children. It is also to reconsider the ways in which we have viewed curriculum theory.²

My interest is to understand how knowledge (discourses) as a governing practice relates to Foucault’s (1979) idea of governmentalities. Governmentality is not found by looking at purposes of public policies or the unrealized values in the implementation of reforms. Rather, it is produced through the principles that organize thought, reason and action (mentalities). By focusing on the reasoning of educational research and curriculum as “the problem,” I am interested in how the “liberatory” and redemptive quest of educational discourses to “save” children may not necessarily be liberatory or redemptive. This skepticism draws on Foucault who suggested that all discourses should be treated as dangerous but not necessarily bad.

What Is Dangerous About Knowledge?

To say that knowledge is dangerous seems to go against the grain of modern philosophy and liberal democratic theory. Knowledge is how we have contact with the world and the means by which we assume the security and stability of our place in it. The available distinctions and categories order the relations of the world of which we are a part. When we walk in a park to look at the pastoral setting or go to the local grocery store, the knowledge that we have of these worlds “tells” us what to expect, guides our interpretations, and generates the principles that guide our actions. We trust the available knowledge about “health foods” to tell us what to buy and what not to buy. We believe in our knowledge of “the terrible twos” and “adolescent youth” as we plot the raising of our children.

A certain virtuousness is tied to the idea of knowledge. Knowledge is believed, leads to empowerment and liberation. “To know” is to be part of the emancipatory project. The folklores and theories of political and cultural life are that reason (a generalized knowledge about how to think and judge what is appropriate for action) will produce a progressive life. Knowledge is perceived as something that one obtains to gain power. Knowledge is believed to provide the path to improve our “self” and the world. This Enlightenment faith in knowledge is linked to science in our modern cosmology. Science is not only about the physical world; since the 19th century it has been about the social realm and the interpretation and administration of social change.

Much curriculum theory in social studies embodies this view: if we could just provide greater integrity, authenticity, and honesty to the curriculum, then we could move toward the idea of the citizen who acts according to reason (knowledge) in a more progressive and just world. The “new” social studies that focuses on the structure of
the disciplines maintains this universalized faith, as do current curriculum reforms.

Yet, it is a mistake to regard the "reason" of science or our personal lives as phenomena that are natural, pure, creative, and individual. Once we explore the categories and distinctions of "the terrible twos," or the health choices made through the tables of ingredients on the back of a package, we are confronted with the realization that the categories that organize "our" perceptions are not of our making but historically constructed and expressed through our actions. To put this somewhat differently, the knowledge that orders and gives meaning to experiences is formed through power relations and is the effect of those relations. Joan Scott (1991), in her essay on the politics of experiences, persuasively argues that what are taken as "natural" experiences are socially constructed identities tied to power. While the rhetorical constructions of today's reforms speak of giving marginal groups "voice" in schools, there is no natural "voice." There are only mediated distinctions and divisions which are the historical effects of discourse and power.

The virtues of knowledge and reason inhabit a dual world that enables us to explore possibilities and, at the same time, are the effects of power. We can think of power in modern political regimes as exercised less and less by brute force, and more and more through the circulation of knowledge that ties political rationalities to the governing principles of our individuality. The "educated subject" in the contemporary world is also one that relates political rationalities to the governing of the "self." One just needs to look at the debates about the national curriculum standards in social studies to understand this relation of knowledge, power and the idea of the educated subject. Rarely, however, are the rules through which we "know" about the world questioned or thought of as the effects of power.

The "naturalism" of knowledge occurs, in part, because categories that are deployed in schooling are practices of remembering/forgetting. The categories and distinctions deployed to organize educational inquiry, for example, provide the order and classification to think and talk about schooling. The power of this construction of memory can be looked at through the categories of learning and "childhood." It is almost impossible to engage in a conversation about what occurs in schools without evoking these concepts. But to organize thought in this manner is to forget other ways of thinking about schooling and also forget that the ideas of schools as places for learning and childhood are recent social inventions related to the joining of the registers of administration with those of freedom.
The Registers Of Freedom And Social Administration

We can think of the modern school as an institution whose purpose is to shape and fashion the individual who participates and acts in modern liberal societies. This governing practice enables us to rethink the Spencerian question, "What knowledge is most worthwhile?" Rather than ask about "What knowledge is most worthwhile?" our histories and theories of schooling need to ask about the rules and standards of knowledge as governing systems. The construction of modern schooling and educational research is, I think, best understood as one of governing the child.  

We can best understand this governing of the child through examining the changing relation of knowledge and politics that appears clearly by the late 19th century. The emergence of liberal democratic societies embodied a new relationship between the governing of the state and the governing of the individual, particularly in liberal states where individuals were expected to exhibit self-discipline and self-motivation. The new democratic states entailed the democratization of the individual. People were expected to "be seen" and "to see" themselves as individuals who could act on their world with self-autonomy and responsibility. In one sense, the individual now became a citizen who had certain obligations, responsibilities, and freedoms. The freedoms, however, involved a citizen who acted responsibly through a new sense of self-motivation and self-discipline. Modern pedagogy and the sciences of education embodied this belief in the administration of the democratic "self."

But this new sense of individuality in liberal democratic states was not one that "merely" appeared as a complement to political philosophy and state government. The different discursive systems of the late 19th century and early 20th century embodied new systems of public administration. The State was to shape the individual who mastered change through the application of rationality and reason (see, e.g., Hunter, 1994). The State was to produce a universalization of policies and a routinization of politics that would remove strife and produce harmonious social development.

New institutions for planning social welfare, health, economy and education carried the political rationalities of citizenship into the constructions of individuality. The social sciences, whose emergence coincides with the modern state, were not only about interpreting social practices or guiding social policy. The social sciences provided ways to "reason" about the citizen, the child, the family, gender, and the worker. The discourses of economy and culture were systems to administer freedom in modernity including how the worker was to feel, see, think and act in the new industrial relations, and what dispositions and sen-
sitivities a mother/wife and child were to have in the new social relations of the home. "Taylorism" was designed to emancipate the worker!

This social administration of freedom is most evident in the construction of pedagogy. Schooling and pedagogy made the soul into an object of scrutiny. Religious motifs of pastoral care and the confessional were brought into the curriculum through the discipline of psychology. But the religious motifs about personal salvation and redemption had new points of reference as they became associated with pedagogical projects. It became possible to talk about children's inner sense of "self" in the same way as earlier religious discourses talked about the salvation of soul. The psychological vocabulary gave attention to seemingly secular concerns about personal development and "fulfillment." Categories about attitudes, learning, self-actualization and self-esteem were words that signaled religious motifs but placed them in secular discourses of science and rational progress.

The administration of reflection replaced revelation in finding human progress. In the history of curriculum and particularly social studies, citizenship education was a social project to administer the soul (see, e.g., Theory and Research in Social Studies Education, 8(3), 1980; Lybarger, 1987; Kliebard & Wegner, 1987). John Dewey, for example, inscribed political/moral assumptions of progress into his conception of personal development within "community." The idea of community embodied a Protestant notion of hard work, a commitment to science as problem solving in a democracy, and an Emersonian notion of citizen "voluntarism" in social affairs. Dewey's writings further embodied an American "exceptionalism" that transformed Protestant millennial visions about the United States as a New World into a secular belief that the United States had a unique national history and a mission to bring about human perfection. (For a general discussion of the religious and pastoral motifs in U.S. thought, see, e.g., Bercovitch, 1978; Marx, 1964; Ross, 1991; West, 1989).

Curriculum as a governing practice becomes almost self-evident as we think of the "making" of the proper citizen. This citizen is one who has the correct dispositions, sensitivities and awarenesses to act as a self-governing individual in the new political, cultural and economic contexts. Current reforms that focus on "constructivist pedagogy" and teacher education reforms that consider the "beliefs" and "dispositions" of the teacher are the secularization of the confessional systems of self discipline and control.

We are continually implicated in the paradox (and irony) that joins the register of freedom with the register of social administration. The democratic "self" was inscribed in discursive practices related to social planning and the idea of the welfare state (see, e.g., Wagner, 1994; also see Foucault, 1984). Yet we know at the simplest level that things do not always turn out the way we want them, and that planning is
rarely complete. There are slippages and reversals that cannot be planned for. But the tying of the two registers also occurs as the effects of power.

Knowledge As The Effects Of Power

My argument to this point has been that the ideas of curriculum are not altruistic statements about a better world but embodiments of governing practices that are the effects of power. By effects of power I refer to how the categories, distinctions and differentiations embodied in pedagogical practices function to discipline and produce the principles of action and participation.

Let me delve more directly into social studies education to provide an example. Much multicultural literature has focused on how we can have a more inclusive society through a more just system of representation. Curriculum, it is believed, can achieve this result through giving more accurate representation of groups that have been marginalized in textbooks as well as in the teaching force. At a different level, educational research has sought to understand how the achievement and “self-esteem” of children can be raised through, for example, identifying “successful” teachers. Successful teachers are often classified as those who develop a relevant curriculum that takes into account the cultural background of children in a manner that produces respect for the child as well as higher achievement levels.

But the curriculum discussions rarely consider the discursive “rules” through which “success” is constructed. The systems of ideas invoked to represent social groups and “success” are not free floating, universal ideas. To define “success” or to “give” representation to groups of people is to inscribe a particular set of distinctions and norms that organize and define who is the “educated subject.” Further, the categories that normalize the representation of the “good,” and the “successful” are also systems of omission and divisions that define what is not “good” and not successful.

Fendler’s (1998) study of the changing discourses about “the educated subject” enables us to understand how the norms of success are the effects of power. Fendler argues “[t]o be educated has meant to become disciplined according to a regimen of remembering and forgetting, of assuming identities normalized through discursive practices, and of a history of unpredictable diversions.” She examines over time the shifting assumptions of “true” and good in the notion of the “educated subject,” the practical technologies to educate, the systems of recognition and things “examined,” and the ways people are “invited” to recognize themselves as “educated.” Fendler argues that the systems of reason about the “educated subject” entail practical technologies that organize the performances and “skills” embodied in a
particular type of individuality. These performances and "skills" appear as "natural" and desirable, but inscribe a normativity through which new forms of supervision and "self" supervision are produced.

If we examine the reasoning about "the successful" teacher and child in the multicultural curriculum reforms, we can recognize that the ideas of "success" embody a normativity about childhood, learning, and achievement that are not necessarily progressive but are the effects of power. These effects inscribe particular sets of norms and values about "reason" and the "reasonable person" who is then seen as successful. The norms are not those of the public rhetoric about inclusion but relate to rules of reasoning about "the educated subject" to changes in culture and economy. These images of the subject are the effects of power rather than abstract principles of citizenship or social inclusion. Certain children who are placed outside these norms can never be "average," a problem of exclusion that I will return to.

Normalizing "The Self" And The Problem Of Inclusion/Exclusion

Above, I introduced the idea of discourses as systems of norms that distinguish and divide. I want to pursue this further as a way to further excavate the relation of knowledge, governing and power. But to do this, let me backtrack to my original TRSE articles; they considered knowledge as something used to represent something else. For example, I discussed how the knowledge of research and social studies curriculum were built on norms of consensus and stability. These norms of stability gave attention to how structural forces (e.g., bureaucracy, capitalism, racism) imposed their "will" on society. My discussion of the values in research, as well, adopted a quasi-Gramscian perspective that theoretical knowledge (and the researcher) are attached to certain groups in society and promote their interests. The assumption was that if one could locate these interests, then the structures could be undermined and the rules of participation changed. The ethical and political commitment of this research was to broaden the representation of groups by altering the rules which permitted participation.

The problem of representation and access are still important today, but I now think of knowledge as not only representing "other" things but a discipline that shapes and forms the objects acted on. I used to think, for example, that if we just changed the curriculum to one that stressed theories of conflict, there would be greater integrity and honesty in the processes of schooling. I have now come to think that this is somewhat simplistic and that this way of thinking is itself the effect of power. The problem of schooling is not just that the wrong people have organized the curriculum and used the wrong "lenses" to think about the social studies or literature. Rather, I have begun to view
the "culprit" of the inequities and injustices in schooling as embodied in its discursive practices. This was Fendler's point in her study of "the educated subject." It is not whether we use this theory or that, but that the amalgamation of ideas, technologies and institutions produces the educated subject.

This rethinking of the function of knowledge leads us to think of the discursive practices of schools as normalizing practices. What do I mean by normalizing practices? The norms are not what we typically talk about as teacher's beliefs or their philosophy of education. Neither are the norms necessarily what is publicly spoken about as educational purposes. Rather the norms are embodied in the categories, distinctions, differentiations and divisions by which teachers come to "see" and act toward children. To say, for example, that a child "needs to work harder to get better grades" inscribes norms about the work that the child is not doing, as well as unspoken values expressed in the ordering produced by "grades." Such expressions provide principles that "tell" the teacher about the average, and the not average and the not normal. The norms of "success/failure" of the child that I spoke about earlier, for example, are part of a grid of ideas about learning, childhood, teaching, and curriculum that functions objectively to separate and rank individuals by creating finer and finer differentiations of everyday behavior.

For me, then, to understand the values and politics of knowledge we need to consider the culprit to be investigated as the divisions and distinctions produced in the everyday, common sense activities of pedagogy. Thus, we can think of the ideas about childhood, learning, self-esteem, and intelligence as embodying systems that divide and separate the children along a continuum of values. Further, these dividing practices are about the dispositions and sensitivities of the inner qualities of the child, and more recently, the teacher. Modern pedagogy is concerned with the child who has the "right" dispositions to construct knowledge and to solve problems!

The normalization is part of the relation of knowledge as a governing practice. Let me provide urban education as an example to pursue this idea. When teachers talk about urban teaching as a problem of management, of teaching as producing learning, or of children as being "at risk," they use these words as part of historically constructed principles of "reason." The discourses about the urban child organize educational policy and State administrative programs that target ethnic, racial and minority groups as needing help to be productive students, and while not often articulated, needing help to be productive citizens. The discourses about the urban school and child are inscribed in pedagogical knowledge (discourses) to administer how teachers can help rescue the urban child.
The idea of urban is not only a descriptive, helpful statement, but an embodiment of a historically constructed system of ideas that normalize and divide children. (Hennon, in press; Popkewitz, in press). If "urban" has positive norms when used in expressions that relate to the urbane and cosmopolitan, it has a more ambiguous and less positive relation when used in educational discourses. Historically, the focus on urban schools is part of a longer trajectory of school reform, capturing a 19th century view of schooling as a means to “rescue” children from their economic, social and cultural conditions through planned intervention. The notion of rescue combined religious views of salvation with secular notions about the effects of poverty, class, and social/racial discrimination. The groups to be rescued by schools, however, were not merely those who were marginalized, but also the middle classes.

In the post World War Two years, the federal War on Poverty began to signify a particular system of ideas to differentiate and divide the “urban” child from some other child who is silently present and not spoken about. That different urban (sometimes inner city) child becomes present in discourses of psychological development and learning (such as learning styles), conceptions of school subjects (learning as “hands on”), distinctions about children’s intelligence, and technologies of classroom management. The urbanness of the child also joins state welfare policies that target certain populations who are in need of remediation with discourses about the psychological and cognitive effects of being “inner city.” The different set of ideas orders how the children of the “urban” school are thought of and acted upon as learners/non-learners, and the competence of the teacher who performs in classrooms. The urban children are discursively placed as those who can never be average or normal, no matter how hard they try.

I use the example of "urban," then, to think about the problem of inclusion/exclusion in schooling. Ideas of inclusion and exclusion are mutually implicated in the other when focusing on discursive practices. What is included as “successful” practices of the teacher, to go back to a previous example, also excludes through the same ordering principles. What is excluded is no longer the child as the embodiment of populational characteristics, but the dispositions of the child. The urban child is understood to have personal inner qualities that are not regarded as “reasonable.” The normalization that characterizes the child is not mentioned but silently inscribed in the differentiations that compose those that stand outside of thought and reason, and thus become outside of being reasonable.
What Does This Mean For The Projects Of Educational Research?

I want to pursue this analysis of the problematic of research in two ways. First, I want to raise the question of the relation of research to the problem of governing in modern (and post-modern) conditions. Second, I want to explore the relation of intellectual work to the politics of knowledge.

First, the focus on the politics and values of research is not to ask in whose interests is the research carried out. Rather, it is to consider how the systems of reasoning and knowledge of "being" enter and enclose our individuality. This is one of the central ideas of feminist scholarship that has focused on how the concept of "woman" has been historically constructed. But if we move into schooling, we interrogate, through historical and empirical means, the systems of reasoning about the child and the teacher that produce systems of inclusions/exclusions (see, e.g., Gore, 1998).

My argument is not to preclude structural arguments that are found in the politics of representations, that is, to ask who is and who is not represented. Rather, it is to create a research "space" in order to ask about how the rules and standards embodied in these representations are the effects of power. Making the forms of reasoning and rules for "telling the truth" potentially contingent, historical, and susceptible to critique is a practice to dislodge the ordering principles, and thereby to create a greater range of possibilities for the subject to act. The politics of educational knowledge is in the manner in which research constructs its objects of interpretation and generates principles of action and participation.

Second, the analysis raises questions about the doxa of social and educational research. That doxa is that research is to be useful and practical in producing change. The notion of useful transcends ideological stances as both liberal and left traditions focus on providing direction for change. I have argued elsewhere that such claims reinsert and reconstitute the knowledge of the educational sciences as governing practices, although that practice is continually positioned rhetorically in the name of the people whether those people are classified as silenced, oppressed or learning disabled (Popkewitz & Brennan, 1997). What is less noticed in such claims about usefulness is that it also positions the educational scientists as the messengers who bring the new prophecies to the people (Calleawart, in press). It is the researcher who textually constructs the audience that is deemed to be democratic! This function of professional knowledge as governing the soul is dangerous.

Whereas educational studies have continually asked about "how research can be useful or practical" through providing positive suggestions of reform or change, I think of a social epistemology as a nega-
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tive science (see e.g., Johnannson, 1998, Blacker, 1998). I take this position, in part, from a book by Stephen Toulmin, a philosopher of science. Toulmin argues that in the earlier part of the 17th century, science was dominated by uncertainty and skepticism which fell into disuse by the end of the 17th century. By the latter half of the 17th century, Newtonian ideas of certainty dominated. This ascension of certainty occurred for a number of historical (rather than necessary) reasons. The assumptions still persist. Toulmin suggests at the end of his book that certainty has gotten us to a fixed point, and maybe it is time to give skepticism a chance. I agree. We tend to ignore the important and productive side of critical thinking in the social and educational sciences. No single theory is adequate to deal with the historical contingencies in which problems are solved. What social and educational sciences can provide is systematic information about the pivotal points where social policy and social action might focus in producing a more equitable and just society.

Alchemies and Curriculum

The implication of post-modern social and political theories to curriculum theory provides the final point of this essay. It can be introduced through the idea of alchemy. We can think of curriculum as performing an alchemy on disciplinary knowledge. As the sorcerer of the Middle Ages sought to turn lead into gold, modern curriculum theory produces a magical change as it turns the specific intellectual traditions of historians or physicists, for example, into teaching practices.

To understand the alchemies of curriculum, we can approach science, social science, mathematics, and literary studies as systems of knowledge produced within complex and pragmatic sets of social relations. The knowledge accepted as sociology or anthropology, for example, involves particular institutional relations and systems of reasoning about research, teaching, and professional status. My earlier discussion about social science as a governing practice must also be understood as embedded in a network of historically constructed social relations. In this sense, the idea of a disciplinary field has both internal qualities to the academic field of knowledge as well as qualities of a knowledge that disciplines in its ordering the construction of subjectivities. Further, what counts as knowledge involves struggles among different groups within a discipline about the norms of participation, truth, and recognition. The notions of power as sovereignty and power as effects are part of this struggle in contemporary social science.

The norms of "truth," however, are not only influenced by the internal dimensions of a discipline. They are produced through alliances with groups external to the discipline, such as State agencies and
commercial entities interested in laser technologies or in the social ques-
tion of poverty. When Thomas Kuhn (1970) spoke about “revolution-
ary” and “normal” science, in one sense, he was speaking of the com-
peting standards and rules for “telling the truth” and the different stakes
that are authorized (and want to be authorized) as groups compete.

Whereas disciplines involve competing sets of ideas about re-
search (we can call these paradigms or “systems of reasoning”) school
subjects tend to treat knowledge as logical systems of unambiguous
content for children to learn. Even the notions of problem solving in
current curriculum reforms focus on the processes of children’s think-
ing while leaving aside the questions about the discursive and rhetori-
cal practices of science. Thus, what appears in school as “science,”
“math,” “composition,” or “art” has little relation to the intellectual
field that bears the same name, but is a pedagogical construction that
conforms to expectations related to the school timetable, conceptions
of childhood, and conventions of teaching that transform knowledge
and intellectual inquiry into a strategy for governing the “soul.” Thus,
we can say that there is an alchemy of the “discipline” of physics into,
for example, categories of “concept mastery,” psychological registers
about “cooperative small group learning” and concerns about the “mo-
tivation” and the “self-esteem” of children.

Perhaps the alchemy of school subjects is necessary because chil-
dren are not scientists or artists. But that is not my point. My objective
is to recognize the significance of this alchemy to the study of school-
ring as a governing practice in two related ways. Next, I will be some-
what schematic in outlining the significance of the alchemy.

First, curriculum theory tends to revision the complexities and
contingencies of daily life as things of logic. Concepts and generaliza-
tions are taken as logical, nontemporal structures which function as
foundations from which learning occurs. Even methods of research
are assumed to be logical entities that follow some rules that exist out-
side of social processes. The alchemy makes it possible in schooling to
talk about children’s learning of social studies as involving concep-
tions and misconceptions of concepts, as if concepts were stable and
fixed entities of knowledge. It also makes possible the teaching of “labo-
atory skills” or interview practices as universal procedures that en-
able learning about science or social science. One learns laboratory skills,
for example, as a specific instrumental practice that is separate from
the discursive patterns through which data are interpreted and prac-
tices are organized. If we think of the laboratory work of psychology,
for example, we see that the idea of an experiment involves a whole
range of norms about the relation of the experimenter and the
experimentee that define the objects to be scrutinized as appropriate
knowledge (Danziger, 1990). This alchemy is present when research is
classified according to the distinctions in procedures of collecting data,
such as the distinction between "quantitative" and "qualitative" research.

Yet when we examine research at the cutting edge of science, we can "see" a knowledge which is quite different from that enshrined in the school curriculum. It involves debates and struggles about what is to be studied and how. Further, the conception of knowledge used by research scientists privileges strategies to make the familiar strange, to think about the mysterious and unfamiliar, and to raise questions precisely about that which is taken for granted. The rules of curriculum are quite different as they privilege the stable, fixed and categorical properties of knowledge, even in recent "constructivist pedagogies" (see Popkewitz, 1991, Chapter 7).

The alchemy that makes the world and events seem to be things of logic removes any social mooring from knowledge. The debate and struggle that produced disciplinary knowledge are glossed over, and a stable system of ideas is presented to children. The social relationships in experiments, testing and "qualitative" approaches are historically constructed rather than "natural." Further, the assumptions about data and knowledge inscribed in the methods of data collection are the effects of power that should not be taken for granted when thinking about the knowledge of a discipline.

A second function of the alchemy is related to issues of exclusion. These exclusions are different from those associated with the children who succeed or fail in a school subject. Further, the exclusion that I speak about is different from what I discussed in the TRSE article about "consensus" and "conflict" in the content of school subjects. There, I spoke about inclusion and exclusions in relation to the groups that are represented in curriculum. The issue of inclusion and exclusions that I speak about how are related to the systems of reason that underlie the school subjects.

Let me return again to the example of a multicultural curriculum. Much of this literature focuses on the inclusion of African American and Latinos, among others, in the curriculum. It looks at the ways in which these groups have provided unique contributions to the economic, social and cultural development of the United States. At the same time, there is discussion about how U. S. curriculum needs to be less Eurocentric. There are efforts to construct historical narratives about marginal groups to be included in textbooks. This notion of inclusion "gives" representation and "voice."

This move to give greater representation to various groups that have been excluded from historical and social discussions is important. Postmodern theories, in contrast, focus on the rules through which these different groups are represented and on the normalizing processes that are occurring. Further, it also questions that manner in which the new histories in curriculum universalize and naturalize subjects.
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and subjectivities, thus establishing new systems of exclusion that operate at the level of the body and the mind. Feminist research, for example, has directed attention to how disciplinary discourses about the body, health, and science maintain images of women that are the effects of power. To give representation in curriculum, if I follow this example, is also to require attention to the norms generated for action and participation in that representation. Thus, while we can applaud the new curriculum of inclusion as creating spaces for groups previously excluded, curriculum theory also needs to consider the inscription of norms that are embodied in the representational practices.

Further, we need to recognize that knowledge systems are hybrids. There is no pure logic or knowledge. This is evident when discussing issues of the Eurocentric focus of the curriculum. The assertion is often that cultural discussions accept European knowledge as valuable and other ways of thinking as not valuable. This discussion is sometimes put into colonial/post-colonial dichotomies to emphasize some non-western approach to knowledge. But such discussions do not examine how oppositional (post-colonial) images relate with colonial images in a manner that is neither European nor non-European. Within the different social sciences and humanities, for example, there is intense debate about their narratives as hybrids which draw on different European and non-European systems of thought (even the Old Testament is a hybrid, and not of "Western" thought!). Toni Morrison's (1992) Playing in the Dark discussion of how "blackness" is embodied in the literary construction of "whiteness" and Gilroy's (1993) discussion of "blackness" as a double consciousness are examples of the construct of "self" as a hybridity. Gilroy, for example, explores various expressions of popular culture and literacy and philosophical ideas of the African communities in North America and Britain as coming out of the African diaspora in Africa, the Americas, and Europe. The "Black Atlantic," he argues, was a critical transformative site of modernity through these complex engagements.

These post-modern and post-colonial literatures direct our attention to the "systems of reason" embedded in disciplinary knowledge and curriculum. They refocus attention to the problematic of knowledge (and reason) that is brought into the school as school subjects, and ask about the rules of representation as the effects of power. It takes the Spencerian question of "What knowledge is of most worth" and moves it from one that treats knowledge as an object to one that treats the problematic of knowledge and its function as the effects of power.

But to focus on the problematic of knowledge as a theory of curriculum and critical research requires, I believe, a struggle against the psychologization of the curriculum. The current alchemy of school subjects entails pedagogical discourses that focus on the processes by
which children learn or fail in the curriculum mastery. Even critical traditions of curriculum return to the psychology of the individual. Curriculum has made the soul into the site of struggle for norms of achievement, competence and salvation. To revision curriculum theory and research is also to struggle against the psychological, pastoral concern of governing the soul.

There is a continual paradox and irony in the study of curriculum and schooling. It is a problem of social administration that is concerned with questions of freedom. Historically, the register of social administration and the register of freedom are linked. Schooling is an enterprise that embodies the Enlightenment beliefs in reason with the political rationalities of the administration of the soul. The irony involved in tying the two registers requires that we continually assume a stance of skepticism and ask: "What are the rules and standards by which we reason about the world?" "What are the ways that we 'tell the truth' about teaching, children, historical knowledge, the social sciences in the social studies curriculum?" Asking about the knowledge from which we act is difficult because "our" points of communication with experiences are embodied in the discursive systems of categories and differentiations available for that communication. While I do not think that the paradox and irony will be resolved, I do think, as did Toulmin, that we need to give attention to skepticism in curriculum work.

Notes

1 I think of Bourdieu’s (1984) study and Bowles and Gintis’ (1976) as two different paradigmatic examples which employ statistical methods in a manner that has none of the limitations of empiricism.

2 I have provided more elaborated discussions in, e.g., Popkewitz, 1996; Popkewitz & Brennan, 1998; and Popkewitz, 1998.

3 This is not to say the governing of the inner "self" was not previously part of education, it was as Durkheim (1977) illustrated in his discussion of the Counter Reformation. What was different in the 19th century is the movement of education from a religious to a political activity to construct the new citizen and worker, as well as with the mobilization of scientific discourse to organize the pedagogical functions of administering the “soul”.

4 This development of institutions of social welfare and economy moved across multiple historical trajectories and multiple overlays of social practices in which the outcomes could be foretold. Thus, while I summarize the outcomes, the summaries should not be read as a conspiracy theory of power and control.

5 I do not think that this essay is outside of the effects of power, remembering my earlier statement about all discourses are dangerous and thus need what Bourdieu has called "an epistemological vigilance" that maintains a continual and historical skepticism. This skepticism will be clearer but not resolved in the last section, which focuses on the politics of intellectual knowledge.

6 While I cannot take up the issue here, others have also argued that the very models to emancipate emerged within as colonial expression to regulate and produce subjects (see, Young, 1990).

7 There is little discussion in education about science as rhetoric, however, the series of science as rhetoric that is published by The University of Wisconsin Press pro-
vides strong arguments that linguistic strategies for tell the truth are more than mere representations of knowledge.

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RESEARCHER IDENTITIES AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENTS: A COMMENTARY ON MOVING "FROM UNDERSTANDING TO ACTION"

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Professor Yvonna Lincoln proposes that educational researchers must move from accumulating, reporting, and publishing neutral knowledge to research grounded in communities and aimed to aid praxis. The conception of researcher as independent thinker must change to an action research orientation that merges "community research with community service" (Lincoln, 1998, p. 28). The imperatives for this transformation stem from new university demands for faculty involvement in communities, society’s increasingly scarce resources for social welfare programs, and the need for research to promote positive change. Professor Lincoln also delineates several criteria for assessing the quality of this new activist inquiry, new methods for researchers, and implications for life in higher education.

Some of the ideas and images that propel Professor Lincoln’s propositions about action research are compelling; for example, she writes that the

purpose of science is not the accumulation of neutral knowledge, but rather the acquisition of knowledge for praxis, for action, for community building and for the amelioration of some social predicament. (Lincoln, p. 23)

I agree with this general aim. However, Professor Lincoln does not go far enough in examining what kinds of action and collaboration are necessary to the proposed action-oriented research. The elision of particular relationships and specific duties and alliances pulls the ideas about action back toward a positivist and managerial position, and reproduces the splits between educational, political, and economic realms of social life.

Creeping Positivism

Despite constructivist, post-modern, and post-structuralist ideas and language, the trajectory of knowledge gathering and utilization in Professor Lincoln’s projections remains positivist. By this I mean that the steps of diagnosis-action-remediation-progress seem grounded in positivist orientations about the nature of the world, of human knowing, and of progress. While numerous scholars have written eloquently
of the ironies, contingencies, multiplicities, and tensions of knowing and being known, the seemingly direct aim of "acquiring knowledge for praxis" (Lincoln, p. 23) remains uncomplicated by the inaccessibility of much knowledge to simple recording, accumulation, and portrayal. For example, Jonathan Silin writes about our "passion for ignorance" on the topics of sexuality, children, and curriculum in the time of AIDS; he evokes "the inevitable tension of private voices in public spaces" (1995, p. 163). Silin underlines

the growing pressures schools place on children, parents, and teachers to tell or not to tell the truth of their lives. For everyone schools are places that invite exposure, provoke the desire to hide, and stimulate the development of differentiated social personae. They are complex institutions through which we want to know, want to be known, seek not to be known, by a plethora of helping professionals (1995, p. 163).

The simple "community research and community service" (Lincoln, p. 28) advocated by Lincoln does not come to grips with the will to ignorance and the necessity of telling secrets in plain sight about sexuality, as well as, about many other "private" issues such as harassment, abuse, and violence toward women, children, and others. Silin's work illustrates the intricate politics of knowing and not-knowing, and it suggests problems for researchers who expect to accumulate knowledge for practice or to harmonize various participants' perspectives.

Maxine Greene utilizes the image of the cloud to suggest the difficulty of knowing and knowledge in the contemporary world:

When we "do" the human sciences...we have to relate ourselves somehow to a social world that is polluted by something invisible and odorless, overhung by a sort of motionless cloud. It is the cloud of givenness, of what is considered "natural" by those caught in the taken-for-granted, in the everydayness of things. I also think we have to hold in mind that the modern world is an administered world structured by all sorts of official languages. More often than not, they are the languages of domination, entitlement, and power; and there are terrible silences where ordinary human speech ought to be audible....The modern world is, as well, a world where what we conceive to be our tradition is petrified, located in private enclaves, or surrounded by auras that distance it from lived experience, from the landscape of our lives (1995, pp. 47-48).
Greene’s cloud of givenness and petrified traditions suggest a society not immediately amenable to the description of various voices and orchestration of diverse interests. Knowing and knowledge is complex, conflicted, inexpressible, and often dangerous to ourselves and others.

My response to the complicated knowing and not-knowing of Silin and Greene is different priorities in researcher identity. My researcher identity is rooted in a critical approach to knowing and knowledge such as provided by feminism, critical theory, post-colonialism, queer theory, or critical race theory, among others. Such theories help alert researchers to petrified knowledges, dangerous exposures, and telling secrets of school lives, and are necessary for praxis.

**Researcher Identity and Political Engagement**

My thinking about social research is influenced by AIDS scholar and activist, Cindy Patton, who writes, “the terms for asserting identity are the categories of political engagement” (1993, p. 173). Thus, the asserted identity of the new action-oriented educational researcher is important to scrutinize in some detail for its setting up of the terms of political engagement. Professor Lincoln expects that the new action researcher will acquire knowledge for praxis utilizing new methods that necessitate new skills. The new skills include: facilitation, mediation, collaboration, cooperation, orchestration, commitment to diversity and pluralism, and the ability to “portray” various stakeholders and situations. What is the political engagement asserted in these emphasized skills? Following Patton’s lead, “the achievement of identities is precisely the staking out of duties and alliances in a field of power” (Patton, 1993, p. 174), I find that Professor Lincoln’s action researcher’s duties emphasize administrative or managerial duties. Her standpoint appears to be an organizational one that treats researchers and particular research projects and communities as interchangeable. This researcher identity emphasizes the duties of "managing" diverse interests; the researcher’s alliances seem to be with "everyone" but with "no one" in particular.

From a feminist vantage point, this new researcher identity emulates a traditional female care-taker who facilitates and mediates in research projects that serve re-masculinized universities and their demands for accountability, global reach, and competitive achievements (Davies, 1992; Lesko, in press; Mac an Ghaill, 1994). Action researchers, fulfilling a female role, may become, again, “guardians of a [social] order” (Fine, 1994, p. 14). So I am wary of the identity of Lincoln’s new action researcher, with her managerial alliances and feminine duties. The managerial perspective severs the ideas from real, present situations and links them to a sense of order and harmony that has a particular history (Smith, 1990).
Despite their intent to be action-oriented, Professor Lincoln's ideas remain insufficiently politicized because they fail to take up specific duties or alliances beyond a macro-liberal commitment to a more equitable or democratic society. I propose a different researcher identity with specific, present duties and alliances which are firmly grounded in contemporary politics; I start with theoretically-informed understandings (albeit always partial) of major events in the political, social, and economic landscape of our lives and society. For me, two major dimensions of present social life are the dominance of the New Right and the welfare wars, and my current thinking about and research on education and schooling begin with the New Right and the welfare wars. Unlike Professor Lincoln's "standpoint" that is grounded in the changing demands of universities and the changing views of knowledge, I propose that action-oriented researchers position themselves, first, in pressing political problems of our time. My beginning point places the researcher into political debates as a citizen, as an educator, as a social being first. Research develops from a full engagement in political issues and their implications for education. This starting point emphasizes the social/political persona of every person and contrasts with the image of researcher who chooses to engage in political life. We are already all in political life.

Making Claims for Allies

Acquiring knowledge for praxis as the aim of research leaves the specific goals ambiguous. Given the present political conflicts, I believe in more specific aims, such as those of Cindy Patton:

The task of the critic and activist would be to unravel the historic and conditional relations of forms of claims-making and look for ways to stage claims that better meet the desires of, say, gay liberation, feminism, or a Rainbow Coalition [emphasis added] (Patton, 1993, p. 171).

My social research follows Patton's lead to understand claims for educational equity and other public resources. For example, how might we make more compelling claims for comprehensive educational programs for teenage mothers (Lesko, 1995)? How might we best make claims for the educational needs of gay, lesbian, and bisexual youth? How do we best make claims for school practices that are gender-sensitive? Each of these questions necessitates the understanding of existing arguments for needs-claims and propels researchers to help construct better, more effective ones. Each question is situated in the contemporary political scene, the impact of the New Right, and the attacks on the welfare state.
Professor Lincoln's repeated use of the term "community" conjures up the image of a place where we all belong equally. But we know this is a fiction—that communities are cobbled together groups and individuals with unequal power. Researchers must come to grips with politicized communities in which harmonizing and mediating are useful but insufficient strategies.

Since my social researcher identity both gathers information and acts politically to make new claims on public resources, I would like more research that informs us how various groups work the establishment of new claims. David Berliner concludes his analysis of the incommensurability of the beliefs of the Christian Right with educational psychology with a call for vigilance:

All who are interested in the preservation of our public schools must be polite to the Christian Right and respectful of their concerns....But we must also be extraordinarily vigilant to prevent them from gaining control of the public's common schools (1997, p. 413).

How are people "vigilant"? How do groups counter the claims for abstinence-only sex education curricula? How do defenders of whole language approaches assert their claims effectively? In my view, researchers move between political contexts and educational endeavors to create different conditions and different claims on public resources for youths.

In conclusion, I espouse more specific starting points and particular kinds of aims for action researchers. First, I advocate that researchers identify topics with important, immediate political dimensions and utilize various critical theories to understand the contemporary issues. Second, researchers need to discern their problem-related "identity", that is the duties and alliances within which they will operate in their work on the topic. Third, researchers should strive to help their allies articulate and press new claims for education that meets their needs.

Numerous questions remain in my mind about action research. One persisting issue is whether we can come to experience conflict and disagreement as other than disagreeable and to be avoided whenever possible. If we are to engage fully the politics of education and educational research, new approaches to conflict seem imperative to me. Action researchers need abilities to work with and through conflict, to not just tolerate, harmonize, or manage it. For me, this is a central theoretical and practical issue for continuing political engagement.
Notes

I am grateful to Leslie Bloom for stimulating and helpful conversation on these issues.

1 In her history of action research, Noffke (1997) notes that more meliorative approaches have coexisted with more overtly politicized ones. Thus, there are traditions of action research in which to locate both Lincoln's and my approaches.

2 I am not suggesting that political education is automatic just by virtue of existing in a society, but that there is necessary political education that must occur and that this is the important beginning point for social researchers.

3 Nancy Fraser (1989) theorizes the significance of needs-claims as political action.

References


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I like a number of things about Yvonna Lincoln's paper. Her general point is that we no longer can rely on time- and context-free generalizations but rather must "focus on forms of knowledge which are deep, structural, historical, socially located, context-specific, and accountable to and inseparable from, issues of race, gender and class" (p. 17). I support her argument that "conventional scientific method has not and cannot solve the enduring and persistent problems of schooling, and that new forms of inquiry and action should be undertaken" (p. 17).

I want to focus my response specifically on what Lincoln calls "the leap from understanding to action". She contends that there are "compelling imperatives for action to replace classical disinterestedness and presumed objectivity" (p. 20), and she suggests that "action, never the part of the scientist's repertoire or vocabulary, is now her or his mandate" (p. 18). I like the way this mandate denies the image of ivory tower researchers who have little concern for the consequences of their research. Rather than identify the points on which I agree with Lincoln, I use my response to build on and extend this idea somewhat.

To do so, my response will use two recent books by poststructural feminist authors, Judith Butler and Laurel Richardson. Like Lincoln, both authors are concerned with the relation between research and action, but they articulate a more fluid sense of what it means to "act on" our research. Lincoln uses phrases like "action coupled to research" (p. 20) and "research for action and for participation and involvement" (p. 22) implying that action and research are separate activities that must be connected. For Butler and Richardson, thinking and speech are action. Butler, in particular, focuses on speech acts—the intended and unintended meanings and influences of language use. For these authors, as we think, reflect, and speak we are already acting in the world, we are changing our work, our context, and ourselves. Thinking, reflecting, and speaking are acts, political acts that have consequences for ourselves and others.

The first book, *Excitable Speech, A Politics of the Performative* by Judith Butler, is a bit difficult to read for those unfamiliar with poststructural texts, but it is provocative. Her ideas connect and contrast with Lincoln's paper in several ways. Lincoln argues that we need to understand our role as researchers in new ways and in ways that compel us to action. Butler agrees but she does not see action as distinct from and following understanding in Lincoln's way (i.e., that first we understand and then we act, or our actions result from our under-
standings). In contrast, Butler thinks that we are constituted in language that is already a form of action, that situates, determines, and often injures us in ways we may not be aware of and are unable to control. As Homi Bhabha on the book jacket describes:

This sober and subtle work draws us into the dark heart of a world where words wound, images enrage, and speech is haunted by hate. Butler intervenes brilliantly in an argument that tests the limits of both legal claims and linguistic acts. She explores the link between “reasons” of state and the passions of personhood as she mediates on utterance as a form of incitement, excitement, and injury.

Butler argues that “we exercise the force of language even as we seek to counter its force, caught up in a bind that no act of censorship can undo” (p. 1). She reflects a common set of poststructural feminist assumptions that individuals are political actors constituted in language and inescapably determined by the ways in which language is used, with and without our knowledge and intent. Language, for Butler, is performative, is always action, and thus words are always deeply entrenched in the political. We are shaped by our historical and cultural contexts which constitute our uses of language (including our legal practices and procedures—her particular focus here). She examines how we institutionally and morally attempt to control speech injuries (for example, liable and censorship) even as these same systems support their continuation. She is particularly interested in the formation and uses of hate speech and considers why we should be cautious about the use of state speech to regulate it.

Butler does not speak directly to our issues as social education researchers, but the notion of language as action raises provocative questions for us. Rather than following our research with action (as Lincoln suggests), what if we were to consider our language as action? Might we consider the injurious possibilities of our uses of “researcher language”—the potential of our research reports to silence, censor, and claim authority that is situated in our roles and political positionings rather than the value of our work. How do we as researchers become more aware of the naming and language uses that have outcomes beyond our control, injure others by their implied power, and yet can only be partially understood by us? How can we be more explicit about the theoretical assumptions and hierarchical positions we hold that direct attention in particular directions and favor some voices and points of view while concealing others?

Butler does not have solutions, but she offers some suggestions. Like Lincoln, she is critical of modernist approaches because by using them we “reinvoke the contexts of oppression in which they were pre-
viously used” (p. 160). To counter this tendency, she suggests reappropriations or new uses of traditional terms in order to create new meanings. For example, reappropriating “equality” in ways that include those who were previously excluded. These meanings, however, can not be predetermined because this is not just an assimilation and accommodation of old terms. Reappropriating requires that the meanings are not secured in advance. They are both continually in the making and tethered to the past, but open to reworkings. This non-foundational (or less-foundational) way of situating ourselves, results in unpredictable possibilities. Butler argues:

I would insist that the speech act...is one whose contexts are never fully determined in advance, and that the possibility for the speech act to take on a non-ordinary meaning, to function in contexts where it has not belonged, is precisely the political promise of the performative, one that positions the performative at the center of a politics of hegemony, one that offers an unanticipated political future for deconstructive thinking. (p. 161)

The possibilities offered by new and non-ordinary meanings, the promise of the performative, and the potential to continually examine the hegemonies of an inequitable society are aspects of Butler’s poststructural feminist perspective that I find useful. As social studies educators we probably cannot live continuously in the postmodern, but neither can we persist within our unexamined language uses and the potential injuries incurred from our traditional research.

The second book is Laurel Richardson’s Fields of Play. Richardson, a sociologist, surveys her own writings from the past 10 years by looking at them as works-in-progress. She situates each piece in an autobiographical context, what she calls “writing stories,” and then writes into and around her papers and publications in ways that blur the boundaries between her personal and academic selves, between autobiography and theory, and between post-structuralism and everyday experience. Richardson’s book is beautifully written and engaging.

What is most striking is the seamless web she spins between her life and her research. There is no distinction between autobiography and writing, between doing research and acting in the world. In contrast, Lincoln describes the “orchestration” (using a term coined by Guba and Lincoln, 1989) of research where individual researchers, or researchers within a community of scholars, are at different phases of doing the research. “Some members of the community may be in an action phase, while others are in a reflection or theorizing phase; multiple hermeneutic circles of research may be underway at a single time” (p. 25). Richardson’s reflections on and reworking of her own papers
and publications creates a more ambiguous and fluid process of research action. Lincoln argues for connections between doing research and action on our research; Richardson accounts for how "the specific circumstances in which we write affects what we write . . . [but also how] what we write affects who we become [my emphasis]." Lincoln acknowledges the situated nature of research; Richardson pushes the boundaries of what counts as the contexts and influences of our research and writing.

Richardson also employs a dual critical perspective that I found refreshing and captivating. As she explains: "I want to criticize standard sociological texts and to 'deconstruct' the text I was writing" (p. 37). Lincoln is critical of modernists research assumptions and research that is "sequestered from policy debates" (p. 17) but her paper lacks the self-reflective critique so evident in Richardson's writing. Richardson consistently turns a critical eye inward. As an example, in a paper presented at the American Sociological Association (ASA) 1989 annual meeting, she ends the paper with two conclusions and a theoretical appendix. This format allows her to ask questions from different positionings about how she may be reinscribing the very precepts and power positions she is criticizing. Critique is necessary because we are shaped by language, metaphors, and habits of mind that are not easily shed. We have grown up in the soil of the theories and research we critique; whether conscious or not of these roots, they continue to feed us as we grow in new directions. For Richardson, this rootedness requires that we are vigilant over our own assumptions, political motives, uses of language, and the unintended meanings created from our work. As she asserts:

How one writes one's theory is not simply a theoretical matter. The theoretical inscribes a social order, power relationships, and the subjective state of the theorist. (p. 49)

It is not enough to be critical of others; we must examine our own ideas in light of the criticisms we offer. This kind of critique moves beyond the "reflection, grace, and authenticity" that Lincoln speaks of as requirements for "new kinds of researchers," although these are also important.

One section in Richardson's book traces the evolution of a writing project that involved turning a research interview into a poem. Writing her research as a poem provides a means to deconstructing assumptions and discourses in the social sciences. She says of her poem that it is "both a poem masquerading as a transcript, and a transcript masquerading as a poem. The subtext is political..." (p. 139), it challenges the taken-for-granted aspects of how traditional sociology is constructed. Louisa May, the subject of a social science interview in
Richardson’s poetic portrayal, speaks in the first person. She speaks in the poem about her life using her own categories and priorities, rather than those typically used by researchers. Richardson calls this “transgressive writing” used “not for the sake of sinning or thumbing one’s nose at authority, nor for the sake of only and just writing poetry...but for the sake of knowing about lived experiences that are unspeakable in the ‘father’s voice,’ the voice of objectivity; flattened worlds” (p. 166). For Richardson, literary forms, like poems, plays, and dramas, move people emotionally and intellectually, something traditionally not allowed in sociological writings. “The suppression of these feelings shapes a sociology that is lopsided—lopped off is the body.” So she asks, “How valid can the knowledge of a floating head be?” (p. 167).

Richardson traces the construction of her poem, its presentation at a conference, and a subsequent drama, “Ethnographic Presentation in One Act and Many Scenes” that represents the discussion after the conference presentation of the Louisa May poem. Richardson takes the reader into the process, content, and reflections of the researcher. She sets the poem in a set of wider issues that probe the purposes and meanings of sociological research. Her purpose is not to destroy sociology, but to problematize its concepts and methods by “grounding sociology in lived experience” (p. 153).

Richardson suggests some fruitful possibilities for us as social studies researchers. She demonstrates how experimental texts can be used to challenge conventions urging us to think of new forms and possibilities for our research. While these kinds of literary texts are difficult to write, and few of us have the literary talent of Richardson, they offer possibilities on the boundaries that may help us to critique and extend research in social studies.

Butler and Richardson, for me personally, suggest an uneasy straddling of the modern and postmodern, a both/and rather than either/or position. A both/and position allows for deconstructive critique and action in the world. It situates the researcher in his or her own context and also reflects the ideas that move outside and within communities of scholarship. It acknowledges the distinction between concepts like understanding and action at the same time questions it. The possibilities for renewal and rethinking are richest when modern and postmodern ideas critique and inform each other. Reflective critique as a part of action is at the heart of my orientation to social studies. In this spirit, Butler and Richardson compliment and extend Lincoln’s suggestions for us as social studies researchers.
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As a means of framing a response to Yvonna Lincoln’s Couper Memorial Lecture, let me begin with a personal story. In the early days of planning my research agenda, I conceptualized a series of comparative case studies of teachers teaching American history in the grades where history is typically taught (fifth, eighth, and at some point in high school). First, I was interested in understanding more about how teachers who were identified in their school systems as exemplary actually taught these courses. Second, reviews of the social education literature (Armento, 1986; Brophy, 1990; Downey & Levstik, 1991; Marker & Mehlinger, 1992) suggested that the field could be helped by having access to detailed cases of excellent history teaching, studies conducted using naturalistic methods that portrayed the activities of these teachers in rich detail. Third, I was also aware that the social education literature generally lacked studies in which teachers’ voices and perspectives were given serious treatment in ways that let them tell about the complex nature of their practices. As a researcher committed to generously descriptive, context-situated empirical inquiries, work that attempted to address these three areas held significant appeal.

By the fall of 1993, I had completed two pairs of such studies at the fifth- and eighth-grade levels and prepared to embark on the two high school studies. It would be fair to say that these four preceding studies taught me more about myself as a teacher and especially a researcher than they did about the history teachers themselves. However, I was still not entirely prepared for what I would encounter in the next and fifth step in this series: a study with a teacher who was also a historian.

At the time of the study, this teacher-historian was a recent recipient of a Ph.D. degree in American history from a large east coast university. In fact, she had successfully defended her dissertation (on the topic of progressive educational reform in the city of Baltimore in the early 20th century) and had the degree bestowed upon her in the spring of 1993, three months before my entrance into her high school classroom and into her world. In one particular way, this was a strange world for me. I had never met, much less studied at close range, a Ph.D. historian who relished the idea of using that degree to enhance what she did in her primary role a high school American history teacher. This of course heightened my intrigue with her case.
My undergraduate degree is in American history and I was an American history teacher for 13 years before becoming an educational researcher. I have been interested especially in historiographical debates within the field for a number of years and, by the time of the study, had read much of the same historiography literature my informant encountered in her program. This literature suggests that, over the last several decades, the positivist’s notion of objectivity that once anchored the historical profession has lost its grip in the sea bottom, sending the field adrift on rough epistemological seas (see Novick, 1988). The result: a profession deep in debate over questions of historical “author”-ity, the nature of history as a written artifact, the influence of the frame of reference of the historian on an understanding of evidence, and so forth. I thought these matters would animate much of the teacher-historian’s and my interview conversations. More importantly, I assumed that her understanding of such issues and the debate in the field would likely have significant implications for how she taught her students.

I could envision a classroom structured around genuine inquiry into how historians go about their tasks, read and study historical evidence, make judgments, and self-consciously face up to the problematic aspects of those deeply interpretive practices that had been described in the recent historiographical scholarship. This would prove to be an interesting contrast to my preceding studies which had indicated that even exemplary teachers were largely concerned with having kids “get the facts.” I imagined that a well documented case of the emic perspective of a history teacher thinking about and doing something quite different would furnish the history education community with an exemplar that could push thinking to new levels and provide ambitious history teachers with an interesting model. But things didn’t turn out as I expected.

On the one hand, I was right to assume that our conversations (both formal interview and informal) would be peppered with references to the interpretive nature of historical scholarship, that historians often filled in gaps left open by a lack of historical evidence, and that they had to wrestle with serious questions about how their own frames of reference colored their interpretations. My informant seemed fully aware of the nature of the recent historiographical debate and the thorny epistemological issues it had thrust upon historians such as herself. On several occasions, she intimated that history was largely an inquiry-based discipline in which “facts” tended to be elusive and establishing them far less interesting as goal of inquiry than studying those historical events and agents where the nature of the evidence tended to be contested. Many of these thoughts were noted in the context of comments she made concerning the conduct of her own dissertation. She also thought of herself as one of the new social historians.
who have emerged in the profession in the last several decades. They study history, as she put it, from the bottom up. The recent scholarship of social historians has done much to plunge the profession into epistemological quicksand because it often contests the top-down, political-economic-military, consensus scholarship of the decades prior to the 1960s (see again Novick, 1988, and Seixas, 1993).

On the other hand, despite all her deep knowledge of the profession, its decidedly interpretive nature, and the epistemological turmoil it faced, very little of this knowledge made its way into her ninth-grade American history classroom. I observed every day in that classroom for almost eight weeks while she taught a section of ninth graders about the American Revolution and Nation-Building periods. I took detailed fieldnotes and tape-recorded everything that went on. My catalog of those fieldnotes and tape-recordings suggested a surprisingly traditional approach to teaching history. Students were required to read from textbook and engage her lecture-recitations and question-answer sessions. Later, they were tested on this content. Seventy-percent of the items on that test were standard multiple-choice questions that essentially asked for recall of the content conveyed by the textbook and the lectures.¹

Occasionally, students read from alternative texts in which they considered opposing perspectives on an issue under study (e.g., a justification for the colonists’ revolt against England by a colonial sympathizer and a counterpoint by a French politician). In one of the approximately 35 class sessions observed, my informant introduced the idea of social history and noted its contentious nature. Students spent a portion of this class briefly exploring the Revolution period from the perspectives of African Americans, women, and those typically marginalized by standard U.S. history textbooks. But these more interpretive inquiry-based activities were the exception. The message students received about what mattered most turned on “getting the content” from the textbook, lecture-recitations, and question-answer sessions.²

As the case evolved, I became more puzzled about what I was seeing and hearing, especially as it related to my informant’s remarks in our lengthy interview conversations. In various ways, I had attempted to ask her about the puzzle I was experiencing. Finally, at the risk of being too blunt, I attempted to ask her about what I thought was an apparent “discontinuity” between how she was relaying her understanding and beliefs about history in our conversations and the messages I thought I was hearing sent to students about the nature of history in class.

The tape-recorded and transcribed account of this specific conversation showed that my question was either poorly framed or fell short, for, from my perspective, my collaborator said very little in re-
sponse to my query to indicate that she understood my sense of "dis-
continuity." If she did understand, she responded in my view by com-
partmentalizing: she suggested that the textbook's "authorless" con-
sensus exposition was to be considered the authoritative account for
her ninth graders. Then she noted that the interpretive side of history
was something she engaged her senior AP history students in.

How was I to understand what was happening here? How could
she compartmentalize her views this way? Did she believe "knowing
the facts" was a perquisite to engaging in interpretive inquiry? Did
this mean she was stratifying knowledge here, so that her ninth grad-
ers got less higher status knowledge than her bright seniors? How could
all those textbook "facts" (and there were a host of them) be putative
and open to interpretation simultaneously? How would these ninth
graders, who might later take her AP American history course, recon-
cile this contradiction once they became her senior students? How then
was I to reframe the question I needed to ask? I simply didn't know. I
had great respect for this high school teacher-historian. She and I had
developed a warm conversational relationship that went beyond what
many researchers establish with their informants. She was interested
in collaborating on the study because it gave her a chance to share her
expertise and convey her sense of teaching high school American his-
tory to those beyond her immediate setting. But what was this expert-
tise and teaching sense? I was unsure. I was aware that I dared not risk
offending my key informant by saying something blunt and possibly
construed as accusatory like, "Well, your beliefs and understandings
seem inconsistent with your practices in this class. What's going on?"
I left the site with the puzzle unresolved and feeling stuck on the horns
of an ethical dilemma.

By the time I sat down to analyze the case—pour over fieldnotes
and transcripts, shuffle and reassemble the pieces, create a catalog of
data, thematize, engage in analytic induction—my puzzlement had
given way to frustration. Ironically, I was faced with a task most histo-
rians face, that of filling in the gaps created by conflicting (and poten-
tially nonexistent) evidence. I began the task by challenging my own
assumptions about her case. I wondered to what degree I was project-
ing my own understanding of the recent historiographic changes on
my informant. Did she share the view that a key goal of the historical
positivists' project—the objective representation of events in history,
the arriving at timeless generalizations about the past—had run amuck
and been discredited? Did she accept the revisionist premises of the
social historians? Did she really think history was essentially inter-
pretive, with all but a rather uninteresting set of statements about the past
open to question and revision?

Facing the prospect of having to present a paper about this case,
I had to begin the task of arriving at some array of plausible interpreta-
tions of this seeming paradox. With the fieldnote data, catalog, and transcripts in hand, I began to tell the first of what became several different versions of this case. I studied the data over and over again. The evidence was contradictory. How to resolve it (I had tried before)? How far could I go in applying my own assumptions and frames of reference to this case? How self-reflexive should I be in talking about my perspectives; how obvious a role should my positionality play? The evidence could support a story of contradiction. But how would the social studies-history education community understand such an account? I kept thinking that it was incumbent upon me to present a case for the most plausible set of interpretations that would allow both me and my collaborator to be heard. But I also toyed with the feasibility of constructing a narrative that led readers up to the interpretive dilemma I was struggling with and then left them to draw their own conclusions. Was this acceptable community practice for an untenured, novice interpretivist researcher? In short, what was my authorial role here? How much license did I have? How much license can any interpretive researcher take? And how clear must they be in their writing about the extent to which they are exercising that license?

Second, the question of portraying the case was troubling. Conveying an emic perspective was essential. My informant needed to speak throughout the work as often as was possible. I wanted a narrative that let outsiders in. But I also wanted a narrative that would allow my teacher-historian respondent and myself a deeper understanding of ourselves as researchers, historians, history educators. How was such a narrative to be constructed when the data appeared to conflict? How could I avoid offending my informant in a portrayal that seemed to suggest contradiction and paradox at crucial junctures?

And third, as I sifted through the data I became more troubled by the way knowledge appeared to be compartmentalized and stratified: Were the "average" ninth graders primarily being pushed to get only the ostensible facts, while a richer, more interpretive approach was reserved for bright AP American history seniors? Was knowledge being stratified in ways reminiscent of Jean Anyon's (1980) and Linda McNeil's (1986) accounts? If so, was this acceptable? What was my role here, my call to action? How might my account spur action on my informant's part? Should it? At what cost?

This story and all of the questions I raise around it are leading to several points I want to make in response to Lincoln's essay. While I am clearly sympathetic with the "understanding to action" call Lincoln proffers in her address, I think it one thing to lay claim, for example, to a set of "new educational research criteria" that will foster this call to action, and quite another to engage these criteria in the conduct of real educational studies, especially interpretive ones that con-
cern themselves with emic perspectives, relationships, ethical regard, and understanding and action.

As my questions suggest, I want to focus on research criteria that turn on what Lincoln calls positionality, portrayal, and action. With regard to each of these important areas of interpretive research, I suspect that, Lincoln's call notwithstanding, the community of educational researchers has few clear, widely-applicable guidelines about the actual conduct of field research and concerning the communication of study results. For example, as near as I can tell, the community has not come to terms with the issue of positionality. The full scope of the researcher/author's position within the field or in a research article is something of a mystery in itself. We simply don't know very much about the subtle ways in which an researcher/author's frame of reference is influenced by informants and respondents and, in turn, influences field-based observations, informants' collaborations, and particularly research writing as a genre. As a community, we have tended to spend much of our time attempting, as Lincoln observes, to drive the traces of positionality out of "what we see and hear" and off the pages we write. Nonetheless, we leave our latent marks all about, but still seem to lack a good sense of what to make of them. As a result, we appear to be quite uncertain about the role this positionality now plays, much less understand what role it could and ought to play. I would like to think that my anxiety over this teacher-historian's case makes this abundantly clear.

As an untenured novice researcher attempting to do good work that holds significance to the field and community, it was difficult to resolve these positionality dilemmas by locating clear, widely-accepted guidelines within the extant literature. Yes, one could consult work in the *Handbook of Qualitative Research* or Lincoln's (1995) article on criteria for qualitative research in *Qualitative Inquiry*, but as recent exchanges in *Educational Researcher* (e.g., Cizek, 1995; Donmoyer, 1996; Eisner, 1997; Heshusius, 1994) suggest, applications of these so-called criteria are fraught with difficulty. For example, what does it mean that "positionality is enhanced when the knowledge is generated within and from an entire community...", or that, "research...created by a single individual paradoxically has more limitations than [that which is] negotiated and produced by a polyvocal community" (Lincoln, 1998, p. 22)? What is an entire community? Whose polyvocal community do we mean? Are researchers, teachers, and policymakers all apart of this same community? My positionality may (and did) intersect with my informant's, yet remain distinct in important ways because, despite both being part of a broad educational context, we nonetheless walk about in community (sub)cultures where norms and criteria differ. Issues of positionality may be only the criteria with the roughest applied edges. I suspect that, because of this (and for other reasons),
the larger educational research field has yet to reach a sizable intersubjective understanding the role of positionality.

Closely linked to positionality is the question of portrayal. As the now fourth incarnation of this case above suggests, there are possibly an infinite number of ways to portray the events and perspectives encountered in a study. Which is the best portrayal and who should decide, especially when there is conflict over interpretation? One collaborator, or the other? Both? Teacher practitioners as a community? Journal reviewers as guardians of the norms and criteria of the educational research community at large? Policymakers? How would this work? There are few clear guidelines here either. How one answers the “should question” tends to determine the nature of the portrayal. The anthropologist John Van Manen (1988) speaks of three different types of portrayals in his field: the realist tale, the impressionist tale, and the confessional tale. The foregoing portrayal of this case comes closest to a confessional tale. With some additional spit and polish, but yet essentially in this confessional form, would it reach a wide audience, say, by being published in the American Educational Research Journal? Would it stand muster among that journal’s reviewers. By contrast, would it pass scrutiny with my informant? And would it be received favorably in a widely-read practitioner journal such as Social Education in this confessional form?

To belabor this point, we can say as Lincoln (1998) does that “portrayal is the ability to craft compelling narratives, narratives which give outsiders vicarious experiences of the community, and which give insiders both a deeper understanding of themselves, and the power to act” (p. 26). However, while agreeing that portrayals should do what Lincoln indicates, I want to inquire in the strongest possible way about where such narratives will appear and in what form? Is a realist portrayal acceptable? Or should it be impressionistic or confessional? Multiple forms for different audiences and for different purposes? If so, what are the rules for coherence among accounts? I suspect there is no widespread agreement on these portrayal issues, leaving researcher-practitioners on rocky, difficult-to-navigate terrain.

Lastly, I want to raise questions about what “giving insiders the power to act” means for educational researchers. This is a pivotal feature of Lincoln’s remarks. Her call to action made me wonder again about how the narrative portrayal of this case might propel action on my part and that of my informant. What would this action entail? How would the conflicting evidence be resolved? Would having her read my account (but which one?) encourage her to change approaches, end the way she stratified knowledge, and give her ninth graders more equal access to the higher-status understandings her seniors encountered? Or would she reject my account, labeling it an imposition of my positionality on hers, an affront to her sensibilities? If the latter, what
would be the next course of action? Or, upon the latter, would we declare the experience a failure for both of us? As with issues of positionality and portrayal, this is dangerous territory. And again, researchers have very few guidelines here that are widely accepted within the research community, much less the larger educational context. Saying its time has arrived, and actually doing it, turn out to be very different things.

In conclusion, I would like to maintain that the concerns raised here should do little to derail the ongoing calls to action that animate the work of dedicated interpretive researchers such as Yvonna Lincoln. My questions center on the work that yet has to be done in sorting out what these criteria mean when applied to the actual conduct of interpretive "action-oriented" research. I am arguing that calls to this sort of research take the converted across some very problematic research landscape where there are few good roadmaps and many attractive, but potentially perilous detours. I would like to see greater efforts expended on designing better roadmaps that result in a wider embrace by researchers, teachers, and policymakers alike, roadmaps that take even the most difficult cases into account.

Notes
1 In order to conserve space, I am supplying only the relevant contours of this study.
2 Interviews with a handful of students from my informant's class about what they thought they had learned from the unit confirmed this contention.
3 Arrangements concerning the conduct of the study, left me with the analysis and the writing responsibilities.
4 Perhaps this is why some have taken to calling this sort of work "daredevil research" (see Paley & Jipson, 1997).
5 For an interesting exchange on this point, see articles by Alvermann and Dillon (1991) and Roller (1991) in Reading Research Quarterly.

References


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Over the last fifteen years, the rhetoric of educational reform has been dominated by one word: "standards." Ever since publication of the report, *A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform* in 1983, raising educational standards has been promoted as the panacea for the "rising tide of mediocrity" eroding the nation's "educational foundations" and imperiling the economic future of the United States. The report warned that America was committing "an act of unilateral educational disarmament" and demanded "more rigorous standards" and "higher expectations for academic performance." More recently, Goals 2000 has put millions of dollars of federal money behind the rhetoric of reform through new standards. Many states have followed suit, including New York which will eliminate the Regents Competency Test (the second tier tests once allowed for graduation from high school) in favor of uniform use of the Regents (the first tier) tests.

Two areas have been targeted: higher standards for graduation from high school and higher standards for the teaching profession. While an educator scarcely wishes to go on record as being opposed to higher standards, nevertheless certain features of the standards strategy are problematic. First, historians of education will be familiar with David Tyack's comment about the cyclical nature of national interest in school improvement:

"Reform periods in education are typically times when concerns about the state of the society or the economy spill over into demands that the schools set things straight. The discovery of some problem—America losing in economic competition, the threat of Russian science, poverty, racial injustice, unassimilated immigrants—triggers such policy talk. Policymakers translate these anxieties and hopes into proposals for educational reform." (1990, p. 174)

If Tyack is correct, this may suggest that the more robust state of the economy today than in 1983 presages a coming decline of interest in reform, the recent Clinton-Gore initiatives concerning education notwithstanding. A related problem stems from the reluctance of legislators at both the federal and state levels to address the systemic economic and social problems in urban areas like New York City (see Ross, 1997) and Newark (see Anyon, 1997),

**VIEWPOINT**

Crafting a Culturally Responsive Pedagogy in an Age of Educational Standards

Margaret Smith Crocco  
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Over the last fifteen years, the rhetoric of educational reform has been dominated by one word: "standards." Ever since publication of the report, *A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform* in 1983, raising educational standards has been promoted as the panacea for the "rising tide of mediocrity" eroding the nation's "educational foundations" and imperiling the economic future of the United States. The report warned that America was committing "an act of unilateral educational disarmament" and demanded "more rigorous standards" and "higher expectations for academic performance." More recently, Goals 2000 has put millions of dollars of federal money behind the rhetoric of reform through new standards. Many states have followed suit, including New York which will eliminate the Regents Competency Test (the second tier tests once allowed for graduation from high school) in favor of uniform use of the Regents (the first tier) tests.

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which undermine all efforts at educational reform:

"The seductive lure of standards is that the problems public schools face can be solved by merely being tough-minded, rather than investing in the improvement of schools and redressing the contexts of local schools that include joblessness and diminished tax bases" (Ross, 1997, p. E1)

Politicians are fiscal realists; thus, they seek ways to raise the educational stakes but not the spending. The standards bandwagon offers an attractive, relatively inexpensive, and sound-bite friendly strategy that appears to accommodate budgetary constraints while suggesting concern coupled with action. Finally, gross disparities in spending for education between urban and suburban districts nationwide (with court challenges occurring in only a small number of states) exacerbate all other problems.

Calls for standards have a certain irony in New York, already perhaps the most centralized state educational structure in the country. Likewise, New York City is arguably the most regulated and bureaucratized urban system in the United States with its own parallel set of licensing and curriculum mandates co-existing alongside those of New York State. New York City is also the largest school district in the country, encompassing over one million students, 100,000 teachers and support staff, and more than 1,100 schools. Furthermore, about 30% of its school population is foreign-born. Between 1993 and 1996, almost 130,000 new students from 193 countries entered City schools. As a result, the number of students with limited English proficiency has doubled within the last ten years. Due to the influx of immigrant students and widespread anticipated teacher retirements, thousands of new teachers will be hired in New York City in the coming decade.

In this essay, I offer a cautionary tale from my experience as a teacher educator which suggests how educational systems built on the values of centralization and bureaucratization often produce paradoxical, even counter-productive, ends. In fact, in an educational version of Gresham's Law, the procedures associated with standardization can undermine the very standards the bureaucracy was designed to protect. Two examples illustrate the damage that can be done to education when an emphasis on standards comes without attention to what Mary Dietz (1997) has termed the "moral coherence" of accountability in relation to standards. I interpret the Dietz injunction to include two elements she does not explicitly address: the necessity for policymakers to provide the tools required to effect the educational ends mandated and the necessity to build a system sensitive to the backgrounds and contexts of students and schooling, or "culturally responsive
pedagogy.” I will focus on the latter in this essay.¹

The stories I share suggest the problems with education tethered to the premise that “one size fits all” and of an educational system rooted in what historians (somewhat ironically from today’s vantage point) refer to as the “cult of efficiency.” As applied in New York City, these principles translate to “one teacher fits all schools” and “one lesson strategy fits all social studies instruction.”

Last spring, I witnessed a panel discussion by four social studies professionals concerning the recruitment process for new teachers across the metropolitan New York area. The four participants included a vice-principal from a Long Island high school; a teacher and administrator from a private school in New Jersey; a social studies administrator from a comprehensive New York City high school; and a social studies teacher from a restructured high school in Manhattan. A prospective teacher asked the group what single most important quality they would look for in a candidate for a teaching position. The responses included those one might expect: impressive academic credentials, facility with a variety of teaching methods, and commitment to building a department, among others. However, when the social studies administrator from the comprehensive high school took a turn, his answer came as a surprise: The single most important thing he would look for in a teaching candidate was a file number with the Board of Education.

This response did not appear to have been given facetiously; nor was a quick caveat, clarification, or footnote appended. Without a trace of irony, this educator proceeded to elaborate the critical importance of fingerprinting and file-number assigning to hiring teachers in New York City. His answer represents the reductionism inherent in a system in which the means have become the end, one in which jumping through bureaucratic hoops has become more important than teaching skills, content knowledge, qualities of caring, or intellectual aptitude.

While this administrator’s perspective may not be typical, his twenty-five years had taught him a lesson that does reflect the inner logic of a system designed to “batch process” teachers into New York City’s schools, not one designed to insure quality and contextual fit of teacher to classroom. As a veteran, this man knew that social studies administrators in New York City have little, if any, control over whom they hire. He was also aware that in the last decade the budgetary gridlock in New York State has made the amount of funding for the City uncertain until late July, thus necessitating the hiring of new teachers at the opening of schools in September. Clearly, his response can be considered rational within the Orwellian landscape of teacher recruitment in New York City. Not surprisingly, between 34% and
38% of all new teachers leave City schools within their first four years as a result of these and other factors (Tames, 1997).

The social studies administrator eventually elaborated his statement about teaching qualifications, adding almost as an afterthought the necessity for facility with the developmental lesson, the longstanding boilerplate for teaching social studies at the secondary level in New York City. When one considers the context of this administrator’s workplace, the poignancy of his response intensifies. His high school enrolls thousands of students, most of whom are recent immigrants, African Americans, and Hispanics. Like many other high schools in New York City, the social studies teachers there are largely White, male, and middle-aged. According to student teachers who have been placed there, teachers repeatedly characterize their students in terms of a deficit, culture-of-poverty model during conversations in the teachers’ lounge and bemoan the passing of an earlier more glorious era of students and school. Despite the demographic changes in student body, veteran teachers induct novices into a rigid reliance on the developmental lesson plan. Competent teaching is considered mastery of the developmental lesson along with acquisition of effective classroom management techniques.

Interviews with other social studies administrators around the City, including those who have worked directly for the Board of Education, suggest that this picture is not unique. Continued insistence on this “one-size-fits-all” teaching approach remains endemic to the system. Admittedly, administrators differ in their tolerance for variability in the performance of some of the finer points associated with the developmental lesson, for example, whether a three-minute or a five-minute “do-now” will be allowed. Systemwide, however, few adjustments appear to have been made to address the new social landscape of the schools through more culturally responsive pedagogy.

In fact, in a conversation with an insider knowledgeable about social studies in New York City, this expert explained to me that cooperative learning, a teaching strategy found effective with diverse students by the research summarized in the Handbook on Multicultural Education (Banks, 1995), could not be accommodated within the developmental lesson format. If he is correct, a strategy actually recommended for diverse learners cannot even be utilized in New York City in social studies classrooms wedded to the developmental lesson.

In the title of this essay, I have deliberately juxtaposed the phrase, “culturally responsive pedagogy,” with that of “educational standards” to highlight the tension felt by many educators working in the City today. The nationwide emphasis on this avenue to reform comes at an historical moment when, not coincidentally, a new wave of immigrants
has crowded into urban schools. Politicians champion standards as the (cheap) fix that will forestall degradation of schools from these demographic changes. In my view, however, in a society where intellectual capital is fast becoming the coin of the realm, the education of the next generation of Americans will require more imagination, foresight, and financial support than what is being offered by this new spin on the factory model.

In doing teacher education in New York City, we regularly bump up against a system that colludes to thwart our efforts towards culturally responsive pedagogy in a number of ways: by the insistence of cooperating teachers on the formulaic, monotonous use of the developmental lesson; by class sizes with a minimum of thirty-five students; by budgets so constrained that no new textbooks or teaching materials have been purchased in some schools in years. Moreover, as the graduates of Teachers College seek employment, they encounter what the New York Times describes as a "dizzying web of state laws, city regulations and the teachers' contract, provisions that remain a hallmark of the Byzantine, centralized bureaucracy of the Board of Education." Even more dismaying is the fact that "Teachers looking for jobs in New York City are assigned at random by the central board's personnel office in Brooklyn. They are not required to visit their school before the school year starts or to be interviewed by the principal who will be their boss, their fellow teachers, or the parents whose children they will be educating" (Hartocollis, 1997, p. B4).

As I reflect on the need for culturally responsive pedagogy in social studies for all the nation's children, I am struck by the vast distance between the possible and the actual in New York City. Perhaps my response simply reflects the "serious and profound disconnect" between the views of teacher educators and the rest of the country regarding schools as reported recently in the nation's press. A widely discussed public opinion poll noted that "a majority of us (teacher educators) have declared our intent to prepare teachers for the schools we believe our children deserve" (Imig, 1997, p. 2). Indeed, I do advocate culturally responsive pedagogy both for my own children and for "other people's children" (Delpit, 1995), especially those in the public schools of New York City.

The challenge for concerned educators lies in creating some small space within the rigid and unresponsive school system of New York City for a culturally responsive pedagogy. Some of the small schools, like Central Park East Secondary School, have been successful in this effort. However, such institutions are few and far between. Short of restructuring, I offer three modest suggestions for the incorporation of a culturally responsive pedagogy into the traditional New York City social studies classroom: (1) a critique of the "grand narratives" of our
nation's past through a Howard Zinn (1995) or Ronald Takaki-type (1993) approach to American history, one that focuses student inquiry, for example, on equal rights and their uneven evolution in our nation's past; (2) curriculum which represents, in Emily Style's (1996) felicitous phrase, both "window and mirror" — so that all students can find their experiences reflected in curriculum, as well as opened to the experiences of others; and (3) the development of a sense of personal efficacy in students by creating an atmosphere of respect and caring for them as individuals and culture bearers with their own "funds of knowledge," whatever their ethnic or national origin. Teaching strategies such as cooperative learning, service learning, oral and community history can all contribute to the scaffolding of knowledge from student experience to the acquisition of new ideas that Gloria Ladson-Billings (1995) argues is crucial to this form of learning, in a manner far richer than through the means available under the developmental lesson.

Above all, educating new teachers to be reflective practitioners demands the avoidance of formulas, whether the developmental lesson or the prescriptions of Madeline Hunter. Pre-service students must become professionals who determine what the context demands and who employ a range of methods tailored to suit setting, students, and subject matter. It is very important that they learn how to make their knowlvide meaning to their students' lives.

The master's degree students at Teachers College spend an intensive two semesters in student teaching, one at the junior high level and another at the high school level. The Program in Social Studies has established professional development relationships with a number of schools in which student teachers are allowed freedom and support to experiment with diverse and contextualized approaches to teaching the social studies. We are appreciative of the many City teachers who have worked effectively with our Program in preparing student teachers. Likewise, we are encouraged that so many of our graduates have a commitment to begin their careers in urban schools. Thus, this essay should not be read as yet another "blame-the-teacher" critique of our nation's educational ills. Nevertheless, if teachers are hired chiefly because they have successfully jumped through bureaucratic hoops and can tolerate functioning as well-oiled cogs in a large machine, culturally responsive pedagogy is unlikely to result.

This essay uses the case of New York City as a warning concerning the limitations of educational reform via standards and standardization. At the same time, I do recognize that a role exists for licensing and regulation. However, such procedures are a means to an end, not the end itself. To the degree that current procedures do not encourage and may actually threaten student-centered learn-
An educational system that serves teachers and administrators at the expense of learners and families must itself be reformed.

In fairness to the Board of Education, it is clear that efforts are underway to bring about change in some of its practices. In November of 1997, initiatives were announced to modify the manner in which the hiring of teachers takes place. The Board has established a committee to work with the National Commission on Teaching and America's Future to "prepare, recruit, place into employment, and support the best qualified teachers for every classroom in New York City's public schools" (Tames, 1997, p. 6). Whether this statement reflects a different emphasis from the National Commission's expressed purpose of providing "competent, caring, and qualified teachers" for all U.S. students by the year 2006 remains to be seen (AACTE Briefs, 9/12/96, p. 1). Exclusion of the provisions on competence and caring is troubling, perhaps reflecting a belief that such attributes are simply too much to apply to the New York City context. Despite the announcement of new initiatives which include a proposal for more school autonomy in the hiring process, the steps being taken are extremely limited in scope and will only be operationalized on a system-wide basis very slowly. The distance to be traveled to a culturally responsive pedagogy for New York City public school students, therefore, remains dauntingly vast.

For some beginning social studies teachers, the challenge to their idealism represented by many aspects of this stultifying system can ultimately be defeating. Our task as teacher educators is to gird new teachers for the struggle, help them find space to practice culturally responsive pedagogy, and work to reform a system harnessed to educational standardization at the expense of educational quality.

Notes

I would like to thank Julian Cohen, Stephen J. Thornton, and the anonymous reviewers of TRSE for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay.

1 Culturally responsive pedagogy is a term derived from the work of a number of authors. C.A. Bowers and David J. Flinders (1990) use the idea of "responsive teaching" in their book of that name, Responsive Teaching: An Ecological Approach to Classroom Patterns of Language, Culture, and Thought. Gloria Ladson-Billings (1995) introduces the label "culturally relevant pedagogy" in her article, "Toward a Theory of Culturally Relevant Pedagogy." In addition, Ladson-Billings cites in that article the work of Erickson and Mohatt (1982) on what they call "culturally responsive pedagogy." Paolo Freire's (1970) work on curriculum as liberation is well known and connects with this tradition as well. Freire's work can also be read in a comparative curriculum context in the book, The Curriculum Studies Reader, edited by David J. Flinders and Stephen J. Thornton (1997). The approaches discussed here share with the one I advocate the emanation of curriculum and instruction — at least in part—from responsiveness to students and social contexts.
References


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Observations on Communications to the Readers of TRSE: 25 Years Later

Cleo H. Cherryholmes
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Jack Nelson and I began Volume 1, Number 1 of Theory and Research in Social Education (1973) with a short statement of purposes and a letter to the College and University Faculty Assembly membership and subscribers. It now seems appropriate to revisit those comments on the 25th anniversary of that first issue of TRSE.

First, a few words about the context of that publication. The preceding decade of the 1960s had been heady and exciting for social studies education. It began with the federal government, in response to the Soviet Union’s launching of Sputnik I in 1957, funding for the first time a substantial number of social studies centers that focused on issues of curriculum and teaching. It was surprising and a bit refreshing to find that social studies education was for a brief moment part of a larger national defense policy response. Also, as part of this national policy, the federal government funded the professional organizations of the various social science disciplines to encourage them to address issues of pre-collegiate education. The social science professional organizations did so with a seriousness that was quite new and, as it turned out, quite brief. For a few exhilarating years social studies educators and social scientists together pursued what Jerome Bruner in The Process of Education had called the structure of the disciplines. The decade ended with a certain disillusionment however as federal support for social studies curriculum development and teacher education was sharply curtailed. As federal moneys for the support of social studies curriculum and teaching projects declined so did interest in pre-collegiate education by professional social science associations. In addition, it gradually became clear that the structure(s) of the social science disciplines had successfully evaded detection by social scientist and social studies educator alike, disregarding, for the moment, the question of whether such structures exist.

More important to the wider society perhaps was the growing opposition to the war in Vietnam and the expansion of civil and voting rights to all segments of the population. These developments contributed in complex ways to thinking about social studies curriculum and teaching that were at some remove from disciplinary structure. Social studies educators, for example, have not since then asked the social science disciplines in awe and deference to identify
appropriate content for social education. TRSE was founded in an attempt to increasingly professionalize social studies education as these curriculum development efforts of the 1960s abated. If substantial external funding was no longer to be in our future, then we would have to develop professionally in other ways. The initiation of a research journal in social education, in our opinion, was timely and appropriate.

What I review here are aspects of the conception of social studies education and its professional orientation that we hinted at and alluded to in the “Statement of Purposes and Style for Manuscripts” and letter “From the Editors.” I remain quite proud of some of the things that we wrote in those introductory statements and am comfortable endorsing them again with perhaps an added twist or spin here and there. But there are other things that we wrote that, in hindsight, express nostalgia for what I now reject as mistaken dogmas and beliefs that had driven our efforts of the 1960s, one of these is Bruner’s rhetorically persuasive but mythical conception of disciplinary structures. Such structures, I now believe, never were and apparently never will be. I take this opportunity then to reject, recast, and reinterpret parts of what we wrote.

Our “Statement of Purposes” was general and inclusive. TRSE, we advertised, was designed “to stimulate and communicate systematic research and thinking in social education.” There is considerable evidence that our efforts have succeeded in generating such stimulation and communication. For evidence one need only look at a bookshelf of TRSE issues and survey their wide ranging topics and exchanges. We appealed for eclecticism, for example by encouraging manuscripts that included “Conceptualizations and research from all of the social sciences, philosophy, history and the arts are needed in clarifying thinking and practice in social education.” That original invitation has, I believed, served TRSE and CUFA well. We believed that a wide net should be cast in searching for ideas and practices because there were and remain important disagreements about the nature of social studies education. Intellectual disagreements and diversity for the most part, I am convinced, remain strengths of social studies education if they are embraced as strengths and not reviled as weaknesses.

Whereas the “Statement of Purposes” described our broad ambitions for TRSE, our letter “From the Editors” was more specific about what we envisioned and hoped for the journal. With 25 years hindsight I wish to take issue with some of the views of my youth including some that are now widely contested. I raise the following points not merely out of some autobiographical obsession that I wish to force upon others but because I believe that some of the positions for which I argued at the time and have since come to reject or severely revise speak to on-go-
ing issues in social studies education, the social sciences, and contemporary views about social knowledge and values.

In arguing for a journal such as TRSE we wrote that some characteristics of "a serious, scientific undertaking" may be compromised or subverted where there is no intellectual home for the professional literature for a field of study such as social education. A research journal dedicated to social education, on the other hand, would provide a forum where, we wrote, "an intellectual structure can be built and tested repeatedly against reality." A bit later we added that, "Good theory leads to research and must be subject to empirical testing or it is nonsensical." In these brief references to a "scientific undertaking," tests "against reality," and "nonsensical" theory we consciously invoked the dogmas of empiricism. The dogmas include such structural distinctions as those of: fact/value, objective/subjective, descriptive/prescriptive, theory/practice, analytic/synthetic, logic/rhetoric, theoretical scheme/content of scheme, validity/invalidity, science/politics, and science/literature among others. These empiricist dogmas assert that each concept in each pair is distinct from the other, for example that facts are distinct from values and that science is distinct from politics and literature. The favored term is listed first, for example, facts are preferred to values and science is preferred to literature. Not only did I and many social scientists and social educators endorse these distinctions, we assumed that they were signs of progress. We believed that they pointed in some way to a paradigm, if you will, to which Thomas Kuhn (1962) had recently introduced us. We had a purpose in mind when we pushed this view of science, "The functions of a professional journal, in short, are to increase the rationality of professional activity." Our assumption was that we could make more progress if we could become more rational. At the time it was widely believed that social science and social education were emerging from a stodgy, muddle-headed traditionalism into an era of light and truth that was described by empiricist assumptions.

I now believe, along with a growing number of social scientists, historians, educators, philosophers, and literary theorists and critics that we cannot make good sense of empiricism. For example, we can repeatedly test many of our ideas about social studies education and its effects against our observations but we cannot test them against "reality." We can only test hypotheses and conjectures against our perceptions and how we interpret them. We do not have definitive tests for our hypotheses because we do not know how to construct such tests, Popper's (1959) arguments about falsification notwithstanding. Without definitive hypothesis tests empiricism is neither a coherent body of thought nor a workable scientific practice. If this is so,
a friendly, if skeptical, social studies questioner might ask: Why do we do what we do? Should we continue with our systematic investigations of social education? What is the worth of systematic inquiry?

Here, in brief, are a few answers. At the outset, at least, I follow Richard Rorty:

"If we get rid of traditional notions of 'objectivity' and 'scientific method' we shall be able to see the social sciences as continuous with literature—as interpreting other people to us, and thus enlarging and deepening our sense of community." (Rorty, 1983, p. 203)

Systematic controlled inquiry allows us to tell stories about each other to each other even if it does not give us unmediated access to reality. Stories that emerge from research are valuable to the extent that they are reliable, valid, and generalizable. Reliability and validity in the sense that I am using them have literary as well as scientific overtones. I do not assume that reliability and unreliability or validity and invalidity are distinct conceptually or practically, they are always problematic. Getting back to my story, systematic controlled inquiry allows us to tell stories, some would call them research findings, in the genre we call science. Such stories cannot be interpretively restricted, especially by the dogmas of empiricism. For the moment think of facts and values, objects and subjects, descriptions and prescriptions, theory and practice, analytic statements and arguments and synthetic statements and arguments, logic and rhetoric, validity and invalidity, science and politics, and science and literature no longer as categories distinct from each other but as interpenetrating themes and rhetorical stances. Science, for example, is not distinct from literature, nor is logic distinct from rhetoric. Science and logic, instead, are constituents of literature and rhetoric and vice versa.

If I were writing that first letter today I would urge readers to think of the journal as a place to exchange reliable, interesting, and valuable stories about the social world as they see it and as they wish it to be. How can social education promote a world in which we wish to live? TRSE, in this light, would be a forum for thoughtful, serious, and contested claims about the world as it is and as it is in our desires.

A major purpose of professional journals, we argued, is that they help to clarify arguments and communications. We put it like this, "The functions of a professional journal, in short, are to increase the rationality of professional activity." In 1973, I was inclined to interpret rationality in a hard edged, utility-maximizing sense but I have since abandoned this construction of rationality. This calculating view of rationality must go because we can no longer maintain a coherent and hard edged view of science. Professional journals are successful,
I believe, when they increase the reasonableness, efficacy, and beauty of what we do. I now think of rationality as a reasonableness that is open to interpretation, criticism, and reinterpretation. Interpretation and criticism help us negotiate our way through the stories we tell or wish to tell to each other and what they might mean. They help us sort the useful and the beautiful from the inconsequential and ugly.

If research reports and theoretical articles are, in effect, stories what are such stories about? I believe that research stories, taking a bit of liberty with Dewey’s views on art (1934/1980), are ultimately about aesthetics and beauty. We want things to turn out well. What constitutes such a state of wellness and how we would know it when we got there are themselves questions whose answers constantly recede before us. We deal with these ambiguities and deferrals of meaning by continuing to talk and interpret and criticize. Sometimes it is true that we tell stories about interventions that do not work. But we tell stories about what does not work in order that we can better tell stories about what does work.

To close, if I were to write those two communications today I would try to avoid making a flawed and nostalgic appeal for empirical certainties in the social sciences and social education. I would appeal instead for solidarity in a communal search for a more desirable society and world. I would, if I were successful, look more to the future and less to the past while calling the past the future. Of course, it is easier to separate what ideas will belong more to the past than to the future with the benefit of 25 years hindsight than it is to separate them as I write.

References

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INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS

Statement of Purpose
Theory and Research in Social Education is designed to stimulate and communicate systematic research and thinking in social education. Its purpose is to foster the creation and exchange of ideas and research findings that will expand knowledge and understanding of the purposes, conditions, and effects of schooling and education about society and social relations. Manuscripts reporting conceptual or empirical studies of social education are welcomed.

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Editor, Theory and Research in Social Education
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School of Education and Human Development
State University of New York at Binghamton
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