Social Implications of Fair Trade Coffee
in Chiapas, Mexico: Toward Alternative Economic Integration

by

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Political Organization, Fair Trade Certification Programs

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glossary of Terms</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter One: Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Two: The Legacy of Oppression and the Indigenous Awakening</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Three: The Restructuring of Power Relations in Fair Trade</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Four: Participatory, Social, and Economic Impacts of Fair Trade</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Five: Conclusion</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendices</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1  Three-way dynamic as applied to Chiapas social movement 45
Figure 2  Fair Trade and Organic Premium Prices 58
Figure 3  Contractual relations between certifying agencies, inspectors, and certified parties 69
Figure 4  Yield by number of shade species 85
Figure 5  Average depth of litter and humus layer, by technology 86
Figure 6  Historical Events Impacting National and Regional Production 91
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Commodity Chain – Plot to Consumer 66
Table 2 Certification Criteria Utilized in Chiapas 68
Table 3 Characteristics of Chiapas Organizations 71
Table 4 Average gross income from coffee per hectare of coffee 85
Table 5 Certification costs for Cooperative with membership of 300 87
Table 6 Returns to Labor 89
Table 7 Returns to Labor, with Subsidies 89
Table 8 Returns to Producer/Cost-Price Structures 90
Table 9 Increase in Coffee Productions 91
Table 10 Total Mexico Exports 93
Table 11 Chiapas Share of GDP by Year 93
Table 12 Percent of Purchase Price to Producers 94
Table 13 Additional Income to Farmers and Producer Organizations, including Fair Trade Premium Reported by TransFair USA in Global markets from 1998-2007 95
# GLOSSARY OF TERMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cacique</td>
<td><em>rural boss or agricultural middleman</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Campesino</td>
<td>farmers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comite de vivilancia</td>
<td>oversight committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consejos Supremos</td>
<td>supreme counsul</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>El Fondo de Estabilizacion de Precios</em></td>
<td>Price Stabilization Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional</td>
<td>Zapatista National Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ejidos</td>
<td><em>a commonly owned and ministered piece of land acquired in form of a government land Grant, now increasingly privatized</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ejidatarios</td>
<td>member of an <em>ejido</em>—basicos or derecheros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>U.S. Environmental Protection Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenismo</td>
<td>essentialist view of peasants or rural Community held by policy-makers and/or intellectuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>inhabitants with early historical connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladino</td>
<td>non Indian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesoamerican Maya Communities</td>
<td>strong centralized government with ancient connections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mestizo</td>
<td>non Indian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIsta</td>
<td>those who took control of the operation of PRI, or members of PRI or EZLN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students of the Isthmus</td>
<td>Coalition of Workers, Peasants, and students, a Mexican socialist political organization (COCEI)</td>
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**zapatosmo**

Emeliano Zapato follower or EZLN member, rebels against Mexican state
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATOs or FTOs</td>
<td>alternative trade organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCCSM</td>
<td>Consejo Civil para la Caféticultura Sustentable en Mexico Mexican Sustainable Coffee Civic Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPCO</td>
<td>Coordinadora Estatal de Productores de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CESMAC</td>
<td>Ecological Farmers of the Sierra Madre of Chiapas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLAC</td>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean Producer Assembly—Coordinadora Latinoamericana y del Caribe de Pequenos Productores de Comercio Justo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNC</td>
<td>Unión de Ejidos Lázaro Cárdenas was founded in 1979 with the support of the Agrarian Department of the National Confederation of Campesinos/ National Peasant Confederation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNOC</td>
<td>Nacional de Organizaciones Cafétaleras National Coordinating Committee for Coffee-Producing Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNPI</td>
<td>National Council of Indian Peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCE</td>
<td>Coalition of Workers, Peasants,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCOPA</td>
<td>Commission for Agreement and Pacification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCEI</td>
<td>Coalition of Workers, Peasants, and Students of the Isthmu, a Mexican socialist political organization</td>
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<td>CONAI</td>
<td>Zapatistas’ National Commission of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTO</td>
<td>Community Technical Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certimex</td>
<td>Smithsonian’s Bird Friendly inspection certification</td>
</tr>
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<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Fair Trade Association International</td>
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<tr>
<td>EZLN</td>
<td><em>Ejército Aapatista de Liberación</em>, the Zapatista Army of National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FONASAES</td>
<td>Bancrisa and the Fondo Nacional de Apajoa Empresas de Solidaridad</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTO</td>
<td>Fair Trade Labeling Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMO</td>
<td>genetically modified organisms the United</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICO</td>
<td>International Coffee Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>Standardization International Engineering</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMO</td>
<td>Control for certification of organic products</td>
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<tr>
<td>INMECAFE</td>
<td>Mexican Coffee Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPI</td>
<td>Community Technical Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peasant inspector</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ISMAM</td>
<td>*Indígenas de la Sierra Madre de Motozintla “San Isidoro Labrador” cooperative the)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISO</td>
<td>International Organization for Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NII</td>
<td>National Indianist Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>NISO</td>
<td>International Organization (Consortium) For technical standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOP</td>
<td>National Organic Program, affiliated with USDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCIA</td>
<td>Mexico Organic Crop Improvement Association (Organic Crop Improvement Association)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCIA-USA</td>
<td>USDA National Organic Program (NOP) worldwide, and Naturland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td><em>Partido Acción Nacional</em>, Party of National Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAS</td>
<td><em>Partido Alianzo Social</em>/Social Alliance Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td><em>Partido de la Revolución Democrático</em>, Democratic Revolutionary Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRI</td>
<td><em>Partido de la Revolución Insticional</em>, Institutional Revolutionary Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCIRI</td>
<td>Unión de Comunidades Indígenas de al Region del Istmo, Union of indigenous communities of the isthmus region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCO</td>
<td>Organized Communal Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTT</td>
<td><em>Sociedad Cooperativa Tzabolotic</em>, Mayan Tzotzil People United</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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Social Implications of Fair Trade Coffee
in Chiapas, Mexico: Toward Alternative Economic Integration

Joseph J. Torok

ABSTRACT

The coffee trade in Chiapas, Mexico is a unique approach of sustainable
development and economic integration, demonstrating that local social movements can change behaviors in international trade regimes. The Zapatista community of Chiapas, Mexico, has an impact on the global trade system, where resultant changes begin at the local level. In the southern Mexican state of Chiapas, factors contributing to the Zapatista rebellion have led actors within civil society to form new socio-political organizations capable of changing participation, norms, and economic outcomes during the post-rebellion period (1994 - present). This study explores the dilemmas facing the autonomy of actors in broadening and deepening their roles in the fair trade movement. It argues that innovative practices of fair trade coffee production, originating at the local level in Chiapas from Zapatista reform measures, has a transformative effect on international trade regimes. The Zapatista social movement has aided Mayans and other groups in establishing new linkages where the impacts of fair trade are experienced beyond the local level. Social movement theorists provide an analytical framework necessary to examine these dynamic linkages between civil society, the state, and international trade regimes. However, contemporary Latin American social movement
theorists do not seem to have adequately transcended the dualism between civil society and the state. The importance of this study is that it illuminates how, although the state remains the principle actor, these linkages formed by fair trade have important repercussions for the autonomy of indigenous groups in pursuing independent economic relations. Findings illustrate that fair trade is a viable means to socially re-embed international trade relations, attributing new rules, norms, and procedures to trade regimes. Reorganization in the face of state oppression has enabled a shift from anti-globalization tendencies toward an alternative form of economic integration which has become widely legitimized through a three-way dynamic between civil society, the state, and the international community.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The southern Mexican state of Chiapas had briefly solicited scholarly attention during 1994 in the setting of the Zapatista rebellion. After a well-timed uprising against the state in protest of provisions for entrance into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), continued conflict in the post-rebellion period (1994-present) has led actors within civil society to form new socio-political organizations with the intent of changing rules, norms, and procedures in international trade regimes. This study explores the case of Chiapas and some of the dilemmas facing the autonomy of actors in broadening and deepening their roles in the fair trade movement. It argues that innovative practices of fair trade coffee production, originating at the local level in Chiapas from Zapatista reform measures, have a transformative effect on international trade regimes.

The Zapatista social movement has aided Mayans and other ethnic groups of southern Mexico in establishing new linkages where the impacts of fair trade reach beyond the local level. Social movement theorists provide an analytical framework useful for examining these dynamic linkages between civil society, the state, and international trade regimes. However, especially concerning Latin American social movements, contemporary theorists do not seem to have adequately transcended the dualism between civil society and the state. On the contrary, the cultural autonomy of the Mayans provided them with mobility to enter the international level, thus bypassing the
In other words, because Mexican Mayans could not convey their interests to the state through the public sphere, they opted to bypass it. To accomplish this, they channeled their concerns toward international regimes, similar to a domestic social movement, in which civil society impacts the state, except on a larger scale, in which the movement expands to the international level. Hence, this case study of Chiapas differs from mainstream social movement literature, in that it extends the application of social movement theory beyond the dualism of state-society relations to the international level. As such, this study has a strong exploratory component: A conceptualization of local social movements, and their impact on global trade regimes has not been sufficiently explored, let alone explained, by the relevant literature.

In arguing that fair trade coffee production, originating at the local level in Chiapas, Mexico, is impacting the international trade system, it is necessary to define the concept of regimes and the different dimensions of the international trade regime. The definitive concept of “regime” is subject to scholarly debate. International regimes can be defined as coordinated behavior centered around “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge.” (Krasner, 1985, p. 4) These principles are the fulcrum around which agreements result regarding finance, production, and distribution through both formal and informal organizations and networks. The definitive concept of “regime” is subject to scholarly debate. According to John G. Ruggie, two classes of explanation dominate literature on international regimes and their construction. The first sees regimes as imposed by hegemonic state power. Under this traditional framework, states are perceived as either altruistic—that is, trade relationships may be mutually beneficial; or pressing—where trade relations are an
expression of dominant states’ narrowly defined interests on weaker actors. (Ruggie, 1998, pp. 64-66) This state-centric view argues that regimes continue to constrain the behavior of states toward one another through their most dominant actors. This view is problematic in that if hegemonic state interests are the impetus of regime formation, and sovereignty is the only defense working against the fundamental rules of international trade regimes, then scholars are ignoring the power of economic liberalism as a force which states have difficulty containing. It seems unreasonable to believe that state-centric theories of regime initiation are applicable in describing the contributions and interests of fair trade organizations and non-state actors. The view relies heavily on “logical positivism” with a focus on states that is derived from international relations theory. Without the work of scientists, advocacy groups, and social and non-governmental organizations, global trade agreements would not have come about. Those who ascribe to this state-centered approach, may include Kenneth Waltz, John G. Mearsheimer, and Robert Jervis, Steven Krasner. Traditionally this school of thought has suffered from a serious “small-numbers” problem (small numbers of examples, small populations, lack of statistics, lack of studies), where there are not many replications of states leading to regime formation. (Ibid.) It is necessary to move beyond “objectivist explanations” of regimes because “different approaches construe the social world differently” and regimes are “conceptual creations rather than concrete entities.” (Ibid., p.87) “Ultimately, there exists no external Archimedean point from which regimes can be viewed as they ‘truly’ are”. (Ibid.)

Ruggie explains a different conceptualization of regimes which shows them as expressions of self-interest on the part of the parties, which in terms of trade and the
environment, emanates from individual or group non-state actors. In other words, regimes are constructed, not of states, but of society. Ruggie believes that regimes, like principles and norms, work not only in the causal sense of delivering injunctions against states, but that they also work in a broader communicative and constitutive sense. In other words, they encompass the dimension of meaning as well as causes. The efficacy of regimes, according to Ruggie, involves the intelligible exchange and acceptance of actions by using a framework based on principles and norms—therefore, an interpretive epistemology remains central to how regimes evolve and function. (Ruggie, 1998, p. 86)

In other words, international regimes are not just about power, regulation and governance, about the interests, demands and needs of society. In effect, regimes are subject to transformation in terms of power relations, as new actors have a greater role, and impact the level of openness toward concepts of fairness, social justice, and ecological concerns.

To describe how events in Chiapas changed dimensions of international trade regimes, it is necessary to assess their nature from the perspective of their contemporary actors and constituents; that is, to focus on them as normative social constructs not created by states. For the purpose of this study, I will try to demonstrate that this change is in part due to the influence of fair trade as promoted in southern Mexico. The dimensions of this transformation are economic, including the growing volume of fair trade coffee as a portion of global coffee market transactions; participatory, including how new actors are involved in negotiation and conduct of trading practices; and finally social, including the evolution, organization and networking of those engaged in fair
trade coffee and the legitimacy that comes from communicative action. The fair trade component of the international trade regime is composed of several actors including local civil society, major trading houses, ecologically mindful companies including coffee roasters and distributors, certification organizations, and others. These indicators will be operationalized through a combination of historical analysis of the origins of social opposition and contentious action against traditional state actors, the change from almost exclusively state actors toward non-state actors, and empirical evidence of economic impacts of organizational behavior on trade in southern Mexico. Perspectives for a changed trade regime may therefore trace back to practices that emanated from Chiapas during the period from 1994 to the present.

The case of coffee provides a typical example of fair trade. Coffee companies often claim to practice social and environmental responsibility by utilizing the best available production methods, which support biological diversity, sustainable development, and equitable relationships with small-scale producers. Fair trade coffee is often promoted in US establishments by depicting an image of a stereotypical Latin American community. Typically, these advertising images show several people of various skin-tones and features, representing different indigenous groups associated with Latin American cultural identities. All are dressed as typical farmers in work boots, trousers, and button-down collared shirts. One is wearing a dirty cowboy hat. A row of females stand in the foreground, dressed more traditionally, with facial complexions suggesting a mix of European and indigenous backgrounds. But what exactly are the social risks and realities behind those claims? It can be viewed as both a highly symbolic guarantee of the conditions under which the coffee was produced, as well as a
representation of the connection between third-world producers and consumers in developed countries. “There seems little doubt that shoppers want to show concern and solidarity with growers through acts of generosity.” (Luetchford, 2008, p. 3) However, the image leaves much to be desired in terms of knowledge regarding a mystic culture and the true impact of a simple economic transaction. This is an example of exporting identity in order to influence a link between producers in a developing country and consumers in the industrialized north. The relevancy of the widespread use of such images in contemporary advertising indicates that Western and environmentally conscientious consumers have a growing interest in fair trade products.

Economists differentiate between fair trade and free trade based on how trade liberalization affects economic growth and efficiency. Free trade has been associated with unfairness due to its asymmetrical costs and advantages, where developing countries typically experience lowering wages, greater unemployment, and reduced sovereignty. (Stiglitz, 2006, p. 62) Under free trade, developing countries are not permitted to enact protectionist policies such as import or export tariffs, restrictive quotas, or other actions which may be considered barriers to trade and pose an unfair advantage to participants. Rather, each country shares a “comparative advantage” where trade is based on relative, rather than absolute, strengths (Ibid., p. 73). Proponents of free trade believe it would ideally benefit both locations, or individuals, dependent upon whether they make the correct choices among trade alternatives. However, unequal growth in the global north at the expense of the global south has raised doubts about the benefits of free trade, especially for peasants in the developing world, as they experience difficulties competing with technical production methods of rich countries.
Fair trade, on the other hand, is most frequently defined as the alternative effort to “link socially and environmentally conscious consumers in the north with producers engaged in socially progressive and environmentally sound farming in the south. It is an attempt to build more direct links between consumers and producers that provide the latter with greater benefits from the marketing of their products than conventional production and trade have allowed, while breaking down the traditional alienation of consumers from the products they purchase.” (Murray et. al., 2006, p 180) While the movement does have potential to become an exponentially larger portion of coffee trading transactions, it absolutely does not claim to solve or replace the current neo-liberal trade regime. From a political power standpoint, fair trade has potential to become part of what Peter Evans calls a “counter hegemonic network” which can be used to stimulate globalization from the beneath. (Evans, 2000, p. 230) Thus, in a social movements context, fair trade is worthy of inquiry by its own volition.

Social movements can be considered inclusive organizations comprised of various interest groups, which contain the significant strata of civil society, bound together by a “common grievance” which in most cases is the “perceived lack of democracy in a specific political setting.” (Tilly, 2004, p. 1) This definition was introduced in Tilly’s text *Social Movements 1768 to 2004*, which becomes less useful as he adds what he considers necessary qualities for social movements, which can be considered limiting factors. Tilly later criticized that “activists” extend and dilute the term to explain all forms of collective action. His co-authors in *Dynamics of Contention* Sidney Tarrow and Doug McAdam take a more inclusive view of what qualifies as a social movement, building on the basis that Tilly provides but focusing on the “processes” emphasizing the
various forms of mobilization and contentious action. (McAdam et. al., 2001, p. 314) In view of these reviews, both the Zapatista rebellion and subsequent fair trade movement can be considered social movements. Fair trade is not a regime, yet it is increasingly considered as part of the international trade regime. The traditional dialogue on international regime formation is predominantly comprised of neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists, who claim that the identity and interest of their constituent actors are exogeneous and given. These theorists do not adequately analyze regime formation because regime construction involves norms and subjective criteria, which can be “contestable” if based on “unreflective logical positivist premises.” (Ruggie, 1998, p. 86-87) In addition, a positivist approach to regime analysis suffers from a “small numbers problem,” in that few regimes are formed and not easily replicated. (Ibid.) However, social constructivists have emerged providing empirical evidence that normative factors, in addition to collective identities, shape interests and political behavior in international trade regimes. This research illustrates that norms and identities are institutionalized in bureaucratic structures, not only by states, but as Keck and Sikkink suggest, by the growing role of non-governmental actors and civil society. (Keck and Sikkink, 1998)

The central importance of this thesis is that it seeks to provide evidence for the fact that domestic actors are capable of reconstructing rules, norms, and procedures in international trade regimes. While the state remains the principal actor, the impact of civil society as new actors has important repercussions for states in pursuing independent economic relations. Furthermore, this relationship between international and domestic politics impacts indigenous cultural autonomy and identity, and the degree to which the state-society relationship has transformed after periods of conflict, such as the Zapatista
rebellion. The coffee trade in Chiapas, Mexico is a unique approach of sustainable
development and economic integration driven principally by identity politics and a desire
to strengthen cultural autonomy. It illustrates the capacity to change international
approaches to economic development by expressing actors’ varied identities, cultures,
and worldviews. Fair trade as promoted by the Zapatista community in Chiapas, Mexico,
has an impact on the global trade system where resultant changes are experienced beyond
the local level.

This thesis will explain the evolution of fair trade organizations in Chiapas,
Mexico. An emphasis will be placed on organizational behavior, as well as the dynamic
between state, civil society, and international community in order to explain how
organizational practices of fair trade have resulted in an effect on international trade
regimes.

Chapter 2 illustrates the legacy of oppression in Chiapas, Mexico, and stresses the
social origins of political and economic organization. Chiapas has a diverse population
with a rich and complex cultural history, yet the numerous ethnic groups have been
characterized under the umbrella term of “indigenous peoples”. This chapter will
examine this characterization and illustrate state challenges and peasant activism which
led them to constitute a group. In addition, this chapter introduces historical factors that
influence organizational behavior including land tenure and constitutional reform, as well
as recent trade agreements and economic considerations. Identity and “groupness” as
defined by Rogers Brubaker, and “nationalism” as defined by E. J. Hobsbawm will be
familiarized in a social movements context.
Chapter 3 further examines the construction of international solidarity with Chiapas by describing the role of the state and civic participation in forging nationalism. Colonialism and the role of the state in ethnopoliticization, as well as the strengthening of identity-based claims which are made through civic participation, are part of Hobsbawm’s “National Question” and a dialogue of civic recognition. In this dialogue the issue of agency is examined, where nationalism and civic recognition involve a struggle between macroeconomic progress and resource claims. Cultural identity and autonomy can be used (from above) by government elites as a substitute for economic progress; as well as from below, where differentiation along economic lines allows groups to lay claim to resources, strengthen autonomy, and establish direct linkages with other nations. This chapter shows how the struggle between nationalism and community often leads to ethnic regimes in the making. Myths of nationalism and ethnicity are created by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) which help to build political structures for opportunity – doors to the international community. Second, Chapter 3 examines Judith Tendler’s explanation of a national level dynamic which can be extended to the international level. Third, it describes how Jeffrey W. Rubin’s theory on decentralization impacts regime formation and how it facilitates Chiapas’ economic entrance into the international arena.

Chapter 4 discusses the participatory, social, and economic impacts of Chiapas’ participation in fair trade. Chiapas farmers established a common ground to challenge domestic policies and focus on lessening the gap between coffee producers and consumers. The common ground is their participatory variables: their conscious effort to use entities outside the state and the insurgent struggle of the Ejército Zapatista de
Liberación Nacional (EZLN), Zapatista National Liberation Army, to socially re-embed themselves and focus their indigenous norms, and agricultural traditions on sustainable and organic agriculture and distribution. First, re-embeddedness results from new linkages between southern producers and northern consumers, through the five principles of fair trade, which impact regional organized co-ops, statewide organizations, and transnational linkages with civil society (ATOs and NGOs). Second, the vehicles influencing producers and consumers are labeling and certification rules, which, through a “Commodity Chain,” enable farm families to overcome marketing, language and cultural barriers due to the creation of international homogeny and equity. Third, the intra- and inter-collectivity is build on “syncretic’ identity which impacts new group frameworks to nurture fair trade participation for marginalize groups globally. The social variables involve the global exchange of ideas in order to address problems of ecological, economic, and cultural sustainability. Addressing these security concerns allows for a global exchange of ideas, which impact international trade norms and procedures, and add deeper consideration of local conditions to the processes of negotiation. The economic variables involve the exchange of knowledge, logistics of northern support of fair trade coffee, the economic impacts of fair trade on growers, and how Chiapas fair trade impacts others. The chapter describes the processes of linking growers and consumers and the indicators of Chiapas function in fair trade.

Chapter 5 sums up the principal findings of this thesis, and attempts to show that fair trade in Chiapas has impacted international trade regimes through participatory, social, and economic means.
CHAPTER 2: THE LEGACY OF OPPRESSION AND THE INDIGENOUS AWAKENING

In order to fully understand the impact of local, indigenous organizing and its impact on global trade regimes, one needs to first understand the strength of indigenous organizing in Chiapas. Chiapas is the southernmost state of the United Mexican States and inhabited by predominately indigenous groups. Indigenous strength is a direct result of resisting the state for over five hundred years. Chiapas’s history illustrates that the colonial period is characterized by the Spanish taking control of exportable resources and cultural fractures for the sake of establishing trade routes between the Lacandón jungle and the Belizean coast. Reestablishment of geographical sectors by replacing and relocating small indigenous groups, in order to take advantage of the large labor forces of self-sufficient villages, caused mulattos and Africans to replace Indians in the lowlands, Indians to migrate to the highlands, where shade-grown coffee flourishes, of eastern Chiapas and the Yucatan, and caused indigenous populations to migrate to highland regions, and Europeans and mestizos to dominate the plateau regions. (Farriss, 1992, p. 32) These movements at the time both uprooted and destabilized the Indians; but in later periods they were able to recover from the colonial invasion and reorganize along ethnic lines. (Ibid., 1992, p. 38)

By the seventeenth century, Chiapas was devoid of indigenous governance, despite the fact that the Spanish were located in urban areas, and were financially controlled by Spain’s economic goals. Chiapas farmers were at the bottom of the social
hierarchy. According to Natividad Gutierrez, sociologist at the National University of Mexico, it is significant that they did not succumb to total Hispanization: “Historians have commented on the easy assimilation….into Spanish structures, but this social group did not survive the eighteenth century; deculturation, loss of influence, and mortality account for their disappearance…. If the construction of mestizo and Indian identity ran parallel, and both were exposed to the increasing effects of Spanish territorial organization, immigration, and evangelization….the more durable basis of identity for the people who did not become mestizos was the fervent embracing of Catholic iconography, acquired along with other important traits…” (Gutierrez, 1999, p.36) Their underlying, traditional, pre-Colombian ethic of self-sufficiency, and the marketability of Mayan crafts and products, were reasons the culture was not totally replaced by Spanish influences. This latter factor was economically important to international trade (Ibid. p. 39), and assisted in the preservation of their identity. Their ethnic traditions combined with Christianity enforced their propensity for “community leadership”. The traditional Mayan philosophy of man’s “bond with the sacred at the corporate level was a collective enterprise”. (Farriss, p. 318) One example of Chiapas’ rise above the Spanish attempts to control “all access to the sacred,” is that, in 1610, they asserted their Mayan identity by capturing the power to ordain their own Maya clergy. Another example is that, in 1712, Chiapas instituted their own image of the Virgin. These exemplified the attempt to control their identity in the face of state challenges. They also established that there is a link between religious leadership, though it is part of “ritual office”, and “community leadership”. (Ibid. p. 318) Thus it is established that Chiapas identity has been faced with state challenges, which have been confronted through indigenous organization.
Indigenous Groups, State Challenges, and Peasant Activism

This section explores some of the state’s challenges to the autonomy of actors which helped generate the broadening and deepening the fair trade movement. In examining the greater argument that innovative practices of fair trade coffee production, originating at the local level in Chiapas from Zapatista reform measures, have a transformative effect on international trade regimes, we must examine the origins of organizational behavior which has effectuated this transformation. The Zapatista social movement has aided indigenous Mayans and other groups in establishing new linkages where the impacts of fair trade are experienced beyond the local level. However, these linkages between groups are the result of colonial masses and state influence on civic belonging and civic organizations. According to Rogers Brubaker, “Although participants’ rhetoric and commonsense accounts treat ethnic groups as the protagonists of ethnic conflict, in fact the chief protagonists of most ethnic conflict—and a fortiori of most ethnic violence—are not ethnic groups as such but various kinds of organizations, broadly understood, and their empowered and authorized incumbents”. (Brubaker, 2004, p. 14) This is primarily due to the fact that they possess material and organizational resources, including “particular ministries, offices, law enforcement agencies, and armed forces units; they include terrorist groups, paramilitary organizations, armed bands, and loosely structured gangs; and they include political parties, ethnic associations, social movement organizations, churches, newspapers, radio and television stations, and so on”. (Ibid.) In the case of Chiapas, two forces of identity are in competition, “the self” and “the other” where “self- and other-identification are fundamentally situational and
contextual” (Ibid., p. 41). Opposition by the Mexican state is considered the protagonist for invoking the “processual, interactive development of the kind of collective self-understanding, solidarity, or ‘groupness’ that can make collective action possible”. (Ibid. p. 34) Civic environmentalism is therefore the result of an evolution of solidarity among indigenous groups, as well as the re-construction of identity and “groupness”, which will later be examined through a social movement context. (Brubaker, 2004, p. 4) Amid challenges from the protagonist state, organization was able to occur on the local level by civic initiatives during the rebellion itself and subsequent fair trade organization. Civic champions and emerging intellectuals, both indigenous and non-indigenous, have played a key role in identity formation and creating the myth of nationalism. In sum, Brubaker’s claim is that states influence group formation, whether directly or through polarizing forces, strengthening the identity of the opposition. The state helped forge Mayan identity by oppressing them; Mayans later successfully circumvented the state, still perceived as adversarial.

Social and political changes, including extensive land use and land tenure reforms, were incipient to organizational behavior occurring in Chiapas. As one of the poorest states in Mexico, subsistence agriculture based on the collective land-holding system known as *ejido* has been vital to economic security. Security was threatened by the influx of foreign investment and Mexico’s inclusion into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In 1992, to facilitate that inclusion, the federal government reformed Article 27 of the constitution to allow *ejido* land to be purchased by corporations and foreign investors. Article 27 was originally established in 1917, leading to an expropriation of land to indigenous groups for collective purposes beginning in the
1930s under President Cardenas. The original intent was to solidify the euro-Mexican elite’s positions and keep indigenous people tied down where they were. (Rus et. al, 2003, p. 3) The influx of migratory Guatemalan farm workers, accompanied by a doubling population between 1970 and 1990, drove Mayans deeper into the Lacandón jungle as well as toward urban centers in Chiapas, including the cities of San Cristóbal, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, and Tapachula. The *ejido* lands which were once considered inalienable to indigenous populations, were gradually ransacked by the state and sold to or absorbed by corporations. Thousands of families, with permission negotiated by the Red Cross, took refuge in the hills of Chiapas, during 1994, where they formed the basis for the EZLN (Zapatista National Liberation Army), declaring war against the state. (Bellinghausen, 1995, p. 134) In approximately 30 years, land tenure and the economic foundations of Chiapas’s indigenous societies were swept away.

This led to a credit crisis and court struggles over indigenous people’s land tenure. Peasant workers’ vulnerability to threat of losing their land further shaped the level of production for remaining producers, making them less likely to receive credit. Crop diversification, inter-cropping and the scattering of plots were technical options which reduced the risk, yet the problem continued. Historically, credit has been made available mostly to the largest producers, but not extended to small-scale farmers and women due to a perceived lack of reliability. Moreover, credit usually aids in the purchase of “Green Revolution” technologies that carry an extreme level of risk to those without mechanical knowledge or maintenance capabilities. The perception of power that peasant groups and individuals believe they possess to deal with changes in the “environment, market, and/or political organization inevitably alter the ability of different actors to earn a livelihood”.

16
Therefore, indigenous people reorganized in order to strengthen their economic and political standing.

Coffee cooperatives, church-based organizations, and *ejido* unions including *campesinos* or peasant farmers, which took hold in Chiapas in the 1930s and 1940s, were now united in the 1980s by common economic goals rather than discrete identities. It began a pattern of community organization which allowed civil society in Chiapas to overcome divisive state forces. (Rus et al., 2003, p. 112) This pattern including the use of these organizations, is a manner of action in which people utilize existing resources including “production means (land, environment, skills, technology, capital, market access), and social means (household members, kinship patrons, and political and/or business organization, religion and other social values that give them rights).” (Bacon et al., 2008, p. 72) The ultimate goal was to locate their own economic standing and secure their cultural autonomy through solidarity. Their vital challenge was to take locally anchored organizations, groups, and individuals, and “articulate their concerns in such a way as to connect with distant actors and construct transnational networks and other forms of interaction.” (Olesen, 2005, p. 204) The Mayans from southern Mexico therefore hoped to get positive reaction from the state as an ally, but instead lives were upheaved: “A campesino who had lost everything except his life commented, “We asked for a house and they sent planes, we asked for piping and they sent canons, we asked for doctors and teachers and they sent us soldiers—this isn’t going to help us live…. They had been applauded by thousands of Mexicans and admired in many parts of the country and the world. They played hosts to thousands of visitors during 1994 and in preceding years, and like thousands of families in the rainforests and hills of Chiapas, they formed
the support base for the controversial Zapatista National Liberation Army.” (Bellinghausen, p. 134) Therefore, still being considered and treated as enemies of the state, instead of depending on the state, they looked for international agents to support their cause of autonomy and defense of traditional livelihoods.

In addition to land tenure, the constitution, NAFTA, and the credit crisis, there are historical factors which have influenced preliminary organizational behavior that led to indigenous groups. Mexico’s indigenous population is not without cleavages, and is considered rather numerous and diverse. The 2000 census in Mexico identified “6,950,567 Mexicans who spoke an indigenous language – the measure by which the government defines a person as indigenous”. (Mattiace, 2003, p. 1) Anthropologists, however, consider this figure to be an underestimation, and would rather cite Mexico’s fifty-six different categories of Indian peoples, approximately 14 categories in Chiapas. (Gutierrez, 1999, p. xviii) It is documented that Spanish is not the first language of the majority of the population of Chiapas. The ethnic diversity of the region early in the 1520s was evidenced by four spoken “indigenous language families: Mixe-Zoquean, Oto-Manguean (the Chiapanec),” several distinct Maya languages, and “ Uno-Aztecan” (speakers of Nahua, who occupied certain towns). (Cahill and Tovias, 2006, p. 118-119) By 1982, bilingual education became necessary and was sanctioned by the Mexican Constitution in 1991: the entire population of primary school aged students spoke indigenous languages. (Gutierrez, ibid. p. 64) Notwithstanding perspectives, it evidences that native Mexicans were geographically dispersed, and that there was very little communication and coordination between them. Currently, visitors to Chiapas are mainly aware of Tzotzil (291,550 speakers) and Tzeltal Maya, (278,577 speakers).
Besides these, (according to the 2000 census) the next largest groups in Chiapas spoke Chol (10,806), Zoque (41,509), Tojolabal (7,667), Kanjobal (5,769), and Mame (5,450).

(Schmal, 2004) The question of how Indians became actors in the political system during the 1990s is deeply rooted in history, not only in cultural and linguistic modeling representing a diversity of cultures and different natural environments, but by primary activities including agriculture and services. (Gutierrez, 1999, p. 6)

A major transition point in understanding groupness in Mexico occurred during the 1970s, prior to which scholars from Mexican universities, largely Marxist, focused on grand schematics rather than particular differences among ethnic identities. They questioned the anthropological focus on the study of individual communities, insisting that they rather be placed in the larger context of Mexican nationalism. (Nash, 1995) However, the structural organization of indigenous groups has revolved around the social challenges during the rebellion period, and has gradually strengthened communities on the local, regional, and global level. In many respects, indigenous communities in the Lacandón jungle were already autonomous from the state, since the state was not providing social services. Autonomy was thus not simply strategic resistance to the state, but a survival alternative to state-sanctioned organization. As corporate infrastructure developed and migration took place, the isolation and homogeneity which ensured the mestizo campesinos’ cultural integrity of indigenous communities was threatened and autonomy from state intervention had become fractured. Linkages of ladino (mixed-descent mestizos) became evident as highways connected markets and people migrated between rural and urban areas and the Lacandón forest. Development agencies, state intervention, protestant conversion, political parties, and female participation led to the
pluralization of communities. By the 1980s communities had virtually “exploded” wherever economic, political and cultural interests collided. (Ibid. 1995) Peasant, human rights, and international NGOs, organized on regional and local levels since the mid-1980s, took full advantage of the political vacuum opened wide by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in order to mobilize peasants.

Therefore as the condition of peasant activists is deeply rooted in historical events, so is their belonging in terms of groupness, identity, and as a nation. On January 1, 1994, the EZLN seized power across much of Chiapas, comprised almost entirely of ingenious peoples, and asserted a declaration of war, entitled *Ya Basta! or Enough!* on the Mexican government, encouraged by the charismatic leadership of Subcomandante Marcos. Public demands were directed toward the state, primarily requesting the provision of basic needs: housing, healthcare, and food. It remains difficult to believe that these public demands were all that was desired, since it seems unrealistic to both declare war on the Mexican state and expect agricultural subsidies and aid. Rather, these statements were geared toward the greater cause of uniting peasant Mexicans, while drawing international attention to the current “plight” of indigenous peoples. Throughout the 20th century the Mexican state has attempted to assimilate these groups into mestizo society through policies called “indigenismo”, an active attempt to categorize different and specific ethnic groups as indigenous. (Mattiace, 2003, p. 7) Along ethnic lines, the fifty-six Supreme Councils of Ethnic Groups were founded in 1975. In light of the character of these groups, the discourse on indigenous rights “could have the potential to be radicalized”; therefore, before the state grouped them, they tried to keep them separate. (Mattiace, 1995, p. 62) Thus, in studying the Zapatista social movement,
ethnic conflict should not be understood as conflict between groups, but rather as a process of politicization of ethnicity, initiated by the state, or as the rebellious response the state’s stimuli.

A review of the literature will affirm that a shift in indigenous identity has resulted following the Zapatista conflict in which people of diverse ethnicities emphasize solidarity among one another in vindication of ethnic politicization processes by the state. The identities which they carry have resulted from a shared history of oppression stemming from fundamental redirections of elitists’ nationalist programs for statecraft, and the establishment of an ethnic regime.

Because of state oppression, the indigenous people of Chiapas managed to consolidate identity and achieve solidarity. The beginning of this chapter presented the importance of group identity, nationalism, and the intersection of identity group formation and politics, supplemented by background information and key terms, in order to facilitate understanding of postmodern ethnopolitical theory in Mexico. Postmodern ethnopolitical theory will be operationalized through a critical analysis of the literature, providing evidence that state oppression affects solidarity among indigenous groups. Finally, the conclusion will link postmodern ethnopolitical theory to the outcome of a constructed indigenous identity.

National Projects: A Question of Agency

While contemporary ethnopolitical theorists focus mainly on participation within local civil society, by which people aim to strengthen identity-based claims, such as indigenous rights, other scholars add that conflict has resulted from an ecological and
economic crisis for which the Mexican state is responsible. In accordance with E. J. Hobsbawm’s idea of nationalism, the term “nation” is directly attached to the concept of citizenship and sovereignty. In the context of economic crisis and weakening state corporatism in Chiapas, struggles of citizen recognition emerged and continue as a result of a political stalemate with the state. Hobsbawm’s national question lies in the issue of agency: cultural identity and autonomy can be used (from above) as a substitute for economic progress; as well as from below, where differentiation along economic lines allows groups to lay claim to resources, strengthen autonomy and establish direct linkages with other nations. Hobsbawm believes that groups mobilize around specific interests. (Hobsbawm, 1990) Differences between indigenous groups become salient when specific organizations or individuals, including ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, are behind group formation. However, communities in Chiapas were forged around specific interests. This can be attributed partly to Subcomandante Marcos, an iconic figure of the EZLN movement. It is also attributable to the state and increased networks within peasant society. Proto-nationalism has given way to opposition of the state. Nations can also be considered the product of overcoming cultural divisions.

In *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson points out the problem of communities, in that nationalism is a deep horizontal relationship where the citizens conceive images of one-another, citing Gellner, providing a sovereign realm. (Anderson, 1991, p. 8) In Chiapas, communities were divided along socio-cultural boundaries. Cultural exchanges between groups was limited, therefore the explosion of communities involved a project of social reconstruction surrounding indigenous and mestizo supporters of the uprising. Indigenous alliances with mestizos who share their poverty
simultaneously challenged control by caciques—indigenous leaders co-opted by the *Partido de la Revolución Institucional*, Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) officials. Hence, the boundaries of indigenous identity have widened from putative homogeneity to ethnic plurality. The people of Chaipas overcame their ethnic divisions by social organization and opposition against the state. They overcame their language divisions. They therefore became a social movement against the state oppression to which they had been subjected since Spanish colonization. As a result, they became a *pan-ethnic* community, as explained by Anderson. In the context of nationalism, there are two distinctions, according to Anthony D. Smith, ethnic and civic. Since Chaipas is composed of multitude of indigenous ethnicities they exemplify of civic nationalism. (Smith, A.D. (1987) Ethnicity and nationalism projects identity on people who are concerned with their social justice, ecological concerns and equitable trade relationships. Therefore, Chiapas ethnicity has the capacity to transform the fair trade regime.

Anthony Marx also contributes to the framework by explaining that race and ethnicity are merged with national projects in order to create ethnic regimes. The Mexican government has focused primarily on maintaining stability and fostering economic growth as part of that regime. (Earle and Simonelli, 2005, p. 23) This regime is facilitated through organizations and the state. In turn, the state provides the impetus giving people reason to organize and create a political consciousness that promotes mobilization and radicalization. (Marx, 1998, p. 265) In the case of Chiapas, once the Mexican state did not duly represent them, the indigenous groups began to circumvent state authority and make direct linkages with the international community.
Subcomandante Marcos, Indigenous Groupness and the Onset of Identity Politics

Since 1994, the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN), Zapatista Army of National Liberation, has been presented as a political organization with collective democratic principles, reminiscent of Mexico’s revolutionary past, as well as a hierarchical organization based on authoritarianism, focused on projecting its own political interests onto its constituent population in the name of their own views regarding neoliberal economics or NAFTA. One lens is based on a democratic view of participation, and the other on orthodox Marxism, with the goal of dissolving the Mexican State. Although the EZLN engaged in a discourse which seems to have shifted from leftist socialist toward nationalist and revolutionary in a traditional sense, neither the EZLN nor its leader, Subcomandante Marcos, explicitly utilized a discourse of identity. Following the Zapatista rebellion, autonomy became the principal discourse which the high command seemed to be derived from scholarly advisors, rather than indigenous sources. Zapatista leadership was comprised of mestizos, and did not include indigenous leaders until immediately before the uprising with mediating civilian recruits called the Clandestine Indigenous Revolutionary Committee (CCRI), primarily for negotiation and relations between societal levels. Resulting from this discourse was the press, which played a central role in engaging in identity politics. The aim of the Zapatista leadership was to create its own mythology of indigenous nationalism and establish a leftist agenda under the guise of indigenous rights. Groupmaking has thus become a project which is defined by external factors, while groups were not previously defined in the sense they were during the conflict period. In this case, ethnopolitical
entrepreneurs were able to utilize the available social base. Although the EZLN was largely connected to pre-existing peasant organizations, it appeared to be “the armed expression of deep social conflict” at the regional level. (Washbrook, 2007, p. 9) Although its discourse has evolved, it operated based on a pre-existing agenda of political self-interest.

In *Ethnicity Without Groups*, Rogers Brubaker says that “by reifying groups, by treating them as substantial things-in-the-world, ethnopolitical entrepreneurs can... ‘contribute to producing what they apparently describe or designate”. (Brubaker, 1991, p. 10) Opposition to the state is the response to state pressure. By drawing on indigenous organizations they control, the Zapatista rebels are able to reach both a global audience through media relations and further legitimize their role as actors among their own constituency. He further explains that political actors interpret acts of conflict and violence in ethnic terms, taking advantage of the “generalized legitimacy of ethnic and national frames”. (Ibid., 17) Utilizing schemas, narratives, and environmental indicators they cognitively advance a construction of their perspective on the world. The case of Chiapas illustrates that the pursuit of groupism is according to individually defined interests, rhetorical claims based on those interests in the name of other groups, self-awareness of the divergence of interests, and that groupness changes with identity and legitimized perception. In addition, Thomas Olesen states that “resources often come to social movements via the participation of ‘conscience constituents’”. (Olesen, 2004, p. 33) They have material and psychological resources permitting them to facilitate organizations with little or no bearing for them personally. They also provide structures and organization for communication and mobilization.
While there is generally disagreement among scholars about the origins and political aims of the EZLN, there is very little argument that Chiapas has undergone a period of serious economic problems which spurred reorganization in society, opening the opportunistic door for people to stand behind Subcomandante Marcos. These problems include an increase in Guatemalan migrants beginning in 1983, and a sudden drop in coffee prices in 1987, which resulted in an increase in undocumented workers, ecological problems due to over-intense land use, and rising poverty levels. (Rus, 2003) Additional challenges included rising inputs, unobtainable credit, and unbalanced exchange rates discouraging exports. Many of these events resulted from constitutional reforms which hit Chiapas’s indigenous societies in 1970, sweeping away their agricultural foundations and forcing them to look for an alternative base of identity and community. In the search for solidarity, they turned to expectations based on an international human rights framework, which emerged from a global consciousness of the human condition. (Olesen, 2004, p. 38) It demonstrates that solidarity can be derived from transnational movements built on identity and understanding which exists in informal organization and previous solidarity activism. (Ibid., p. 40) Solidarity is therefore a social construction, based on transnational framing and communicative action, which includes that of human rights and the human condition. A significant part of this mobilization structure was the Catholic Church, which served to strengthen the community base against struggles for justice, civil rights, land, and democratization, while simultaneously providing an organizational framework with an ideological basis for the re-conceptualization of ethnic identity.
Role of the State

As independent peasant organizations began to emerge in Chiapas during the 1930s and 1940s, to make up for the lack of state funding, indigenous groups began to fight against local caciques, rural bosses who serve as agricultural middlemen, and Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) offices to control municipal budgets (Mattiace, 2003, p. 16). The state response was a policy of co-optation and selective repression of community leaders and radical peasants. Analysts and scholars of Mexican indigenous movements believe that the state response was part of a larger effort to weaken the PRI, traditionally associated with land-owning elites and both Indian and ladino party bosses. In sum, the context of economic crisis and weakening corporatism, coupled with agricultural challenges, signaled a form of state-sanctioned repression, which was key to constructing the consciousness of peasant activists. As part of a strategy to silence peasant organizations, the Indigenous Conference was held in San Cristobal de Las Casas in 1963. (Harvey, 1998, p. 123) Governor Suarez of the state of Chiapas used it as an attempt to lure church officials into co-optation and bind the church and state, thereby expanding the state’s apparatus in Chiapas. This plan backfired by providing a networking forum for community leaders, peasant academics, and others to voice their shared complaints to state officials. (Washbrook, p, 13)

Anthony Marx (1998) noted that national projects are defined in order for states to mobilize ethnicity for the sake of constructing national identities. Agrarian reform was the single most important instrument for creating a state institutional framework in order to generate further legitimacy among Chiapas’ peasant population. Statecraft and
agrarian reform had led to the emergence of “zapatismo”, indigenous Zapatista communities, in the Lacondon forest. The movement emerged on the outskirts of state-controlled areas primarily because constitutional reforms spurred by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) had alienated peasants, inciting support for the EZLN. In the 1970s, a long history of state corporatism had begun, through which agricultural subsidies were intended to keep peasant populations dependent, while peasant leadership and local elites which might be potential adversaries could be co-opted into government programs. The state embarked on a process of colonization, rather than redistributing the existing land; therefore, most of the agrarian reform involved uninhabited federal areas protecting elite land owners at the expense of the rainforest.

Agrarian reform was concentrated in certain areas. From 1950-59, 46.1% of national land suitable for cultivation were distributed to 12 cities, mainly in the Lacondon rainforest. During 1970-79, 28% of land grants to ejidatarios and 12% in 1980-84 was in the same colonization area. (Washbrook, 2007, p. 20) Immediately following the initial reforms, the government attempted to politically reconcile with peasants for the brutal repression of a 1968 student movement regarding land tenure. In 1982, conservative elite land owners elected Miguel de la Madrid president and Absalon Castellanos Domingues state governor of Chiapas, which resulted in further repression of peasants, as both endeavored utilizing peasant organizations to promote elite interests by militarism and graft in favor of prominent landowners. In 1992, the CNC or National Peasant Confederation, was supported by Mexico’s government and PRI leaders in order to fracture and co-opt the peasant uprising. While CNC members obtained land preferences and government subsidized credit lines, state actions only deepened polarization between
the state and civil society. Ultimately, as a result of agricultural policies, the 1990s saw an escalation of conflict between land-owning elites and the state on one hand, and the Catholic diocese of San Cristobal, peasant groups, and indigenous peoples on the other. Along with fights to control municipal government funds, the politicization of ethnic identity continued. (Ibid. 2007)

In 1992, land reform and the corporatist policy were ended in order to appear more economically liberal to other members of NAFTA, under President Salinas, triggering the rebellion. In the aftermath of the rebellion, the EZLN contributed to end the PRI party majority in the legislature during 1997 and aided in the election of Vincente Fox to Party of National Action (PAN) in 2000. (Washbrook, 2007, p. 34) Even though the EZLN opposed constitutional reforms on indigenous rights, it is credited with placing them on the agenda. According to anthropologists, George and Jane Collier, “Civil society has flourished, responding to the Zapatistas’ call to revitalize Mexico’s democratic life and social organization. The Zapatistas have sparked new attention to gender rights. The independent labor movement, to which Zapatista had ties before the rebellion, has advanced Peasant and indigenous Mexico, which appeared at risk of extinction in after the 1992 ‘reform’ of the agrarian law, has been reinvigorated in a new national movement for indigenous rights and autonomy.” (Ibid.) However, the economic crisis continued, resulting from state-sponsored oppression as well as the appearance of de-facto municipal governments which operate autonomously from the state, and reject its governing principles. The politicization of ethnicity continues, but with a decreasing emphasis on peasant issues and a greater emphasis on women’s rights. (Hernandez-Castillo, 2001) Although the EZLN rejects state elections, political pluralism has
emerged in many municipalities. Municipal governments operate functionally and free from the state, with many incorporating additional autonomy by the *San Andreas Accords*, explained later. In sum, while the EZLN contributed to the democracy and rights of women and indigenous peoples, in many ways it has replicated the abusive institutions of the Mexican state by developing political imagery and organizational practices geared toward maintaining power and transboundary relations like a nation, as well as developing parallel structures to the state with a national and global reach, in order to gain further legitimacy. Greater legitimacy inspires a wide range of actors with autonomy. (Washbrook, 2007, p. 87)

Recalling Hobsbawm’s argument that states make nations, the official nationalism in Mexico is the state’s long-term project aimed at constructing a nation which is culturally and linguistically uniform, through methods of integration policies and frameworks. Indigenismo is the nationalist project of racial homogenization which aims at reclassifying diverse Indian groups into mestizos – a combination of the best of the Spanish and Indian peoples that is “quintessentially Mexican”. (Mattiace, 2003, p. 55) Indigenismo has evolved over time as the state has changed from assimilation and racial homogenization, to “participatory indigenismo” during the 1960s, using the National Indigenist Institute (INI), a federal state agency, and finally toward an independent Indian movement and hostile government which threatens to dismantle the INI. (Ibid.) Under participatory indigenismo, traditional dances and plays were performed at national government functions which had not been practiced in years, that were unique to minority ethnic groups in Chiapas. Although the state tried to promote those activities in a manner
which was devoid of political intent, it still provided the peasantry with a place to seek further autonomy. (Ibid, p. 72)

As part of indigenismo, the state created organizations along ethnic lines, such as the Patzcuaro Congress and the Consejos Supremos in 1975. The congress was where indigenous groups first articulated demands for self-determination, in describing the role of the new National Council of Indian Peoples (CNPI). The goal was to unify indigenous peoples in various ways, including proposing to communities solutions for the land tenure debate which included ethnic and cultural considerations, without attempting to separate their identity from the state government. These fora signify the seeds of modern communities described by June Nash as the location where interests converge in dialogue. (Nash, 1995)

The state also initiated the Solidaridad (Solidarity) Program, which served to target social spending towards three groups: indigenous groups, the peasantry, and the urban poor. It was designed by Salinas in December of 1988 around social services and infrastructure to alleviate impoverishment. (Mattiace, 2003, p. 75) However, Solidaridad sought to replace sectoral organizations like the Confederacion Nacional Campesina (CNC) with territory-based organizations, bypassing lower-level bureaucrats. Although this maneuver kept them from rent-seeking, it also attempted to consolidate state power. Ultimately indigenismo was a policy designed from the top-down by elites, to keep groups separate. It continues to fail because indigenous groups believe that national heroes, art, dance, and culture, once encouraged by the state, was tied to tradition, and cannot be separated from demands for land, individual rights, and autonomy. As a result: “The revolt in Chiapas made Mexican society at large pay attention to backward rural
Mexico, a Mexico replete with nostalgic images and evocations, and reminded the rest of the population that poverty, social exclusion and inequality not only had not disappeared but had tended to increase as a result of neoliberal economic restructuring”. (Washbrook, 2007, p. 99) It created a “war of images” spurred by repression. (Ibid.)

The dialogues begun by the Zapatistas and the government resulted in no actual satisfaction until after the first Lancandon invasions. The Zapatistas’ National Commission of Mediation (CONAI) and the government Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA) attempted to find solutions to the violence and insurgency in the village of San Andres Larrainzar at the same time as the National Congress of Indigenous (CNI) in Mexico City, a series of national, state, and local meetings, outlined four areas of concern: Indigenous Rights and Culture, Democracy and Justice, Welfare and Development, and Women’s Rights, which they took to San Andres. The agreements regarded the topic of Indigenous Rights and Culture. These San Andres Accords were signed by the EZLN and the Mexican Government; however the Mexican government did not attend the next negotiation meeting, and the negotiations were suspended by the Zapatistas. The Agreement recognized indigenous autonomy and “self-determination in areas ranging from development and language, to women’s rights, education and health practices…the move to recover traditional indigenous agriculture, promote organic production, control production and marketing, and eliminate commercial middlemen.” (Earle and Simonelli, 2005, p.95)

The reason the Mexican government did not address the issue of rights is because of seventy-five year domination by the PRI party, which is based on socialist ideology. Socialism has no concern for ethnicity or autonomy. Socialism doesn’t allow for
particularism, it only allows rights for peasants or workers, not individual rights. The PRI offered no resolutions to address issues of racial discrimination, poverty, destruction of human dignity, and it restricted ethnic languages in schools; therefore, childhood education was hindered as well as social, political and economic equality. The change in political party, incited a renewal of a dialogue on indigenous rights. The election of President Vicente Fox, in 2000, the president of the *Partido Acción Nacional*, Party of National Action (PAN), a conservative, Christian, democratic party, provided the opportunity for negotiations between the EZLN and the Mexican government.

The *San Andreas Accords* were cancelled unilaterally, by 2000, because the government failed to implement the necessary constitutional reforms and legislation. Officials argued that indigenous autonomy represented an unacceptable threat to true national unification. Immediately thereafter, the government began a silent re-municipalization policy without the participatory consent of Zapatistas. The government tried to render *zapatismo* unnecessary, claiming that the state effectively responded to demands of indigenous and mestizo peasants in Chiapas. To the Zapatista community, the San Andreas accords were the last opportunity to culturally integrate into the national political system. Since then Subcomandante Marcos ceased to participate in the national discourse, choosing to end communiqués and sacrifice his place at the political pulpit. The EZLN was replaced by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which brought considerable, but unequal capital to the peasantry. (Washbrook, 2007, p. 105) Despite some degree of economic progress, the EZLN continues to equate Indians with poverty. Under the new post-rebellion economic conditions, indigenous peoples have been transformed into citizens, and are now demanding individual rights. The San Andreas
accords fell short of successful. Zapatista identity has developed through processes of social integration and grassroots solidarity. The value of both individual and collective existence which resulted reflects the two predominant discourses presented above, and that personal collective history is rooted in cultural dignity.

Conclusion: Multiple Origins of Sub-national Organization

By establishing a new relationship between the state and indigenous groups, indigenismo was centered on liberation of groups, not individuals. It represented change that occurred from civil society below, rather than the paternalist authoritarian ideology of the state. It represented claims to autonomy and recognition which have enabled ethnic citizenship. Ethnic citizenship was formed from the solidarity of networks based on those claims. As a concept, it evolved from debates concerning the relationship between cultural belonging and identity, thus rooted in cultural citizenship. Cultural citizenship recognizes that there may be separate origins to a single existing identity, based on the assumption that “no universal truth defines citizenship”. (Washbrook, 2007, p. 141) It acknowledges that citizenship, participation and rights are subject to reconstruction and redefinition. Citizens may then have allegiances to various nations, and it is often unclear who nationalism belongs to. By eroding cultural “otherness”, neoliberal state policies have fuelled the emergence of what is essentially a sub-nationalism, with indigenous subjects who favor the indigenismo project of reproducing the peasant economy through grassroots organization.

June Nash notes that ethnic identity once divided indigenous communities from one another, but now, in the aftermath of the Zapatista conflict, diverse groups with
different indigenous backgrounds are more so emphasizing what they share, cognitively perceiving a resultant indigenous identity. This new solidarity has been forged by transformations which resulted from fundamental redirections of Mexico’s social policy for nationalism. These transformations marked the end of Mexico’s economic, political, and cultural statecraft. Changes in global markets and finance including structural adjustment, as well as agrarian or land tenure reform, have gradually set aside social contracts, uniting peasants against the state. Mexico’s corporatist approach, managing peasants and indigenous groups as institutionalized sectors has tended to “naturalize” differences among indigenous communities while simultaneously differentiating them from non-indigenous peasants. Class and power divisions have made way for a new democratic discourse on behalf of those living in poverty. Historically subordinate groups now have the opportunity structure to reconstruct ethnicity from the bottom.

Therefore, solidarity is not the result of historical continuity common to a heterogeneous population, but rather takes root in a shared experience, recent in history, by the mestizo majority. It is this solidarity which allows indigenous groups to pursue their own alternatives to the state corporatism on which they were fully dependent prior to the elite’s concessions for NAFTA negotiations. As new structures are set into place, the people of Chiapas find the capability to network through organizations, reaching themselves and the international community.
CHAPTER 3: THE RESTRUCTURING OF POWER RELATIONS IN FAIR TRADE

This chapter examines three topics to understand the impact of innovative practices of fair trade in Chiapas on international trade regimes. The first is Hobsbawm’s (1990) arguments about the origins of nationalism as a negotiated concept constructed from historical evidence. Second, the chapter explores the origins of a three-way social dynamic, according to Tendler (1997). It then provides an alternative argument or explanation of a three-way dynamic of civil society, state, and international trade regimes. It also describes how social practices in Chiapas aided in negotiations and restructuring power relations in order to achieve stability, replace corporatism, and achieve decentralization of a state-centered model of power, as argued by Rubin (1997).

The variables of international trade regimes, defined earlier in Chapter 2, will be operationalized by illustrating the arguments of these three authors. They will demonstrate that new actors, namely peasant coffee cooperatives, are capable of changing the dimensions of international trade. I will focus on coffee as a typical fair trade practice, although the fair trade regime is not limited to coffee.

Both “groupness” and “nations” are products of history and are created or constructed. Chiapas coffee producers reflect this process. The actors themselves, without being sanctioned or designated by “powerful agents such as the state”, engendered “groupness” and solidarity. (Brubaker, p. 41) In the terms of Brubaker’s
definition and historical events, the Chiapas identity among fair trade actors was not based on ethnicity, religion, or geography, but on a “commonality” and “connectedness”.

‘Commonality’ denotes the sharing of some common attribute, ‘connectedness,’ the relational ties that link people. Neither commonality nor connectedness alone engenders ‘groupness’—the sense of belonging to a distinctive, bounded, solidary [sic] group….A strongly bounded sense of groupness may rest on categorical commonality and an associated feeling of belonging together with minimal or no relational connectedness. This is typically the case for large-scale collectivities such as ‘nations.’ (Ibid. p. 47)

Therefore, collective interests of actors which were not part of powerful corporations and state corporatism – Chiapas growers – entered the international coffee market system with a minimum of government intervention by combining their perceptions of history, identities, resources and common interests, to attain historical relevance as a group. Similarly, Hobsbawm instructs that, just as “groupness”, “nations” are a historical product, constructed and negotiated. There is a difference between the two analysts: Hobsbawm expands the implications of history by emphasizing that “states make nations.” These dialogues are relevant to Chiapas’ integration to the global economy via fair trade. The state-centered model, as introduced above, reflects transitions in the study of Chiapas’ impact on the fair trade regime. Three other concepts are noteworthy: Hobsbawm’s discussion of state centered model and “proto-nationalism,” Tendler’s “three-way dynamic,” and Rubin’s analysis of “decentralization”. They have relevance to each other, the practices of civil society in Chiapas, and its impacts on fair trade.
Hobsbawm’s discussion of “nationalism” is useful in understanding how the members of civil society – a body of citizens, with collective sovereignty, unifying for public welfare, political expression, common interests, and claim of resources, developing national projects – constitute a nation. (Hobsbawm, 1990, p.19-21) His main premise is that “states make nations” (Ibid. p.44) by attempting to classify groups according to “some ways primary and fundamental for social existence, or even the individual identification.” (Ibid. p.5) Commonalities such as ethnicity, language, religion, race, icons, symbols, or political bonds, thought to be objective and fundamental, always pose exceptions. Hobsbawm presents evidence of attempts to construct a definition primarily by “historical association with a current state,” “the criterion…of…cultural elite,” or “the Darwinian proof of evolutionary success as a social species” (conquest). (Ibid. p. 7-38) Relative to these criteria, large nations were largely constructed by elites because of their heterogeneity and their desire to unite them under a common identity. Usually elites create nationalism from above, catering to the masses, sponsoring special interests of civil society, and proposing national projects, anchored by the media—they have the literary and monetary means, interact and “intercommunicate” (Ibid., p. 59) across geographical boundaries, and substitute cultural identity and autonomy for economic progress.

As discussed in chapter 2, the Mexican state’s attempt to create a mestizo nation failed and instead contributed to the affirmation of pan-Mayan identity, especially in Chiapas, where strong proto-nationalism sways Mayan’s toward their deep historical roots.
Nationalism can also occur from below, in which case civil society differentiates according to economics in order to maintain their cultural identity, strengthen their autonomy, lay claim to resources, and form international linkages, without the state. Therefore in order to justify the premise that “It is the state which makes the nation and not the nation the state,” (Ibid. p. 44) Hobsbawm poses as part of his argument that some semblance of nationalism pre-existed. He terms it “proto-nationalism.” He attempts to clarify that proto-nationalism:

made the task of nationalism easier, however great the differences between the two, insofar as existing symbols and sentiments of proto-national community could be mobilized behind a modern cause or a modern state. But this is far from saying that the two were the same or even that one must logically or inevitably lead into the other. For it is evident that proto-nationalism alone is clearly not enough to form nationalities, nations, let alone states. The number of national movements, with or without states, is patently much smaller than the number of human groups capable of forming such movements by current criteria of potential nationhood, and certainly smaller than the number of communities with a sense of belonging together in a manner which is hard to distinguish from the proto-national. (Ibid., p. 77)

The reason that certain groups attain nationalism, while other large and pluralistic groups do not, is vague and indifferent to Hobsbawm’s definition. The case of Chiapas has relevance to both of Hobsbawm’s concepts, both nationalism and proto-nationalism. Chiapas society displays evidence of a commonality of Mayan norms and civic environmentalism, despite ethnic diversity, its plurality of languages, migrations and state
challenges. Chiapas developed an identity through what Hobsbawm labels as a proto-national symbol, its virgin icon, which is important enough to “constitute a nation”, for example, the Olympic symbol. (Ibid., p. 72) It displays community leadership ties through religious and cultural linkages which engender collective understanding of their identity. People in Chiapas formed groups and agencies which resulted in solidarity capable of movement toward preservation of their autonomy and traditional livelihoods. It satisfies the historical criterion of “capacity for conquest” (Ibid., p. 38) by the indigenous peasants’ war against the state which resulted in negotiations against elite concessions and state corporatism. Chiapas, therefore, fulfills Hobsbawm’s ideas of nationalism; but for the same reasons it fits his concept of proto-nationalism. In response to the argument that “states make nations,” Chiapas has entered a realm of interaction with nations in the fair trade regime without state legitimatization or sanction and without the elitist traditions and communicability. Second, Chiapas’ history of norms, religious and cultural linkages, solidarity, and fight against state oppression fulfill Hobsbawm’s criteria that make a group a nation may have already existed – proto-nationalism – but that it is not enough to form nationalities, nations, or the states that make nations. This dialogue illustrates that the practices of the civil society of Chiapas displays a synergism with groups as nations and the states in which they function.

The discussion of central or state governments in a synergistic relationship with civic movements is also relative to the practices which escalate civic actors to successful performers and movements. Judith Tendler (1997) makes a point concerning government and programs of civil societies. She stresses the impacts of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civic associations on the effectiveness of the actions of
“central government”, which she uses interchangeably with “state government”. (Tendler, 1997, p. 15) She first describes a central government and community which “portrays local government and civil society as locked in a healthy two-way dynamic of pressures for accountability that results in improved government.” (Ibid.) In this model, civic associations and NGOs, including donors and organizers, become key actors in program development, have a closer relationship to the citizens, and reduce the role of central government. She uses the example of successful programs in Ceará, Brazil to illustrate that programs of public services in the area operated more effectively with less involvement of central/state interference. She later constructed a model of a “three-way dynamic” for the success story of public movement programs. She based the model on an “activist ‘central government’”—in this case, the state government—as well as local governments and civil society…because state governments are powerful actors vis-á-vis municipal governments in Brazil’s federal system, and because to the extent that decentralization was involved in these programs, it was from state to municipal government.” (Ibid., p. 15) In Tendler’s case study, although some activities proved to be a disadvantage to the state, the practices contributed to the “creation of civil society by encouraging and assisting in the organizing of civil associations, including producing groups, and working through them. These groups then turned around and ‘independently’ demanded better performance from government, both municipal and central, just as if they were the autonomous entities portrayed by students of civil society.” (Ibid., p. 16)

The points developed here are that states and society operate with synergy, that some civic associations and societal entities synergize in a positive way with the
government, new alliances form between government and civil society, and that it is therefore possible for “reformist fractions of civil society to unite with reformist fractions within government, sometimes at both the local and central levels. In the case of small farmers in Brazil, the government encouraged and contributed to the emergence of an “independent” civil society. (Ibid., p. 157) In addition, Tendler states that effects of civil society on government extend to central and local government: “Some members of civic associations or nongovernment organizations, moreover, migrated to government, making alliances with like-minded colleagues already within government. Once in government, they spanned the public-private divide by continuing to relate to their outside networks.” (Ibid., p. 146) Tendler is saying that civil society and NGOs are autonomous instruments of improving local government, because their association “relocates government to a place where civil society can work its magic better.” (Ibid., p. 145) In other words, Tendler holds that government in association with civil organizations and NGOs may not be decentralized but operating according to the three-way dynamic, in that central government “caused” civil society to act, as an “alternative path” to improvement of local government. (Ibid p. 146-9) Tendler’s dynamic applies to Chiapas peasants. In Tendler’s example of Ceará, the municipalities appropriated benefits through highly trained agents who were sensitive to ethnic concentrations of the poor and peasants, who educated and counseled recipients, and kept mayors and community leaders informed about needs of “remote and dispersed households.” (Ibid., p. 27) The agents, being members of the community were personally impacted socially and economically, In addition to this point, Tendler observes in her Brazilian case study, as in Chiapas, concerning state municipal and civil associations, that the role of elites is
noteworthy: The elites, including mayors, large landowners, representatives from municipal departments, and rotary leaders, were considered part of civil society, were sensitive to peasant needs as instrumental in their prosperity, and “introduced heterogeneity into elite influence on local government and sometimes helped generate fairer and more carefully crafted decisions.” (Ibid., p. 68) Tendler’s three-way dynamic, therefore, consists of the state government providing the criteria for forming a “local decision making council” and choosing public projects, which involves “less consumer sovereignty”, and “more public-mindedness among local elites.” (Ibid., p. 69) To sum up, Tendler’s three-way dynamic model inspires an alternative approach to extending social movements beyond the dualism of state and civil society to impact the international system. In Chiapas, the state remained insensitive to the needs of local communities, which pushed coffee growers toward joining international networks.

The alternative approach to extending social movements beyond the dualism of state and civil society that I propose consists of civil society, state, and international regimes. Networks created within Chiapas civil society, reinforced by fair trade labeling organizations and coffee certification programs, illustrate civic organization similar to Judith Tendler’s model, but include different entities. Tendler illustrates that civic associations impact central government or state government by bypassing traditional powerholders – mayors and municipalities – and that it was the consent of a strong governor that served as the impetus for civic demands to be met with greater accountability and transparency from government. In the case of Chiapas, it is the Mexican state which has played a powerful role in monitoring civic associations, but did not meet the demands and pressures for greater participation and accountability.
Traditional social movements as illustrated earlier by Tilly, McAdam, and Tarrow, include what these authors believe is a healthy two-way dynamic between civil society and the state, where civil society channels its concerns – usually the lack of democracy within a particular setting – to the state through a medium called the “public sphere” or “public space”. However, when these demands are not recognized, civil society attempts to utilize new channels and create their own direct linkages with others, who respond with greater legitimacy and accountability. In the case of Chiapas, civic associations seeking recognition decided to bypass the state and look for responses by the international community, by engaging in the fair trade regime. This illustrates a move to become socially embedded on a much broader, deeper scale. The dualistic relationship was not necessarily synergistic – that is, the distance between state and society was far from having state institutions embedded within society. Rather, a chasm existed between the two. The following figure illustrates the new model based on Judith Tendler’s three way dynamic.
This figure illustrates that civic demands originating from civil society enter the public sphere, but a privileged few reach the state. Civil society has channeled these demands around the states, eliciting attention of members of the international trade regime. The regime responds, granting recognition and legitimacy, to actors in local civil society.

This coincides with Hobsbawm, Tendler, and Rubin, who illustrate properties of this dynamic. Hobsbawm’s narrative explains how protonationalists can engage in governance on an international level without state legitimization or sanction, and without the communication and support of traditional elitists. Tendler illustrates that this governance is not the result of a “unidirectional transfer of power and funding from central to local.” (Tendler, 1997, p. 147) Quite opposite, in that the state government would not effectively respond to civic demands. It also differs from the “stylized portrayal of decentralization” in that addition of a third element required and supported the formation of civic associations, yet did not strengthen capacity of local clientelistic powerholders.

The three-way dynamics described are associated with the solidarity of peasants, ethnic bonds, decentralization by means of NGOs and civil social movements. They are
the challenges shared by repressed regions which lead to the dysfunction of state-centered power. Like Hobsbawm and Tendler, Jeffrey Rubin addresses the dynamics of historical changes throughout Mexico. Rubin acknowledges Mexico as “one of the preeminent enduring regimes in the world today.” (Rubin, 1997, p. 12) He illustrates the history of Juchitán as parallel to that of Chiapas in its challenge to state centered power. His main reflection is that although the role of central state has been strong and efficient, it has been “uneven and incomplete” in diverse ways in different locations. He defines “decentering,” in Mexico, as “broadening” the concepts of regime and politics as “enduring regional counterweights to national power in Mexico; circuitous pathways of historical change, and locations of power outside formal politics, in people’s experiences of culture and daily life.” (Rubin, 1997, p. 11)

Since his book analyzes regimes and “decentralization”, Rubin brings to light the deep relationships of nationalism and the central authority that reaches beyond the country. He stresses that “the Mexican state and regime should be seen as parts of a complex and changing center that coexists with, and is indeed constituted through and embedded in, the diversity of regional and cultural constructions that have evolved throughout Mexico since the 1930s,” not a homogeneous national hegemony. (Ibid., p.13). He describes that “by balancing political constituencies on the left and right and then increasingly by exercising control over those opposed or harmed by inequalitarian [ineffectual] forms of economic development,” (Ibid. p.15) the corporatism that came out of the ‘30s and ‘40s, maintained stability for thirty years, despite graft, economic favoritism of the elite, and which amounted to “nonmilitary authoritarianism”. (Ibid., p.
17) He further states that this history illustrates how “regimes, as singular entities, controlled what were seen as the relatively objective demands expressed by individuals and groups experiencing socioeconomic change…and in the work that emerged in the late ‘70s, of political culture.” (Ibid., p. 18) He continues that the contemporary Mexican regime is an “all-powerful state…without the old corporatism, and one describing complex state-society dynamics…made up of diverse actors, on a battleground somewhere between weakened corporatism and emergent pluralism.” (Ibid., p. 21) He suggests that the tension between ethnicity and nationalism is a relevant “fissure” in the regime providing the opportunity for ethnic identities to “maintain their distance from centers of political power.” (Ibid., p. 25) He explicitly states that the Zapatistas in Chiapas, as well as the Coalition of Workers, Peasants, and Students of the Isthmus (COCEI), mobilized in Juchitán, are models for empowering indigenismo from below the state regime.

The coinciding histories of Chiapas and Juchitán illustrate that ethnicity is fundamental in creating more effective self-government. Rubin defines ethnicity as “the medium through which autonomy and difference, as well as alliance and accommodation, were constructed historically.” (Ibid., p. 24) From two centuries of history, Juchitán is notorious for resistance against the Spanish, French, duly inspired by women martyrs and rebels, their barbaric resistance during the 1911 Che Gómez rebellion, violent confrontations in answer to murders of COCEI officials in the ‘70s, and inciting violence through radio broadcasts in the ‘90s. Though not legitimized by moral necessity, dignified attitude or democratic methodology, the ethnic imprint is established. Rubin states that “destabilization”, “in the context of the recurring reconstruction of nation and
sovereignty in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries” is important in Mexico. (Ibid., p. 25) In other words, Rubin illustrates that “renegotiating” ethnic identity causes changes in political authority.

Rubin constructs a state-centered model for creating state stability, where the state’s mission was to repress or “circumvent” opposition. (Ibid. p. 16) He describes the origins of state centralization from the 1920s national party, beginning with the coerced backing of revolutionary generals, who became or appointed political bosses to create clientelism and influence negotiations, then restructuring by means of “corporatism” (Ibid., p. 20), during the next twenty years, by means of state-formed organizations’ labor legislation, social-welfare and land reform, “elite quiescence, and insignificant elections.” (Ibid., p. 63) Rubin attributes decentralization or to eliminating elite market control, engaging civil society’s disbandment of corporatism, partly to media propagandizing of potential violent repercussions, while grassroots peasant movements attracted elite sympathizers concerned with agricultural production, marketing, credits and prices, in lieu of “ownership” itself. Thus, Rubin sees the beginning of decentralization as the eliminating of elite market control, the passing of cacique control of regions. Another important historical event, not expounded upon by Rubin, but which affected the nation’s stability was NAFTA’s repeal of Article 27, which will be described later. Rubin also notes that the president of COCEI attended the Zapatistas’ National Democratic Convention, establishing Juchitán prominence in “grassroots autonomy” and “engaging civil society” in decentralizing the regime. (Ibid., p.193) The state-centered model, therefore, according to Rubin, reflects that regimes and states are subject to civil impacts and changing ideologies between regions and centralized government, which provide
opportunities for political arrangements within and outside regimes. It follows, then, that his model provides for civil society to engage the fair trade regime.

The means for the practices of Chiapas to enter fair trade and the impact that practices of fair trade has without sanction and management of the state have been illustrated. Hobsbawm’s narrative on nationalism provides an understanding of how actors like those in Chiapas have constructed an approach in opposition to the Mexican state, according to the theory of its proto-nationalist roots, which enables them to enter the fair trade regime, without state legitimatization or sanction, and without the elitist traditions and communicability required by the theory of nationalism. Tendler’s “three-way” dynamic and my association of it with fair trade are models for peasant producers to bypass the state to enter the fair trade regime. Rubin analyzes the decentralization of regimes, including state regimes, through the strengths of group autonomy, which provide opportunities for change through civil society. The following give insight into facilitating group economic transformation to the international level.

Regime politics in Mexico is characterized by rural conflict, changing instruments leading to state decentralization and legal land reform. The impact of land reform is centered on the reform of Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution, in an aftermath of the Mexican Revolution. The vagaries of the law resulted in loss of constitutional land rights for agrarian communities and a legacy of human rights violations. It provided that land ownership is vested with the Nation, resulting in land tenures, state control of land markets, land grants, land restrictions, and a history of compromises to redefine “small private property, not susceptible to expropriation.” (Sanchiz, 2008, p. 584) In 1992, the article was reformed. As a result, unresolved petitions for land in Chiapas, which had
gone on for as long as eleven years, were considered failed, social programs were eliminated, international investors and privatized state corporations threatened indigenous agrarian livelihoods, and the Zapatistas organized after the 1974 Indigenous Congress rebelled in violence on the same day as the signing of the North American Free Trade agreement, between Mexico, the US, and Canada, 01 January 1994. Chiapas’ situation, after the amendment of Article 27 is described in *Zapatismo Resurgent*: Government programs were directed for peasants, not Indians; the National Indianist Institute (NII) and other programs were “designed more to assimilate indigenous people into the peasantry” (Collier, 2000, p. 2); the rural repression drew the attention of Amnesty International after the jailing of Chiapas’ journalist Jorge E. Hernandez Aguilar (Ibid. p. 4); autonomy according to Mexican law did not include indigenous communities. Central Chiapas was characterized as “institutional revolutionary communities” because the government was able to infiltrate its civil and religious hierarchies; while northern Chiapas, due to its reformation of traditional lifestyle as *ejidos*, were able to create linkages between local indigenous groups and regional government, while the federal institutions concentrated on the densely populated central highlands. (Sanchiz, 2008, p. 579) Chiapas’ hopes were in the San Andres accords, which were voted to take place by the Mexican population, but were cancelled. According to the amendment of Article 27, in 1991, *ejido* lands were permitted “full privatization”, which meant “free sale and free rent”. (Ibid. p. 590) Chiapas lands were subjected to trusteeships and paramilitary group takeovers which “perpetuated in a way the existence of the State-regulated land market that had long been entwined with the *ejido* tenure. As in former decades, peasant land claimants continued to turn official contradictions and complexities in agrarian
regulations to their advantage.” (Sanchiz, 2008, p. 1596) Across Chiapas, land invasions and groups of land squatters as well as corruption continued until the dissolution of the PRI regime. Agrarian needs drastically changed as coffee prices collapsed, as uncontrolled amounts of Mexican coffee flooded the export markets, as did the governmental aid programs and subsidies. The Chiapas “recuperation” of land and its autonomy are significant to Mexican regime politics and Chiapas’ validation as an actor in international trade regimes.

A facet of regime formation which reflects significantly on state role in international trade is described by Peter Evans as “embedded autonomy”. (Evans 1995) He reminds us that the state has a responsibility for maintaining itself and the interests of society. Furthermore, “as political survival and internal peace are more often defined in economic terms, states have become responsible for economic transformation.” (Evans, Peter. 1995 p. 5) The state “autonomy” he defines consists of independence of social pressures to attain a collective goal; yet having specific connections and linkages with specific social groups with synergistic relationships and goals. (Ibid., p. 59) Evans states that “the new internationalization clearly complicates the politics of state involvement.” To illustrate, he continues that “the political vacuum that allowed early ‘guerrilla’ initiatives from inside….the kind of autonomous action that propelled the initial development” no longer exists. In the international realm of interaction, alliances between local producers and transnational firms, “no longer comprise a political constituency as they did under the old greenhouses. Their interests are much less clearly bound with the growth of local demand and the enhancement of local productive capacity”; and, “forces us to think anew about the political roots and economic
consequences of the state’s role.” (Evans. 1995. p. 205-6) Greenhouse politics is the state sanctioning of partnerships or incentives to promote and protect products beneficial to its interests or those of specific societal groups, by means of protective regulations, tariffs, import prohibitions, investment restrictions, or encouraging “entrepreneurial groups to venture into more challenging kinds of production” (Ibid., p. 15). The extent that the old “greenhouse” alliance would satisfy local demand for growth and productivity places stress on the state to reinforce the process. “This in turn demands more intimate connections to private economic agents, a state that is more ‘embedded’ in society than insulated from it.” (Ibid., p. 32) Modern trends, however, take the form of seeking “transnational capital,” in a shift to global markets. (Ibid. p. 184)

Evans contrasts three cases for economic/industrial transformation: Brazil, as an example of dependent development, driven by transnational corporate investors and the consumer needs that exhibited civil inequality; India, as a multinational society of a majority of agro-peasants; and Korea, where industrialization was the focus and peasants were a minority. Evans estimates that Brazil, is characterized by a fragmented and shifting bureaucracy (Ibid., p. 62), but a “tight symbiosis between the state and the traditional oligarchy” allowed for certain successful projects between state and industrialists (Ibid., p72-3); India “invented” private linkages to successfully fulfill autonomous goals of large scale industrial projects. (Ibid., p. 73); Korea, though having control of private capital, employed the benefits of “embeddedness” by private managerial linkages and entrepreneurship. In comparing the transformational abilities of Korean bureaucracy to Mexico’s, Evans critiques Mexican lack of traditional bureaucratic institution for selecting civil servants. He states: “This tradition is vital in
providing both legitimacy for state initiatives and nonmaterial incentives for the ‘best and the brightest’ to consider bureaucratic careers.” (Ibid., p. 51) In these three examples, “embeddedness” is based off a state/society synergy. However in the case of Chiapas, the ‘embeddedness’ is based off locating themselves in the international economic system, not the state.

In the Fair Trade Regime, the tradition of embeddedness exists between peasant and civic bureaucracies, and on a larger scale between democratic cooperatives and members of the international arenas. Sarah Lyon illustrates this through her case study on human rights in Guatemala. She notes: “Unlike other forms of local participation in the global economy (migration, service jobs in the tourist industry, drug trafficking, etc.) which often present alternatives to community based livelihoods, participation in the fair trade coffee market embeds members more deeply in local economics and social spheres since it is contingent upon individual membership within the democratically organized cooperative….This cooperative structure reaffirms existing cultural traditions of service and mutual aid common to many Mesoamerican Maya Communities…” (Lyon. 2007. p. p.243) She also draws significantly upon Guatemala/Maya parallels and Chiapas. Another author attesting that Fair Trade success involves embeddedness is L. T. Raynolds, illustrated in a fair trade model for success that centers on developing linkages which facilitate deeper relationships internally and externally: “Fair Trade success requires producer groups to create and maintain strong external ties with corporate buyers, development NGOs, and other organizations. Cosmopolitan leaders typically facilitate these international links.” (Ibid., p. 116) In the study, since producers maintain participation through cooperatives, their power is enhanced by individual and collective
“empowerment and capacity building”. (Ibid., p. 116) Her UK study also states that though civic norms are not uniform within the regime of Fair Trade, trust and benefits practiced by the network actors facilitate, “re-embed trade relations and shorten the distance between consumers and producers.” (Ibid., 2004, p. 420)

This chapter has examined the success of fair trade practices of small coffee growers in Chiapas in entering the global market regime through a dynamic model which empowers from below the state. First, it reviews the Chiapas coffee growers’ propensity as a national actor because of its success in maintaining its solidarity and autonomy, in terms of Hobsbawm’s discussion of “nationalism” and “proto-nationalism.” According to his definitions, Chiapas has fulfilled his criteria for nationalism because of its common identity, its capacity for conquest, and its ability to mobilize to achieve its goal without the powers of the state. Second, Chiapas’ model for independent actors to impact central or state government by bypassing traditional powers, coincides with Tendler’s three-way dynamic: Chiapas bypasses the Mexican state through “public sphere” channels to create its own linkages with international actors that possess their own legitimacy and accountabilities. Beyond Tendler’s three-way dynamic is my model which extends Tendler’s into international regimes. Third, “regimes” are discussed by Rubin’s analysis of Mexico’s decentralization and restructuring of regimes and states, which provide opportunities and political arrangements for market actors within and outside regimes. Peter Evans, Sarah Lyon, and L.T. Raynolds attribute the extension of Chiapas’ interaction into the international sphere to “embeddedness” between peasants and civic bureaucracies. Chiapas’ growers exemplify that non-uniformity of civic norms, bureaucracies and politics among states and nations do not matter in a fair trade regime.
Chiapas’ growers are re-embedded by trade relationships which link producers to consumers globally, by bypassing the state.
CHAPTER 4: PARTICIPATORY, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF FAIR TRADE

The capability of Chiapas growers to enter an international commodity regime by reembedding themselves against conventional state, oligopolistic, and corporate governance, lessens the gap between coffee producers and consumers. The common ground established between them is the realization of their ability to challenge domestic policies and focus on the new concerns for sustainable and organic agricultural production and distribution. The strategic efforts are not price oriented but are based on ideologies shared by certain countries and groups, including producers and consumers, which elevate participants to enter small niches in large market regimes from which they would be marginalized. The success of the indigenous organization resulted from the ties outside the EZLN (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional), with individuals and entities outside the local and national linkages. According to sociologist Markus Schulz, “to explain how indigenous peasants from the remote jungles of Chiapas linked up with individuals and groups in Mexico City, New York, Toronto, Berlin, Madrid, Milan, Paris, and Sydney, it is necessary to examine the communicative praxis through which these linkages were achieved”. (Schulz, 1998, p. 591) The traditional analysis of communicating beyond social boundaries is described as “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.” (Snow and Benford, 1988, p. 592)
The impact of the insurgent struggle for recognition and justice for indigenous peasants resulted in linkages and methods for establishing stable political and economic relations and building environmental and social reforms for changing rules, norms and procedures for entering the international regime of fair trade. Through Fair trade, embeddedness results from cooperatives, producer networks created within Chiapas’ civil society, reinforced by fair trade labeling organizations and coffee certification programs. External producer-consumer linkages result from the creation of common grounds for dialogue on ecological ideas, sustainable production, needs of society, and fair trade.

**Fair Trade**

Fair trade is a coordinated international network of organizations which combine market-based economic strategies, interests in the environment, and the concern for social justice. The principles fair trade practices are based on respect of cultural diversity: Fair Trade producers and organizations “are equal commercial partners and treat each other with mutual respect and support.” (Waridel, 2002, p. 65) The movement originated with the Max Havelaar Foundation of the Netherlands, in 1988, as a vehicle for alternative trade organizations (ATOs or FTOs) to designate their “seal of approval” for coffee producers. The principles contradict the free market relations which are based on buyers seeking the lowest prices rather than “long-term human relationships.” (Schulz, 1988, p. 31) The first principle of fair trade is to purchase directly from cooperatives made up of small plot producers, and cut out any middlemen, the majority cultivating less than 30 hectares of coffee plants and who are considered to be equal partners, sharing mutual respect and information to aid each other in their pursuit of their
goals. The second principle is to fix fair prices which take into account the needs of southern producers and the demands of northern consumers. For example, The Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International (FLO-International) has established the standard payment to cooperatives of $2.77 per kg ($1.26 per lb) for Arabica coffee and $2.42 per kg ($1.10 per lb) for Robusta. In the case of high market prices, in excess of these guaranteed prices, a premium of $0.30 per kg ($0.05 per lb) is added. (Waridel, ibid., p. 65)

**Figure 2. Fair Trade and Organic Premium Prices**

In addition, a higher price ($0.20) is paid for organic coffee. Third, the benefit of consistent sales enables growers to plan their operations to endure market fluctuations and cultivation problems such as drought, disease, etc.; therefore ensuring a long-term commitment. The fourth principle in fair trade organizations is low interest credit in the form of prepayment for orders, in rare cases. The fifth principle is equitable division of profits, with all workers taking part in the decision-making process. Sixth, fair trade
organizations provide consumers with knowledge of producer methods and reasons to support fair trade. The public should be able to access financial records of the fair trade organizations. Often fair trade coffee is also certified organic, which influences consumers who are environmentally and health conscious.

Labeling: Building Bridges between Producers and Consumers

There are two vehicles for consumers and producers to influence the international fair trade coffee market – labeling and agricultural certification – the former being more recognized and attractive to the coffee consumer. Coffee is an important model for alternative trade and “the export crop in which alternative trade can make the most difference.” (Martinez-Torres, 2006, p. 36) It is said to make up about half of the alternative trade volume. Alternative trade and development groups based their relations and understanding on trust and subjective knowledge of the producers of commodities by means of labeling. In 1990, the European Fair Trade Association (EFTA) created the TransFair label; formal labeling began in 1995 with Max Havelaar; and in 1997, influenced by the U.S. fair trade organizations’ movement for organic and fair trade coffee, the EFTA adopted the Fairtrade mark of the Fair Trade Labeling Organizations International (FTO). (Ibid., p. 37-38) These initiatives united international trade activities and are instrumental in the growth of fair trade products. However, fair trade is based not only on commercial market practices, but also on “collective responsibility and evaluations of societal benefits” (Raynolds, 2002, p. 411) The FLO mission is restructuring the relationship between northern consumers and southern producers through norms of equality and trust. Labels and national organizations set the norms but
do not enforce rules and norms; certifying agencies inspect and perpetuate adherence to norms but do not set them. (Muttersbaugh, 2008, p. 262) Coincidentally, certifying agencies protect the integrity of the labeling system, even though trade labels do not guarantee adherence to rules and norms.

Trade labels indicate the environmental and social conditions of the production of the commodity by specific criteria which must be met to satisfy specific consumer trends, demands, and interests. An example is the Fairfood label, which includes “corruption initiatives” among its policies, in cooperation with the United Nations Global Compact, World Economic Forum Partnering Against Corruption Initiative, Transparency International and International Chamber of Commerce. (Fairfood, 2008, p. 1) One anomaly in the conventions of the international coffee market, is that many product labels are uncertified, including those of about $15 million in shade-grown coffee from Mexico and Central America. One other marketing ploy is the effort of large corporations to sway consumers with such labels as “produced by small-scale growers” or “peasant coffee”. (Martinez-Torres, p. 41) A third problem is that corporations such as Sara Lee (Douwe Egberts) and Starbucks have advertising programs that deal with environmental and social criteria, such as “peasant grown” and “fair trade” to compete with accurate labels. In response to labeling problems, as an expansion to the European Fair Trade Association (EFTA, 1998), the Fair Trade Labeling Organization International has specific agreements among its members on all fair trade pricing and initiatives which serve to standardize some labeling terms and classifications, hoping to give small coffee farmers a competitive advantage. To challenge the labeling competition, the Consejo Civil para la Cafeticultura Sustentable en Mexico (CCCSM, Mexican Sustainable Coffee
Civic Council), made up of eleven Mexican coffee producer organizations, seven nonprofit organizations, three certification programs and various experts formed, in 2002, to channel information to consumers and the global coffee market. These labeling organizations focus on promoting fair trade markets and licensing distributors. They do not produce or trade, but concentrate on increasing “total sales and market share for fair trade coffee by penetrating mainstream industry channels”. (TransFair USA 2009) The TransFair label, as well as special interest indicators, such as the Rainforest Alliance label (ECO-O/K), indicates that a commodity is endorsed by international organizations whose members promote viable economics, sustainable livelihoods for growers, and conservation. (Ibid.) Such labels ensure strict and specific “Shade Regime” standards: For example, the Rainforest Alliance specifies the number of species and distribution of native trees, the density of shade tree species per hectare (1 hectare equals 2.47 acres), the, pruning management, and stratification of shade structures, in order to provide continuous habitat, control erosion, enrich soil, and maintain biodiversity. (Wunderlich, 2002, p. 35) Labeling, therefore, is a vehicle for producing an image with legal implications that a product satisfies consumer expectations.

**Agricultural Certification: Perpetuating Standards and Norms**

There are considerable differences among certifications regarding standards, claims, credibility, organizations involved, and their impacts on the growers, management and consumers. The primary unit for the organic movement is the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM). Founded in 1972, it consists of more than 750 voting member organizations, including producers, retailers,
NGOs, and public information specialists from over 100 countries. Its General Assembly meets every three years to elect the World Board which directs and implements the strategies set by the Assembly and its consultants. The Board members come from Sweden, Germany, India, Australia, Senegal, Japan and the U.S., with backgrounds in organic agriculture. Another certification, Utz Kapeh, which is Mayan Quiché for “good coffee,” is currently a not-for-profit organization in the Netherlands which is committed to “responsible coffee production” and includes issues of hired labor and small producers. (Courville, in Bacon, 2008, p. 292) In addition, an organic company owned by General Mills, with expertise in Cascadian Farms, exemplifies the range of linkages of sectors of the coffee industry and backgrounds of the members.

Linkages between coffee producers and consumers are established by labeling principles. Labeling is closely related to trademarks which provide a “guarantee” to consumers of specific principles, particularly concerning biodiversity of lands and resources. Also referred to as “ecolabeling,” it addresses reliability of information, “rationality in resource use and consumption…and helps define legal parameters in national and international markets.” (Guerra, 2003, p. 1) The Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International (FLO), founded in 1997, united various fair trade labeling institutions in consumer countries. Among the 20 groups was Max Havelaar, in the Netherlands. Currently there are initiatives in 21 countries, including the most recent participants Spain, Australia/New Zealand, and Mexico. They certify 422 producer groups and trading companies. Its board of directors includes representatives of consumer groups, producers from developing countries, trade organizations, and national delegations. Two representatives of traders are Oxfam Wereldwinkels of Belgium and
Green Mountain Coffee Roasters of Vermont. Each representative group has two seats, but lacks decision-making power. Their efforts are currently to influence policymaking in regional producer networks, through the formation of Latin America and Caribbean Producer Assembly (CLAC—Coordinadora Latinoamericana y del Caribe de Pequenos Productores de Comercio Justo). (Bacon, 2008, p. 291) Primarily, the principles of labeling concern the conservation of landscapes, biological sustainability, and promotion of cultural diversity.

Environmental labeling standards were outlined by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, in 1998, according to who verifies labeling claims, and were similarly complemented by other state and international organizations which participate in international trade conferences, including the World Trade Organization (WTO). “First-party verification” is self-promoting by marketers to create an image, by means of self-regulatory peer associations and regulatory civic boards. “Third-party verification” involves independent agents, such as certification agencies, state regulatory and food safety agencies, environmental/scientific and nonprofit advisory groups. Labeling can be mandatory or voluntary, and tends to reflect positive, negative or neutral judgments. It can categorically refer to forestry, resources, energy, or biotechnology, to name a few contemporary concerns. Examples of mandatory labeling in the U.S. involve hazardous chemicals or pesticides. According to the WTO, many other countries are negligent in such labeling and the enforcement. Since this is a concern of the WTO, it is important that the agenda of developing regions and emerging economies, promote mandatory ecolabeling and its enforcement, “not only to gain access to niche countries [and] niche markets, but for the environmental health of our own societies.” (Guerra, 2003, p. 2)
terms of labeling standards, third party certification methods are burdensome for small coffee producers; however, coffee communities and organizations in Mexico, particularly in Chiapas, are moving into the forefront of the international organic and fair trade movement.

These principles of fair trade and the identifiable prescriptions for honest and equitable trade are instrumental in ensuring that Chiapas coffee growers enjoy long-term benefits of global trade.

**Fair Trade Coffee in Chiapas**

*Agricultural methodologies and certifications*

Chiapas production of coffee consists of another alternative strategy for competing in the broader market regime. Like free trade, and sometimes in combination with it, networks of organic producers form another alternative trade organization based on production methods. Organic farming is a traditional production method in Chiapas. It is based on knowledge of environmentally friendly patterns of horticultural methods. One characteristic of organic production in Chiapas is the intensive labor involved in the practice of cultivation. Coffee production is traditionally diversified and mixed with other agricultural commodities rather than mono-cultured. Specifically, shade certification ensures higher yield and better quality, as the coffee plant is not well-adapted to full sunlight. Shade production methods are traditional and natural elements of organic coffee cultivation in Mayan communities. In organic cultivation, organic applications utilizing human labor, instead of heavy equipment and agrochemicals.
Environmental and social practices have led to a variety of regulatory systems for certification of individual producer organizations. Certification systems are mission driven. Classifications of certification for products, which often overlap with fair trade certification, include “organic,…Rainforest Alliance Certified, Utz Certified, Shade-grown, Bird Friendly, individual company codes of conduct,” and others. (Courville, 2008, p. 290) “Nowhere is this trend more pronounced than in the international production, trade, and marketing of coffee. While on the average representing less than 2 percent of consumption in major markets, what we call sustainable coffees have seen significant growth from a very small base, to total global sales for coffee with an ethical claim to fame in 2002 estimated to be in excess of 1.1 million bags.” (Ibid.) Likewise, Fair Trade Certified sets strict environmental standards including prohibition of chemicals, proper waste disposal, usage and storage of hazardous chemicals, planning and monitoring of crops, conservation of soil and water, a ban on genetically modified organisms (GMOs), and requires environmental impact assessments. Fair trade offers knowledge, methods, and incentives for improving production, protecting the environment, and skills to compete in the global market. (TransFair USA 2009) Therefore, certification systems can be described as mission-driven.

**Commodity Chain**

Certification of commodities is a transnational vehicle for insuring that standards and norms are satisfied through monitoring agencies. Certification involves a network of officers who judge and implement norms and standards based on transnational agreement. It requires “administrative agents, marketing and administrative staff,
governmental liaisons, secretaries, local inspectors and community technical officers required to sustain certified production.” (Mutersbaugh, 2002, p. 263) Eight certifying agencies in Mexico audit growers, processors, storage and transport facilities according to examination and auditing standards which are increasing in conformity transnationally. Certification operations can be seen in the Table 1 (Ibid, p. 262), “Certified agricultural commodities and custody chains: the case of Mexican coffee.”

Table 1: Commodity Chain – Plot to Consumer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity Chain</th>
<th>Custody Chain</th>
<th>Certification Practice</th>
<th>Certification Product</th>
<th>Certifying Entity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmer’s Plot</td>
<td>Farm Family</td>
<td>Field Inspection</td>
<td>Peasant Inspector</td>
<td>Internal Peasant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm storehouse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Documents</td>
<td>Inspectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Warehouse</td>
<td>Regional Organization</td>
<td>Product Flow Audit/Village Warehouse Audit</td>
<td>Field Inspection report</td>
<td>External Mexican National Inspectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Organization</td>
<td>Statewide Organization</td>
<td>Milling Plant Inspection</td>
<td>Village Certification</td>
<td>Mexican National Certifiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port/Customhouse</td>
<td>Roaster/Retailer</td>
<td>Dossier Review</td>
<td>Organic Seal</td>
<td>EU or US-based Certifiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU US</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mutersbaugh, Tad, 2006, p. 262

The “Commodity Chain” includes in succession, the farmer’s plot, the farm storehouse, warehouse, regional milling, and port /customhouse. The “Custody Chain” consists of the farm family, regional organization or co-op, and statewide organization. The latter link is substituted by Chiapas growers with individual initiatives and linkages with civil society organizations. The certifying chain involves peasants, external Mexican inspectors and service workers, and national certifiers. Certifications of organic products in transnational trade are regulated by separate networks. In the EU, a linkage of the
Smithsonian’s Bird Friendly inspection certification (Certimex), the Institute for Market Ecology (IMO-Control) for certification of organic products worldwide, and Naturland (the international organization of organic farmers) operates according to EU 2092/01 rules. In the US, a linkage between OCIA-Mexico (Organic Crop Improvement Association), OCIA International and OCIA-USA operates according to USDA National Organic Program (NOP) rules. Specific certifications sought by Chiapas growers are Organic, Fair Trade, Rain Forest and the Utz Kapeh Foundation certification for good agricultural practices. To illustrate the explicit qualifications for certification, a field study of shade coffee labels indicated that growers hoping to be certified shade grown by Specialty Coffee Association (SCAA) need to meet three criteria, while to be certified as Mexican Shade Plus, need to meet seven criteria. Other certifications require meeting seven criteria to be Smithsonian Institute Bird Friendly, eight criteria to be EKO Rain Forest Alliance certified. (Martinez-Torres, 2006, p. 40) Recently, a labeling category of popular consumer interest is “sustainable coffee,” initiated by the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C. This labeling category has the mission of “real ecological criteria,” from agro-ecological regions and biodiversity, to commercial competition and social benefits. (Ibid., p. 39) Certification is based on strict standards; and certification in more than one category is a potential marketing and development tool used by Chiapas cooperatives. The following table indicates that of the five farms that applied for shade certifications, three also fulfilled the 8 criteria for EKO Ok, Rainforest certification, one fulfilled requirements for five certifications, and three fulfilled requirements for two certifications. Note the certification choices in the following:
### Table 2: Certification Criteria Utilized in Chiapas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Certification Program</th>
<th>Belem Traditioinal Rustic</th>
<th>Belen Production</th>
<th>Irlanda Buffer Zone</th>
<th>Irlanda Production</th>
<th>Hamburgo Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCAA, Specialty Coffee Association / 3 criteria</td>
<td>3, Shade</td>
<td>3, Shade</td>
<td>3, Shade</td>
<td>3, Shade</td>
<td>2, Not Shade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EKO Ok, Rain Forest Alliance / 8 criteria</td>
<td>8, Certify</td>
<td>7, Borderline</td>
<td>8, Certify</td>
<td>8, Certify</td>
<td>5, Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bird Friendly, Smithsonian Institute / 7 criteria</td>
<td>7, Certify</td>
<td>3, Reject</td>
<td>6, Borderline</td>
<td>5, Reject</td>
<td>3, Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican Shade / 7 criteria</td>
<td>7, Certify</td>
<td>4, Reject</td>
<td>6, Borderline</td>
<td>4, Reject</td>
<td>2, Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican Shade Plus / 7 criteria</td>
<td>7, Certify</td>
<td>1, Reject</td>
<td>4, Reject</td>
<td>4, Reject</td>
<td>2, Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Certification</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Martinez-Torres, 2006, p. 40

This sampling attests to the Chiapan growers’ dedication to environmental as well as economic and social sustainability.

**Contractual Relations**

International organic certification rules have an impact on “village-level” certification. Upon entering the international fair trade regime, Chiapas’ growers have overcome potential marketing, cultural and language barriers due to the transnational homogeneity of the content of many national certification standards. Under International Organization for Standardization (ISO)/International Engineering Consortium (IEC) guide 65 and guide 68 rules, the inter-institutional and national terms and codes of compliance are becoming increasing “harmonious.” The progress is fueled by “the increasing volume of international food sales driven by global appetites and cheap labor…and the food safety crises during the 1990s of which BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy, ‘mad cow disease’) has become emblematic.” (Mutersbaugh, 2002, p. 68)
267) The transnational rules are enforced by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the ISO under penalty of trade sanctions by the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) provision (ISO 2000a; ISO 2000b). In addition, since the 2002 ISO/IEC guide 68, “recognition by all WTO signatory nations of all products, regardless of national origins, as long as they are certified under procedures harmonized to the ISO/IEC guide 65 norm,” the purpose of which is “to trace the effects of global standards on field-level service work.” (Ibid p. 267) In light of the complexity and standardization of certification norms and procedures, Chiapas fair trade and organic coffee producers become involved in “inter-and intra-organizational contractual linkages” which affect the costs of meeting standards, such as auditing and record keeping, expanding communication channels and offices (fax machines, printers, transportation and curriers, buildings, etc.) in order to enable intra-organization linkages. Inter-organizational contractual linkages involve increasing the number of management workers; increases in labor time and numbers of service workers; training technical assistants, peasant inspectors, and training officers who develop organic work plans and provide training. A study of the contractual relations between certifying agencies and producer groups is illustrated by the following diagrams. Figure 3 illustrates the “contractual relations between certifying agencies, inspectors, and certified parties,” a resource of Naturland’s Quality Guarantee Manual.
Organization at the village level may include Peasant Inspector (PI) and Community Technical Officer (CTO), which are often the same person from a neighboring community, who are appointed by a village assembly, known as cargos. They are paid service workers who usually have some proficiency in organic farming, attend training courses and pass a test. (Ibid., p. 274-5). These service workers receive minimal salaries to aid producers in recording and filling out documents and accounting records necessary for certification applications. These service workers pose an added burden on production costs, but produce the documentation and information exchange necessary to communicate accountability and quality in transnational markets.
Chiapas Cooperatives

Chiapas’ small scale coffee growers are notable for the success and strategies of their organizations in competing in international trade. Their cooperative organizations represent diverse ethnic identities, political affiliations, and variations in technological methods. The cooperatives have three bodies of leadership: a general assembly of community representatives who collectively make decisions and delegate them to an executive committee; an oversight committee (comite de vivilancia) to supervise and prevent corruption; and experienced advisors from NGOs, community groups, political parties, etc. (Martinez-Torres, 2006, p. 96-109) The six major cooperatives have been surveyed, by Maria Elena Martinez-Torres (Table 3), according to their agro-technology (natural, chemical, organic), ethnic identities (indigenous), and political affiliations (Zapatista, government, or independent affiliations). (Ibid., p. 86) It is significant to note that two are politically pro EZLN, and that ISMAM, La Selva, Majomut, and MutVitz ethnically identify themselves as indigenous.

Table 3: Characteristics of Chiapas Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Technological focus</th>
<th>Ethnic identification</th>
<th>Political stance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organic Natural Chemical Transition Indigenous Mixed Mestizo ProEZLN ProPRI Independent/autonomous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISMAM</td>
<td>X - - X - X - + - +</td>
<td>X X X X X X X X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lázaro Cárdenas</td>
<td>- - X - - - - - -</td>
<td>- - - - - - - -</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Selva</td>
<td>X X - X X X - - X</td>
<td>X X X X X X X X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majomut</td>
<td>X X - X X - - X X</td>
<td>X X X X X X X X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MutVitz</td>
<td>- - X X X - - - X</td>
<td>X X X X X X X X</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tzotzilotic</td>
<td>- X X X - - - X</td>
<td>- - X X X X X X</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other orgs</td>
<td>X X X X X - - X</td>
<td>X X X X X X X X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Martinez-Torres, 2006, p. 86
Unión de Ejidos Lázaro Cárdenas was founded in 1979 with the support of the Agrarian Department of the National Confederation of Campesinos (CNC) because of the favoritism toward large producers of the Mexican Coffee Institute (INMECAFE), the main buyer in the region. They became a major coffee exporter, selling to INMECAFE and other marketers, independently. They are comprised 24 ejidos, with 1200 members. Representatives serve without compensation and change every 3 years, with 2 delegates from each ejido attending monthly meetings. With credit from Bancrisa and the Fondo Nacional de Apoyo Empresas de Solidaridad (FONASAES), the co-op pays for labor and fertilizers and repayment is deducted from individual members upon delivery of the harvest. A co-op development program pays ten technicians from its development fund. It offered processing and other services to other coops and businesses. It met with opposition and tension with members and the state authorities due to claims that it did not pay back credits. (Martinez-Torres, pp. 96-98)

Indígenas de la Sierra Madre de Motozintla “San Isidoro Labrador” cooperative (ISMAM) [sic] is from Soconusco and the sierra regions. Founded in 1987, despite the failure of the International Coffee Organization (ICO) and the drop in coffee prices, it owes its success to the Catholic Church, support of the Unión de Comunidades Indígenas de al Region del Istmo (UCIRI), Union of Indigenous Communities, an established union of certified organic coffee producers, and international NGOs. It received a grant from the SOS Werdeldhandel, an importer of the Netherlands. It certified by Naturland. ISMAM helped promote the Organized Communal Labor (TCO), a labor exchange. It is composed of 91 of the 250 original organic producers and reflects democratic principles organized into 6 committees: executive, controller, finance, education, technical
assistance, and special project issues. Its producers are 100 percent organic. Its mission is to export directly and eliminate intermediaries, and it has the most modern coffee mills in Chiapas, bought in 1992 from the government, on credit, as part of the privatization of Instituto Mexicano del Café (INMECAFE). (Martinez-Torres, pp. 101-103)

Profiles of the Chiapas cooperative named in the previous chart include the following information on the organizations:

*La Unión de Sociedades de La Selva* formed by farmers and local priests in the Lacandon jungle of Chiapas, mostly of Tojolabal ethnicity, characterized by their terrace cultivation, and are Fair Trade Certified by FLO in 1988. They employ diversification of crops and organic fertilizers to ensure sustainability and own their own chain of coffee shops. (Internet: *La Selva*) In 1990, with three other cooperatives they formed Coffee Producers’ Union of the Southern Border (UNCAFESUR) owners of a commercial processor and a coffee mill.

*Unión de Ejidos y Communidades Majomut* is comprised of three agrarian communities and two ejidos, have a professional staff and advisors, is certified organic and funded by grants from the Rockefeller and the Inter-American Foundations.

*MutiVitz* (Tzotzil for Bird Mountain) sell through organic and solidarity markets, are Zapatistas and sell through Cloud Forest Initiative, the Human Bean Company and others.

*Sociedad Cooperative Tzotzilotic Tzobolotic* (Mayan Tzotzil People United) sells mainly to the conventional market, has exported to the U.S. and
Germany, advocates alternative technology, is a member of Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafetaleras (National Coordinating Committee for Coffee-Producing Organizations (CNOC), relies on campasinos and technical promoters who live in the community, and functions as the price regulator in the western highlands.  (Martinez-Torres, p. 96-108)

Other Coops of importance are:

*Proish, Chiapas* (MOCPC), certified organic and Fair Trade certified.  
(Sweet Marias, 2008)

*Unión de Productores Maya Vinic* is comprised of 700 families from 36 highland communities, founded in 1999, is run by a general assembly of community delegates, indigenous and certified organic., imports for 23 roasters in Canada and the U.S.  (Internet:  *Just Coffee Coop*)

*Ecological Farmers of the Sierra Madre of Chiapas* (CESMACH) was certified organic in 1994, Fair Trade certified in 2000, promotes projects to rescue native species and agro diversification, and receives financing from Heifer International, Green Mountain and Equal Exchange.  (Internet:  “Ecological Farmers from the Sierra Madre of Chiapas-Part II.”)

None of the benefits of cooperatives can be achieved individually by small farmers.  Because of collective action, Chiapas organic coffee growers enjoy social, environmental, and economic benefits.  Social benefits include improvement in the acquisition of food and household basics, shoes and clothing, housing, credit, health
programs and production infrastructure. Environmental benefits are the elimination of agrochemicals entering watersheds and pathogenic micro-organisms, eliminating pollution from manufacturing and transport of chemicals, conservation of soil, improvement of health of crops, and new strategies for promoting shade coffees. Economic benefits at the farm level include increases in yields and returns, credits and funding, increase in export sales prices, increase in quantity of production and export, insured prices and the ability to become owners of the processing phase of operations. Of greater significance is that cooperatives empowered the small scale growers to enter the mainstream of the international fair trade coffee regime.

_Ecology and Economy as Common Grounds for Civic Participation and Dialogue_

From the elucidation of the networks created within Chiapas society, reinforced by fair trade labeling and the correlation with governmental, nongovernmental, and international entities, the model for fair trade participation is devised similar to Judith Tendler’s model (from Chapter 3) and my model, Figure 1, which eliminates much of state bureaucracy. Its variables consist of socially embedded networks and external producer-consumer linkages with economic interests, ecological concerns, and social equity in creating dialogue. Since the model is tied primarily to economic structures, the passage of new actors from local to global relationships engenders an onset of participatory problems. In Chiapas, sustainability of cultural identity was a factor in collectivity and organization. This was already discussed in terms of traditional identity, solidarity, and proto-nationalism. The new actor relationships in the global fair trade
regime are taking on a new identity, with possible impacts of contriving a new nationalism under fair trade, and making Chiapas an example for strategic development.

Two Chiapas communities, organized as MutVitz and TTT (*Sociedad Cooperativa Tzobolotic*/Mayan Tzotzil People United) cooperatives, have been studied by Tatiana Schreiber in terms of cultural stability and resilience. They reflect a process of change in their identities impacted by their new linkages. Schreiber finds that:

For both groups to retain a sense of cultural integrity and cohesion, they require the withdrawal of military forces from their regions, and the right and ability to establish regional autonomous. Both organizations provide a homeland of sorts, an alternative to the vision of the Mexican state, as each confronts the cultural, political, economic, and ecological aspects of globalization. I suggest that TTT, as a result of the regional based stewardship identity it is cultivating, provides a process for the construction of identity that has the potential to support long-term cultural resilience. (Schreiber, 2005, p. 275-6)

The two groups are comparative in ideals of identity and community in transition, illustrated by their tendency to retain cultural traditions of dress, and traditions of planting and harvesting. In relation to individual identity, it was found that in comparing the communities, very few residents of MutVitz leave the area, including newcomers, despite the devastation of Chiapas rains and plummeting coffee prices in 1998. Citizens born in the community of Tierra Libertad, a remote village in the highlands, held the philosophy that “Where the parents are, that’s where the children should stay.” (Ibid., p. 277), that they know no other places, and that the area is beautiful and sustains agriculture. In
contrast, members of TTT reflect a difference between generations. Many of the older members of TTT, although they had been forced to leave their home communities in search of new opportunities in the jungle, felt a strong attachment to their new region, and a strong desire to stay.” The younger generation, it was found, is eager to travel to learn new skills, find better occupations than available in their community, or earn more. It is estimated that 30,000 people, primarily indigenous campesinos left Chiapas in 2004. (Ibid.) A few return, escaping the pressures and pollution of the cosmopolitan areas. Community attachments in the MutVitz, therefore, are related to community values of family tradition, lack of knowledge about alternative opportunities, and faith in the potential success of the fair trade network. In contrast, Members of TTT, most of whom have migrated at least once, are emotionally and physically attached to the comparatively peaceful and productive location.

Other differences between the two organizations include cultural attitudes concerning alternative trade, clothing and agricultural methods. Some farmers have added diversity in crops to sustain their own needs or adapted other crafts to satisfy foreign and domestic markets; for example, carpentry, or handcrafts, which may detract from the primary production of coffee. Another issue, though it seems less relevant to trade issues, is the subject of traditional dress, which reflects on the collective identity of the groups. Compared to TTT, MutVitz is emotionally biased by their traje, or clothing, to the extent that newcomers to their social groups, such as craft coop or commuters from surrounding towns were treated as outsiders. (Ibid. p. 281): One exception to the tradition is exhibited by the tendency of independent women participating in nontraditional occupations, like the president of the women’s organization, who was
unmarried, also nontraditional for her age; another exception is the departure from the traditional patterns of embroidery by artisans who wanted to learn about the wide range of designs and sewing techniques to reach a wider market, “in the form buyers want.” (Ibid. p. 282) TTT members’ *traje* varied widely:

“In Monte de Colores, for example, almost everyone wore modern clothing, (including what seemed…very ‘dressy’ hand-made dresses which women wore even while taking care of animals, preparing meals, and traversing muddy mountain trails) except the seven Tzotzil families…. Those families wore traditional dress and spoke Tzotzil among themselves, while most community members spoke Spanish. However, in Guadalupe Rio Verde, whose inhabitants are primarily Tzotzil and Tzeltal, most of the women wore traditional blue skirts…and …blouses, but in a range of colors…. Attire among the men of TTT varied widely….a range of hats and footwear in the room—baseball caps and *sombreros*; sandals, sneakers, rubber boots, and leather work boots…. [W]hile this difference may be primarily accounted for by the history of migration of members of TTT…..” (Ibid. p. 282-3)

More significant in understanding participatory variables is the organizations’ wide range of attitudes of traditions in planting and harvesting. Some of the MutVitz communities reflect a change from harvesting fiestas to only religious fiestas, from new generation and alternative religion influences; in some communities, autonomous schools emphasize literacy and bilingualism; women express reluctance to learn Spanish, in order to function in the urban community, where they need to go to health clinics and government offices. Both communities continue a traditional Maya relationship with the land and resources, but tend to reject some practices and beliefs, such as use of alcohol
for rituals, and candle lighting. Both have members with narrow outlooks on marriage, education and traditions of respect for elders among the older generation and tend to pass the knowledge of the attitudes along. MutVitz members retain a Mayan principle of respect toward the spiritual and the Maya “symbol of reciprocity” between “beings,” including owners, and “natural resources.” (Ibid., 287-288) While MutVitz is exhibiting a new moral outlook shaped by Zapatismo, TTT is in greater transition of attitudes with greater abandonment of indigenous languages and customs exhibited by referring to themselves as Ladinos or reinventing themselves as a “dialect.” (Ibid., p. 291) Both organizations exhibit attitudes of commitment to the community and identified themselves as indigenous.

The manner in which these two organizations transition from individual to collective identities transpires from an affinity with the marginalization and struggles of the Zapatistas. MutVitz members consider themselves as part of a collective of indigenous people worldwide. TTT members claim empathy with both their mestizo (originating from speakers of Spanish) identity and struggles of the campesino (farmers): they are “intertwined” geographically, despite language barriers, learning and teaching each other, maintaining their autonomy, supporting and contributing resources to movements of other communities, especially those linked by poverty and using the terms campesino and indigenous interchangeably. Both identify their membership as “indigenous people in resistance” of the state and federal government to pursue a livelihood independently. TTT members see themselves as part of the political demands of the Zapastistas but do not necessarily support their strategy of armed rebellion. TTT is “ecologically-inspired” and founded on “stewardship” (Ibid., p. 307): MutVitz’s stance
against the government aid and directives for using chemicals and pesticides to enhance production is their commitment to organic production. These situation factors constitute building relationships in the process of collective identity construction.

Another term for collective identity construction is “Syncretic identity of resistance,” which Marco Tavanti describes as the construction of organizational identities through dialogue, negotiation and collective reformation of norms and ideas built on a framework of politics and economic issues, cultural framework, and religious framework. (Tavanti, 2003, p. 209-219) Chiapan growers’ practices, by reflection upon the two cooperatives examined above, illustrate an organizational framework beyond the local, and bypassing, for the state in a neo-liberal global direction. Chiapas MutVitz was framed by the Zapatistas and their sympathizers (political framework); their cultural framework is Maya indigenous people who identify with indigenous people worldwide, deserving rights to autonomy and self-determination to earn a living from their land; and a concern for human rights and a resistance to a government that undermines who they are; their religious framework is traditional moral values including respectful relations with one another and the environment; however religious tolerance may not inhibit clashes in political ideology. TTT was framed by a pluralism which has no specific political ideology, ethnic or religious frameworks, but only “broadly” supports Zapatistas struggle for autonomy. TTT supports the struggle for indigenous autonomy as members of a region; equal access to goods and services as Mexican citizens (political framework), and being culturally and religiously pluralistic, reaches beyond the locality. Both cooperatives reflect this translocal nature of many Chiapas organizations and are considered to be “supra-community” organizations which counters problems of cultural
and religious norms and beliefs, language, dress, with a sense of a larger community of people and alternative ideas on which to work collectively, solve problems, and negotiate differences. (Schreiber, 2005, p. 292)

Examples of tensions and problems within and between Chiapas supra-communities have manifest themselves, due to religious ties, fear of exploitation and misjudgment by outsiders. An example of religious/political clashes is exemplified by the differences in these two ideologies: In Flor de Primavera, non-Catholics tend to be affiliated with the Partido de la Revolución Institucional/Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), “the original fundamental left-wing activists who were in severe opposition to the PRI”; while town politicians and TTT members are members of party of the Partido Revolucionario Democrático/Democratic Revolution (PRD), “the disenfranchised PRI leftists who had been indecorously ostracized and denied access to power circles until they were encouraged to depart,” which is vocal in matters of policy. (Luken 2003) Their differences arose because citizens feared that the PRI would control government benefits, instead of using them to benefit both parties. In another case, there was animosity among TTT members and PRIsta, who took control of the operation of a collective store which was designated to be run by the TTT women. Within the TTT, another source of unrest was members who were affiliated with the Partido Alianzo Social/Social Alliance Party (PAS). In 2003, discontent with the new Board of Directors, who serve for three years, arose over concern that they would increase government involvement. (Schreiber, 2005, p. 253-255) Likewise, divisions in communities arise regarding Zapatista sympathies. Another sensitive issue concerning new linkages and associations is that most cooperative organizations there is fear of exploitation by
researchers, scientists, unknown government or corporate representatives or any foreign investigators. (Ibid., p. 257) Finally, there are misconceptions concerning the comprehension of how knowledgeable *mestizo* and *campesino* communities are. Interpreters tended to undermine how well informed the people interviewed were concerning transnational trade agreements such as NAFTA, and had participated in classes and meetings on biodiversity, agro-ecology and agro-methods, and answered questions in terms of their “autonomy” (Ibid., p. 264) These are a few of the problems new actors and negotiations in Chiapas address that prove the adeptness of the communities to interact, and renegotiate, norms and concerns, and extend these new knowledge and skills to participation in international organizations.

*Chiapas’ Economic Strategies*

Chiapas’ role in the emergence of the international organic and fair trade coffee market demonstrates an organizational structure that provides access and price premium benefits to balances some of standard and monitoring costs. The southern agenda and fair trade movement are escalating to options benefiting the producers in terms of economics, programs, sustainability of resources, and gains in productivity and quality. Whether these gains indicate “just compensation” remains a matter of the opinion of the participants. Studies of Chiapas farmers illustrate an ingenious incorporation of indigenous logic “to negotiate their interactions with the encroaching global market on a more even footing and has helped to protect their subsistence agriculture in the process.” (Jaffee, 2007, p. 41) Chiapas’ organizational structure indicates economic advantages.
Chiapas growers have endured periods of vulnerability from inequitable distribution of market power; however, they are realizing access, by collective measures, to fair trade market. The history of critical economic plunges that resulted from control by outsiders—from foreign elite, to monopoly by large plantation owners, to competition from large mechanized estates, to drops in market prices influenced by trade policies of wealthy nations—“wild swings based on supply and demand, the vagaries of the weather, and the whims of traders.” (Ibid.) Specific impacts from ICA quota and pricing agreements resulted in producing countries stockpiling, destroying or selling at extra low prices to non International Coffee Organization (ICO) countries; and upon the failure of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA), the U.S geopolitical “sabotage” of negotiations, in the 1980s, with “free-marketers.” (Ibid., p. 42-43) The Chiapans and other producers experienced decline, after a slight rebound between 1994 and 1997, to an all-time low in 2002. Through fair trade, instead of abandoning their land, migrating, or succumbing to the temptations of sacrificing quality and avoiding labor costs for a quick cash-in through middlemen coyotes who offer more than fair trade guarantees, producers are assured of a price and economic control over more important concepts of capital. Chiapas fair trade certified coffee growers’ norms and practices reflect resilience in an unpredictable and challenging system.

The Chiapas growers’ economic success is measured by their social and natural capital as well as exports and sales. Social capital is the basis on which a community has the power and resources to insure productive activities can be sustained. It includes “the reduction of out-migration, an increase of local control over economic processes, increased incomes, the use of low-external-input technology, improved resource
management diversification, and greater local economic and social linkages.” (Martinez-Torres, p. 71)

Independent of help or initiation by the state or other outside control, organic and fair trade farmers have created social capital by means of cultural identity, their own marketing, and production methods based on family labor and traditional interest in management of natural capital (land, species, and resources on which human survival and well-being depend). It is relevant therefore to note that, in remote Chiapas regions, growers have little cash to invest in chemicals and technology for intensification; therefore these methods are left to large and wealthy growers. Especially where families have the advantage of using their own labor, the advantages of organic farming provides cost-effective but labor-intensive productivity. Most natural production is in transition to organic methods. Comparison of agro-technology on yields of Chiapas is illustrated in Table 4, which shows that the average gross income from coffee per hectare of coffee is not significantly different between organic and chemical production; and the employment of the economic benefits is indicated by the success of the producers in transition to qualify as organic and fair trade.
The implication is that ecological variables (natural, transitional, organic and chemical technologies) are related to economic variables in the Chiapas organic and fair trade regime. Therefore, the employment of organic methods is a strategy for ecological and economic success.

Chiapas organic methods enhance the region’s natural capital through investments in sustaining biodiversity and soil as well as enhancing economic returns. For example, Chiapas avian diversity in traditional shade coffee has been proven to be greater than in natural forests, and mammals susceptible to endangerment are provided good protection and habitat by the arboreal layer provided for the shade coffee. (Wundwerlich, 2002, p. 9) Figure 4 indicates that shade biodiversity impacts yield as well as other diversities which include animal and micro-organisms and “soil biota” which creates soil fertility and typically is enhanced by a greater diversity of types of decomposing leaf litter.
As the number of shade species exceeds five, the yield increases, due to the deposition of leaf litter. Table 4 coordinates with the following index of the average depths of litter and humus resulting from the usual Chiapas agro-methodologies illustrated in Figure 5. Figure 5 illustrates that organic methods produce significantly more leaf litter and humus, impacting soil levels and quality. The economic impact on Chiapas growers is that organic production builds natural capital.
Both certified organic and fair trade coffee movements have controversial economic impacts on Chiapas. In the organic coffee model, producers pay certification and inspection costs; while in fair trade costs are balanced by services, consumer references, credits, and distributions made accessible by the importers and roaster/distributors. In marketing co-ops all producers benefit, regardless of the quality, and premiums are averaged, at times resulting in premiums below market prices, and a portion remains at the organizational level to fund projects and initiatives. In the case of transitional growers, co-ops may offer higher priced incentives for converting to organic production.

A sample of certification costs is shown by Table 5. As the table indicates, certification costs are a small percent of the production costs.
Table 5
Certification costs for Cooperative with membership of 300

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Inspection</th>
<th>Pesos</th>
<th>USD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 day field Inspection</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 day Process Inspection</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 day Report</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 day Travel</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 day Verification of Internal Monitoring</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 day Verification of Storage and Commercialization</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 day Translation</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 day Field Inspection</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Certification Costs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certimex Administration (70 pesos per member)</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Seal (1% of sales)</td>
<td>17,070</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Membership/Naturland (1 euro per member)</td>
<td>4,164</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Per Organization</td>
<td>57,484</td>
<td>$5,015.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Producer</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>16.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per quintal</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CERTIFICATION COSTS AS A PERCENT OF SALES: 3.37%

Source: Ibid., adapted from Table 8: “Annual certification costs for 300-member cooperative with references,” p. 53

In addition to certification, labor costs constitute an economic consideration which producers must consider in their strategy for use of fair trade premiums. The small producer economy is not always determined by market labor costs. A sampling of (Coordinadora Estatal de Productores de Café de Oaxaca) CEPCO’s returns for family labor estimated that certified organic labor received 68 pesos per labor day for an estimated 37 days of labor/hectare and only 28 pesos per labor-day for workers of transitional plots where the market labor costs were 75 pesos. (Calo, ibid., p. 31) In another survey of two families of Oaxaca, in 2005, 60 percent of labors during harvest were hired laborers, cutting returns for owner families. (Ibid.)

Table 6 provides estimates for wages spent for cultivation and harvesting, according to Global Development and Environment Institute (GDAE).
Table 6: Returns to Labor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conventional</th>
<th>Certified Organic</th>
<th>Transitional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net income per quintal (100 lbs) (price minus direct costs)</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor-days per hectare</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net return (Pesos per labor-day)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibid., p. 32

However, after organizational costs, market value for labor, and for certification costs, the returns for CEPCO showed results of 1508 per ha. Cooperative subsidies in 2003-4, for example awarded the difference between the N.Y. stock price and US$0.85 per lb., up to US$0.20 per lb. from *El Fondo de Estabilizacion de Precios* (Price Stabilization Fund). This amounted to US $0.15 per lb. [165 pesos per quintal (100 lbs.).]

Table 7: Returns to Labor, with Subsidies (Pesos)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conventional</th>
<th>Certified Organic</th>
<th>Transitional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net income per quintal (price + cooperative subsidies - direct costs)</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor-days per hectare</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Wages (Pesos per labor-day)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibid., p. 33

During this year, transitional producers’ “break-even period” period for conversion to organic was reduced five years. (Ibid., p. 32-33)
In another model from the same period, CEPCO (Coordinadora Estatal de Productores de Café de Oaxaca) is expanded to compare organic and fair trade returns for one hectare of land in coffee per producer (Table 8).

Table 8: Returns to Producer/Cost-Price Structures (Pesos)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conventional</th>
<th>Certified Organic</th>
<th>Transitional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average yield quintals/ha.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor per day (Oaxaca)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor-days per hectare</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net income per quintal (price - direct costs)</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>1013</td>
<td>1425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational/Certification</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee prices/FOB and US $0.25/lb/organic/prem.</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>1066</td>
<td>778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair Trade prices</td>
<td>1451</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>1451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price to producer</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibid., Table adapted to summarize, p. 49

The study shows that certified organic fair trade prices and prices to producers, though they take more labor days and require slightly higher investment for organization and certification fees, yield as much as the other two agro-technologies produce combined, and are noticeably higher than for conventional and transitional productions.

Chiapas Fair Trade can be seen to enhance the success of Mexico as well as its members by the production statistics in Table 9.
According to Table 9, Chiapas shows a 327% increase in production per hectare. Therefore, it can be deduced that Chiapas production impacted the 290% increase for the nation and that the region is important as a coffee commodity producer.

Figure 6 lists historical events which impacted national and regional production. Comparing the events with Table 9, it can be deduced that, despite the collapse of the ICA in 1989, and the drop in international rank among world producers, Chiapas producers have exhibited a sustainable production capability, almost doubling since the first fair trade certification.

Chiapas producers’ capital remains predictable due to the stabilization of prices and premiums based on the following fair trade policies: Fair Trade keeps the producer premiums at a steady prices; and, organic coffee prices are consistently US $.15/lb above the conventional Fair Trade price of US $1.41/lb. The following exceptions are applied:
• If market price rises above these prices, Fair Trade prices rise only US $.05/lb above the market price.
• If market prices are low, the Fair Trade price may double the cooperative’s return.

(Calo and Wise, 2005, p. 12)

Besides the effects on local and national production, Chiapas methods and trade linkages have resulted in marked differences in their export statistics (Table 10).
Table 10: Total Mexico Exports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Fair Trade Labeled</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3,257,038 bags</td>
<td>(Raynolds, 2000, p. 302-303)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2,507,694 bags</td>
<td>(Reuters, 2007, Oct. 15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>12,456,000 bags</td>
<td>(Reuters, 2008, August 22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>94,500,000 bags</td>
<td>(Ibid.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that exports during the recent years reflects a traditional increase in fair trade coffee volume. The above statistics have not born the effects of inflation and do reflect favorable productions due to the improved methods of cultivation in transitions to organic and the consumer demand for fair trade and organic product. Despite the unpredictability of weather, the practices and methods of Chiapas growers illustrate the potential for a sustainable commodity market.

How Chiapas impacts Mexico's Gross Domestic Product is illustrated by its increasing contributions, reflected in the statistics of Table 11.

Table 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Share of Mexico</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>3.99%</td>
<td>High international prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>8.99%</td>
<td>Increase 5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>Increase 4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
<td>Decline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Raise 1%(Est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td>Raise 2% (Est.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Washbrook, ibid., p. 47-48; Castillo, E. Edwardo, p. 1; and US Department of State Online)

These increases show a slow but steady rebounding after the catastrophic collapse in coffee prices in 1992.
The material benefits to growers that have been given are perceived negatively compared to the monetary compensation in the years of free trade and collapses in the international market. However, the following timeline shows the increase in benefits to Chiapas producers. Table 12 illustrates that producers receive less cash than in the days of free trade before the 1992 collapse in prices. It explains the failure to alter the incidence of poverty. In 2005, the percent of purchase price received by producers was less than half the free market benefit.

| Table 12 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Percent of Purchase Price to Producers: | | | |
| 30% | 16% | 7% | 10-12% |

*Source: Created by author.*

Though proceeds have not caught up to 1989 free trade rates, success is in terms of insured premiums, and capacity to build social and economic impetus for the future. However, monetary economic benefits are not the only indicators of success. Fair trade certified coffee incomes for farmers and producer organizations are reported in Table 13, as global market economic benefits.
Table 13
Additional Income to Farmers and Producer Organizations, including Fair Trade Premium Reported by
TransFair USA in Global markets from 1998-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farmers and Producer Organizations (Included Fair trade premium)</th>
<th>Premiums Paid to Producer Organizations (by TransFair USA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998 $ 44,000</td>
<td>$ 3,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 1,517,000</td>
<td>102,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 3,104,000</td>
<td>212,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 5,669,000</td>
<td>333,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 8,090,000</td>
<td>487,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 15,864,000</td>
<td>951,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 26,212,000</td>
<td>1,648,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 14,189,000</td>
<td>2,229,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 16,971,000</td>
<td>3,238,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 18,721,000</td>
<td>4,941,530</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note that premiums were raised in 2007 due to low market prices as defined in Calo’s exceptions.)

Source: Calo, M. and Wise, T. A., 2005

These increasing totals are not indicators of personal financial benefits, but indicate mobility from the local markets to the international coffee markets, an increasing connection with new markets and new connections with consumers, without contracting by the state.

The economic benefits to producers of fair trade certified coffee should not be analyzed in terms of cash only. In a 2003 survey of housing conditions, almost double the number of fair trade families, in comparison to the general population, enjoyed gas cooking stoves as a supplement to wood burning, television and stereo or CD players, venting of cooking chimneys, toilets, and in some villages, outnumbered families having non-dirt floors, indoor showers, conventional roofing, sufficient number of beds, and the like. (Jaffe, 2007 pp. 114-16) These are some of the personal benefits to indigenous growers. Recent fair trade profiles on cooperative, published by TransFair USA, offer campesino testimonials on how their living conditions have improved as a result of their
organizational benefits. The recent testimonials by coop members indicate their investments are in improving roofs, structures, and housing materials (cement block houses with tin roofs), housing expansions, and more diversified and plentiful food, and small production projects of divesting crops and honey. Most coops boast 100% elementary school education and increased higher education, such as community schools, high school and university education, and provide school supplies. Most coops experience no or fewer migrating family members. Many coops support environmental and resource protection techniques, hire expert training teams to help in transition to all organic production, provide agronomic studies, including native species protection, and prevention of erosion. Cooperative health benefits include education concerning cancer, economic support in medical emergencies. Cooperative organization profiles indicate productive investment such as: the founding of small-scale coffee roasting and milling business that provides coffee to local markets (Majomut); tourist programs, grocery store and coffee shops (Unión de Ejidos San Fernando); construction of a central warehouse for members; purchase of wet-processing, de-pulping machines and vehicles to transport inspectors (POSI and Trinidad); construction of cupping lab, storage shed and meeting hall (CESMACH); purchase of tank and materials to ferment coffee (CIRSA); established the COMPRAS export company; provide training and funding to diversify commodities for local markets (KAFFE). Finally, the cooperative profiles indicate launching women-administrated programs and projects dealing with organic vegetables, flowers, medicinal plants, and support for women producers equality. Fair Trade cooperative members expressed the assurance that they do not need to deal with coyotes, and producers in transition to organic see benefits of higher quality product before receiving capital
benefits. (Ibid., p. 12) All these advantages translate to economic compensation for entrance into the fair trade network.

Concluding remarks about these facts as economic strategies for entering international are in agreement with L. T. Raynolds conclusions that the short term economic benefits seem ineffective for Chiapas farmers, but long term are a foundation for other types of cooperative linkages. (Raynolds, 2002, p. 119) These linkages Chiapas farmers struggling for organizational competence and communication technologies and skills in the international realm find faith that their incomes are saving their farms, sustaining their land and traditions, and improving their living conditions. Their “pre-existing strengths bolster successful participation” through their traditional norms, mission toward sustainable production procedures, maintenance of their autonomy, and developing linkages among their cooperatives and outside sources, NGO's and ATO organizations, are a future solution to marginalization and migrations of small producers globally. (Raynolds, 2004, p. 1118) Though they cannot control economic and market tendencies, Chiapans’ fair trade economic benefits have helped raise the GDP, partly by remaining as a top ten coffee exporter for the nation. Their incomes from coffee premiums help aid their cooperatives during times of failure of the state subsidies and programs; the premiums are insuring some progress in meeting quality requirements; their testimonials state that the premiums received are intended for improving economic assets, their land, office and farming equipment and technology. Their benefits in the long run lie in “the empowerment and capacity building nature of fair trade.” (Raynolds, 2004 p. 119) Their traditional norms and practices besides providing the capacity to supply more than fifty percent of the country's hydro-electric power and other natural
resources (Schulz, 1998, p. 591), have provided a model for networking new actors into the international fair trade regime. The ultimate result of Chiapas organic coffee producers’ values and practices relate to trust and societal wide benefits,” within fair trade, “shorten the social distance between consumers and producers even where the products being exchanged traverse substantial geographic distances.” (Raynolds, 2002, p. 420) Therefore, Chiapas fair trade coffee growers’ identity as a member of fair trade is building capacity for future sustainability and illustrates strategies for new actors in international trade for emerging “from below” into the international regime.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

The people of Chiapas have established a new relationship between the state and indigenous groups, which represents a change from civil society below into the international community. They impacted a strategy for small groups of actors to create linkages without state initiation and implementation. Their strategies are the capability to network through solidarity, which stems from a five hundred year history of resistance to the oppression by the state. Chiapas peasant organizations initiated actions to stifle graft and politicization of ethnic identity which has stirred up a national movement for indigenous rights and autonomy. Chiapas history is characterized by the Spanish taking control of exportable resources and cultural fractures in order to control trade routes between the Lancadón jungle and the Belizean coast, the reestablishment of geographical sectors to benefit the labor force, the migration of indigenous groups into highlands, the replacement of Indians by mulattos and Africans, and the domination by Europeans and mestizos of the plateaus. They were uprooted and destabilized by the colonial invasion and later were reorganized according to their ethnicity. The role of the state and the backfire of its strategies to silence peasant organizations were reviewed by Mattiace, Harvey, and Washbrook. Chiapas’s emergence against the state’s lack of funding by fighting against local caciques and the PRI office’s attempts to control municipal funds created a consciousness among peasant activists. The Chiapas governor tried to utilize the government to silence peasant organizations at the Conference in San Cristobal de Las Casas, in 1963. The conferences were aimed at attracting and binding the church and
state, thereby expanding state governance in Chiapas. The backfire occurred as the Chiapas network of community leaders, peasant academics and other linkages expressed their grievances against state cooptation. Chiapas had used the national project of agrarian reform as the instrument for a state institutional framework for legitimizing the peasant population. Chiapas peasants countered statecraft and agrarian reform, such as corporatism which aimed to keep the peasant population dependent, according to Anthony Marx, with support for EZLN. The Chiapas peasant organizations initiated organizations to stifle graft and politicization of ethnic identity stirred up a national movement for indigenous rights and autonomy. The movement expanded to women’s rights and contributed to maintaining power and transboundary relations like a nation, developing parallel structures to the state, and inspiring a wider range of actors interested protecting autonomy. The struggle of Chiapas peasant autonomy resulted in the Patzcuaro Congress and the Consejos Supremos in 1975, the National Council of Indian Peoples, the Confederacion Nacional Campesina, where as Nash indicates, interests converge in dialogue. Though the San Andreas Accords agreement, inspired by the EZLN formed in Chiapas to recognize indigenous autonomy and self determination, were signed by Mexican government, the meetings were cancelled unilaterally in 2000, because the government failed to implement the necessary constitutional reforms and legislation.

However, Chiapas people have structured the capability to network through organizations, reaching themselves and the international community. They were financially and socially controlled but were able to resist through their underlying, traditional, pre-Colombian ethic of self-sufficiency, the marketability of Mayan crafts and
products, which proved to be economically important to international trade and assisted in preserving their identity. They were able to recapture their religious identity and establish a link between religious festivals and community organization which translated to skills in community leadership and collective enterprise. Chiapas collective action against the state is validated by the theories of Rogers Brubaker as a social movement invoked by “interactive development of the kind of collective self-understanding, solidarity, or groupness,” with the state as the influence of group formation. (Brubaker, 2004, p. 34) Their ability to organize both indigenous and non-indigenous champions and intellectuals has resulted in creating the myth of nationalism, according to Brubaker’s definition. Chiapas’ civic initiatives began at the local level but found the capacity to attain economic standing and secure their cultural autonomy in the face of social and political changes which ravaged them to become one of the poorest states in Mexico. In sum, Brubaker’s claim is that states influence group formation, whether directly or through polarizing forces, strengthening the identity of the opposition.

Chiapas’ organizational practices were affected by a history of destruction of their economic security, subsistence agriculture based on ejido, a collective land-holding system. This economy was threatened by the influx of foreign investment; Mexico’s participation of NAFTA; the terms of the 1917 Article 27, which sustained euro-Mexican elite’s exploitation of ejido lands which were supposed to be inalienable to the indigenous population, according to the Mexican constitution; the revision of Article 27 which allowed corporations and foreign investors to absorb or purchase ejido lands; the influx of migrating Guatemalans and doubling population from the 1970s to 1990s which drove thousands of indigenous people into the hills of Chiapas, during 1994, where they
formed the EZLN, declaring war against the state; while remaining peasants suffered a credit crisis and legal struggle over land tenure. Chiapas small scale farmers depended on credit to aid those without mechanical knowledge or funds for maintaining production. In approximately 30 years, land tenure and the economic foundations of Chiapas’ indigenous societies were swept away. By the 1980s, Chiapas small scale growers united by common economic goals, formed organizations which allowed civil society to overcome divisive state forces. The practices included utilizing existing resources, “land, environment, skills, technology, capital, market access,” and social means, “household members, kinship patrons, and political and/or business organization, religion and other social values,” (Bacon, 2008, p. 72)

Chiapas’ goal was economic standing and cultural autonomy through solidarity; and their strategy was to establish new linkages with distant actors, at first with other indigenismos among the fourteen categories estimated by anthropologists in Chiapas. The ethnic diversity of the region was addressed by bilingual education, sanctioned by the Mexican Constitution in 1991, the abandonment of Marxist focus on the grand schematic rather than on the ethnic identities, the view that autonomy was a survival alternative to state-sanctioned organization, and by new linkages. The pluralism of Chiapas communities resulted from diverse economic, political and cultural interests of development agencies, state interventions, protestant religious perspectives, political parties and women activism. Literary reviews of Brubaker and Mattiace’s historical research confirm that, following the Zapatista conflict, groupness, identity and the nationalism of the Chiapas peasant activists is rooted in historical events, politicization of ethnicity, and conflict initiated by the state or as the response to the conflict. Chiapas’
ethnic plurality is examined in terms of horizontal relationships which provide a realm of sovereignty, divided by socio-cultural boundaries of preconceptions and prejudices were united by poverty to challenge control by indigenous leaders (caciques). Chiapas ethnicity and merger with government ethos in fostering stability and economic growth amounted to the creation of an ethnic regime, similar to that theorized by Anthony Marx, which provided for the indigenous groups to circumvent state authority, when the state failed to support them, and directly link with the international community. Chiapas’ attraction to ethnopolitical entrepreneurs is illustrated by Thomas Oleson, Brubaker, and Rus’s discussions of linkages with Subcomandante Marcos and the transnational identity and understanding which signifies that solidarity is a “social construction” for building foundations for nationalism.

Chiapans emerge by terms of a theory of nationalism or proto-nationalism based on a history of solidarity and struggle for autonomy. Chiapas fair trade coffee growers’ identity as a member of fair trade is building capacity for future sustainability and illustrates strategies for new actors in international trade to emerge “from below” into the international trade regime. The impact of Chiapas on the international fair trade regime is that the international regimes have responded to these practices by implementing ecological and social considerations into trade negotiations and decision-making processes, and by recognition of a growing fair trade market. International organizations have changed to become more open and permissive to dialogue with civil society, NGOs, and other non-state actors. In its engagement, Chiapas illustrate that fair trade is a viable means to socially re-embed international trade relations, attributing new rules, norms, and
procedures to trade regimes. The norms of global consumers, though not universal, are consistent in demanding truth, fairness, quality, and sustainability.

Chiapas civil society has transformed fair trade relations. Their participatory methods for networking and establishing linkages reinforced fair trade norms of social justice, sustainability and ecology. Their organizations have made the international trade regime more susceptible to the demands of alternative trade issues, therefore, creating openness and sensitivity toward the changing needs of consumers and producers. They have provided better links between producers and consumers in international markets resulting in new openness and communication of new ideas. They have impacted international trade regimes causing them to change its rules, norms and procedures regarding the environment, social conditions, and ecological concerns of producers, consumers and traders, as exemplified by the WTO’s openness to considerations of non governmental and other interest groups.

The impact of Chiapas on the international fair trade regime is that the international regimes have responded to these practices. The norms of global consumers, though not universal, are consistent in demanding truth, fairness, quality, and sustainability, however, Chiapas illustrates that fair trade is a viable means to socially re-embed international trade relations, attributing new rules, norms, and procedures to trade regimes. In effect, regimes are subject to transformation in terms of power relations, as new actors have a greater role, and impact the level of openness toward concepts of fairness, social justice, and ecological concerns.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDICES
Map of Chiapas in relation to Mexico
Adapted from: Earle, D. and Simonelli, J., 2005, p. 2
APPENDIX B

Map of principal cities in Chiapas
Adapted from: Earle, D. and Simonelli, J., 2005, p. 3